War in Vietnam (1959–1963)

496:, but how much of this was considered a real threat, and how much a nucleus around which he justified his controls, is less clear. Those controls, and the shutdown of most indigenous opposition by 1959, were clearly alienating the Diệm government from significant parts of the Southern population. The government was massively mismanaging rural reforms and overemphasizing its power base in the cities, which might have had an independent rebellion. North Vietnam, however, clearly began to exploit that alienation. The US, however, did not recognize a significant threat, even with such information as intelligence on the formation of the logistics structure for infiltration. The presentation of hard evidence — communications intelligence about the organization building the 448:(Viet Cong). At the same time, the United States helped the South Vietnamese regime conduct its war strategy. Despite this assistance, the communist forces still won on the battlefield, fighting several large campaigns next to the big cities. Diệm was unable to take control of political crisis and was overthrown by the Council of Revolutionary Military (some documents of both sides suggest that it was the United States which had given the green light for this coup). After several years of chaos, the Ngô Đình Diệm government came to an end in 1963 and South Vietnam then fell into management crisis. 602:

support of Khánh. As opposed to Diệm's catastrophic handling of the Buddhist crisis, Khánh responded with moderation, and, on August 28, INR concluded he was, in fact, improving the political situation. Evidence cited including the dissolution, in the next two weeks, of Minh's military triumvirate and Minh's election as chairman of a new Provisional Steering Committee, as well as release of some jailed generals that had supported Minh. INR suggested that Khánh may have caused the unrest by supporting the genuinely popular Khánh. Khánh, however, promptly sent Minh to exile in Thailand.

353: 342: 329: 316: 205: 892:, went from the Ministry of the Interior to the province chiefs, district chiefs, and village councils. Even though the province chiefs and district chiefs were often military officers, commanders of ARVN units operating in a province or district could not give orders to these units. Instead, they had to pass a request through military channels to the Ministry of Defense in Saigon. If the officials there agreed, they would convey the request to their counterparts in the Ministry of the Interior, who would then send orders down its chain of command to the local units. 882:"The Department of National Defense and most of the central organizations and the ministerial services were located in downtown Saigon, while the General Staff (minus air and navy elements) was inefficiently located in a series of company-size troop barracks on the edge of the city. The chief of the General Staff was thus removed several miles from the Department of National Defense. The navy and air staffs were also separately located in downtown Saigon. With such a physical layout, staff action and decision-making was unduly delayed on even the simplest of matters. 228: 425:, were as much an influence as any internal matters. There is little question that in 1957–1958, there was a definite early guerrilla movement against the Diệm government, involving individual assassinations, expropriations, recruiting, shadow government. The insurgents were South Vietnamese rebels or northerners who had been living there for some time. While there was clearly communications and perhaps arms supply from the north, there is little evidence of any Northern units in the South, although organizers may well have infiltrated. 536:(MAAG) was a proposal to change what appeared to be a dysfunctional structure. Further analysis showed the situation was not only a jockeying for power, but also reflected that the province chiefs indeed had security authority that could conflict with that of tactical military operations in progress, but also had responsibility for the civil administration of the province. That civil administration function became more and more intertwined, starting in 1964 and with acceleration in 1966, of the "other war" of rural development. 186: 791:, it was ordered that MAAG-V assign advisors to the infantry regiment and special troops regiment level, who were not to participate directly in combat, and advisers be provided down to infantry regiment and to artillery, armored, and separate Marine battalion level. This move would enable advisers to give on-the-spot advice and effectively assess the result of the advisory effort. He also requested US Army Special Forces (SF) mobile training teams (MTT) to assist in training ARVN units in 885:"The over-all ministerial structure described above was originally set up by the French and slightly modified by presidential decree on 3 October 1957. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, had proposed a different command structure which would have placed the ministry and the "general staff" in closer proximity both physically and in command relationship." Diệm, however, made a practice of keeping individuals or small groups from having too much authority. 302: 289: 245: 278: 265: 176: 164: 879:, got onto the tactical radio net and confused the local commanders with German-accented and obscure commands. Johnson and Kissinger did have more military experience than Diệm; Johnson had briefly served in the Naval Reserve, and Kissinger lectured on politics at the end of World War II and the start of the Occupation, with a high status but an actual rank of Private, United States Army. Diệm had never worn a uniform. 217: 444:

increasingly US direct support to South Vietnamese soldiers, increased, under US military authority, in late 1959 and early 1960. Communications intercepts in 1959, for example, confirmed the start of the Ho Chi Minh trail and other preparation for large-scale fighting. North Vietnam declared its public support for communist insurgents in South Vietnam. The communist forces in South Vietnam established the

1361:. It was the first time U.S. forces directly and overtly supported ARVN units in combat, although the American forces did not directly attack the guerrillas. Approximately 1,000 Vietnamese paratroopers were airlifted into a suspected Viet Cong headquarters complex about ten miles west of the Vietnamese capital, achieving tactical surprise and capturing a radio station. 1308:(MAAG), such as the senior U.S. military organization in Vietnam, is a support and advisory organization. A Military Assistance Command (MAC) is designed to carry out MAAG duties, but also to direct command combat troops. There was considerable discussion about the reporting structure of this of the organization: a separate theater reporting to the 1028:, killing 23 soldiers and taking large quantities of munitions. Four days later, a guerrilla group seized a town for several hours, and stole cash from a French citizen. These were still in the first Maoist stage, as raids rather than hit-and-run battles. Still, larger guerrilla forces broke lines of communications within areas of South Vietnam. 590:, since it was getting much more accurate — if pessimistic — from the new government than it had from Diệm. Secretary McNamara, however, testified to the House Armed Services Committee, on December 27, that only a maximum effort of American power could salvage the situation. Two days later, the Minh-Tho government was overthrown. 485:. In areas under communist control in 1959, the guerrillas established their own government, levied taxes, trained troops, built defense works, and provided education and medical care. In order to direct and coordinate the new policies in the South, it was necessary to revamp the party leadership apparatus and form a new united front group. 1545:"Johnson was a profoundly insecure man who craved and demanded affirmation." When the North Vietnamese did not respond as Johnson wanted, he took it personally, and may have made some judgments based on his emotional responses to Ho. He also spoke with a much smaller advisory circle than Kennedy, and excluded active military officers. 1415:

officer with a U.S. advisor. Relationships in particular operations often were more a matter of personalities and politics rather than ideal command. U.S. troops also did not report to ARVN officers; while many RVN officers had their post through political connections, others would have been outstanding commanders in any army.

45: 1110:(in office 1961–63) in 1961 that it was "absurd to think that a nation of 20 million people can be subverted by 15-20 thousand active guerrillas if the government and the people of that country do not wish to be subverted." McNamara, a manufacturing executive and expert in statistical management, had no background in 1407:

the ARVN. At first, MAC-V delegated control of U.S. combat units to the MAAG. While it was not an immediate concern, MAC-V never controlled all the Air Force and Navy units that would operate in Vietnam, but from outside its borders. These remained under the control of Pacific Command, or, in some cases, the

1559:

While there had been long-standing animosity between Diệm and the Buddhists, in April 1963, for unclear reasons, the central government ordered the provincial authorities to enforce a ban on the display of all religious flags. This ban was rarely enforced, but, since the order went out shortly before

1382:

In 1962, the U.S. Military Assistance Command–Vietnam (MACV) established Army Special Forces camps near villages. The Americans wanted a military presence there to block the infiltration of enemy forces from Laos, to provide a base for launching patrols into Laos to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and

1093:

The NLF platform recognized some of the internal stresses under the Diệm government, and put language in its platform to create autonomous regions in minority areas and for the abolition of the "U.S.-Diêm clique's present policy of ill-treatment and forced assimilation of the minority nationalities".

