357:, one of the price-cutter retailers that Parke Davis had cut off, protested to the assistant branch manager of Parke Davis that Parke Davis was discriminating against him because a drugstore across the street, one of the Peoples Drug chain, had a sign in its window advertising Parke Davis vitamin products at cut prices. The retailer was told that, if this were so, the branch manager "would see Peoples and try to get them in line." The branch manager then visited a vice-president of Peoples and told him "that anyone that did not go along with our policy, we were not interested in doing business with them." Peoples then told Parke Davis that it would stop cutting prices on Parke Davis products. However, five retailers, including Dart Drug, continued their price cutting. Parke Davis decided that at least advertising cut prices should stop and that would lessen the price cutting. A Parke Davis representative visited Dart's president and he said that he might be willing to stop advertising, although continuing to sell at discount prices if shipments to him were resumed. Parke Davis representatives then told each of the other price-cutter retailers that Dart was ready to discontinue price-cut advertising. Each of the retailers said that, if Dart stopped advertising, he would also. Parke Davis reported this to Dart, and then all five retailers discontinued advertising of Parke Davis vitamins at less than suggested minimum retail prices, and Parke Davis and the wholesalers resumed sales of Parke Davis products to them.
625:
by a prohibited combination to suppress price competition if each customer, although induced to do so solely by a manufacturer's announced policy, independently decides to observe specified resale prices. So long as
Colgate is not overruled, this result is tolerated, but only when it is the consequence of a mere refusal to sell in the exercise of the manufacturer's right "freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond mere announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he employs other means which effect adherence to his resale prices, this countervailing consideration is not present, and therefore he has put together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act. Thus, whether an unlawful combination or conspiracy is proved is to be judged by what the parties actually did, rather than by the words they used.
342:
However, during the spring and early summer of 1956, drug retailers in the two cities advertised and sold several Parke Davis vitamin products at prices substantially below the suggested minimum retail prices. As a result, the
Baltimore office manager of Parke Davis in charge of the sales district that included the two cities sought advice from his head office on how to handle this situation. The Parke Davis attorney advised that the company could legally "enforce an adopted policy arrived at unilaterally" to sell only to customers who observed the suggested minimum resale prices. He further advised that this meant that "we can lawfully say 'we will sell you only so long as you observe such minimum retail prices' but cannot say 'we will sell you only if you agree to observe such minimum retail prices,' since, except as permitted by Fair Trade , agreements as to resale price maintenance are invalid."
346:
that not only would Parke Davis refuse to sell to wholesalers who did not adhere to the policy announced in its catalogue, but also that it would refuse to sell to wholesalers who sold Parke Davis products to retailers who did not observe the suggested minimum retail prices. Each wholesaler was interviewed individually and informed that his competitors were also being apprised of this. The wholesalers each indicated a willingness to go along with the Parke Davis policy. Parke Davis representatives also called on the price-cutter retailers and told each that, if he did not observe the suggested minimum retail prices, Parke Davis would refuse to deal with him, and that, furthermore, he would be unable to purchase any Parke Davis products from the wholesalers. Each retailer was also told that his competitors were being similarly informed.
406:
634:
willingness to deny Parke Davis products to retailers, and thereby help gain the retailers' adherence to its suggested minimum retail prices. The retailers who disregarded the price policy were promptly cut off when Parke Davis supplied the wholesalers with their names. The large retailer who said he would "abide" by the price policy, the multi-unit
Peoples Drug chain, was not cut off. In thus involving the wholesalers to stop the flow of Parke Davis products to the retailers, thereby inducing retailers' adherence to its suggested retail prices, Parke Davis created a combination with the retailers and the wholesalers to maintain retail prices and violated the Sherman Act.
680:
791:, the Supreme Court held that mere evidence of complaints by retailer competitors about price cutting did not permit inference of an agreement to fix prices. The Court held that "a vertical restraint is not illegal per se unless it includes some agreement on price or price levels." The Court explained that some economic effect must be shown to depart from a rule-of-reason analysis: "here is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard; departure from that standard must be justified by demonstrable economic effect, such as the facilitation of cartelizing. . . ." A large part of the rationale of the holding of a Sherman Act violation in
887:, but in reverse. A retailer of e-books put together or "facilitated" a combination among its suppliers (publishers) to fix and raise prices. The Second Circuit held that "the district court did not err in determining that Apple orchestrated an agreement with and among the Publisher Defendants, in characterizing this agreement as a horizontal price fixing-conspiracy, or in holding that the conspiracy unreasonably restrained trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Pointing to "express collusion among" the publishers, the Court said that "Apple consciously played a key role in organizing that collusion." Apple argued that under
526:, That was a treble damage suit alleging a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act between the manufacturer and jobbers to maintain resale prices. In that case, the Court held improper a jury instruction that a Sherman Act violation (price-fixing agreement) could be found if the defendant repeatedly called to the attention of the wholesales and jobbers the minimum price provision of its sales plan and "the great majority of them not only no dissent from such plan, but actually in carrying it out by themselves selling at the prices named." But the authority of
651:
and Dart's apparent willingness to cooperate was used as the lever to gain their acquiescence in the program. Having secured those acquiescences, Parke Davis returned to Dart Drug with the report of the accomplishment. Not until all this was done was the advertising suspended and sales to all the retailers resumed. In this manner, Parke Davis sought assurances of compliance and got them, as well as the compliance itself. It was only by actively bringing about substantial unanimity among the competitors that Parke Davis was able to gain adherence to its policy.
