330:—the attempt to understand the relationship between management control, worker skill and wages in industrial workplaces—Filtzer emphasised the continuing absence of control by Soviet workers over their own labour process. The Soviet elite would not radically change the labour process by democratising it and introducing truly equal wages for everyone in society, but nor could they generate the culture of consumerism that in the West was used to help explain the wage and skill structure. In these circumstances, attempts to coordinate production quotas, wages and expected levels of worker effort failed and continued to fail into the 1980s. The wage reform of 1956–1962 was a failure, as it could neither fix nor improve the economic conflict between workers and the elite in the Soviet Union. On the shop floor, workers continued to directly bargain with low-level management over effort, wages and what "skill" they would exert. In particular, Filtzer notes that Soviet workers were constantly forced into a position of exerting more skill than was officially called for in plans or quotas. This was because Soviet workers often had to find their own ways of working around problems that made their efforts difficult, such as building their own tools to carry out tasks that could not be performed with the tools provided, or by devising entirely new production processes of their own when existing processes were not suitable. This was a condition only seen to such an extent in the West in industries that were insulated from market forces. Because this was common in Soviet industry, workers and managers in the Soviet Union had many reasons to work together in the setting of wages, quotas and skill expectations, even after the wage reform. Filtzer wrote that
153:
Soviet ministry or government department would set its own rates and wage scales for work in the factories or enterprises for which they were responsible. Within one ministry there could be great variation in pay rates for jobs requiring largely identical responsibilities and skills, based on what the factory was producing, the location of the factory and other factors that Moscow considered important. Basing payments on these central directives often led to long and costly processes in the calculation of wages. Historian Donald
Filtzer wrote of one 1930s machinist who in one month completed 1,424 individual pieces of work. Amongst these had been 484 differing tasks, all of which had been assigned a basic individual payment rate of between 3 and 50 kopecks each (1 rouble was made up of 100 kopecks). To calculate this worker's wage, his employer had to process 2,885 documents which had required some 8,500 signatures on 8 kilograms (18 lb) of paper, costing the factory 309 roubles, a fifth of what they would pay the worker, whose total earnings for the labour amounted to 1,389 roubles.
290:
try to encourage workers into roles that had lost much of their attraction after basic wages were cut to match pay throughout an area. Managers would therefore offer higher wages to new trainees. This had the effect of encouraging some to take a high-paid training position and then leave for a new training position upon qualification. In coal mining, managers had long held the ability to vary wages based on local considerations, such as geological factors or hazard levels, and after the reform they continued to vary wages through manipulation of quotas or rates to protect workers' wages. A further problem with a centrally directed bonus system was that it encouraged factories to continue producing well established, more familiar products because it was far easier to overfulfill targets on familiar products than to start work on new items.
157:
that they would (on paper) overfulfill their targets and therefore receive their bonuses. Typically, managers were loath to see their employees' wages fall too low, so they frequently kept quotas deliberately low, or offered ways for workers to manipulate their work outputs to achieve a higher bonus. They generally did this to ensure that their factory could run smoothly, rather than out of concern for the workers' personal welfare. The erratic and seemingly arbitrary way that quotas had been set across different industries led to a high level of uncompleted production in industries where it was more difficult to overfulfill production quotas. Managers therefore tried to keep quotas deliberately low to attract workers to their factories to ensure their factories were able to meet their targets.
217:
323:) they had undergone a process of "hyper individualisation", a process that had been heavily influenced by the overall incentive process. This had led to a situation where workers who could not count on a Western-style meritocracy (where they might expect to find their pay and conditions improve with promotions) would instead have to rely on the decisions of managers to give bonuses and overtime payments if they wanted to increase their wages. Because managers needed to be able to give rewards and bonuses at their own discretion, sticking to a centrally directed system of wages was very difficult.
117:) was endemic; it involved crash programs in which factories tried to undertake all their monthly production quota in a very short space of time. This was usually the result of a lack of industrial materials that left factories without the resources to complete production until new supplies arrived at the end of the month. Workers then worked as many hours as possible to meet monthly quotas in time; this exhausted them and left them unable to work at the beginning of the next month (although lack of raw materials meant there would have been very little for them to produce at this point anyway).
77:
128:) by fulfilling 100 percent of their quota. The wage rate for work would grow as production over this level increased. If a worker produced 120 percent of his own personal quota for the month (for example, if he was supposed to produce 1,000 items, but actually produced 1,200) he would receive his basic wage for the first 100 percent, a higher rate for the first 10 percent of over production and an even higher rate for the next 10 percent. Soviet authorities hoped that this would encourage a
2688:
2626:
2638:
915:
2664:
2676:
20:
265:
raised, many could not meet their own personal quota. The proportion of workers who achieved 100 percent or less of their quota varied from as low as 5.1 percent in iron and steel industries, to 31.4 percent in coal mining. Across Soviet industry, the average level of quota fulfillment fell from 169 percent before the reform, to 120 percent in
October 1963.
277:
were working a 41-hour week. It was planned to decrease this further to 40 hours in 1962, but this was eventually not carried out. Khrushchev had stated a longer-term aim of giving Soviet workers the shortest working hours in the world, aiming for a 30- to 35-hour week by 1968. He had spoken previously of the reduction of working hours as a basic goal of a
102:, but by 1932, annual production increased to 23.1 billion roubles. Factories and industrial enterprises were actively encouraged to "achieve at whatever cost", with a strong emphasis placed on overfulfilling stated targets so as to produce as much as possible. For example, the slogan for the first
268:
Overall wages rose much more slowly throughout the period than planned: wages across the entire state (not only industrial wages) rose by 22.9 percent between 1959 and 1965, against a plan for growth of 26 percent. Wage rises during the reform were made up for by increases in industrial productivity.