1035:

and in a March U.S. intelligence assessment, that there were distinct plans to conduct larger-scale operations "under the flag of the People's Liberation Movement", which was identified as "red, with a blue star." It was uncertain if their intent was to continue to build bases in the Mekong Delta, or

831:

There were problems with the military structure, even before considering the paramilitary forces under the Interior Ministry. The JGS itself had conflicting components with no clear authority. For example, support for the Air Force came both from a Director of Air Technical Service and a Deputy Chief

597:

Whether or not Khánh was right about Minh's plan, INR judged Minh as motivated primarily by personal ambition. Where Minh had tried to form a government of technicians, Khánh, admittedly with U.S. urging, brought in political elements, which quickly led to factionalism not present under Minh's period

1406:

Military Assistance Command-Thailand was created on May 15, 1962, but reported to Harkins at MAC-V. In a departure from usual practice, the MAAG was retained as an organization subordinate to MAC-V, rather than being absorbed into it. The MAAG continued to command U.S. advisors and direct support to

1373:

was the consensus approach to pacifying the countryside. There was a sense, however, that this was simply not a high priority for Diệm, who considered his power base to be in the cities. The Communists, willing to fill a vacuum, became more and more active in rural areas where the GVN was invisible,

1077:

In April 1960, eighteen distinguished nationalists in South Vietnam sent a petition to President Diệm advocating that he reform his rigid, family-run, and increasingly corrupt government. Diệm ignored their advice and instead closed several opposition newspapers and had journalists and intellectuals

987:

Operating on a local basis since 1955 and formally created in 1956, the Self-Defense corps was a village-level police organization, for protection against intimidation and subversion. It put units of 4-10 men into villages of 1,000 or more residents. In 1956, it had 48,000 non-uniformed troops armed

859:

of all, getting on a radio in the garden of the Presidential Palace, and issuing orders to regiments, bypassing the Department of National Defense, Joint General Staff, operational commanders, and division commanders. He also consciously played subordinates against one another to avoid the formation

1667:

met with Generals Minh and Don. Afterwards, Lodge reported, "Minh seemed tired and somewhat frazzled; obviously a good, well-intentioned man. Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?" The new government was announced on the 6th: General Minh was chairman, Don and Dinh were deputy chairmen,

1261:

special operations squadron, part of the 4400th CCTS, deployed to SVN, officially in a role of advising and training. The aircraft were painted in South Vietnamese colors, and the aircrew wore uniforms without insignia and without U.S. ID. Sending military forces to South Vietnam was a violation of

1207:

The task force reported back in May, with a glum assessment of the situation in the South, and a wide-ranging but general plan of action, which became NSAM 52. In June, Kennedy issued a set of NSAMs transferring paramilitary operations to the Department of Defense. These transfers of responsibility

696:

The Pathet Lao were operating not only against the Laotian government, but also working with NVA Group 959 to supply the southern insurgency; much of the original Trail was in Laos, first supplying the Pathet Lao. Nevertheless, the Laotian government did not want it known that it was being assisted

570:

INR saw the priority during this period as more a matter of establishing a viable, sustainable political structure for South Vietnam, rather than radically improving the short-term security situation. It saw the Minh-Tho government as enjoying an initial period of popular support as it removed some

1696:

McNamara was insistent that a rational enemy would not accept the massive casualties that indeed were inflicted on the Communists. The enemy, however, was willing to accept those casualties. McNamara was insistent that the enemy would comply with his concepts of cost-effectiveness, of which Ho and

1236:

control, entered Vietnam operating under the cover name "3rd Radio Research Unit". Organizationally, it provided support to MAAG-V, and trained ARVN personnel, the latter within security constraints. The general policy, throughout the war, was that ARVN intelligence personnel were not given access

818:

When the MAAG was instructed to improve the effectiveness of the ARVN, the most fundamental problem was that the Diệm government had organized the military and paramilitary forces not for effectiveness, but for political control and patronage. The most obvious manifestation of Diệm's goal was that

472:

troops that had returned to the North following the Geneva Agreements had begun filtering back into the South to take up leadership positions in the insurgency apparat. Mass demonstrations, punctuated by an occasional raid on an isolated post, were the major activities in the initial stage of this

1567:

In May, a government paramilitary unit fired into demonstrators. As part of a wave of protests, a Buddhist monk immolated himself; photographs of his body, apparently seated calmly in the lotus position as he burned to death, drew worldwide attention. By early June, the government was negotiating

1414:

No regular ARVN units were under the command of U.S. military commanders, although there were exceptions for irregular units under Special Forces. Indeed, there could be situations where, in a joint operation, U.S. combat troops were under a U.S. commander, while the ARVN units were under an ARVN

1331:

headquarters, with the Vietnam commanders present. He addressed short-term possibilities, urging concentration on stabilizing one province: "I'll guarantee it (the money and equipment) provided you have a plan based on one province. Take one place, sweep it and hold it in a plan." Or, put another

1248:

of Viet Cong radio transmitters, which they started doing from vehicles equipped with sensors. On December 22, 1961, an Army Security Agency soldier, SP4 James T. Davis, was killed in an ambush leading an ARVN squad on one of these direction finding missions. After Johnson became President of the

1146:

meeting that he wanted covert operations launched against North Vietnam, in retaliation for their equivalent actions in the South. It is not suggested that this was an inappropriate decision, but the existence of covert operations against the North, has to be understood in analyzing later events,

827:

President Diệm appointed the Secretary of State for National Defense and the Minister of the Interior. The Defense Secretary directed of General Staff chief and several special sub-departments. The General staff chief, in turn, commanded the Joint General Staff (JGS), which was both the top-level

642:

administration made Presidential decisions to increase its influence. Diệm, as other powers were deciding their policies, was clearly facing disorganized attacks and internal political dissent. There were unquestioned conflicts between the government, dominated by minority Northern Catholics, and

428:

There was endemic insurgency in South Vietnam throughout the period 1954–1960. It can also be established-but less surely- that the Diệm regime alienated itself from one after another of those domestic sectors which might have offered it political support, and was grievously at fault in its rural

617:

The North had clearly defined political objectives, and a grand strategy, involving military, diplomatic, covert action and psychological operations to achieve those objectives. Whether or not one agreed with those objectives, there was a clear relationship between long-term goals and short-term

1640:

counseled a delay in meeting with the coup leadership, which had started calling itself the "Revolutionary Committee", to avoid appearance of it being a U.S. coup. Apparently unknown to the U.S., the plotters had negotiated, beforehand, with vice-president Tho, who had been the chief government

1520:

into office, with a different philosophy toward the war. Kennedy was an activist, but had a sense of unconventional warfare and geopolitics, and, as is seen in the documentary record, discussed policy development with a wide range of advisors, specifically including military leaders although he

1294:

of southern Vietnam. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) were under CIA operational control until July 1, 1963, when MACV took over. Army documents refer to control by "CAS Saigon", a cover name for the CIA station. According to Kelly, the SF and CIA rationale for establishing the CIDG

1180:, only allowing limited air strikes by CIA-sponsored pilots acting as Cuban dissidents. After it was learned that the main strike had left behind few jet aircraft, he refused a follow-up strike; those aircraft savaged the poorly organized amphibious ships and their propeller-driven air support. 1094:

Such zones, with a sense of identity although certainly not political autonomy, did exist in the North. In the early 1960s, NLF political organizers went to the Montagnard areas in the Central Highlands, and worked both to increase alienation from the government and directly recruit supporters.

979:

Created by presidential decree in April 1955, and originally under the direct control of President Diệm, with control passed to the Ministry of the Interior in September 1958, the Civil Guard was made up of wartime paramilitary veterans. Its major duty was to relieve the ARVN of static security

601:

INR considered new student demonstrations, in April 1964, as the first warning of a new wave of protest, which became more manifest in August. Those demonstrations contained anti-American messages, but INR was uncertain if they represented true anti-Americanism, or simply opposition to American

443:

While the visible guerrilla incidents increased gradually, the key policy decisions by the North were made in 1959. Early in this period, there was a greater degree of conflict in Laos than in South Vietnam. US combat involvement was, at first, greater in Laos, but the activity of advisors, and

539:

An issue that remains unclear is whether or not any of the post-Diệm governments seriously explored a neutralist solution through direct negotiations with Hanoi, which would have been against U.S. policy. Contemporary intelligence analyses discount such negotiations, although they remained an

1432:

The USMC 1st Composite Radio Company deployed, on January 2, 1962, to Pleiku, South Vietnam as Detachment One. After Davis' death in December, it became obvious to the Army Security Agency that thick jungle made tactical ground collection exceptionally dangerous, and direction-finding moved

1688:

became the new President of the United States. Johnson was far more focused on domestic politics than the international activist, Kennedy. Some of the Kennedy team left quickly, while others, sometimes surprisingly given extremely different personalities, stayed on; the formal and logical

1456:

Stability in the South, however, would not improve with increasing dissent, coup attempts, and a major coup. It remains unclear as to what extent the South Vietnamese were exploring solutions based on a neutralist Vietnam, but this apparently existed at some level, without U.S. knowledge.

