551:, a decline in unipolarity creates a crisis in multilateralism; it is possible to revive multilateralism in a multipolar system, but this is more threatened and the structure to do so is not fully developed. In multipolarity, larger powers can negotiate "mega-regional" agreements more easily than smaller ones. When there are multiple competing great powers, this can lead to the smaller states being left out of such agreements. Though multipolar orders form regional hegemonies around 'poles' or great powers, this can weaken economic interdependencies within regions, at least in regions without a great power. Additionally, as multipolar systems can tend to regional hegemonies or bounded orders, agreements are formed within these bounded orders rather than globally. Though, Mearsheimer predicts the persistence of a thin international order within multipolarity, which constitutes some multilateral agreements.
201:
the states in the international system. In 2023, Wohlforth and
Stephen Brooks argued that the United States is still the unipole but that U.S. power has weakened and the nature of U.S. unipolarity has changed. They add, "The world is neither bipolar nor multipolar, and it is not about to become either. Yes, the United States has become less dominant over the past 20 years, but it remains at the top of the global power hierarchy—safely above China and far, far above every other country... Other countries simply cannot match the power of the United States by joining alliances or building up their militaries."
165:
World War II, thereby convincing weaker states that it was more interested in cooperation rather than domination. U.S. strategic restraint allowed weaker countries to participate in the make-up of the post-war world order, which limited opportunities for the United States to exploit total power advantages. Ikenberry notes that while the United States could have unilaterally engaged in unfettered power projection, it decided instead to "lock in" its advantage long after zenith by establishing an enduring institutional order, gave weaker countries a voice, reduced great power uncertainty, and mitigated the
499:
278:
258:
but also a social structure whereby the unipole maintains its status through legitimation, and institutionalization. In trying to obtain legitimacy from the other actors in the international system, the unipole necessarily gives those actors a degree of power. The unipole also obtains legitimacy and wards off challenges to its power through the creation of institutions, but these institutions also entail a diffusion of power away from the unipole.
169:. The liberal basis of U.S. hegemony—a transparent democratic political system—has made it easier for other countries to accept the post-war order, Ikenberry explains. "American hegemony is reluctant, open, and highly institutionalized—or in a word, liberal" and "short of large-scale war or a global economic crisis, the American hegemonic order appears to be immune to would-be hegemonic challengers."
234:, 2. American commercial power, and 3. American military preponderance. The United States benefits disproportionately from its status as hegemon. Other states do not challenge U.S. hegemony because many of them benefit from the U.S.-led order, and there are significant coordination problems in creating an alternative world order.
240:
argues that unipolarity is conflict-prone, both between the unipole and other states, and exclusively among other states. Monteiro substantiates this by remarking that "the United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the end of the Cold War. Put another way, the first two
249:
that unipolarity is "the least durable of international configurations." Secondly, even if the United States acts benevolently, states will still attempt to balance against it because the power asymmetry demands it: In a self-help system, states do not worry about other states' intentions as they do
213:
argues that unipolarity is durable and peaceful because it reduces the likelihood of hegemonic rivalry (because no state is powerful enough to challenge the unipole) and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance of power politics among the major states, thus reducing the likelihood that attempts
200:
argued that the international system was heading towards a system that can be characterized neither as bipolarity nor multipolarity. He added that polarity did not appear to matter as much in the current international system, as great powers command a far smaller share of power vis-a-vis the rest of
257:
argues that unipolarity has, contrary to some expectations, not given the United States a free rein to do what it wants and that unipolarity has proven to be quite frustrating for the United States. The reasons for this is that unipolarity does not just entail a material superiority by the unipole,
164:
argues in a series of influential writings that the United States purposely set up an international order after the end of World War II that sustained U.S. primacy. In his view, realist predictions of power balancing did not bear fruit because the United States engaged in strategic restraint after
114:
Unipolarity is a condition in which one state under the condition of international anarchy enjoys a preponderance of power and faces no competitor states. According to
William Wohlforth, "a unipolar system is one in which a counterbalance is impossible. When a counterbalance becomes possible, the
841:
The closer the resulting concentration is to zero, the more evenly divided power is. The closer to 1, the more concentrated power is. There is a general but not strict correlation between concentration and polarity. It is rare to find a result over 0.5, but a result between 0.4 and 0.5 usually
714:
222:
theory. With no great power to check its adventurism, the United States will weaken itself by misusing its power internationally. "Wide latitude" of "policy choices" will allow the U.S. to act capriciously on the basis of "internal political pressure and national ambition."
540:" (states which do not experience an immediate proximate threat do not balance against the threatening power in the hope that others carry the cost of balancing against the threat). John Mearsheimer also argues that buck passing is more common in multipolar systems.