31:
705:
331:
minimum resale prices on the Parke Davis products that wholesalers sold to retailers and stating that it was "Parke Davis' continuing policy to deal only with drug wholesalers who observed that schedule." The retailers' catalog contained a schedule of minimum retail prices applicable in States with Fair Trade laws, and stated that this schedule was suggested for use also in places such as
Virginia and D.C. where there were no Fair Trade laws.
548:, the company adopted a policy of refusing to sell to price cutters. It set up a policing system. " When an offender was cut off, he would be reinstated upon the giving of assurances that he would maintain prices in the future." The Court held that the FTC could find a violation of FTC Act § 5 where a practice "had a "dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly." The company sought to defend under
568:
Beech-Nut's methods were as effective as agreements in producing the result that "all who would deal in the company's products are constrained to sell at the suggested prices," the Court held that the securing of the customers' adherence by such methods constituted the creation of an unlawful combination to suppress price competition among the retailers.
896:, as in this case "in which a vertical player organizes a horizontal cartel," are to be judged under the rules applicable to horizontal cartels: "In that situation, the court need not consider whether the vertical agreements restrained trade because all participants agreed to the horizontal restraint, which is and ought to be,
319:. In addition, the Court held that when a company abandons an illegal practice because it knows the US Government is investigating it and contemplating suit, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to hold the case that follows moot and dismiss it without granting relief sought against the illegal practice.
716:
The Court's opinion reaches much further than at once may meet the eye, and justifies fuller discussion than otherwise might appear warranted. Scrutiny of the opinion will reveal that the Court has done no less than send to its demise the
Colgate doctrine, which has been a basic part of antitrust law
669:
The courts have an obligation, once a violation of the antitrust laws has been established, to protect the public from a continuation of the harmful and unlawful activities. A trial court's wide discretion in fashioning remedies is not to be exercised to deny relief altogether by lightly inferring an
664:
The district court alternatively rested its judgment of dismissal on the holding that Parke Davis had discontinued the scheme. "So far as the record indicates any reason, it is that Parke Davis stopped its efforts because the
Department of Justice had instituted an investigation." The Court said that
330:
makes pharmaceutical products and markets them through drug wholesalers and drug retailers. The retailers buy these products from the wholesalers or make large quantity purchases directly from Parke Davis. Parke Davis placed in its wholesalers' catalogue a Net Price
Selling Schedule listing suggested
891:
its conduct was vertical and had to be judged under a rule-of-reason analysis. The Second
Circuit rejected that argument, saying that it was settled law that a mixed vertical and horizontal conspiracy, where distributors and manufacturers act together to fix prices or engage in other conduct illegal
873:
A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or competing retailers that decreases output or reduces competition in order to increase price is, and ought to be, per se unlawful. To the extent a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices is entered upon to facilitate either type of cartel,
655:
Instead of inducing the retailers to adhere to the price-maintenance program as a "matter of individual free choice prompted alone" by individual self-interest, Parke Davis offered them its products "packaged in a competition-free wrapping . . . by virtue of concerted action induced by the
364:
The US Government sued Parke Davis under §§ 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Act for combining and conspiring "with retail and wholesale druggists in Washington, D.C., and Richmond, Virginia, to maintain the wholesale and retail prices of Parke Davis pharmaceutical products." The district court held that
360:
However, after a month one of the retailers again started newspaper advertising, and, despite the efforts of Parke Davis to prevent it, the others quickly followed suit. At this point, the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, on complaint of Dart Drug, began investigating Parke Davis for
162:
By utilizing wholesalers and other retailers, the company actively induced unwilling retailers to comply with the policy rather than declining to deal with retailers who refused to abide by the resale price maintenance policy; the resulting concerted action constituted a conspiracy or combination in
770:
that "a simple refusal to sell to customers who will not resell at prices suggested by the seller is permissible under the Sherman Act" although an unlawful "combination is also organized if the producer secures adherence to his suggested prices by means which go beyond his mere declination to sell
729:
The Court now says that the seller runs afoul of the Sherman Act when he goes beyond mere announcement of his policy and refusal to sell not because the bare announcement and refusal fall outside the statutory phrase, but because any additional step removes a "countervailing consideration" in favor
624:
decisions cannot be read as merely limited to particular fact complexes justifying the inference of an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act. . . . The Sherman Act forbids combinations of traders to suppress competition. True, there results the same economic effect as is accomplished
345:
The Baltimore branch manager put into effect a program for promoting observance of the suggested minimum retail prices. In order to ensure that retailers who did not comply would be cut off from sources of supply, representatives of Parke Davis visited the five wholesalers and told them, in effect,
650:
Parke Davis did not rest with the simple announcement to the trade of its policy in that regard followed by a refusal to sell to the retailers who would not observe it. First, it discussed the subject with Dart Drug. When Dart indicated willingness to go along, the other retailers were approached,
510:
meant no more than that a manufacturer is not guilty of a combination or conspiracy if he merely "indicates his wishes concerning prices and declines further dealings with all who fail to observe them ..."; however, there is unlawful combination where a manufacturer "enters into agreements—whether
431:
doctrine, a manufacturer, having announced a price-maintenance policy, may bring about adherence to it by refusing to deal with customers who do not observe that policy. The Government contended, however, that "subsequent decisions of this Court compel the holding that what Parke Davis did here by
608:
but those decisions "plainly fashioned its dimensions as meaning no more than that a simple refusal to sell to customers who will not resell at prices suggested by the seller is permissible under the Sherman Act." A combination in violation of the Sherman Act is "organized if the producer secures
454:
In that case, Dr. Miles entered into contracts with wholesale and retail merchants that required them to resell a medicine at prices that Miles fixed. Park refused to sign the contracts, induced customers of Miles to resell to Park, and then Park sold the medicines at cut prices in violation of
349:
Several retailers refused to give Parke Davis any assurances of compliance and continued despite these interviews to advertise and sell Parke Davis products at prices below the suggested minimum retail prices. Parke Davis furnished their names to the wholesalers. Parke Davis refused to fill any
567:
to a holding that, when the only act specified in the indictment amounted to saying that the trader had exercised his right to determine those with whom he would deal, and to announce the circumstances under which he would refuse to sell, no Sherman Act violation was made out. However, because
341:
There were about 260 drugstores in D.C., and about 100 in Richmond, Virginia. Many of these stores were units of the large Peoples Drug Store chain (now CVS). Five drug wholesalers handled Parke Davis products in these areas. The wholesalers observed the resale prices suggested by Parke Davis.
633:
Parke Davis did not content itself with announcing its policy regarding retail prices and following this with a simple refusal to have business relations with any retailers who disregarded that policy. Instead, Parke Davis used the refusal to deal with the wholesalers in order to elicit their
784:," however, "it did not choose to argue that Section 5 does not require agreement." Instead, the FTC attempted to find a violation by invoking § 1 of the Sherman Act, including specifically the requirement of a contract, combination, or conspiracy, but it failed to establish that.
432:
entwining the wholesalers and retailers in a program to promote general compliance with its price maintenance policy went beyond mere customer selection, and created combinations or conspiracies to enforce resale price maintenance in violation of . . . the Sherman Act."
766:," took the position that an unlawful combination or agreement could be found when a buyer unwillingly submitted to and complied with a supplier's pricing policy in order to avoid termination. The Eighth Circuit reversed, however, pointing to the statement in
943:
Court finds an illegal combination or conspiracy on the basis of "control of third party resales and, more arguably, individualized negotiations with dealers falling short of traditional agreement, and perhaps even exhortation meetings." Although the
1491: (1941) (dictum: if the defendant's "purpose and practice . . . runs counter to the public policy declared in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Federal Trade Commission has the power to suppress it as an unfair method of competition").
591:
and announced principles which subject to Sherman Act liability the producer who secures his customers' adherence to his resale prices by methods which go beyond the simple refusal to sell to customers who will not resell at stated prices." In
335:
350:
direct orders from such retailers, and the wholesalers likewise refused to fill any of their orders. This ban extended to all Parke Davis products, even those necessary to fill prescriptions (on which price cutting had not occurred).
596:, the Court found a violation of the Sherman Act where the distributor proffered a price-fixing plan and the wholesales joined in "by cooperating in prices, limitation of sales to and approval of retail licensees." The scope of the
948:
case also involved "wholesalers reporting noncomplying dealers to the manufacturer as forming an 'information conspiracy' with the latter," he regards that as no longer surviving as a tenable theory under present law.
775:
doctrine" by enlisting wholesalers and retailers to adhere to and participate in the price-fixing program. The court said that the FTC has presented a case in which "there are no 'plus factors' to take the case beyond
361:
price fixing. Parke Davis then stopped trying to promote the retailers' adherence to its suggested resale prices, and neither it nor the wholesalers since declined further dealings with the price cutters.
687:
Justice Stewart agreed that the record amply "shows an illegal combination to maintain retail prices." He therefore could "find no occasion to question, even by innuendo, the continuing validity of the
1801:
730:
of permitting a seller to choose his customers. But we are left wholly in the dark as to what the purported new standard is for establishing a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy ."
365:
the Government's proofs did not establish a violation of the Sherman Act because Parke Davis's actions "were properly unilateral, and sanctioned by law under the doctrine laid down in the case of
916:, "the Court did not use the term 'coercion' to characterize the manufacturer's enforcement practices (describing them instead as creating a 'combination')," a few years later "the Court in
874:
it, too, would need to be held unlawful under the rule of reason. This type of agreement may also be useful evidence for a plaintiff attempting to prove the existence of a horizontal cartel.
