371:-first with wind at 35 knots (65 km/h; 40 mph), swell of 5 m (16 ft), and sea current of 3 knots (5.6 km/h; 3.5 mph). The transfer of the injured person was completed, however the strong swell subsequently pushed the MSV against the platform. Her helideck collided with and severed one or more gas export risers, which were supported from the platform jacket. Crucially, they had been installed outside the jacket structure footprint, which made them liable to be struck in case of ship collision. They were protected by structural guards, but these had been designed for collision from smaller
500:, it became apparent that riser jet fires can result in the rapid catastrophic loss of an offshore facility. This is due to the high fluid pressures and the large fuel inventory contained in the pipeline, which upon breach of containment becomes available for long lasting fires. It is therefore essential that fires occurring elsewhere in the platform do not cause failure of the risers; this also applies to protecting the risers from fires originating from other risers (the scenario that occurred at Mumbai High). In the wake of
56:
1377:
1372:
63:
77:
40:
423:, ONGC, and various supply boats also participated in the emergency and rescue operations. Several crew members of the complex sought safety by jumping directly to the sea. Rescued persons were transferred to supply boats for passage to Mumbai. Rescue helicopters remained unavailable due to weather conditions.
487:
Avoiding any lift or other vessel operation in proximity to the risers is another effective measure to prevent riser-threatening collisions. Again, an inherent design approach would altogether avoid lifting appliances and laydown areas on the edge of the platform closest to the risers. Locating the
394:
At the time there were 384 persons in the complex, including the MSV and jack-up rig personnel. Of these, 362 were rescued over the next 15 hours and 22 perished (of which 11 bodies were recovered and 11 are missing). The severity of the fire hampered the evacuation and rescue efforts. Only two out
512:
is far more common, although not universally practiced. Another practice that is sometimes used, subject to risk assessment, is the use of subsea isolation valves (SSIVs); these are pipeline isolation valves placed in the vicinity of the platform, which enable the sectionalization and consequent
453:
The whole complex became a total loss and the field production was impacted for years until a new Mumbai High North complex was built. No official investigation report has been issued publicly by either the Indian authorities or ONGC. Subsequent to the disaster, however, the Indian government
343:(OIM) received a request for the transfer of the injured person onboard MHN. The transfer had to be accomplished using a man-riding basket lifted from one of the platform cranes. The OIM and the master agreed on the use of the south crane, which was located on the
1041:
331:(SCI), was supporting diving operations elsewhere in the field. At about 14:00 local time a cook onboard the MSV got injured having sliced off the tips of two of his fingers. Medical evacuation to shore was deemed necessary by the MSV
523:
they saw necessary, and having to complete a dangerous vessel approach to the platform under difficult circumstances (bad weather, unavailability of the leeward crane, and faulty dynamic positioning system). Even comprehensive
366:
requested some time to fix the issue. However, the master decided to proceed with the approach to the platform, operating the thrusters manually and using an emergency source of control via pushbuttons. The MSV was brought in
249:. The accident was the consequence of a collision between a support vessel and the production platform. The fire caused 22 fatalities (of whom 11 recovered and 11 missing) and material damage estimated at $ 370 million.
458:(OISD) with stronger capacities of action to promote safety in the local offshore oil and gas industry and counter poor safety practices, including in particular the mandate for the regulation of offshore safety.
891:
536:
should not have been allowed to approach the platform, especially in the circumstances in which it happened. The importance of enforcing the so-called 500 metres exclusion zone has been stressed from various
1049:
488:
risers away from the prevailing weather is also advisable. Further, strict procedures to prevent any vessel approach to said side of the platform should be put in place by the operating company.
1449:
484:, this is firstly achieved by ensuring they are placed inside the jacket envelope. Alternatively, they should be protected by structural guards designed for credible collision scenarios.