964:"Is Bipolarity a sound recipe for world order–as compared to other historically known alternatives. In ICD Annual Conference on Cultural Diplomacy in the USA Options on the Table," Soft Power, Intercultural Dialogue & the Future of US Foreign Policy. 2013"
517:, hold that multipolar systems are more stable than bipolar systems, as great powers can gain power through alliances and petty wars that do not directly challenge other powers; in bipolar systems, classical realists argue, this is not possible.
3188:
269:(1644–1912) that the durability of unipolarity is contingent on the ability of the unipole to sustain its power advantage and for potential challengers to increase their power without provoking a military reaction from the unipole.
421:
argued that bipolarity tended towards the greatest stability because the two great powers would engage in rapid mutual adjustment, which would prevent inadvertent escalation and reduce the chance of power asymmetries forming.
1635:
842:
indicates a unipolar system, while a result between 0.2 and 0.4 usually indicated a bipolar or multipolar system. Concentration can be plotted over time, so that the fluctuations and trends in concentration can be observed.
371:
Bipolarity is a distribution of power in which two states have a preponderance of power. In bipolarity, spheres of influence and alliance systems have frequently developed around each pole. For example, in the
3193:
580:
523:
hold that multipolar systems are particularly unstable and conflict-prone, as there is greater complexity in managing alliance systems, and a greater chance of misjudging the intentions of other states.
76:, whereas the end of the Cold War led to unipolarity with the US as the world's sole superpower in the 1990s and 2000s. Scholars have debated how to characterize the current international system.
1259:
2553:
836:
41:
is distributed within the international system. It describes the nature of the international system at any given period of time. One generally distinguishes three types of systems:
963:
2744:
3229:
3203:
3137:
3465:
2715:
1288:
Traditional theory of international politics maintains that, other things being equal, a multipolar balance-of-power system is more stable than a bipolar system
376:
of 1947–1991, most
Western and capitalist states would fall under the influence of the US, while most Communist states would fall under the influence of the
506:
219:
3405:
2949:
851:
366:
3343:
450:, was an example of peaceful multipolarity (the great powers of Europe assembled regularly to discuss international and domestic issues), as was the
353:
250:
other states' capabilities. "Unbalanced power leaves weaker states feeling uneasy and gives them reason to strengthen their positions," Waltz says.
2928:
3515:
3275:
230:, U.S. unipolarity is stable and sustainable due to a combination of three factors: 1. The status of the American dollar as the world's dominant
82:
do not have an agreement on the question what kind of international politics polarity is likely to produce the most stable and peaceful system.
3032:
2448:
2046:
2015:
1810:
1724:
1647:
1187:
1100:
178:
520:
3132:
3106:
3270:
3213:
177:
Scholars have debated whether the current (in 2024) international order is characterized by unipolarity, bipolarity or multipolarity.
709:{\displaystyle {\text{Concentration}}_{t}={\sqrt {\frac {\sum _{i=1}^{N_{t}}(S_{it})^{2}-{\frac {1}{N_{t}}}}{1-{\frac {1}{N_{t}}}}}}}
3359:
3280:
3208:
3198:
3178:
2708:
2145:
529:
1792:
417:
3157:
3152:
3122:
2724:
891:
38:
942:
in the mid-19th century had expected the bipolar world centered on
America and Russia but had not advanced beyond bipolarity.
871:
53:
for three or more centers of power. The type of system is completely dependent on the distribution of power and influence of
1550:
Ikenberry, G. John (Winter 1998–1999). "Institutions, Strategic
Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order".
430:
has challenged Waltz on this, arguing that bipolarity creates a risk for war when a power asymmetry or divergence happens.
3290:
2918:
392:
3239:
3037:
2981:
2913:
2736:
2701:
483:
3327:
3080:
2976:
2923:
498:
1876:"Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be"
1743:
3369:
2966:
215:
3173:
2954:
2837:
1516:
777:
140:
2169:
838:
represents the sum of the squares of the proportion of power possessed by all states in the great power system.
3379:
3101:
3016:
2648:
384:
2102:
983:
3400:
3285:
2996:
181:
argues
American primacy is vastly underestimated because power indices frequently fail to take into account
128:
34:
1429:
1408:
unipolarity implies the existence of many juridically equal nation-states, something that an empire denies
438:
Multipolarity is a distribution of power in which more than two states have similar amounts of power. The
3470:
3374:
3056:
1019:
939:
525:
467:
3455:
2847:
876:
345:
154:
1434:
426:
also argued, that bipolarity is the most stable form of polarity, as buck passing is less frequent.