1389:
556:
case, was held to be within the legal right of the producer." It made no difference that there were not express price-fixing contracts because the course of dealing was equivalent to that.
939:
does not find a price-fixing agreement on the basis of "announced conditions, terminations, or the use of third parties to gather information or to effect a termination." Rather, the
1740:
1694:
1592:
1560:
1504:
1481:
1466:
1449:
1258:
1223:
1200:
1164:
1128:
1094:
980:
124:
108:
72:
1123:
481:
indictment did not charge that company with selling its products to dealers under agreements which obligated the latter not to resell except at prices fixed by the seller.
495:, the Government indicted a parts manufacturer for entering into price-fixing agreements with retailers, jobbers and manufacturers who used or resold his products. The
315:
by taking affirmative steps to induce adherence to its suggested prices, it puts together a combination among competitors to fix prices in violation of § 1 of the
1461:
1555:
800:
511:
express or implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances—with all customers . . . which undertake to bind them to observe fixed resale prices.
552:, but the Court said that "the Beech-Nut system goes for beyond the simple refusal to sell goods to persons who will not sell at stated prices, which, in the
962:
1796:
808:. It held "that vertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason." Of this ruling, the dissent (but not the majority of the Court) said:
1806:
771:
to a customer who will not observe his announced policy"; the court added that Parke Davis had been found to have gone far "beyond the limits of the
1811:
609:
adherence to his suggested prices by means which go beyond his mere declination to sell to a customer who will not observe his announced policy."
405:
679:
465:, the Court held the restrictive agreements that Miles sought to enforce were invalid at common law and under the Sherman Act as well. In the
852:
Court had found that Parke Davis had put together a horizontal combination or conspiracy among those to whom it sold its products, as in
656:
manufacturer." Parke Davis was "thus the organizer of a price maintenance combination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act."
277:
35:
455:
Miles's resale-price maintenance program. Miles sued Park for inducing Miles's customers to breach their contracts with him. Citing
1089:
642:
in still another way. Its treatment of the advertising controversy "demonstrates how far Parke Davis went beyond the limits of the
415:
299:
210:
1625:
879:
295:
1751:
413:
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court began with a review of what the Court had held in its 1919 decision in
1063:
138:
100:
924:
as holding that "a supplier may not use coercion on its retail outlets to achieve resale price maintenance."
394:
305:, which substantially insulates unilateral refusals to deal with price-cutters from the antitrust laws. The
222:
1769:
1368:
419:, since the issue before the Court was whether the conduct of Parke Davis fell under the protection of the
218:
145:
1717:
1744:
1698:
1596:
1564:
1508:
1485:
1470:
1453:
1262:
1227:
1204:
1168:
1132:
1098:
984:
273:
128:
112:
64:
908:
Professor Robinson argues that "some surpassingly foolish Supreme Court decisions" have misinterpreted
795:
is that Parke Davis organized a horizontal cartel agreement among its direct customers to fix prices.
746:
doctrine into discard." He concludes: "It is surely the emptiest of formalisms to profess respect for
738:. Moreover, he sees the majority's treatment of the trial court's findings as disguised oevrruling of
704:
461:
378:
198:
1473:
1456:
390:
386:
311:
194:
670:
abandonment of the unlawful activities from a cessation which seems timed to anticipate suit.
163:
violation of the Sherman Act, although it was not based on any contract, express or implied.
1488:
1265:
1701:
446:
doctrine is best understood," the Court said, "by reference to a case which preceded the
1599:
1567:
1511:
1230:
1207:
1135:
1101:
469:
case, however, there was no agreement, just a refusal to deal with price cutters. "The
382:
230:
131:
1760:
1171:
987:
1790:
865:
1444:. There is case law that it is unnecessary under § 5 to find a conspiracy. See
1631:
206:
692:
decision. (The innuendo to which he objects is in such statements as "So long as
67:
327:
316:
178:
334:
281:
186:
354:
149:
79:
1372:
958:
912:
as making "coercion an effective substitute for agreement." Although in
309:
case held that, when a company goes beyond "the limited dispensation" of
135:
97:
1635:
1391:
Explaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust Method
816:, decided 100 years ago, and we overrule the cases that reaffirmed its
1778:
1067:
104:
780:," so it reversed the Commission. "Despite the FTC's attempt to gut
742:—"I think that what the Court has really done here is to throw the
1365:
869:, that a vertical arrangement may organize a horizontal cartel:
638:
Furthermore, Parke Davis exceeded the "limited dispensation" of
142:
856:. The majority opinion, however, says nothing about overruling
30:
377:
The Government appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed.
530:"has been seriously undermined by subsequent decisions," The
665:
dismissal in such circumstances was an abuse of discretion:
762:, the FTC, "in an admitted effort to test the viability of
423:
doctrine. The Government conceded for the purposes of the
1440:. Professor Robinson found this "a little surprising."
1802:
United States Supreme Court cases of the Warren Court
1501:
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
789:
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
1124:
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.