1439:
26:
560:
504:, the British offshore industry first, followed by the rest of the world, have gradually implemented policies by which the risk of riser fire is quantitatively assessed and riser
273:. Located in the northern section of the field at about 100 km from shore was the original Mumbai High North production complex, consisting of four bridge-linked platforms: NA, a
1444:
1399:
899:
863:
1119:
1124:
508:
is installed accordingly. The fireproofing of the risers all the way down to the water surface is still rare. Passive fire protection of riser boarding
1152:
1434:
415:, was in the field at the time and was among the first providing assistance to the emergency operations. She started firefighting operations using
779:
1074:
1082:
1018:
989:
928:
826:
289:. The North complex had a production capacity of 180,000 barrels per day (28,600 m/day, or about 40% of India's domestic production) and 148
55:
573:
629:
383:. The fire escalated to further risers, which lacked fire protection, and eventually engulfed all the production platform, including its
1429:
1070:
730:
290:
285:
facilities. The complex imported well fluids from 11 unmanned wellhead platforms and exported oil and gas to shore, as well as gas for
1419:
1414:
90:
480:
Hydrocarbon flowlines and risers on fixed offshore platforms should not be exposed to potential vessel collisions. In the spirit of
186:
Vessel collision against gas flowlines, as a result of high seas, vessel approach on the windward side and faulty positioning system
1075:"Work Programme: Proposal for a New Output Concerning Amendments to the Code of Safety for Diving Systems and Resolution A.692(17)"
810:
605:
1409:
1404:
282:
1424:
455:
262:
433:, which was drifting dangerously at the mercy of the swell and the current. At the time of the accident, six divers were in a
281:, built in 1978; MHN, the production platform, built in 1981; and MNW, a processing platform housing the gas compression and
140:
1145:
340:
659:
133:
850:
637:
519:: The MSV master and the offshore installation manager found themselves in the dilemma of deciding between aborting a
311:(41 to 46 km/h; 25 to 29 mph), currents of 1.8 to 2 knots (3.3 to 3.7 km/h; 2.1 to 2.3 mph) and
39:
1380:
1376:
1371:
1367:
1167:
1010:
1219:
1138:
1114:
328:
1241:
1208:
695:
505:
445:
for towing to shore. However, she sank four days after the fire, when she was a short distance off Mumbai.
347:
side of the platform, an arrangement that made the MSV approach more complicated. There was a crane on the
1303:
372:
278:
21:
335:, and this was seconded by ONGC. A helicopter was at the time parked on MHN, however it could not fly to
307:
operations. It was monsoon season and the sea conditions were particularly rough, with winds of 22 to 25
1335:
981:
408:
949:
771:
1274:
1252:
738:
525:
400:
396:
384:
348:
344:
1230:
1197:
1188:
1087:
352:
920:
520:
356:
339:
due to the rough seas making a landing there unsafe. Shortly before 15:00, the Mumbai High North
323:
On the day of the accident, the 100 m (330 ft)-long multi-purpose support vessel (MSV)
266:
419:, of which she had four with a capacity of 1,800 m/h (18,000 cu ft/ks) each. The
642:
1014:
985:
822:
434:
388:
387:, as well as the accommodation platform MHF. NA and the jack-up rig were severely affected by
234:
118:
892:"Remembering BHN_SURAKSHA Oilfield Fire - A Citizen's Rescue Report at humanrescueintermedia"
743:
1130:
814:
359:
1315:
568:
509:
481:
597:
467:
363:
351:
side of the platform but it was not operable. The vessel experienced an issue with her
1086:. MSC 99/20/9, Maritime Safety Committee, 99th session, agenda item 20. Archived from
1393:
1353:
1263:
1177:
312:
17:
375:(OSV), not larger MSVs. The gas release immediately ignited, resulting in a massive
496:: The risers on MHN had no fire protection arrangements. In the aftermath of the
1037:
501:
497:
420:
332:
308:
258:
242:
122:
95:
1292:
818:
667:
416:
297:
437:
on the MSV; they were rescued 36 hours after the shipboard fire was put off.
155:
142:
261:, approximately 170 km (110 mi) west of Mumbai. It is operated by
210:- Total loss of Mumbai High North complex (four platforms) and jack-up rig
1281:
376:
304:
286:
274:
176:
1120:
Prototype: Journal of
Undergraduate Engineering Research and Scholarship
641:. HID Semi Permanent Circular SPC/Technical/OSD/33. 2006. Archived from
442:
220:- Financial damages estimated at $ 370 million ($ 552 million in 2020)
858:
630:"Riser Safety in UK Waters – Lessons from Mumbai High North Disaster"
238:
978:
High
Integrity Systems and Safety Management in Hazardous Industries
391:. Within two hours from the fire onset, MHN collapsed into the sea.
257:
The Mumbai High oil field, the largest in India, is located in the
368:
246:
126:
270:
230:
1134:
466:
The following issues of interest, as well as lessons learnt in
851:"Lessons Learned Database: Individual Incident Summary Report"
399:
of the complex proper were launched, and only one out of 10
1042:"Podcast: Catastrophe at the Hands of Legacy Design Issues"
561:"100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974-2019"
513:
dramatic reduction of the inventory available to the fire.