189:
argued that unipolarity was in wane and that the world was shifting towards multipolarity. In 2019,
90:
are among those who argue that bipolarity tends to generate relatively more stability. In contrast,
3450:
3127:
3011:
3006:
866:
396:
2468:
2668:
2630:
2581:
2534:
2421:
2413:
2366:
2358:
2277:
2269:
2222:
1986:
1944:
1843:
1766:
1575:
1567:
1456:
in empires, inter-societal divide-and-rule practices replace interstate balance-of-power dynamics
1447:
1334:
1240:
1232:
1153:
2064:"Neorealism and the myth of bipolar stability: Toward a new dynamic realist theory of major war"
1387:
1703:
Wohlforth, William C. (2022), Græger, Nina; Heurlin, Bertel; Wæver, Ole; Wivel, Anders (eds.),
1634:
Posen, Barry R. (2011), Ikenberry, G. John; Mastanduno, Michael; Wohlforth, William C. (eds.),
3254:
3234:
3001:
2961:
2754:
2622:
2573:
2526:
2444:
2405:
2350:
2295:
2261:
2214:
2151:
2141:
2110:
2083:
2042:
2011:
2005:
1978:
1936:
1897:
1826:
Monteiro, Nuno (Winter 2011–2012). "Polarity and Power: U.S. Hegemony and China's
Challenge".
1806:
1720:
1685:
1643:
1616:
1368:
1326:
1279:
1224:
1183:
1179:
After
Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars
1096:
1068:
1027:
991:
901:
563:
439:
388:
282:
277:
210:
197:
95:
79:
380:. According to Wohlforth and Brooks, "the world was undeniably bipolar" during the Cold War.
185:
in the U.S. relative to other purportedly powerful states, such as China and India. In 2011,
2991:
2944:
2870:
2660:
2612:
2565:
2516:
2508:
2397:
2340:
2332:
2253:
2206:
2075:
1928:
1887:
1835:
1798:
1758:
1712:
1675:
1606:
1559:
1439:
1399:
1318:
1271:
1216:
1145:
1058:
861:
463:
427:
423:
254:
237:
231:
227:
190:
166:
132:
87:
2971:
2897:
2885:
906:
571:
544:
510:
451:
443:
103:
98:
are among those arguing for the stabilizing impact of unipolarity. Some scholars, such as
1420:
Nexon, Daniel and Thomas Wright (2007). "What's at Stake in the
American Empire Debate".
548:
3189:
Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)
729:= the state of which the proportion of control over the system's power is being measured
3486:
3425:
3410:
3306:
3249:
3244:
2890:
2832:
2827:
2779:
2774:
2769:
2749:
886:
856:
471:
362:
182:
161:
91:
54:
1594:
193:
argued that the international system was shifting from unipolarity to multipolarity.
3509:
3075:
2880:
2874:
2634:
2585:
2538:
2370:
2281:
1962:
1948:
1533:
881:
533:
400:
307:
246:
149:
83:
2425:
1847:
1770:
1579:
1451:
1338:
1244:
1157:
566:
uses a systemic concentration of power formula to calculate the polarity of a given
2822:
2693:
2345:
1489:
896:
723:= the time at which the concentration of resources (i.e. power) is being calculated
537:
532:
argue that multipolarity tends towards instability and conflict escalation due to "
487:
479:
475:
459:
404:
332:
320:
316:
299:
266:
262:
242:
99:
1932:
2135:
1716:
1177:
1090:
3445:
3440:
3096:
2862:
2842:
2817:
2796:
2791:
2785:
2688:
1916:
1500:
567:
455:
447:
341:
324:
295:
186:
144:
136:
127:
Numerous thinkers predicted U.S. primacy in the 20th century onwards, including
17:
1704:
922:
Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988, pp. 209–210.
3415:
2852:
2801:
2764:
2759:
2569:
2512:
2401:
2079:
1443:
514:
73:
2626:
2577:
2530:
2409:
2386:"Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity"
2354:
2265:
2218:
2155:
2114:
2087:
1982:
1940:
1901:
1802:
1689:
1620:
1372:
1330:
1283:
1228:
1072:
1063:
1031:
995:
2496:
2063:
1762:
1468:
1149:
1046:
1711:, Governance, Security and Development, Cham: Springer, pp. 411–424,
3194:
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA)
3142:
2617:
2497:"Sustaining multilateral trade cooperation in a multipolar world economy"
1839:
1680:
1663:
1611:
1563:
1322:
536:" (allies get drawn into unwise wars provoked by alliance partners) and "
373:
286:
61:
2651:(March 1993). "Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power".
