998:
the poorer half, and the redistribution created no overall effects, a voter under the broad altruism model would have no incentive to vote. However, if a voter cared particularly for the welfare of the poor, that voter would have an incentive to vote for the candidate; similarly, a voter that cared particular for the welfare of the rich would have an incentive to vote against the candidate. The result in my model is that both such voters would be rationally motivated to vote.
633:
951:" as an explanation for why the average voter holds views that are persistently and systematically contradictory to the consensus view of expert economists. His thesis is that indulging innate cognitive biases (of which he identifies four as being major contributors to bad economic policy positions) is psychologically gratifying, while overcoming natural prejudices through training, education, and
862:...There is by now a substantial literature in economics, sociology, biology, psychology, and political science yielding evidence that human beings are also motivated by the welfare of others (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Monroe 1998; Piliavin and Charng 1990). Specifically, people frequently engage in acts of altruism by choosing to bear costs in order to provide benefits to others.
793:, the probability of any one vote determining the outcome, is extremely small for any large election, the expected benefits of voting under the traditional rational choice model is always roughly equal to zero. This leads to the so-called paradox of voting, in which rational choice models of voter behavior predict tiny turnouts which simply do not occur. In all democracies,
36:
871:... or an individual with both selfish and social preferences, the social preferences will dominate and make it rational for a typical person to vote even in large elections;(2) to show that rational socially-motivated voting has a feedback mechanism that stabilizes turnout at reasonable levels (e.g., 50% of the electorate)...
851:
Scholars incorporate altruism into the traditional calculus of voting model by assuming that a citizen also cares about the benefits that others secure from the preferred outcome (Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2006; Jankowski 2002, 2004). Under this assumption, B is a function not only of direct benefits
839:
Because of the multitude of different and contradictory definitions of expressive voting, recently another effort by political scientists and public choice theorists has been made to explain voting behavior with reference to instrumental benefits received from influencing the outcome of the election.
997:
It is rational to vote as long as the candidates differ in their effect on the welfare of subsets of the population, and one happens to be particularly concerned with an affected subset. For example, if a candidate proposed to take wealth from the richer half of the population and distribute it to
866:
Essentially, voters behave altruistically by absorbing the cost of voting in order to provide society with the benefits of their preferred policy, although the expected reward of voting under this model is greater than zero (and thus still a rational decision) because of voters' altruistic social
962:
These views tend not to be related to the particular voter in any rationally self-interested way, and so voters are genuinely not being subject to any direct economic penalties for choosing irrational policies. The altruistic voter will indulge, without restraint, in make-work bias, anti-foreign
831:, intended to actually change the outcome. The benefits here did not come from actually influencing the election, but rather from the social payoffs of participating in it. Because the term BP was assumed to be zero, D was presumed to be the only important factor in determining elections.
972:
A 2008 study of voters in Sweden during the 1990s found significant evidence for self-interested "pocketbook" voting. The authors found that voters can and will respond to direct promises of personal economic benefits, although it appears that citizens respond almost entirely to the
840:
If voters assumed to be rational but also to have altruistic tendencies and some preference for outcomes enhancing the social welfare of others, they will reliably vote in favor of the policies they perceive to be for the common good, rather than for their individual benefit.
852:
to oneself BS, but to the N other people affected by the outcome of the election who would gain an average benefit BO if the citizenâs preferred alternative won. It also depends on how much the citizen cares about benefits to others, which is labeled a for altruism.
785:
is the individual's expected reward from voting. If R > 0, then the expected utility of voting outweighs its costs, and it is reasonable to vote. But if R ⤠0, the costs outweigh the benefits and a strictly rational individual would not be expected to vote.
898:
argued that, all else equal, voters do not, in fact, choose policies based on self-interest. The rich are not more likely to support policies that personally benefit them, like lower marginal rates, and the poor are not more likely to oppose welfare reform.
922:
Wrong, wrong, wrong. The 47% won't vote for Obama "no matter what." Almost half of voters who earn less than the median income vote
Republican in the typical election. A person doesn't support the nanny state because he wants government to take care of
984:
George Mason Law
Professor Tun-Jen Chiang criticized the Edlin altruist model as overly simplistic and ultimately naive about voter preferences. Chiang presents an alternative model of altruist voting behavior, centered around voters'
989:
altruism towards favored racial, cultural, religious, regional, sexual, economic, or social groups (of which they may or may not be a member). He contends that, even if two candidates policies had identical social welfare benefits
886:
875:
Their findings suggest that in a large election, altruistic preferences will trump selfish tendencies, thus encouraging a stable voter turnout that closely mirrors the observed rate in western democracies.
