Brazil–United States relations during the João Goulart government

575: 311: 1127:

Goulart and his government.” The NSC staff recommended Kennedy follow option three (engaging with Goulart to influence him of aligning Brazil with U.S. policy and interests) as the most feasible. The memo went on to discuss talking points, tactics, and other ideas for engaging and influencing Goulart. On the subject of an overthrow, the memo ruled this approach out because of the lack of organized opposition in Brazil that could mount an overthrow attempt, as welkl as the lack of U.S. capacity to “stimulate such an operation successfully.” However, an overthrow of Goulart's government was identified as a contingency. The use of economic incentives continued, being abandoned only in 1963. Still, the third option continued to be considered.Doubt about the military's capability still existed even at the end of 1963.

20: 1392:

was still in Brazil. Thus, it had no constitutional basis. On the evening of the 2nd, Lyndon Johnson recognized Ranieri Mazzilli's government. The early recognition tarnished the international image of the U.S. government, generating some astonishment in other Latin American governments. Lincoln Gordon and Dean Rusk were concerned about the appearance of legality of the new government, which, in fact, suggested some legality by having the next in line as president and calling new elections, in which, thirteen days after taking office, Congress elected Castelo Branco. The Secretary of State released the official version of the events, with themes such as "communist influence", the presidential message to Congress on March 15, the Central Rally, the

548:, "the largest area of extreme poverty in Latin America (23 million people, per capita income below $ 100)". It was a region prone to unrest and political radicalization, sometimes compared to Cuba by Americans. The focus was not on politicians, but on social movements, notably the Peasant Leagues, sources of great concern. The fear was that social conflict in the region would lead to a Cuban-like revolution. On the other hand, the Northeast was also considered ideal to implement the Alliance for Progress, modernizing its agrarian economy and social structure to ward off the conceived threats. Foreign aid was focused on the region, entering into alliance with local political leaderships. 879: 451:

However, at the end of July, when Quadros failed to comply with the austerity he had promised, the IMF suspended its loan, which had only been partially used up until then. The Europeans did the same. The Americans, however, maintained their support, and Kennedy invited Jânio to visit Washington in December. They not only relaxed their demands for an austere fiscal policy, but also did not undermine Jânio for his IEP. Kennedy accepted Jânio's argument that this policy had a tactical function, to gain domestic support, without causing "ideological contamination" of the Brazilian society. Jânio had an easier time getting his deals done than

1155:, Executive Secretary of the State Department. It described that while a rightist coup should not be encouraged, secret contacts would be maintained with Brazilian conspirators. It listed four possible scenarios in Brazil and corresponding lines of action for the US. They were a revolt by the radical left, a revolt by "democratic forces" against an authoritarian turn by the president, the removal of Goulart in response to the deterioration of the national situation, and a gradual seizure of power by the extreme left, with the Armed Forces neutralized. In the end, he added one more scenario, external communist support. 1213:, would nominate him as secretary of government; in case of a prolonged conflict, he would obtain the recognition of the state of belligerence abroad. After the request of this provisional government, the line of action would be logistical support. From this was born Operation Brother Sam, a naval task force to follow the Brazilian coast. The hypothesis of a land intervention is mentioned, not clearly, in the expression "intervene with forces", in case of Soviet or Cuban interference. The military plan for this landing was even studied, but was not foreseen in the actual naval operation planned months later. 679:, head of the Casa Militar, was sent to speak with Fidel Castro, although the Americans considered the general sympathetic to communism and preferred that the messenger was Bastian Pinto, the Brazilian ambassador in Havana. At the UN, Brazil proposed an international inspection of Cuba and the transformation of Latin America into a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The first proposal was not necessary, as the USSR agreed to have the inspection done by American aircraft, while the second, although potentially agreeable to both the U.S. and the 832:

Brazil. Lincoln Gordon was against the proposal. The debate continued and in mid-November Dean Rusk informed Gordon of the State Department's conclusions: there would be no major assistance to cover the Brazilian balance of payments deficit, but there would be minor support as long as Goulart made concessions. The latter, in turn, intended to implement the Triennial Plan, projected from September to December. To balance high growth, low inflation and compliance with international obligations, the Plan would need American economic aid.

