Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact negotiations

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presumptuous claim to world dominion." Stalin concurred by adding, "If England dominated the world, that was due to the stupidity of the other countries that always let themselves be bluffed". Ribbentrop stated that the Anti-Comintern Pact was directed against not the Soviet Union but the Western democracies, "frightened principally the City of London and the English shopkeepers", and he stated that Berliners had joked that Stalin would yet joint the Anti-Comintern Pact himself. Stalin proposed a toast to Hitler, and Stalin and Molotov repeatedly toasted the German nation, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and Soviet-German relations. Ribbentrop countered with a toast to Stalin and a toast to both countries' relations. As Ribbentrop left, Stalin took him aside and stated that the Soviet government took the new pact very seriously and that he would "guarantee his word of honor that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner."

943: 888:

potential improvements in Soviet-Japanese relations. Molotov stated that "should the German foreign minister come here", those issues "must be discussed in concrete terms". Within hours of receiving word of the meeting, Germany sent a reply stating that it was prepared to conclude a 25-year non-aggression pact, "guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the Soviet Union" and exert influence to improve Soviet-Japanese relations. The Soviets responded positively but stated that a "special protocol" was required, "defining the interests" of the parties. Germany replied that in contrast to the British delegation in Moscow at that time without Strang, Ribbentrop would personally travel to Moscow to conclude a deal.

49: 476:

That same day, Stalin, in a speech to the Eighteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party, characterised the Western nations' actions regarding Hitler as moving away from "collective security" and toward "nonintervention" with the goal being to direct fascist aggression anywhere but against themselves. After the Congress concluded, the Soviet press mounted an attack on both France and Britain. Stalin believed that the British and the French governments were engaging in a conspiracy to direct Germany towards the east and to cause a German-Soviet war. In the aftermath of the Great Terror, the maxim

921:, dated August 19. It provided for the trade of certain German military and civilian equipment in exchange for Soviet raw materials. The agreement covered "current" business, which entailed a Soviet obligation to deliver 180 million Reichsmarks in raw materials in response to German orders, and Germany would allow the Soviets to order 120 million Reichsmarks for German industrial goods. Under the agreement, Germany also granted the Soviet Union a merchandise credit of 200 million Reichsmarks over seven years to buy German manufactured goods at an extremely-favourable interest rate. 1234:, that formed a documentary base for studies of Nazi-Soviet relations. The collection contains the German State Secretary's account on a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Merekalov. The memorandum reproduces the following ambassador's statement: "there exists for Russia no reason why she should not live with us on a normal footing. And from normal the relations might become better and better". According to Carr, that document is the first recorded Soviet step in the rapprochement with Germany. 2339:

with Hitler. In view of Litvinov's Jewish heritage and his militant anti-nazism, that is not an unreasonable supposition. But it is a hypothesis for which there is as yet no evidence. Moreover, we shall see that what evidence there is suggests that Stalin's decision was determined by a quite different set of circumstances and calculations", Geoffrey Roberts. The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 639-657 Stable URL:

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negotiators confidential British information. The British contingent stated that Britain currently had only six army divisions but in the event of a war they use employ 16 divisions initially, followed by a second contingent of 16 divisions, far less than the 120 Soviet divisions. French negotiators stated that they had 110 divisions available. In discussions on August 18–19, the Poles informed the French ambassador that they would not approve Red Army troops operating in Poland.

816:

to German officials that the Soviets had begun their British negotiations "without much enthusiasm" when they felt Germany would not "come to an understanding", and the parallel talks with the British could not be simply broken off when they had been initiated after "mature consideration". On August 12, Germany received word that Molotov wished to further discuss these issues, including Poland, in Moscow.

661:, the German ambassador in Moscow that he no longer wanted to discuss only economic matters, and that it was necessary to establish a "political basis", which German officials saw an "implicit invitation." Due to information provided by Scheliha, the Soviets knew that Germany did not want a diplomatic solution to the Danzig crisis and had decided to invade Poland in the summer of 1939. 35: 490:, had been working as a Soviet spy since 1937 and kept the Kremlin well informed about the state of German-Polish relations, and it was intelligence provided by him that let the Soviets know that Hitler was seriously considering invading Poland from March 1939 onward and gave the orders for an invasion of Poland in May. On 13 March 1939, Scheliha reported to 772:

political negotiations could begin: a new economic treaty and the cessation of anti-Soviet attacks by German media, and German officials immediately agreed with them. On August 2, Soviet political discussions with France and Britain were suspended when Molotov stated they could not be restarted until progress was made in the scheduled military talks.

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dinner, the Soviets accepted a proposed three-stage agenda, which included first the economic agenda and "a new arrangement which took account of the vital political interests of both parties." On July 28, Molotov sent a first political instruction to the Soviet ambassador in Berlin that finally opened the door to a political détente with Germany.

812:

and foodstuffs by huge margins. Every internal German military and economic study had argued that Germany was doomed to defeat without at least Soviet neutrality. On August 5, Soviet officials stated that the completion of the trading credit agreement was the most important stage that could be taken in the direction of further such talks.

665:

undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union." The ensuing discussions were channelled through the economic negotiation because the economic needs of both sides were substantial and because close military and diplomatic connections had been severed in the mid-1930s, which left those talks as the only means of communication.

556:'s attempts to have the Soviets join the anti-German "peace front". The Foreign Office's diplomatic telegrams were selectively edited to make it sound like that Anglo-Soviet relations were far better than they actually were and that the talks were going much better than they really were. The German ambassador to Britain, 864:: "Staggering. Chamberlain is still up to his tricks. He does not need a tripartite pact, he needs negotiations on a pact, in order to sell more dearly this card to Hitler". The Anglo-French mission arrived in Leningrad on 10 August and in Moscow via train on 11 August. On August 14, the question of Poland was raised by 1250:

and he came to the conclusion that the German archival documents cannot serve as evidence for the existence of a dual policy during first half of 1939. According to him, no documentary evidence exists that the Soviets responded to or made any overtures to the Germans "until the end of July 1939 at the earliest".

2326:, page 330. Litvniov "was referred to by the German radio as 'Litvinov-Finkelstein'-- was dropped in favor of Vyascheslav Molotov. 'The emininent Jew', as Churchill put it, 'the target of German antagonism was flung aside… like a broken tool… The Jew Litvinov was gone and Hitler's dominant prejudice placated.'" 2425:

out of the fire for them". That was intended to warn the Western powers that they could not necessarily rely upon the support of the Soviet Union. As Flewers put it, "Stalin was publicly making the none-too-subtle implication that some form of deal between the Soviet Union and Germany could not be ruled out".