1299:

the Montagnards and other minority groups were prime targets for Communist propaganda, partly because of their dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese government, and it was important to prevent the Viet Cong from recruiting them and taking complete control of their large and strategic land

2424: 1656:, on November 3. Explaining that Minh was, as they spoke, with Tho, they said there would be a two-tiered government structure with a military committee presided over by General Dương Văn Minh overseeing a regular cabinet that would be mostly civilian with Tho as prime minister. 1515:

that ended with the killing of Diệm was an obvious major event, it was by no means the only important event of the year. In keeping with the President's expressed desires, covert operations against the North were escalated. Of course, the assassination of Kennedy himself brought

1598:

Taylor, although a distinguished Airborne (paratroopers once being believed special operators) officer, disagreed with Kennedy's emphasis on covert operations, did not have the appropriate resources in the Department of Defense, and he did not believe it was a proper job for

593:

INR looked pessimistically at Khánh, who claimed that Minh had been making overtures to Hanoi for a neutralist settlement. It was the contemporary assessment of INR that Minh had been making no such overtures, although this is contradicted by Secretary McNamara's 1999 book.

1541:

to examine the situation and reassure him. McNamara at this point, as he had with Kennedy, exuded a sense of logical control; he was not yet in the deep despair that led him to write, "...we were wrong, terribly wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain why."

582:

that had considered themselves as especially persecuted by Diệm. Pike believed that a portion of the NLF was variously anti-Diệm, or simply in search of political power, rather than Communist. When this part left, the NLF came much more closely under Hanoi's control.

528:(ARVN) as a device to secure power, rather than as a tool to unify the nation and defeat their enemies. Province and District Chiefs in the rural areas were usually military officers, but reported to political leadership in Saigon rather than the military operational 672:

Diệm, in early 1959, felt under attack and broadly reacted against all forms of opposition, which was presented as a "Communist Denunciation Campaign", as well as some significant and unwelcome rural resettlement, the latter to be distinguished from land reform.

571:

of the most disliked aspects of the Diệm government. During this time, the increase in VC attacks was largely coincidental; they were resulting from the VC having reached a level of offensive capability rather than capitalizing on the overthrow of Diệm.

988:

with French weapons. The Self-Defense Corps, like the Civil Guard, was established to free regular forces from internal security duties by providing a police organization at village level to protect the population from subversion and intimidation.

1606:

It is unclear if Taylor did not believe covert operations should not be attempted at all, or if he regarded it as a CIA mission. If the latter, Kennedy would have been unlikely to support him, given the President's loss of confidence after the

999:

As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the U.S. was urging the RVN to revise its parallel province/district command and military operations command structure; the Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) was the first of several such proposals.

1269:

The deployment package consisted of 155 airmen, eight T-28s, and four modified and redesignated SC-47s and subsequently received B-26s. U.S. personnel flew combat as long as a VNAF person was aboard. FARM GATE stayed covert until after the

1129:

Still trying to resolve the problems of GVN conflicting command, a new reorganizational proposal, the "Geographically Phased Plan", was offered. Its goal was to have a coherent national plan, which was, in 1962, to be expressed as the

500:— of Hanoi's involvement in the developing strife became evident. Not until 1960, however, did the US recognize both Diệm was in danger, that the Diệm structure was inadequate to deal with the problems, and present the first " 1532:

Johnson tended to view the situation from the standpoint of U.S. domestic policy, and did not want to render himself vulnerable to political criticism as the man who had "lost Vietnam". Early after becoming president, as he told

1641:

negotiator in the Buddhist crisis. In the immediate followup of the coup, Diệm's cabinet were told to resign, and there were no reprisals. Tho, however, was negotiating with the committee, especially the most powerful general,

1203:

trainers (equipped for ground attack), with an official mission of training indigenous air forces in counterinsurgency and conducting air operations. A volunteer unit, they would deploy in October, to begin FARM GATE missions.

984:. In 1956, it had 68,000 men organized into companies and platoons. The Civil Guard was represented by two to eight companies in each province. It had a centrally controlled reserve of eight mobile battalions of 500 men each. 780:. The latter was commanded by the Department of the Interior, and controlled by province and district chiefs. This structure let the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM, the contemporary term for non-military foreign aid from the 819:

there were two parallel organizations, the regular military under the Department of National Defense and the local defense forces under the Ministry of the Interior. Diệm was the only person who could give orders to both.

1572:, a Buddhist, apparently being an effective negotiator in spite of Diệm's brother and political advisor Ngô Đình Nhu's announcing "if the Buddhists want to have another barbecue, I will be glad to supply the gasoline". 1208:

should be considered not only in respect to the specific operations against the North, but also to the level of covert military operation in the South in the upcoming months. This transfer also cut the experienced MG

843:

role of corps commanders in most militaries, but also from the regional commander of the home base of the division — even if the division was operating in another area. The chiefs of branches of service (e.g.,

216: 731:

The CIA directed Air America in August 1959 to train two helicopter pilots. Originally, this was believed to be a short-term requirement, but "this would be the beginning of a major rotary-wing operation in Laos.

598:

of good will. INR saw Khánh as having a contradictory policy in terms of U.S. goals: while he did increase security, he did so by means judged counterproductive in broadening the political base of the government.

852:), who in most armies were responsible only for preparation and training of personnel of their branch, and orders only before they were deployed, would give direct operational orders to units in the field. 2585: 512:

Quite separate from its internal problems, South Vietnam faced an unusual military challenge. On the one hand, there was a threat of a conventional, cross-border strike from the North, reminiscent of the

618:

actions. Its military first focused on guerrilla and raid warfare in the south (i.e., Mao's "Phase I"), simultaneously improving the air defenses of the north. By the mid-sixties, they were operating in

429:

programs. That these conditions engendered animosity toward the Southern dictatorship seems almost certain, and they could have led to a major resistance movement even without North Vietnamese help.

1714:

Statistical indicators showed that VC attacks were increased in comparison with the first half of the year, and MACV was concerned that units involved in the coup were not getting back to the field.

1176:

out of operational planning. The JCS believed the operation was ill-advised, but, if it was to be done, American air support was essential. Kennedy, however, had made a number of changes to create

1580:

At the May 6 Honolulu conference, the decision was made to increase, as the President had been pushing, covert operations against the North. A detailed plan for covert operations, Pacific Command

832:

of Air Staff for Matériel. The Director was, in principle, under the Chief of Staff, but actually reported to the Director General of Administration, Budget, and Comptroller for fiscal matters.

1324:

After meetings in Vietnam by GEN Taylor, the Secretaries of State and Defense issued a set of recommendations, on November 11. Kennedy accepted all except the use of large U.S. combat forces.

1165:, then Saigon station chief, said it would consume too many resources needed in the South. He further directed, in April, a presidential task force to draft a "Program of Action for Vietnam". 1102:

Not surprisingly, with a change in U.S. administration, there were changes in policy, and also continuations of some existing activities. There were changes in outlook. Defense Secretary

991:

The Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps were poorly trained and ill-equipped to perform their missions, and by 1959 their numbers had declined to about 46,000 and 40,000, respectively.

440:" organization between 1954 and 1960, but it is unclear whether they were directed to take over action until 1957 or later. Before that, they were unquestionably recruiting and preparing. 1445:

advisers was sent to Vietnam to operate within the United States military advisory system. As with most American advisors, their initial orders were to train, but not go on operations.

1157:

Kennedy discovered that little had progressed by mid-March, and issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 28, ordering the CIA to launch guerrilla operations against the North.

1500:

in September. This has been considered the trigger for an increasingly skeptical, although small, American press corps in Vietnam. Ap Bac was of particular political sensitivity, as

1624: 701:

against the Pathet Lao. U.S. military assistance could also be considered a violation of the Geneva agreement, although North Vietnam, and its suppliers, were equally in violation.

129: 1948: 740:

Cause and effect are unclear, but it is also accurate that the individual and small group actions, by the latter part of 1959, included raids by irregulars in battalion strength.

559:

define the political problems from a viewpoint different from that of the military. They described the immediate post-coup government, controlled by the popular "Big" Minh with

1383:

to serve as a western anchor for defense along the DMZ. These defended villages were not part of the Strategic Hamlet Program, but did provide examples that were relevant.

1249:

United States several years later, he referred to Davis in a speech as the first American killed in Vietnam; in reality, there had been fifteen battle deaths before Davis.

1697:

Giap were unaware. They were, however, quite familiar with attritional strategies. While they were not politically Maoist, they were also well versed in Mao's concepts of

1087: 445: 1072: 631: 1900: 1154:

Even earlier, he issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 2, directing the military to prepare counterinsurgency forces, although not yet targeting the North.

1161:, deputy chief of the Saigon CIA station, observed the actual CIA action plan was "very modest". Given the Presidential priority, Weisshart said it was modest because 402:, which led to a major US escalation of its involvement. Vietnamese communists saw this as a second phase of their revolution, the US now substituting for the French. 1172:

of Cuba, under the CIA, had failed, and Kennedy lost confidence in the CIA's paramilitary operations. Kennedy himself had some responsibility for largely cutting the

622:

and larger military formations that would remain in contact as long as the correlation of forces was to their advantage, and then retreat — Mao's "Phase II".

