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developed and published a tool to extract and analyze the steganographic codes of a given color printer and subsequently to anonymize prints from that printer. The anonymization works by printing additional yellow dots on top of the printer's tracking dots. The scientists made the software available
285:
Copies or printouts of documents with confidential personal information, for example health care information, account statements, tax declaration or balance sheets, can be traced to the owner of the printer and the inception date of the documents can be revealed. This traceability is unknown to many
95:
In the mid-1980s, Xerox pioneered an encoding mechanism for a unique number represented by tiny dots spread over the entire print area, and first deployed this scheme in its DocuColor line of printers. Xerox developed this surreptitious tracking code "to assuage fears that their color copiers could
185:
was one of the few manufacturers to draw attention to the marked pages, stating in a product description, "The digital color printing system is equipped with an anti-counterfeit identification and banknote recognition system according to the requirements of numerous governments. Each copy shall be
136:
Although we still don't know if this is correct, or how subsequent generations of forensic tracking technologies might work, it is probably safest to assume that all modern color laser printers do include some form of tracking information that associates documents with the printer's serial number.
286:
users and inaccessible, as manufacturers do not publicize the code that produces these patterns. It is unclear which data may be unintentionally passed on with a copy or printout. In particular, there are no mentions of the technique in the support materials of most affected printers. In 2005 the
166:
The pattern consists of a dot-matrix spread of yellow dots, which can barely be seen with the naked eye. The dots have a diameter of a tenth of a millimeter (0.004") and a spacing of about one millimeter (0.039″). Their arrangement encodes the serial number of the device, date and time of the
167:
printing, and is repeated several times across the printing area in case of errors. For example, if the code consists of 8 Ă— 16 dots in a square or hexagonal pattern, it spreads over a surface of about 4 square centimetres (0.62 sq in) and appears on a sheet of
128:(EFF) encouraged the public to send in sample printouts and subsequently decoded the pattern. The pattern has been demonstrated on a wide range of printers from different manufacturers and models. The EFF stated in 2015 that the documents that they previously received through a
314:
Other methods of identification are not as easily recognizable as yellow dots. For example, a modulation of laser intensity and a variation of shades of grey in texts are feasible. As of 2006, it was unknown whether manufacturers were also using these techniques.
96:
be used to counterfeit bills" and received U.S. Patent No 5515451 describing the use of the yellow dots to identify the source of a copied or printed document. The scheme was then widely deployed in other printers, including those made by other manufacturers.
418:
277:, which included publishing secret NSA documents unredacted and including the printer tracking dots, was used to identify Winner as the leaker, leading to her arrest in 2017 and conviction.
132:
request suggested that all major manufacturers of color laser printers entered a secret agreement with governments to ensure that the output of those printers is forensically traceable.
1018:
213:. The yellow color channel can then be enhanced with an image processing program to make the dots of the identification code clearly visible. Under good lighting conditions, a
808:
433:
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marked with a label which, if necessary, allows identification of the printing system with which it was created. This code is not visible under normal conditions."
171:
about 150 times. Thus, it can be analyzed even if only fragments or excerpts are available. Some printers arrange yellow dots in seemingly random point clouds.
416:, Tsuji, Masato; Seki, Masao & Leng, Svay et al., "Image processing system for selectively reproducing documents", issued 1996-05-07
129:
109:
reported the machine identification code had been used for decades in some printers, allowing law enforcement to identify and track counterfeiters. The
868:
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The public first became aware of the tracking scheme in
October 2004, when it was used by Dutch authorities to track counterfeiters who had used a
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The dots can be made visible by printing or copying a page and subsequently scanning a small section with a high-resolution
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produce on every printed page that identifies the specific device that was used to print the document. Developed by
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137:(If any manufacturer wishes to go on record with a statement to the contrary, we'll be happy to publish that here.)
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178:
in 2005, color printers leave the code in a matrix of 32 Ă— 16 dots and thus can store 64 bytes of data (64Ă—8).
116:
963:
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analyzed the patterns of 106 printer models from 18 manufacturers and found four different encoding schemes.