1990:
1966:
920:
On Global War: Historical–Structural Approaches to World Politics.
2672:
2600:
2417:
2385:
2362:
2320:
2273:
2241:
2226:
2194:
1875:
1571:
1356:
1306:
1236:
1204:
245:, account for more than 25 percent of the nation's total time at war."
214:
at balances of power cause major war. Wohlforth builds his argument on
2521:
1917:"The Durability of a Unipolar System: Lessons from East Asian History"
1892:
1403:
209:
Scholars have debated the durability and peacefulness of unipolarity.
2601:"Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order"
1794:
America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation
1664:"Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order"
116:
2664:
2336:
2257:
2210:
2137:
Theories of International Relations : Transition vs Persistence
1275:
1220:
3430:
3395:
3364:
3183:
1640:
International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity
750:
497:
349:
328:
27:
Way in which power is distributed within the international system
3460:
3311:
3147:
1523:, (Nantes, 1899: chapter "L`Avenir des Aryens," pp. XXXI-XXXII).
1260:"Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity, and International Stability"
1136:
Wohlforth, William (1999). "The Stability of a Unipolar World".
377:
303:
119:
or a hegemon that can control the behavior of all other states.
115:
system is not unipolar." A unipolar state is not the same as an
69:
3054:
2697:
1490:
https://fr.wikisource.org/La_Guerre_et_la_Crise_europ%C3%A9enne
547:
and can pose a challenge against multilateralism. According to
3435:
740:= the number of states in the great power system at time
261:
In a 2021 study, Yuan-kang Wang argues from the experience of
241:
decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10 percent of
65:
3461:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
3420:
3365:
Australia–New Zealand–United States Security Treaty (ANZUS)
1737:
1735:
1471:, “The US and Western Europe: A New Era of Understanding,”
106:, argued that multipolarity was the most stable structure.
64:
period was widely understood as one of bipolarity with the
1709:
Polarity in International Relations: Past, Present, Future
3102:
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC)
1636:"From unipolarity to multipolarity: transition in sight?"
3204:
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
3138:
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)
1018:
Brooks, Stephen G.; Wohlforth, William C. (2023-04-18).
1507:, (tr. Thompson, Lawrence G., London, 1958, pp. 79-85).
2554:"Multipolarity and the future of economic regionalism"
1484:
Michel Chevalier, ‘La Guerre et la Crise Européenne’,
1205:"Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability"
780:
583:
3466:
Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)
3479:
3388:
3352:
3336:
3320:
3299:
3263:
3222:
3166:
3115:
3089:
3068:
3025:
2937:
2906:
2861:
2810:
2735:
1705:"Polarity and International Order: Past and Future"
3230:Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
2101:Haass, Richard; Kupchan, Charles A. (2021-04-29).
830:
708:
1307:"Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful"
502:Empires of the world in 1905, with minor mistakes
2140:. S. Burchill. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 128.
1642:, Cambridge University Press, pp. 317–341,
3451:India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA)
2296:"China Debates the Future Security Environment"
3396:Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS)
3276:Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
3184:Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
1595:"The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters"
2709:
2384:Christensen, Thomas J.; Snyder, Jack (1990).
762:= the proportion of power possessed by state
8:
1545:
1543:
454:. Examples of wartime multipolarity include
1203:Deutsch, Karl W.; Singer, J. David (1964).
1131:
1129:
1127:
831:{\displaystyle \sum _{i=1}^{n}(S_{it})^{2}}
474:period and the tripartite division between
3406:Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries
3133:Central American Integration System (SICA)
3065:
3051:
2732:
2716:
2702:
2694:
2439:Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). "Chapter 8".
2037:Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). "Chapter 9".
852:Balance of power (international relations)
367:Balance of power (international relations)
3344:South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone
3312:North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
3148:North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
3107:Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
2616:
2520:
2501:The Review of International Organizations
2344:
1891:
1860:"Structural Realism After the Cold War,"
1797:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1679:
1610:
1433:
1062:
822:
809:
796:
785:
779:
694:
685:
669:
660:
651:
638:
623:
618:
607:
599:
590:
585:
582:
3360:Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
3271:Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
3214:Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS)
3179:Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
3158:Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)
2321:"Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma"
383:Historic examples of bipolarity include
276:
3281:Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)
3209:Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
3199:Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)
2240:Midlarsky, Manus I.; Hopf, Ted (1993).
1744:"Structural Realism after the Cold War"
1388:"Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective"
954:
932:
3033:Composite Index of National Capability
2242:"Polarity and International Stability"
2195:"Tripolarity and the Second World War"
2170:"A dangerous history of multipolarity"
2007:World Political Systems after Polarity
1350:
1348:
3153:Organization of American States (OAS)
3123:Association of Caribbean States (ACS)
2490:
2488:
2462:
2460:
2246:The American Political Science Review
2010:. Taylor & Francis. p. 224.