2161:

In Jonathan Haslam's view, it should not be overlooked that Stalin's adherence to the collective security line was purely conditional. Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War. by R. Raack; The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and

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in the summer of 1941. Most historians agreed that the geopolitical differences between the Soviet Union and the Axis made war inevitable and that Stalin had made extensive preparations for war and exploited the military conflict in Europe to his advantage. A number of German historians have debunked

933:

That same day, August 21, Stalin has received assurance would approve secret protocols to the proposed non-aggression pact that would grant the Soviets land in Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Romania. That night, with Germany nervously awaiting a response to Hitler's August 19 telegram, Stalin

811:

In August, as Germany scheduled its invasion of Poland on August 25 and prepared for war with France, German war planners estimated that with an expected British naval blockade, if the Soviet Union became hostile, Germany would fall short of its war mobilization requirements of oil, manganese, rubber

789:

and stated "there is one common element in the ideology of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies", "neither we nor Italy have anything in common with the capitalist west" and "it seems to us rather unnatural that a socialist state would stand on the side of the

664:

On May 26, German officials feared a potential positive result to come from the Soviets talks regarding proposals by Britain and France. On May 30, fearing potential positive results from a British and French offer to the Soviets, Germany directed its diplomats in Moscow that "we have now decided to

581:

In mid-March 1939, the Soviet Union, Britain and France traded a flurry of suggestions and counterplans regarding a potential political and military agreement. The Soviet Union feared the West and the possibility of a "capitalist encirclements", had little faith either that war could be avoided or in

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Carr, however, has argued that the Soviet Union's replacement of Litvinov with Molotov on May 3, 1939 indicated not an irrevocable shift towards alignment with Germany but rather Stalin's way of engaging in hard bargaining with the British and the French by appointing a tough negotiator, Molotov, to

1236:

The next documentary evidence is the memorandum on the May 17 meeting between the Soviet ambassador and the German Foreign Office official, and the ambassador "stated in detail that there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and Soviet Russia and that therefore there was no reason for

1172:

argued that it was necessary to join a non-aggression pact to buy tim since the Soviet Union was not in a position to fight a war in 1939 and needed at least three years to prepare. He stated: "In return for non-intervention Stalin secured a breathing space of immunity from German attack." According

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There is no consensus among historians regarding the reasons that prompted the Soviet Union to sign the pact with Germany. According to Ericson, the opinions "have ranged from seeing the Soviets as far-sighted anti-Nazis, to seeing them as reluctant appeasers, as cautious expansionists, or as active

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was signed with provisions that included consultation, arbitration if either party disagreed, neutrality if either went to war against a third power and no membership of a group "which is directly or indirectly aimed at the other." Most notably, there was also a secret protocol to the pact according

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and presented him a note requesting speedy removal of any obstacles for fulfillment of military contracts signed between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union before the former was occupied by Germany. According to German accounts, at the end of the discussion, the ambassador stated, "there exists for

3995:

The choice of Molotov reflected not only the appointment of a nationalist and one of Stalin's leading lieutenants, a Russian who was not a Jew and who could negotiate with Nazi Germany, but also someone unencumbered with the baggage of collective security who could obtain the best deal with Britain

1245:

The last document is the German State Office memorandum on the telephone call made on June 17 by Bulgarian Ambassador Purvan Draganov. In German accounts of Draganov's report, Astakhov explained that a Soviet deal with Germany better suited the Soviets than one with Britain and France, but from the

1184:

The extent to which the Soviet Union's territorial acquisitions may have contributed to preventing its fall and thus a German victory in the war remains a factor in evaluating the pact. Soviet sources point out that the German advance eventually stopped just a few kilometres away from Moscow and so

1003:

Ribbentrop and Stalin enjoyed warm conversations at the signing, exchanged toasts and further discussed the prior hostilities between the countries in the 1930s. Ribbentrop stated that Britain had always attempted to disrupt Soviet–German relations, was "weak" and "wants to let others fight for her

815:

By August 10, the countries worked out the last minor technical details to make their economic arrangement all but final, but the Soviets delayed signing that agreement for almost ten days until they were sure that they had reached a political agreement with Germany. The Soviet ambassador explained

767:

On July 18, the Soviet trade representative Yevgeniy Barbarin visited Julius Schnurre and said that the Soviets would like to extend and intensify German-Soviet relations. On July 25, the Soviet Union and Germany were very close to finalising the terms of a proposed economic deal. On July 26, over

2424:

to the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 10, 1939, discounted any idea of German designs on the Soviet Union. Stalin had intended: "To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts

2338:

In an introduction to a 1992 paper, Geoffrey Roberts wrote, "Perhaps the only thing that can be salvaged from the wreckage of the orthodox interpretation of Litvinov's dismissal is some notion that, by appointing Molotov foreign minister, Stalin was preparing for the contingency of a possible deal

1249:

The documentary evidence of an early Nazi-Soviet rapprochement was questioned by Geoffrey Roberts, who analyzed Soviet archival documents that had been declassified and released on the eve of the 1990s. Roberts found no evidence that the alleged statements quoted by the Germans had ever been made,

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on June 22, 1941. After the launch of the invasion, the territories gained by the Soviet Union by the pact were lost in a matter of weeks. Within three weeks, the Soviets, attempting to defend against large German advances, had suffered 750,000 casualties, and lost 10,000 tanks and 4,000 aircraft.

1020:

The day after the Pact was signed, the French and British military negotiation delegation urgently requested a meeting with Voroshilov. On August 25, Voroshilov told them, "In view of the changed political situation, no useful purpose can be served in continuing the conversation". That day, Hitler

3897:

God krizisa: 1938-1939 : dokumenty i materialy v dvukh tomakh.By A. P. Bondarenko, Soviet Union Ministerstvo inostrannykh del. Contributor A. P. Bondarenko. Published by Izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1990. Item notes: t. 2. Item notes: v.2. Original from the University of Michigan. Digitized Nov 10,

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stated that "the claim that the Soviet Union was at the time threatened by Hitler, as Stalin supposed,... is a legend, to whose creators Stalin himself belonged". In Maser's view, "neither Germany nor Japan were in a situation invading the USSR even with the least perspective of success", which

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Germany and the Soviet Union discussed an economic deal throughout early 1939. For months, Germany had secretly hinted to Soviet diplomats that it could offer better terms for a political agreement than could Britain and France. On March 10, Hitler in his official speech proclaimed that directly.

929:

After the Poles' resistance to pressure, Voroshilov proposed on August 21 the adjournment of the military talks with the British and French by using the excuse that the absence of the senior Soviet personnel at the talks interfered with the autumn manoeuvres of the Soviet forces, but the primary

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and "entirely different matters", Germany took that as a signal that there was still time and hope to reach a Soviet-German deal. Hitler himself sent out a coded telegram to Stalin to state that because "Poland has become intolerable", Stalin must receive Ribbentrop in Moscow by August 23 at the

692:

On June 2, the Soviet Union insisted that any mutual assistance pact should be accompanied by a military agreement describing in detail the military assistance that the Soviets, the French and the British would provide. The same day, the Soviet Union also submitted a modification to a French and

626:

The dismissal also signaled to France and Britain the existence of a potential negotiation option with Germany. One British official wrote that Litvinov's disappearance also meant the loss of an admirable technician or shock-absorber, and Molotov's "modus operandi" was "more truly Bolshevik than

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Derek Watson argued that Molotov could get the best deal with Britain and France because he was not encumbered with the baggage of collective security and could more easily negotiate with Germany. Geoffrey Roberts argued that Litvinov's dismissal helped the Soviets with British-French talks,

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of the mid-1930s seriously undermined Soviet prestige in the West. The Soviet purges in 1937 and 1938 made a deal less likely by disrupting the already-confused Soviet administrative structure that was necessary for negotiations and gave Hitler the belief that the Soviets were militarily weak.

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By replacing Litvinov with Molotov, Stalin significantly increased his freedom of maneuver in foreign policy. Litvinov's dismissal served as a warning to London and Paris that Moscow had another option: rapprochement with Germany. After Litvinov's dismissal, the pace of Soviet-German contacts

891:

In the Soviet-British-French talks, the Anglo-Franco military negotiators were sent to discuss "general principles", rather than details. On August 15, the British contingent was instructed to move more quickly to bring the military talks to a conclusion and thus were permitted to give Soviet

887:

Meanwhile, Molotov spoke with Germany's ambassador in Moscow on August 15 about the possibility of "settling by negotiation all outstanding problems of Soviet–German relations". The discussions included the possibility of a Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the fates of the Baltic states and

279:

Despite the political rhetoric, the Soviets in 1936, attempted to seek closer political ties to Germany along with an additional credit agreement, but Hitler rebuffed the advances and did not want to seek closer political ties even though a 1936 raw material crisis prompted Hitler to decree a

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quickened. But that did not mean that Moscow had abandoned the search for collective security, now exemplified by the Soviet draft triple alliance. Meanwhile, Molotov's appointment served as an additional signal to Berlin that Moscow was open to offers. The signal worked, the warning did not.