54:
system. Thus their individual wages were directly tied to the amount of work they produced. This policy was intended to encourage workers to toil and therefore increase production as much as possible. The piece-rate system led to the growth of bureaucracy and contributed to significant inefficiencies
293:
Sometimes in areas where the new wages were applied, factories would struggle to recruit workers for important tasks because the reform had given a low pay grade to a task that was considered to require a lower level of skill. For example, machine-tool operation was given a low pay grade, and at one
247:
A major change was made in the way overfulfillment was rewarded. Progressive piece-rates, where rates increased as outputs grew, were ended, and workers were paid a one-off bonus upon overachieving a quota. Where bonus rates were retained for each percentage of overfulfillment, they were capped. For
177:
system that had existed under Stalin, but also reforming the economic policies of the Soviet Union. In the 1950s, the Soviet economy had begun to fall behind schedule in the output of several key materials including coal, iron and cement, and worker productivity was not growing at the rate expected.
160:
Even without managerial manipulation, quotas were very often low and easy to overfulfill. Quotas had been lowered during the Second World War so that new workers would be able to fulfill their output expectations; in industries such as engineering, it was common for workers to double their basic pay
306:
Overall, the wage reform failed to create a stable and predictable incentives system. Filtzer wrote that wider issues in Soviet industry and relations between managers and workers are important in understanding the failure. Filtzer noted a myriad of issues in Soviet production that had meant a more
276:
The wage reform was linked to a program that reduced the length of the overall working week in the Soviet Union, and in 1958, the working week was reduced from 48 hours to 41. This was to apply to all Soviet workers, and by 1961, 40 million Soviet workers (approximately two thirds of the workforce)
230:
The Sixth Five Year Plan made several key changes to Soviet workers' wages. Firstly, basic wages were increased so that there would be less pressure to overfulfill quotas, and therefore less pressure to manipulate or distort results. Wage increases were restricted to the lowest paid jobs, as Soviet
207:
included calls for a reform of wages. The reforms had several objectives, the most important of which was to create a more consistent system of incentives for workers. It was also hoped that the reforms would help to reduce the levels of waste and misallocation of labour that were frequently found
152:
The piece-rate approach to wages had been introduced in the first Five-Year Plan in 1928 and had changed very little since then. In practice the piece-rate system led to many inefficiencies in Soviet industry. One issue was the vast bureaucracy that was involved in administering wage payments. Each
297:
In other instances, managers deliberately used the reforms as an opportunity to cut wages, exaggerating wage cuts made by the ministries so that they would be able to cut back on overall expenditure. In one case, a manager of a concrete factory was sentenced to eight months corrective labour after
289:
Whilst the reform did remove some of the peculiarities of the
Stalinist era, the overall impact of program created additional problems for the Soviet worker. In many areas, large variations in wages continued to exist. In engineering, for example, factory managers often ignored wage directives to
264:
By 1961, workers' basic wages had risen to an average of about 73 percent of their total earnings; piece-rate workers saw an average of 71 percent and time workers 76 percent of their earnings as their basic wage. There was also a reduction in the overall level of quota overfulfillment—with quotas
243:
The number of wage rates and wage scales was drastically reduced; this not only cut bureaucracy, but also ensured that workers would be more eager to take on a wider range of tasks. Time workers, for example, would be paid the same regardless of which task they carried out during their shift. This
239:
Secondly, quotas were raised to limit the ability of workers to overfulfill targets. In the case of time workers, this was sometimes done by keeping quotas the same but reducing hours; for example, coal miners saw their working day shortened to six hours. Some rises were very steep; in the case of
260:
The reform's clearest effect was to reduce the proportion of Soviet industrial labour that was paid by piece-rate, and by August 1962, 60.5 percent of Soviet workers were paid by piece-rate, down from the 1956 level of 75 percent. Around half of those who remained on piece-rates would continue to
156:
Time workers—workers who were paid for the time they spent working rather than by how much they individually produced—also received bonuses based on performance. Factory managers, who did not want these workers to lose out to their piece-rate colleagues, often manipulated output figures to ensure
311:
and a reliance on "storming" that made it difficult to motivate workers through a more conventional payments system. In such cases, it was vital to have the ability to offer additional overtime payments and even use bribes or "palm-greasing" to incentivise workers to meet monthly quotas on time.
58:
The wage reforms sought to remove these wage practices and offer an efficient financial incentive to Soviet workers by standardising wages and reducing the dependence on overtime or bonus payments. However, industrial managers were often unwilling to take actions that would effectively reduce
59:
workers' wages and frequently ignored the directives they were given, continuing to pay workers high overtime rates. Industrial materials were frequently in short supply, and production needed to be carried out as quickly as possible once materials were available—a practice known as
261:
receive some kind of bonus payment, but the progressive piece-rate bonuses were mostly eliminated, with only 0.5 percent of workers continuing to receive them in 1962. Workers who were taken off piece-rate payments were then paid an hourly rate or received a salary.
251:
Lastly, workers whose tasks were considered too important to be paid on a piece-rate basis were moved to a time-rate method. This was largely done in consideration of safety grounds and usually applied to those conducting maintenance or the repair of equipment.
132:
spirit of overfulfillment of quotas among the Soviet workforce. In 1956, approximately 75 percent of Soviet workers were paid under such a piece-rate system, so the majority of Soviet workers could significantly boost their earnings by increasing their output.
244:
allowed managers to better distribute labour and reduce the frequency of bottlenecks occurring in production. They could do this because workers would be paid a similar rate no matter what they undertook, so it became easier to move workers between tasks.
235:
sought to be seen as the "friend to the underdog". It was also hoped that wage rises for lower paid jobs would encourage more women to enter industry and that freezes on higher paid jobs would deter people from leaving employment.
63:. The prevalence of storming meant that the ability to offer bonus payments was vital to the everyday operation of Soviet industry, and as a result the reforms ultimately failed to create a more efficient system.
905:
1545:
144:) that the lack of transparency surrounding average wages was intended to prevent Soviet workers from discovering the huge disparities that existed between wages in different sectors of the Soviet economy.
