285:(outward, inward, and hybrid) the intentional content supplied to the mood state is not capable of sufficiently capturing the phenomenal aspects of the mood states. In the case of inward directedness, the phenomenology of the mood does not seem tied to the state of one's body, and even if one's mood is reflected by the overall state of one's body that person will not necessarily be aware of it, demonstrating the insufficiency of the intentional content to adequately capture the phenomenal aspects of the mood. In the case of outward directedness, the phenomenology of the mood and its intentional content does not seem to share the corresponding relation they should given that the phenomenal character is supposed to reduce to the intentional content. Hybrid directedness, if it can even get off the ground, faces the same objection.
224:
unrestricted version, for any state with phenomenal character that state's phenomenal character reduces to its intentional content. Only this unrestricted version of representationalism is able to provide a general theory about the nature of phenomenal character, as well as offer a potential solution to the hard problem of consciousness. The successful reduction of the phenomenal character of a state to its intentional content would provide a solution to the hard problem of consciousness once a physicalist account of intentionality is worked out.
237:
conclude that because moods are undirected they are also nonintentional i.e. they lack intentionality or aboutness. Because they are not directed at anything they are not about anything. Because they lack intentionality they will lack any intentional content. Lacking intentional content their phenomenal character will not be reducible to intentional content, refuting the representational doctrine.
233:
have intentional content to which that character is reduced. Phenomenal states without intentional content therefore serve as a counterexample to the unrestricted version. If the state has no intentional content its phenomenal character will not be reducible to that state's intentional content, for it has none to begin with.
202:
symbol structures (concepts and propositions). Content (i.e., thought) emerges from the meaningful co-occurrence of both sets of symbols. For instance, "8 x 9" is a meaningful co-occurrence, whereas "CAT x §" is not; "x" is a symbol rule called for by symbol structures such as "8" and "9", but not by "CAT" and "§".
275:
In the case of outward directedness, moods might be directed at either the world as a whole, a changing series of objects in the world, or unbound emotion properties projected by people onto things in the world. In the case of inward directedness, moods are directed at the overall state of a person's
201:
very much like those of natural languages. For the
Portuguese logician and cognitive scientist Luis M. Augusto, at this abstract, formal level, the syntax of thought is the set of symbol rules (i.e., operations, processes, etc. on and with symbol structures) and the semantics of thought is the set of
97:
Mental representations (or mental imagery) enable representing things that have never been experienced as well as things that do not exist. Our brains and mental imageries allow us to imagine things have either never happened or are impossible and do not exist. Although visual imagery is more likely
284:
Even if one can identify some possible intentional content for moods we might still question whether that content is able to sufficiently capture the phenomenal character of the mood states they are a part of. Amy Kind contends that in the case of all the previously mentioned kinds of directedness
341:
There are also objective and subjective mental representations. Objective representations are closest to tracking theories—where the brain simply tracks what is in the environment. Subjective representations can vary person-to-person. The relationship between these two types of representation can
240:
Though emotions are typically considered as having directedness and intentionality this idea has also been called into question. One might point to emotions a person all of a sudden experiences that do not appear to be directed at or about anything in particular. Emotions elicited by listening to
232:
When arguing against the unrestricted version of representationalism people will often bring up phenomenal mental states that appear to lack intentional content. The unrestricted version seeks to account for all phenomenal states. Thus, for it to be true, all states with phenomenal character must
205:
Canadian philosopher P. Thagard noted in his work "Introduction to
Cognitive Science", that "most cognitive scientists agree that knowledge in the human mind consists of mental representations" and that "cognitive science asserts: that people have mental procedures that operate by means of mental
249:
In response to this objection, a proponent of representationalism might reject the undirected non-intentionality of moods, and attempt to identify some intentional content they might plausibly be thought to possess. The proponent of representationalism might also reject the narrow conception of
236:
A common example of this kind of state are moods. Moods are states with phenomenal character that are generally thought to not be directed at anything in particular. Moods are thought to lack directedness, unlike emotions, which are typically thought to be directed at particular things. People
219:
on intentional content. Strong representationalism aims to provide a theory about the nature of phenomenal character, and offers a solution to the hard problem of consciousness. In contrast to this, weak representationalism does not aim to provide a theory of consciousness, nor does it offer a
223:
Strong representationalism can be further broken down into restricted and unrestricted versions. The restricted version deals only with certain kinds of phenomenal states e.g. visual perception. Most representationalists endorse an unrestricted version of representationalism. According to the
309:
Structural representations are also important. These types of representations are basically mental maps that we have in our minds that correspond exactly to those objects in the world (the intentional content). According to Morgan, structural representations are not the same as mental
214:
There are two types of representationalism, strong and weak. Strong representationalism attempts to reduce phenomenal character to intentional content. On the other hand, weak representationalism claims only that phenomenal character
293:
There is a wide debate on what kinds of representations exist. There are several philosophers who bring about different aspects of the debate. Such philosophers include Alex Morgan, Gualtiero
Piccinini, and Uriah Kriegel.
