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to whether the classified summary is the same, I couldn’t possibly comment, but again, draw your own conclusion.)" Grayson cited as a specific example the intercept of a phone call between the Syrian 155th
Brigade and the Syrian ministry of defence, the transcript of which was not available to members of Congress, leaving him unable to judge whether a report in
199:
160:
also criticised the US report, including the classified one, which he described as 12 pages long. Grayson said the unclassified summary relied on "intercepted telephone calls, 'social media' postings and the like, but not one of these is actually quoted or attached — not even clips from YouTube. (As
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The report dismissed the possibility that evidence supporting the U.S. government's conclusion could have been manufactured by the opposition, stating it "does not have the capability" to fabricate videos, eyewitness accounts, and other information. The report also said that the U.S. believed Syrian
127:
that 3,600 patients with symptoms consistent with chemical weapons had been admitted to three hospitals in
Damascus that morning, and 100 videos "attributed to the attack". The videos were analysed and the report said that " many ... show large numbers of bodies exhibiting physical signs consistent
64:
that outlined the evidence against Syria that included "a few key caveats — including acknowledging that the U.S. intelligence community no longer has the certainty it did six months ago of where the regime's chemical weapons are stored, nor does it have proof Assad ordered chemical weapons use."
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with, but not unique to, nerve agent exposure. The reported symptoms of victims included unconsciousness, foaming from the nose and mouth, constricted pupils, rapid heartbeat, and difficulty breathing. Several of the videos show what appear to be numerous fatalities with no visible injuries..."
135:
The intelligence assessment on the attacks suggested a motive for the attack, saying that it "was a desperate effort to push back rebels from several areas in the capital’s densely packed eastern suburbs – and also suggests that the high civilian death toll surprised and panicked senior Syrian
122:
Evidence cited for this included satellite imagery, which the report said "corroborate that attacks from a regime-controlled area struck neighborhoods where the chemical attacks reportedly occurred... This includes the detection of rocket launches from regime controlled territory early in the
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in a statement on 1 September, "I have just attended a classified
Congressional briefing on Syria that quite frankly raised more questions than it answered. I found the evidence presented by Administration officials to be circumstantial." Republican Representative
32:. The report declared that "the United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013. We further assess that the regime used a nerve agent in the attack."
52:
that the description as a "Government" rather than an "Intelligence" assessment "means that this is not an intelligence community document"; another said that the White House had apparently "decided on a position and cherry-picked the intelligence to fit it".
176:, said he believed the administration's case would ultimately convince Congress to support strikes on Syria. Some legislators who supported military action said the administration would have to do a better job of persuading Congress, with Senator
210:, President Obama admitted on 9 September in a television interview, "I wouldn't say I'm confident" in being able to convince Congress to support strikes against Syria. The bill was put on hold when the US and Russian governments reached
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190:'s Washington Bureau reported on September 2 that the "Obama administration’s public case for attacking Syria is riddled with inconsistencies and hinges mainly on circumstantial evidence."
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official and a chemical weapons unit commander in which the former demanded answers for the attacks. According to some reports, this phone intercept was provided to the U.S. by
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morning, approximately 90 minutes before the first report of a chemical attack appeared in social media." Public evidence cited included social media reports and reports from
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report on intelligence community skepticism about the quality of evidence said, based on comments from "two intelligence officials and two other U.S. officials."
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on August 21, 2013. The 4-page summary document and map was publicly released on August 30. A 12-page classified summary was made available for members of
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The map of "Areas of
Influence" and "Areas Reportedly affected by the 21 August Chemical Attack" that was published by the White House on 30 August 2013.
211:
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and labelled an "Intelligence
Assessment." This report was described as a "Government Assessment" and the unclassified version was released by the
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A major element of the evidence, as reported by news media prior to the report's publication, was an intercepted telephone call between a
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41:
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Authorization for the Use of
Military Force Against the Government of Syria to Respond to Use of Chemical Weapons (S.J.Res 21)
202:, which was proposed on 6 September. The bill proved difficult to pass, and while it was not put to a vote of either the
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U.S. Government
Assessment of the Syrian Government's Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013
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that the implications of the call had been misrepresented in the report were accurate or not.