124:; their wage payments depended upon how much work they personally completed. Soviet workers were given individual quotas for the amount of work they should personally deliver and would earn a basic wage (
1949:
1932:
1362:
185:
315:
Filtzer also stated that because Soviet workers were unable to organise against their superiors in the same way that their counterparts in the West could (for example by forming an independent
1979:
1337:
136:
Average wage rates in the Soviet Union were published relatively rarely. Some academics in the West believed this was because the Soviet government wanted to conceal low average earnings.
1922:
1301:
2442:
1942:
920:
1317:
1968:
1937:
1927:
1879:
192:) announced that a State Committee on Labour and Wages had been formed to investigate changes to wages and a centralised system of wage adjustments. In July 1955, Soviet
2176:
55:
in Soviet industry. In addition, factory managers frequently manipulated the personal production quotas given to workers to prevent workers' wages from falling too low.
1238:
904:
2735:
1874:
1487:
1540:
270:
40:
2059:
2029:
216:
1513:
2316:
2276:
2186:
1997:
199:
spoke of the need for Soviet industry to end outdated work quotas and reform wages, so that the Soviet Union could better incentivise workers and reduce
28:
2304:
2199:
2071:
1857:
1261:
94:, the Soviet Union attempted to achieve economic growth through increased industrial production. In 1927–1928, the sum total of Soviet production of
2209:
2126:
2019:
2149:
1956:
1823:
1088:
1847:
1692:
86:, a coal miner who famously cut 14 times his daily quota of coal in one shift, was presented as a role model for workers by Soviet authorities.
307:
formal bonus system was unworkable in the Soviet Union: irregular availability of supplies that were often of variable quality, an irrational
1835:
1801:
1789:
1784:
1675:
1190:
949:
2371:
2139:
1327:
1286:
1231:
2745:
2251:
1917:
1864:
1852:
1296:
1266:
320:
204:
189:
120:
To encourage individual workers to work hard and produce as much as they possibly could, most workers in Soviet industry were paid on a
103:
2740:
2725:
2720:
2715:
2710:
2299:
2294:
2014:
1962:
1342:
2551:
2502:
2435:
2246:
1974:
1576:
1480:
1291:
1180:
1130:
1077:
1025:
2581:
2569:
2393:
2383:
2339:
2154:
1830:
1779:
1662:
2586:
2574:
2430:
2415:
2329:
2231:
1813:
1633:
1224:
973:
2527:
2507:
2261:
2204:
1818:
1643:
1571:
80:
1281:
2668:
2598:
2425:
2289:
2241:
2002:
1796:
1670:
1653:
294:
factory in
Kotlyakov some 30 machine-tools sat unused as factory managers were unable to recruit workers to operate them.
2654:
2194:
1869:
1764:
1565:
1473:
1413:
1102:
1040:
106:, "The Five-Year Plan In Four Years!", called on workers to fulfill the state's objectives a year earlier than planned.
939:
2475:
2457:
2334:
2223:
2081:
2042:
2009:
1699:
1687:
1603:
1505:
1398:
1357:
1322:
1271:
1004:
982:
958:
193:
2470:
2447:
2420:
1017:
169:
After the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union went through a process of moving away from
Stalinist policies known as
109:
Frantically rushed production was very common in Soviet industry, and in particular a process known as "storming" (
2730:
2512:
2485:
2388:
1367:
2593:
39:
away from the mindset of overfulfilling quotas that had characterised the Soviet economy during the preceding
1842:
935:
2522:
2114:
2052:
1434:
1403:
1247:
273:(Russia) wages rose by 7 percent between 1959 and 1962, whilst productivity increased by some 20 percent.
1613:
2641:
1449:
129:
1884:
2403:
2266:
2086:
1598:
327:
36:
2692:
2630:
2359:
2164:
2093:
1901:
1750:
1628:
1550:
1523:
1408:
1383:
1200:
962:
2497:
2480:
2408:
1725:
1638:
1528:
1518:
1049:
308:
2605:
2545:
2324:
2110:
1806:
1608:
1593:
1535:
1276:
1176:
1126:
1073:
1021:
331:
298:
being found guilty of using the reforms as a pretext to extract unpaid overtime from workers.
232:
50:
Throughout the
Stalinist period, most Soviet workers had been paid for their work based on a
1332:
1152:
1061:
1035:
196:
170:
110:
2517:
1730:
1682:
1588:
1352:
1195:
1093:
200:
60:
2537:
2465:
1745:
1735:
1347:
1156:
1143:(March 1966). "Wages in the Soviet Union: A Comment on Recently Published Statistics".
1140:
1066:
338:), which ultimately failed and had to be replaced with a decentralised system in 1991.
248:
example, in engineering, bonuses could not exceed 20 percent of their normal earnings.
137:
23:
A Soviet postage stamp from 1959. The stamp celebrates growth in the chemical industry.
2704:
2680:
2490:
2398:
1164:
173:. The purpose of de-Stalinization included not only ending the use of terror and the
99:
986:
2281:
2102:
1496:
141:
95:
32:
281:
and had hoped that communism would eventually achieve a working day of 3–4 hours.
998:
903:
2144:
2106:
2098:
1720:
1704:
1618:
1560:
1418:
335:
316:
140:
wrote in 1966 (when wage statistics were published for the first time since the
2134:
1393:
121:
51:
1169:
2354:
2349:
2171:
2064:
1894:
1555:
1122:
278:
91:
44:
19:
2663:
2344:
1889:
1623:
1583:
1439:
1216:
923:
was created from a revision of this article dated 23 April 2012
2236:
1740:
1454:
1444:
1053:
1465:
76:
222:
180:
2159:
2037:
951:
An
Evaluation of the Program for Reducing the Workweek in the USSR
700:
An
Evaluation of the Program for Reducing the Workweek in the USSR
174:
75:
18:
2271:
2047:
1469:
1220:
2256:
2076:
1363:
Five-year plans for the national economy of the Soviet Union
1038:(May 1960). "Soviet Growth: Routine, Inertia and Pressure".