691:
from helping others, to vote. Altruistic voting has been compared to purchasing a lottery ticket, in which the probability of winning is extremely low but the payoff is large enough that the
687:
will be outweighed by the large cumulative benefits society will receive from the voter's preferred policy being enacted, such that it is rational for an âaltruisticâ citizen, who receives
935:
Caplan says that voters consistently demonstrate preferences that are not clearly related to self-interest, and they are motivated primarily by what they believe is best for the country.
902:
He claims that what he calls the "Self-Interest Voter
Hypothesis" (SIVH), the theory that individuals' policy preferences are narrowly selfish, is empirically wrong. In response to U.S.
955:, is psychologically costly. Therefore, when the personal benefit giving in to our biases is greater than the personal cost suffered from acting on them, individuals will tend to
805:
Because simple selfishness cannot explain why large numbers of people consistently choose to vote, Riker and
Ordeshook introduced another term to the equation,
683:
which states that if citizens in a democracy have "social" preferences for the welfare of others, the extremely low probability of a single vote determining an
353:
1143:
Caplan, Bryan. "Will False Belief in the SIVH Destroy Romney's
Candidacy?" EconLog. Library of Economics and Liberty, 18 Sept. 2012. Web. 20 Oct. 2012.
318:
348:
187:
290:
745:
809:, to symbolize the personal or social benefits conferred by the act of voting itself, rather than by affecting the outcome of the election.
493:
959:
indulge in irrational behavior, like voting for protectionist tariffs and other economically damaging but socially popular policies.
714:
as a way to explain why rational individuals would choose to vote despite its apparent lack of individual benefit, explaining the
903:
661:
722:
of elections in favor of the candidate that they believe will implement policies for the greater good of the entire population.
338:
1185:
615:
275:
1115:
266:
911:
295:
232:
488:
247:
963:
bias, pessimistic bias, and anti-market bias, all in the hopes of better his fellow man through the ballot box.
323:
1071:"Buying a Lottery Ticket to Help the Poor: Altruism, Civic Duty, and Self-interest in the Decision to Vote."
891:
309:
1195:
1169:
George Mason
University Law and Economics Research Paper Series. 12â36 (2012): n. page. Web. 22 Oct. 2012.
1027:
948:
503:
404:
285:
952:
358:
343:
242:
718:. The theory suggests that individual voters do, in fact, derive personal utility from influencing the
654:
399:
1156:
Institute for the Study of Labor
Discussion Paper Series. 3763 (2008): n. page. Web. 22 Oct. 2012.
1190:
1022:
944:
610:
569:
159:
144:
98:
93:
66:
1012:
823:
715:
579:
559:
498:
447:
328:
280:
214:
139:
129:
108:
103:
20:
736:
513:
442:
394:
237:
223:
1058:"Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote To Improve the Well-Being of Others."
1032:
1017:
844:
740:
699:
680:
647:
637:
564:
547:
483:
409:
363:
61:
508:
452:
257:
252:
197:
192:
867:
preferences. Edlin, et al., found in their study of altruistic behavior among voters,
632:
1179:
1037:
915:
794:
707:
703:
605:
523:
518:
178:
154:
149:
71:
1102:
The
American Political Science Review 62.1 (1968): 25â42. JSTOR. Web. 20 Nov. 2012.
895:
600:
584:
532:
423:
414:
389:
169:
134:
1099:
1086:
927:; a person supports the nanny state because he wants government to take care of
907:
574:
457:
437:
164:
1070:
1118:
British
Journal of Political Science. 41.3 (2011): 645â670. Web. 22 Oct. 2012.
432:
300:
124:
84:
1073:
Rationality and
Society 14.1 (2002): 55â77. Sage Journals. Web. 20 Oct. 2012.
80:
1057:
827:, intended only to signal support or demonstrate civic responsibility, and
749:. The basic utility hypothesis for the calculus of voting they gave was:
711:
684:
333:
688:
1116:"Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications."
1089:
The Journal of Politics 68.3 (2006): 673â83. JSTOR. Web. 20 Oct. 2012.
35:
847:
explained how the altruistic theory modified the calculus of voting:
52:
27:
1166:
1154:"Selfish and Prospective: Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting."
