718:, in the region to visit U.S. troops, came to Vietnam in early January, celebrated masses, and gave a donation to Catholic Relief Services. While various reports suggested Spellman was Diệm's patron in the U.S., it seems likely that his visit was one for his coreligionists. Obviously, Spellman would not be unhappy with a Catholic leader, but the U.S. was quite aware that Diệm's Catholicism isolated him from the majority of South Vietnamese. When an Australian cardinal visited Vietnam shortly afterwards, J. Lawton Collins suggested to Diệm's brother, the Bishop of Huế, that there be a moratorium on high-level Catholic visits. Collins suggested that these visits aggravated the isolation of Diệm from the majority.
587:
pro-French. That he was a nationalist was secondary. The ideal of U.S. policy was for Diệm to form a representative government, oust Bảo Đại, and introduce democracy. French relations with the U.S., with France seen as an important anti-Communist resource in Europe, complicated the situation. The French ambassador to the U.S. warned John Foster Dulles that
American support was being offered to Diệm without conditions that he form a stable and representative government. Guy le Chambre, French minister for the Associated States (i.e., Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) reportedly felt Diệm would lead the country into disaster, but, since the U.S. had so visibly supported him,
681:, arrived on July 1. A paramilitary specialist, well-known to the French for his help with French-operated maquis in Tonkin against the Japanese in 1945, he was the one American guerrilla fighter who had not been a member of the Patti Mission. Conein was to have a continuing role, especially in the coup that overthrew Diệm in November 1963. In August, Conein was sent to Hanoi, to begin forming a guerilla organization. A second paramilitary team for the south was formed, with Army LT Edward Williams doing double duty as the only experienced counter-espionage officer, working with revolutionary political groups.
350:
339:
326:
313:
218:
206:
299:
187:
245:
45:
171:
987:
of
Communist objectives. The terror was directed not only against officials but against all whose operations were essential to the functioning of organized political society, school teachers, health workers, agricultural officials, etc. The scale and scope of this terrorist and insurrectionary activity mounted slowly and steadily. By the end of 1958 the participants in this incipient insurgency, whom Saigon quite accurately termed the "Viet Cong", constituted a serious threat to South Viet Nam's political stability
288:
277:
902:
in many areas . . . in regions inhabited by minority tribes we have attacked tribal chiefs too strongly, thus injuring, instead of respecting, local customs and manners. . . . When reorganizing the party, we paid too much importance to the notion of social class instead of adhering firmly to political qualifications alone. Instead of recognizing education to be the first essential, we resorted exclusively to organizational measures .
159:
834:, in November 1998, the Vietnamese were shocked that the Soviets and Chinese, their "big friends", were about to divide Vietnam. Huynh said his delegation failed, given that as encouragement, to seek out the Americans and explain the nationalist position. An American diplomat, Chester Cooper, was at the conference, and said he could never decide to whom, or if, the North Vietnamese were "reporting".
229:
497:
that the U.S. and the UK furnished inadequate support to France during the latter phases of the war, and at the
Conference. And it is equally certain that American policy in the aftermath of Geneva widely alienated affection for the U.S. in France, and created that lack of confidence which the Suez crisis of summer, 1956, translated into outright distrust.
553:
However, the organizational system of the party from the highest to the lowest echelons survived, and since the party remained close to the people, its activities were not completely suppressed. In 1959 the party combined its political agitation with its military operations, and by the end of 1959 the combined operations were progressing smoothly.
787:
the elections that were scheduled for the following year, according to the Geneva agreements. Diệm pointed out that his government had not signed the Geneva agreements, and thus was not subject to them. The U.S. did not—as is often alleged—connive with Diệm to ignore the elections. The U.S. expected elections to be held and fully supported them.
540:
most held on to the belief that the elections would take place. They were disappointed in two respects: not only were the promised elections not held, but the amnesty which had been assured by the Geneva
Settlement was denied them, and they were hounded by the Anti-Communist campaign. After 1956, for the most part, they went "underground."
935:
cadres who had remained in the south and had hidden caches of weapons in case unification failed to take place through elections. This widespread campaign of terror included bombings and assassinations. Guerilla attacks reported included the killing of a group, not further identified, of 17 people in
508:
US personnel dealing with the
Government of Vietnam had difficulty in understanding the politics. The diplomats were not getting clear information in 1954 and early 1955, but the CIA station "had and has no mandate or mission to perform systematic intelligence and espionage in friendly countries, and
492:
Nevertheless, the relationships both with the French and
Vietnamese changed with the French defeat and gradual withdrawal. French trainers did not abruptly withdraw in 1954 after the Geneva accords, and, indeed, there was a French desire to stay involved in training the South Vietnamese. Part of this
986:
A pattern of politically motivated terror began to emerge, directed against the representatives of the Saigon government and concentrated on the very bad and the very good. The former were liquidated to win favor with the peasantry; the latter because their effectiveness was a bar to the achievement
901:
We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people. We attacked on too large a front and, seeing enemies everywhere, resorted to terror, which became far too widespread. . . . Whilst carrying out our land reform program we failed to respect the principles of freedom of faith and worship
882:
had had autonomy from the lowland colonial government. In 1956, these areas were absorbed into the
Republic of Vietnam, and Diêm moved ethnic Vietnamese, as well as refugees from the North, into "land development centers" in the Central Highlands. Diệm intended to assimilate the unwilling tribes, a
574:
While the
Communists certainly had external assistance, they still considered themselves Vietnamese Communists. Clearly, pure geography would prevent them from being a Soviet satellite, and the long history of Chinese conquest and Sino-Vietnamese conflict would also limit the role of Great Powers in
552:
The period from the
Armistice of 1954 until 1958 was the darkest time for the VC in South Vietnam. The political agitation policy proposed by the Communist Party could not be carried out due to the arrest of a number of party members by RVN authorities. The people's agitation movement was minimized.