470:, have been pointed out in the years after the accident:
475:
Vulnerability of flowlines and risers to ship collisions
1007:
Offshore Safety
Management: Implementing a SEMS Program
355:
system, having been observed at around 15:30 that her
237:, located approximately 100 km (62 mi) off
696:"Mumbai High Incident and Regulatory Progress Since"
265:
and produces oil and gas, which are transported via
1326:
1166:
206:
198:
190:
182:
171:
132:
117:Mumbai High North offshore oil production complex,
113:
105:
517:Management of marine operations around the complex
1450:Maritime incidents involving engineering failures
94:Location of the Mumbai High North complex in the
62:
772:"Mumbai High North, Mumbai, India, 27 July 2005"
44:Riser jet fire engulfing the production platform
1440:Building and structure collapses caused by fire
429:eventually shifted the firefighting efforts on
532:it has become clear that a vessel the size of
528:may not include such an eventuality. However,
1146:
541:Evacuation of divers from hyperbaric chambers
8:
32:
950:"The Samudra Suraksha at Bombay High North"
896:The Human Rescue Team Intermedia Laboratory
1153:
1139:
1131:
215:- Sinking of multi-purpose support vessel
38:
31:
1445:Building and structure collapses in India
1161:Shipwrecks and maritime incidents in 2005
303:was positioned over NA to carry out well
1400:Industrial fires and explosions in India
776:FABIG (Fire and Blast Information Group)
552:
809:. Vol. 1 (4th ed.). London:
805:Vinnem, Jan-Erik; Røed, Willy (2020).
229:On July 27, 2005, a major fire struck
1115:"Mumbai High North Platform Disaster"
1032:
1030:
971:
969:
885:
883:
703:IRF (International Regulators' Forum)
315:of 4 to 5 metres (13 to 16 ft).
7:
844:
842:
840:
838:
800:
798:
796:
766:
764:
762:
760:
758:
756:
724:
722:
720:
718:
689:
687:
685:
683:
681:
679:
677:
624:
622:
327:, owned by ONGC and operated by the
1071:International Maritime Organization
235:Mumbai High North offshore complex
14:
296:At the time of the accident, the
1375:
1370:
1127:from the original on 2023-10-31.
1009:(2nd ed.). Waltham, Mass.:
277:platform built in 1976; MHF, an
75:
61:
54:
1435:2005 disestablishments in India
931:from the original on 2023-03-28
869:from the original on 2023-01-30
782:from the original on 2023-06-04
608:from the original on 2023-06-10
456:Oil Industry Safety Directorate
411:(DSV) operated by SCI like the
1040:; Purdum, Traci (2020-08-05).
76:
1:
341:offshore installation manager
226:Offshore oil and gas disaster
731:"Mumbai High North Accident"
729:Walker, Steve (2007-06-06).
462:Analysis and lessons learned
849:Marsh, Peter (2020-03-01).
638:Health and Safety Executive
1466:
1430:Maritime incidents in 2005
890:Kumar, Ashu (2011-07-25).
526:emergency management plans
379:. Flames quickly engulfed
1420:2005 industrial disasters
1415:July 2005 events in India
1365:
819:10.1007/978-1-4471-7444-8
329:Shipping Company of India
269:to a processing plant in
69:Mumbai High North complex
49:
37:
807:Offshore Risk Assessment
362:pitch was sluggish. The
1410:2005 disasters in India
1405:Collapsed oil platforms
598:"Mumbai High Oil Field"
506:passive fire protection
482:inherently safer design
373:offshore supply vessels
1425:Oil platform disasters
1113:Daley, Jenine (2013).
976:Thomson, J.R. (2015).
279:accommodation platform
27:considered for merging
982:Butterworth-Heinemann
494:Riser fire protection
409:diving support vessel
156:19.76306°N 71.07806°E
119:Mumbai High oil field
1005:Sutton, Ian (2014).
984:. pp. 209–212.
694:Verma, J.B. (2007).