2685: 1453:

1963 was a critical year not only because the Diệm government fell, but also because the North, at the end of the year, chose a more aggressive military strategy.

1114:

or other than Western culture, and rejected advice from area specialists and military officers. He preferred to consult with his personal team, often called the "

2690: 1628: 1309: 2286: 2710: 2700: 1789: 1257:

More U.S. personnel, officially designated as advisors, arrived in the South and took an increasingly active, although covert, role. In October, a

689:. Additional transportation groups were created for maritime supply to the South: Group 759 ran sea-based operations, while Group 959 supplied the 1143: 2695: 784:) financially aid the Guard, they were so dispersed that there could be no systematic advice, much less to the combination of Guard and Army. 2378: 1585: 1119: 871:

and his political advisors would do detailed air operations planning for attacks in the North, with no input from experienced air officers.

2597: 1984: 1427: 1400: 1188: 781: 1959: 1817: 2188: 1846: 1762: 552: 2506: 1304:

It was in mid-November when Kennedy decided to have U.S. operatives take on operational as well as advisory roles. Under U.S. terms, a

2655: 2605: 2593: 2259: 1305: 1229: 1066: 533: 92: 1295:

program with the Montagnards was that minority participation would broaden the GVN counterinsurgency program, but, more critically,

1115: 705: 1927:

Hanyok, Robert J. (2002), "Chapter 3 - "To Die in the South": SIGINT, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the Infiltration Problem, 1968",

1504:, a highly visible American officer, was the advisor, and the U.S. press took note of what he considered to be ARVN shortcomings. 2625: 963: 2715: 1564:(informally called Buddha's Birthday), which fell on May 8, many Buddhists perceived this as a direct attack on their customs. 777: 525: 1906: 1827: 889: 1719: 1328: 1313: 788: 548:, the leader of the coup that actually overthrew Diệm, was actively exploring such an approach without informing the U.S. 1008:

After the initial 180-day assignment phase of the Special Forces personnel in Laos, the name of the operation changed to

501: 457: 1537:, he had the "terrible feeling that something has grabbed me by the ankles and won't let go." His response was to send 763:

the proliferation of Ranger-type counterinsurgency units without central direction and without a civil-military context

1358: 1283: 1238: 1237:

above the collateral SECRET (i.e., with no access to material with the additional special restrictions of "code word"

743:

The situation in Vietnam formed a significant part of the agenda of the U.S. Pacific commanders' conference in April.

489: 478: 864:

was a defeat caused by a lack of unity of command, with conflicts between the military commander and province chief.

626: 2314: 551:

Throughout this period, there clearly was a lack of information about South Vietnamese motivations. Analyses by the

482: 270: 2680: 2675: 2670: 2665: 2660: 1949:"Seminole Negro Indians, Macabebes, and Civilian Irregulars: Models for the Future Employment of Indigenous Forces" 1620: 1512: 1200: 747: 586:

During this period, INR observed, in a December 23 paper, the U.S. needed to reexamine its strategy focused on the

1466: 980:

missions, freeing it for mobile operations, with additional responsibility for local intelligence collection and

2364:

Impressions: Australians in Vietnam. Overview of Australian military involvement in the Vietnam War, 1962 - 1975

2153:"SP4 James Thomas Davis, Livingston, TN on www.VirtualWall.org The Virtual Wall® Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall" 1708:

How stable was the new government? Was the presence of an empowered Tho a threat to Minh and the other generals?

2650: 2645: 2640: 2635: 2630: 1850: 1673: 1370: 1287: 1233: 1131: 587: 556: 406: 113: 107: 1595:

MACV had no established covert operations force, so even if he approved a plan, there was no one to execute it

1738: 835:

Combat units also had conflicting chains of command. A division commander might receive orders both from the

357: 2292: 1862:, vol. George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 121, INR-VN4 1795: 1478: 1271: 1148: 606: 409:

and 1956, the two states created by the talks were still forming; the influence of major powers, especially

399: 1642: 134: 1482: 2103:

the Secret War against Hanoi: the untold story of spies, saboteurs, and covert warriors in North Vietnam

1660: 1522: 1408: 1263: 1177: 1173: 1024:

On 25 January 1960, a Communist force of 300 to 500 men escalated with a direct raid on an ARVN base at

709: 1158: 721: 578:

said that there was a substantial defection from the NLF after the overthrow of Diệm, especially among

1357:

Twelve days later these helicopters were committed into the first airmobile combat action in Vietnam,

655:. These conflicts were exploited, initially at the level of propaganda and recruiting, by stay-behind 2705: 2068: 1668:

and nine other generals, including Kim, Khiêm, "little" Minh, Chieu, and Thieu were members. General

1608: 1470: 1225: 1169: 1009: 644: 294: 2173:

Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990

1669: 1090:(NLF) formally declared its existence, although it did not hold its first full congress until 1962. 802:

was raided by the Viet Cong; two South Vietnamese guards were killed along with two advisors, Major

564: 346: 2425:

Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam

2362: 1062: 981: 117: 2384: 1477:

to replace him later. In a structural reorganization, the ARVN made the Saigon Special Region the

681:

In May, the North Vietnamese made the commitment to an armed overthrow of the South, creating the

321: 2040: 1653: 1103: 1042:

stated the guerrillas were establishing three options, of which they could exercise one or more;

744: 2012: 1990: 953:

four armored cavalry "regiments" (approximately the equivalent of a U.S. Army cavalry squadron)

481:

resulted in the establishment of liberated zones, including an area of nearly fifty villages in

2346: 2067:

Human Rights Watch (April 2002), "III. A History of Resistance to Central Government Control",

2601: 2098: 1823: 1698: 1517: 1497: 1245: 1111: 876: 807: 792: 698: 686: 529: 497: 50: 2194: 545: 2590:

By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia

1768: 1493: 1395:, then Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, under Pacific Command, was promoted to 1332:

way, let us demonstrate that in some place, in some way, we can achieve demonstrable gains.

919: 861: 725: 282: 2512: 2330: 2265: 2193:, Center of Military History, Department of the Army, CMH Publication 90-23, archived from 2083: 1649: 2549:

People's War People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries

2505:"Chapter 4, "The Overthrow of Ngô Đình Diệm", May–November 1963, Section 2, pp. 232–276", 2465: 2070:

Repression of Montagnards: Conflicts over Land and Religion in Vietnam's Central Highlands

1690: 1569: 1554: 1538: 1526: 1508: 1465:

Organizations and commands would change with time. In January, for example, Major General

1442: 1209: 1107: 1038: 872: 840: 639: 560: 541: 394:

had made a firm decision to commit to a military intervention in the guerrilla war in the

307: 124: 1854: 1588:, who did not approve it until September 9. Shultz suggests the delay had three aspects: 2121: 652: 334: 2419: 1905:. 4th Triennial Vietnam Symposium, Texas Tech University Vietnam Center. Archived from 1685: 1501: 1258: 1213: 1184: 1123: 868: 799: 155: 32: 1052:

force the GVN into such repressive countermeasures that popular uprisings will follow.

2619: 2014:

Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972

1986:

Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972

1711:

The economy was in tatters, partially due to the suspension of aid as a lever on Diệm

1664: 1581: 1351: 1347: 1162: 1013: 493: 414: 395: 391: 352: 341: 328: 315: 301: 288: 277: 264: 210: 169: 78: 74: 776:

LTG Williams pointed to the dual chain of command of the ARVN, as distinct from the

685:, named after the creation date, to operate the land route that became known as the 648: 579: 1928: 1525:. He was attracted to officers that he saw as activist and unconventional, such as 1474: 1392: 1196: 1032: 856: 803: 717: 712:, wearing civilian clothes and having no obvious US connection. These soldiers led 575: 474: 422: 250: 2291:, Center of Military History, Department of the Army, Tolson 1974, archived from 693:

by land routes. Group 959 also provided secure communications to the Pathet Lao.

488:

North Vietnam committed, in May 1959, to war in the South; this was confirmed by

1534: 1291: 1078:

arrested. On 5 May 1960, MAAG strength was increased from 327 to 685 personnel.

1025: 957: 713: 517:. In the fifties, the U.S. advisors focused on building a "mirror image" of the 461: 437: 386: 28: 2152: 690: 514: 2122:"Farm Gate: In 1961, the Air Force took its first step into a very long war." 1645:

knowing that the military leaders wanted him in the new civilian government.