1132:
The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies
887:
The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies
914:
who will "always" vote Democrat because they are dependent on the
1060:
Rationality and Society. 19.3 (2008): 293â314. Web. 22 Oct. 2012.
702:
modelsâwhich assume voters have "selfish" preferencesâto explain
1153:
1131:
743:
in their 1968 article "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting" in
777:(that is, turning the election for his preferred candidate);
710:
economists and social scientists have increasingly turned to
781:
is the individual's cost of voting in the election; and
735:
The standard model of voter calculus was articulated by
797:
exceeds what the basic rational choice models predict.
855:
These assumptions transform the calculus of voting to
1152:
Elinder, Mikael, Henrik Jordahl, and Panu Poutvaara.
981:to the actual implementation of those policies.
773:is the probability of the voter bringing about
769:receives from his preferred candidate winning;
1056:Edlin, Aaron, Andrew Gelman, and Noah Kaplan.
765:is the expected differential utility a voter
655:
8:
364:Parallel voting (Mixed member majoritarian)
1167:"Unequal Altruism and the Voting Paradox."
1134:, Princeton University Press, 2007. Print.
662:
648:
553:
477:
383:
329:Mixed single vote (positive vote transfer)
267:Proportional and semi-proportional systems
219:
48:
15:
1126:
1124:
1110:
1108:
1098:Riker, William H., and Peter Ordeshook.
1081:
1079:
943:Related to the public choice concept of
1049:
592:
531:
422:
308:
265:
222:
177:
116:
79:
51:
26:
879:
1100:"A Theory of the Calculus of Voting."
843:In his paper "Altruism and Turnout,"
835:The "altruistic" rationale for voting
801:Expressive versus instrumental voting
746:The American Political Science Review
7:
1114:Hamlin, Alan, and Colin Jennings.
947:, Caplan proposes the concept of "
731:The "selfish" rationale for voting
224:Plurality and majoritarian systems
14:
334:Scorporo (negative vote transfer)
821:This drew a distinction between
631:
34:
726:The rational calculus of voting
880:Voter's altruistic preferences
698:Since the failure of standard
339:Mixed ballot transferable vote
1:
967:Criticisms and modifications
695:benefit outweighs the cost.
616:End-to-end verifiable voting
276:Single non-transferable vote
474:Voting patterns and effects
1212:
296:Single transferable voting
233:First-past-the-post voting
677:altruism theory of voting
489:Voting advice application
319:Mixed-member proportional
248:Plurality-at-large voting
354:Ruralâurban proportional
349:Dual-member proportional
324:Additional member system
1087:"Altruism and Turnout."
892:George Mason University
1028:Rational irrationality
949:rational irrationality
939:Rational irrationality
912:the "47%" of Americans
504:Passive electioneering
405:Straight-ticket voting
359:Majority bonus system
344:Alternative Vote Plus
243:Instant-runoff voting
1186:Public choice theory
1069:Jankowski, Richard.
975:prospective promises
706:in large elections,
310:Mixed-member systems
977:of politicians but
857:P(BS + aNBO) > C
829:instrumental voting
638:Politics portal
400:Split-ticket voting
1023:Rational ignorance
945:rational ignorance
611:Voter registration
570:Voter intimidation
94:Write-in candidate
67:Provisional ballot
1165:Chiang, Tun-Jen.
1085:Fowler, James H.
1013:Paradox of voting
918:, Caplan writes,
910:'s remarks about
884:In his 2007 book
824:expressive voting
716:paradox of voting
672:
671:
623:
622:
580:Voter suppression
560:Ballot harvesting
538:
537:
499:Paradox of voting
465:
464:
448:None of the above
380:Voting strategies
371:
370:
281:Cumulative voting
215:Electoral systems
205:
204:
140:Electronic voting
130:Compulsory voting
1203:
1170:
1163:
1157:
1150:
1144:
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1135:
1128:
1119:
1112:
1103:
1096:
1090:
1083:
1074:
1067:
1061:
1054:
815:R = (BP) â C + D
664:
657:
650:
636:
635:
554:
514:Political apathy
478:
443:Election boycott
384:
238:Two-round system
220:
49:
38:
16:
1211:
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1206:
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1204:
1202:
1201:
1200:
1176:
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1097:
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1068:
1064:
1055:
1051:
1046:
1033:Voting behavior
1018:Rational choice
1009:
969:
941:
882:
845:James H. Fowler
837:
817:
803:
757:
733:
728:
700:rational choice
674:
668:
630:
625:
624:
565:Ballot stuffing
551:
548:Electoral fraud
540:
539:
484:Coattail effect
475:
467:
466:
410:Tactical voting
381:
373:
372:
286:Binomial system
217:
207:
206:
85:Ballot measures
62:Absentee ballot
46:
21:Politics series
12:
11:
5:
1209:
1207:
1199:
1198:
1193:
1188:
1178:
1177:
1172:
1171:
1158:
1145:
1136:
1130:Bryan Caplan.