359:
Eliminativists think that subjective representations do not exist. Reductivists think subjective representations are reducible to objective. Non-reductivists think that subjective representations are real and distinct.
333:. e.g. The 3 rings on the bell of a bus mean the bus is full—the rings on the bell are independent of the fullness of the bus—we could have assigned something else (just as arbitrary) to signify that the bus is full.
1523:
193:(i.e., mentalese). The contents of thoughts are represented in symbolic structures (the formulas of mentalese) which, analogously to natural languages but on a much more abstract level, possess a
271:
Hybrid directedness: What it is like to be in mood M is to have both a certain kind of outwardly focused representational content and a certain kind of inwardly focused representational content.
181:
in general. According to this version of the theory, the mental representations were images (often called "ideas") of the objects or states of affairs represented. For modern adherents, such as
241:
music are another potential example of undirected, nonintentional emotions. Emotions aroused in this way do not seem to necessarily be about anything, including the music that arouses them.
325:'s forthcoming work, he discusses topics on natural and nonnatural mental representations. He relies on the natural definition of mental representations given by Grice (1957) where
789:
313:
There are also internal representations. These types of representations include those that involve future decisions, episodic memories, or any type of projection into the future.
804:
896:
102:
proposes that images are used to help solve certain types of problems. We are able to visualize the objects in question and mentally represent the images to solve it.
1751:
1713:
1613:
783:
105:
Mental representations also allow people to experience things right in front of them—however, the process of how the brain interprets and stores the
1475:
2392:
1718:
170:, processes or other entities observed in the external world. These intermediaries stand for or represent to the mind the objects of that world.
2352:
889:
2079:
868:
162:, the representational theory of mind postulates the actual existence of mental representations which act as intermediaries between the
2387:
2074:
527:
846:
574:
306:, have a special relation—the represented object does not need to exist, and content plays a causal role in what gets represented:.
799:
Henrich, J. & Boyd, R. (2002). Culture and cognition: Why cultural evolution does not require replication of representations.
2433:
1744:
922:
1708:
882:
98:
to be recalled, mental imagery may involve representations in any of the sensory modalities, such as hearing, smell, or taste.
265:
Outward directedness: What it is like to be in mood M is to have a certain kind of outwardly focused representational content.
2261:
2194:
1688:
1553:
190:
268:
Inward directedness: What it is like to be in mood M is to have a certain kind of inwardly focused representational content.
2423:
2382:
2209:
1861:
1768:
1434:
1213:
1175:
1125:
821:
2448:
2413:
2027:
1801:
1683:
1583:
1374:
2418:
2377:
1737:
1424:
515:
121:
810:
2428:
2126:
2116:
1563:
1303:
1183:
914:
329:. e.g. Those spots mean measles, entails that the patient has measles. Then there are nonnatural representations:
835:
2356:
2276:
2001:
1931:
1921:
1648:
1248:
1155:
995:
385:
2360:
1573:
390:
276:
body. In the case of hybrid, directedness moods are directed at some combination of inward and outward things.
250:
intentionality as being directed at a particular thing, arguing instead for a broader kind of intentionality.
778:
Augusto, Luis M. (2013). 'Unconscious
Representations 1: Belying the Traditional Model of Human Cognition.'
355:
All representations found in subjective and none in the objective: e.g. an agent that experiences in a void.
2463:
2234:
2059:
1218:
1145:
1000:
155:
144:
63:
2438:
2311:
2306:
2214:
1464:
1308:
1243:
905:
435:
420:
2296:
2054:
2224:
2174:
2049:
1936:
1911:
1786:
1439:
1354:
1238:
1020:
649:
Augusto, Luis M. (2014). "Unconscious representations 2: Towards an integrated cognitive architecture".
520:
Vision. A Computational
Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information
2443:
2331:
2064:
1603:
1513:
1312:
1273:
1005:
32:
2458:
2011:
1841:
1653:
1643:
1493:
1449:
1283:
1060:
975:
425:
322:
302:
There are "job description" representations. That is representations that represent something—have
167:
117:
2364:
2239:
2089:
1760:
1503:
1399:
1394:
1318:
1293:
1095:
1080:
1045:
739:
666:
497:
405:
310:
representations—there is nothing mental about them: plants can have structural representations.