780: 969:(USIS) financed ideological propaganda in Brazil. The amount set aside for this purpose reached US$ 2 million in 1964. Its staff employed in the country was 26 in 1958–60, rising to 43 by 1965. Among other activities, the organization financed trips to the U.S. for politicians, journalists, professors, and university students, showed films, and distributed publications. Carlos Fico commented that knowing of the existence of propaganda does not in itself confirm that it was effective and accepted by the "target audience". 866:, head of USAID. The remaining US$ 84 million of Jânio's agreements were offered under conditions: the signing of the memorandum with AMFORP and devaluation of the exchange rate. Both were met in April, and the credit was released. Another $ 314 million, also conditional, was to be delivered over twelve months, but the U.S. did not disburse it. The IMF sent another mission and provided $ 60 million, without making a stand-by arrangement. This, in turn, made it difficult to seek credit in private banks or in Europe. 661: 758:(ITT). Brizola paid only a fraction of the company's estimated value, justifying that he had discounted the value of the land and illegal profits. With the attention given to the case, American & Foreign Power (AMFORP), which Brizola had expropriated in 1959, also mobilized. Kennedy interpreted the problem as political and instructed Lincoln Gordon to pressure Goulart, who, in turn, saw the case as an attempt to sabotage his visit to the U.S. In the U.S. Congress, the dispute led to the passage of the 788:

The need for stabilization, relativized for Jânio, was rigidly demanded of his successor, due mainly to his political associations and, to a lesser extent, to pressure from American businessmen and the stabilization failure of his predecessor. The economic policy recommendations accompanying the agreements were used to put pressure on the Jango government. The goal was, through economic aid, to make his government break with the radical left and adopt a pro-American and anti-communist foreign policy.

870:

taking the possibilities of an agreement with the IMF and the US with it and deepening the economic and social crises. No further credit was released, and $ 86 million offered by USAID presumably was passed to opposition governors, not Brazil's federal government. However, financial relations did not reach the point of a rupture, which would hurt the pro-American governors and the military. In Washington, the policy of financial toughness with Brazil was controversial and had its opponents.

698:, expanding its political relations with the Soviet bloc and, in international forums, testing the limits of its relationship and tending towards neutralism. As part of his negotiations for American credit, Jango threatened to seek support from the Soviet bloc. Although with little credibility, this maneuver influenced American calculations. This, coupled with the rejection of the use of force in the Missile Crisis, changed American views on the IEP. An additional concern was the 622: 1248: 421:(ESG), and its ideology advocated alignment with the U.S. However, the theories developed at ESG were not merely those received from the U.S., since the School synthesized already existing concepts of both Brazilian and foreign origins, among them American. The officers connected with it were prominent, but they comprised only one among several military tendencies. Besides the ESG, the military was also influenced through the Caribbean School or 5411: 716: 804:

powers, achieving in September the anticipation of the plebiscite to January of the following year. Political polarization and social conflict were growing. By mid-year, Brazil-U.S. relations deteriorated and loan disbursements were again interrupted. The justification was the macroeconomic deterioration (public and external deficits and inflation were out of control) but there was the important political issue: the prospect was the end of

530:"; they even conceived negative traits such as laziness and corruption. Americans working in the country often had a paternalistic attitude. The press was considered unreliable and intellectuals tending too much toward abstraction. "The apathy, resignation, and incapacitation of the poor in general and the complacency and incompetence of government agencies" would be barring development. Anti-American sentiment was a concern. 447:

this policy, Brazil defended non-intervention against Cuba, opposing American intentions. Economic stabilization, on the other hand, would typically consist of public spending cuts, export promotion through the exchange rate, credit restrictions, and wage adjustments. These measures were intended to address inflation and balance the external finances. In the short term they would be harmful, which made Brazilians reluctant.