273:"Government Assessment of the Syrian Government's Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013"
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A number of members of
Congress expressed skepticism about the assessment, including Senator
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The report blamed the chemical attacks on the Syrian government, saying rockets containing a
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The
Government Assessment, in its classified version, became the primary basis for the
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Harkin on
Classified Syria Briefing: 'Frankly Raised More Questions Than It Answered'
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published on 16 September, following site visits to attacked locations in Damascus.
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urged the U.S. to declassify satellite and phone intercepts supporting its case.
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saying Obama had to "up his game" to win support from other members of Congress.
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358:"Exclusive: Intercepted Calls Prove Syrian Army Used Nerve Gas, U.S. Spies Say"
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Israeli intelligence 'intercepted Syrian regime talk about chemical attack'
313:"/CORRECTED REPEAT/Obama's Case for Syria Didn't Reflect Intel Consensus"
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said, "I saw the classified documents yesterday. They were pretty thin."
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officials directed the attacks, based on "intercepted communications".
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Texas Republican: Evidence that Assad used chemical weapons is 'thin'
400:"More than 1,400 killed in Syrian chemical weapons attack, U.S. says"
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officials, who called off the attack and then tried to cover it up."
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539:"To some, US case for Syrian gas attack, strike has too many holes"
564:"Obama on the fence about Syria strike without Congress' approval"
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were fired from government-held territory into neighborhoods of
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Intelligence reports are normally released by the Office of the
486:"Obama Told to 'Up His Game' to Persuade Congress on Syria"
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on 14 September. It was also to some extent superseded by
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Some lawmakers praised the White House report. Senator
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in the early morning, impacting at least 12 locations.
344:"AP sources: Intelligence on weapons no 'slam dunk'"
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describes an unreleased report by the Office of the
212:an agreement to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons
342:Dozier, Kimberly; Apuzzo, Matt (30 August 2013).
537:Allam, Hannah; Seibel, Mark (2 September 2013).
488:. Businessweek. 3 September 2013. Archived from
156:On 6 September Democratic Party Representative
337:
335:
8:
612:American involvement in the Syrian civil war
513:"Fine Print: Time to show and tell on Syria"
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597:Chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war
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48:. One former intelligence official told
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464:"Robert Menendez: Syria action needed"
285:from the original on 27 February 2021
7:
511:Pincus, Walter (2 September 2013).
14:
62:Director of National Intelligence
42:Director of National Intelligence
248:On Syria Vote, Trust, but Verify
398:Joby Warrick (31 August 2013).
20:was a report published by the
1:
56:A 29 August article from the
566:. NBC News. 9 September 2013
466:. Politico. 3 September 2013
174:Foreign Relations Committee
46:White House Press Secretary
633:
216:UN report into the attacks
79:Israeli Intelligence Corps
75:Syrian Ministry of Defence
602:2013 in the United States
204:House of Representatives
22:United States Government
125:Doctors without Borders
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26:Ghouta chemical attack
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492:on September 6, 2013
450:, 2 September 2013,
426:, 1 September 2013,
311:(9 September 2013).
246:, 6 September 2013,
429:The Weekly Standard
404:The Washington Post
346:. Associated Press.
318:Inter Press Service
50:Inter Press Service
592:Government reports
385:, 28 August 2013,
281:. 30 August 2013.
243:The New York Times
172:, chairman of the
151:Michael C. Burgess
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295:National Archives
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494:. Retrieved
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293:– via
287:. Retrieved
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238:Alan Grayson
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158:Alan Grayson
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409:4 September
109:nerve agent
36:Preparation
586:Categories
222:References
146:Tom Harkin
289:30 August
188:McClatchy
140:Responses
82:Unit 8200
447:the Hill
283:Archived
117:Damascus
30:Congress
548:6 March
522:6 March
324:5 March
206:or the
24:on the
208:Senate
113:Ghouta
95:Report
572:2013
550:2016
524:2016
498:2013
472:2013
411:2013
370:2013
326:2016
291:2013
16:The
194:Use
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432:,
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360:.
334:^
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275:.
254:^
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574:.
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297:.
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