147:
71:
28:
2453:
2301:
2158:
1871:
1776:
1469:
1389:
1228:
1110:
631:
613:
570:
523:
151:
40:
2143:
2136:
2101:
2084:
2069:
1891:
1533:
1444:
1268:
1263:
1065:
831:
731:
658:
621:
603:
489:
430:
380:
863:
1986:
1846:
1806:
1678:
1593:
1349:
1328:
1278:
1258:
1198:
1165:
1120:
1115:
1075:
960:
375:
99:
2246:
2096:
1991:
1901:
1866:
1836:
1821:
1791:
1429:
1384:
1208:
1140:
1015:
1010:
626:
591:
303:
258:
159:
140:
106:
59:
2407:
2326:
2251:
2204:
2121:
2111:
2016:
1971:
1966:
1941:
1916:
1906:
1886:
1811:
1673:
1288:
1193:
1188:
1150:
1070:
1050:
1025:
990:
670:
370:
216:
186:
174:
501:
352:
All representations found in objective and none in the subjective: e.g. thermometer
2281:
2271:
2266:
2229:
2179:
1976:
1956:
1946:
1876:
1796:
1414:
1409:
1364:
1323:
1233:
1135:
1090:
1085:
1055:
1040:
1035:
684:
440:
395:
173:
The original or "classical" representational theory probably can be traced back to
36:
564:
544:
2347:
2321:
2131:
2044:
2021:
1996:
1981:
1951:
1881:
1856:
1831:
1826:
1658:
1623:
1543:
1369:
1160:
1100:
985:
970:
182:
163:
128:
124:) is the view that representations are the main way we access external reality.
83:
79:
67:
52:
2184:
2106:
2006:
1926:
1896:
1851:
1663:
1454:
1298:
1253:
1130:
1105:
1030:
965:
662:
493:
415:
178:
617:
2256:
2189:
2153:
1816:
1781:
1695:
1404:
1344:
1223:
1203:
955:
950:
930:
608:
474:
445:
198:
635:
1668:
1359:
980:
940:
874:
410:
349:
Subjective varies, but the objective does not: e.g. color-inverted world
75:
2199:
1379:
935:
743:
592:"The heterogeneity of mental representation: Ending the imagery debate"
400:
136:
91:
48:
16:
Hypothetical internal cognitive symbol that represents external reality
2316:
1729:
1459:
194:
44:
735:
346:
Objective varies, but the subjective does not: e.g. brain-in-a-vat
1961:
945:
2291:
2219:
132:
87:
1733:
1524:
An Essay
Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language
878:
206:
representations for the implementation of thinking and action"
189:, the representational system consists rather of an internal
78:, a mental representation is one of the prevailing ways of
62:
of things that are not actually present to the senses. In
755:
753:
842:
ed. Uriah
Kriegel. New York, NY: Routledge, 180–95.
828:
ed. Uriah
Kriegel. New York, NY: Routledge, 161–79.
817:
ed. Uriah
Kriegel. New York, NY: Routledge, 113–34.
796:
ed. Uriah
Kriegel. New York, NY: Routledge, 91-108.
2340:
2167:
2037:
1767:
1636:
1485:
1337:
1174:
921:
853:
ed. Uriah Kriegel. New York, NY: Routledge, 73–90.
546:Imagination and thinking: A psychological analysis
790:The Bodily Formats Approach to Embodied Cognition
590:Pearson, Joel; Kosslyn, Stephen M. (2015-08-18).
811:The Case against Representationalism about Moods
127:The representational theory of mind attempts to
596:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
558:
556:
220:solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
1745:
890:
8:
851:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
840:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
826:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
815:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
794:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
836:The Sufficiency of Objective Representation
762:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind
709:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind
1752:
1738:
1730:
1614:Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
897:
883:
875:
210:Strong vs weak, restricted vs unrestricted
625:
607:
376:Cognitive model § Dynamical systems
689:Mind. Introduction to Cognitive Science
458:
43:, is a hypothetical internal cognitive
177:and was a dominant theme in classical
158:. In contrast to theories of naĂŻve or
2353:Philosophy of artificial intelligence
253:There are three alternative kinds of
228:Problems for the unrestricted version
7:
822:Two Notions of Mental Representation
702:
700:
698:
468:
466:
464:
462:
869:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
711:. New York: Routledge. p. 118.
14:
113:Representational theories of mind
722:Grice, H.P. (1957). "Meaning".
1554:Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
1:
2210:Hard problem of consciousness
1435:Principle of compositionality
764:. Routledge. pp. 161–79.
475:"Representations Gone Mental"
58:Mental representation is the
1584:Philosophical Investigations
563:Robert J. Sternberg (2009).
261:one might posit for moods.