995:
proposing a discussion on troop reductions and trade relations as a renewed step towards reunification. On 26 April, Diệm rejected any discussion until North
Vietnam had established "democratic liberties" similar to those in the South. A coordinated command structure was formed by Communists in the
958:
In December 1957, the Soviet Union and China agreed to proposals to seat both the North and South, as independent countries, in the United Nations. Their decision was based on a growing east-west détente, but the North Vietnamese saw it as a sellout of their goal of reunification, and this may have
940:
in July, 1957. A District chief and his family were killed in September. In October, the clandestine radio of the "National Salvation Movement" began to broadcast support for armed opposition to Diệm. By year's end, over 400 South Vietnamese officials were killed. Operations appeared to solidify in
849:
In America, President Eisenhower pledged his support for the new government and offered military aid. U.S. representatives told Hinh that another coup attempt would cut off U.S. aid. Diệm ordered Hinh out of the country in September, but Hinh refused. Eventually, Bảo Đại invited Hinh to France, and
619:
LTG O'Daniel was to have retired, but was convinced to come to Vietnam, in April 1954, as the third head of MAAG-I. Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), on three trips to Indochina. General O'Daniel's visits were made after General Jean de Lattre de
504:
The second, and more far-reaching, was whether Ngô Đình Diệm was to remain at the head of Vietnam's government, or whether he was to be replaced by another nationalist leader more sympathetic to Bảo Đại and France. The first issue was resolved relatively quickly. General Collins struck an agreement
500:
All the foregoing tension resolved to two central issues between the United States and France. The first was the question of how and by whom Vietnam's armed forces were to be trained. In addition, the Geneva accords limited the number of advisers that could be assigned, and specified that equipment
786:
The Geneva agreements had specified the start of consultations on the 1956 referendum would begin, between Hanoi and Saigon, in July 1955. Diệm refused to enter into talks. On 20 July, Vietnam announced that it would not participate in talks for the reunification of North and South Vietnam through
782:
In June, concerned that Viet Minh might win, Diệm abolished elections for village councils. Traditionally, the village level was autonomous. By replacing it at all, he inherited responsibility for corruption at that level. His appointments were usually from outside the villages; outsiders that he
566:
Diệm, who was backed by the U.S. was an Annamite, from Central Vietnam (although not the Central Highlands) in the South upon taking power. In seeking political support from Southerners, he was not nearly as visible as Bảo Đại, nor was he seen as sympathetic to Buddhism or the smaller minorities.
539:
It is quite clear that even the activists were not instructed to organize units for guerrilla war, but rather to agitate politically for the promised Geneva elections, and the normalization of relations with the North. They drew much reassurance from the presence of the ICC, and up until mid-1956,
804:
were convinced that China and the Soviet Union saw Vietnam as the starting point for the Communist conquest of Southeast Asia. Postwar discussions between McNamara and North Vietnamese told him that the Hanoi leadership saw the U.S. as the main enemy, "imperialists" bent on crushing the North and
496:
France's painful withdrawal may have led to its lack of cooperation in European defense arrangements that included the United States. France rejected European Defense Community on August 30, 1954, possibly to thank the Soviets for help at Geneva. But it is certain that many French were persuaded
448:
U.S. aid to the non-Communist forces of the area had started in 1950, both with materiel and assistance to the French doing the primary training. It had to wait for U.S. aid was administered by the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina (MAAG-I), which had been established in October 1950
977:
Beginning with a plantation raid in January and a truck ambush in February, steady guerilla ambushes and raids became more regular in 1958, and of serious concern to the GVN. This intensity level was consistent with Mao's Phase I, "the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic
586:
had a priority of stopping Communism everywhere, and saw South Vietnam as a key barrier to Communist expansion. Diệm, despite his personal rigidity, distrust of those outside his immediate circle, and minority ethnicity and religion, was, most importantly to the U.S., neither pro-Communist nor
512:
Also, after the end of French rule, Laos became independent, but with a struggle there among political factions, with neutralists heading the government and a strong Pathet Lao insurgency. Laos, also not to have had foreign military involvement according to the Geneva agreement, quickly had the
945:
In Washington, U.S. intelligence indicated that the "Viet Minh underground" had been directed to conduct additional attacks on U.S. personnel "whenever conditions are favorable." U.S. intelligence also noted a total of 30 armed "terrorist incidents initiated by Communist guerillas" in the last
918:
take a firmer stand on national reunification, but Hanoi hesitated in launching a full-scale military struggle. In the fall of 1956, Diệm dealt strongly with another group not considered of his circle: the approximately 1,000,000 Chinese-identified people of Vietnam, who dominated much of the
562:
After partition, the South worked on defining an identity. Its core had been Buddhist, but also had a number of influential groups, some religious and some simply taking power. Now, hundreds of thousands, close to a million, Northern refugees, mostly Catholic, joined the approximate 5 million
919:
economy. He barred "foreigners", including Chinese, from 11 kinds of businesses, and demanded the half-million Vietnamese-born men, known as "uncles", "Vietnamize", including changing their names to a Vietnamese form. His vice-president, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, was put in charge of the program.
