425:
was speculated that someone was sitting in the jumpseat (which is located directly behind the control pedestal) had rested their feet on it and inadvertently toggled the trim knob. This knob used to have a raised flat and straight portion protruding from it. Subsequent to this event, all 737s were retrofitted with a rounded rudder trim knob – and a higher ridge around the aft section of the pedestal in an effort to prevent a similar occurrence. That mistrim of the rudder should have been discovered when the Before
Takeoff checklist was read, but the pilots failed to ensure the rudder was in the zero trim (neutral) position at that time. The captain also failed to detect that the rudder pedals were unequally displaced by 4.25 inches (108 mm) and the nosewheel steering was turned to 4 degrees left, during the taxi out from the gate to the takeoff position on the runway.
358:"Passengers who egressed at the two floor-level exits entered the water and because of the one-knot current some persons drifted away from the airplane and under the runway deck. Crewmembers threw flotation seat cushions and crew life preservers, which were held by passengers and crewmembers, some of whom could not swim. Several persons complained that they could not hold onto the cushions or that the cushions did not keep them afloat. Some clung to pilings under the deck and floating debris. Some passengers also swallowed fuel that was on the water surface. Several complained that waves from boats and downwash from a rescue helicopter hampered staying afloat with their heads out of the water. One passenger said that she sustained a fractured right ankle and a lacerated hand when a rescue boat backed over her."
355:"About 20 passengers stood on the left wing, which was out of the water. Someone unstowed the fabric ditching line from above a left overwing exit and tied it to its wing fitting. These 20 passengers, including the woman with the 5 year old child and the 8-month old infant, held onto the line as they awaited rescue. The ditching line was unstowed from its right overwing exit opening but evacuees did not know it needed to be tied to the right wing fitting. The forward portion of the right wing was out of the water and passengers held onto the ditching line so they could stay out of the water."
429:
248:
465:
again about 20 hours after the accident. USAir representatives stated they did not know where the pilots were sequestered. The Air Line Pilots
Association representatives initially stated that they also did not know where the pilots were, then later stated that their location was being withheld so they could not be found by the media. This complicated the investigative process to a great degree. The sequestering of the pilots for such an extended period of time in many respects borders on interference with a federal investigation and is inexcusable.
29:
507:
531:
328:
519:
562:
460:), which was the labor union representing the two pilots of flight 5050, sequestered the pilots and refused to reveal their whereabouts until such time that any testing for drugs and alcohol would be useless. This made the NTSB investigators so upset that a very unusual and strong statement was included in the official accident report:
403:
The failure of the captain, during the takeoff roll, to take control of the aircraft and transfer control back to the first officer in a smooth and professional manner, with the result of confusion as to who was in control. Because of poor communication between the pilots, both attempted to 'maintain
351:
All the exits except the L1 door and L2 door were used for evacuation. Senior flight attendant Wayne Reed could not open the L1 door. The L2 door was opened and then closed by Kelly
Donovan when water entered the cabin. Flight attendant Susan Harelson deployed the evacuation slide at R1; the R2 slide
414:
The failure of the captain to execute the abort procedure in a rapid and aggressive manner. After initiating the RTO, the captain used differential braking to steer the airplane. This delayed the attainment of effective braking until 5½ seconds after the takeoff was rejected. Braking during the RTO
338:
As the first officer began the takeoff on runway 31, the airplane started to drift to the left. The captain attempted to correct that drift with the use of the nosewheel tiller. Moments later, they heard a "bang" and then a rumbling noise. The bang was most likely due to air escaping from the left
464:
The Safety Board is extremely concerned that no federal investigators were allowed to speak to the pilots of flight 5050 until almost 40 hours after the accident. Specific requests to USAir and ALPA to interview the pilots and to have them provide toxicological samples were made about ten hours and
424:
Analysis of the digital flight data recorder revealed that the rudder trim had moved to the far left limit, while the plane was parked at the gate. Since power to the DFDR was off, while parked at the gate, the NTSB could not determine what caused the rudder trim to move to that extreme limit. It
437:
When the rudder trim is centered to zero degrees, as required for takeoff, the rudder pedals would be matched so that the captain's legs would be extended the same amount, for each pedal, and the plane's nosewheel steering would not keep trying to turn the plane to the left, during taxi operations
342:
The airplane collided with a wooden approach lighting stanchion as it went off the end of the overrun. The fuselage broke into three sections, with the forward section resting on part of the elevated light stanchion and the aft section partially submerged. All of the fuselage fractures were due to
486:
The
National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's failure to exercise his command authority in a timely manner to reject the takeoff or take sufficient control to continue the takeoff, which was initiated with a mistrimmed rudder. Also
446:
The safety issues discussed in the report are the design and location of the rudder trim control on the Boeing 737-400, air crew coordination and communication during takeoffs, crew pairing, and crash survivability. Safety
Recommendations addressing these issues were made to the Federal Aviation
310:
flight engineer for a year before transitioning to the Boeing 737. Martin's training as airline captain was interrupted twice, once due to a USAF Reserve deployment and once due to personal illness. Martin had accumulated a total of 2,625 flight hours in the Boeing 737, including 140 hours as a
469:
The FAA was in the process of preparing subpoenas to compel the pilots to present themselves to NTSB accident investigators, when the pilots finally relented and appeared, some 44 hours after the accident. The FAA was processing an emergency suspension of their licenses for failing to present
473:
The pilots were requested to provide both blood and urine samples. Upon the advice of their ALPA attorney, they refused to provide any blood samples, but did give urine samples. ALPA officials refused to respond to questions submitted by media reporters. Local law-enforcement officials were
432:
Rudder trim control (in red) and rudder trim position indicator (in yellow), on the rear of the center console, between the pilot seats of the B737-400. Note that the indicator needle is in the center of the gauge—the required position when pilots finish running the pre-start and pre-takeoff
318:
Neither pilot had formal training in cockpit resource management. The captain did not discuss emergency procedures such as rejected takeoffs with the first officer before the departure, despite the presence of weather conditions that included darkness, low visibility, and a wet runway.
339:
nose tire as it was pulled off its wheel, damaged by the captain's improper use of the nosewheel steering tiller. The captain took over control from the first officer and aborted the takeoff, but he was unable to stop the plane before it ran off the end of the runway into Bowery Bay.
441:
The NTSB could not understand why the captain failed to detect the mistrimmed rudder (as evidenced by the abnormal displacement of the rudder pedals and the tendency for the plane to keep trying to turn left), during the time that the plane was taxied to the takeoff position.
1190:
474:
attempting to track down rumors that the FO had told Port
Authority police after the crash, that the captain had been "mumbling and acting irrationally just before takeoff." However, they were never able to find any witnesses to substantiate that rumor.
407:
The failure of the captain to make speed call outs and to consult airspeed before initiating an abort. Computed V1 speed was 125 knots (144 mph; 232 km/h) and action by the captain to reject the takeoff began at 130 knots (150 mph;
1183:
1176:
399:
at the beginning of the takeoff roll. He then manually advanced the throttles; the resultant delay and the slightly low thrust set on the left engine lengthened the airplane's ground roll and added to the directional control
1673:
314:
Constantine
Kleissas, 29, who served as Flight 5050's first officer, had been hired by Piedmont three months before the accident. Flight 5050 was his first takeoff in a 737 without supervision by a flight instructor.
285:
on
December 23, 1988, and was inherited by USAir when it acquired Piedmont in 1989. On the date of the accident, the aircraft had accrued 2,235 flight hours, and was painted in a Piedmont-USAir transition livery.
1643:
352:
was disarmed before the door was opened because flight attendant Jolynn
Galmish believed that the slide would float upward and block the exit. All four of the overwing exits were used to evacuate successfully.