800:

release $ 20 million negotiated with Jânio. The program was unsuccessful due to lack of additional U.S. credit and a political crisis in mid-year. In addition, Goulart focused his political capital on anticipating the plebiscite on parliamentarianism and recovering his full powers. Thus, he had no way to make an unpopular fiscal adjustment and no reason to stabilize the parliamentary system, which he needed to eliminate.

270:(OAS). Armaments were supplied, but this was of little military use - "supplying tanks to Honduras or Ecuador would probably not prevent the Soviet Union from launching a nuclear attack." Containment had two instruments: economic aid and destabilization. In the first case, one example is Bolivia after 1952, whose government, installed after a revolution, was influenced in a more conservative direction. In the latter, the 5423: 657:. The same year, during the Missile Crisis, Kennedy demanded the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Jango communicated to the American ambassador his support for this decision. Lincoln Gordon evaluated this moment as a high point in a deteriorating relationship. When, on October 22, the USA convened an OAS meeting, Brazil was in favor of a naval blockade of the island, but opposed to military intervention. 1122:

the government, and the fear of supporting an unsuccessful coup. On December 11, 1962, the National Security Council Executive Committee held a meeting where President Kennedy “accepted the recommendation that our best course of action is to seek to change the political and economic orientation of Brazilian President Goulart and his Government.” This decision was based on a review of

351:'s modernization theory, it conceived poverty as an open space for unwanted ideologies, and economic development as the only way to prevent communist revolution. The Alliance's strategy was based on democratic reform, anti-communism and raising the standard of living. The latter would be achieved by economic planning, state and foreign investment, and social reforms, including 5399: 368:

of supporting democratic regimes failed, and the U.S. government used political, economic, and military tools to destabilize leftist rulers elected within democracy. Cold War logic took priority. As late as 1950, George Kennan wrote that "It is better to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated by communists."

887:

the military. Gordon explained to Kennedy that these efforts should strengthen the "democratic and moderate elements" so that Goulart would cooperate with them, not with the radical left. Thus, the eventual deposition of the president, although taken into consideration, would not be the goal. Jango was the target of a destabilization campaign; according to historian

1099:

understands that the people responsible for the coup were Brazilians, but with the full support of the American government. For Carlos Fico there was an overvaluation of the American importance in the 60s and 70s, under the academic dominance of Marxism, but affecting mainly journalists and commentators, followed by an undervaluation in the next decades.

1469:"...we approved the Brazilian revolution because of our conviction that the president was planning to accumulate dictatorial powers on the pattern of his two mentors, Getúlio Vargas and Juan Perón. To support this conviction we have much more solid evidence than accusations in the Brazilian antigovernment press. I never had any reason to doubt that..." 929:

US, among them Miguel Arraes, for whom the policy was not to benefit it, but without creating the impression of persecution. If it was still necessary to finance works in Pernambuco, they should favor elements more favorable to the US within his government. Among the other Northeastern states, favoured were

1072:

others considered the alternatives available to the Americans. For Moniz Bandeira, well before 1963 the American government was already predisposed to the overthrow the Brazilian, because there would be a conflict between the interests of capitalists in the U.S. and autonomous industrialization in Brazil.

766:

left of reinvestment. The deal was controversial, with nationalists protesting that the purchase would be for more than double the estimated value of the assets, and Jango cancelled it, pending the exact value of the property. Internally, he was weakened. Externally, his delay irritated the Americans.