66:, specifically in fields of
1425:Modality (natural language)
845:Shapiro, Lawrence (2014). '
2480:
1564:Language, Truth, and Logic
1304:Theological noncognitivism
1189:Contrast theory of meaning
1184:Causal theory of reference
915:Index of language articles
847:When Is Cognition Embodied
788:Goldman, Alvin I (2014). '
2373:
1932:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
1922:David Lewis (philosopher)
1704:
1649:Philosophy of information
1249:Mediated reference theory
912:
801:Culture and Cognition, 2,
663:10.1007/s10516-012-9207-y
494:10.1007/s11229-013-0328-7
386:Condensation (psychology)
47:that represents external
1574:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
820:Kriegel, Uriah (2014). '
543:Mckellar, Peter (1957).
391:Knowledge representation
107:representational content
25:cognitive representation
2434:Concepts in metaphysics
2060:Eliminative materialism
1375:Use–mention distinction
1219:Direct reference theory
760:Kriegel, Uriah (2014).
609:10.1073/pnas.1504933112
156:experimental psychology
64:contemporary philosophy
2312:Propositional attitude
2307:Problem of other minds
2215:Hypostatic abstraction
1309:Theory of descriptions
1244:Linguistic determinism
906:Philosophy of language
436:Social constructionism
421:Representative realism
344:
2383:Philosophers category
2287:Mental representation
2050:Biological naturalism
1937:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
1912:Frank Cameron Jackson
1420:Mental representation
1355:Linguistic relativity
1239:Inquisitive semantics
864:Mental Representation
473:Morgan, Alex (2014).
21:mental representation
2424:Cognitive psychology
2065:Emergent materialism
1604:Naming and Necessity
1514:De Arte Combinatoria
1313:Definite description
1274:Semantic externalism
724:Philosophical Review
569:. Cengage Learning.
566:Cognitive Psychology
33:cognitive psychology
2449:Metaphysics of mind
2414:Analytic philosophy
2262:Language of thought
2012:Ludwig Wittgenstein
1842:Patricia Churchland
1654:Philosophical logic
1644:Analytic philosophy
1450:Sense and reference
1329:Verification theory
1284:Situation semantics
809:Kind, Amy (2014). '
602:(33): 10089–10092.
426:Schema (psychology)
331:P does not entail P
323:Gualtiero Piccinini
317:Gualtiero Piccinini
191:language of thought
118:Representationalism
2419:Cognitive modeling
2090:Neurophenomenology
1761:Philosophy of mind
1504:Port-Royal Grammar
1400:Family resemblance
1319:Theory of language
1294:Supposition theory
707:Kind, Amy (2014).
549:. Oxford, England.
406:Object of the mind
280:Further objections
148:philosophy of mind
72:philosophy of mind
29:philosophy of mind
2429:Cognitive science
2401:
2400:
2297:Mind–body problem
2195:Cognitive closure
2159:Substance dualism
1777:G. E. M. Anscombe
1727:
1726:
1229:Dynamic semantics
832:Rupert, Robert D.
522:. The MIT Press.
152:cognitive science
41:cognitive science
2471:
2149:Representational
2144:Property dualism
2137:Type physicalism
2102:New mysterianism
2070:Epiphenomenalism
1892:Martin Heidegger
1754:
1747:
1740:
1731:
1689:Formal semantics
1637:Related articles
1629:
1619:
1609:
1599:
1589:
1579:
1569:
1559:
1549:
1539:
1529:
1519:
1509:
1499:
1269:Relevance theory
1264:Phallogocentrism
899:
892:
885:
876:
782:23.4, 645–663.
