266:
the utterance is made with a certain illocutionary force, or else that it constitutes the performance of a certain illocutionary act. In
English, for example, the interrogative is supposed to indicate that the utterance is (intended as) a question; the directive indicates that the utterance is (intended as) a directive illocutionary act (an order, a request, etc.); the words "I promise" are supposed to indicate that the utterance is (intended as) a promise. Possible IFIDs in English include: word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and performative verbs.
125:(e.g., a listener's reaction) is to note how in the former case, by uttering the object — for example, "I hereby promise you" — (and assuming that all other necessary features of the performative situation pertain), then the act has taken place: a promise was made. The perlocutionary result (how the promisee reacts) might be acceptance, or skepticism, or disbelief, but none of these reactions alter the illocutionary force of the statement: the promise was made.
253:
room, in which case the illocutionary force would be that of 'describing'. But she might also intend to criticise someone who should have kept the room warm. Or it might be meant as a request to someone to close the window. These forces may be interrelated: it may be by way of stating that the temperature is too cold that one criticises someone else. Such a performance of an illocutionary act by means of the performance of another is referred to as an
142:
the view that even true/false constative statements have illocutionary force (as in "I hereby state and affirm") and even performatives can be evaluable as true/false statements (as "guilty" verdict might be right or wrong). It is also often emphasised that Austin introduced the illocutionary act by means of a contrast with other aspects of "doing" by "speaking." The illocutionary act, he says, is an act performed
265:
Searle and
Vanderveken (1985) often speak about what they call 'illocutionary force indicating devices' (IFIDs). These are supposed to be elements, or aspects of linguistic devices which indicate either (dependent on which conceptions of "illocutionary force" and "illocutionary act" are adopted) that
252:
as an aspect of meaning, then it appears that the (intended) 'force' of certain sentences, or utterances, is not quite obvious. If someone says, "It sure is cold in here", there are several different illocutionary acts that might be aimed at by the utterance. The utterer might intend to describe the
132:
On the other hand, with a perlocutionary act, the object of the utterance has not taken place unless the hearer deems it so — for example, if one utters, "I hereby insult you," or "I hereby persuade you" — one would not assume an insult has necessarily occurred, nor persuasion has necessarily taken
141:
Whereas Austin used "performative" to talk about certain kinds of utterances as having "force," his term "illocution" rather names a quality or aspect of all utterances. They will have a locutionary sense or meaning, an illocutionary force, and a perlocutionary result. This approach has encouraged
239:
to perform a certain illocutionary act—rather than as the successful performance of the act (which is supposed to further require the appropriateness of certain circumstances). According to this conception, the utterance of "I bet you five pounds that it will rain" may well have an illocutionary
165:
According to the conception adopted by Bach and
Harnish in 'Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts' (1979), an illocutionary act is an attempt to communicate, which they analyse as the expression of an attitude. Another conception of the illocutionary act goes back to Schiffer's book 'Meaning'
113:
Thus, for example, in order to make a promise I must make clear to my audience that the act I am performing is the making of a promise, and in the performance of the act I will be undertaking a conventional obligation to do the promised thing: the promisee will understand what it means to make a
274:
Another notion Searle and
Vanderveken use is that of an 'illocutionary negation'. The difference of such an 'illocutionary negation' to a 'propositional negation' can be explained by reference to the difference between "I do not promise to come" and "I promise not to come". The first is an
173:(e.g., 1969, 1975, 1979). In recent years, however, it has been doubted whether Searle's account is well-founded. A wide-ranging critique is in FC Doerge 2006. Collections of articles examining Searle's account are: Burkhardt 1990 and Lepore / van Gulick 1991.
244:
this or that illocutionary act is actually (successfully) performed. According to this conception, the addressee must have heard and understood that the speaker intends to make a bet with them in order for the utterance to have 'illocutionary force'.
128:
That is to say, in each case a declaration, command, or promise has necessarily taken place in virtue of the utterance itself, whether the hearer believes in or acts upon the declaration, command, or promise or not.