1300:
1298:
1296:
570:system. The formula was developed by
7:
1171:
1169:
1167:
1084:
1082:
1013:
1011:
1009:
1007:
1005:
978:
976:
391:in 18th century from the end of the
289:(between 30 April and 24 June 1975)
37:is any of the various ways in which
2929:International relations (1814–1919)
2599:Mearsheimer, John J. (2019-04-01).
2441:The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
2039:The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
1357:"The Stability of a Unipolar World"
1118:The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
984:"Did the Unipolar Moment Ever End?"
3240:European Political Community (EPC)
1967:"The Stability of a Bipolar World"
494:Impact on conflict and cooperation
411:Impact on conflict and cooperation
205:Impact on conflict and cooperation
25:
1422:American Political Science Review
1095:. McGraw-Hill. pp. 170–171.
558:Measuring the power concentration
543:Multipolarity does not guarantee
407:during the Cold War (1947–1991).
3370:Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG)
2725:Power in international relations
1092:Theory of International Politics
418:Theory of International Politics
3174:Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD)
2653:International Studies Quarterly
2495:Hoekman, Bernard (2014-06-01).
2199:International Studies Quarterly
892:Power (international relations)
3516:International relations theory
3380:Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG)
3286:Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU)
2469:"Can multilateralism survive?"
2443:. W. W. Norton & Company.
2193:Schweller, Randall L. (1993).
2041:. W. W. Norton & Company.
1742:Waltz, Kenneth (Summer 2000).
1355:Wohlforth, William C. (1999).
1182:. Princeton University Press.
1120:. W.W. Norton. pp. 44–45.
872:International monetary systems
819:
802:
648:
631:
1:
3291:Organization of Turkic States
3128:Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
2919:List of medieval great powers
2134:Sullivan, Michael P. (2001).
1933:10.1080/09636412.2020.1859127
1662:Mearsheimer, John J. (2019).
1488:, (1 June 1866), p. 784–785,
1047:"Unipolarity is not over yet"
393:War of the Spanish Succession
356:, and other neutral countries
319:: Countries aligned with the
298:: Countries aligned with the
3038:Comprehensive National Power
2914:List of ancient great powers
2467:Derviş, Kemal (2018-07-23).
1717:10.1007/978-3-031-05505-8_21
1258:Zoppo, Ciro Elliott (1966).
1089:Waltz, Kenneth Neal (1979).
415:Kenneth Waltz's influential
3375:Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)
3328:Union for the Mediterranean
3081:Union for the Mediterranean
2924:List of modern great powers
2103:"The New Concert of Powers"
1176:Ikenberry, G. John (2001).
1020:"The Myth of Multipolarity"
753:of power possessed. Hence,
3532:
3456:Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
2967:Hegemonic stability theory
2390:International Organization
2062:Copeland, Dale C. (1996).
1305:Monteiro, Nuno P. (2012).
1116:Mearsheimer, John (2001).
1026:. No. May/June 2023.
442:, a period from after the
360:
331:, and allies), led by the
216:hegemonic stability theory
3064:
3050:
2731:
2570:10.1017/S1752971916000191
2552:Garzón, Jorge F. (2017).
2513:10.1007/s11558-014-9187-3
2402:10.1017/S0020818300035232
2080:10.1080/09636419608429276
1874:Martha Finnemore (2009).
1593:Beckley, Michael (2018).
1517:Georges Vacher de Lapouge
1444:10.1017/s0003055407070220
160:Liberal institutionalist
141:Georges Vacher de Lapouge
57:in a region or globally.
3057:Organizations and groups
3017:Superpower disengagement
1915:Wang, Yuan-kang (2021).
1803:10.1017/cbo9780511676406
1521:L`Aryen: Son Role Social
1505:The One World Philosophy
1051:Global Studies Quarterly
306:and allies), led by the
3401:Commonwealth of Nations
3235:Council of Europe (CoE)
2997:Power transition theory
2346:2027/uc1.31158011478350
2319:Jervis, Robert (1978).
1791:Norrlof, Carla (2010).
1763:10.1162/016228800560372
1386:Jervis, Robert (2009).
1150:10.1162/016228899560031
218:and a rejection of the
35:international relations
2689:Global Power Barometer
2605:International Security
1862:International Security
1828:International Security
1751:International Security
1668:International Security
1599:International Security
1552:International Security
1428:(2): 253–271, p. 253.
1398:(1): 188–231, p. 190.