452:
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.
267:
259:
251:
243:
238:
167:
156:
119:
92:
87:
59:
49:
42:
23:
1719:Leegin, the Rule of Reason, and Vertical Agreement
1478:Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC
503:did not immunize the conduct, and explained that
294:, 362 U.S. 29 (1960), was a 1960 decision of the
247:Brennan, joined by Warren, Black, Douglas, Clark,
1462:FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Trading Stamp Co.
863:Furthermore, the majority opinion observed, in
1556:Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc.
1255:United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.
801:Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc.
717:concepts since it was first announced in 1919.
696:is not overruled, this result is tolerated.")
581:United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.
957:The citations in this article are written in
8:
1712:
1710:
1589:Interstate Circuit, Inc., v. United States
1197:Frey & Son. Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co.
854:Interstate Circuit, Inc., v. United States
820:rule in the intervening years. See, e.g.,
524:Frey & Son. Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co.
20:
1407:718 F.2d at 258 (quoting 362 U.S. at 43).
1325:362 U.S. at 44 (Stewart, J., concurring).
1025:
1023:
848:dissent cites include those in which the
1334:362 U.S. at 49 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
883:involved a fact pattern very similar to
703:
678:
600:doctrine may have been uncertain before
404:
333:
263:Harlan, joined by Frankfurter, Whittaker
1737:United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.
1059:United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.
977:United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.
969:
830:United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.
734:He denied that Parke Davis went beyond
291:United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.
54:United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.
24:United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.
1446:FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists
1161:United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc.
812:We here overrule one statutory case,
725:doctrine vague and incomprehensible:
493:United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc.
18:1960 United States Supreme Court case
7:
107:1958); probable jurisdiction noted,
1362:Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC
750:and eviscerate it in application.'
629:In this case, the Court explained:
1090:United States v. Colgate & Co.
927:Professor Hovenkamp contends that
416:United States v. Colgate & Co.
36:Supreme Court of the United States
14:
1797:United States Supreme Court cases
1807:United States antitrust case law
1747:29 (1960) is available from:
834:Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal.
721:He found the majority's limited
612:To sum this up, the Court said:
29:
385:concurred in the judgment, and
1812:1960 in United States case law
1398:577, 594-95 & n.68 (1994).
804:, the Supreme Court overruled
1:
832:, 362 U.S. 29, 45-47 (1960);
760:Russell Stover Candies v. FTC
141:(D.D.C. 1963); affirmed, 344
1377:In re Russell Stover Candies
1220:FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.
840:The particular pages of the
836:, 377 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1964).
546:FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.
134: (1961); on remand, 221
1626:United States v. Apple Inc.
935:decision. He suggests that
880:United States v. Apple Inc.
296:United States Supreme Court
1828:
1779:Oyez (oral argument audio)
712:Justice Harlan protested:
272:
172:
161:
148:, 120 U.S. App. D.C. 79 (
45:Decided February 29, 1960
28:
1691:Simpson v. Union Oil Co.
1064:164 F. Supp. 827
918:Simpson v. Union Oil Co.
824:, 273 U.S., at 399-401;
381:wrote for the majority,
367:United States v. Colgate
43:Argued November 10, 1959
931:partially survives the
754:Subsequent developments
477:on the ground that the
473:decision distinguished
373:Ruling of Supreme Court
298:limiting the so-called
1689:, at 500 n.90 (citing
1379:, 100 F.T.C. 1 (1982).
965:for more information.
961:style. Please see the
876:
838:
732:
719:
709:
684:
672:
653:
636:
627:
583:, made it clear "that
570:
522:The next decision was
513:
410:
338:
307:Parke, Davis & Co.
219:William J. Brennan Jr.
123:Vacated and remanded,
871:
810:
727:
714:
707:
682:
667:
648:
631:
614:
561:
508:
427:case that, under the
408:
337:
274:Sherman Antitrust Act
1632:791 F.3d 290
1245:, 362 U.S. at 41-42.
1079:164 F. Supp. at 829.
828:, 321 U.S., at 721;
442:"The history of the
391:Justices Frankfurter
223:Charles E. Whittaker
1770:Library of Congress
1716:Herbert Hovenkamp,
1523:485 U.S. at 735-36.
484:
1614:, 551 U.S. at 893.
1388:Glen 0. Robinson,
1316:362 U.S. at 47-48.
1151:, 220 U.S. at 378.
1113:362 U.S. at 37-38.
1038:362 U.S. at 35-36.
1017:362 U.S. at 33-34.
1008:362 U.S. at 32-33.
999:362 U.S. at 31-32.
710:
685:
491:In the next case,
462:Mitchel v Reynolds
411:
339:
199:William O. Douglas
183:Associate Justices
1545:, 362 U.S. at 43.
1375:1983), reversing
1280:, 362 U.S. at 43.
1187:, 252 U.S. at 99.