1094:

have similar reasoning and placed the decisive moment in 1962, respectively in the OAS conference in January or in the Gordon-Kennedy meeting in July. Carlos Fico, on the other hand distinguished between destabilizing the government and plotting to overthrow it, the latter being embraced by Americans

869:

With his international creditors still dissatisfied, Goulart probably concluded that the considerable loss of domestic support caused by his agreements had not been matched by external gains. Thus, in mid-1963 he reversed course and hardened his position with the US. The Triennial Plan was abandoned,

857:

Jango regained his presidential powers in January 1963. From the American point of view, his new initiatives expressed a positive change, with a "possible divergence between the regime and communist and pro-communist elements on the left". He triggered stabilization with the Triennial Plan, initiated

477:

considered communist in the unions would be an important source of political capital, but this association would eventually influence society. The IEP could even be tolerated, but not these union contacts. Thus, Jango could not be trusted to receive economic assistance from the Alliance for Progress.

476:

Since 1953, when Jango was appointed Getúlio Vargas' Minister of Labor, his relations with the radical left were already a concern in Washington. For many members of the Kennedy administration, Goulart was not a communist, but he still opened space for the political growth of communists. The elements

367:

However, from the Latin American perspective, this was nothing more than a common assistance program. Applying Cold War logic to interpret a region with its own characteristics and the function of the Alliance as a tool to fight it limited its ability to realize its ideology. Further, the stated goal

355:

and tax reforms. It would be more than a common assistance program, reaching into political, economic and social structures, in a "revolution on the margins of capitalism" or "middle-class revolution". However, not all anti-communist right-wingers accepted issues such as land reform in Latin America,

164:

Internal conditions in the United States throughout the 1950s and early 1960s made it more difficult for the country to coexist peacefully with left and center-left governments in Latin America. If the U.S. president was too favorable to Goulart, he would fuel criticism from his internal enemies. The

1221:

A plan for Brazil's internal defense dates from March 20, 1964. It notes the deterioration of the national political-economic crisis and Lincoln Gordon's political assessments as "Peronist-like maneuvers" by the president and the possible installation of a regime contrary to American interests. That

1071:

Historiography diverges on the inevitability of the clash between the Kennedy and Goulart administrations, as well as the moment when the U.S. started collaborating with the Brazilian conspirators who would carry out the coup d'état in 1964. While certain authors deemed the confrontation inevitable,

928:

The decision in mid-1962 to support favorable governors was executed by redirecting Alliance for Progress funds to their states, which Lincoln Gordon would later call "islands of administrative sanity." In this way, the investment would not benefit the federal government or governors contrary to the

886:

From June to August 1962, while the "step-by-step" policy to reorient Goulart through loans was being implemented, the U.S. government decided to support "democratic" candidates in the October elections, direct Alliance for Progress funds to favorable governors, and organize a pro-U.S. faction among

799:

In January 1962, an IMF mission expressed concern over the public deficit and control over the exchange rate. In March, Moreira Salles proposed a stabilization program to follow the Fund's recommendations, which, however, were limited to extending a $ 20 million debt and urging European creditors to

791:

Brazil had US$ 338 million in American loans already negotiated, but not yet delivered. With bureaucratic justifications, this credit was effectively frozen after the inauguration. Dean Rusk conditioned its release on Brazil's commitment to the goals negotiated by Jânio with the IMF. This impediment

787:

With Goulart's inauguration, the Embassy recommended maintaining existing financial arrangements and slowing down or not establishing new ones. Kennedy's administration partly followed this line of reasoning and in the following years approved only short-term credit and funds for Brazil's Northeast.

53:

Jango, as the Brazilian president was known, took office already distrustful of the Americans because of his connections with the radical left in the unions, although he was not considered a communist. Even so, the year 1962 did not start out negative, and Goulart managed to have a good relationship

1311:

It is not impossible that this Minas Gerais movement will be supported by the State Department. It is not impossible that it was not started with the knowledge and agreement of the State Department. It is not impossible that the State Department will recognize the existence of another government in

853:

in 1940. Vargas had room to maneuver internally, while Goulart could be overthrown by pro-American military if he actually followed a pro-Soviet line. In the hypothesis of a rupture with the U.S., be it only financial or also commercial, Brazil would be left with a huge external deficit, even if it

