58:. The theory then explores the consequences of this point of departure for a different understanding of various conventional ways of distinguishing mental from physical phenomena, such as internal versus external phenomena, private versus public phenomena, subjective versus objective phenomena, and the world-as-experienced versus the world as described by physics. The theory also combines facets of
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processes are translated into experiences depends on the location in space and time of a given observer, and the exact mix of perceptual, cognitive, affective, social, cultural and historical influences which enter into the 'construction' of a given experience. In this sense, each conscious construction is private, subjective, and unique. Taken together, the contents of consciousness provide a
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just on the light, but on the events in E's brain and his reports of the experience. In such a situation, S becomes the experimenter and E becomes the subject; thus, following current conventions, "S would now be entitled to think of her observations (of the light and E's brain) as 'public and objective' and to regard E's experiences of the light as 'private and subjective'."
191:). Thus, Velmans argues, the relationship between subjects and experienced reality is reflexive: some experiences apprehended by the subject are quite clearly placed "in the world" by the perceiving mind. The contents of consciousness are, thus, not exclusively in the brain, but often in the perceived physical world itself; in fact, in terms of
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stimulus and brain states of S that he can observe. In such a case, E's experience of events would be considered "objective" or "public", while S's experiences are "subjective" and "private"; while E's focus is on recording the neural causes and correlates of visual experiences, S is interested only in reporting about such experiences.
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between a "subjective" first-person experience of a given event or object and a third-person "objective" observation of the same event or object. It also throws doubt on the supposed contrast between the "subjectivity" of a subject's experience and the supposed "objectivity" of an external observer's
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Velmans points out that this outcome is patently absurd, as the phenomenology of the light (that is, the way it is experienced) remains the same from the perspective of S or E, whether it is thought of as being an observed stimulus or a subjective experience. Nothing has changed in the nature of the
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of the light, and thus E's focus is not just on the light (which he thinks of as a "stimulus") but also on the observable events in S's brain, and on S's reports concerning what she experiences. Thus, E is interested first and foremost in the subject's experience, and how these relate to the light
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However, Velmans points out that all that would be required for S and E to exchange roles is for them to change their respective foci (as he puts it "S and E merely have to turn their heads"), so that E focuses exclusively on the light and reports his experiences, while S focuses her attention not
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of the wider universe, giving it the appearance of a 3D phenomenal world. ... However, such conscious representations are not the thing-itself. In this vision, there is one universe (the thing-itself), with relatively differentiated parts in the form of conscious beings like ourselves, each with a
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the brain, given that some of them quite clearly occur within the experienced world itself (for example, asked to point to an external light as-experienced, almost all rational subjects would point to the light that is experienced rather than to the brain, which is where, according to dualists and
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This sketch of how consciousness fits into the wider universe supports a form of non-reductive, Reflexive Monism. Human minds, bodies and brains are embedded in a far greater universe. Individual conscious representations are perspectival. That is, the precise manner in which entities, events and
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difference between publicly observed phenomena and private, subjective experiences. This becomes a point of departure for a more nuanced analysis of subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity, and ultimately for an epistemology for the study of consciousness that, according to
Velmans, fits
131:
After his graduation in 1963 Velmans had started his career designing electrical circuits at the electronics laboratory of the
Australian engineering company EMAIL Ltd. After half a year he moved to systems analyses of business and industrial systems at the new information technology department.
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Velmans conceives of a situation in which an experimenter ("E") is observing a subject ("S") exposed to a light stimulus. The differences between the two viewpoints, Velmans argues, is primarily derived from a difference in interest, reflected in a difference in their required activities. To
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experiences of the external world are none other than the physical world-as-experienced, thereby placing aspects of human consciousness in the external phenomenal world, rather than exclusively within the head or brain. A similar point of departure is adopted in much of
European
128:, where he received his B.Eng in 1963. In the evening he attended psychology classes at the University of Sydney for another two years, before moving to Europe. After several years of research and development he received his PhD in Psychology from Bedford College in 1974.
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categorises
Velmans' work as non-reductionist, stressing the importance of first-person accounts of the phenomenology of consciousness, as well as third-person accounts of brain states and functions, which in Velmans' work are thought of as complementary.
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biem Graben, P. & Atmanspacher, H. (2009) Extending the philosophical significance of the idea of complementarity. In H. Atmanspacher and H. Primas (eds.) Recasting reality: Wolfgang Pauli’s
Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science. Springer,
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unique, conscious view of the larger universe of which it is a part. In so far as we are parts of the universe that, in turn, experience the larger universe, we participate in a reflexive process whereby the universe experiences itself."
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in 1994, and served as its chair from 2003 to 2006. He was appointed
National Visiting Professor for 2010–2011 by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, and in 2011 was elected to a Fellowship of the British
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Hoche, Hans-Ulrich (2007). "Reflexive monism versus complementarism: An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max
Velmans's reflexive model of consciousness".
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195:, there is no clear and distinct difference between what we normally think of as the "physical world", the "phenomenal world" and the "world as perceived". He writes:
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Batthyany, A (2002) Consciousness in the natural world (a review of M.Velmans, 2000, Understanding
Consciousness). Theory & Psychology 12(3), pp. 415–417.
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Harman, W. (1993) Towards an
Adequate Epistemology for the Scientific Exploration of Consciousness Journal of Scientific Exploration, 7 (2), pp. 133–143.