844:opinion that the
826:Bausch & Lomb
822:Trenton Potteries
618:Bausch & Lomb
606:Bausch & Lomb
594:Bausch & Lomb
587:narrowly limited
574:Bausch & Lomb
459:, § 360 and
457:Coke on Littleton
353:The president of
287:
286:
211:John M. Harlan II
195:Felix Frankfurter
78:80 S. Ct. 503; 4
1819:
1783:
1777:
1774:
1768:
1765:
1759:
1756:
1750:
1723:
1714:
1705:
1684:
1678:
1672:
1666:
1665:791 F.3d at 325.
1663:
1657:
1656:791 F.3d at 316.
1654:
1648:
1647:791 F.3d at 314.
1645:
1639:
1629:
1621:
1615:
1609:
1603:
1586:
1580:
1577:
1571:
1552:
1546:
1539:
1533:
1532:485 U.S. at 726.
1530:
1524:
1521:
1515:
1498:
1492:
1435:
1429:
1423:
1417:
1416:718 F.2d at 260.
1414:
1408:
1405:
1399:
1397:
1386:
1380:
1359:
1353:
1350:
1344:
1341:
1335:
1332:
1326:
1323:
1317:
1314:
1308:
1305:
1299:
1296:
1290:
1287:
1281:
1275:
1269:
1252:
1246:
1240:
1234:
1217:
1211:
1194:
1188:
1181:
1175:
1158:
1152:
1145:
1139:
1120:
1114:
1111:
1105:
1086:
1080:
1077:
1071:
1061:
1054:
1048:
1045:
1039:
1036:
1030:
1029:362 U. S. at 34.
1027:
1018:
1015:
1009:
1006:
1000:
997:
991:
974:
499:Court held that
401:Majority opinion
168:Court membership
33:
32:
21:
1827:
1826:
1822:
1821:
1820:
1818:
1817:
1816:
1787:
1786:
1781:
1775:
1772:
1766:
1763:
1757:
1754:
1748:
1732:
1727:
1726:
1715:
1708:
1685:
1681:
1673:
1669:
1664:
1660:
1655:
1651:
1646:
1642:
1623:
1622:
1618:
1610:
1606:
1587:
1583:
1578:
1574:
1553:
1549:
1540:
1536:
1531:
1527:
1522:
1518:
1499:
1495:
1436:
1432:
1424:
1420:
1415:
1411:
1406:
1402:
1395:
1387:
1383:
1360:
1356:
1352:362 U.S. at 57.
1351:
1347:
1343:362 U.S. at 53.
1342:
1338:
1333:
1329:
1324:
1320:
1315:
1311:
1307:362 U.S. at 47.
1306:
1302:
1298:362 U.S. at 46.
1297:
1293:
1289:362 U.S. at 44.
1288:
1284:
1276:
1272:
1253:
1249:
1241:
1237:
1218:
1214:
1195:
1191:
1182:
1178:
1159:
1155:
1146:
1142:
1121:
1117:
1112:
1108:
1087:
1083:
1078:
1074:
1057:
1055:
1051:
1047:362 U.S. at 36.
1046:
1042:
1037:
1033:
1028:
1021:
1016:
1012:
1007:
1003:
998:
994:
975:
971:
955:
906:
756:
702:
683:Justice Stewart
677:
662:
579:The next case,
577:
542:
520:
489:
440:
409:Justice Brennan
403:
383:Justice Stewart
379:Justice Brennan
375:
325:
221:
209:
197:
115:903 (1959).
83:
44:
38:
19:
12:
11:
5:
1825:
1823:
1815:
1814:
1809:
1804:
1799:
1789:
1788:
1785:
1784:
1731:
1730:External links
1728:
1725:
1724:
1706:
1679:
1667:
1658:
1649:
1640:
1616:
1604:
1581:
1579:551 U.S. at _.
1572:
1547:
1534:
1525:
1516:
1493:
1430:
1428:, at 594 n.68.
1418:
1409:
1400:
1381:
1354:
1345:
1336:
1327:
1318:
1309:
1300:
1291:
1282:
1270:
1247:
1235:
1212:
1189:
1176:
1153:
1140:
1115:
1106:
1081:
1072:
1049:
1040:
1031:
1019:
1010:
1001:
992:
968:
967:
954:
951:
905:
902:
755:
752:
708:Justice Harlan
701:
698:
676:
673:
661:
658:
576:
571:
541:
536:
519:
514:
497:Schrader's Son
488:
486:Schrader's Son
483:
439:
434:
402:
399:
387:Justice Harlan
374:
371:
324:
321:
285:
284:
278:15 U.S.C.
270:
269:
265:
264:
261:
257:
256:
253:
249:
248:
245:
241:
240:
236:
235:
234:
233:
231:Potter Stewart
184:
181:
176:
170:
169:
165:
164:
159:
158:
154:
153:
121:
117:
116:
94:
90:
89:
85:
84:
77:
61:
57:
56:
51:
50:Full case name
47:
46:
40:
39:
34:
26:
25:
17:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1824:
1813:
1810:
1808:
1805:
1803:
1800:
1798:
1795:
1794:
1792:
1780:
1771:
1762:
1753:
1752:CourtListener
1746:
1742:
1738:
1734:
1733:
1729:
1721:
1720:
1713:
1711:
1707:
1704: (1964)).