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Germany had learned about the military convention talks before the July 31 British announcement and was skeptical that the Soviets would reach a deal with Britain and France during those planned talks in August. On August 1, the Soviet ambassador stated that two conditions must be met before

656:

In May, German war planners also became increasingly concerned that without Soviet supplies, Germany would need to find massive substitute quantities of 165,000 tons of manganese and almost 2 million tons of oil per year. In the context of further economic discussions, on May 17, the Soviet

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Britain and France believed that war could still be avoided and that the Soviet Union, weakened by Great Purge, could not serve as a main military participant. France, as a continental power, was more anxious for an agreement with the Soviets than was Britain, which was more willing to make

551:

Immediately, the Soviet ambassador had been withdrawn to Moscow and never returned to Germany. According to Ulam, future conversations on the topic in Berlin were believed to continue with lower-level officials working under the cover of a Soviet trade mission. Starting on 14 April 1939 and

400:

After the German need for military supplies after the Munich Agreement and the Soviet demand for military machinery increased, talks between both countries occurred from late 1938 to March 1939. The Soviet Third Five-Year Plan would require massive new infusions of technology and industrial

506:, had meanwhile reported to Moscow that the German attempt to convert the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance had failed, as Germany wanted the alliance to be directed against Britain as well, but Japan wanted it to only be directed against the Soviet Union. On 5 April 1939, Baron 678:

The Soviets sent mixed signals thereafter. In his first main speech as Soviet Foreign Minister on May 31, Molotov criticized an Anglo-French proposal, stated that the Soviets did not "consider it necessary to renounce business relations with countries like Germany" and proposed to enter a

1153:

had suffered 4.3 million casualties, and the Germans had captured three million Soviet prisoners-of-war, two million of whom would die in German captivity by February 1942. German forces had advanced 1,050 mi (1,690 km) and maintained a linearly-measured front of 1,900 mi

430:

in war equipment, and Germany relied on Soviet supplies or transit by using Soviet railways. Finally, Germany also imported 40% of its fat and oil food requirements, which would grow if Germany conquered nations that were also net food importers. Germany thus needed Soviet imports of

1025:

and changed the strategic situation from that in World War I and that Britain should accept his demands regarding Poland. Surprising Hitler, Britain signed a mutual-assistance treaty with Poland that day, which caused Hitler to delay the planned August 26 invasion of western Poland.

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ambassador told a German official that he wanted to restate "in detail that there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and Soviet Russia and that therefore there was no reason for any enmity between the two countries". Three days later, on May 20, Molotov told Count

1173:

to Carr, the "bastion" created by means of the Pact, "was and could only be, a line of defense against potential German attack". An important advantage, projected by Carr, was that "if Soviet Russia had eventually to fight Hitler, the Western Powers would already be involved".

683:

argued on June 2 to a German official that Moscow "had lost all interest in these negotiations' as a result of earlier German procrastination". By June 1939, information sold by Scheliha let the Soviets know that Germany was committed to an invasion of Poland later that year.

568:

had no agent with access to the Foreign Office's codes, the intercepted cables were not the work of German intelligence. In fact, the cables that sent to the German embassy in London were the work of the NKVD, which had broken the British codes and was seeking to pressure the

622:

with France and Britain, and pro-Western orientation by the standards of the Kremlin made his dismissal indicate the existence of a Soviet option of rapprochement with Germany. Likewise, Molotov's appointment served as a signal to Germany that the USSR was open to offers.

758:

and the Baltic states or push those countries to seek closer relations with Germany, but France was less resistant to the supplement. On July 23, France and Britain agreed with the Soviet proposal to draw up a military convention specifying a reaction to a German attack.

218:

In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union made repeated efforts to re-establish closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets sought chiefly to repay debts from earlier trade with raw materials, and Germany sought to rearm, and both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. The

4017:

the foreign policy factor in Litvinov's downfall was the desire of Stalin and Molotov to take charge of foreign relations in order to pursue their policy of a triple alliance with Britain and France - a policy whose utility Litvinov doubted and may even have opposed or

538:

On April 7, a Soviet diplomat visited the German Foreign Ministry stating that there was no point in continuing the German-Soviet ideological struggle and that the countries could conduct a concerted policy. Ten days later, Soviet Ambassador Alexei Merekalov met

177:

that are needed for economic and military operations. Since the late 19th century, it had relied heavily upon Russian imports of raw materials. Germany had imported 1.5 billion Rechsmarks of raw materials and other goods annually from Russia before the war.

829:. That undermined the Soviets' confidence in British resolve. In a show of Allied solidarity, the French military mission led by General Joseph Doumenc, was to travel with the British delegation, and there were a number of protests from French Ambassador 824:

The Soviets, British and French began military negotiations in August. They were delayed until August 12 because the British military delegation, which did not include Strang, took six days to make the trip since it travelled in a slow merchant ship,

275:

to the east. In 1934, Hitler spoke of an inescapable battle against "pan-Slav ideals", the victory in which would lead to "permanent mastery of the world", but he stated that they would "walk part of the road with the Russians, if that will help us".

1189:

between the Soviets and the Germans and that the pact was a precondition not only for the Germans' invasion of Western Europe but also their invasion of the Soviet Union. The military aspect of moving from established fortified positions on the

548:

Russia no reason why she should not live with us on a normal footing. And from normal the relations might become better and better", but other sources admit that it could be an exaggeration or an inaccurate recounting of the ambassador's words.

784:

told Soviet diplomats that "there was no problem between the Baltic and the Black Sea that could not be solved between the two of us". The Germans discussed prior hostility between the nations in the 1930s. They addressed the common ground of

750:, on July 8, the British and French submitted a proposed agreement to which Molotov added a supplementary letter. Talks in late July stalled over a provision in Molotov's supplementary letter stating that a political turn to Germany by the 900:

After Soviet and German officials in Moscow first finalised the terms of a seven-year German-Soviet Commercial Agreement, German officials became nervous that the Soviets were delaying its signing on August 19 for political reasons. When

1243:. According to the document, Molotov told the German ambassador that he no longer wanted to discuss only economic matters and that it was necessary to establish a "political basis", which German officials saw as an "implicit invitation". 94:

regarding a potential "Tripartite" alliance. Long-running talks between the Soviet Union and Germany over a potential economic pact expanded to include the military and political discussions, culminating in the pact, along with a

709:

On June 8, the Soviets had agreed that a high-ranking German official could come to Moscow to continue the economic negotiations, which occurred in Moscow on July 3. Thereafter, official talks were started in Berlin on July 22.

647:

told the Soviet Ambassador to France, Jakob Suritz, that Bonnet was willing to support turning over all of eastern Poland to the Soviet Union, regardless of Polish opposition, if that was the price of an alliance with Moscow.

884:. The British and the French contingent communicated the Soviets' concern over Poland to their home offices and told the Soviet delegation that they could not answer that political matter without their governments' approval. 534:

would not engage in talks for a diplomatic solution to the Danzig issue, which indicated that German policy towards Poland was not a policy with a high risk of war, but it was a policy aimed at causing a war.