705:
Military Committee until 1956. His additional duties to Saigon were within the scope of the U.S. defense system centered on NATO; he had the personal diplomatic rank of Ambassador. This was his last assignment before retirement. Collins, in late 1954 and early 1955, supported the French
684:
In August, a National Intelligence Estimate, produced by the CIA, predicted that the Communists, legitimized by the Geneva agreement, would take quick control of the North, and plan to take over all of Vietnam. The estimate went on that Diệm's government was opposed both by Communist and
721:
Lansdale also advised against Diệm being too visible with his Catholicism, citing an anti-Catholic bias in U.S. politics and a concern about creating a "Vatican state". As a response to Spellman's visibility as a member of the hierarchy, Lansdale encouraged U.S. support of
591:
We would prefer to lose in Vietnam with the US than to win without them...we would rather support Diệm knowing he is to lose and thus keep Franco-US solidarity than to pick someone who could retain Vietnam for the free world if this meant breaking Franco-US
752:
In January, the Republic of Vietnam received its first direct shipment of military supplies from the U.S. The U.S. also offered to train the fledgling National Army. A paramilitary group had cached its supplies in Haiphong, having had them shipped by
613:, said that O'Daniel was optimistic of forming tank divisions and saving Dien Bien Phu, but was both sensitive to, and contemptuous of, the French. Beech quoted him as saying "I can understand why they are sensitive, but not what they are proud of."
567:
Diệm had to create a viable alternative to the Viet Minh in those areas where the French had provided security, both the cities and towns, but also in pockets of the rural areas inhabited by people of the regional or "folk" religions, such as the
535:" cited a study of twenty-three Viet Minh who, according to U.S. analysts, told consistent stories of being given stay-behind roles by the Viet Minh leadership going north. Some were given political roles, while others were told to await orders:
978:
defensive." Mao's use of "strategic defensive" refers to the guerilla force making its presence known and building its organization, but not attempting to engage military units. George Carver, the principal CIA analyst on Vietnam, said in a
423:
The period ended with major negotiations, but formal discussions had started as early as 1950, with less formal meetings during and immediately after the Second World War. France gave limited autonomy in February 1950, Associated States of
821:
Both sides, according to McNamara, had missed opportunities both after the end of the Second World War, and at the Geneva conferences. In 1945, China was in civil war, and some of the Vietnamese politicians in exile were in China. An
662:
was Assistant Air Attaché. The broad mission for the team was to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare. Beech observed Lansdale to become an "adviser and confidant" of Diệm.
635:
arrived in Saigon from France on 25 June 1954. and, with U.S. and French support, was named Premier of the State of Vietnam by Emperor Bảo Đại, who had just won French assent to "treaties of independence and association" on 4 June.
795:
In 1999, Robert McNamara wrote that both sides had missed opportunities. As he entered government in 1960, he freely admits he knew little about Vietnam, but his colleagues, ranging from the President and Vice President, to the
1012:
On March 1959, the armed revolution began as Ho Chi Minh declared a People's War to unite all of Vietnam under his leadership. His Politburo now ordered a changeover to an all-out military struggle. Thus began the
689:
would take a longer view. Under command of the north, Viet Minh individuals and small units will stay in the south and create an underground, discredit the government, and undermine French-Vietnamese relations.
480:
on 1 April 1952, and after General Henri-Eugene Navarre had succeeded General Salan in May of the following year. While he had no effect on French operations, he did build relationships. O'Daniel had been a
729:
The U.S. and France, going into 1955, were dubious of Diệm's ability to unify South Vietnam, but there was no obvious alternative: anti-French, nationalist, anti-Bảo Đại. The French supported the
616:
In deference to French sensibilities and to ensure the seniority of the French Commander in Chief in Indochina, O'Daniel relinquished his third star and reverted to the rank of major general.
846:. The referendum, however, seemed less than ideally honest; Diệm's overall margin over Bảo Đại was 98.2 percent, and Diệm received 605,000 votes from the 405,000 registered voters of Saigon.
856:
In 1955, the first part of Diệm's land reforms involved resettling refugees and other land destitute Vietnamese on uncultivated land; the ownership of this land was not always clear.
853:
December was a time of land reform in both North and South. In the North, it was a period of ideological purges, with thousands of landowners executed or imprisoned (see Giap below).