777:
1648:
1638:
376:
The captain's failure to provide an extended briefing, or an emergency briefing, before the takeoffs at BWI and LGA or at any time during the 9 hours the crewmembers spent together before the accident.
470:
themselves to investigators promptly after the crash. An FAA official said the pilots are entitled to legal counsel, but it is a regulation that they have to talk to the FAA after an accident.
1653:
770:
392:
The failure of the aircraft to hold at taxiway GOLF GOLF during taxiing as directed by ATC (this error, although an obvious violation, had no effect on the accident sequence).
1683:
1501:
1159:
1153:
763:
335:
Flight 5050 was cleared for a departure from LaGuardia
Airport's runway 31, a 7,000-foot (2,100 m) runway which ends with an elevated deck overhanging Bowery Bay.
411:
The failure of the captain to announce the abort decision in standard terminology, with the result of confusion by the first officer as to what action was being taken.
695:
1251:
389:
The failure of the crew to detect the improper rudder trim setting by means of rudder pedal displacement, information during taxiing and holding for takeoff.
1663:
1583:
1460:
1061:
1001:
881:
726:
1372:
981:
1354:
260:
160:
1513:
1366:
664:
639:
570:
372:
The NTSB found numerous "crew coordination problems" during its investigation, which had a bearing on the ultimate outcome of Flight 5050:
1168:
1530:
1448:
1413:
231:. As the plane took off from LaGuardia's runway 31, the plane drifted to the left. After hearing a loud bang, the pilots attempted to
991:
235:, but were unable to stop the plane short of the end of the runway. The plane continued past the end of the runway and plunged into
1011:
404:
directional control initially and neither was fully in control later in the takeoff, compounding directional control difficulties.
1507:
1121:
787:
1407:
1337:
1319:
1678:
951:
831:
632:
1495:
1483:
497:
361:
The last passengers, who were trapped in seats 21F and 22A, were extricated approximately 90 minutes after the accident.
1536:
1477:
1360:
1307:
1228:
1560:
1419:
1301:
1263:
971:
851:
841:
811:
457:
428:
282:
1668:
1607:
1589:
1577:
1489:
1401:
1389:
1331:
1141:
941:
911:
861:
415:
was less than the maximum braking achievable on the wet runway; the airplane could have been stopped on the runway.
1548:
1395:
1081:
931:
303:
247:
1658:
1425:
1211:
1454:
1325:
1257:
871:
306:
at the time of the accident. Martin was hired by USAir subsidiary Piedmont Airlines in 1984 and worked as a
299:
295:
1275:
891:
543:
331:
LaGuardia Airport. The airplane overran runway 31 and entered Bowery Bay, seen at the bottom of the photo.
1431:
1313:
1245:
1101:
1091:
961:
821:
137:
1071:
921:
511:
271:
1031:
477:
The FAA followed through with a suspension of their licenses, shortly after they finally appeared.
755:
672:
487:
causal was the captain's failure to detect the mistrimmed rudder before the takeoff was attempted.
1111:
700:
386:
The failure of the crew to detect the improper rudder trim setting in response to the checklists.
268:
96:
1542:
1284:
1269:
364:
Two of the 57 passengers were killed. Fifteen other passengers were injured, one critically.
220:
150:
73:
1021:
383:
disengaged, on a wet and short runway, contrary to company and manufacturer recommendations.
251:
N416US, the aircraft involved in the accident, when still in service with Piedmont Airlines.
228:
77:
59:
28:
1554:
668:
566:
523:
232:
259:
to replace the regularly scheduled but cancelled Flight 1846, from LaGuardia Airport to
1601:
1199:
Aviation accidents and incidents in the United States and U.S. territories in the 1980s
1131:
1041:
901:
264:
1632:
633:
USAir, Inc., Boeing 737-400, LaGuardia Airport, Flushing, New York September 20, 1989
549:
81:
535:
396:
274:
546:, which was flying the same route for the successor airline to USAir, US Airways
530:
327:
55:
307:
256:
236:
69:
741:
728:
380:
395:
The failure of the first officer to push the correct button to engage the
255:
On September 20, 1989, Flight 5050 was an unscheduled flight operated by
1621:
An asterisk (*) denotes an incident that took place in a U.S. territory.