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pact, and co-ordination of Soviet and German forces in Poland followed. Eleven days later, the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was modified to allot Germany a larger part of Poland and cede most of

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in exchange for Germany ending its armaments program. The British press broke a story on the talks, and Germany eventually rejected the offer. As the Soviets were reading the British diplomatic codes in 1939, the

693:

British proposal, which specified the states that would be given aid in the event of "direct aggression"; they included Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Finland. Five days later,

83:. The treaty renounced warfare between the two countries. In addition to stipulations of non-aggression, the treaty included a secret protocol dividing several eastern European countries between the parties. 405:

economic approach or an alliance with Britain were impossible for Germany and so closer relations with the Soviet Union were necessary if only for economic reasons. Germany could then supply only 25% of its

189:. Imports of Soviet goods to Germany fell after World War I, but after trade agreements signed between the two countries in the mid-1920s, trade had increased to 433 million Reichsmarks per year by 1927. 1258:

Many historians note that the dismissal of Foreign Minister Litvinov, whose Jewish ethnicity was viewed unfavourably by Nazi Germany, removed a major obstacle to negotiations between it and the Soviets.

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for the first time by requesting British and French pressure on the Poles to agree to allow the Soviet Army transit rights in Poland. The Polish government feared that the Soviet government sought to

494:

that he had a conversation with one of Ribbentrop's aides, Peter Kleist, who told him Germany would probably attack Poland sometime that year. In his reports to Moscow, Scheliha made it clear that the

1007:

The news of the pact was met with utter shock and surprise by government leaders and media worldwide, most being aware only of the British–French–Soviet negotiations that had taken place for months.

1194:

into undefended Polish territory could also be seen as one of the causes of rapid disintegration of Soviet armed forces in the border area during the German 1941 campaign, as the newly-constructed

439:

soybeans. Moreover, an anticipated British blockade in the event of war and the end of petroleum from the United States would create massive shortages for Germany in a number of key raw materials

4866: 480:("sniff out, suck up, survive") dominated the Soviet regime, and the NKVD tended to provide Stalin with intelligence that fit his preconceptions, which thus reinforced what he already believed. 849:

instead of taking the first flight to Moscow, but Drax claimed that he and the other members of the mission needed a ship because of all the excess baggage that they were bringing with them.

170:, those countries also became independent. However, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk lasted only eight-and-a-half months, when Germany renounced it and broke off diplomatic relations with Russia. 643:

Although informal consultations started in late April, the main negotiations between the Soviet Union, Britain and France began in May. At a meeting in May 1939, the French Foreign Minister

934:

replied at 9:35 p.m. that the Soviets were willing to sign the pact and that he would receive Ribbentrop on August 23. The Pact was signed sometime in the night between August 23–24.

725:, an economist of the Four-Year Plan Organisation who was in London as part of the German delegation to the International Whaling Conference for an economic agreement. Acting on his own, 4876: 1121:

by providing for millions of tons of shipment to Germany of oil, foodstuffs and other key raw materials in exchange for German war machines and other equipment. That was followed by a

590:

outlined a French–British–Soviet mutual assistance pact between the three powers for five to ten years, including military support, if any of the powers was the subject of aggression.

312:

informers, rendered most Soviet espionage in Germany ineffective. Stalin's decision to execute or imprison most of the German Communist emigres living in the Soviet Union during the

196:

regime asserted power and the abandonment of post-war military control decreased Germany's reliance on Soviet imports and so Soviet imports fell to 223 million Reichsmarks in 1934.

173:

Before World War I, Germany and Russia had long shared a trading relationship. Germany. a relatively small country with few natural resources, lacks natural supplies of several key

4685: 4736: 4581: 300:, which allowed the Soviets to read British diplomatic traffic. However, the Soviet code-breakers were completely unable to break the German codes that were encrypted by the 4767: 4637: 4590: 635:, the French ambassador in Moscow, reported to Bonnet that Molotov wanted a full military alliance as "the new commissar now intends to obtain more extensive advantages". 4700: 1122: 4856: 526:). as the Danzig issue was just a pretext for war, and he was afraid if talks began, the Poles might actually agree to Danzig rejoining Germany, which would deprive the 4654: 450:

made the famous "guarantee" of Poland that Britain would go to war in the defense of Polish independence but its integrity. On 28 April 1939, Hitler in a speech to the

914:

asserting that a great war between the Western powers was necessary for the spread of world revolution. Historians debate whether that speech ever actually occurred.

4871: 4695: 1185:

the role of the extra territory might have been crucial in such a close call. Others postulate that Poland and the Baltic countries played the important role of

1118: 1100: 918: 96: 4621: 911: 607:, which significantly increased Stalin's freedom to manoeuvre in foreign policy. The dismissal of Litvinov, whose Jewish ethnicity was viewed disfavourably by 1246:

Bulgarian ambassador, it "could not be ascertained whether it had reflected the personal opinions of Herr Astakhov or the opinions of the Soviet Government".

976:

Poland was to be partitioned in the event of its "political rearrangement". The Soviets promised the eastern part of Poland that was primarily populated with

209: 4819: 1279: 552:

continuing right up to August 1939, the German embassy in London received anonymous copies of British diplomatic cables to and from Moscow, which detailed

185:, renouncing territorial and financial claims against each other. Both countries pledged neutrality in the event of an attack against each other with the 4690: 1528: 1114: 4881: 942: 4574: 694: 368: 213: 125: 347:, but it contained a secret agreement that either side would remain neutral if the other became involved with the Soviet Union. In November 1937, 4659: 698: 241:. The Nazis were convinced that ethnic Slavs were incapable of forming their own state and accordingly had to be ruled by others. Moreover, the 455: 4851: 4470: 4452: 4342: 4282: 4264: 4246: 4227: 4187: 4151: 4089: 4062: 3769: 3736: 3484: 3416: 2683: 1904: 159: 4891: 1240: 902: 658: 2497:, pages 261-280 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 edited by Robert Boyce, London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 1998 page 264 2429: 717:, the British government's Chief Industrial Adviser and one of Chamberlain's closest friends, conducted talks in London with Ambassador 390: 4567: 3671:

E. H. Carr., From Munich to Moscow. I., Soviet Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Jun., 1949), pp. 3–17. Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

1108: 4749: 4551: 4044: 1202: 726: 1878:"Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War 1917–1991" by Robert C. Grogin 2001, Lexington Books page 28 586:

concessions and more aware of the dangers of an agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany. On April 17, Soviet Foreign Minister

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approached Wohlthat and Dirksen regarding a potential plan to bail out the debt-ridden German economy at the cost of 1 billion

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western democracies". They explained that their prior hostility toward Soviet Bolshevism had subsided with the changes in the

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with Germany, which created suspicions that Germany had ambitions in a region through which it could attack the Soviet Union.

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would be too provocative to Germany during the Danzig crisis. Maisky reported to Moscow about the decision to use

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during the winter of 1938-1939, but the Poles had refused to play that role. The chief Soviet spy in Japan,

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argued that the replacement of Litvinov by Molotov was both a warning to Britain and a signal to Germany.