766:
765:
757:
748:
747:
719:
713:
712:
704:
693:
692:
681:
675:
674:
646:
640:
639:
629:
611:
587:
581:
580:
560:
551:
550:
540:
534:
533:
512:
506:
505:
479:
470:
431:Set (psychology)
381:Conceptual space
327:P entails that P
166:subject and the
122:indirect realism
2479:
2478:
2474:
2473:
2472:
2470:
2469:
2468:
2404:
2403:
2402:
2397:
2369:
2336:
2282:Mental property
2175:Abstract object
2163:
2033:
1987:Wilfrid Sellars
1862:Donald Davidson
1847:Paul Churchland
1807:George Berkeley
1763:
1758:
1728:
1723:
1700:
1679:School of Names
1632:
1627:
1617:
1607:
1597:
1594:Of Grammatology
1587:
1577:
1567:
1557:
1547:
1537:
1527:
1517:
1507:
1497:
1481:
1333:
1279:Semantic holism
1259:Non-cognitivism
1199:Conventionalism
1170:
917:
908:
903:
860:
775:
773:Further reading
770:
769:
759:
758:
751:
736:10.2307/2182440
721:
720:
716:
706:
705:
696:
683:
682:
678:
648:
647:
643:
589:
588:
584:
577:
562:
561:
554:
542:
541:
537:
530:
514:
513:
509:
477:
472:
471:
460:
455:
450:
366:
339:
319:
300:
291:
282:
247:
230:
212:
120:(also known as
115:
100:Stephen Kosslyn
17:
12:
11:
5:
2477:
2475:
2467:
2466:
2464:Theory of mind
2461:
2456:
2451:
2446:
2441:
2436:
2431:
2426:
2421:
2416:
2406:
2405:
2399:
2398:
2396:
2395:
2390:
2385:
2380:
2374:
2371:
2370:
2368:
2367:
2350:
2344:
2342:
2338:
2337:
2335:
2334:
2329:
2324:
2319:
2314:
2309:
2304:
2299:
2294:
2289:
2284:
2279:
2277:Mental process
2274:
2269:
2264:
2259:
2254:
2249:
2247:Intentionality
2244:
2243:
2242:
2237:
2227:
2222:
2217:
2212:
2207:
2202:
2197:
2192:
2187:
2182:
2177:
2171:
2169:
2165:
2164:
2162:
2161:
2156:
2151:
2146:
2141:
2140:
2139:
2129:
2124:
2119:
2114:
2109:
2104:
2099:
2097:Neutral monism
2094:
2093:
2092:
2082:
2080:Interactionism
2077:
2072:
2067:
2062:
2057:
2052:
2047:
2041:
2039:
2035:
2034:
2032:
2031:
2024:
2019:
2014:
2009:
2004:
1999:
1994:
1992:Baruch Spinoza
1989:
1984:
1979:
1974:
1969:
1964:
1959:
1954:
1949:
1944:
1939:
1934:
1929:
1924:
1919:
1914:
1909:
1904:
1902:Edmund Husserl
1899:
1894:
1889:
1884:
1879:
1874:
1872:René Descartes
1869:
1867:Daniel Dennett
1864:
1859:
1854:
1849:
1844:
1839:
1837:David Chalmers
1834:
1829:
1824:
1822:Franz Brentano
1819:
1814:
1809:
1804:
1802:Alexander Bain
1799:
1794:
1792:Thomas Aquinas
1789:
1784:
1779:
1773:
1771:
1765:
1764:
1759:
1757:
1756:
1749:
1742:
1734:
1725:
1724:
1722:
1721:
1716:
1711:
1705:
1702:
1701:
1699:
1698:
1693:
1692:
1691:
1681:
1676:
1671:
1666:
1661:
1656:
1651:
1646:
1640:
1638:
1634:
1633:
1631:
1630:
1620:
1610:
1600:
1590:
1580:
1570:
1560:
1550:
1540:
1530:
1520:
1510:
1500:
1489:
1487:
1483:
1482:
1480:
1479:
1472:
1467:
1462:
1457:
1452:
1447:
1442:
1437:
1432:
1430:Presupposition
1427:
1422:
1417:
1412:
1407:
1402:
1397:
1392:
1387:
1382:
1377:
1372:
1367:
1362:
1357:
1352:
1347:
1341:
1339:
1335:
1334:
1332:
1331:
1326:
1321:
1316:
1306:
1301:
1296:
1291:
1286:
1281:
1276:
1271:
1266:
1261:
1256:
1251:
1246:
1241:
1236:
1231:
1226:
1221:
1216:
1211:
1209:Deconstruction
1206:
1201:
1196:
1191:
1186:
1180:
1178:
1172:
1171:
1169:
1168:
1163:
1158:
1153:
1148:
1143:
1138:
1133:
1128:
1123:
1118:
1113:
1108:
1103:
1098:
1093:
1088:
1083:
1078:
1073:
1068:
1063:
1058:
1053:
1048:
1043:
1038:
1033:
1028:
1023:
1018:
1013:
1008:
1003:
998:
993:
988:
983:
978:
973:
968:
963:
958:
953:
948:
943:
938:
933:
927:
925:
919:
918:
913:
910:
909:
904:
902:
901:
894:
887:
879:
873:
872:
859:
858:External links
856:
855:
854:
843:
829:
818:
807:
797:
786:
774:
771:
768:
767:
749:
730:(3): 377–388.