1350:

and 400 men, organized into two Transportation Companies (Light Helicopter);

855:

Diệm himself, who had no significant military background, could be the worst

1637: 1142:

On January 28, 1961, shortly after his inauguration, John F. Kennedy told a

849: 682: 656: 638:

Guerrilla attacks increased in the early 1960s, at the same time as the new

619: 518: 469: 465: 433: 398:, a buildup phase began, between the 1959 North Vietnamese decision and the 221: 196: 101: 2245:

United States National Interests in South Viet-Nam; report to the President

970:

Eight independent artillery battalions with U.S. 105 mm, and 155 mm pieces.

2329:"Chapter 3, "Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces, 1962-1964", pp. 160-200.", 2171: 1794:, Center of Military History, U.S. Department of the Army, archived from 1761:"Chapter 6, "The Advisory Build-Up, 1961-1967", Section 1, pp. 408-457", 1342: 845: 36: 2563: 2044: 1983:

Collins, James Lawton Jr., "Chapter I: The Formative Years, 1950-1959",

1492:

South Vietnamese forces, with U.S. advisors, took severe defeats at the

1418:

At the same time, the U.S. was beginning to explore withdrawing forces.

2028: 2011:

Collins, James Lawton Jr., "Chapter II: The Crucial Years, 1960-1964",

1816:

McNamara, Robert S.; Blight, James G.; Brigham, Robert Kendall (1999),

1396: 908:

for the northern and central areas; the Central Highlands were separate

905: 2243: 1930:

Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975

912: 410: 1191:(CCTS), code named "Jungle Jim." The unit, of about 350 men, had 16 532:. The 1960 "Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam (CIP)" from the U.S. 1187:, however, responded to NSAM 2 by creating, on April 14, 1961, the 1561: 836: 810:. These were the first American battle deaths in the Vietnam War. 720:

tribesmen against Communist forces. The covert program was called

473:

insurgency. Communist-led uprisings launched in 1959 in the lower

418: 233: 1819:

Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy

524:

Diệm (and his successors) were primarily interested in using the

2170:

McClintock, Michael (2002), "Chapter 9, The Heart of Doctrine",

1192: 609:, with its obvious ramifications of increased U.S. involvement. 492:. Diệm, well before that point, had constantly pushed a generic 44: 464:

became Secretary-General in 1956, was formed in the South, and

1676:

tactical zone in central Vietnam, was not in the government.

1568:

with the Buddhists as it had never done, with Vice President

563:

as figurehead Prime Minister, unable to get control, and the

1391:

U.S. command structures continued to emerge. On February 8,

1278:

Building the South Vietnamese Civil Irregular Defense Groups

625:

In the Viet Cong, and in the North Vietnamese regular army (

1693:

quickly bonded with the emotional and deal-making Johnson.

1936:, Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency 1576:

May 1963 Honolulu conference; covert warfare a major issue

901:

Three corps headquarters and a special military district:

629:), every unit had political and military cadre to ensure 2586:"Chapter 2: The Era of Growing Conflict, 1959-1965]" 2258:"Chapter 2, "The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963"", 728:

was called the head of the "Program Evaluation Office."

567:

that replaced him simply being a period of instability.

1469:

became Commander-in-Chief of the RVN armed forces, GEN

1340:

On 11 December 1961 the United States aircraft carrier

1118:"; his key foreign policy advisor was a law professor, 839:-level tactical commander who actually carried out the 754:

absence of a national plan for control of the situation

643:

both the majority Buddhists and minorities such as the

605:

Note that Minh was exiled within the same month as the

521:, designed to meet and defeat a conventional invasion. 2500: 2498: 2316:

Battle of Khe Sanh: Recounting the Battle's Casualties

1756: 1754: 1752: 1138:

Kennedy pushes for covert operations against the North

2029:"Chronology of Events Relative to Vietnam, 1954-1965" 1902:

The Maritime Nature of the Wars for Vietnam (1945-75)

1739:"Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics" 1441:

In addition to the U.S. advisers, in August 1962, 30

1336:

First U.S. direct support to an ARVN combat operation

1856:

Vietnam 1961-1968 as interpreted in INR's Production

1853:, "IV. Time of Decision: November 1963-March 1965", 1049:

set up a popular front government in the lower Delta

828:

staff and the top of the military chain of command.

2190:

Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971

1718:

US dissatisfaction with indigenous efforts led to "

1592:

Washington was preoccupied with the Buddhist crisis

1481:; the former III Corps for the Mekong Delta became 1216:officer, the military saw him as belonging to CIA. 468:underground activity increased. Some of the 90,000 2242:Rusk, Dean; McNamara, Robert (November 11, 1961), 1088:National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam 814:Structural barriers to effectiveness of RVN forces 446:National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam 432:There is little doubt that there was some kind of 2470:In Retrospect: the Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam 1073:1962 South Vietnamese Independence Palace bombing 888:The chain of command of both the Civil Guard and 1327:McNamara held the first Honolulu Conference, at 1262:the Geneva Accords of 1954, and the U.S. wanted 772:lack of centralized direction of the war effort. 16:Phase of the war between North and South Vietnam 2264:, vol. 2, pp. 128–159, archived from 2115: 2113: 1602:Diệm, fighting for survival, was not interested 750:, chief of the MAAG cited the key concerns as: 116:to combat the communist insurgency by means of 21: 1791:Vietnam Studies: Command and Control 1950-1969 1633:Diệm was overthrown and killed on November 1. 2508:The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2 2332:The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2 1684:Kennedy and Diệm both died in November 1963. 1346:docked in downtown Saigon with 82 U. S. Army 100:Foundation of the National Liberation Front ( 8: 1878:, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library 1488:January 1963: Question of ARVN effectiveness 1244:Their principal initial responsibility was 2176:, Pantheon Books, Division of Random House 1629:Reaction to the 1963 South Vietnamese coup 1057:South Vietnam corruption breeds discontent 757:no rotation of military units in the field 18: 2082:Rusk/McNamara memorandum. Nov. 11, 1961, 1956:US Army Command and General Staff College 1841: 1839: 1625:Arrest and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm 1387:U.S. ground command structure established 708:, who arrived on CIA proprietary airline 456:In April 1959, a branch of the Lao Động ( 130:Arrest and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm 2534:War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoiree 1253:Covert U.S. air support enters the South 787:Under the authority of the commander of 760:the need for a central surveillance plan 1730: 950:Airborne group of five battalion groups 2472:, Times Books division of Random House 2380:MACV Command History Chronology - 1964 2377:Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 2288:Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 1876:Oral History interview of Douglas Pike 1354:had not yet become a separate branch. 1290:involvement came in October, with the 1212:out of the process, as while he was a 925:Saigon city special military district. 798:On 8 July, the MAAG-V headquarters at 1899:Goscha, Christopher E. (April 2002). 1663:and his liaison to the coup plotters 1586:Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1584:(OPPLAN 34A) went to GEN Taylor, now 1374:irrelevant, or actively a hindrance. 1282:Under the operational control of the 7: 2598:United States Department of the Navy 1428:Signals intelligence in the Cold War 1401:Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 1189:4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron 1031:There was uncertainty, expressed by 922:for the southern part of the country 782:Agency for International Development 736:Escalation and response in the South 2261:The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition 1847:Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1764:The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition 1433:principally to aircraft platforms. 1126:was perhaps his closest colleague. 1106:(in office 1961–68) told President 930:Seven divisions of 10,450 men each 915:for the Central Highlands provinces 553:Bureau of Intelligence and Research 2691:Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower 2594:Naval History and Heritage Command 2120:Whitcomb, Darrel (December 2005), 1648:Generals Đôn, Chief of Staff, and 1306:Military Assistance Advisory Group 1067:1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt 769:inadequate military communications 534:Military Assistance Advisory Group 502:Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam 93:Americanization of the Vietnam War 14: 2686:History of Vietnam (1945–present) 2551:, University Press of the Pacific 1704:Three things concerned the U.S.: 964:M8 self-propelled 75 mm howitzers 706:United States Army Special Forces 659:receiving orders from the North. 53:was used to supply the Viet Cong. 2711:Wars involving the United States 1399:and assigned to command the new 704:In July, the CIA sent a unit of 351: 340: 327: 314: 300: 287: 276: 263: 243: 226: 215: 203: 184: 174: 162: 43: 2701:Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson 1369:From the U.S. perspective, the 526:Army of the Republic of Vietnam 2568:Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung 1874:Ted Gittinger (June 4, 1981), 574:Contrary to the INR analysis, 1: 2696:Presidency of John F. Kennedy 2313:Brush, Peter (26 June 2007), 1767:, vol. 2, archived from 1329:United States Pacific Command 1314:United States Pacific Command 956:one squadron (U.S. troop) of 945:company-size support elements 789:United States Pacific Command 2468:; Vandermark, Brian (1995), 2187:Kelly, Francis John (1973), 1788:Eckhardt, George S. (1991), 1652:, his deputy, called at the 1422:Intelligence support refines 1224:Also in May, the first U.S. 508:Republic of Vietnam strategy 1461:Organizations and personnel 1284:Central Intelligence Agency 1239:communications intelligence 1020:Beginning of Phase II raids 490:communications intelligence 2732: 2105:, Harper Collins Perennial 1621:1963 South Vietnamese coup 1618: 1552: 1549:The Buddhist crisis begins 1425: 1310:National Command Authority 1098:1961: Slow U.S. engagement 1070: 1060: 683:559th Transportation Group 677:Increased activity in Laos 137:succeeds Diệm as president 22:War in Vietnam (1959–1963) 2656:Anti-communism in Vietnam 2570:, Foreign Languages Press 2361:Australian War Memorial, 1437:Additional allied support 1378:Special Forces operations 1320:First Honolulu Conference 1144:National Security Council 458:Worker's Party of Vietnam 417:, and to a lesser extent 368: 363: 256: 147: 57: 42: 26: 2449:Karnow, Stanley (1983), 2406:A Bright and Shining Lie 2285:Tolson, John J. (1974), 1851:U.S. Department of State 1680:After two assassinations 1473:was named deputy to GEN 1371:Strategic Hamlet Program 1288:U.S. Army Special Forces 1234:National Security Agency 1132:Strategic Hamlet Program 933:three infantry regiments 724:. At the US Embassy, BG 588:Strategic Hamlet Program 565:Khánh-led military junta 557:U.S. Department of State 114:Strategic Hamlet Program 2626:20th century in Vietnam 2547:Võ Nguyên Giáp (2001), 1947:Holman, Victor (1995). 1659:On the 4th, ambassador 1479:III Corps tactical zone 1365:1962: Getting in deeper 1272:Gulf of Tonkin incident 1149:Gulf of Tonkin Incident 1036:to isolate Saigon. The 1012:, commanded by Colonel 766:inadequate intelligence 607:Gulf of Tonkin incident 544:'s 1999 book says that 400:Gulf of Tonkin Incident 2716:Wars involving Vietnam 2404:Sheehan, Neil (1989), 2142:Shultz 2000, pp. 17–23 2099:Shultz, Richard H. Jr. 1483:IV Corps tactical zone 1302: 407:Geneva accords in 1954 257:Commanders and leaders 2562:Mao Tse-tung (1967), 1523:Joint Chiefs of Staff 1409:Strategic Air Command 1297: 1264:plausible deniability 1178:plausible deniability 1174:Joint Chiefs of Staff 1046:incite an ARVN revolt 867:In fairness to Diệm, 364:Casualties and losses 2584:Marolda, EJ (1994). 