294:
Flight 5050's captain was Michael Martin, 36, who began his career as a
224:
696:"Pilots in Jet Crash at La Guardia Are Sought by U.S. Investigators"
427:
326:
246:
106:
447:
Administration and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
1172:
759:
379:
The decision of the captain to execute the takeoff at LGA with
1674:
Aviation accidents and incidents in the United States in 1989
1644:
Airliner accidents and incidents involving runway overruns
627:
625:
623:
621:
619:
617:
615:
613:
611:
609:
607:
605:
603:
601:
1649:
Accidents and incidents involving the Boeing 737 Classic
599:
597:
595:
593:
591:
589:
587:
585:
583:
581:
1639:
Airliner accidents and incidents caused by pilot error
495:
302:; Martin continued to hold the rank of Major in the
219:
was a passenger flight that crashed on takeoff from
1570:
1523:
1470:
1441:
1382:
1347:
1294:
1238:
1221:
1204:
206:
198:
190:
182:
174:
166:
156:
146:
136:
128:
120:
112:
102:
92:
87:
65:
51:
43:
38:
1654:Airliner accidents and incidents in New York City
1502:Indianapolis Ramada Inn A-7D Corsair II crash
1184:
771:
281:). The aircraft was originally delivered to
8:
21:
452:Testing of the pilots for drugs and alcohol
1684:September 1989 events in the United States
1584:Evergreen International Airlines Flight 17
1461:Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1628 incident
1191:
1177:
1169:
1002:Pakistan International Airlines Flight 404
882:Evergreen International Airlines Flight 17
778:
764:
756:
694:McFadden, Robert D. (September 22, 1989).
665:"New York City: Flight 5050 to Bowery Bay"
27:
20:
1252:Thunderbirds Indian Springs Diamond Crash
659:
657:
33:Wreckage of Flight 5050 in the Bowery Bay
1373:Provincetown-Boston Airlines Flight 1039
1355:Scandinavian Airlines System Flight 901
577:
502:
261:Charlotte Douglas International Airport
1514:Pacific Southwest Airlines Flight 1771
1062:Soviet Air Force Ilyushin Il-76 crash
7:
640:National Transportation Safety Board
571:National Transportation Safety Board
1531:Trans-Colorado Airlines Flight 2286
1414:Midwest Express Airlines Flight 105
982:Alice Springs hot air balloon crash
1664:US Airways accidents and incidents
992:China Eastern Airlines Flight 5510
569:from websites or documents of the
267:. The flight was operated using a
14:
1367:San Luis Obispo mid-air collision
671:. October 2, 1989. Archived from
1508:Continental Airlines Flight 1713
788:Aviation accidents and incidents
565: This article incorporates
560:
529:
517:
505:
1408:Bar Harbor Airlines Flight 1808
1320:Reeve Aleutian Airways Flight 8
243:Aircraft and flight information
239:. Two passengers were killed.