901:
240:
engineering enterprises, quotas were raised by 65 percent.
35:
attempted to implement major wage reforms intended to move
334:
attempted a very similar series of wage reforms in 1986 (
319:
or joining a political party in opposition to the ruling
2652:
1089:"Substance and Shadow in the Soviet Seven Year Plan"
833:
831:
770:
768:
659:
657:
655:
2562:
2536:
2456:
2370:
2315:
2222:
2185:
2125:
2028:
1990:
1910:
1772:
1763:
1713:
1661:
1652:
1504:
1427:
1376:
1318:
Collectivization in the People's
Republic of Poland
1310:
1254:
642:
640:
638:
625:
623:
621:
565:
563:
561:
559:
557:
472:
470:
1168:
1065:
445:
443:
441:
416:
414:
389:
387:
385:
2345:Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences
1000:An Evaluation of the Soviet Wage Reform, 1956–62
975:Soviet Economic Policy: December 1956 – May 1957
584:
582:
580:
578:
513:Soviet Economic Policy: December 1956 – May 1957
914:
1481:
1232:
8:
220:Lidiya Kulagina, a worker in the newspaper
2376:
1769:
1658:
1488:
1474:
1466:
1389:Wage reform in the Soviet Union, 1956–1962
1282:Economy of the People's Republic of Poland
1239:
1225:
1217:
1414:Economic System of Socialism (GDR, 1970s)
1384:New Economic Policy (Soviet Union, 1920s)
31:, especially from 1956 through 1962, the
931:, and does not reflect subsequent edits.
512:
215:
2659:
1404:New Economic Mechanism (Hungary, 1960s)
1145:British Journal of Industrial Relations
346:
1514:Index of Soviet Union–related articles
1003:. Cia/Rr Er 63-22. Washington, D.C.:
205:sixth Five-Year Plan for 1956 to 1960
7:
2736:Economic history of the Soviet Union
1399:Kosygin reform (Soviet Union, 1960s)
1328:Collectivization in the Soviet Union
687:
612:
1267:Economy of Communist Czechoslovakia
1014:Soviet Workers and de-Stalinization
321:Communist Party of the Soviet Union
43:period and toward a more efficient
1157:10.1111/j.1467-8543.1966.tb00928.x
747:
699:
353:
14:
1419:Perestroika (Soviet Union, 1980s)
873:
861:
849:
837:
822:
810:
798:
786:
774:
759:
735:
723:
711:
675:
663:
646:
629:
600:
569:
500:
476:
449:
420:
365:
2686:
2674:
2662:
2637:
2636:
2624:
1409:New Economic System (GDR, 1960s)
1199:. 9 January 1933. Archived from
913:
588:
548:
536:
524:
488:
461:
405:
393:
184:(the official newspaper of the
1175:. New York: Ballantine Books.
1119:Russia: A State of Uncertainty
377:
81:Aleksei Grigorievich Stakhanov
1:
2177:Political abuse of psychiatry
1969:Congress of People's Deputies
1277:Goulash (Hungarian) Communism
1087:Hoeffding, Oleg (1958–1959).
1068:A History of the Soviet Union
1191:"Russia: End Five-Year Plan"
1103:Council on Foreign Relations
1041:The American Economic Review
432:
2340:Academy of Medical Sciences
1358:Collectivization in Romania
1338:Collectivization in Ukraine
1323:Collectivization in Hungary
1272:Economy of the Soviet Union
1005:Central Intelligence Agency
983:Central Intelligence Agency
959:Central Intelligence Agency
98:amounted to 6 billion
2762:
2746:Reform in the Soviet Union
1343:Land Reforms (Afghanistan)
1018:Cambridge University Press
113:: штурмовщина, pronounced
2741:Labor in the Soviet Union
2726:1960s in the Soviet Union
2721:1960s in economic history
2716:1950s in the Soviet Union
2711:1950s in economic history
2618:
2379:
1368:Systematization (Romania)
1333:Battle for trade (Poland)
1302:Economy of SFR Yugoslavia
37:Soviet industrial workers
1353:Three Year Plan (Poland)
1012:Filtzer, Donald (1992).
997:Fearn, Robert M (1963).
16:Economic reform movement
2631:Soviet Union portal
1394:New Course (GDR, 1950s)
1377:Pre-dissolution reforms
1262:Economy of East Germany
1121:. London and New York:
1117:Robinson, Neil (2002).
2669:Business and economics
2523:Stalinist architecture
2277:Science and technology
2187:Ideological repression
2115:Soviet Airborne Forces
2053:Destruction battalions
1435:Eastern Bloc economies
1248:Eastern Bloc economies
985:. 1957. Archived from
961:. 1961. Archived from
909:
889:Listen to this article
227:
87:
24:
2305:List of metro systems
1858:Collective leadership
908:
328:labour process theory
219:
90:During the period of
79:
22:
2267:Net material product
2210:Censorship of images
2127:Political repression
2087:Soviet Border Troops
2020:First Deputy Premier
1604:1965 economic reform
1599:Soviet space program
1287:Economy of Lithuania
1203:on November 22, 2010
981:. Washington, D.C.:
957:. Washington, D.C.:
940:More spoken articles
876:, pages 233, 237–238
852:, pages 233, 234–236
269:For example, in the
208:in Soviet industry.
2335:Academy of Sciences
2150:Population transfer
2094:Soviet Armed Forces
1957:Congress of Soviets
1938:Presidium/Politburo
1902:Soviet anti-Zionism
1751:West Siberian Plain
1629:Revolutions of 1989
1566:Great Patriotic War
1551:New Economic Policy
1297:Economy of Moldavia
1072:. London: Fontana.