1120:
1104:
1091:
1075:
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982:
968:
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836:
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819:
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799:
759:
758:
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732:
729:
727:
724:
681:voter behavior
679:is a model of
670:
669:
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644:
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627:
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621:
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595:
594:
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589:
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587:
582:
577:
572:
567:
562:
552:
550:and prevention
546:
545:
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541:
536:
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529:
528:
527:
526:
521:
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509:Vote splitting
506:
501:
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491:
486:
476:
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469:
468:
463:
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461:
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455:
453:Refused ballot
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258:Usual judgment
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198:Voting machine
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47:
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31:
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24:
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10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
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1196:Voting theory
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1127:
1125:
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1117:
1111:
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1088:
1082:
1080:
1076:
1072:
1066:
1063:
1059:
1053:
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1043:
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1038:Voting system
1036:
1034:
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1029:
1026:
1024:
1021:
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976:
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950:
946:
938:
936:
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926:
921:
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919:
917:
916:welfare state
913:
909:
905:
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869:
868:
861:
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841:
834:
832:
830:
826:
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816:
812:
811:
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808:
800:
798:
796:
795:voter turnout
792:
787:
784:
780:
776:
772:
768:
764:
756:
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751:
750:
748:
747:
742:
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730:
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723:
721:
717:
713:
709:
708:public choice
705:
704:voter turnout
701:
696:
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686:
682:
678:
665:
660:
658:
653:
651:
646:
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643:
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629:
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609:
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606:Secret ballot
604:
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568:
566:
563:
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557:
556:
555:
549:
544:
543:
534:
533:Protest votes
530:
525:
524:Voter turnout
522:
520:
519:Voter fatigue
517:
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512:
510:
507:
505:
502:
500:
497:
495:
492:
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487:
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482:
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470:
459:
456:
454:
451:
449:
446:
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431:
430:
429:
428:
425:
424:Protest votes
421:
416:
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411:
408:
406:
403:
401:
398:
396:
395:Fusion voting
393:
391:
388:
387:
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377:
376:
365:
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347:
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155:Postal voting
153:
151:
150:Polling place
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133:
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78:
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72:Sample ballot
70:
68:
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50:
42:
41:
37:
33:
32:
29:
25:
22:
18:
17:
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1139:
1094:
1065:
1052:
986:
978:
974:
961:
956:
942:
934:
928:
924:
901:
896:Bryan Caplan
885:
883:
874:
865:
856:
842:
838:
828:
822:
820:
814:
806:
804:
790:
788:
782:
778:
774:
770:
766:
762:
760:
755:R = (BP) â C
754:
744:
734:
719:
697:
692:
676:
673:
601:Election ink
585:Voter caging
494:Likely voter
415:Vote pairing
390:Issue voting
188:Popular vote
170:Voting booth
135:Early voting
19:Part of the
908:Mitt Romney
575:Vote buying
458:Spoilt vote
438:Donkey vote
165:Vote center
145:Open ballot
1180:Categories
1044:References
957:rationally
953:skepticism
906:candidate
904:Republican
894:economist
767:personally
593:Prevention
433:Abstention
301:Spare vote
291:Party-list
125:Ballot box
117:Collection
99:Electorate
81:Candidates
1191:Elections
987:selective
741:Ordeshook
45:Balloting
1007:See also
990:overall,
789:Because
712:altruism
693:expected
685:election
179:Counting
160:Precinct
720:outcome
689:utility
53:Ballots
761:Where
109:Ticket
28:Voting
737:Riker
193:Tally
104:Slate
739:and
675:The
83:and
979:not
925:him
1182::
1123:^
1107:^
1078:^
929:us
890:,
931:.
859:.
807:D
791:P
783:R
779:C
775:B
771:P
763:B
663:e
656:t
649:v
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