781: 289: 80: 54: 881: 458:. Britain and France had made statements guaranteeing the sovereignty of Poland and on April 25 signed a 4799: 1227: 515: 1523: 1211: 746:

After weeks of political talks that began after the arrival of Central Department Foreign Office head

304:. The fact that Soviet intelligence-gathering activities in Germany were performed by the underground 4783: 1312: 1145: 1080: 1021:

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II 1676:, Alfred A. Knopf, 2000, 1040:Soviet invasion of Poland 1036:Invasion of Poland (1939) 1010: 956:On August 24, a ten-year 18:Tripartite military talks 4887:Treaties of Nazi Germany 4842:1939 in the Soviet Union 4670:Gestapo–NKVD conferences 4353:Diplomacy and Statecraft 4124:, Taylor & Francis, 4057:, Boydell & Brewer, 3646:Edward E. Ericson, III. 3455:Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline, 1533:, Berghahn Books, 2002, 1181:Stalin must have known. 1105:German–Soviet Axis talks 448:British House of Commons 231:, which were considered 118:Treaty of Rapallo (1922) 4892:Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact 4862:Romania in World War II 4763:Northern Sea Route Raid 4643:Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact 4216:Montefiore, Simon Sebac 4098:Erickson, John (2001), 1656:Robert Melvin Spector. 1531:: A Critical Assessment 1482:Weimar and Nazi Germany 1149:Within six months, the 1056:. On September 17, the 961:to which the states of 952:Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact 478:ugadat, ugodit, utselet 393:. That was part of the 345:Communist International 160:signing of an armistice 152:Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 122:Treaty of Berlin (1926) 114:Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 65:Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact 4524:Wegner, Bernd (1997), 4447:, Simon and Schuster, 4409:The Historical Journal 4308:10.1080/09668130098253 4196:Maser, Werner (1994). 4178:Herf, Jeffrey (2006), 4160:Hehn, Paul N. (2005), 2367:, Anthem Press, 2005, 1501:Bendersky, Joseph W., 1435:Bendersky, Joseph W., 947: 782:Joachim von Ribbentrop 577:Tripartite talks begin 290:Ernest Holloway Oldham 81:Joachim von Ribbentrop 55:Joachim von Ribbentrop 4800:Falsifiers of History 4638:Relations before 1941 2384:Gorodetsky, Gabriel, 1550:Rauschning, Hermann, 1522:Müller, Rolf-Dieter, 1228:U.S. State Department 1068:to the Soviet Union. 945: 516:Hans-Adolf von Moltke 359:Further information: 261:were being ruled by " 204:Further information: 187:1926 Treaty of Berlin 112:Further information: 4784:Operation Barbarossa 4660:Population transfers 4519:. London: Parthenon. 4075:. Ivan Dee: Chicago. 3965:Europe-Asia Studies, 3475:Senn, Alfred Erich, 3407:. London, New York: 2909:, Macmillan, 2002, 2290:Osborn, Patrick R., 1860:on September 8, 2007 1146:Operation Barbarossa 971:spheres of influence 541:Ernst von Weizsäcker 508:Ernst von Weizsäcker 329:Spanish Nationalists 308:, which was full of 239:Nazi racial ideology 4605:Anti-Comintern Pact 4481:Europe-Asia Studies 4296:Europe-Asia Studies 3987:Europe-Asia Studies 2905:Vehviläinen, Olli, 2388:, Routledge, 1994, 2318:, NYU Press, 1988, 1484:, Heinemann, 1996, 1170:Edward Hallett Carr 958:non-aggression pact 874:Eastern Borderlands 719:Herbert von Dirksen 620:collective security 558:Herbert von Dirksen 520:Free City of Danzig 484:Rudolf von Scheliha 444:Neville Chamberlain 341:Anti-Comintern Pact 206:Anti-Comintern Pact 4717:Invasion of Poland 4686:Economic relations 4528:, Berghahn Books, 4200:. München: Olzog. 3934:Geoffrey Roberts. 2432:2006-02-23 at the 2246:, pp. 109–110 2137:, pp. 197–198 1994:, pp. 705–706 1643:Gerhard Weinberg: 1524:Gerd R. Ueberschär 1216:Christian Hartmann 1212:Rolf-Dieter Müller 1208:Andreas Hillgruber 948: 880:, which ended the 866:Kliment Voroshilov 862:The City of Exeter 847:The City of Exeter 835:The City of Exeter 827:The City of Exeter 802:Final negotiations 605:Vyacheslav Molotov 599:Litvinov dismissal 249:and international 77:Vyacheslav Molotov 41:Vyacheslav Molotov 4829: 4828: 4617:Spanish Civil War 4611:Jewish Bolshevism 4493:10.1080/713663077 4472:978-0-8070-7005-5 4454:978-0-671-72868-7 4344:978-0-300-11204-7 4331:Roberts, Geoffrey 4284:978-0-87249-992-8 4266:978-0-231-10676-4 4248:978-0-300-11981-7 4229:978-0-7538-1766-7 4189:978-0-674-02175-4 4153:978-0-15-602754-0 4091:978-0-275-96337-8 4064:978-1-58046-137-5 3821:Geoffrey Roberts. 3771:978-1-84545-501-9 3738:978-0-19-870170-5 3561:Brackman, Roman, 3495:Wettig, Gerhard, 3485:978-90-420-2225-6 3457:Stalin's Cold War 3434:Wettig, Gerhard, 3418:978-0-415-33873-8 2896:, pp. 589–90 2845:, pp. 509–10 2684:978-0-333-30050-3 2087:, pp. 171–72 1905:978-0-19-518261-3 1154:(3,058 km). 