502:Lord Cullen's report
498:Piper Alpha disaster
301:Noble Charlie Yester
212:Noble Charlie Yester
91:class=notpageimage|
1352:Aug (unknown date)
1244:William H. Standley
1046:Chemical Processing
925:Offshore Technology
921:"Mumbai High Field"
660:"Mumbai High North"
441:was handed over to
353:dynamic positioning
152: /
34:
435:saturation chamber
161:19.76306; 71.07806
1387:
1386:
1189:Almirante Lattore
1020:978-0-323-26206-4
991:978-0-12-801996-2
828:978-1-4471-7443-1
664:Oil Rig Disasters
389:thermal radiation
224:
223:
1457:
1379:
1374:
1358:
1348:
1340:
1319:
1309:
1298:
1287:
1269:
1258:
1247:
1236:
1225:
1214:
1203:
1192:
1182:
1155:
1148:
1141:
1132:
1128:
1102:
1101:
1099:
1098:
1092:
1079:
1067:
1061:
1060:
1058:
1057:
1048:. Archived from
1034:
1025:
1024:
1002:
996:
995:
973:
964:
963:
961:
960:
946:
940:
939:
937:
936:
917:
911:
910:
908:
907:
898:. Archived from
887:
878:
877:
875:
874:
868:
855:
846:
833:
832:
802:
791:
790:
788:
787:
768:
751:
750:
748:
742:. Archived from
735:
726:
713:
712:
710:
709:
700:
691:
672:
671:
666:. Archived from
656:
650:
649:
647:
634:
626:
617:
616:
614:
613:
594:
588:
587:
585:
584:
578:
572:. Archived from
565:
557:
534:Samudra Suraksha
381:Samudra Suraksha
360:azimuth thruster
337:Samudra Suraksha
325:Samudra Suraksha
217:Samudra Suraksha
167:
166:
164:
163:
162:
157:
153:
150:
149:
148:
145:
79:
78:
65:
64:
58:
42:
35:
33:Mumbai High fire
1465:
1464:
1460:
1459:
1458:
1456:
1455:
1454:
1390:
1389:
1388:
1383:
1361:
1351:
1343:
1333:
1327:Other incidents
1322:
1316:Carthaginian II
1312:
1301:
1290:
1272:
1261:
1250:
1239:
1228:
1217:
1206:
1195:
1185:
1175:
1162:
1159:
1112:
1110:
1108:Further reading
1105:
1096:
1094:
1090:
1077:
1069:
1068:
1064:
1055:
1053:
1036:
1035:
1028:
1021:
1004:
1003:
999:
992:
975:
974:
967:
958:
956:
948:
947:
943:
934:
932:
919:
918:
914:
905:
903:
889:
888:
881:
872:
870:
866:
853:
848:
847:
836:
829:
813:. p. 151.
804:
803:
794:
785:
783:
770:
769:
754:
746:
733:
728:
727:
716:
707:
705:
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693:
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675:
658:
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645:
632:
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620:
611:
609:
596:
595:
591:
582:
580:
576:
563:
559:
558:
554:
550:
510:shutdown valves
464:
451:
321:
283:water injection
255:
227:
219:
214:
207:Property damage
160:
158:
154:
151:
146:
143:
141:
139:
138:
101:
100:
99:
98:
93:
87:
86:
85:
84:
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72:
71:
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66:
45:
30:
12:
11:
5:
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1427:
1422:
1417:
1412:
1407:
1402:
1392:
1391:
1385:
1384:
1366:
1363:
1362:
1360:
1359:
1349:
1341:
1337:Irving Johnson
1330:
1328:
1324:
1323:
1321:
1320:
1313:Unknown date:
1310:
1299:
1288:
1270:
1259:
1248:
1237:
1226:
1215:
1204:
1193:
1183:
1172:
1170:
1164:
1163:
1160:
1158:
1157:
1150:
1143:
1135:
1109:
1106:
1104:
1103:
1073:(2018-02-13).
1062:
1026:
1019:
1013:. p. 72.
1011:William Andrew
997:
990:
965:
941:
927:. 2017-09-21.
912:
879:
834:
827:
792:
752:
749:on 2007-07-15.
739:Oil and Gas UK
714:
673:
670:on 2020-03-02.
651:
648:on 2008-08-01.