161:Charlotte/Douglas Int'l Airport
1449:Grand Canyon mid-air collision
1012:Cubana de Aviación Flight 9046
952:Philippine Airlines Flight 124
642:. July 3, 1990. NTSB/AAR-90/03
1:
1496:Northwest Airlines Flight 255
1484:Northwest Airlink Flight 2268
1537:American Airlines Flight 132
1478:SkyWest Airlines Flight 1834
1361:Vieques Air Link Flight 901A
1308:Eastern Air Lines Flight 855
1229:Eastern Air Lines Flight 935
1561:Delta Air Lines Flight 1141
1426:Teterboro mid-air collision
1420:Henson Airlines Flight 1517
1302:United Airlines Flight 2885
1264:Pilgrim Airlines Flight 458
1122:Angola Lockheed L-100 crash
972:Olympic Aviation Flight 545
852:Flying Tiger Line Flight 66
842:Independent Air Flight 1851
458:Air Line Pilots Association
1700:
1608:United Express Flight 2415
1590:United Airlines Flight 232
1578:United Airlines Flight 811
1490:American Eagle Flight 5452
1402:Delta Air Lines Flight 191
1390:Galaxy Airlines Flight 203
1338:Anchorage runway collision
1332:Ozark Air Lines Flight 650
1142:United Express Flight 2415
942:United Airlines Flight 232
912:Surinam Airways Flight 764
862:United Airlines Flight 811
1617:
1549:Aloha Airlines Flight 243
1396:China Airlines Flight 006
1151:
1082:China Airlines Flight 204
832:Germany mid-air collision
803:
26:
1619:This list is incomplete.
1212:Air Wisconsin Flight 965
311:Boeing 737-400 captain.
1326:Air Illinois Flight 710
1258:World Airways Flight 30
872:Air Ontario Flight 1363
300:United States Air Force
892:Transbrasil Flight 801
812:Air battle near Tobruk
567:public domain material
544:US Airways Flight 1549
489:
467:
449:
434:
332:
252:
16:1989 aviation accident
1679:1989 in New York City
1455:Aeroméxico Flight 498
1432:Death of Ricky Nelson
1314:Air Canada Flight 797
1246:Air Florida Flight 90
1102:Korean Air Flight 175
1092:Aeroflot Flight 37577
962:Korean Air Flight 803
822:Kegworth air disaster
484:
462:
444:
431:
330:
277:(registration number
250:
1072:TAN-SAHSA Flight 414
932:Belgium MiG-23 crash
922:Interflug Flight 102
1422:(September 23 1985)
1160:► 1990
1154:1988 ◄
1032:Partnair Flight 394
738: /
481:NTSB probable cause
23:
1610:(December 26 1989)
1604:(December 15 1989)
1545:(February 19 1988)
1416:(September 6 1985)
1340:(December 23 1983)
1334:(December 20 1983)
1157:
1112:Avianca Flight 203
701:The New York Times
435:
333:
253:
233:reject the takeoff
93:Aircraft type
47:September 20, 1989
1669:LaGuardia Airport
1626:
1625:
1596:USAir Flight 5050
1543:AVAir Flight 3378
1539:(February 3 1988)
1285:Pan Am Flight 830
1270:Pan Am Flight 759
1260:(January 23 1982)
1254:(January 18 1982)
1248:(January 13 1982)
1166:
1165:
1052:USAir Flight 5050
742:40.776°N 73.885°W
420:Rudder trim issue
368:Accident analysis
323:Accident sequence
304:Air Force Reserve
283:Piedmont Airlines
221:LaGuardia Airport