2348:Army Security Agency 2033:Vietnam Perspectives 1609:Bay of Pigs invasion 1560:the major festival, 1496:in January, and the 1471:William Westmoreland 1230:Army Security Agency 1226:signals intelligence 1220:Intelligence support 1170:Bay of Pigs invasion 1082:Formation of the NLF 1014:Arthur "Bull" Simons 1010:Operation White Star 975:Local defense forces 806:and Master Sergeant 452:Competing strategies 295:Dwight D. Eisenhower 2564:"On Protracted War" 2532:Adams, Sam (1994), 2214:Collins 1974, p. 70 2157:www.virtualwall.org 1672:, the commander of 1636:Secretary of State 1582:Operations Plan 34A 1199:bombers, and eight 1063:Caravelle Manifesto 982:counterintelligence 936:artillery battalion 860:of opposition; the 823:Command and control 483:Quảng Ngãi Province 118:population transfer 2536:, Steerforth Press 2492:Shultz, pp. 32–33. 2466:Robert S. McNamara 2451:Vietnam, a History 2126:Air Force Magazine 2047:– via JSTOR. 2039:(1): 17–28. 1965. 1745:. August 15, 2016. 1654:US Embassy, Saigon 1615:Interim government 1195:transports, eight 1122:, while economist 1104:Robert S. McNamara 1004:Laotian operations 942:engineer battalion 890:Self-Defense Corps 748:Samuel T. Williams 745:Lieutenant General 613:Communist strategy 390:started after the 2681:Conflicts in 1963 2676:Conflicts in 1962 2671:Conflicts in 1961 2666:Conflicts in 1960 2661:Conflicts in 1959 2592:. Washington DC: 2223:Kelly 1974, p. 19 2057:Collins, pp. 9-10 1822:, PublicAffairs, 1743:National Archives 1661:Henry Cabot Lodge 1518:Lyndon B. Johnson 1498:Battle of Go Cong 1359:Operation Chopper 1246:direction finding 1159:Herbert Weisshart 1112:guerrilla warfare 1086:In December, the 962:two squadrons of 877:Mayaguez incident 808:Chester M. Ovnand 793:counterinsurgency 722:Operation Hotfoot 699:Laotian Civil War 697:by the US in the 687:Ho Chi Minh Trail 635:was carried out. 498:Ho Chi Minh trail 479:Central Highlands 378: 377: 143: 142: 120:of its supporters 51:Ho Chi Minh trail 2723: 2611: 2572: 2571: 2559: 2553: 2552: 2544: 2538: 2537: 2529: 2523: 2522: 2521: 2520: 2511:, archived from 2502: 2493: 2490: 2484: 2483:McMaster, p. 50. 2481: 2475: 2473: 2462: 2456: 2454: 2446: 2440: 2439:McMaster, p. 48. 2437: 2431: 2429: 2416: 2410: 2409: 2401: 2395: 2394: 2393: 2392: 2383:, archived from 2374: 2368: 2367: 2358: 2352: 2351: 2345:Knight, Judson, 2342: 2336: 2335: 2326: 2320: 2319: 2310: 2304: 2302: 2301: 2300: 2282: 2276: 2275: 2274: 2273: 2255: 2249: 2248: 2239: 2233: 2230: 2224: 2221: 2215: 2212: 2206: 2204: 2203: 2202: 2184: 2178: 2177: 2167: 2161: 2160: 2149: 2143: 2140: 2134: 2133: 2117: 2108: 2106: 2095: 2089: 2080: 2074: 2073: 2064: 2058: 2055: 2049: 2048: 2025: 2019: 2017: 2008: 2002: 2000: 1999: 1998: 1989:, archived from 1980: 1974: 1973: 1971: 1970: 1964: 1958:. Archived from 1953: 1944: 1938: 1937: 1935: 1924: 1918: 1917: 1915: 1914: 1896: 1890: 1887: 1881: 1879: 1871: 1865: 1863: 1861: 1843: 1834: 1832: 1813: 1807: 1805: 1804: 1803: 1785: 1779: 1778: 1777: 1776: 1758: 1747: 1746: 1735: 1494:Battle of Ap Bac 1348:H-21 helicopters 939:mortar battalion 896:Regular military 862:Battle of Ap Bac 530:chain of command 392:North Vietnamese 358:Nguyễn Chí Thanh 356: 355: 345: 344: 332: 331: 319: 318: 305: 304: 292: 291: 281: 280: 268: 267: 249: 247: 246: 232: 230: 229: 220: 219: 209: 207: 206: 190: 188: 187: 180: 178: 177: 168: 166: 165: 110:in South Vietnam 59: 58: 47: 19: 2731: 2730: 2726: 2725: 2724: 2722: 2721: 2720: 2651:1963 in Vietnam 2646:1962 in Vietnam 2641:1961 in Vietnam 2636:1960 in Vietnam 2631:1959 in Vietnam 2616: 2615: 2608: 2583: 2580: 2578:Further reading 2575: 2561: 2560: 2556: 2546: 2545: 2541: 2531: 2530: 2526: 2518: 2516: 2504: 2503: 2496: 2491: 2487: 2482: 2478: 2464: 2463: 2459: 2448: 2447: 2443: 2438: 2434: 2428:, Harpercollins 2420:McMaster, H. R. 2418: 2417: 2413: 2403: 2402: 2398: 2390: 2388: 2376: 2375: 2371: 2360: 2359: 2355: 2344: 2343: 2339: 2328: 2327: 2323: 2312: 2311: 2307: 2298: 2296: 2284: 2283: 2279: 2271: 2269: 2257: 2256: 2252: 2241: 2240: 2236: 2232:Eckhardt, p. 25 2231: 2227: 2222: 2218: 2213: 2209: 2200: 2198: 2186: 2185: 2181: 2169: 2168: 2164: 2151: 2150: 2146: 2141: 2137: 2119: 2118: 2111: 2097: 2096: 2092: 2086:Pentagon Papers 2081: 2077: 2066: 2065: 2061: 2056: 2052: 2027: 2026: 2022: 2010: 2009: 2005: 1996: 1994: 1982: 1981: 1977: 1968: 1966: 1962: 1951: 1946: 1945: 1941: 1933: 1926: 1925: 1921: 1912: 1910: 1898: 1897: 1893: 1888: 1884: 1873: 1872: 1868: 1859: 1845: 1844: 1837: 1830: 1815: 1814: 1810: 1801: 1799: 1787: 1786: 1782: 1774: 1772: 1760: 1759: 1750: 1737: 1736: 1732: 1728: 1720:Americanization 1691:Robert McNamara 1682: 1631: 1619:Main articles: 1617: 1578: 1570:Nguyen Ngoc Tho 1557: 1555:Buddhist crisis 1551: 1539:Robert McNamara 1527:Edward Lansdale 1521:distrusted the 1509:Buddhist crisis 1490: 1463: 1451: 1443:Australian Army 1439: 1430: 1424: 1393:Paul D. Harkins 1389: 1380: 1367: 1338: 1322: 1280: 1255: 1228:unit, from the 1222: 1210:Edward Lansdale 1147:especially the 1140: 1120:John McNaughton 1108:John F. Kennedy 1100: 1084: 1075: 1069: 1061:Main articles: 1059: 1039:Pentagon Papers 1022: 1006: 997: 977: 958:M24 light tanks 898: 873:Henry Kissinger 841:operational art 825: 816: 738: 679: 670: 665: 640:John F. Kennedy 615: 561:Nguyen Ngoc Tho 542:Robert McNamara 510: 454: 373: 350: 349: 339: 338: 326: 325: 313: 308:John F. Kennedy 299: 298: 286: 285: 275: 274: 262: 244: 242: 240: 236: 227: 225: 224: 214: 213: 204: 202: 201: 185: 183: 182: 175: 173: 172: 163: 161: 125:Buddhist revolt 97: 81: 48: 17: 12: 11: 5: 2729: 2727: 2719: 2718: 2713: 2708: 2703: 2698: 2693: 2688: 2683: 2678: 2673: 2668: 2663: 2658: 2653: 2648: 2643: 2638: 2633: 2628: 2618: 2617: 2614: 2613: 2607:978-0160359385 2606: 2579: 2576: 2574: 2573: 2554: 2539: 2524: 2494: 2485: 2476: 2457: 2455:, pp. 324–325. 2453:, Viking Press 2441: 2432: 2411: 2396: 2369: 2353: 2337: 2321: 2305: 2277: 2250: 2234: 2225: 2216: 2207: 2179: 2162: 2144: 2135: 2109: 2090: 2075: 2059: 2050: 2020: 2003: 1975: 1939: 1919: 1891: 1889:INR-VN4, p. 12 1882: 1866: 1835: 1828: 1808: 1780: 1748: 1729: 1727: 1724: 1722:" of the war. 1716: 1715: 1712: 1709: 1699:protracted war 1686:Lyndon Johnson 1681: 1678: 1643:Dương Văn Minh 1616: 1613: 1604: 1603: 1600: 1596: 1593: 1577: 1574: 1553:Main article: 1550: 1547: 1502:John Paul Vann 1489: 1486: 1462: 1459: 1450: 1447: 1438: 1435: 1423: 1420: 1388: 1385: 1379: 1376: 1366: 1363: 1337: 1334: 1321: 1318: 1279: 1276: 1259:U.S. Air Force 1254: 1251: 1241:(CCO or SI). 