618:
589:
551:
549:
546:
545:
544:
538:
514:
491:
490:
489:
485:
468:process safety
463:
460:
454:empowered its
450:
447:
405:Samudra Prabha
364:chief engineer
320:
317:
254:
251:
225:
222:
221:
208:
204:
203:
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196:
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188:
187:
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180:
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136:
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115:
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107:
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89:
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82:
81:
74:
73:
68:
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60:
59:
53:
52:
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50:
47:
46:
43:
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1462:
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1413:
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1408:
1406:
1403:
1401:
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1382:
1378:
1373:
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1342:
1339:
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1329:
1325:
1318:
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1300:
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1289:
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1285:
1279:
1278:
1271:
1268:
1267:
1260:
1257:
1256:
1249:
1246:
1245:
1238:
1235:
1234:
1227:
1224:
1223:
1216:
1213:
1212:
1205:
1202:
1201:
1194:
1191:
1190:
1184:
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1180:
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1173:
1171:
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1149:
1144:
1142:
1137:
1136:
1133:
1129:
1126:
1122:
1121:
1116:
1107:
1093:on 2023-03-09
1089:
1085:
1084:
1076:
1072:
1066:
1063:
1052:on 2023-08-12
1051:
1047:
1043:
1039:
1033:
1031:
1027:
1022:
1016:
1012:
1008:
1001:
998:
993:
987:
983:
979:
972:
970:
966:
955:
954:Ships and Oil
951:
945:
942:
930:
926:
922:
916:
913:
902:on 2021-01-06
901:
897:
893:
886:
884:
880:
865:
861:
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852:
845:
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841:
839:
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741:
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723:
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669:
665:
661:
655:
652:
644:
640:
639:
631:
625:
623:
619:
607:
603:
602:A Barrel Full
599:
593:
590:
579:on 2022-10-04
575:
571:
570:
562:
556:
553:
547:
542:
539:
535:
531:
527:
522:
518:
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469:
461:
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457:
448:
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444:
440:
436:
432:
428:
424:
422:
418:
417:fire monitors
414:
410:
406:
402:
398:
395:of the eight
392:
390:
386:
385:process plant
382:
378:
374:
370:
365:
361:
358:
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342:
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318:
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185:
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137:
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128:
124:
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116:
112:
109:July 27, 2005
108:
104:
97:
92:
57:
48:
41:
36:
28:
24:
23:
22:Infobox event
19:
1354:
1345:
1336:
1314:
1305:
1294:
1283:
1276:
1265:
1254:
1243:
1232:
1222:Mount Vernon
1221:
1210:
1199:
1187:
1178:
1118:
1111:
1095:. Retrieved
1088:the original
1081:
1065:
1054:. Retrieved
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1038:Kerin, Trish
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1346:Mumbai High
1304:HMNZS
1211:Guadalcanal
421:Indian Navy
259:Arabian Sea
243:Maharashtra
159: /
134:Coordinates
123:Maharashtra
96:Arabian Sea
16:‹ The
1394:Categories
1306:Wellington
1253:HMAS
1179:Big Valley
1168:Shipwrecks
1097:2023-08-12
1056:2023-08-12
980:. Oxford:
959:2023-08-09
935:2023-03-28
906:2023-08-09
873:2023-08-06
786:2023-08-07
708:2023-08-07
612:2023-08-07
583:2023-08-11
548:References
253:Background
175:Gas riser
144:19°45′47″N
1355:Hanseatic
1282:USS
1275:USS
1266:Oldendorf
1264:USS
1242:USS
1231:USS
1220:USS
1209:USS
1198:USS
449:Aftermath
401:liferafts
397:lifeboats
357:starboard
147:71°4′41″E
25:is being
1344:27 Jul:
1334:25 Mar:
1302:13 Nov:
1295:Yun Yang
1273:25 Aug:
1262:22 Aug:
1255:Brisbane
1251:31 Jul:
1240:23 Jun:
1229:22 Jun:
1218:16 Jun:
1207:19 May:
1196:14 May:
1186:11 Apr:
1176:15 Jan:
1125:Archived
929:Archived
864:Archived
811:Springer
780:Archived
606:Archived
537:sources.
443:tugboats
439:Suraksha
431:Suraksha
413:Suraksha
377:jet fire
345:windward
305:workover
287:gas lift
275:wellhead
267:pipeline
177:jet fire
29:. ›
18:template
1291:6 Sep:
1277:Briscoe
1200:America
521:medevac
349:leeward
298:jack-up
199:Missing
1233:Elliot
1017:
988:
859:IChemE
825:
427:Prabha
403:. The
333:master
319:Events
291:MMSCFD
239:Mumbai
191:Deaths
121:, off
83:Mumbai
1293:ROCS
1091:(PDF)
1078:(PDF)
867:(PDF)
854:(PDF)
747:(PDF)
734:(PDF)
699:(PDF)
646:(PDF)
633:(PDF)
577:(PDF)
569:Marsh
564:(PDF)
369:stern
313:swell
309:knots
247:India
183:Cause
127:India
114:Venue
1381:2006
1368:2004
1284:Deyo
1083:ADAS
1015:ISBN
986:ISBN
823:ISBN
407:, a
271:Uran
263:ONGC
231:ONGC
172:Type
106:Date
815:doi
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