831:

visited Brazil. It produced a report proposing to cut all aid, leading to the country's economic deterioration, followed by Goulart's turn to the left, and ultimately his overthrow by the military. This document was controversial, highlighting the lack of consensus in Washington on how to deal with

765:

The Brazilian president committed himself to solve the expropriation issue. In January 1963, he agreed to compensate ITT. In late April, he reached an agreement to buy the assets of AMFORP, which would reinvest 75% of the value in other sectors. The right did not approve of nationalization, and the

582:

Jango visited the United States in April 1962, where he established a good personal relationship with Kennedy, gave speeches at the OAS and in Congress, and attracted positive attention in the press. In Brazil the trip also resonated well in the newspapers, while the Communist Party criticized him.

500:

In the following decades, Gordon insisted that his analysis was correct, though varying his arguments. In 1967, he stated that "we have far more solid evidence than we have accusations in the Brazilian anti-government press". In 2005, he contradicted his earlier claims, being much more modest about

496:

disagreed with this reasoning and concluded that Goulart only intended to complete his term and hand over power to his elected successor. In the White House there was a suspicion that, as pro-Goulart figures pointed to him as a nefarious influence on Brazilian politics, Gordon was offended, biasing

371:

Military coups occurred in Argentina and Peru in 1962, and in Guatemala and Ecuador in 1963, and in all of them the U.S. attitude moved from near-reaction (even stopping economic assistance) to expectation, and finally acceptance of the newly installed authoritarian regimes. By the "Mann Doctrine,"

289:

to the poor image of the U.S. in the region. The Cuban Revolution in 1959 and subsequent events led to a turnaround in Latin American politics. Attempts to achieve a moderate government, as late as 1959, failed. The following year, the quota on Cuban sugar exports was suspended. In his presidential

1391:

Lincoln Gordon and the American summit in Washington discussed the recognition and legitimacy of the new government. Under the Brazilian Constitution, the president would lose his office if he left the country without the authorization of Congress, but the session that ousted him was held while he

1261:

On the 30th, the CIA reported an imminent "revolution by anti-Goulart forces" in the coming days, with troops from São Paulo and Minas Gerais marching toward Rio de Janeiro to meet with allies there. "The revolution will not be resolved quickly and will be bloody." Dean Rusk ordered the Embassy to

1121:

There is contradiction of opinions about this meeting being a definite decision to support a coup. The alternative - pushing the government to the center-right - had in its favor, at the time, the belief in the possibility of influencing Goulart, the doubt about the military's ability to overthrow

446:

and opened space for American interference in the Brazilian administration. Obtaining these loans had obstacles: the American Congress wanted economic stabilization measures demanded by the IMF as a counterpart, and the Brazilian Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) was unwanted in Washington. Through

1141:

as the articulator of the most developed plan. Throughout that year, Kennedy's administration sought a group in the Armed Forces capable and willing to overthrow the Brazilian president. At least by the end of the year, the possibility of supporting his destitution was being seriously considered.

835:

At this point there was dissatisfaction in the Brazilian government with Kennedy's assistance policy. On November 19, 1962, in a meeting with Gordon, Jango insisted on the need for American support to accomplish the Triennial Plan and, according to Gordon, threatened a break with the US: he could

1126:

which suggested the U.S. had three options via-a-vis Goulart: one, "do nothing and allow the present drift to continue;” two, “collaborate with Brazilian elements hostile to Goulart with a view to bringing about his overthrow;” and three, “seek to change the political and economic orientation of

909:

Still, many leftist, reformist and labor candidates were elected. ADEP's success was limited, with both victories and defeats of the candidates it supported. In the embassy's assessment, the electorate continued its march to the left. In the case of the Northeast, the feeling was that efforts to

803:

Americans expected political changes from Goulart after his visit to the U.S. in April - especially the distancing of communists in the trade union milieu - but in the following months these did not materialize. Jango resorted to pressure from the unions in order to restore his full presidential

706:

on Brazilian territory was discovered. Still, there is the interpretation that domestic factors were more important than foreign policy in the deterioration of bilateral relations. Lincoln Gordon judged Brazilian foreign policy as unreal, but a learning process, and wanted to prioritize economic

433:

In the early 1960s, when Jânio Quadros took over the presidency, Brazil faced rising inflation and internal and external deficits. The foreign debt, although not as big (in 1960 it was equivalent to two years of exports), carried high short-term interest rates, and the country's ability to raise

1229:

In a telegram dated March 27, the ambassador noted the strength of Castelo Branco's group in the officialdom, the imminence of an action, and the possible lack of arms or fuel, suggesting a clandestine delivery of armaments by submarine to the coast of São Paulo. He thought that in this way the

840:

on the debt, ration gasoline and wheat, increase the socialization of the economy, accept Soviet loans and publicly denounce the Americans, the IMF and the Alliance for Progress. This maneuver was possibly inspired by Vargas, who in 1940, during World War II, threatened to align Brazil with the

472:

created by the resignation of Jânio Quadros on August 25, 1961. There is documentary evidence that already at that time there was negative opinion of Jango, the next in the succession line. For Kennedy, "We don't want this comrade for four and a half years '". The State Department wrote to the

450:

The Brazilian government entered into negotiations with its creditors: the US, IMF, Europeans and the Japanese. It got more than US$ 1.6 billion in refinancing and new loans. In addition to providing 55% of these loans, the Americans pressured the other creditors to offer these favorable terms.

237:

school of international relations believed that a totalitarian regime like the Soviet Union would be aggressively expansionist. After communism was installed in a country, the restoration of capitalism and liberal democracy would be impossible. Thus, it sought to prevent the spread of communism

1098:

American actions progressively increased the chances of occurrence and success of a rebellion against the Brazilian government, but the dynamics of the crisis were mainly Brazilian. "An interpretation based on the analysis of vast documentation, which has been supported by several historians",

1400:

and the State Department sought international recognition, and within 15 days it was obtained throughout Latin America, with the exception of Venezuela. Among European governments there was doubt about the American version, but also the understanding that it was a U.S. problem and not theirs.

1163:. The courses of action in the first, third and fourth scenarios are poorly developed. The second and third have striking similarities to the actual course of events in the coup a few months later, indicating collaboration with Brazilian conspirators. The document mentions the inauguration of 1113:

Gordon added that "The military, I can see that they are very friendly to us: very anti-Communist, very suspicious of Goulart." but "The military's not united. This is one of the things that make it complicated." The participants decided to send a representative to be an intermediary with the

509:

The American public in general knew little about Brazil, and the events in Panama in 1964 and in the Dominican Republic the following year had more resonance than the Brazilian coup. The government saw "a continental country, populous, with significant economic possibilities, but militarily

645:

and have a code of coexistence with the hemisphere. The continuation of the IEP would be a reason for dissatisfaction in the Kennedy administration with the directions of Brazilian foreign policy, but there was no immediate impact on relations. The IEP was seen as a way to use Brazil as an

330:

The new policy had two pillars, the Latin American military and economic assistance. The local Armed Forces were seen as "the most stable and modernizing social organization." Since the last year of the Eisenhower administration there had been thoughts of making them smaller and focused on

318:

The perception was that Cuba had been lost, which led to a reformulation of foreign policy and "a stance of paranoid vigilance" against a "second Cuba" or "other Cubas". Meanwhile, revolutionary movements that sought Soviet support were emerging. However, even leaders that came to power

1478:

Then: "If you reviewed the Brazilian press, you would see all kinds of rumors. The general impression was that that rally would be the definitive one. On the Primeiro de Maio he would announce that he was assuming full powers, which would be equivalent to Vargas' speech in 1937 the