620:
Tassigny had been replaced by General Raoul Salan on 1 April 1952, and after General Henri-Eugene Navarre had succeeded General Salan in May of the following year. With him was then-
883:
point of ethnic resentment that was to become one of the many resentments against Diệm. These resentments both cost internal support, and certainly were exploited by the Communists.
830:, had been in China with the Vietnamese, and moved south with them; Washington paid little attention to their reporting, but Ho did not follow up the lack of response. According to
505:
with General Ely in Vietnam by which, despite serious misgivings in Paris, France agreed to turn over the training of the Vietnamese army to the U.S. and to withdraw French cadres.
1659:
783:
considered "dependable" Catholics, Northerners, or others not tied to the rural culture. This drove the villagers to the sort of conspiracy that they used against the French.
643:, who had replaced Navarre in the dual roles of French High Commissioner and commander of military forces. This arrangement, however, was not to be formalized until December.
417:
1604:
440:) within the French Union. The enabling agreement was signed among the five states on 23 December 1950, and was the prerequisite for direct U.S. aid to Indochina.
670:(USIA), a new psychological warfare campaign was devised for the Vietnamese Army and for the government in Hanoi. Shortly after, a refresher course in combat
1619:
659:
1225:
1045:
698:
509:
so lacks the resources to gather and evaluate the large amounts of information required on political forces, corruption, connections, and so on."
671:
1500:
801:
1614:
1421:
1116:
775:
and Bình Xuyên representatives. On 28 April, Diệm, against U.S. advice, against French advice, and against the advice of his cabinet,
1589:
1373:
1335:
1084:
887:
817:...In 1961 the North Vietnamese government and the Kennedy Administration saw each other through fifteen years of Cold War rhetoric.
465:
544:
The Viet Minh went underground in 1956, but there was no major decision until 1959. A 1964 interrogation report also included in the
1318:
1170:
1021:
1001:
693:
The final agreement between France and the U.S. was drafted between the senior French official in Vietnam, General Ely, and General
450:
1664:
843:
797:
667:
1624:
1584:
1579:
609:(LTG) Michael "Iron Mike" O'Daniel had been a U.S. observer in Indochina before Dien Bien Phu. Keyes Beech, a reporter for the
437:
389:
1431:
1258:
514:
760:
On February 12, 1955, the U.S. assumed responsibility for training Vietnamese forces, and the French disassociation began.
1609:
1594:
954:
dissident elements", and reported "at least" 75 civilians or civil officials assassinated or kidnapped in the same period.
458:
992:
864:
860:
823:
408:
recovered from the wounds of war, rebuilt nationally, and accrued to prepare for the anticipated war. In South Vietnam,
1599:
647:
571:. The existing upper class might be wealthy, but the French had found it was neither popular nor internally cohesive.
632:
409:
281:
117:
879:
473:
1004:
and occupied parts of the country. Fall reported that the GVN lost almost 20% of its village chiefs through 1958.
1197:
915:
723:
1308:
1654:
1649:
1644:
1639:
1634:
1629:
1574:
1420:
McNamara, Robert S.; Blight, James; Brigham, Robert K.; Biersteker, Thomas J.; Schandler, Col. Herbert (1999),
730:
381:
44:
1287:, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1983, Combat Studies Institute No. 5
354:
1569:
1051:
639:
On June 15, O'Daniel had established an informal agreement for U.S. training of native forces, with General
472:, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), made three fact-finding trips to France, after Marshal
734:
966:
377:
1234:
726:, a physician volunteer for the "Passage to Freedom" refugee program, who was Catholic but not clerical.
897:
as head of the program, Võ Nguyên Giáp, in the fall of 1956, offered the self-criticism for the Party:
650:(CIA) team in Saigon was the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), headed by United States Air Force Colonel
1564:
1481:
1372:"Volume 1, Chapter 5, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960 Section 1, pp. 242-69",
1014:
875:
583:
501:
could be replaced, but that no additional quantities be given. These agreements were ignored by all.
385:
304:
50:
1143:
894:
831:
343:
842:
On 26 October Ngô Đình Diệm became President and Commander-in-Chief after defeating Bảo Đại in the
754:
482:
469:
397:
393:
373:
110:
98:
1508:
318:
937:
768:
621:
606:
579:
1480:
Human Rights Watch (April 2002), "III. A History of Resistance to Central Government Control",
772:
1427:
1314:
1282:
1166:
1025:
694:
624:
William B. Rosson, who would later rise to high rank with the U.S. combat forces in Vietnam.