1361:International Security
1311:International Security
1138:International Security
1064:10.1093/isagsq/ksae018
832:
801:
710:
630:
503:
395:(1701–1715) until the
358:
3471:Uniting for Consensus
2174:www.lowyinstitute.org
2004:Kopalyan, N. (2017).
1864:, 25/1, (2000): p 27.
1486:Revue des Deux Mondes
940:Alexis de Tocqueville
918:Thompson, William R.
833:
781:
711:
603:
501:
468:Warring States period
399:(1754–1763), and the
280:
3337:Africa–South America
3300:North America–Europe
2649:Mansfield, Edward D.
2618:10.1162/isec_a_00342
2558:International Theory
1840:10.1162/ISEC_a_00064
1681:10.1162/isec_a_00342
1612:10.1162/isec_a_00328
1564:10.1162/isec.23.3.43
1475:, 6/1, (1962): p 17.
1323:10.1162/ISEC_a_00064
877:Non-Aligned Movement
778:
581:
346:Non-Aligned Movement
155:William Thomas Stead
80:Political scientists
3487:United Nations (UN)
3255:Visegrád Group (V4)
3245:European Union (EU)
3012:Superpower collapse
3007:Sphere of influence
2982:Philosophy of power
1045:Røren, Pål (2024).
867:Global Swing States
509:theorists, such as
72:as the world's two
3321:Africa–Asia–Europe
828:
706:
526:Thomas Christensen
504:
359:
3503:
3502:
3499:
3498:
3495:
3494:
3046:
3045:
3002:Second Superpower
2962:Deterrence theory
2450:978-0-393-34927-6
2048:978-0-393-34927-6
2017:978-1-315-45139-8
1963:Waltz, Kenneth N.
1893:10.1353/wp.0.0027
1812:978-0-521-76543-5
1726:978-3-031-05505-8
1649:978-1-107-01170-0
1404:10.1353/wp.0.0031
1189:978-0-691-05091-1
1102:978-0-07-554852-2
902:Regional hegemony
704:
703:
700:
675:
588:
564:Correlates of War
507:Classical realist
440:Concert of Europe
253:In a 2009 study,
211:William Wohlforth
198:William Wohlforth
129:William Gladstone
96:William Wohlforth
16:(Redirected from
3523:
3066:
3052:
2992:Power projection
2977:Internationalism
2950:Balance of power
2945:American decline
2733:
2718:
2711:
2704:
2695:
2677:
2676:
2645:
2639:
2638:
2620:
2596:
2590:
2589:
2549:
2543:
2542:
2524:
2492:
2483:
2482:
2480:
2479:
2464:
2455:
2454:
2436:
2430:
2429:
2381:
2375:
2374:
2348:
2316:
2310:
2309:
2307:
2306:
2292:
2286:
2285:
2237:
2231:
2230:
2190:
2184:
2183:
2181:
2180:
2166:
2160:
2159:
2131:
2125:
2124:
2122:
2121:
2098:
2092:
2091:
2068:Security Studies
2059:
2053:
2052:
2034:
2028:
2027:
2025:
2024:
2001:
1995:
1994:
1959:
1953:
1952:
1921:Security Studies
1912:
1906:
1905:
1895:
1871:
1865:
1858:
1852:
1851:
1823:
1817:
1816:
1788:
1782:
1781:
1779:
1777:
1748:
1739:
1730:
1729:
1700:
1694:
1693:
1683:
1659:
1653:
1652:
1631:
1625:
1624:
1614:
1590:
1584:
1583:
1547:
1538:
1530:
1524:
1514:
1508:
1498:
1492:
1482:
1476:
1465:
1459:
1458:
1437:
1417:
1411:
1410:
1383:
1377:
1376:
1352:
1343:
1342:
1302:
1291:
1290:
1255:
1249:
1248:
1200:
1194:
1193:
1173:
1162:
1161:
1133:
1122:
1121:
1113:
1107:
1106:
1086:
1077:
1076:
1066:
1042:
1036:
1035:
1015:
1000:
999:
980:
971:
970:
968:
959:
943:
937:
862:Global policeman
837:
835:
834:
829:
827:
826:
817:
816:
800:
795:
715:
713:
712:
707:
705:
702:
701:
699:
698:
686:
677:
676:
674:
673:
661:
656:
655:
646:
645:
629:
628:
627:
617:
601:
600:
595:
594:
589:
586:
574:et al. in 1972.