1158:

In Carlos Fico's evaluation, the ambassador's intention was that the first and fourth scenarios, being unlikely, would be discarded in favor of the second and third. The bureaucratic tradition of leaving the expected option among other unlikely ones has already been described by

590:

elections in the US). He wanted the visit to give prestige to his government before the elections. The Americans, however, were financing the opposition candidates. In October, the Missile Crisis justified another postponement, now without a date. It is likely that, with the

1028:. He added that the entry of Americans in 1962 was in a volume far above the average for the time, comparable only to that seen during World War II, when military bases were operated in the country. He also described the smuggling of weapons into Brazil's territory. 796:, Kennedy's desire not to give the impression of being a deal breaker, Goulart's weakened position within the parliamentary system, his political moderation and the importance of Brazil explain the continuity of American support at the beginning of his government. 613:. Kennedy later accepted the invitation for a visit, then scheduled for November. That month Kennedy was assassinated. Goulart became worried. Afterwards, his position would become more difficult with the inauguration of Johnson, who had a tougher foreign policy. 683:, was not accepted by Cuba. Brazilian attempts to mediate tensions were unsuccessful, running into Cuban intransigence. The Americans felt that Goulart had lost credibility and his rhetoric was ambiguous. Relations with Washington (and Havana) ended up damaged. 541:, was the closest to the American concept of development. The State Department considered it promising for a modernization of Brazilian capitalism. In February 1961 the Embassy evaluated that the party would have difficulties to accumulate political capital. 723:

Many American companies had investments or investment plans in Brazil. Thus the private lobby against the Brazilian government was stirred by the law limiting profit remittances and cases of expropriation of American companies by Leonel Brizola, governor of

1367:, strongly democratic. Still awaiting formal announcement but we believe Goulart has already or is just about to resign. Mazzilli would then take over on interim basis as provided in constitution. Castello Branco states no need U.S. logistical support." 1106:-Gordon: "I think one of our important jobs is to strengthen the spine of the military. To make it clear, discreetly, that we are not necessarily hostile to any kind of military action whatsoever if it’s clear that the reason for the military action is" 690:

the purchase of one hundred helicopters with coffee. In December, it signed a $ 70 million credit agreement with the Poles; until then, its relations with the Eastern bloc were only through bilateral trade. Agreements in the area of oil were considered.

42:. Although the crisis' dynamics were primarily Brazilian, American actions progressively increased the chances of the occurrence and success of a rebellion against the government. Historians differ on the inevitability of a clash between the Goulart and 1504: 858:

talks with the IMF for a stand-by loan, compensated the ITT subsidiary, made the deal with AMFORP, supported the Workers' Trade Union (UST), which had no communists, and moderated the IEP, notably not giving official support to a pro-Cuba congress.

372:

established in 1964, dictatorships would not be questioned if they maintained anti-communism. The goal of preventing new socialist or communist governments in the region, thought of from the beginning by the founders of the Alliance, was achieved.

1383:, Uruguay, at 1:00 PM; He was actually in the interior of Rio Grande do Sul, and only arrived in the Uruguayan capital on the 4th. At 10:30 PM on the 2nd, the ambassador reported that the last military resistance, in Porto Alegre, was over. 1150:

A contingency plan in case of a coup d'état in Brazil was probably under development still in the Kennedy administration. A version dated December 11, 1963, early in the Johnson administration, is known. It was drafted by Lincoln Gordon and

96:

The U.S. used several instruments to alter the course of the Brazilian government and subsequently to weaken it. Kennedy's visit to Brazil was successively postponed, while opposition candidates in Brazil received millions of dollars in the

1702:

In his definition (pp. 75-76), destabilization would not necessarily lead to the deposition of the president, it could only weaken him in the elections, and there is no empirical evidence that it had the same intentions as the conspiracy.