95:
it is issued in the course of the "doing of an action" (1975, 5), by which, again, Austin means the performance of an illocutionary act (Austin 1975, 6 n2, 133). According to Austin's original exposition in
275:
illocutionary negation—the 'not' negates the promise. The second is a propositional negation. In the view of Searle and
Vanderveken, illocutionary negations change the type of illocutionary act.
219:
The classification is intended to be exhaustive but the classes are not mutually exclusive: John Austin's well-known example "I bet you five pounds it will rain" is both directive and commissive.
109:(2) the performance of which involves the production of what Austin calls 'conventional consequences' as, e.g., rights, commitments, or obligations (Austin 1975, 116f., 121, 139).
215:= speech acts that change the reality in accord with the proposition of the declaration, e.g. baptisms, pronouncing someone guilty or pronouncing someone husband and wife
114:
promise and fulfill it. Thus, promising is an illocutionary act in the present sense. Since Austin's death, the term has been defined differently by various authors.
106:(1) for the performance of which I must make it clear to some other person that the act is performed (Austin speaks of the 'securing of uptake'), and
459:
442:
416:
400:
377:
363:
209:= speech acts that express on the speaker's attitudes and emotions towards the proposition, e.g. congratulations, excuses and thanks
498:
98:
320:
169:
According to a widespread opinion, an adequate and useful account of "illocutionary acts" has been provided by
305:
197:= speech acts that are to cause the hearer to take a particular action, e.g. requests, commands and advice
86:
162:
saying something. Austin, however, eventually abandoned the "in saying" / "by saying" test (1975, 123).
232:
231:. In Austin's original account, the notion remains rather unclear. Some followers of Austin, such as
503:
488:
240:
force even if the addressee doesn't hear it. However, Bach and
Harnish assume illocutionary force
493:
310:
166:(1972, 103), in which the illocutionary act is represented as just the act of meaning something.
155:
73:
85:
The notion of an illocutionary act is closely connected with Austin's doctrine of the so-called
455:
438:
412:
396:
373:
359:
343:
370:
Speech Acts, Meaning and
Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle
285:
147:
67:
447:
431:
421:
405:
387:
352:
91:
482:
471:
Discussion of illocutionary acts in sec. 1 of
Stanford Encycolopedia of Philosophy, "
227:
Several speech act theorists, including Austin himself, make use of the notion of an
290:
39:
203:= speech acts that commit a speaker to some future action, e.g. promises and oaths
300:
295:
189:
181:
Searle (1975) set up the following classification of illocutionary speech acts:
170:
43:
35:
472:
235:, view illocutionary force as the property of an utterance to be made with the
133:
place, unless the hearer were suitably offended or persuaded by the utterance.
330:
315:
71:(the literal sentence) was to ask a question about the presence of salt. The
17:
325:
384:
Illocutionary Acts – Austin's
Account and What Searle Made Out of It
188:= speech acts that commit a speaker to the truth of the expressed
77:(the actual effect), might be to cause somebody to pass the salt.
61:
When somebody says "Is there any salt?" at the dinner table, the
424:“A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts”, in: Günderson, K. (ed.),
65:
is a request: "please give me some salt" even though the
121:(e.g., a declaration, command, or a promise), and a
117:One way to think about the difference between an
42:in his investigation of the various aspects of
261:Illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs)
154:saying something, and also contrasted with a
8:
391:Lepore, Ernest / van Gulick, Robert (eds).
358:. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1975
137:Approaches to defining "illocutionary act"
87:'performative' and 'constative utterances'
349:. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2000
248:If we adopt the notion of illocutionary
347:Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning
146:saying something, as contrasted with a
27:Linguistic term coined by J. L. Austin
437:. Cambridge University Press. 1979
411:. Cambridge University Press. 1969
7:
454:. Cambridge University Press. 1985.
452:Foundations of Illocutionary Logic
102:, an illocutionary act is an act:
25:
89:: an utterance is "performative"
395:. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1991.
58:is what happened as a result.
1:
426:Language, Mind, and Knowledge
382:Doerge, Friedrich Christoph.