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Yellow dots on white paper, produced by color laser printer (enlarged, dot diameter about 0.1 mm)
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68:
327:, a dot matrix spread over a bank note, which stops some printers and color copiers from processing
201:
175:
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Tracking dots under UV-light in regular (red and blue markings) and irregular arrangement (green).
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can be made identifiable. Using this process, even shredded prints can be identified: the 2011 "
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701:"Beitrag bei Druckerchannel: Big Brother is watching you: Code bei Farblasern entschlĂĽsselt"
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17:
967:
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910:"Printer Characterization and Signature Embedding for Security and Forensic Applications"
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Tiny yellow dots on a print-out representing the hidden code of an HP Color LaserJet 3700
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233:
367:
150:
In 2007, the
European Parliament was asked about the question of invasion of privacy.
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Richter, Timo; Escher, Stephan; Schönfeld, Dagmar; Strufe, Thorsten (June 14, 2018).
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in the mid-1980s, the existence of these tracking codes became public only in 2004.
624:"Abschnitt „Technische Daten des Digitalen Farbdrucksystems Xerox DocuColor 6060""
413:
952:
661:
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Workshop on
Information Hiding and Multimedia Security
463:
253:
726:
563:
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was solved by a team called "All Your Shreds Are Belong To U.S." consisting of
823:"docucolor.cgi - CGI script to interpret Xerox DocuColor forensic dot pattern"
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DEDA - tracking Dots
Extraction, Decoding and Anonymisation toolkit:
571:
Die
Datenschleuder, Das wissenschaftliche Fachblatt fĂĽr Datenreisende
76:
960:
360:"Government Uses Color Laser Printer Technology to Track Documents"
158:
852:
223:
200:
182:
157:
115:
80:
31:
869:"Dresdner Forscher ĂĽberlisten Tracking-Punkte bei Laserdruckern"
778:"Did The Intercept Betray Its NSA Source With Sloppy Reporting?"
978:
EFF List of
Printers Which Do or Do Not Display Tracking Dots
396:"Tracking Dots unlesbar machen: Interview mit Uli Blumenthal"
491:"List of Printers Which Do or Do Not Display Tracking Dots"
719:"CONGRATULATIONS to "All Your Shreds Are Belong To U.S."!"
657:"Forensic Analysis and Anonymisation of Printed Documents"
545:"Tracking codes in photocopiers and colour laser printers"
525:. Letter to Latita M. Huff. Electronic Frontier Foundation
264:
Both journalists and security experts have suggested that
27:
Digital watermark tracking code produced by many printers
904:
Chiang, Pei-Ju; Mikkilineni, Aravind K.; Suh, Sungjoo;
577:]. Hamburg: Chaos Computer Club. pp. 19–21.
434:"Dutch track counterfeits via printer serial numbers"
290:(EFF) sought a decoding method and made available a
236:
process, high-quality copies of an original (e.g. a
162:
Yellow dots produced by an HP Color LaserJet CP1515n
113:(CBCDG) has denied that it developed the feature.
973:Information by the Electronic Frontier Foundation
485:
483:
481:
631:Xerox DocuColor® 6060 Digitales Farbdrucksystem
134:
908:; Chiu, George T.-C.; Delp, Edward J. (2006).
8:
953:Laudatio der deutschen BigBrotherAwards 2004
124:In 2005, the civil liberties activist group
1019:Computer-related introductions in the 1980s
520:"Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request"
633:(Prospectus). Neuss: Xerox GmbH. p. 8
306:in their efforts to publicize grievances.
221:the yellow dots are clearly recognizable.
120:The decoding process discovered by the EFF
723:Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
551:. European Parliament. November 20, 2007.
111:Central Bank Counterfeit Deterrence Group
801:"Did the Intercept bungle the NSA leak?"
217:may be enough to see the pattern. Under
456:"DocuColor Tracking Dot Decoding Guide"
347:
281:Protection of privacy and circumvention
273:handling of the leaks by whistleblower
103:color laser printer. In November 2004,
961:Information by the Chaos Computer Club
887:"So verpfeift dich dein Drucker nicht"
605:
595:
432:de Vries, Wilbert (October 26, 2004).