688:Hoeffding (1958–59)
613:Hoeffding (1958–59)
45:financial incentive
1980:Military Collegium
1848:Capital punishment
1726:Caucasus Mountains
1639:Post-Soviet states
1519:Russian Revolution
910:
309:division of labour
279:communist movement
228:
88:
25:
2650:
2649:
2614:
2613:
2606:Hammer and sickle
2548:and their groups
2546:Soviet dissidents
2325:Communist Academy
2242:Economic planning
2218:
2217:
2111:Soviet Air Forces
2030:Security services
1950:General Secretary
1933:Central Committee
1875:Political parties
1807:Brezhnev Doctrine
1802:Foreign relations
1759:
1758:
1700:Autonomous okrugs
1614:Soviet–Afghan War
1594:Sino-Soviet split
1536:Russian Civil War
1463:
1462:
1292:Economy of Latvia
1062:Hosking, Geoffrey
1036:Grossman, Gregory
906:
332:Mikhail Gorbachev
233:Nikita Khrushchev
226:print shop (1959)
203:. The subsequent
186:Central Committee
161:through bonuses.
2753:
2731:De-Stalinization
2691:
2690:
2689:
2679:
2678:
2677:
2667:
2666:
2658:
2640:
2639:
2629:
2628:
2627:
2377:
2285:
2140:Collectivization
1885:Marxism–Leninism
1770:
1659:
1490:
1483:
1476:
1467:
1440:Shortage economy
1428:Related concepts
1311:Collectivization
1241:
1234:
1227:
1218:
1212:
1210:
1208:
1186:
1174:
1160:
1151:(1–3): 212–221.
1136:
1113:
1111:
1109:
1083:
1071:
1057:
1031:
1008:
993:
991:
980:
969:
967:
956:
930:
928:
917:
916:
907:
897:
895:
890:
877:
871:
865:
859:
853:
847:
841:
835:
826:
820:
814:
808:
802:
796:
790:
784:
778:
772:
763:
757:
751:
745:
739:
733:
727:
721:
715:
709:
703:
697:
691:
685:
679:
673:
667:
661:
650:
644:
633:
627:
616:
610:
604:
598:
592:
586:
573:
567:
552:
546:
540:
534:
528:
522:
516:
510:
504:
498:
492:
486:
480:
474:
465:
459:
453:
447:
436:
430:
424:
418:
409:
403:
397:
391:
380:
375:
369:
363:
357:
351:
197:Nikolai Bulganin
171:de-Stalinization
142:Second World War
2761:
2760:
2756:
2755:
2754:
2752:
2751:
2750:
2701:
2700:
2697:
2687:
2685:
2675:
2673:
2661:
2653:
2651:
2646:
2625:
2623:
2610:
2558:
2532:
2452:
2366:
2311:
2283:
2257:Internet domain
2252:Five-year plans
2214:
2181:
2121:
2024:
1986:
1918:Communist Party
1906:
1865:Passport system
1755:
1731:European Russia
1709:
1648:
1589:Khrushchev Thaw
1568:(World War II)
1546:Creation treaty
1500:
1494:
1464:
1459:
1423:
1372:
1306:
1250:
1245:
1215:
1206:
1204:
1189:
1183:
1163:
1139:
1133:
1116:
1107:
1105:
1094:Foreign Affairs
1086:
1080:
1060:
1034:
1028:
1011:
996:
989:
978:
972:
965:
954:
948:
944:
943:
932:
926:
924:
921:This audio file
918:
911:
902:
899:
893:
892:
888:
885:
880:
872:
868:
864:, pages 209–230
860:
856:
848:
844:
836:
829:
821:
817:
809:
805:
801:, pages 116–117
797:
793:
785:
781:
773:
766:
758:
754:
748:Grossman (1960)
746:
742:
734:
730:
722:
718:
710:
706:
698:
694:
686:
682:
674:
670:
662:
653:
645:
636:
628:
619:
611:
607:
599:
595:
587:
576:
568:
555:
547:
543:
535:
531:
523:
519:
511:
507:
499:
495:
487:
483:
475:
468:
460:
456:
448:
439:
431:
427:
419:
412:
404:
400:
392:
383:
376:
372:
364:
360:
354:Robinson (2002)
352:
348:
344:
304:
287:
258:
214:
201:labour turnover
190:Communist Party
167:
150:
115:shturmovshchina
74:
72:Existing system
69:
17:
12:
11:
5:
2759:
2757:
2749:
2748:
2743:
2738:
2733:
2728:
2723:
2718:
2713:
2703:
2702:
2696:
2695:
2683:
2671:
2648:
2647:
2645:
2644:
2634:
2619:
2616:
2615:
2612:
2611:
2609:
2608:
2603:
2602:
2601:
2591:
2590:
2589:
2579:
2578:
2577:
2566:
2564:
2560:
2559:
2557:
2556:
2555:
2554:
2542:
2540:
2534:
2533:
2531:
2530:
2525:
2520:
2515:
2510:
2505:
2500:
2495:
2494:
2493:
2483:
2478:
2473:
2468:
2462:
2460:
2454:
2453:
2451:
2450:
2445:
2440:
2439:
2438:
2433:
2423:
2418:
2413:
2412:
2411:
2406:
2401:
2391:
2386:
2380:
2374:
2368:
2367:
2365:
2364:
2363:
2362:
2352:
2347:
2342:
2337:
2332:
2327:
2321:
2319:
2313:
2312:
2310:
2309:
2308:
2307:
2302:
2300:Rail transport
2297:
2295:Railway system
2287:
2279:
2274:
2269:
2264:
2259:
2254:
2249:
2244:
2239:
2234:
2228:
2226:
2220:
2219:
2216:
2215:
2213:
2212:
2207:
2202:
2197:
2191:
2189:
2183:
2182:
2180:
2179:
2174:
2169:
2168:
2167:
2157:
2152:
2147:
2142:
2137:
2131:
2129:
2123:
2122:
2120:
2119:
2118:
2117:
2091:
2090:
2089:
2084:
2074:
2069:
2068:
2067:
2057:
2056:
2055:
2045:
2040:
2034:
2032:
2026:
2025:
2023:
2022:
2017:
2015:Deputy Premier
2012:
2007:
2006:
2005:
1998:Heads of state
1994:
1992:
1988:
1987:
1985:
1984:
1983:
1982:
1972:
1966:
1963:Supreme Soviet
1960:
1954:
1953:
1952:
1947:
1946:
1945:
1940:
1930:
1925:
1914:
1912:
1908:
1907:
1905:
1904:
1899:
1898:
1897:
1892:
1887:
1880:State ideology
1877:
1872:
1867:
1862:
1861:
1860:
1850:
1845:
1840:
1839:
1838:
1828:
1827:
1826:
1816:
1811:
1810:
1809:
1799:
1794:
1793:
1792:
1787:
1776:
1774:
1767:
1761:
1760:
1757:
1756:
1754:
1753:
1748:
1746:Ural Mountains
1743:
1738:
1736:North Caucasus
1733:
1728:
1723:
1717:
1715:
1711:
1710:
1708:
1707:
1702:
1697:
1696:
1695:
1685:
1680:
1679:
1678:
1667:
1665:
1656:
1650:
1649:
1647:
1646:
1641:
1636:
1631:
1626:
1621:
1616:
1611:
1606:
1601:
1596:
1591:
1586:
1581:
1580:
1579:
1574:
1563:
1558:
1553:
1548:
1543:
1538:
1533:
1532:
1531:
1526:
1516:
1510:
1508:
1502:
1501:
1495:
1493:
1492:
1485:
1478:
1470:
1461:
1460:
1458:
1457:
1452:
1447:
1442:
1437:
1431:
1429:
1425:
1424:
1422:
1421:
1416:
1411:
1406:
1401:
1396:
1391:
1386:
1380:
1378:
1374:
1373:
1371:
1370:
1365:
1360:
1355:
1350:
1348:Dekulakization
1345:
1340:
1335:
1330:
1325:
1320:
1314:
1312:
1308:
1307:
1305:
1304:
1299:
1294:
1289:
1284:
1279:
1274:
1269:
1264:
1258:
1256:
1252:
1251:
1246:
1244:
1243:
1236:
1229:
1221:
1214:
1213:
1187:
1181:
1165:Smith, Hedrick
1161:
1137:
1131:
1114:
1084:
1078:
1058:
1032:
1026:
1009:
994:
992:on 2011-12-23.
970:
968:on 2012-05-31.
945:
933:
919:
912:
900:
887:
886:
884:
881:
879:
878:
874:Filtzer (1992)
866:
862:Filtzer (1992)
854:
850:Filtzer (1992)
842:
838:Filtzer (1992)
827:
823:Filtzer (1992)
815:
811:Filtzer (1992)
803:
799:Filtzer (1992)
791:
787:Filtzer (1992)
779:
775:Filtzer (1992)
764:
760:Filtzer (1992)
752:
740:
736:Filtzer (1992)
728:
724:Filtzer (1992)
716:
712:Filtzer (1992)
704:
692:
680:
676:Filtzer (1992)
668:
664:Filtzer (1992)
651:
647:Filtzer (1992)
634:
630:Filtzer (1992)
617:
605:
601:Filtzer (1992)
593:
574:
570:Filtzer (1992)
553:
541:
529:
517:
505:
501:Filtzer (1992)
493:
481:
477:Filtzer (1992)
466:
454:
450:Filtzer (1992)
437:
425:
421:Filtzer (1992)
410:
398:
381:
370:
366:Hosking (1985)
358:
345:
343:
340:
303:
300:
286:
283:
257:
254:
213:
210:
166:
163:
149:
146:
104:Five-Year Plan
73:
70:
68:
65:
29:Khrushchev era
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2758:
2747:
2744:
2742:
2739:
2737:
2734:
2732:
2729:
2727:
2724:
2722:
2719:
2717:
2714:
2712:
2709:
2708:
2706:
2699:
2694:
2684:
2682:
2672:
2670:
2665:
2660:
2656:
2643:
2635:
2633:
2632:
2621:
2620:
2617:
2607:
2604:
2600:
2597:
2596:
2595:
2592:
2588:
2585:
2584:
2583:
2580:
2576:
2573:
2572:
2571:
2568:
2567:
2565:
2561:
2553:
2550:
2549:
2547:
2544:
2543:
2541:
2539:
2535:
2529:
2526:
2524:
2521:
2519:
2516:
2514:
2511:
2509:
2506:
2504:
2503:Printed media
2501:
2499:
2496:
2492:
2489:
2488:
2487:
2484:
2482:
2479:
2477:
2474:
2472:
2469:
2467:
2464:
2463:
2461:
2459:
2455:
2449:
2446:
2444:
2441:
2437:
2436:Cyrillisation
2434:
2432:
2429:
2428:
2427:
2424:
2422:
2419:
2417:
2414:
2410:
2407:
2405:
2404:Working class
2402:
2400:
2399:Soviet people
2397:
2396:
2395:
2392:
2390:
2387:
2385:
2382:
2381:
2378:
2375:
2373:
2369:
2361:
2358:
2357:
2356:
2353:
2351:
2348:
2346:
2343:
2341:
2338:
2336:
2333:
2331:
2328:
2326:
2323:
2322:
2320:
2318:
2314:
2306:
2303:
2301:
2298:
2296:
2293:
2292:
2291:
2288:
2286:
2280:
2278:
2275:
2273:
2270:
2268:
2265:
2263:
2260:
2258:
2255:
2253:
2250:
2248:
2247:Energy policy
2245:
2243:
2240:
2238:
2235:
2233:
2230:
2229:
2227:
2225:
2221:
2211:
2208:
2206:
2203:
2201:
2198:
2196:
2193:
2192:
2190:
2188:
2184:
2178:
2175:
2173:
2170:
2166:
2163:
2162:
2161:
2158:
2156:
2153:
2151:
2148:
2146:
2143:
2141:
2138:
2136:
2133:
2132:
2130:
2128:
2124:
2116:
2112:
2108:
2104:
2100:
2097:
2096:
2095:
2092:
2088:
2085:
2083:
2080:
2079:
2078:
2075:
2073:
2070:
2066:
2063:
2062:
2061:
2058:
2054:
2051:
2050:
2049:
2046:
2044:
2041:
2039:
2036:
2035:
2033:
2031:
2027:
2021:
2018:
2016:
2013:
2011:
2008:
2004:
2001:
2000:
1999:
1996:
1995:
1993:
1989:
1981:
1978:
1977:
1976:
1975:Supreme Court
1973:
1970:
1967:
1964:
1961:
1958:
1955:
1951:
1948:
1944:
1941:
1939:
1936:
1935:
1934:
1931:
1929:
1926:
1924:
1921:
1920:
1919:
1916:
1915:
1913:
1909:
1903:
1900:
1896:
1893:
1891:
1888:
1886:
1883:
1882:
1881:
1878:
1876:
1873:
1871:
1868:
1866:
1863:
1859:
1856:
1855:
1854:
1851:
1849:
1846:
1844:
1841:
1837:
1834:
1833:
1832:
1829:
1825:
1822:
1821:
1820:
1817:
1815:
1812:
1808:
1805:
1804:
1803:
1800:
1798:
1795:
1791:
1788:
1786:
1783:
1782:
1781:
1778:
1777:
1775:
1771:
1768:
1766:
1762:
1752:
1749:
1747:
1744:
1742:
1739:
1737:
1734:
1732:
1729:
1727:
1724:
1722:
1719:
1718:
1716:
1712:
1706:
1703:
1701:
1698:
1694:
1691:
1690:
1689:
1686:
1684:
1681:
1677:
1674:
1673:
1672:
1669:
1668:
1666:
1664:
1660:
1657:
1655:
1651:
1645:
1642:
1640:
1637:
1635:
1632:
1630:
1627:
1625:
1622:
1620:
1617:
1615:
1612:
1610:
1607:
1605:
1602:
1600:
1597:
1595:
1592:
1590:
1587:
1585:
1582:
1578:
1577:The Holocaust
1575:
1573:
1570:
1569:
1567:
1564:
1562:
1559:
1557:
1554:
1552:
1549:
1547:
1544:
1542:
1539:
1537:
1534:
1530:
1527:
1525:
1522:
1521:
1520:
1517:
1515:
1512:
1511:
1509:
1507:
1503:
1498:
1491:
1486:
1484:
1479:
1477:
1472:
1471:
1468:
1456:
1453:
1451:
1448:
1446:
1443:
1441:
1438:
1436:
1433:
1432:
1430:
1426:
1420:
1417:
1415:
1412:
1410:
1407:
1405:
1402:
1400:
1397:
1395:
1392:
1390:
1387:
1385:
1382:
1381:
1379:
1375:
1369:
1366:
1364:
1361:
1359:
1356:
1354:
1351:
1349:
1346:
1344:
1341:
1339:
1336:
1334:
1331:
1329:
1326:
1324:
1321:
1319:
1316:
1315:
1313:
1309:
1303:
1300:
1298:
1295:
1293:
1290:
1288:
1285:
1283:
1280:
1278:
1275:
1273:
1270:
1268:
1265:
1263:
1260:
1259:
1257:
1253:
1249:
1242:
1237:
1235:
1230:
1228:
1223:
1222:
1219:
1202:
1198:
1197:
1192:
1188:
1184:
1182:0-345-29764-4
1178:
1173:
1172:
1166:
1162:
1158:
1154:
1150:
1146:
1142:
1138:
1134:
1132:0-415-27113-4
1128:
1124:
1120:
1115:
1104:
1100:
1096:
1095:
1090:
1085:
1081:
1079:0-00-686205-5
1075:
1070:
1069:
1063:
1059:
1055:
1051:
1047:
1043:
1042:
1037:
1033:
1029:
1027:0-521-41899-2
1023:
1019:
1016:. Cambridge:
1015:
1010:
1006:
1002:
1001:
995:
988:
984:
977:
976:
971:
964:
960:
953:
952:
947:
946:
941:
937:
922:
882:
875:
870:
867:
863:
858:
855:
851:
846:
843:
839:
834:
832:
828:
824:
819:
816:
812:
807:
804:
800:
795:
792:
788:
783:
780:
776:
771:
769:
765:
761:
756:
753:
749:
744:
741:
737:
732:
729:
725:
720:
717:
713:
708:
705:
701:
696:
693:
689:
684:
681:
677:
672:
669:
665:
660:
658:
656:
652:
648:
643:
641:
639:
635:
631:
626:
624:
622:
618:
614:
609:
606:
602:
597:
594:
590:
585:
583:
581:
579:
575:
571:
566:
564:
562:
560:
558:
554:
551:, pages 13–14
550:
545:
542:
538:
533:
530:
526:
521:
518:
514:
509:
506:
502:
497:
494:
490:
485:
482:
478:
473:
471:
467:
463:
458:
455:
451:
446:
444:
442:
438:
434:
429:
426:
422:
417:
415:
411:
407:
402:
399:
395:
390:
388:
386:
382:
379:
374:
371:
367:
362:
359:
355:
350:
347:
341:
339:
337:
333:
329:
324:
322:
318:
313:
310:
301:
299:
295:
291:
284:
282:
280:
274:
272:
266:
262:
255:
253:
249:
245:
241:
237:
234:
225:
224:
218:
211:
209:
206:
202:
198:
195:
191:
187:
183:
182:
178:In May 1955,
176:
172:
164:
162:
158:
154:
147:
145:
143:
139:
134:
131:
127:
123:
118:
116:
112:
107:
105:
101:
97:
96:capital goods
93:
85:
82:
78:
71:
66:
64:
62:
56:
53:
48:
46:
42:
38:
34:
30:
21:
2698:
2693:Soviet Union
2622:
2394:Demographics
2384:Antisemitism
2237:Central Bank
2155:Forced labor
2103:Spetsnaz GRU
1923:organisation
1831:Human rights
1780:Constitution
1663:Subdivisions
1541:Russian SFSR
1497:Soviet Union
1450:Stakhanovite
1388:
1205:. Retrieved
1201:the original
1194:
1171:The Russians
1170:
1148:
1144:
1118:
1106:. Retrieved
1098:
1092:
1067:
1048:(2): 62–72.