217:USAir Flight 5050
214:
213:
151:LaGuardia Airport
74:LaGuardia Airport
22:USAir Flight 5050
1691:
1598:(September 1989)
1410:(August 25 1985)
1369:(August 24 1984)
1363:(August 2 1984)*
1231:(September 1981)
1193:
1186:
1179:
1170:
1158:
1022:Varig Flight 254
798:
797:
795:
780:
773:
766:
757:
753:
752:
750:
749:
748:
743:
739:
736:
735:
734:
731:
713:
712:
710:
708:
691:
685:
684:
682:
680:
675:on July 13, 2011
661:
652:
651:
649:
647:
637:
629:
564:
563:
534:
533:
522:
521:
520:
510:
509:
508:
501:
60:rejected takeoff
31:
24:
1699:
1698:
1694:
1693:
1692:
1690:
1689:
1688:
1659:1980s in Queens
1629:
1628:
1627:
1622:
1620:
1613:
1580:(February 1989)
1566:
1555:TACA Flight 110
1519:
1516:(December 1987)
1510:(November 1987)
1466:
1463:(November 1986)
1437:
1434:(December 1985)
1428:(November 1985)
1404:(August 2 1985)
1398:(February 1985)
1378:
1375:(December 1984)
1357:(February 1984)
1343:
1290:
1266:(February 1982)
1234:
1217:
1200:
1197:
1167:
1162:
1156:
1147:
1146:
1145:
1144:
1139:
1135:
1134:
1129:
1125:
1124:
1119:
1115:
1114:
1109:
1105:
1104:
1099:
1095:
1094:
1089:
1085:
1084:
1079:
1075:
1074:
1069:
1065:
1064:
1059:
1055:
1054:
1049:
1045:
1044:
1039:
1035:
1034:
1029:
1025:
1024:
1019:
1015:
1014:
1009:
1005:
1004:
999:
995:
994:
989:
985:
984:
979:
975:
974:
969:
965:
964:
959:
955:
954:
949:
945:
944:
939:
935:
934:
929:
925:
924:
919:
915:
914:
909:
905:
904:
899:
895:
894:
889:
885:
884:
879:
875:
874:
869:
865:
864:
859:
855:
854:
849:
845:
844:
839:
835:
834:
829:
825:
824:
819:
815:
814:
809:
799:
793:
791:
786:
784:
747:40.776; -73.885
746:
744:
740:
737:
732:
729:
727:
725:
724:
722:
717:
716:
706:
704:
693:
692:
688:
678:
676:
663:
662:
655:
645:
643:
635:
631:
630:
579:
561:
558:
540:
528:
518:
516:
506:
504:
496:
494:
483:
454:
438:(See graphic).
422:
408:240 km/h).
370:
349:
325:
292:
245:
121:ICAO flight No.
113:IATA flight No.
34:
17:
12:
11:
5:
1697:
1695:
1687:
1686:
1681:
1676:
1671:
1666:
1661:
1656:
1651:
1646:
1641:
1631:
1630:
1624:
1623:
1618:
1615:
1614:
1612:
1611:
1605:
1602:KLM Flight 867
1599:
1593:
1587:
1581:
1574:
1572:
1568:
1567:
1565:
1564:
1558:
1552:
1546:
1540:
1534:
1533:(January 1988)
1527:
1525:
1521:
1520:
1518:
1517:
1511:
1505:
1504:(October 1987)
1499:
1493:
1487:
1481:
1480:(January 1987)
1474:
1472:
1468:
1467:
1465:
1464:
1458:
1452:
1445:
1443:
1439:
1438:
1436:
1435:
1429:
1423:
1417:
1411:
1405:
1399:
1393:
1392:(January 1985)
1386:
1384:
1380:
1379:
1377:
1376:
1370:
1364:
1358:
1351:
1349:
1345:
1344:
1342:
1341:
1335:
1329:
1328:(October 1983)
1323:
1317:
1311:
1305:
1304:(January 1983)
1298:
1296:
1292:
1291:
1289:
1288:
1282:
1281:(July 23 1982)
1273:
1267:
1261:
1255:
1249:
1242:
1240:
1236:
1235:
1233:
1232:
1225:
1223:
1219:
1218:
1216:
1215:
1208:
1206:
1202:
1201:
1198:
1196:
1195:
1188:
1181:
1173:
1164:
1163:
1152:
1149:
1148:
1140:
1137:
1136:
1132:KLM Flight 867
1130:
1127:
1126:
1120:
1117:
1116:
1110:
1107:
1106:
1100:
1097:
1096:
1090:
1087:
1086:
1080:
1077:
1076:
1070:
1067:
1066:
1060:
1057:
1056:
1050:
1047:
1046:
1042:UTA Flight 772
1040:
1037:
1036:
1030:
1027:
1026:
1020:
1017:
1016:
1010:
1007:
1006:
1000:
997:
996:
990:
987:
986:
980:
977:
976:
970:
967:
966:
960:
957:
956:
950:
947:
946:
940:
937:
936:
930:
927:
926:
920:
917:
916:
910:
907:
906:
902:EAS Flight 602
900:
897:
896:
890:
887:
886:
880:
877:
876:
870:
867:
866:
860:
857:
856:
850:
847:
846:
840:
837:
836:
830:
827:
826:
820:
817:
816:
810:
807:
806:
805:
804:
801:
800:
785:
783:
782:
775:
768:
760:
721:
720:External links
718:
715:
714:
686:
653:
576:
575:
557:
554:
553:
552:
547:
539:
538:
526:
514:
493:
490:
482:
479:
453:
450:
421:
418:
417:
416:
412:
409:
405:
401:
393:
390:
387:
384:
377:
369:
366:
348:
345:
324:
321:
298:pilot for the
291:
288:
269:Boeing 737-400
265:North Carolina
244:
241:
212:
211:
208:
204:
203:
200:
196:
195:
192:
188:
187:
184:
180:
179:
176:
172:
171:
168:
164:
163:
158:
154:
153:
148:
144:
143:
140:
134:
133:
130:
126:
125:
122:
118:
117:
114:
110:
109:
104:
100:
99:
97:Boeing 737-400
94:
90:
89:
85:
84:
67:
63:
62:
53:
49:
48:
45:
41:
40:
36:
35:
32:
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1696:
1685:
1682:
1680:
1677:
1675:
1672:
1670:
1667:
1665:
1662:
1660:
1657:
1655:
1652:
1650:
1647:
1645:
1642:
1640:
1637:
1636:
1634:
1616:
1609:
1606:
1603:
1600:
1597:
1594:
1591:
1588:
1585:
1582:
1579:
1576:
1575:
1573:
1569:
1563:(August 1988)
1562:
1559:
1556:
1553:
1550:
1547:
1544:
1541:
1538:
1535:
1532:
1529:
1528:
1526:
1522:
1515:
1512:
1509:
1506:
1503:
1500:
1498:(August 1987)
1497:
1494:
1491:
1488:
1485:
1482:
1479:
1476:
1475:
1473:
1469:
1462:
1459:
1457:(August 1986)
1456:
1453:
1450:
1447:
1446:
1444:
1440:
1433:
1430:
1427:
1424:
1421:
1418:
1415:
1412:
1409:
1406:
1403:
1400:
1397:
1394:
1391:
1388:
1387:
1385:
1381:
1374:
1371:
1368:
1365:
1362:
1359:
1356:
1353:
1352:
1350:
1346:
1339:
1336:
1333:
1330:
1327:
1324:
1322:(June 8 1983)
1321:
1318:
1316:(June 2 1983)
1315:
1312:
1309:
1306:
1303:
1300:
1299:
1297:
1293:
1287:(August 1982)
1286:
1283:
1280:
1278:
1277:Twilight Zone
1274:
1272:(July 9 1982)
1271:
1268:
1265:
1262:
1259:
1256:
1253:
1250:
1247:
1244:
1243:
1241:
1237:
1230:
1227:
1226:
1224:
1220:
1213:
1210:
1209:
1207:
1203:
1194:
1189:
1187:
1182:
1180:
1175:
1174:
1171:
1161:
1155:
1150:
1143:
1133:
1123:
1113:
1103:
1093:
1083:
1073:
1063:
1053:
1043:
1033:
1023:
1013:
1003:
993:
983:
973:
963:
953:
943:
933:
923:
913:
903:
893:
883:
873:
863:
853:
843:
833:
823:
813:
802:
789:
781:
776:
774:
769:
767:
762:
761:
758:
754:
751:
719:
703:
702:
697:
690:
687:
674:
670:
666:
660:
658:
654:
641:
634:
628:
626:
624:
622:
620:
618:
616:
614:
612:
610:
608:
606:
604:
602:
600:
598:
596:
594:
592:
590:
588:
586:
584:
582:
578:
574:
572:
568:
555:
551:
550:Water landing
548:
545:
542:
541:
537:
532:
527:
525:
515:
513:
512:New York City
503:
499:
491:
488:
480:
478:
475:
471:
466:
461:
459:
451:
448:
443:
439:
430:
426:
419:
413:
410:
406:
402:
398:
397:autothrottles
394:
391:
388:
385:
382:
378:
375:
374:
373:
367:
365:
362:
359:
356:
353:
346:
344:
340:
336:
329:
322:
320:
316:
312:
309:
305:
301:
297:
289:
287:
284:
280:
276:
273:
270:
266:
262:
258:
249:
242:
240:
238:
234:
230:
226:
222:
218:
209:
205:
201:
197:
193:
189:
185:
181:
177:
173:
169:
165:
162:
159:
155:
152:
149:
147:Flight origin
145:
141:
139:
135:
131:
127:
123:
119:
115:
111:
108:
105:
101:
98:
95:
91:
86:
83:
82:United States
79:
75:
71:
68:
64:
61:
57:
54:
50:
46:
42:
37:
30:
25:
19:
1595:
1586:(March 1989)
1551:(April 1988)
1486:(March 1987)
1276:
1051:
723:
707:September 2,
705:. Retrieved
699:
689:
679:September 2,
677:. Retrieved
673:the original
646:September 2,
644:. Retrieved
559:
485:
476:
472:
468:
463:
455:
445:
440:
436:
423:
371:
363:
360:
357:
354:
350:
343:overstress.
341:
337:
334:
317:
313:
293:
278:
275:jet airliner
254:
216:
215:
138:Registration
18:
1592:(July 1989)
1492:(May 1987)*
1451:(June 1986)
1214:(June 1980)
745: /
290:Flight crew
272:narrow-body
157:Destination
132:US AIR 5050
56:Pilot error
1633:Categories
1557:(May 1988)
1310:(May 1983)
733:73°53′06″W
730:40°46′34″N
638:(Report).
456:ALPA (the
433:checklists
381:autobrakes
347:Evacuation
308:Boeing 727
237:Bowery Bay
191:Fatalities
175:Passengers
70:Bowery Bay
207:Survivors
167:Occupants
129:Call sign
1279:accident
524:Aviation
492:See also
400:problem.
229:New York
199:Injuries
103:Operator
88:Aircraft
78:New York
39:Accident
792: (
790:in 1989
498:Portals
124:USA5050
52:Summary
1138:Dec 26
1128:Dec 15
1118:Nov 27
1108:Nov 27
1098:Nov 25
1088:Nov 21
1078:Oct 26
1068:Oct 21
1058:Oct 18
1048:Sep 20
1038:Sep 19
998:Aug 25
988:Aug 15
978:Aug 13
958:Jul 27
948:Jul 21
938:Jul 19
918:Jun 17
898:Apr 10
888:Mar 21
878:Mar 18
868:Mar 10
858:Feb 24
848:Feb 19
828:Jan 13
279:N416US
225:Queens
142:N416US
116:US5050
1028:Sep 8
1018:Sep 3
1008:Sep 3
968:Aug 3
928:Jul 4
908:Jun 7
838:Feb 8
818:Jan 8
808:Jan 4
636:(PDF)
556:Notes
536:1980s
296:C-130
257:USAir
107:USAir
72:near
1571:1989
1524:1988
1471:1987
1442:1986
1383:1985
1348:1984
1295:1983
1239:1982
1222:1981
1205:1980
794:1989
709:2016
681:2016
669:Time
648:2016
183:Crew
66:Site
44:Date
263:in
223:in
1635::
698:.
667:.
656:^
580:^
573:.
227:,
210:61
202:21
178:57
170:63
80:,
76:,
58:,
1192:e
1185:t
1178:v
796:)
779:e
772:t
765:v
711:.
683:.
650:.
500::
194:2
186:6
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