882:Polish–Soviet War 391:German annexation 333:Spanish Civil War 294:John Herbert King 183:Treaty of Rapallo 108:After World War I 16:(Redirected from 4899: 4598:Prior antagonism 4584: 4577: 4570: 4561: 4556: 4538: 4520: 4511: 4475: 4465:, Beacon Press, 4457: 4439: 4403: 4375: 4347: 4326: 4287: 4269: 4251: 4233: 4211: 4192: 4174: 4156: 4145: 4134: 4123: 4112: 4094: 4076: 4067: 4049: 4021: 4005: 3999: 3983: 3977: 3958: 3952: 3945: 3939: 3932: 3926: 3925:, pp. 57–78 3920: 3914: 3895: 3889: 3888:, pp. 112–3 3883: 3877: 3872: 3863: 3858: 3852: 3845: 3839: 3832: 3826: 3819: 3813: 3805: 3799: 3798: 3790: 3784: 3783: 3757: 3751: 3750: 3724: 3718: 3712: 3706: 3700: 3694: 3687: 3681: 3678: 3672: 3669: 3663: 3657: 3651: 3644: 3638: 3631: 3625: 3624:, pp. 116–7 3619: 3613: 3607: 3598: 3592: 3586: 3580: 3574: 3559: 3553: 3547: 3541: 3526: 3520: 3519:, pp. 150–3 3514: 3508: 3493: 3487: 3473: 3467: 3453: 3447: 3432: 3423: 3422: 3397: 3391: 3385: 3376: 3375:, pp. 541–2 3370: 3361: 3355: 3344: 3336: 3323: 3317: 3302: 3296: 3290: 3284: 3278: 3272: 3263: 3257: 3251: 3245: 3239: 3233: 3224: 3218: 3207: 3201: 3190: 3189:, pp. 24–28 3184: 3175: 3174:, pp. 526–7 3169: 3163: 3157: 3148: 3142: 3136: 3130: 3124: 3123:, pp. 523–4 3118: 3109: 3103: 3092: 3089: 3083: 3077: 3068: 3067:, pp. 533–4 3062: 3051: 3045: 3039: 3033: 3024: 3018: 3009: 3003: 2997: 2991: 2985: 2984:, p. 539-30 2979: 2973: 2967: 2956: 2950: 2939: 2930:, Rodopi, 2004, 2924: 2918: 2903: 2897: 2891: 2882: 2876: 2870: 2864: 2858: 2852: 2846: 2840: 2834: 2828: 2822: 2821:, pp. 54–55 2816: 2803: 2797: 2791: 2776: 2770: 2764: 2758: 2752: 2746: 2740: 2734: 2728: 2722: 2716: 2710: 2704: 2698: 2692: 2686: 2664: 2658: 2652: 2646: 2640: 2634: 2628: 2613: 2607: 2601: 2595: 2589: 2583: 2577: 2571: 2556: 2550: 2544: 2538: 2529: 2523: 2510: 2504: 2498: 2491: 2485: 2479: 2473: 2467: 2461: 2455: 2449: 2448:, pp. 33–56 2443: 2437: 2418: 2412: 2406: 2397: 2382: 2376: 2361: 2355: 2349: 2343: 2336: 2327: 2312: 2303: 2288: 2279: 2278:, pp. 97–98 2273: 2262: 2261:, pp. 480–1 2256: 2247: 2241: 2232: 2217: 2208: 2202: 2196: 2190: 2184: 2169: 2163: 2159: 2153: 2147: 2138: 2132: 2126: 2120: 2107: 2101: 2088: 2082: 2076: 2070: 2061: 2060: 2053: 2047: 2042: 2031: 2030:, pp. 108–9 2025: 2019: 2013: 2007: 2001: 1995: 1989: 1983: 1977: 1971: 1965: 1959: 1953: 1947: 1941: 1932: 1929: 1920: 1914: 1908: 1885: 1879: 1876: 1870: 1869: 1867: 1865: 1856:. 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An 383:Czechoslovakia 356: 353: 327:supported the 302:Enigma machine 286:Foreign Office 282:Four-Year Plan 201: 198: 156:Eastern Europe 140:Central Powers 109: 106: 104: 101: 88:United Kingdom 53: 46: 45: 39: 32: 31: 30: 29: 28: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 4904: 4893: 4890: 4888: 4885: 4883: 4880: 4878: 4875: 4873: 4870: 4868: 4865: 4863: 4860: 4858: 4855: 4853: 4850: 4848: 4845: 4843: 4840: 4839: 4837: 4822: 4821: 4817: 4816: 4813: 4807: 4804: 4802: 4801: 4797: 4795: 4792: 4790: 4789:Eastern Front 4787: 4785: 4782: 4781: 4779: 4775: 4769: 4766: 4764: 4762: 4758: 4756: 4753: 4751: 4748: 4746: 4745: 4740: 4738: 4735: 4733: 4730: 4728: 4725: 4723: 4720: 4718: 4715: 4714: 4712: 4708: 4702: 4699: 4697: 4694: 4692: 4689: 4687: 4684: 4683: 4681: 4677: 4671: 4668: 4666: 4663: 4661: 4658: 4656: 4653: 4649: 4646: 4645: 4644: 4641: 4639: 4636: 4635: 4633: 4629: 4623: 4620: 4618: 4615: 4612: 4608: 4606: 4603: 4602: 4600: 4596: 4592: 4585: 4580: 4578: 4573: 4571: 4566: 4565: 4562: 4555: 4549: 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3382: 3378: 3374: 3369: 3367: 3363: 3360:, p. 539 3359: 3354: 3352: 3350: 3346: 3342: 3341: 3335: 3333: 3331: 3329: 3325: 3322:, p. 540 3321: 3316: 3314: 3312: 3310: 3308: 3304: 3301:, p. 528 3300: 3295: 3292: 3288: 3283: 3280: 3277:, p. 715 3276: 3271: 3269: 3265: 3261: 3256: 3253: 3250:, p. 227 3249: 3244: 3241: 3237: 3232: 3230: 3226: 3223:, p. 668 3222: 3217: 3215: 3213: 3209: 3205: 3200: 3198: 3196: 3192: 3188: 3183: 3181: 3177: 3173: 3168: 3165: 3162:, p. 525 3161: 3156: 3154: 3150: 3147:, p. 536 3146: 3141: 3138: 3134: 3129: 3126: 3122: 3117: 3115: 3111: 3108:, p. 521 3107: 3102: 3100: 3098: 3094: 3088: 3085: 3082:, p. 535 3081: 3076: 3074: 3070: 3066: 3061: 3059: 3057: 3053: 3049: 3044: 3041: 3037: 3032: 3030: 3026: 3022: 3017: 3015: 3011: 3008:, p. 713 3007: 3002: 2999: 2996:, p. 513 2995: 2990: 2987: 2983: 2982:Erickson 2001 2978: 2975: 2971: 2966: 2964: 2962: 2958: 2955:, p. 115 2954: 2949: 2947: 2945: 2941: 2937: 2936:90-420-0890-3 2933: 2929: 2923: 2920: 2916: 2915:0-333-80149-0 2912: 2908: 2902: 2899: 2895: 2890: 2888: 2884: 2881:, p. 504 2880: 2875: 2872: 2869:, p. 503 2868: 2863: 2860: 2856: 2851: 2848: 2844: 2839: 2836: 2833:, p. 588 2832: 2827: 2824: 2820: 2815: 2813: 2811: 2809: 2805: 2802:, p. 447 2801: 2796: 2793: 2789: 2788:0-521-53120-9 2785: 2781: 2778:Hiden, John, 2775: 2772: 2769:, p. 708 2768: 2763: 2760: 2757:, p. 186 2756: 2751: 2748: 2745:, p. 752 2744: 2743:Weinberg 2010 2739: 2736: 2733:, p. 218 2732: 2727: 2724: 2720: 2715: 2712: 2709:, p. 114 2708: 2703: 2700: 2696: 2691: 2688: 2685: 2681: 2677: 2676:0-333-30050-5 2673: 2669: 2663: 2660: 2656: 2651: 2648: 2645:, p. 704 2644: 2639: 2636: 2633:, p. 502 2632: 2627: 2625: 2623: 2621: 2619: 2615: 2612:, p. 746 2611: 2610:Weinberg 2010 2606: 2603: 2600:, p. 703 2599: 2594: 2591: 2588:, p. 179 2587: 2582: 2579: 2575: 2570: 2568: 2566: 2564: 2562: 2558: 2555:, p. 726 2554: 2553:Weinberg 2010 2549: 2546: 2543:, p. 111 2542: 2537: 2535: 2531: 2527: 2522: 2520: 2518: 2516: 2512: 2508: 2503: 2500: 2496: 2490: 2487: 2483: 2478: 2475: 2471: 2466: 2463: 2460:, p. 699 2459: 2454: 2451: 2447: 2442: 2439: 2435: 2431: 2428: 2423: 2417: 2414: 2410: 2405: 2403: 2399: 2395: 2394:0-7146-4506-0 2391: 2387: 2381: 2378: 2374: 2373:1-84331-034-1 2370: 2366: 2360: 2357: 2353: 2348: 2345: 2342: 2335: 2333: 2329: 2325: 2324:0-8147-5051-6 2321: 2317: 2314:Levin, Nora, 2311: 2309: 2305: 2301: 2300:0-313-31368-7 2297: 2293: 2287: 2285: 2281: 2277: 2272: 2270: 2268: 2264: 2260: 2255: 2253: 2249: 2245: 2240: 2238: 2234: 2230: 2229:0-271-02297-3 