336:Typewriter § Forensic examination
788:from the original on January 1, 2019.
749:"Tip for Bad Guys: Burn, Don't Shred"
650:
648:
389:
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7:
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811:from the original on July 13, 2018.
725:. November 21, 2011. Archived from
358:Tuohey, Jason (November 22, 2004).
25:
394:Escher, Stephan (June 28, 2018).
331:Taggant § Explosive taggants
776:Anderson, L.V. (June 6, 2017).
827:Electronic Frontier Foundation
496:Electronic Frontier Foundation
460:Electronic Frontier Foundation
288:Electronic Frontier Foundation
143:Electronic Frontier Foundation
126:Electronic Frontier Foundation
1:
799:Wemple, Erik (June 6, 2017).
518:Lee, Robert (July 27, 2005).
893:(in German). June 26, 2018.
875:(in German). June 25, 2018.
189:In 2018, scientists at the
61:machine identification code
18:Machine Identification Code
1045:
130:Freedom of Information Act
663:. ACM. pp. 127–138.
297:In 2018, scientists from
562:Frank Rosengart (2005).
966:March 13, 2017, at the
917:CERIAS Security Seminar
669:10.1145/3206004.3206019
549:Parliamentary questions
49:DocuColor tracking dots
829:. 2005. Archived from
754:Bloomberg Businessweek
462:. 2005. Archived from
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1029:Hardware restrictions
260:Practical application
227:
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45:printer steganography
41:Printer tracking dots
35:
891:Deutschlandfunk Nova
499:. September 20, 2007
325:EURion constellation
310:Comparable processes
256:and two colleagues.
980:(last updated 2017)
805:The Washington Post
757:. December 15, 2011
707:. October 26, 2005.
575:technical factsheet
248:" initiated by the
176:Chaos Computer Club
994:Identity documents
930:on August 22, 2017
729:on August 25, 2016
627:(PDF; 1,4 MB)
564:"Datenspur Papier"
246:Shredder Challenge
230:
207:
164:
122:
38:
999:Printing software
921:Purdue University
705:Druckerchannel.de
444:on June 24, 2009.
370:on August 8, 2019
174:According to the
154:Technical aspects
71:which many color
69:digital watermark
16:(Redirected from
1036:
1004:Privacy software
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923:. Archived from
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1014:Watermarking
932:. Retrieved
925:the original
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899:
890:
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873:heise online
872:
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835:. Retrieved
831:the original
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759:. Retrieved
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731:. Retrieved
727:the original
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637:February 27,
635:. Retrieved
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588:February 27,
586:. Retrieved
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503:December 10,
501:. Retrieved
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468:. Retrieved
464:the original
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402:(in German).
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372:. Retrieved
368:the original
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956:(in German)
529:November 7,
374:December 3,
302:to support
254:Otavio Good
232:Using this
57:secret dots
53:yellow dots
988:Categories
837:October 3,
414:US5515451A
342:References
299:TU Dresden
242:blue light
197:Visibility
191:TU Dresden
608:ignored (
598:cite book
583:0930-1054
238:bank note
964:Archived
809:Archived
786:Archived
761:June 12,
733:June 12,
687:49345609
438:PC World
364:PC World
319:See also
240:) under
219:UV-light
140:—
106:PC World
67:), is a
934:June 9,
470:July 5,
211:scanner
91:History
77:copiers
59:, or a
857:GitHub
685:
675:
581:
420:
271:'s
145:(2017)
928:(PDF)
913:(PDF)
683:S2CID
573:[
567:(PDF)
523:(PDF)
250:DARPA
183:Xerox
101:Canon
85:Canon
81:Xerox
936:2017
853:deda
839:2018
782:Digg
763:2014
735:2014
673:ISBN
639:2011
610:help
590:2011
579:ISSN
531:2016
505:2018
472:2018
376:2019
83:and
75:and
855:on
665:doi
65:MIC
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Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
