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illegal acts which had been committed in the context of resistance to the Kapp Putsch. With respect to the disarmament, the negotiators agreed on cooperation between the local authorities and the workers' executive councils. Indeed, both were to cooperate, to set up republican defence forces. The government delegates agreed that, if these measures were complied with, the Ruhr would not be militarily occupied by the
Reichswehr.
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the military was not included in the agreement, and was also not as a whole effectively controlled by the government, it could act on its own initiative. The consequence of Watter's ultimatum was the proclamation of a general strike by the Essen central council. This was answered, after 29 March, by about three quarters of the miners of the area. The military, above all the semi-official
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In the end, a commission agreed on precisely that. The negotiated
Bielefeld Agreement at first contained wording similar to an agreement reached a short while previously on a national level between trade unions and the government. It also contained certain specific points. It contained an amnesty for
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The agreement seemed a sensible attempt to end the conflict through peaceful means. In the end it came to a division of the rebels. The moderate forces including the USPD and the central body in Hagen supported the agreement. The central council in Essen and the KPD demanded new negotiations, whilst
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then tightened the provisions of this ultimatum regarding the surrender of weapons so much so that it was not even technically possible for the rebels to comply with them, even though they were willing to do so. The behaviour of Watter illustrates one central weakness of the
Bielefeld Agreement: as
115:(SPD) also played a central role. He formulated the goal of the negotiations: to come to an understanding over disarming, and how this was to be organised. Whilst Braun and Giesberts tried to make as few concessions as possible, Severing kept to the 9-points-program, which the chairman of the
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The government in Berlin saw these internal differences as an opportunity. They wanted to drive a wedge between the various movements and thereby weaken the power of the movement as a whole.
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61:
60:, anarchist forces took control and acted completely separately from any higher authorities. In general, in the east and south part of the Ruhr, the less radical
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rejected any settlement. The military leaders of the Red Ruhr Army took the same view. They preferred an "honourable downfall" to an apparently foul compromise.
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The demands for fresh negotiations might have been successful, had it not been for the increasingly chaotic situation in
Duisburg. The Reich Cabinet under
44:, the Ruhr Red Army was in control of the Ruhr area and the nearby areas. However, the differences among the participants were great. The central organ in
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160:, suppressed the revolt subsequently with brutal violence. The Bielefeld Agreement therefore had, ultimately, no effect at all.
95:. The other participants were the executive councils of the rebels, city governments, the regional presidents of the regions
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127:, which provided for a strengthening of the political influence of the workers' movement in German politics.
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broke away from the agreement and set an ultimatum. The regional military commander
Generalleutnant
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64:(USPD) was dominant, whereas in the west, syndicalists and communists were stronger.
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The representatives of the government were Post
Minister
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was relatively moderate, whereas the central council in
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Germany in the
Twentieth Century (RLE: German Politics)
91:(SPD). They held a conference on 23 — 24 March 1920 in
207:Biographical Dictionary of European Labor Leaders
119:(General German Confederation of Trade Unions)
135:the radical executive councils of Mülheim and
62:Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany
8:
210:. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 880.
24:of 1920 between the representatives of the
111:(KPD). As Reichskommissar for the Ruhr,
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117:Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
238:20th century in North Rhine-Westphalia
83:and the Prussian agriculture minister
36:At the height of the conflict in the
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89:Social Democratic Party of Germany
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40:, which had started due to the
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177:Childs, David (2014-12-17).
20:was an agreement during the
28:and the German government.
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109:Communist Party of Germany
71:Negotiations and agreement
183:. Routledge. p. 29.
143:Failure and escalation
204:Lane, A. T. (1995).
18:Bielefeld Agreement
77:Johannes Giesberts
217:978-0-313-29900-1
190:978-1-317-54228-5
52:was dominated by
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121:Carl Legien
42:Kapp Putsch
164:References
97:Düsseldorf
85:Otto Braun
32:Background
158:Freikorps
93:Bielefeld
232:Category
105:Arnsberg
58:Duisburg
137:Hamborn
101:Münster
87:of the
79:of the
50:Mülheim
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56:. In
46:Hagen
212:ISBN
185:ISBN
103:and
38:Ruhr
16:The
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