1045:
1039:
1013:
999:
987:the original
974:
963:the original
950:
869:
857:
845:
818:
806:
794:
782:
755:
743:
731:
719:
707:
695:
683:
671:
608:
596:
589:Fearn (1963)
549:Fearn (1963)
544:
537:Fearn (1963)
532:
525:Fearn (1963)
520:
508:
496:
489:Fearn (1963)
484:
462:Fearn (1963)
457:
428:
406:Fearn (1963)
401:
394:Smith (1976)
373:
361:
349:
326:In terms of
325:
314:
305:
296:
292:
288:
275:
267:
263:
259:
250:
246:
242:
238:
229:
221:
179:
168:
159:
155:
151:
135:
130:Stakhanovite
125:
119:
114:
108:
89:
83:
57:
49:
33:Soviet Union
26:
2498:Phraseology
2443:Prohibition
2431:Linguistics
2416:Drug policy
2409:1989 census
2330:Cybernetics
2232:Agriculture
2145:Great Purge
2107:Soviet Navy
2099:Soviet Army
1971:(1989–1991)
1965:(1938–1991)
1959:(1922–1936)
1943:Secretariat
1814:Gun control
1721:Caspian Sea
1705:Closed city
1634:Dissolution
1619:Perestroika
1561:Great Purge
503:, pages 1-2
433:Nove (1966)
378:Time (1933)
336:Perestroika
317:trade union
27:During the
2705:Categories
2538:Opposition
2528:Television
2508:Propaganda
2481:Literature
2355:Naukograds
2350:Sharashkas
2284:(currency)
2262:Inventions
2205:Censorship
2135:Red Terror
1819:Government
1693:Autonomous
1676:Autonomous
1609:Stagnation
1572:Evacuation
1207:11 October
1108:11 October
936:Audio help
927:2012-04-23
883:References
840:, page 227
825:, page 226
813:, page 117
789:, page 116
777:, page 108
738:, page 104
726:, page 105
714:, page 102
690:, page 396
678:, page 101
666:, page 100
615:, page 394
435:, page 212
396:, page 286
368:, page 153
212:Provisions
122:piece-rate
67:Background
61:"storming"
52:piece-rate
2599:Republics
2587:Republics
2575:Republics
2426:Languages
2290:Transport
2172:Holodomor
2065:Militsiya
2003:President
1895:Stalinism
1797:Elections
1671:Republics
1654:Geography
1644:Nostalgia
1556:Stalinism
1255:Economies
1123:Routledge
762:, page 80
750:, page 68
649:, page 98
632:, page 97
603:, page 96
572:, page 99
539:, page 13
479:, page 94
452:, page 95
423:, page 93
356:, page 38
256:Successes
138:Alec Nove
92:Stalinism
41:Stalinist
2642:Category
2195:Religion
2082:Chairmen
1928:Congress
1890:Leninism
1870:Propiska
1765:Politics
1624:Glasnost
1584:Cold War
1524:February
1167:(1976).
1064:(1985).
938: ·
702:, page 2
591:, page 1
527:, page 5
515:, page 5
491:, page 9
464:, page 8
408:, page 7
285:Failures
148:Problems
2655:Portals
2563:Symbols
2476:Fashion
2458:Culture
2372:Society
2317:Science
2282:Rouble
2224:Economy
2200:Science
2010:Premier
1991:Offices
1853:Leaders
1773:General
1741:Siberia
1714:Regions
1688:Oblasts
1529:October
1506:History
1455:Comecon
1445:Sovkhoz
1141:Nove, A
1054:1815011
925: (
896:minutes
302:Results
231:leader
194:Premier
188:of the
111:Russian
100:roubles
84:(right)
2681:Russia
2582:Emblem
2570:Anthem
2518:Sports
2471:Cinema
2466:Ballet
2448:Racism
2421:Family
1911:Bodies
1499:topics
1179:
1129:
1101:(37).
1076:
1052:
1024:
223:Pravda
181:Pravda
165:Reform
126:stavka
2513:Radio
2491:Opera
2486:Music
2389:Crime
2160:Gulag
2038:Cheka
1683:Krais
1050:JSTOR
990:(PDF)
979:(PDF)
966:(PDF)
955:(PDF)
342:Notes
271:RSFSR
175:Gulag
2594:Flag
2552:List
2360:List
2272:OGAS
2165:List
2048:NKVD
1836:LGBT
1824:List
1790:1977
1785:1936
1209:2011
1196:Time
1177:ISBN
1127:ISBN
1110:2011
1074:ISBN
1022:ISBN
2077:KGB
2072:MGB
2060:MVD
2043:GPU
1843:Law
1153:doi
2707::
2109:•
2105:•
1193:.
1147:.
1125:.
1099:37
1097:.
1091:.
1046:50
1044:.
1020:.
894:20
830:^
767:^
654:^
637:^
620:^
577:^
556:^
469:^
440:^
413:^
384:^
47:.
2657::
2113:/
2101:/
1489:e
1482:t
1475:v
1240:e
1233:t
1226:v
1211:.
1185:.
1159:.
1155::
1149:4
1135:.
1112:.
1082:.
1056:.
1030:.
1007:.
942:)
934:(
929:)
898:)
891:(
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