464:Thirty Years War
428:Dale C. Copeland
424:John Mearsheimer
397:Seven Years' War
339:
314:
293:
265:(1368–1644) and
255:Martha Finnemore
238:Nuno P. Monteiro
232:reserve currency
220:balance of power
191:John Mearsheimer
167:security dilemma
133:Michel Chevalier
123:American primacy
88:John Mearsheimer
21:
18:Multipolar world
3531:
3530:
3526:
3525:
3524:
3522:
3521:
3520:
3506:
3505:
3504:
3491:
3475:
3384:
3353:Oceania–Pacific
3348:
3332:
3316:
3295:
3259:
3218:
3162:
3111:
3085:
3060:
3042:
3021:
2972:Multilateralism
2933:
2902:
2857:
2806:
2727:
2722:
2685:
2680:
2665:10.2307/2600833
2647:
2646:
2642:
2598:
2597:
2593:
2551:
2550:
2546:
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2493:
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2383:
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2378:
2337:10.2307/2009958
2318:
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2304:
2302:
2294:
2293:
2289:
2258:10.2307/2938964
2239:
2238:
2234:
2211:10.2307/2600832
2192:
2191:
2187:
2178:
2176:
2168:
2167:
2163:
2148:
2133:
2132:
2128:
2119:
2117:
2107:Foreign Affairs
2100:
2099:
2095:
2061:
2060:
2056:
2049:
2036:
2035:
2031:
2022:
2020:
2018:
2003:
2002:
1998:
1961:
1960:
1956:
1914:
1913:
1909:
1873:
1872:
1868:
1859:
1855:
1825:
1824:
1820:
1813:
1790:
1789:
1785:
1775:
1773:
1746:
1741:
1740:
1733:
1727:
1702:
1701:
1697:
1661:
1660:
1656:
1650:
1633:
1632:
1628:
1592:
1591:
1587:
1549:
1548:
1541:
1531:
1527:
1515:
1511:
1499:
1495:
1483:
1479:
1466:
1462:
1435:10.1.1.136.2578
1419:
1418:
1414:
1385:
1384:
1380:
1354:
1353:
1346:
1304:
1303:
1294:
1276:10.2307/2009806
1257:
1256:
1252:
1221:10.2307/2009578
1202:
1201:
1197:
1190:
1175:
1174:
1165:
1135:
1134:
1125:
1115:
1114:
1110:
1103:
1088:
1087:
1080:
1044:
1043:
1039:
1024:Foreign Affairs
1017:
1016:
1003:
988:Foreign Affairs
982:
981:
974:
966:
962:Jiang, Shiwei.
961:
960:
956:
952:
947:
946:
938:
934:
929:
915:
907:Thucydides Trap
848:
818:
805:
776:
775:
774:The expression
761:
739:
690:
678:
665:
647:
634:
619:
602:
584:
579:
578:
572:J. David Singer
560:
554:
545:multilateralism
511:Hans Morgenthau
496:
452:Interwar period
444:Napoleonic Wars
436:
413:
369:
361:Main articles:
357:
337:
335:
312:
310:
291:
275:
207:
179:Michael Beckley
175:
173:Current debates
125:
112:
104:J. David Singer
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
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3333:
3331:
3330:
3324:
3322:
3318:
3317:
3315:
3314:
3309:
3307:Arctic Council
3303:
3301:
3297:
3296:
3294:
3293:
3288:
3283:
3278:
3273:
3267:
3265:
3261:
3260:
3258:
3257:
3252:
3250:Nordic Council
3247:
3242:
3237:
3232:
3226:
3224:
3220:
3219:
3217:
3216:
3211:
3206:
3201:
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3117:
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2698:
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2684:
2683:External links
2681:
2679:
2678:
2659:(1): 105–128.
2640:
2591:
2564:(1): 101–135.
2544:
2507:(2): 241–260.
2484:
2456:
2449:
2431:
2396:(2): 137–168.
2376:
2331:(2): 167–214.
2325:World Politics
2311:
2287:
2252:(1): 171–180.
2232:
2185:
2161:
2146:
2126:
2093:
2054:
2047:
2029:
2016:
1996:
1977:(3): 881–909.
1954:
1927:(5): 832–863.
1907:
1880:World Politics
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1460:
1412:
1392:World Politics
1378:
1344:
1292:
1270:(4): 579–606.
1264:World Politics
1250:
1215:(3): 390–406.
1209:World Politics
1195:
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1101:
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1001:
990:. 2023-05-23.
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909:
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887:Pax Britannica
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869:
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857:Bipolarisation
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472:Three Kingdoms
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363:Bipolarisation
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183:GDP per capita
174:
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162:John Ikenberry
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92:John Ikenberry
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3149:
3146:
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3141:
3139:
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3076:African Union
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2205:(1): 73–103.