962:
827:
715:
454:
429:
292:
104:
1379:
1122:
746:
261:
1504:
1496:
1483:
Repression of Montagnards: Conflicts over Land and Religion in Vietnam's Central Highlands
1341:
1092:
946:
quarter of 1957, as well as a "large number" of incidents carried out by "Communist-lead
767:
on February 22, the "United Front" against Diệm was formed, composed of Cao Đài, Hòa Hảo,
685:
non-Communist elements. Pro-French factions were seen as preparing to overthrow it, while
651:
527:
433:
175:
1115:"Volume 1, Chapter 4, "U.S. and France in Indochina, 1950-56", Section 3, pp. 314-346",
947:
907:
742:
697:, President Eisenhower's special envoy to Saigon, on 13 December. Collins had served as
331:
257:
1334:"Volume 1, Chapter 4, "U.S. and France in Indochina, 1950-56, Section 1, pp. 179-214",
413:
150:
123:
32:
686:
1558:
776:
678:
405:
349:
338:
325:
312:
298:
287:
276:
217:
211:
164:
81:
77:
54:
951:
738:
568:
253:
997:
893:
As part of a response to excesses in Northern land reform, for which Ho dismissed
890:(MAAG) assumed responsibility, from French, for training South Vietnamese forces.
578:
Vis-a-vis Great Powers and the South, however, the situation was quite different.
764:
640:
477:
368:
28:
1085:"Document 95, Lansdale Team's Report on Covert Saigon Mission in 1954 and 1955"
991:
On March 7, President Diệm received a letter from North Vietnam Prime Minister
1227:
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 63-5-54: Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina
959:
led to their decision, in 1959, to seek reunification through military means.
928:
517:
as well as the continuing effects of North Vietnam sponsoring the Pathet Lao.
486:
233:
932:
425:
401:
222:
197:
53:
and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles greet South Vietnamese President
1000:
where 37 armed companies were being organized in June 1958. North Vietnam
493:
may have been pride, and partially a desire to maintain French influence.
1050:, Center of Military History, U.S. Department of the Army, archived from
36:
1540:
1144:"Courage and Blood: South Vietnam's Repulse of the 1972 Easter Invasion"
706:
recommendation that Diệm could not unify the Vietnamese nationalists.
674:
was constructed and Vietnamese Army personnel were rushed through it.
757:, a CIA proprietary airline belonging to the Directorate of Support.
528:
Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force
911:
1423:
Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy
927:
As opposition to Diệm's rule in South Vietnam grew, a low-level
702:
228:
170:
489:, so was not unknown since the French had forces in that war.
941:
October, beyond what might have been small group actions:
906:
In late 1956 one of the leading communists in the south,
931:
began to take shape there in 1957, conducted mainly by
1259:"Ely-Collins Agreement is Drafted – December 13, 1954"
1110:
1108:
132:
South Vietnamese rebels take actions against Diệm rule
1024:, opening the first tracks of what was to become the
376:, this period resulted in the military defeat of the
815:
Hanoi was no domino! Washington was no imperialist!
805:
occupying the entire country. His 1999 conclusion (
418:
U.S. support to South Vietnam before Gulf of Tonkin
1406:
1404:
1367:
1365:
1363:
1361:
1359:
1357:
525:In a section titled "The Viet Minh Residue", the
372:was the era of the two nations. Coming after the
476:, dying of cancer, had been replaced by General
420:, as well as communist infrastructure-building.
16:Phase of the war between North and South Vietnam
21:
1047:Vietnam Studies: Command and Control 1950-1969
844:referendum about the future form of government
1375:The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1
1337:The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1
1224:Central Intelligence Agency (3 August 1954),
1163:Why Viet Nam?: Prelude to America's Albatross
1118:The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1
1089:The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1
838:Autumn and winter; the fall of Diệm opponents
404:insurgency with USA aid. During this period,
8:
1449:Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America's Albatross
1284:Conversations with General J. Lawton Collins
965:became U.S. Ambassador in April, succeeding
658:part of the CIA Station in the Embassy. His
654:, who arrived on 1 June 1954. The SMM was
18:
1079:
1077:
701:, and was the U.S. representative to the
464:Starting in 1952, a more senior officer,
1660:United States–Vietnam military relations
1036:
1310:The Human Tradition in the Vietnam Era
666:Working in close cooperation with the
120:becomes new South Vietnamese president
1196:Ted Gittinger, ed. (March 22, 1983),
802:Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
388:into North and South, and the French
129:Communist insurgency in South Vietnam
7:
1620:Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower
1165:. University of California Press.
888:Military Assistance Advisory Group
850:Hinh left Vietnam on November 19.
412:consolidated power and encouraged
14:
1605:History of Vietnam (1945–present)
1091:, pp. 573–83, archived from
1451:, University of California Press
1447:Patti, Archimedes A. H. (1981),
1161:Patti, Archimedes L. A. (1980).
668:United States Information Agency
348:
337:
324:
311:
297:
286:
275:
243:
227:
216:
204:
185:
169:
157:
43:
1501:"South Vietnam: 500,000 Uncles"
973:1958: North Vietnam looks South
710:1955: Establishing two Vietnams
628:Agreements and arrivals in June
116:Moderate Roman Catholic leader
1545:Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung
1199:Oral interviews of Keyes Beech
515:beginnings of U.S. involvement
1:
1142:Sorley, Lewis (Summer 1999),
777:moved again against the sects
749:, failed to organize a coup.