177:Classes of illocutionary acts
50:is what was said and meant,
428:, Minneapolis, vol. 7. 1975
393:John Searle and his Critics
356:How To Do Things with Words
99:How to Do Things With Words
520:
372:. Berlin / New York 1990
450:and Daniel Vanderveken.
368:Burkhardt, Armin (ed.).
270:Illocutionary negations
499:Philosophy of language
435:Expression and Meaning
306:Performative utterance
54:is what was done, and
321:Searle–Derrida debate
46:. In his framework,
34:was introduced into
255:indirect speech act
229:illocutionary force
223:Illocutionary force
158:, an act performed
38:by the philosopher
386:. Tuebingen 2006.
344:Alston, William P.
311:Perlocutionary act
156:perlocutionary act
123:perlocutionary act
74:perlocutionary act
32:illocutionary acts
119:illocutionary act
63:illocutionary act
16:(Redirected from
511:
286:Direction of fit
21:
519:
518:
514:
513:
512:
510:
509:
508:
479:
478:
468:
466:Further reading
448:Searle, John R.
432:Searle, John R.
422:Searle, John R.
406:Searle, John R.
353:Austin, John L.
340:
335:
281:
272:
263:
242:if, and only if
233:David Holdcroft
225:
179:
148:locutionary act
139:
92:if, and only if
83:
68:locutionary act
30:The concept of
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
517:
515:
507:
506:
501:
496:
491:
481:
480:
477:
476:
467:
464:
463:
462:
445:
429:
419:
403:
389:
380:
366:
350:
339:
336:
334:
333:
328:
323:
318:
313:
308:
303:
298:
293:
288:
282:
280:
277:
271:
268:
262:
259:
224:
221:
217:
216:
210:
204:
198:
192:
178:
175:
138:
135:
111:
110:
107:
82:
79:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
516:
505:
502:
500:
497:
495:
492:
490:
487:
486:
484:
474:
470:
469:
465:
461:
460:0-521-26324-7
457:
453:
449:
446:
444:
443:0-521-22901-4
440:
436:
433:
430:
427:
423:
420:
418:
417:0-521-07184-4
414:
410:
407:
404:
402:
401:0-631-15636-4
398:
394:
390:
388:
385:
381:
379:
378:0-89925-357-1
375:
371:
367:
365:
364:0-19-281205-X
361:
357:
354:
351:
348:
345:
342:
341:
337:
332:
329:
327:
324:
322:
319:
317:
314:
312:
309:
307:
304:
302:
299:
297:
294:
292:
289:
287:
284:
283:
278:
276:
269:
267:
260:
258:
256:
251:
246:
243:
238:
234:
230:
222:
220:
214:
211:
208:
205:
202:
199:
196:
193:
191:
187:
184:
183:
182:
176:
174:
172:
167:
163:
161:
157:
153:
149:
145:
136:
134:
130:
126:
124:
120:
115:
108:
105:
104:
103:
101:
100:
94:
93:
88:
80:
78:
76:
75:
70:
69:
64:
59:
57:
53:
49:
45:
41:
37:
33:
19:
18:Illocutionary
451:
434:
425:
408:
392:
383:
369:
355:
346:
291:J. L. Austin
273:
264:
254:
249:
247:
241:
236:
228:
226:
218:
213:declarations
212:
206:
200:
194:
185:
180:
168:
164:
159:
151:
143:
140:
131:
127:
122:
118:
116:
112:
97:
90:
84:
72:
66:
62:
60:
55:
51:
47:
40:J. L. Austin
31:
29:
409:Speech Acts
301:Linguistics
296:John Searle
207:expressives
201:commissives
190:proposition
171:John Searle
56:perlocution
44:speech acts
36:linguistics
504:Statements
489:Pragmatics
483:Categories
473:Assertion"
338:References
331:Speech act
316:Pragmatics
195:directives
186:assertives
150:, the act
52:illocution
494:Semantics
326:Semantics
237:intention
279:See also
81:Overview
48:locution
458:
441:
415:
399:
376:
362:
250:force
456:ISBN
439:ISBN
413:ISBN
397:ISBN
374:ISBN
360:ISBN
485::
257:.
160:by
152:of
144:in
475:.
20:)
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.