503:
description of her claim, there is not a word in the text of the opinion even suggesting that she had made the improbable allegation that the
University of Chicago and Northwestern University had intentionally discriminated against women. In the context of the entire opinion (including both its analysis and its uncontested description of the facts of the case), that single ambiguous phrase provides no basis for limiting the case’s holding to incidents of intentional discrimination. If anything, the fact that the phrase "because she is a woman" encompasses both intentional and disparate impact claims should have made it clear that the reasoning in the opinion was equally applicable to both types of claims. In any event, the holding of the case certainly applied to the disparate impact claim that was described in detail in footnote 1 of the opinion.
512:
essentially two reasons for its position. First, it attaches significance to the fact that the "rights-creating" language in § 601 that defines the classes protected by the statute is not repeated in § 602. But, of course, there was no reason to put that language in § 602 because it is perfectly obvious that the regulations authorized by § 602 must be designed to protect precisely the same people protected by § 601. Moreover, it is self-evident that, linguistic niceties notwithstanding, any statutory provision whose stated purpose is to “effectuate” the eradication of racial and ethnic discrimination has as its "focus" those individuals who, absent such legislation, would be subject to discrimination. Second, the Court repeats the argument advanced and rejected in
31:
481:
relied on for its holding, was absent from section 602. The Court pointed out that section 602, by specifying that the federal government could cut off funding to a program which violated regulations, expressly provided for "one method of enforcing" those regulations. It concluded that this "express
451:
was decided on the assumption that the
University of Chicago had engaged in intentional discrimination, and hence the holding of case applied only to intentional discrimination. The Court asserted that "this Court is bound by holdings, not language." Therefore, from the majority's point of view, the
360:
Alabama's policy of giving the tests for driver's licenses in
English only. She argued that the policy had a disparate impact on those born outside the United States because it denied non-English-speakers, who are disproportionately born outside the US, the opportunity to obtain driver's licenses.
332:
Sandoval sued under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Two sections of Title VI would prove important to her lawsuit. The first was section 601, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national origin" by programs or agencies that receive federal funding, such as the
701:
According to her complaints, petitioner was qualified to attend both of the respondent medical schools based on both objective (i.e., grade-point average and test scores) and subjective criteria. In fact, both schools admitted some persons to the classes to which she applied despite the fact that
430:
The Court then turned to the question that was at issue in the case: whether the disparate-impact regulation that
Sandoval invoked created an implied private right of action. The Court rejected the argument, put forward both by Sandoval and by Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion, that because
502:
In providing a shorthand description of her claim in the text of the opinion, we ambiguously stated that she had alleged that she was denied admission "because she is a woman," but we appended a lengthy footnote setting forth the details of her disparate impact claim. Other than the shorthand
511:
Beyond its flawed structural analysis of Title VI and an evident antipathy toward implied rights of action, the majority offers little affirmative support for its conclusion that
Congress did not intend to create a private remedy for violations of the Title VI regulations. The Court offers
709:
Because the incidence of interrupted higher education is higher among women than among men, it is further claimed, the age and advanced-degree criteria operate to exclude women from consideration even though the criteria are not valid predictors of success in medical schools or in medical
476:
The Court then examined section 602, the section of Title VI under which the disparate-impact regulation was promulgated, to determine whether it created an implied private right of action. It began by noting that certain "rights-creating" language that was present in section 601 and
422:
Then, the Court noted that "it is beyond dispute" and that "no party disagrees" that section 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination but does not prohibit activities with a disparate impact on certain races, colors, or nationalities.
426:
Finally, the Court said it would assume for purposes of deciding the case that regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI may validly prohibit actions that have a disparate impact on certain races, colors, or national origins.
941:
482:
provision of one method" of enforcement "suggests that
Congress intended to preclude others," such as a private right of action. It, therefore, held that Sandoval had no private right of action under the disparate-impact regulation.
705:
Both medical schools receive federal aid, and both have policies against admitting applicants who are more than 30 years old (petitioner was 39 years old at the time she applied), at least if they do not have advanced degrees....
921:
382:. It first held that the regulation under which Sandoval sued allowed a private litigant to enforce its provisions and then affirmed the district court's ruling on the merits. The Supreme Court granted
326:
473:
had agreed that disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI were valid, a majority of the
Justices had not decided that those regulations were enforceable by private plaintiffs.
439:
held that Title IX and, by extension Title VI, create a private right of action to enjoin policies that create a disparate impact. Both
Sandoval and Justice Stevens relied on a footnote in
379:
851:
558:
138:
72:
926:
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agreed with
Sandoval that she had a private right of action and agreed that Alabama's policy was discriminatory under Title VI. The court therefore enjoined the policy.
322:. Thereafter, James Alexander, Director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety, ordered that the test for Alabama driver's license test to be given only in English.
364:
The state defendants, however, argued that the regulation under which
Sandoval was suing them did not include what is called an "implied private right of action," a
415:
of the Education Amendments of 1972, which is identical to Title VI but applies to gender-based discrimination, contained an implied private right of action. Under
54:
James Alexander, Director, Alabama Department of Public Safety, et al., Petitioners v. Martha Sandoval, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
916:
291:
273:
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461:
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not expressly created by a statute or regulation but one that a court has interpreted the statute or regulation to create implicitly.
