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109:
of mathematics, putting forth the theory that mathematics is an extension of logic and therefore some or all mathematics is reducible to logic." Nowhere in these 2 articles is there any proof to how logicism is disproven by Russell's paradox. So I ask, how is logicism, as stricly defined by the above excerpt, false?
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In the article "Reductionism" under the heading "Set-Theoretic Reductionism" it states the following: " then proposed his own form of reductionism, logicism, which in turn was famously disproven by Russell's Paradox." According to wikipedia "Logicism is one of the schools of thought in the philosophy
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article. I took a look at it and tried to figure out how to fix the "set-theoretic reductionism" section, but decided it was so badly flawed that all I could do was delete it. Could be an interesting addition if someone could source it and explain it clearly and accurately, but I saw nothing worth
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These are not the sorts of questions that are really susceptible to final proof or disproof in the ordinary mathematical sense. However, mathematical discoveries do shed light on how difficult these metamathematical positions are to hold, how much sense they make, and how much they accomplish.
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134:, at least, might be reduced to logic, even if sets could not be. Many mathematical logicians now feel that this hope was rendered untenable by 123:
by Russell's paradox. But it was definitely dealt a severe blow. Frege's logicist project for set theory attempted to identify sets with purely
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entities (extensions of definable properties). That didn't work, or at the very least, Frege's version of it didn't work.
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saving in the existing text and didn't have a source that would allow me to rewrite it. My specific criticisms are on
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There was still a logicist school after Russell; it was still possible to hope that the
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didn't think so, and even today there are logicians who call themselves "neo-logicist".
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138:. But there's no unanimous agreement on that, either -- 119:
I wouldn't say that logicism was, strictly speaking,
166:talk:reductionism#"set-theoretic reductionism" 8: 159:Thanks for pointing out this problem in the 49: 36: 65: 43: 7: 32: 136:Gödel's incompleteness theorems 1: 33: 191: 173:08:32, 4 July 2007 (UTC) 151:05:41, 2 July 2007 (UTC) 114:03:49, 2 July 2007 (UTC) 18:Knowledge:Reference desk 103: 87:current reference desk 104:Russell's Paradox 93: 92: 73: 72: 182: 75: 38:Mathematics desk 34: 190: 189: 185: 184: 183: 181: 180: 179: 132:natural numbers 106: 101: 30: 29: 28: 12: 11: 5: 188: 186: 178: 177: 176: 175: 154: 153: 143: 140:Torkel Franzen 128: 105: 102: 100: 97: 95: 91: 90: 82: 81: 71: 70: 64: 48: 41: 40: 31: 15: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 187: 174: 171: 167: 162: 158: 157: 156: 155: 152: 149: 144: 141: 137: 133: 129: 126: 122: 118: 117: 116: 115: 112: 111:67.70.129.135 98: 96: 88: 84: 83: 80: 77: 76: 68: 61: 57: 53: 47: 42: 39: 35: 27: 23: 19: 161:reductionism 131: 124: 120: 107: 94: 78: 26:Mathematics 170:Trovatore 148:Trovatore 121:disproved 50:<< 24:‎ | 22:Archives 20:‎ | 125:logical 89:pages. 99:July 2 67:July 3 46:July 1 69:: --> 63:: --> 62:: --> 44:< 16:< 168:. -- 56:July 60:Aug 52:Jun 146:-- 58:| 54:|

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current reference desk
67.70.129.135
03:49, 2 July 2007 (UTC)
Gödel's incompleteness theorems
Torkel Franzen
Trovatore
05:41, 2 July 2007 (UTC)
reductionism
talk:reductionism#"set-theoretic reductionism"
Trovatore
08:32, 4 July 2007 (UTC)

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