1703:
1700:
1696:
1692:
1688:
1683:
1680:
1676:
1671:
1668:
1662:
1659:
1653:
1650:
1644:
1641:
1637:
1633:
1628:
1627:
1620:
1617:
1613:
1608:
1605:
1601:
1598:
1594:
1590:
1585:
1582:
1576:
1573:
1569:
1566:
1562:
1558:
1557:
1551:
1548:
1544:
1538:
1535:
1529:
1526:
1520:
1517:
1513:
1510:
1506:
1502:
1497:
1494:
1490:
1487:
1483:
1479:
1476: (1972);
1475:
1472:
1468:
1464:
1463:
1459: (1986);
1458:
1455:
1451:
1447:
1443:
1439:
1434:
1431:
1427:
1422:
1419:
1413:
1410:
1404:
1401:
1393:
1392:
1385:
1382:
1378:
1374:
1370:
1367:
1363:
1358:
1355:
1349:
1346:
1340:
1337:
1331:
1328:
1322:
1319:
1313:
1310:
1304:
1301:
1295:
1292:
1286:
1283:
1279:
1274:
1271:
1267:
1264:
1260:
1256:
1251:
1248:
1244:
1239:
1236:
1232:
1229:
1225:
1221:
1216:
1213:
1209:
1206:
1202:
1198:
1193:
1190:
1186:
1180:
1177:
1173:
1170:
1166:
1162:
1157:
1154:
1150:
1144:
1141:
1137:
1134:
1130:
1126:
1125:
1119:
1116:
1110:
1107:
1103:
1100:
1096:
1092:
1091:
1085:
1082:
1076:
1073:
1069:
1065:
1060:
1053:
1050:
1044:
1041:
1035:
1032:
1026:
1024:
1020:
1014:
1011:
1005:
1002:
996:
993:
989:
986:
982:
978:
973:
970:
966:
964:
960:
952:
950:
947:
942:
938:
934:
930:
925:
923:
919:
915:
911:
903:
901:
899:
895:
890:
886:
882:
881:
875:
870:
868:
867:
866:obiter dictum
861:
859:
855:
851:
847:
843:
837:
835:
831:
827:
823:
819:
815:
809:
807:
803:
802:
796:
794:
790:
785:
783:
779:
774:
769:
765:
761:
753:
751:
749:
745:
741:
737:
731:
726:
724:
718:
713:
706:
699:
697:
695:
691:
681:
674:
671:
666:
659:
657:
652:
647:
645:
641:
635:
630:
626:
623:
619:
613:
610:
607:
603:
599:
595:
590:
586:
582:
575:
572:
569:
566:
560:
559:
555:
551:
547:
540:
537:
535:
533:
529:
525:
518:
515:
512:
507:
506:
502:
498:
494:
487:
482:
480:
476:
472:
468:
464:
463:
458:
453:
449:
445:
438:
435:
433:
430:
426:
422:
418:
417:
407:
400:
398:
396:
392:
388:
384:
380:
372:
370:
368:
362:
358:
356:
351:
347:
343:
336:
332:
329:
322:
320:
318:
314:
313:
308:
304:
302:
297:
293:
292:
283:
279:
275:
271:
266:
262:
258:
254:
250:
246:
242:
239:Case opinions
237:
232:
228:
224:
220:
216:
212:
208:
204:
200:
196:
192:
188:
185:
182:
180:
177:
175:Chief Justice
174:
173:
171:
166:
160:
155:
151:
147:
144:
140:
137:
133:
130:
126:
122:
118:
114:
110:
106:
102:
99:
95:
91:
86:
81:
75:
74:
69:
66:
62:
58:
55:
52:
48:
41:
37:
27:
22:
16:
1736:
1718:
1690:
1686:
1682:
1674:
1670:
1661:
1652:
1643:
1624:
1619:
1611:
1607:
1602: (1939).
1588:
1584:
1575:
1570: (2007).
1554:
1550:
1542:
1537:
1528:
1519:
1514: (1988).
1500:
1496:
1477:
1460:
1445:
1441:
1437:
1433:
1425:
1421:
1412:
1403:
1390:
1384:
1376:
1361:
1357:
1348:
1339:
1330:
1321:
1312:
1303:
1294:
1285:
1277:
1273:
1268: (1944).
1254:
1250:
1242:
1238:
1233: (1922).
1219:
1215:
1210: (1921).
1196:
1192:
1184:
1179:
1174: (1920).
1160:
1156:
1148:
1143:
1138: (1911).
1122:
1118:
1109:
1104: (1919).
1088:
1084:
1075:
1058:
1052:
1043:
1034:
1013:
1004:
995:
990: (1960).