714:
694:
676:
641:
582:
575:
552:
535:
529:978-0262514620
528:
507:
457:
456:
454:
451:
449:
448:
443:
438:
433:
428:
423:
418:
413:
408:
403:
398:
393:
388:
383:
378:
373:
367:
365:
362:
357:
356:
353:
350:
347:
338:
335:
318:
315:
304:intentionality
299:
296:
290:
287:
281:
278:
273:
272:
269:
266:
259:intentionality
246:
243:
229:
226:
211:
208:
160:direct realism
141:mental content
131:the nature of
114:
111:
86:the nature of
60:mental imagery
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2476:
2465:
2462:
2460:
2457:
2455:
2452:
2450:
2447:
2445:
2442:
2440:
2439:Conceptualism
2437:
2435:
2432:
2430:
2427:
2425:
2422:
2420:
2417:
2415:
2412:
2411:
2409:
2394:
2391:
2389:
2386:
2384:
2381:
2379:
2376:
2375:
2372:
2366:
2362:
2358:
2354:
2351:
2349:
2346:
2345:
2343:
2339:
2333:
2330:
2328:
2327:Understanding
2325:
2323:
2320:
2318:
2315:
2313:
2310:
2308:
2305:
2303:
2300:
2298:
2295:
2293:
2290:
2288:
2285:
2283:
2280:
2278:
2275:
2273:
2270:
2268:
2265:
2263:
2260:
2258:
2255:
2253:
2252:Introspection
2250:
2248:
2245:
2241:
2238:
2236:
2233:
2232:
2231:
2228:
2226:
2223:
2221:
2218:
2216:
2213:
2211:
2208:
2206:
2205:Consciousness
2203:
2201:
2198:
2196:
2193:
2191:
2188:
2186:
2183:
2181:
2178:
2176:
2173:
2172:
2170:
2166:
2160:
2157:
2155:
2152:
2150:
2147:
2145:
2142:
2138:
2135:
2134:
2133:
2130:
2128:
2127:Phenomenology
2125:
2123:
2122:Phenomenalism
2120:
2118:
2115:
2113:
2112:Occasionalism
2110:
2108:
2105:
2103:
2100:
2098:
2095:
2091:
2088:
2087:
2086:
2085:NaĂŻve realism
2083:
2081:
2078:
2076:
2075:Functionalism
2073:
2071:
2068:
2066:
2063:
2061:
2058:
2056:
2053:
2051:
2048:
2046:
2043:
2042:
2040:
2036:
2030:
2029:
2025:
2023:
2020:
2018:
2017:Stephen Yablo
2015:
2013:
2010:
2008:
2005:
2003:
2000:
1998:
1995:
1993:
1990:
1988:
1985:
1983:
1980:
1978:
1975:
1973:
1972:Richard Rorty
1970:
1968:
1967:Hilary Putnam
1965:
1963:
1960:
1958:
1955:
1953:
1950:
1948:
1945:
1943:
1942:Marvin Minsky
1940:
1938:
1935:
1933:
1930:
1928:
1925:
1923:
1920:
1918:
1917:Immanuel Kant
1915:
1913:
1910:
1908:
1907:William James
1905:
1903:
1900:
1898:
1895:
1893:
1890:
1888:
1885:
1883:
1880:
1878:
1875:
1873:
1870:
1868:
1865:
1863:
1860:
1858:
1855:
1853:
1850:
1848:
1845:
1843:
1840:
1838:
1835:
1833:
1830:
1828:
1825:
1823:
1820:
1818:
1815:
1813:
1812:Henri Bergson
1810:
1808:
1805:
1803:
1800:
1798:
1795:
1793:
1790:
1788:
1785:
1783:
1780:
1778:
1775:
1774:
1772:
1770:
1766:
1762:
1755:
1750:
1748:
1743:
1741:
1736:
1735:
1732:
1720:
1717:
1715:
1712:
1710:
1707:
1706:
1703:
1697:
1694:
1690:
1687:
1686:
1685:
1682:
1680:
1677:
1675:
1674:Scholasticism
1672:
1670:
1667:
1665:
1662:
1660:
1657:
1655:
1652:
1650:
1647:
1645:
1642:
1641:
1639:
1635:
1626:
1625:
1621:
1616:
1615:
1611:
1606:
1605:
1601:
1596:
1595:
1591:
1586:
1585:
1581:
1576:
1575:
1571:
1566:
1565:
1561:
1556:
1555:
1551:
1545:
1541:
1536:
1535:
1531:
1526:
1525:
1521:
1516:
1515:
1511:
1506:
1505:
1501:
1496:
1495:
1491:
1490:
1488:
1484:
1478:
1477:
1473:
1471:
1468:
1466:
1463:
1461:
1458:
1456:
1453:
1451:
1448:
1446:
1443:
1441:
1438:
1436:
1433:
1431:
1428:
1426:
1423:
1421:
1418:
1416:
1413:
1411:
1408:
1406:
1403:
1401:
1398:
1396:
1393:
1391:
1388:
1386:
1383:
1381:
1378:
1376:
1373:
1371:
1368:
1366:
1363:
1361:
1358:
1356:
1353:
1351:
1348:
1346:
1343:
1342:
1340:
1336:
1330:
1327:
1325:
1322:
1320:
1317:
1314:
1310:
1307:
1305:
1302:
1300:
1297:
1295:
1292:
1290:
1289:Structuralism
1287:
1285:
1282:
1280:
1277:
1275:
1272:
1270:
1267:
1265:
1262:
1260:
1257:
1255:
1252:
1250:
1247:
1245:
1242:
1240:
1237:
1235:
1232:
1230:
1227:
1225:
1222:
1220:
1217:
1215:
1214:Descriptivism
1212:
1210:
1207:
1205:
1202:
1200:
1197:
1195:
1194:Contrastivism
1192:
1190:
1187:
1185:
1182:
1181:
1179:
1177:
1173:
1167:
1164:
1162:
1159:
1157:
1154:
1152:
1149:
1147:
1144:
1142:
1139:
1137:
1134:
1132:
1129:
1127:
1124:
1122:
1119:
1117:
1114:
1112:
1109:
1107:
1104:
1102:
1099:
1097:
1094:
1092:
1089:
1087:
1084:
1082:
1079:
1077:
1074:
1072:
1069:
1067:
1064:
1062:
1059:
1057:
1054:
1052:
1049:
1047:
1044:
1042:
1039:
1037:
1034:
1032:
1029:
1027:
1024:
1022:
1019:
1017:
1014:
1012:
1009:
1007:
1004:
1002:
999:
997:
994:
992:
989:
987:
984:
982:
979:
977:
974:
972:
969:
967:
964:
962:
959:
957:
954:
952:
949:
947:
944:
942:
939:
937:
934:
932:
929:
928:
926:
924:
920:
916:
911:
907:
900:
895:
893:
888:
886:
881:
880:
877:
871:
870:
865:
862:
861:
857:
852:
848:
844:
841:
837:
833:
830:
827:
823:
819:
816:
812:
808:
806:
802:
798:
795:
791:
787:
785:
781:
777:
776:
772:
763:
756:
754:
750:
745:
741:
737:
733:
729:
725:
718:
715:
710:
703:
701:
699:
695:
690:
686:
680:
677:
672:
668:
664:
660:
656:
652:
645:
642:
637:
633:
628:
623:
619:
615:
610:
605:
601:
597:
593:
586:
583:
578:
576:9780495506294
572:
568:
567:
559:
557:
553:
548:
547:
539:
536:
531:
525:
521:
517:
511:
508:
503:
499:
495:
491:
488:(2): 213–44.
487:
483:
476:
469:
467:
465:
463:
459:
452:
447:
444:
442:
439:
437:
434:
432:
429:
427:
424:
422:
419:
417:
414:
412:
409:
407:
404:
402:
399:
397:
394:
392:
389:
387:
384:
382:
379:
377:
374:
372:
371:Basic beliefs
369:
368:
363:
361:
354:
351:
348:
345:
343:
337:Uriah Kriegel
336:
334:
332:
328:
324:
316:
314:
311:
307:
305:
297:
295:
288:
286:
279:
277:
270:
267:
264:
263:
262:
260:
256:
251:
244:
242:
238:
234:
227:
225:
221:
218:
209:
207:
203:
200:
196:
192:
188:
187:Steven Pinker
184:
180:
176:
175:Thomas Hobbes
171:
169:
165:
161:
157:
153:
149:
146:
142:
138:
134:
130:
125:
123:
119:
112:
110:
108:
103:
101:
95:
93:
89:
85:
81:
77:
73:
69:
65:
61:
56:
54:
50:
46:
42:
38:
34:
30:
26:
22:
2363: /
2359: /
2355: /
2286:
2272:Mental image
2267:Mental event
2230:Intelligence
2180:Chinese room
2148:
2026:
1977:Gilbert Ryle
1957:Derek Parfit
1947:Thomas Nagel
1877:Fred Dretske
1797:J. L. Austin
1769:Philosophers
1622:
1612:
1602:
1592:
1582:
1572:
1562:
1552:
1532:
1522:
1512:
1502:
1492:
1474:
1419:
1415:Metalanguage
1410:Logical form
1365:Truth-bearer
1324:Unilalianism
1234:Expressivism
1061:Wittgenstein
1006:von Humboldt
923:Philosophers
867:
850:
839:
825:
814:
800:
793:
779:
761:
727:
723:
717:
708:
688:
679:
654:
650:
644:
599:
595:
585:
565:
545:
538:
519:
510:
485:
481:
441:Visual space
396:Mental model
358:
340:
330:
326:
320:
312:
308:
301:
292:
289:Philosophers
283:
274:
255:directedness
254:
252:
248:
239:
235:
231:
222:
213:
204:
172:
145:contemporary
126:
116:
109:is debated.