2204:
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2147:1-281-36762-1
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247:Kenneth Waltz
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226:According to
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150:Anticipations
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84:Kenneth Waltz
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51:multipolarity
48:
44:
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36:
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3389:Non–regional
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2021:. Retrieved
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1999:
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1924:
1920:
1910:
1886:(1): 58–85.
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919:
913:Bibliography
897:Posthegemony
840:
773:
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763:
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726:
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561:
553:
549:Kemal Derviş
542:
538:buck-passing
519:
505:
488:Yuan dynasty
480:Liao dynasty
476:Song dynasty
460:World War II
437:
416:
414:
405:Soviet Union
382:
370:
333:Soviet Union
321:Eastern Bloc
317:Second World
300:Western Bloc
283:Three Worlds
260:
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243:U.S. history
236:
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126:
113:
100:Karl Deutsch
78:
59:
50:
46:
42:
30:
29:
3097:Arab League
3090:Africa–Asia
2863:Geopolitics
2838:Least Great
2786:Realpolitik
2611:(4): 7–50.
1776:13 December
1757:(1): 5–41.
1674:(4): 7–50.
1605:(2): 7–44.
1501:Kang Youwei
1367:(1): 5–41.
1317:(3): 9–40.
1144:(1): 5–41.
568:great power
530:Jack Snyder
521:Neorealists
484:Jin dynasty
456:World War I
448:Crimean War
342:Third World
325:Warsaw Pact
296:First World
187:Barry Posen
145:H. G. Wells
137:Kang Youwei
110:Unipolarity
74:superpowers
43:unipolarity
2522:1814/28962
2478:2021-10-25
2305:2021-10-25
2179:2021-10-25
2120:2021-10-25
2023:2024-05-30
1503:, (1885):
950:References
751:proportion
515:E. H. Carr
354:Yugoslavia
273:Bipolarity
267:Qing China
263:Ming China
47:bipolarity
3059:by region
2848:Potential
2635:139105003
2627:0162-2889
2586:151415696
2578:1752-9719
2539:154578416
2531:1559-744X
2473:Brookings
2410:0020-8183
2371:154923423
2355:0043-8871
2282:145530074
2266:0003-0554
2219:0020-8833
2156:815569732
2115:0015-7120
2088:0963-6412
1983:0011-5266
1949:231808778
1941:0963-6412
1902:1086-3338
1690:0162-2889
1621:0162-2889
1469:Hans Kohn
1467:Cited in
1430:CiteSeerX
1373:0162-2889
1331:0162-2889
1284:1086-3338
1229:0043-8871
1073:2634-3797
1032:0015-7120
996:0015-7120
783:∑
683:−
658:−
605:∑
348:, led by
285:" of the
196:In 2022,
3510:Category
3143:Mercosur
3116:Americas
2987:Polarity
2955:European
2871:American
2833:Emerging
2828:Regional
2780:Politics
2775:National
2770:Maritime
2750:Economic
2426:18700052
1991:20026863
1971:Daedalus
1965:(1964).
1848:57558611
1771:57560180
1580:57566810
1537:, p 107.
1452:17910808
1339:57558611
1245:53540403
1158:57568539
846:See also
403:and the
374:Cold War
287:Cold War
68:and the
62:Cold War
31:Polarity
3264:Eurasia
3026:Studies
2907:History
2898:Pacific
2886:Chinese
2745:Climate
2673:2600833
2418:2706792
2363:2009958
2274:2938964
2227:2600832
1572:2539338
1237:2009578
446:to the
323:(i.e.,
302:(i.e.,
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3223:Europe
3069:Africa
2938:Theory
2891:Indian
2823:Middle
2811:Status
2755:Energy
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1900:
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462:, the
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49:, and
2881:Asian
2853:Super
2843:Great
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2797:Smart
2792:Sharp
2737:Types
2669:JSTOR
2631:S2CID
2582:S2CID
2535:S2CID
2422:S2CID
2414:JSTOR
2367:S2CID
2359:JSTOR
2278:S2CID
2270:JSTOR
2223:JSTOR
1987:JSTOR
1945:S2CID
1844:S2CID
1834:(3).
1767:S2CID
1747:(PDF)
1576:S2CID
1568:JSTOR
1473:Orbis
1448:S2CID
1335:S2CID
1241:S2CID
1233:JSTOR
1154:S2CID
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967:(PDF)
927:Notes
350:India
329:China
281:The "
39:power
3431:G8+5
3167:Asia
2802:Soft
2765:Hard
2760:Food
2623:ISSN
2574:ISSN
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2262:ISSN
2215:ISSN
2152:OCLC
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2012:ISBN
1979:ISSN
1937:ISSN
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