976:
972:
956:
945:
940:
936:
932:
928:
926:
922:Parke, Davis
921:
920:interpreted
917:
913:
909:
907:
897:
893:
888:
884:
878:
877:
872:
864:
862:
857:
853:
849:
845:
841:
839:
833:
829:
825:
821:
817:
813:
811:
805:
799:
797:
792:
788:
786:
781:
777:
772:
767:
763:
759:
757:
747:
743:
739:
735:
733:
728:
722:
720:
715:
711:
693:
689:
686:
668:
663:
654:
649:
643:
639:
637:
632:
628:
621:
617:
615:
611:
605:
601:
597:
593:
588:
584:
580:
578:
573:
564:
562:
557:
553:
549:
545:
543:
538:
534:Court said.
531:
527:
523:
521:
516:
509:
504:
500:
496:
492:
490:
485:
478:
474:
470:
466:
460:
456:
451:
447:
443:
441:
436:
428:
424:
420:
414:
412:
389:, joined by
376:
366:
363:
359:
352:
348:
344:
340:
326:
310:
306:
300:
290:
289:
288:
268:Laws applied
226:
214:
207:Tom C. Clark
202:
190:
88:Case history
71:
53:
15:
1638: 2015).
1543:Parke Davis
1474:233, 239-46
1457:447, 454-55
1396:Va. L. Rev.
1278:Parke Davis
1243:Parke Davis
1070: 1958).
946:Parke Davis
941:Parke Davis
937:Parke Davis
929:Parke Davis
914:Parke Davis
910:Parke Davis
900:unlawful."
885:Parke Davis
858:Parke Davis
850:Parke Davis
842:Parke Davis
793:Parke Davis
768:Parke Davis
675:Concurrence
646:doctrine":
532:Parke Davis
425:Parke Davis
397:dissented.
328:Parke-Davis
317:Sherman Act
252:Concurrence
179:Earl Warren
1791:Categories
1722:12 (2010).
1185:Schrader's
953:References
904:Commentary
450:decision,
323:Background
187:Hugo Black
120:Subsequent
1677:, at 600.
1149:Dr. Miles
963:talk page
814:Dr. Miles
806:Dr. Miles
622:Beech-Nut
602:Beech-Nut
585:Beech-Nut
558:Beech-Nut
539:Beech-Nut
475:Dr. Miles
437:Dr. Miles
395:Whittaker
355:Dart Drug
150:D.C. Cir.
80:L. Ed. 2d
60:Citations
1735:Text of
1687:Robinson
1675:Robinson
1489:457, 463
1426:Robinson
1373:8th Cir.
1266:707, 722
959:Bluebook
660:Mootness
303:doctrine
282:§ 1
244:Majority
136:F. Supp.
98:F. Supp.
1636:2d Cir.
782:Colgate
778:Colgate
773:Colgate
764:Colgate
748:Colgate
744:Colgate
740:Colgate
736:Colgate
723:Colgate
700:Dissent
694:Colgate
690:Colgate
644:Colgate
640:Colgate
598:Colgate
589:Colgate
565:Colgate
554:Colgate
550:Colgate
505:Colgate
501:Colgate
479:Colgate
471:Colgate
467:Colgate
448:Colgate
444:Colgate
429:Colgate
421:Colgate
312:Colgate
301:Colgate
260:Dissent
255:Stewart
157:Holding
1782:
1776:
1773:
1767:
1764:
1761:Justia
1758:
1755:
1749:
1702:13, 17
1693:,
1634: (
1630:,
1612:Leegin
1591:,
1559:,
1503:,
1480:,
1465:,
1448:,
1364:, 718
1257:,
1222:,
1199:,
1163:,
1127:,
1093:,
1068:D.D.C.
1066: (
1062:,
979:,
933:Leegin
898:per se
894:per se
889:Leegin
846:Leegin
818:per se
563:limit
528:Cudahy
517:Cudahy
280:
229:
227:·
225:
217:
215:·
213:
205:
203:·
201:
193:
191:·
189:
152:1965).
105:D.D.C.
1743:
1697:
1595:
1563:
1507:
1484:
1469:
1452:
1394:, 80
1261:
1226:
1203:
1167:
1131:
1097:
983:
127:
111:
93:Prior
1745:U.S.
1699:U.S.
1597:U.S.
1565:U.S.
1541:See
1509:U.S.
1486:U.S.
1471:U.S.
1454:U.S.
1366:F.2d
1263:U.S.
1228:U.S.
1205:U.S.
1183:See
1169:U.S.
1147:See
1133:U.S.
1099:U.S.
1056:See
985:U.S.
620:and
616:The
604:and
393:and
143:F.2d
129:U.S.
113:U.S.
96:164
73:more
65:U.S.
63:362
1741:362
1695:377
1600:208
1593:306
1568:877
1561:551
1512:717
1505:485
1482:312
1467:405
1450:476
1369:256
1259:321
1231:441
1224:257
1208:208
1201:256
1165:252
1136:373
1129:220
1102:300
1095:250
981:362
798:In
787:In
758:In
544:In
369:."
146:173
139:948
132:125
125:365
109:359
101:827
82:505
1793::
1739:,
1709:^
1442:Id
1438:Id
1172:85
1022:^
988:29
860:.
276:,
68:29
1371:(
103:(
76:)
70:(
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.