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on her experiences of the light, which she needs to communicate to E in an appropriate manner. E, on the other hand, is interested primarily in S's
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studies in which he develops this basic point of departure into a general theory that addresses the many problems of consciousness, including
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Faw, B. (2009) Book review of Max
Velmans, Understanding Consciousness (2nd ed.) Journal of Consciousness Studies. Vol. 16, No.9, pp103-108
136:, University of London to pursue research for his PhD. In 1968 he was appointed to a lectureship in the new Psychology Department at
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light that either party can observe, save in the contextualising focus of their interests. That is, Velmans concludes, there is no
70:(for the existence of the phenomenal world), which falls short of avowing the necessity of perception to the existence of reality
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140:, University of London, eventually to a personal chair in Psychology, and from 2006 to Emeritus Professor of Psychology.
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182:. It states that it does not make sense to speak of phenomenological experiences of reality as occurring solely
171:(2000, 2009) is a comprehensive summary of his theoretical work, and introduces the idea of "reflexive monism."
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Blackmore, S. (2005) Conversations on Consciousness: Interviews with twenty minds. Oxford University Press.
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Velmans is the author and editor of numerous books and papers on consciousness, including the following:
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654:"Towards a Deeper Understanding of Consciousness: Selected works of Max Velmans (Hardback) - Routledge"
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640:"Consciousness (Critical Concepts in Psychology), Major Works Series (4 volumes), London: Routledge"
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Varela, F. J. (1999) Present time consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(2–3), 111–140.
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Revonsuo, A. (2006) Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon. Cambridge: MIT Press.
30:(born 27 May 1942 in Amsterdam) is a British psychologist and Emeritus Professor of Psychology at
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Velmans lecture on "The Ancient History and Future of Consciousness Studies", Chesham, UK, 2019
283:(Routledge/Psychology Press, London, 2000), edition 2 (Routledge/Psychology Press, London, 2009)
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Velmans, M. (2009) Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2. Routledge/Psychology Press, p. 298
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Harris, K. (2009) Review of Max Velmans Understanding Consciousness. Metapsychology, 13 (52)
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World Library of Psychologists Series, London: Routledge/Psychology Press, pp. 1-15 (of 22)
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Velmans & Schneider (Eds.)The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Wiley-Blackwell
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http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=5300&cn=396
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The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological and Clinical Reviews
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observations of the neural correlates of that experience in the subject's brain.
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Velmans' website including list of selected publications with brief descriptions
225:. The experiment was designed to demonstrate the difficulties in distinguishing
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Velmans co-founded the Consciousness and Experiential Psychology Section of the
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Toward a Deeper Understanding of Consciousness: Selected works of Max Velmans.
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Blackmore, S. (2003) Consciousness: An introduction. Hodder & Stoughton.
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Velmans' lecture on "The Unconscious Ground of Being", Cortona, Italy, 2009.
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800:"Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New methodologies and maps"
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679:"Understanding Consciousness: 2nd Edition (Paperback) - Routledge"
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After touring through Europe in 1966 he became affiliated with
742:. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons. p. 823.
295:(jointly edited with Susan Schneider, Wiley-Blackwell, 2017)
34:, principally known for the theory of consciousness called "
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Reflexive monism presents itself as an alternative to both
95:(2017). In his map of prominent theories of consciousness
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The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness Second Edition
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The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness Second Edition
289:(jointly edited with Susan Schneider - Blackwell, 2007)
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explain, during the experiment S is required only to
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http://www.psych.ucalgary.ca/thpsyc/Reviews12(3).pdf
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Zeman, Adam (2001). "The paradox of consciousness".
81:Velmans has around 100 publications in the area of
221:is one of many conceived by Velmans, discussed in
785:"How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?"
610:"An Epistemology for the Study of Consciousness"
271:Major Works Series (4 Volumes) (Routledge, 2018)
861:British consciousness researchers and theorists
275:Towards a Deeper Understanding of Consciousness
269:Consciousness (Critical Concepts in Psychology)
93:Towards a Deeper Understanding of Consciousness
627:list of Velmans' publications on consciousness
301:How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?
856:Academics of Goldsmiths, University of London
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420:from the Introduction to Velmans, M. (2017)
866:People educated at Sydney Boys High School
705:"The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness"
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49:divide by noting that, in terms of their
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372:Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
287:The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness
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307:Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness
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256:psychology smoothly into science.
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32:Goldsmiths, University of London
187:reductionists, the experience
124:at St. Andrews College at the
62:(for the existence of reality
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703:Velmans and Schneider (eds).
508:10.1016/S0140-6736(05)71582-8
145:British Psychological Society
41:Reflexive monism bridges the
435:"Academy of Social Sciences"
281:Understanding Consciousness
223:Understanding Consciousness
168:Understanding Consciousness
161:Understanding Consciousness
88:Understanding Consciousness
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798:Velmans, Max, ed. (2000).
638:Velmans, Max, ed. (2018).
150:Academy of Social Sciences
394:10.1007/s11097-006-9045-8
118:Sydney Boy's High School
309:(John Benjamins, 2000)
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122:Electrical Engineering
851:British psychologists
783:Velmans, Max (2003).
608:Max, Velmans (2007).
260:Selected publications
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112:, Velmans grew up in
189:actually takes place
126:University of Sydney
787:. Imprint Academic.
481:10 May 2012 at the
74:(the principle of "
768:has generic name (
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707:. Wiley-Blackwell.
227:phenomenologically
219:thought experiment
138:Goldsmiths College
116:. After attending
91:(2000, 2009), and
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835:Categories
688:12 January
663:12 January
496:The Lancet
445:15 October
360:pp.99–113.
322:References
240:experience
758:cite book
380:CiteSeerX
165:Velmans'
110:Amsterdam
104:Biography
66:), with
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587:cite web
516:54309186
479:Archived
418:Extracts
108:Born in
68:idealism
402:6523654
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60:realism
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184:within
72:per se
64:per se
577:9 May
571:(PDF)
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770:help
744:ISBN
725:help
690:2017
665:2017
593:link
579:2012
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214:The
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