253:(concurrently operating) "processes" from which the belief results. My belief that there is a bird in the tree outside my window might be accorded a result of the process of forming beliefs on the basis of sense-perception, of visual sense-perception, of visual sense-perception through non-opaque surfaces in daylight, and so forth, down to a variety of different very specifically described processes. Some of these processes might be statistically reliable, while others might not. It would no doubt be better to say, in any case, that we are choosing not which process to say resulted in the belief, but instead how to describe the process, out of the many different levels of generality on which it can be accurately described.
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that there is a bird in that tree, one might not at all understand the cognitive processes that account for one's successful act of perception; nevertheless, it is the fact that the processes worked reliably that accounts for why one's belief is justified. In short, one finds one holds a belief about the bird, and that belief is justified if any is, but one is not acquainted at all with the processes that led to the belief that justified one's having it.
264:. Reliabilism usually considers that for generating justified beliefs a process needs to be reliable in a set of relevant possible scenarios. However, according to Stich, these scenarios are chosen in a culturally biased manner. Stich does not defend any alternative theory of knowledge or justification, but instead argues that all accounts of normative epistemic terms are culturally biased and instead only a pragmatic account can be given.
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be the product of a reliable process. But reliabilism need not be regarded as an alternative, but instead as a further explication of the traditional analysis. On this view, those who offer reliabilist theories of justification further analyze the 'justification' part of the traditional analysis of 'knowledge' in terms of reliable processes. Not all reliabilists agree with such accounts of justification, but some do.
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proposed his counterexamples the traditional analysis has included the further claim that knowledge must be more than justified true belief. Reliabilist theories of knowledge are sometimes presented as an alternative to that theory: rather than justification, all that is required is that the belief
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the believer does not know about or understand the process that makes the belief reliable. In defending this view, reliabilists (and externalists generally) are apt to point to examples from simple acts of perception: if one sees a bird in the tree outside one's window and thereby gains the belief
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in reliabilist theories. Brandom is concerned that unless the role of belief is stressed, reliabilism may attribute knowledge to things that would otherwise be considered incapable of possessing it. Brandom gives the example of a parrot that has been trained to consistently respond to red visual
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that it is. For
Brandom, beliefs pertain to concepts: without the latter there can be no former. Concepts are products of the 'game of giving and asking for reasons'. Hence, only those entities capable of reasoning, through language in a social context, can for Brandom believe and thus have
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Another of the most common objections to reliabilism, made first to
Goldman's reliable process theory of knowledge and later to other reliabilist theories, is the so-called generality problem. For any given justified belief (or instance of knowledge), one can easily identify many different
244:, which is the view that one can have knowledge, or have a justified belief, despite not knowing (having "access" to) the evidence, or other circumstances, that make the belief justified. Most reliabilists maintain that a belief can be justified, or can constitute knowledge,
275:, but can be repurposed to object to reliabilist accounts as follows: If our experiences are controlled by an evil demon, it may be the case that we believe ourselves to be doing things that we are not doing. However, these beliefs are clearly justified.
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301:, allowing knowledge to be accounted for by reliable external process so long as a knower possess some internal understanding of why the belief is reliable.
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stimuli by saying 'that's red'. The proposition is true, the mechanism that produced it is reliable, but
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169:. In order to have a valid claim of knowledge for any proposition, one must be justified in believing "p" and "p" must be true. Since
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Moreover, a similar account can be given (and an elaborate version of this
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A broadly reliabilist theory of justified belief can be stated as follows:
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Conee, E.; Feldman, R. (1998). "The
Generality Problem for Reliabilism".
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Some find reliabilism of justification objectionable because it entails
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A broadly reliabilist theory of knowledge is roughly as follows:
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if, and only if, the belief is the result of a reliable process.
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Theory that beliefs are justified when from reliable processes
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was the very first to state the theory, albeit in passing.
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is also regarded as an important source, and (according to
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and more recently, Alvin
Plantinga. Goldman's article "
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thought experiment. Process reliabilism is a form of
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271:. The evil demon problem originally motivated
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30:, has been advanced as a theory both of
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342:"Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"
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210:adding citations to reliable sources
523:Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
511:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
497:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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101:One has a justified belief that
22:, a category of theories in the
1517:List of skeptical organizations
197:needs additional citations for
1497:List of books about skepticism
974:Analytic–synthetic distinction
1:
1507:List of skeptical conferences
159:One classical or traditional
427:"The Diagonal and the Demon"
1543:Internalism and externalism
1512:List of skeptical magazines
1502:List of scientific skeptics
1019:Internalism and externalism
340:Gettier, Edmund L. (1963).