104:
96:
57:
53:abstractions
37:neuroscience
24:
20:
18:
2444:Imagination
2357:information
2348:Metaphysics
2322:Tabula rasa
2132:Physicalism
2117:Parallelism
2045:Behaviorism
2002:Michael Tye
1997:Alan Turing
1982:John Searle
1857:Dharmakirti
1832:Tyler Burge
1827:C. D. Broad
1659:Linguistics
1624:Limited Inc
1544:On Denoting
1370:Proposition
1021:de Saussure
986:Ibn Khaldun
685:Thagard, P.
516:Marr, David
298:Alex Morgan
183:Jerry Fodor
68:metaphysics
2459:Perception
2408:Categories
2393:Task Force
2361:perception
2235:Artificial
2185:Creativity
2107:Nondualism
2007:Vasubandhu
1927:John Locke
1897:David Hume
1852:Andy Clark
1719:Discussion
1714:Task Force
1664:Pragmatics
1455:Speech act
1385:Categories
1299:Symbiosism
1254:Nominalism
1166:Watzlawick
1046:Bloomfield
966:Chrysippus
780:Axiomathes
651:Axiomathes
453:References
416:Perception
217:supervenes
179:empiricism
139:and other
84:describing
80:explaining
2257:Intuition
2190:Cognition
2154:Solipsism
1817:Ned Block
1787:Armstrong
1782:Aristotle
1696:Semiotics
1684:Semantics
1534:Alciphron
1470:Statement
1405:Intension
1345:Ambiguity
1224:Dramatism
1204:Cratylism
956:Eubulides
951:Aristotle
931:Confucius
834:(2014). '
805:Full text
671:122896502
657:: 19–43.
618:0027-8424
446:Worldview
245:Responses
199:semantics
164:observing
2454:Ontology
2378:Category
2225:Identity
2168:Concepts
2038:Theories
2022:Zhuangzi
1952:Alva Noë
1709:Category
1669:Rhetoric
1494:Cratylus
1465:Sentence
1440:Property
1360:Language
1338:Concepts
1176:Theories
1141:Strawson
1126:Davidson
1116:Hintikka
1111:Anscombe
1056:Vygotsky
1011:Mauthner
981:Averroes
971:Zhuangzi
961:Diodorus
941:Cratylus
803:87–112.
784:Preprint
687:(1996).
636:26175024
518:(2010).
502:18194442
482:Synthese
411:Paradigm
364:See also
137:concepts
92:concepts
76:ontology
70:such as
2388:Project
2341:Related
2200:Concept
2055:Dualism
2028:more...
1887:Goldman
1476:more...
1380:Concept
1121:Dummett
1096:Gadamer
1091:Chomsky
1076:Derrida
1066:Russell
1051:Bergson
1036:Tillich
996:Leibniz
936:Gorgias
744:2182440
627:4547292
401:Mindset
168:objects
129:explain
51:or its
49:reality
2332:Zombie
2317:Qualia
1628:(1988)
1618:(1982)
1608:(1980)
1598:(1967)
1588:(1953)
1578:(1951)
1568:(1936)
1558:(1921)
1548:(1905)
1538:(1732)
1528:(1668)
1518:(1666)
1508:(1660)
1498:(n.d.)
1460:Symbol
1161:Searle
1151:Putnam
1101:Kripke
1086:Austin
1071:Carnap
1016:Ricœur
1001:Herder
991:Hobbes
742:
669:
634:
624:
616:
573:
526:
500:
342:vary.
195:syntax
45:symbol
39:, and
27:), in
2240:Human
1962:Plato
1882:Fodor
1486:Works
1395:Class
1156:Lewis
1146:Quine
1131:Grice
1081:Whorf
1041:Sapir
1026:Frege
976:Xunzi
946:Plato
740:JSTOR
667:S2CID
498:S2CID
478:(PDF)
133:ideas
88:ideas
2365:self
2302:Pain
2292:Mind
2220:Idea
1445:Sign
1350:Cant
1136:Ryle
1106:Ayer
1031:Boas
632:PMID
614:ISSN
571:ISBN
524:ISBN
197:and
185:and
154:and
90:and
82:and
74:and
23:(or
1390:Set
849:.'
838:.'
824:.'
813:.'
792:.'
732:doi
659:doi
622:PMC
604:doi
600:112
490:doi
486:191
321:In
143:in
2410::
1546:"
866:–
752:^
738:.
728:66
726:.
697:^
665:.
655:24
653:.
630:.
620:.
612:.
598:.
594:.
555:^
496:.
484:.
480:.
461:^
150:,
135:,
94:.
55:.
35:,
31:,
19:A
1753:e
1746:t
1739:v
1542:"
1315:)
1311:(
898:e
891:t
884:v
746:.
734::
691:.
673:.
661::
638:.
606::
579:.
532:.
504:.
492::
257:/
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.