93:North Vietnam enters the war
1313:, Rowman & Littlefield,
1044:Eckhardt, George S. (1991),
1020:On July 1959, North Vietnam
865:Land reform in South Vietnam
861:Land reform in North Vietnam
824:Office of Strategic Services
416:. This period was marked by
1615:Military history of Vietnam
1307:Anderson, David L. (2000),
677:The second SMM member, MAJ
648:Central Intelligence Agency
1681:
858:
813:But what was the reality?
737:. Hinh, working with the
699:Chief of Staff of the Army
474:Jean de Lattre de Tassigny
444:U.S. missions to Indochina
22:War in Vietnam (1954–1959)
1590:Anti-communism in Vietnam
1547:, Foreign Languages Press
584:Eisenhower administration
563:population in the South.
309:
268:
142:
60:
42:
26:
731:Vietnamese National Army
1665:20th century in Vietnam
826:team, commanded by MAJ
390:withdrawal from Vietnam
1625:Wars involving Vietnam
1585:1950s in South Vietnam
1580:1950s in North Vietnam
989:
967:G. Frederick Reinhardt
956:
916:Vietnam Workers' Party
904:
874:Under the French, the
819:
594:
555:
542:
461:(MG) T.J.H. Trapnell.
269:Commanders and leaders
1539:Mao Tse-tung (1967),
984:
943:
899:
811:
791:Northern developments
733:chief of staff, Gen.
672:psychological warfare
589:
550:
537:
485:commander during the
449:under the command of
264:militias (until 1955)
1610:Insurgencies in Asia
1595:Communism in Vietnam
1470:Donaldson, pp. 86-87
1015:Second Indochina War
660:diplomatic cover job
305:Dwight D. Eisenhower
51:Dwight D. Eisenhower
1541:"On Protracted War"
1511:on October 19, 2011
1461:McNamara, pp. 96-97
1240:on 27 February 2008
755:Civil Air Transport
398:Republic of Vietnam
394:First Indochina War
386:partitioned Vietnam
382:1954 Geneva meeting
374:First Indochina War
111:Republic of Vietnam
1600:Cold War conflicts
1263:vietnamwar50th.com
798:Secretary of State
622:Lieutenant Colonel
611:Chicago Daily News
607:Lieutenant General
580:John Foster Dulles
575:defining the DRV.
521:Communist strategy
466:lieutenant general
400:regime fighting a
1426:, PublicAffairs,
1026:Ho Chi Minh Trail
914:to urge that the
880:Central Highlands
695:J. Lawton Collins
558:Southern strategy
451:brigadier general
360:
359:
138:
137:
103:Overthrow of the
1672:
1550:
1548:
1536:
1530:
1529:Donaldson, p. 88
1527:
1521:
1520:
1518:
1516:
1507:. Archived from
1499:(May 13, 1957).
1493:
1487:
1486:
1477:
1471:
1468:
1462:
1459:
1453:
1452:
1444:
1438:
1436:
1417:
1411:
1408:
1399:
1396:
1390:
1389:
1388:
1387:
1378:, archived from
1369:
1352:
1351:
1350:
1349:
1340:, archived from
1331:
1325:
1323:
1304:
1298:
1295:
1289:
1288:
1279:
1273:
1272:
1270:
1269:
1255:
1249:
1248:
1247:
1245:
1239:
1233:, archived from
1232:
1221:
1215:
1212:
1206:
1205:
1204:
1193:
1187:
1184:
1178:
1176:
1158:
1152:
1150:
1139:
1133:
1132:
1131:
1130:
1121:, archived from
1112:
1103:
1102:
1101:
1100:
1081:
1072:
1069:
1063:
1061:
1060:
1059:
1041:
963:Elbridge Durbrow
828:Archimedes Patti
716:Francis Spellman
470:John W. O'Daniel
455:Francis G. Brink
355:Nguyễn Chí Thanh
353:
352:
342:
341:
329:
328:
316:
315:
302:
301:
291:
290:
280:
279:
249:
247:
246:
232:
231:
221:
220:
210:
208:
207:
191:
189:
188:
174:
173:
163:
161:
160:
126:in South Vietnam
109:Creation of the
105:State of Vietnam
62:
61:
47:
19:
1680:
1679:
1675:
1674:
1673:
1671:
1670:
1669:
1655:1959 in Vietnam
1650:1958 in Vietnam
1645:1957 in Vietnam
1640:1956 in Vietnam
1635:1955 in Vietnam
1630:1954 in Vietnam
1575:1950s conflicts
1555:
1554:
1553:
1538:
1537:
1533:
1528:
1524:
1514:
1512:
1495:
1494:
1490:
1479:
1478:
1474:
1469:
1465:
1460:
1456:
1446:
1445:
1441:
1434:
1419:
1418:
1414:
1410:Eckhardt, p. 13
1409:
1402:
1397:
1393:
1385:
1383:
1371:
1370:
1355:
1347:
1345:
1333:
1332:
1328:
1321:
1306:
1305:
1301:
1296:
1292:
1281:
1280:
1276:
1267:
1265:
1257:
1256:
1252:
1243:
1241:
1237:
1230:
1223:
1222:
1218:
1213:
1209:
1202:
1195:
1194:
1190:
1185:
1181:
1173:
1160:
1159:
1155:
1141:
1140:
1136:
1128:
1126:
1114:
1113:
1106:
1098:
1096:
1083:
1082:
1075:
1070:
1066:
1057:
1055:
1043:
1042:
1038:
1034:
1010:
980:Foreign Affairs
975:
925:
872:
867:
840:
793:
735:Nguyễn Văn Hinh
712:
652:Edward Lansdale
630:
604:
599:
560:
546:Pentagon Papers
533:Pentagon Papers
523:
446:
396:), leaving the
347:
346:
336:
335:
323:
322:
310:
296:
295:
285:
284:
274:
244:
242:
241:
236:
226:
225:
215:
214:
205:
203:
202:
186:
184:
183:
178:
176:Kingdom of Laos
168:
167:
158:
156:
155:
113:(South Vietnam)
84:
68:1954–1959
49:U.S. President
48:
17:
12:
11:
5:
1678:
1676:
1668:
1667:
1662:
1657:
1652:
1647:
1642:
1637:
1632:
1627:
1622:
1617:
1612:
1607:
1602:
1597:
1592:
1587:
1582:
1577:
1572:
1570:Indochina Wars
1567:
1557:
1556:
1552:
1551:
1531:
1522:
1488:
1472:
1463:
1454:
1439:
1432:
1412:
1400:
1391:
1353:
1326:
1319:
1299:
1290:
1274:
1250:
1216:
1207:
1188:
1179:
1171:
1153:
1134:
1104:
1073:
1071:Eckhardt, p. 8
1064:
1035:
1033:
1030:
1009:
1006:
974:
971:
924:
921:
910:, returned to
878:tribes of the
871:
868:
839:
836:
832:Luu Doan Huynh
792:
789:
724:Dr. Tom Dooley
711:
708:
629:
626:
603:
600:
598:
595:
559:
556:
522:
519:
457:, followed by
445:
442:
414:anti-communism
358:
357:
308:
271:
270:
266:
265:
251:
193:
151:Anti-Communist
145:
144:
140:
139:
136:
135:
134:
133:
130:
127:
124:Anti-communism
121:
114:
107:
101:
97:Deposition of
90:
86:
85:
76:
74:
70:
69:
66:
58:
57:
40:
39:
33:Indochina Wars
24:
23:
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1677:
1666:
1663:
1661:
1658:
1656:
1653:
1651:
1648:
1646:
1643:
1641:
1638:
1636:
1633:
1631:
1628:
1626:
1623:
1621:
1618:
1616:
1613:
1611:
1608:
1606:
1603:
1601:
1598:
1596:
1593:
1591:
1588:
1586:
1583:
1581:
1578:
1576:
1573:
1571:
1568:
1566:
1563:
1562:
1560:
1549:, pp. 136-137
1546:
1542:
1535:
1532:
1526:
1523:
1510:
1506:
1505:TIME magazine
1502:
1498:
1492:
1489:
1485:
1484:
1476:
1473:
1467:
1464:
1458:
1455:
1450:
1443:
1440:
1435:
1429:
1425:
1424:
1416:
1413:
1407:
1405:
1401:
1398:Patti, p. 447
1395:
1392:
1382:on 2007-08-14
1381:
1377:
1376:
1368:
1366:
1364:
1362:
1360:
1358:
1354:
1344:on 2019-10-27
1343:
1339:
1338:
1330:
1327:
1322:
1320:9780842027632
1316:
1312:
1311:
1303:
1300:
1297:Patti, p. 446
1294:
1291:
1286:
1285:
1278:
1275:
1264:
1260:
1254:
1251:
1236:
1229:
1228:
1220:
1217:
1214:Beech, p. I-5
1211:
1208:
1201:
1200:
1192:
1189:
1186:Patti, p. 444
1183:
1180:
1174:
1172:0-520-04156-9
1168:
1164:
1157:
1154:
1149:
1145:
1138:
1135:
1125:on 2017-10-19
1124:
1120:
1119:
1111:
1109:
1105:
1095:on 2022-01-03
1094:
1090:
1086:
1080:
1078:
1074:
1068:
1065:
1054:on 2017-10-19
1053:
1049:
1048:
1040:
1037:
1031:
1029:
1027:
1023:
1018:
1016:
1007:
1005:
1003:
999:
994:
993:Phạm Văn Đồng
988:
983:
981:
972:
970:
968:
964:
960:
955:
953:
949:
942:
939:
934:
930:
922:
920:
917:
913:
909:
903:
898:
896:
891:
889:
884:
881:
877:
869:
866:
862:
857:
854:
851:
847:
845:
837:
835:
833:
829:
825:
818:
816:
810:
808:
803:
799:
790:
788:
784:
780:
778:
774:
770:
766:
761:
758:
756:
750:
748:
744:
740:
736:
732:
727:
725:
719:
717:
709:
707:
704:
700:
696:
691:
688:
682:
680:
679:Lucien Conein
675:
673:
669:
664:
661:
657:
653:
649:
644:
642:
637:
634:
633:Ngô Đình Diệm
627:
625:
623:
617:
614:
612:
608:
601:
596:
593:
588:
585:
581:
576:
572:
570:
564:
557:
554:
549:
547:
541:
536:
534:
530:
529:
520:
518:
516:
510:
506:
502:
498:
494:
490:
488:
484:
479:
475:
471:
467:
462:
460:
459:major general
456:
452:
443:
441:
439:
435:
431:
427:
421:
419:
415:
411:
410:Ngô Đình Diệm
407:
406:North Vietnam
403:
399:
395:
391:
387:
383:
379:
375:
371:
370:
366:phase of the
365:
356:
351:
345:
340:
334:
333:
327:
321:
320:
314:
307:
306:
300:
294:
293:Lâm Quang Thi
289:
283:
282:Ngô Đình Diệm
278:
273:
272:
267:
263:
259:
255:
252:
240:
239:Supported by:
237:
235:
230:
224:
219:
213:
212:North Vietnam
201:
199:
194:
192:United States
182:
181:Supported by:
179:
177:
172:
166:
165:South Vietnam
154:
152:
147:
146:
141:
131:
128:
125:
122:
119:
118:Ngô Đình Diệm
115:
112:
108:
106:
102:
100:
96:
95:
94:
91:
88:
87:
83:
82:South Vietnam
79:
78:North Vietnam
75:
72:
71:
67:
64:
63:
59:
56:
55:Ngo Dinh Diem
52:
46:
41:
38:
34:
30:
25:
20:
1544:
1534:
1525:
1513:. Retrieved
1509:the original
1491:
1482:
1475:
1466:
1457:
1448:
1442:
1422:
1415:
1394:
1384:, retrieved
1380:the original
1374:
1346:, retrieved
1342:the original
1336:
1329:
1309:
1302:
1293:
1283:
1277:
1266:. Retrieved
1262:
1253:
1242:, retrieved
1235:the original
1226:
1219:
1210:
1198:
1191:
1182:
1177:, pp.443-444
1162:
1156:
1147:
1137:
1127:, retrieved
1123:the original
1117:
1097:, retrieved
1093:the original
1088:
1067:
1056:, retrieved
1052:the original
1046:
1039:
1022:invaded Laos
1019:
1011:
1002:invaded Laos
998:Mekong Delta
990:
985:
979:
976:
961:
957:
944:
926:
905:
900:
895:Trường Chinh
892:
885:
873:
855:
852:
848:
841:
820:
814:
812:
807:his emphasis
806:
794:
785:
781:
762:
759:
751:
728:
720:
713:
692:
683:
676:
665:
655:
646:The initial
645:
638:
631:
618:
615:
610:
605:
590:
577:
573:
565:
561:
551:
548:determined:
545:
543:
538:
532:
526:
524:
511:
507:
503:
499:
495:
491:
463:
447:
422:
367:
364:1954 to 1959
363:
361:
344:Trường Chinh
330:
317:
303:
238:
196:
195:
180:
149:
148:
143:Belligerents
92:
27:Part of the
1565:Vietnam War
769:Dan Xa Dang
592:solidarity.
478:Raoul Salan
369:Vietnam War
319:Hồ Chí Minh
29:Vietnam War
1559:Categories
1437:, pp.94-95
1433:1586486217
1386:2009-12-02
1348:2009-12-02
1324:, p. 10-11
1268:2020-04-24
1244:2 December
1148:Parameters
1129:2009-12-02
1099:2009-12-02
1058:2009-12-02
1032:References
929:insurgency
876:Montagnard
859:See also:
747:Bình Xuyên
487:Korean War
262:Bình Xuyên
234:Pathet Lao
982:article,
933:Viet Minh
773:Lien Minh
714:Cardinal
687:Việt Minh
426:Indochina
402:communist
223:Viet Minh
198:Communist
1062:, pp.6-7
938:Châu Đốc
765:Tây Ninh
641:Paul Ély
582:and the
483:division
438:Cambodia
73:Location
37:Cold War
1151:, p. 15
952:Cao Đài
948:Hòa Hảo
908:Lê Duẩn
886:The US
743:Hòa Hảo
739:Cao Đài
569:Cao Đài
430:Vietnam
332:Lê Duẩn
258:Hòa Hảo
254:Cao Đài
200:forces:
153:forces:
99:Bảo Đại
1515:May 4,
1430:
1317:
1169:
809:) was
745:, and
597:Events
468:(LTG)
436:, and
378:French
248:
209:
190:
162:
89:Result
1238:(PDF)
1231:(PDF)
1203:(PDF)
912:Hanoi
453:(BG)
392:(see
384:that
250:China
1517:2010
1497:TIME
1428:ISBN
1315:ISBN
1246:2009
1167:ISBN
1008:1959
950:and
923:1957
870:1956
863:and
800:and
703:NATO
602:1954
531:or "
434:Laos
380:, a
362:The
260:and
65:Date
35:and
763:In
656:not
1561::
1543:,
1503:.
1403:^
1356:^
1261:.
1146:,
1107:^
1087:,
1076:^
1028:.
1017:.
969:.
779:.
771:,
741:,
432:,
256:,
80:,
31:,
1519:.
1271:.
1175:.
428:(
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