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35:
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90:) ¶ 40,456; 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3194; 2001 Daily Journal DAR 3941; 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R. 2042; 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 206
338:
403:
352:
under section 602. The regulation prohibited agencies and programs receiving federal funding from taking actions that had a
401:
First of all, "it is clear" that section 601 of title VI contained an implied private right of action. The Court held that
936:
661:, 532 U.S. at 280 ("The reasoning of embraced the existence of a private right to enforce Title VI as well .").
345:
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There is no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the
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that the express provision of a fund cut-off remedy "suggests that Congress intended to preclude others."
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562:
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64:
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His response to the majority's account of the relation between sections 601 and 602 was as follows:
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819:(2001), title VI, and the court's refusal to consider the validity of English-only laws or rules"
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on "only the question whether there a private cause of action to enforce the regulation."
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plaintiff challenged was "to exclude women from consideration." The Court responded that
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Alabama Department of Public Safety. The other was section 602, which authorizes federal
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398:, began by describing the assumptions under which the Court would decide the case.
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those persons had less impressive objective qualifications than she did.
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942:
United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama cases
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Plaintiff Martha Sandoval sued Alexander and other defendants in the
419:, section 601 of Title VI also contained a private right of action.
356:
on persons of a certain race, color, or nationality. She sought to
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and claimed that the English-only test policy was discriminatory.
154:
123:
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United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
30:
465:, a case the Court decided in 1983, dictated the outcome of
825:. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. pp. 185–194.
922:
United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court
443:, which stated that the effect of the policies that the
380:
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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In her lawsuit, Sandoval invoked a regulation that the
823:
Latinos and American Law: Landmark Supreme Court Cases
255:
Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas
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rules, regulations or orders of general applicability
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added an amendment to its state constitution to make
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469:. The Court noted that although five Justices in
462:Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission
337:"to effectuate the provisions of ... by issuing
799:, 532 U.S. at 315-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
699:
298:to allow private lawsuits based on evidence of
642:
640:
86:3367; 69 U.S.L.W. 4250; 80 Empl. Prac. Dec. (
8:
787:, 532 U.S. at 298 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263:Stevens, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
927:Implied statutory cause of action case law
459:The Court also rejected the argument that
20:
290:decision that a regulation enacted under
394:The Court's opinion, written by Justice
292:Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
274:Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
538:
378:The state defendants then appealed to
18:2001 United States Supreme Court case
7:
288:Supreme Court of the United States
36:Supreme Court of the United States
14:
917:United States Supreme Court cases
858:275 (2001) is available from:
609:28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2000).
29:
545:42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-d to 2000d-7.
404:Cannon v. University of Chicago
932:2001 in United States case law
456:did not include the footnote.
1:
286:, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), was a
813:Soltero, Carlos R. (2006).
694:The disputed footnote from
435:involved disparate impact,
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899:Oyez (oral argument audio)
698:reads in pertinent part:
272:
180:
166:
28:
490:In his dissent, Justice
346:US Department of Justice
169:Civil Rights Act of 1964
527:Implied cause of action
296:private right of action
43:Argued January 16, 2001
712:
518:
505:
157:1065 (11th Cir. 2001).
45:Decided April 24, 2001
848:Alexander v. Sandoval
817:Alexander v. Sandoval
763:, 532 U.S. at 289-90.
751:, 532 U.S. at 288-89.
714:441 U.S. at 680 n.2.
555:Alexander v. Sandoval
509:
500:
498:decision as follows:
283:Alexander v. Sandoval
78:121 S. Ct. 1511; 149
24:Alexander v. Sandoval
628:197 F.3d 484
890:Library of Congress
231:Ruth Bader Ginsburg
203:Sandra Day O'Connor
775:, 532 U.S. at 290.
739:, 532 U.S. at 283.
727:, 532 U.S. at 282.
685:, 532 U.S. at 281.
673:, 532 U.S. at 280.
649:, 532 U.S. at 279.
294:did not include a
191:Associate Justices
937:Language case law
623:Sandoval v. Hagan
407:was controlling.
320:official language
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187:William Rehnquist
105:Sandoval v. Hagan
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176:Court membership
145:1305 (2000).
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96:Case history
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53:
15:
634: 1999).
452:holding of
350:promulgated
109:F. Supp. 2d
911:Categories
533:References
411:held that
384:certiorari
306:Background
150:Subsequent
84:U.S. LEXIS
82:517; 2001
797:Alexander
785:Alexander
773:Alexander
761:Alexander
749:Alexander
737:Alexander
725:Alexander
710:practice.
683:Alexander
671:Alexander
659:Alexander
647:Alexander
632:11th Cir.
471:Guardians
310:In 1990,
131:11th Cir.
116:M.D. Ala.
80:L. Ed. 2d
60:Citations
846:Text of
521:See also
467:Sandoval
413:Title IX
390:Decision
335:agencies
252:Majority
863:Findlaw
492:Stevens
486:Dissent
316:English
312:Alabama
260:Dissent
162:Holding
133:1999),
118:1998),
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881:Justia
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829:
696:Cannon
630: (
626:,
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580:
557:,
514:Cannon
496:Cannon
479:Cannon
454:Cannon
449:Cannon
445:Cannon
441:Cannon
437:Cannon
433:Cannon
417:Cannon
409:Cannon
396:Scalia
358:enjoin
237:
235:·
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223:·
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211:·
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199:·
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122:, 197
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120:aff'd
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563:U.S.
371:The
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155:F.3d
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65:U.S.
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