1221: 1218: 1214:U.S. Air Force 1185:U.S. Air Force 1168:In April, the 1139: 1136: 1124:Alain Enthoven 1099: 1096: 1083: 1080: 1058: 1055: 1054: 1053: 1050: 1047: 1021: 1018: 1005: 1002: 996: 993: 976: 973: 972: 971: 968: 967: 966: 960: 951: 948: 947: 946: 943: 940: 937: 934: 928: 927: 926: 923: 916: 909: 897: 894: 869:Lyndon Johnson 824: 821: 815: 812: 774: 773: 770: 767: 764: 761: 758: 755: 737: 734: 678: 675: 669: 666: 664: 661: 614: 611: 540:undercurrent; 509: 506: 453: 450: 376: 375: 366: 365: 361: 360: 311: 259: 258: 254: 253: 192: 156:Anti-Communist 150: 149: 145: 144: 141: 140: 139: 138: 135:Dương Văn Minh 132: 127: 121: 111: 105: 96: 95: 89: 87: 83: 82: 73: 71: 67: 66: 63: 55: 54: 40: 39: 33:Indochina Wars 24: 23: 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 2728: 2717: 2714: 2712: 2709: 2707: 2704: 2702: 2699: 2697: 2694: 2692: 2689: 2687: 2684: 2682: 2679: 2677: 2674: 2672: 2669: 2667: 2664: 2662: 2659: 2657: 2654: 2652: 2649: 2647: 2644: 2642: 2639: 2637: 2634: 2632: 2629: 2627: 2624: 2623: 2621: 2609: 2603: 2599: 2595: 2591: 2587: 2582: 2581: 2577: 2569: 2565: 2558: 2555: 2550: 2543: 2540: 2535: 2528: 2525: 2515:on 2022-05-07 2514: 2510: 2509: 2501: 2499: 2495: 2489: 2486: 2480: 2477: 2471: 2467: 2461: 2458: 2452: 2445: 2442: 2436: 2433: 2427: 2426: 2421: 2415: 2412: 2407: 2400: 2397: 2387:on 2008-10-03 2386: 2382: 2381: 2373: 2370: 2366: 2365: 2357: 2354: 2350: 2349: 2341: 2338: 2334: 2333: 2325: 2322: 2318: 2317: 2309: 2306: 2295:on 2010-06-12 2294: 2290: 2289: 2281: 2278: 2268:on 2010-12-28 2267: 2263: 2262: 2254: 2251: 2247: 2246: 2238: 2235: 2229: 2226: 2220: 2217: 2211: 2208: 2197:on 2014-02-12 2196: 2192: 2191: 2183: 2180: 2175: 2174: 2166: 2163: 2158: 2154: 2148: 2145: 2139: 2136: 2131: 2127: 2123: 2116: 2114: 2110: 2104: 2100: 2094: 2091: 2088: 2087: 2079: 2076: 2072: 2071: 2063: 2060: 2054: 2051: 2046: 2042: 2038: 2034: 2030: 2024: 2021: 2016: 2015: 2007: 2004: 1993:on 2010-06-08 1992: 1988: 1987: 1979: 1976: 1965:on 2008-02-27 1961: 1957: 1950: 1943: 1940: 1932: 1931: 1923: 1920: 1909:on 2009-02-10 1908: 1904: 1903: 1895: 1892: 1886: 1883: 1877: 1870: 1867: 1858: 1857: 1852: 1848: 1842: 1840: 1836: 1833:, pp. 113-114 1831: 1825: 1821: 1820: 1812: 1809: 1798:on 2017-10-19 1797: 1793: 1792: 1784: 1781: 1771:on 2022-01-16 1770: 1766: 1765: 1757: 1755: 1753: 1749: 1744: 1740: 1734: 1731: 1725: 1723: 1721: 1713: 1710: 1707: 1706: 1705: 1702: 1700: 1694: 1692: 1687: 1679: 1677: 1675: 1671: 1666: 1665:Lucien Conein 1662: 1657: 1655: 1651: 1646: 1644: 1639: 1634: 1630: 1626: 1622: 1614: 1612: 1610: 1601: 1597: 1594: 1591: 1590: 1589: 1587: 1583: 1575: 1573: 1571: 1565: 1563: 1556: 1548: 1546: 1543: 1540: 1536: 1530: 1528: 1524: 1519: 1514: 1513:military coup 1510: 1505: 1503: 1499: 1495: 1487: 1485: 1484: 1480: 1476: 1472: 1468: 1460: 1458: 1454: 1448: 1446: 1444: 1436: 1434: 1429: 1421: 1419: 1416: 1412: 1410: 1404: 1402: 1398: 1394: 1386: 1384: 1377: 1375: 1372: 1364: 1362: 1360: 1355: 1353: 1352:Army aviation 1349: 1345: 1344: 1335: 1333: 1330: 1325: 1319: 1317: 1315: 1311: 1307: 1301: 1296: 1293: 1289: 1285: 1277: 1275: 1273: 1267: 1265: 1260: 1252: 1250: 1247: 1242: 1240: 1235: 1231: 1227: 1219: 1217: 1215: 1211: 1205: 1202: 1198: 1194: 1190: 1186: 1181: 1179: 1175: 1171: 1166: 1164: 1163:William Colby 1160: 1155: 1152: 1150: 1145: 1137: 1135: 1133: 1127: 1125: 1121: 1117: 1113: 1109: 1105: 1097: 1095: 1091: 1089: 1081: 1079: 1074: 1068: 1064: 1056: 1051: 1048: 1045: 1044: 1043: 1041: 1040: 1034: 1029: 1027: 1019: 1017: 1015: 1011: 1003: 1001: 994: 992: 989: 985: 983: 974: 969: 965: 961: 959: 955: 954: 952: 949: 944: 941: 938: 935: 932: 931: 929: 924: 921: 918:III Corps at 917: 914: 910: 907: 903: 902: 900: 899: 895: 893: 891: 886: 883: 880: 878: 874: 870: 865: 863: 858: 853: 851: 847: 842: 838: 833: 829: 822: 820: 813: 811: 809: 805: 801: 796: 794: 790: 785: 783: 779: 771: 768: 765: 762: 759: 756: 753: 752: 751: 749: 746: 741: 735: 733: 729: 727: 726:John Heintges 723: 719: 715: 711: 707: 702: 700: 694: 692: 688: 684: 676: 674: 667: 662: 660: 658: 654: 650: 646: 641: 636: 634: 633: 628: 623: 621: 612: 610: 608: 603: 599: 595: 591: 589: 584: 581: 577: 572: 568: 566: 562: 558: 555:(INR) of the 554: 549: 547: 543: 537: 535: 531: 527: 522: 520: 516: 507: 505: 503: 499: 495: 494:anticommunism 491: 486: 484: 480: 476: 471: 467: 463: 459: 451: 449: 447: 441: 439: 435: 430: 426: 424: 420: 416: 415:United States 412: 408: 403: 401: 397: 396:South Vietnam 393: 389: 388: 384:phase of the 383: 371: 370:United States 367: 362: 359: 354: 348: 343: 337: 336: 330: 324: 323: 317: 312: 310: 309: 303: 297: 296: 290: 284: 283:Lâm Quang Thi 279: 273: 272: 271:Ngô Đình Diệm 266: 261: 260: 255: 252: 241: 239: 238:Supported by: 235: 223: 218: 212: 211:North Vietnam 200: 198: 193: 181:United States 171: 170:South Vietnam 160: 159: 157: 152: 151: 146: 136: 133: 131: 128: 126: 122: 119: 115: 112: 109: 108:Anti-Buddhism 106: 103: 99: 98: 94: 91: 90: 88: 85: 84: 80: 79:South Vietnam 76: 75:North Vietnam 72: 69: 68: 64: 61: 60: 56: 52: 46: 41: 38: 34: 30: 25: 20: 2589: 2567: 2557: 2548: 2542: 2533: 2527: 2517:, retrieved 2513:the original 2507: 2488: 2479: 2469: 2460: 2450: 2444: 2435: 2423: 2414: 2405: 2399: 2389:, retrieved 2385:the original 2379: 2372: 2363: 2356: 2347: 2340: 2331: 2324: 2315: 2308: 2297:, retrieved 2293:the original 2287: 2280: 2270:, retrieved 2266:the original 2260: 2253: 2244: 2237: 2228: 2219: 2210: 2199:, retrieved 2195:the original 2189: 2182: 2172: 2165: 2156: 2147: 2138: 2129: 2125: 2102: 2093: 2085: 2078: 2069: 2062: 2053: 2036: 2032: 2023: 2013: 2006: 1995:, retrieved 1991:the original 1985: 1978: 1967:. Retrieved 1960:the original 1955: 1942: 1929: 1922: 1911:. Retrieved 1907:the original 1901: 1894: 1885: 1875: 1869: 1855: 1818: 1811: 1800:, retrieved 1796:the original 1790: 1783: 1773:, retrieved 1769:the original 1763: 1742: 1733: 1717: 1703: 1695: 1683: 1670:Nguyễn Khánh 1658: 1647: 1635: 1632: 1605: 1579: 1566: 1558: 1544: 1531: 1506: 1491: 1475:Paul Harkins 1467:Trần Văn Đôn 1464: 1455: 1452: 1440: 1431: 1417: 1413: 1405: 1390: 1381: 1368: 1356: 1341: 1339: 1326: 1323: 1303: 1298: 1281: 1268: 1256: 1243: 1223: 1206: 1182: 1167: 1156: 1153: 1141: 1128: 1101: 1092: 1085: 1076: 1037: 1033:Bernard Fall 1030: 1023: 1007: 998: 990: 986: 978: 911:II Corps at 887: 884: 881: 866: 857:micromanager 854: 834: 830: 826: 817: 804:Dale R. Buis 797: 786: 775: 742: 739: 730: 703: 695: 680: 671: 637: 630: 624: 616: 604: 600: 596: 592: 585: 576:Douglas Pike 573: 569: 550: 538: 523: 511: 487: 475:Mekong Delta 460:), of which 455: 442: 431: 427: 423:Soviet Union 405:Between the 404: 385: 382:1959 to 1963 381: 379: 369: 347:Trường Chinh 333: 320: 306: 293: 269: 251:Soviet Union 237: 195: 194: 154: 153: 148:Belligerents 27:Part of the 2706:Vietnam War 2018:, pp. 17-18 1864:, pp. 10-12 1806:, pp. 68-71 1535:Bill Moyers 1312:or part of 1292:Rade people 904:I Corps at 778:Civil Guard 710:Air America 645:Montagnards 462:Ho Chi Minh 438:stay behind 387:Vietnam War 322:Hồ Chí Minh 29:Vietnam War 2620:Categories 2519:2009-12-29 2474:, p. xvi. 2391:2009-12-29 2299:2009-12-29 2272:2009-12-29 2201:2009-12-29 2084:online at 1997:2009-12-29 1969:2009-12-29 1913:2009-12-29 1829:1586486217 1802:2009-12-29 1775:2009-12-29 1726:References 1650:Lê Văn Kim 1507:While the 1426:See also: 1286:, initial 1071:See also: 691:Pathet Lao 546:"Big" Minh 515:Korean War 436:-derived " 374:186 killed 2408:, Vintage 1638:Dean Rusk 1599:soldiers. 1403:(MAC-V). 1343:USNS Card 1300:holdings. 1116:Whiz Kids 875:, in the 850:artillery 657:Viet Minh 632:đấu tranh 620:battalion 519:U.S. Army 470:Viet Minh 466:communist 434:Viet Minh 222:Viet Cong 197:Communist 191:Australia 102:Viet Cong 65:1959–1963 2422:(1997), 2101:(2000), 2045:30182459 1880:, p. I-8 1674:II Corps 1611:fiasco. 1026:Tây Ninh 846:infantry 800:Biên Hòa 421:and the 413:and the 70:Location 37:Cold War 2430:, p. 5. 2001:, p. 16 1397:general 906:Da Nang 653:Hòa Hảo 649:Cao Đài 580:Cao Đài 504:(CIP)" 335:Lê Duẩn 199:forces: 158:forces: 2604: 2303:, p. 4 2205:, p. 4 2107:, p. 3 2043: 1826: 1627:, and 1232:under 920:Saigon 913:Pleiku 663:Events 651:, and 411:France 248: 231: 208: 189: 179: 167: 123:Large 86:Result 2041:JSTOR 1963:(PDF) 1952:(PDF) 1934:(PDF) 1860:(PDF) 1562:Vesak 837:corps 718:Hmong 419:China 234:China 2602:ISBN 2132:(12) 1824:ISBN 1511:and 1449:1963 1201:T-28 1197:B-26 1193:C-47 1183:The 1065:and 995:1960 716:and 714:Miao 668:1959 627:PAVN 477:and 380:The 62:Date 49:The 35:and 2622:: 2600:. 2596:, 2588:. 2566:, 2497:^ 2155:. 2130:88 2128:, 2124:, 2112:^ 2035:. 2031:. 1954:. 1849:; 1838:^ 1751:^ 1741:. 1701:. 1623:, 1529:. 1411:. 1316:. 1274:. 1266:. 1151:. 1134:. 1016:. 848:, 795:. 647:, 77:, 31:, 2612:. 2610:. 2159:. 2037:1 1972:. 1916:. 372:: 104:)

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.

Knowledge (XXG)

War in Vietnam (1959–1963)

Index