262:The Fragmentation of Reason
82:is true, one believes that
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1522:List of skeptical podcasts
492:"Reliabilist Epistemology"
323:"Responding to Skepticism"
134:A Causal Theory of Knowing
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850:Evolutionary epistemology
1423:Problem of the criterion
1122:Philosophy of perception
925:Representational realism
895:Naturalized epistemology
40:philosophical skepticism
1102:Outline of epistemology
935:Transcendental idealism
446:10.1023/a:1020656411534
425:Comesaña, Juan (2002).
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361:10.1093/analys/23.6.121
74:), then one knows that
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321:DeRose, Keith (1999).
269:new evil demon problem
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384:Philosophical Studies
166:justified true belief
138:Journal of Philosophy
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90:is true through some
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48:epistemic externalism
1459:Semantic externalism
1428:Problem of induction
1418:MĂĽnchhausen trilemma
1059:Procedural knowledge
1044:Problem of induction
329:on 14 November 2000.
206:improve this article
1464:Process reliabilism
1386:Skeptical scenarios
1266:Academic Skepticism
1214:Types of skepticism
1137:Virtue epistemology
1132:Social epistemology
1112:Formal epistemology
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163:of 'knowledge' is
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559:Epistemology
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18:
1408:Evil genius
1352:Aenesidemus
1337:Clitomachus
1064:Proposition
1034:Objectivity
920:Reliabilism
910:Rationalism
855:Fallibilism
830:Coherentism
775:Ernest Sosa
750:Thomas Reid
735:James Pryor
705:G. E. Moore
695:David Lewis
685:Saul Kripke
680:Peter Klein
660:Susan Haack
590:Robert Audi
519:Reliabilism
478:Reliabilism
390:(1): 1–29.
299:internalism
295:externalism
242:externalism
150:Hugh Mellor
68:proposition
62:Given that
20:Reliabilism
1537:Categories
1479:Relativism
1393:Acatalepsy
1377:David Hume
1322:Arcesilaus
1291:Pyrrhonism
1243:Scientific
1207:Skepticism
1165:Discussion
1155:Task Force
1074:Simplicity
1054:Perception
930:Skepticism
905:Positivism
880:Infinitism
845:Empiricism
700:John Locke
665:David Hume
655:Anil Gupta
650:Paul Grice
625:John Dewey
595:A. J. Ayer
482:PhilPapers
305:References
273:skepticism
218:April 2011
178:Objections
70:(such as,
1447:Responses
1367:Montaigne
1332:Carneades
1296:Solipsism
1286:Humeanism
1276:Cartesian
1248:Religious
1029:Knowledge
1014:Induction
964:knowledge
956:knowledge
454:169069884
412:170425156
130:Kent Bach
36:knowledge
1281:Charvaka
1150:Category
969:Analysis
954:A priori
945:Concepts
885:Innatism
822:Theories
349:Analysis
161:analysis
54:Overview
1357:Agrippa
1327:Lacydes
1226:Radical
1085:more...
865:Fideism
811:more...
521:at the
490:(ed.).
404:4320806
369:3326922
290:believe
246:even if
171:Gettier
34:and of
1347:Cicero
1312:Pyrrho
1271:Ajñana
979:Belief
875:Holism
452:
410:
402:
367:
281:belief
1489:Lists
1317:Timon
1238:Moral
1233:Local
1160:Stubs
1079:Truth
725:Plato
461:(PDF)
450:S2CID
430:(PDF)
408:S2CID
400:JSTOR
365:JSTOR
345:(PDF)
286:knows
297:and
480:at
442:doi
438:110
392:doi
357:doi
260:in
208:by
136:" (
113:by
1539::
508:.
494:.
448:.
436:.
432:.
406:.
398:.
388:89
386:.
363:.
353:23
351:.
347:.
313:^
152:)
142:64
140:,
128:,
124:,
50:.
1199:e
1192:t
1185:v
551:e
544:t
537:v
514:.
500:.
444::
414:.
394::
371:.
359::
231:)
225:(
220:)
216:(
202:.
103:p
88:p
84:p
80:p
76:p
64:p
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