2226: 2222: 2216: 2214: 2210: 2206: 2201: 2198: 2195:, p. 696 2194: 2189: 2186: 2182: 2181:0-394-57916-X 2178: 2174: 2168: 2165: 2158: 2155: 2152:, p. 695 2151: 2146: 2144: 2140: 2136: 2131: 2128: 2125:, p. 197 2124: 2119: 2117: 2115: 2113: 2109: 2106:, p. 508 2105: 2100: 2098: 2096: 2094: 2090: 2086: 2081: 2078: 2074: 2069: 2067: 2063: 2058: 2052: 2049: 2046: 2041: 2039: 2037: 2033: 2029: 2024: 2021: 2018:, p. 713 2017: 2016:Weinberg 2010 2012: 2009: 2006:, p. 712 2005: 2004:Weinberg 2010 2000: 1997: 1993: 1992:Weinberg 2010 1988: 1985: 1982:, p. 705 1981: 1980:Weinberg 2010 1976: 1973: 1970:, p. 691 1969: 1968:Weinberg 2010 1964: 1961: 1958:, p. 192 1957: 1952: 1949: 1946:, p. 195 1945: 1940: 1938: 1934: 1928: 1926: 1922: 1919:, p. 107 1918: 1913: 1910: 1906: 1902: 1898: 1897:0-19-518261-8 1894: 1890: 1884: 1881: 1875: 1872: 1859: 1855: 1849: 1846: 1842: 1837: 1835: 1833: 1831: 1829: 1825: 1821: 1816: 1813: 1810:, p. 698 1809: 1804: 1802: 1800: 1798: 1796: 1792: 1789: 1788:0-7864-2066-9 1785: 1781: 1776: 1773: 1769: 1764: 1762: 1760: 1756: 1752: 1747: 1744: 1740: 1735: 1732: 1728: 1727:0-393-32252-1 1724: 1720: 1714: 1711: 1708: 1707: 1701: 1698: 1694: 1689: 1686: 1683: 1682:0-375-40881-9 1679: 1675: 1671: 1670:Piers Brendon 1666: 1663: 1659: 1653: 1650: 1646: 1640: 1637: 1633: 1632:1-84176-899-5 1629: 1625: 1619: 1616: 1613:, p. 189 1612: 1607: 1604: 1601:, p. 190 1600: 1595: 1593: 1589: 1585: 1580: 1577: 1573: 1568: 1565: 1562:, pages 136-7 1561: 1560:1-4286-0034-5 1557: 1553: 1547: 1544: 1540: 1539:1-57181-293-8 1536: 1532: 1530: 1525: 1519: 1516: 1512: 1511:0-8304-1567-X 1508: 1504: 1498: 1495: 1491: 1490:0-435-30920-X 1487: 1483: 1477: 1474: 1470: 1469:0-674-02213-0 1466: 1462: 1456: 1454: 1450: 1446: 1445:0-8304-1567-X 1442: 1438: 1432: 1429: 1425: 1420: 1418: 1414: 1410: 1405: 1402: 1399:, p. 212 1398: 1393: 1390: 1386: 1381: 1379: 1375: 1371: 1366: 1363: 1359: 1354: 1352: 1350: 1348: 1346: 1344: 1342: 1340: 1336: 1332: 1327: 1325: 1323: 1319: 1316: 1315: 1309: 1306: 1302: 1299: 1294: 1291: 1285: 1281: 1278: 1277: 1273: 1271: 1267: 1265: 1251: 1247: 1242: 1233: 1229: 1226:In 1948, the 1221: 1219: 1217: 1213: 1209: 1204: 1199: 1197: 1193: 1188: 1187:buffer states 1182: 1179: 1174: 1171: 1162: 1157: 1155: 1152: 1147: 1139: 1137: 1135: 1131: 1126: 1124: 1120: 1116: 1110: 1106: 1102: 1094: 1092: 1090: 1086: 1082: 1078: 1077:interim peace 1074: 1069: 1067: 1062: 1059: 1055: 1051: 1045: 1041: 1037: 1029: 1027: 1024: 1023:two-front war 1015: 1008: 1005: 1001: 999: 995: 991: 987: 983: 979: 974: 972: 968: 964: 959: 953: 944: 937: 935: 931: 924: 922: 920: 915: 913: 908: 904: 895: 893: 889: 885: 883: 879: 875: 871: 867: 863: 859: 855: 850: 848: 844: 843:Reginald Drax 840: 836: 832: 828: 819: 817: 813: 806: 801: 799: 797: 793: 788: 783: 775: 773: 769: 762: 760: 757: 753: 752:Baltic states 749: 741: 739: 737: 732: 728: 727:Robert Hudson 724: 720: 716: 715:Horace Wilson 711: 704: 702: 700: 696: 687: 685: 682: 674:Mixed signals 673: 668: 666: 662: 660: 651: 649: 646: 638: 636: 634: 633:Émile Naggiar 630: 624: 621: 617: 612: 610: 606: 598: 593: 591: 589: 583: 576: 574: 572: 567: 563: 559: 555: 549: 546: 542: 536: 533: 529: 525: 521: 517: 513: 509: 505: 504:Richard Sorge 501: 497: 493: 489: 485: 481: 479: 470: 466:Initial talks 465: 463: 461: 457: 453: 449: 445: 440: 438: 434: 429: 425: 421: 417: 413: 412:United States 409: 404: 398: 396: 392: 388: 384: 379: 376: 375:Moscow Trials 370: 366: 362: 354: 352: 350: 346: 342: 338: 334: 330: 326: 325:Fascist Italy 321: 319: 315: 311: 307: 303: 299: 295: 291: 287: 283: 277: 274: 270: 269: 264: 260: 259:untermenschen 256: 252: 248: 244: 240: 236: 235: 234:untermenschen 230: 226: 222: 221:rise to power 215: 211: 207: 199: 197: 195: 190: 188: 184: 179: 176: 175:raw materials 171: 169: 165: 161: 157: 153: 149: 145: 141: 137: 136:Soviet Russia 133: 127: 123: 119: 115: 107: 102: 100: 98: 93: 89: 84: 82: 78: 74: 70: 66: 56: 50: 42: 36: 27: 19: 4818: 4798: 4760: 4743: 4648:negotiations 4647: 4543: 4525: 4516: 4484: 4480: 4462: 4444: 4412: 4408: 4387:(2): 57–78, 4384: 4380: 4356: 4352: 4334: 4302:(1): 33–56, 4299: 4295: 4274: 4256: 4238: 4219: 4197: 4179: 4161: 4141: 4119: 4099: 4081: 4072: 4054: 4035: 4016: 4008: 4003: 3994: 3986: 3981: 3972: 3964: 3961:Albert Resis 3956: 3948: 3943: 3935: 3930: 3923:Roberts 1992 3918: 3893: 3881: 3856: 3848: 3847:E. H. Carr. 3843: 3834: 3830: 3822: 3817: 3807: 3803: 3794: 3788: 3761: 3755: 3728: 3722: 3710: 3698: 3690: 3689:Max Beloff. 3685: 3676: 3667: 3655: 3647: 3642: 3634: 3629: 3622:Roberts 2006 3617: 3612:, p. 85 3610:Roberts 2006 3597:, p. 82 3595:Roberts 2006 3590: 3585:, p. 59 3583:Roberts 2006 3578: 3562: 3557: 3552:, p. 58 3550:Roberts 2006 3545: 3529: 3524: 3517:Ericson 1999 3512: 3496: 3491: 3476: 3471: 3456: 3451: 3435: 3404: 3395: 3339: 3294: 3289:, p. 23 3282: 3262:, p. 61 3260:Ericson 1999 3255: 3243: 3238:, p. 99 3206:, p. 57 3204:Ericson 1999 3167: 3140: 3135:, p. 22 3128: 3087: 3043: 3001: 2989: 2977: 2972:, p. 56 2970:Ericson 1999 2927: 2922: 2906: 2901: 2874: 2862: 2857:, p. 64 2855:Roberts 1992 2850: 2838: 2826: 2819:Ericson 1999 2795: 2779: 2774: 2762: 2750: 2738: 2726: 2714: 2702: 2697:, p. 47 2695:Ericson 1999 2690: 2667: 2662: 2655:Roberts 1995 2650: 2638: 2605: 2593: 2581: 2576:, p. 46 2574:Ericson 1999 2548: 2528:, p. 45 2526:Ericson 1999 2509:, p. 44 2507:Ericson 1999 2502: 2494: 2489: 2477: 2465: 2453: 2441: 2416: 2411:, p. 51 2385: 2380: 2364: 2359: 2354:, p. 35 2347: 2315: 2291: 2220: 2207:, p. 47 2200: 2188: 2172: 2167: 2157: 2130: 2080: 2075:, p. 43 2073:Ericson 1999 2051: 2023: 2011: 1999: 1987: 1975: 1963: 1951: 1912: 1888: 1883: 1874: 1862:. Retrieved 1858:the original 1848: 1843:, p. 30 1841:Roberts 2006 1820:Ericson 1999 1815: 1775: 1768:Ericson 1999 1746: 1739:Ericson 1999 1734: 1729:, page 157-8 1718: 1713: 1705: 1700: 1693:Ericson 1999 1688: 1673: 1665: 1657: 1652: 1644: 1639: 1623: 1618: 1606: 1579: 1574:, p. 37 1567: 1551: 1546: 1527: 1518: 1502: 1497: 1481: 1476: 1460: 1436: 1431: 1424:Ericson 1999 1409:Ericson 1999 1404: 1392: 1385:Ericson 1999 1372:, p. 15 1365: 1358:Ericson 1999 1331:Ericson 1999 1313: 1308: 1300: 1293: 1268: 1264:Albert Resis 1257: 1248: 1232:Nazi Germany 1225: 1200: 1196:Molotov Line 1183: 1178:Werner Maser 1175: 1166: 1143: 1127: 1112: 1070: 1054:World War II 1047: 1019: 1006: 1002: 975: 955: 932: 928: 916: 899: 890: 886: 861: 851: 846: 834: 826: 823: 814: 810: 779: 770: 766: 745: 712: 708: 691: 677: 663: 655: 642: 625: 616:anti-fascist 613: 609:Nazi Germany 602: 584: 580: 570: 565: 550: 544: 537: 531: 527: 511: 495: 482: 477: 474: 451: 441: 399: 397:of Germany. 380: 372: 322: 317: 278: 266: 258: 243:anti-semitic 232: 217: 191: 180: 172: 142:, including 129: 85: 73:Nazi Germany 69:Soviet Union 62: 26: 4018:obstructed. 3373:Shirer 1990 3358:Shirer 1990 3320:Shirer 1990 3299:Shirer 1990 3287:Murphy 2006 3275:Watson 2000 3236:Wegner 1997 3221:Shirer 1990 3187:Murphy 2006 3172:Shirer 1990 3160:Shirer 1990 3145:Shirer 1990 3133:Murphy 2006 3121:Shirer 1990 3106:Shirer 1990 3080:Shirer 1990 3065:Shirer 1990 3048:Carley 1999 3036:Carley 1999 3021:Carley 1999 3006:Watson 2000 2994:Shirer 1990 2879:Shirer 1990 2867:Shirer 1990 2800:Shirer 1990 2767:Watson 2000 2666:J. Haslam, 2643:Watson 2000 2631:Shirer 1990 2598:Watson 2000 2482:Carley 1999 2458:Watson 2000 2259:Shirer 1990 2193:Watson 2000 2171:D.C. Watt, 2150:Watson 2000 1864:February 7, 1808:Watson 2000 1201:Historians 1192:Stalin Line 1134:Axis powers 982:Belarusians 839:Ivan Maisky 594:May changes 395:appeasement 365:Great Purge 314:Great Purge 148:World War I 4836:Categories 4806:Baltic Way 4755:Basis Nord 4732:Winter War 4665:Axis talks 4027:References 3747:1005849626 3715:Maser 1994 3703:Maser 1994 3573:, page 341 2446:Resis 2000 2409:Resis 2000 2375:, page 283 2352:Resis 2000 2302:, page xix 2205:Resis 2000 1634:, page 5-6 1541:, page 244 1513:, page 159 1447:, page 177 1044:Winter War 998:Bessarabia 978:Ukrainians 858:Baltic Sea 437:Manchurian 355:Late 1930s 268:Lebensraum 251:capitalism 225:Nazi Party 130:After the 103:Background 4777:Aftermath 4631:Political 4509:144385167 4437:154228049 4324:153557275 4218:(2005) . 3780:836636715 3507:, page 21 3446:, page 20 3409:Routledge 2917:, page 30 2894:Fest 2002 2843:Ulam 1989 2831:Fest 2002 2790:, page 46 2731:Hehn 2005 2719:Watt 1989 2396:, page 55 2276:Herf 2006 2231:, page 10 2104:Ulam 1989 1751:Hehn 2005 1660:, pg. 257 1572:Hehn 2005 1492:, page 33 1471:, page 15 1397:Hehn 2005 1370:Hehn 2005 1140:Aftermath 1081:Lithuania 1066:Lithuania 854:Leningrad 792:Comintern 452:Reichstag 433:Ukrainian 408:petroleum 247:communism 200:Mid-1930s 194:Stalinist 4820:Category 4710:Military 4679:Economic 4333:(2006), 3403:(2005). 2938:page 131 2472:, p. 312 2430:Archived 1907:, p. 109 1274:See also 1058:Red Army 1052:started 963:Northern 907:Far East 403:autarkic 4429:2639445 2422:address 1132:of the 1085:Estonia 994:Finland 990:Estonia 756:Finland 736:Kremlin 695:Estonia 446:in the 420:Romania 331:in the 310:Gestapo 223:of the 168:Ukraine 164:Belarus 144:Germany 4744:Lützow 4550: 4532: 4507: 4501:153322 4499: 4469: 4451: 4435: 4427: 4401:152247 4399: 4373:153322 4371: 4341: 4322: 4316:153750 4314: 4281: 4263: 4245: 4226: 4204: 4186: 4168: 4150: 4142:Hitler 4128: 4106: 4088: 4061: 4043: 3947:Carr, 3910: 3902: 3898:2006. 3778: 3768: 3745: 3735: 3569: 3536: 3503: 3483: 3463: 3442: 3415: 2934: 2913: 2786: 2682: 2674: 2392: 2371: 2322: 2298: 2227: 2179: 1903: 1895: 1786: 1725: 1680: 1630: 1558: 1537: 1509: 1488: 1467: 1443: 1214:, and 1107:, and 1089:Latvia 1042:, and 986:Latvia 731:pounds 566:Abwehr 562:Berlin 554:London 524:Gdańsk 492:Moscow 488:Warsaw 424:rubber 416:Russia 385:. The 367:, and 273:Aryans 212:, and 124:, and 92:France 4761:Komet 4505:S2CID 4497:JSTOR 4433:S2CID 4425:JSTOR 4397:JSTOR 4369:JSTOR 4320:S2CID 4312:JSTOR 1286:Notes 870:annex 571:Reich 528:Reich 522:(now 428:steel 349:Italy 318:Reich 229:Slavs 146:, in 4548:ISBN 4530:ISBN 4467:ISBN 4449:ISBN 4339:ISBN 4279:ISBN 4261:ISBN 4243:ISBN 4224:ISBN 4202:ISBN 4184:ISBN 4166:ISBN 4148:ISBN 4126:ISBN 4104:ISBN 4086:ISBN 4059:ISBN 4041:ISBN 3908:ISBN 3900:ISBN 3776:OCLC 3766:ISBN 3743:OCLC 3733:ISBN 3567:ISBN 3534:ISBN 3501:ISBN 3481:ISBN 3461:ISBN 3440:ISBN 3413:ISBN 2932:ISBN 2911:ISBN 2784:ISBN 2680:ISBN 2672:ISBN 2436:1995 2390:ISBN 2369:ISBN 2320:ISBN 2296:ISBN 2225:ISBN 2177:ISBN 1901:ISBN 1893:ISBN 1866:2009 1784:ISBN 1723:ISBN 1678:ISBN 1628:ISBN 1556:ISBN 1535:ISBN 1507:ISBN 1486:ISBN 1465:ISBN 1441:ISBN 1087:and 992:and 980:and 965:and 903:Tass 721:and 697:and 418:and 373:The 298:NKVD 292:and 166:and 90:and 71:and 63:The 4489:doi 4417:doi 4389:doi 4361:doi 4304:doi 4015:. 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Knowledge (XXG)

Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact negotiations

Index