4640: 891:, Kennedy's effort against Fidel Castro, João Goulart and Cheddi Jagan "had no precedent in the history of inter-American relations". It was from this moment on that the embassy became a political actor in Brazilian internal affairs. 792:

did not last long, and by April 1962 $ 224 million that had been negotiated under the previous government was released. The release was little by little and, when possible, at short notice. The pressure exerted by Minister of Finance

5165: 1440: 861:

For its part, the U.S. provided a loan of US$ 30 million in January to keep Brazil from going bankrupt. In March San Tiago Dantas (now Minister of Finance) went to Washington to negotiate more credit, signing an agreement with

1230:

opposition military could achieve victory without open American support. However, in the case of a "second stage" with prolonged resistance, he recommended that a squadron be on the coast as a show of force. The next day, the

261:

believed in its relevance. However, in this early period of the Cold War (until 1959), little attention was paid to the region, and capital investment was minimal. There was a security system with a military component, the

1289:, Director of the CIA, were already meeting in Washington. They discussed, among other topics, air and naval support capabilities. Shortly thereafter, the naval task force was activated, consisting of the aircraft carrier 165:

period was marked by "a national security state, high defense spending, militarization, and social conformism". The Cold War and paranoia about communism were intensifying. Trade unionism followed a shift to the right.

1234:

of the National Security Council considered the submarine proposal meaningless (the delivery would be too small) and also criticized sending the squadron, but agreed with the fuel supply. The document emphasized the

1118:, assigned as military attaché. He was fluent in Portuguese and had good relations with important officers, knowing his Brazilian counterparts since World War II. From Brazil, he passed on what he heard from them. 1189:

The second scenario admitted a conflict, even a civil war, and suggested the formation of an alternative provisional government. The latter could then ask for external help. This is consistent with the memoirs of

342:

In turn, economic assistance came in the form of the Alliance for Progress, announced in 1961, with an investment forecast of $ 10 billion over ten years. Its administration was handed over to the newly created

488:, on August 21, 1963, Lincoln Gordon analyzed the Brazilian political situation. He evaluated that Goulart would launch a coup d'état to create a nationalist authoritarian regime along the lines of Vargas and 73:. Domestically, it paid less attention to economic stabilization and limited the remittance of profits from American companies in Brazil. In 1963, Goulart made concessions and an attempt at stabilization, the 1316:

His source was Afonso Arinos. This dialog was reproduced by journalist Araújo Netto, in 1964, in an essay "in which the conversations appear in a somewhat romanticized form". But the event is confirmed by

1266:, reported that he had heard from two leading conspirators that the coup would take place within 48 hours, and further, that the conspirators asked "if the U.S. fleet could quickly reach southern Brazil." 740:, this was a way to avoid friction with the U.S. In September 1962, Congress approved the law, but its final regulation, which was up to the president, only came in January 1964. As registration with the 1584:) included among the policies "Continuing to encourage Brazilian moderate democratic elements in Congress, the Armed Forces and elsewhere who advocate domestic and foreign policies which we can support." 574: 5478: 1020:, leader of the Peasant Leagues, affirmed the presence of American military in disguise in Brazil, especially in the Northeast. Moniz Bandeira cited these affirmations and specified that they were 561: 50:

administrations, the relative importance of the attrition points, and the timing the U.S. government's decision to support the Goulart's ousting - earlier, as in 1962, or later, only in 1963.

906:

was unable to prove the origin of the money, but the two organizations were closed down by presidential decree and then by the courts. Years later IBAD's connection to the CIA was confirmed.

1054:. Thus, the revolt would be the work of American manipulation. However, for the most recent literature there is no evidence for this accusation and the origins of the revolt are within the 1521:

The amendment was never invoked in the Brazilian case. The Executive was against it from the beginning, thinking that it would be an obstacle in foreign policy, and only once - in Ceylon (

849:

financial support. However, the situation was different. The balance of power between the US and the USSR was in favor of the Americans in 1962, different from the proportion against the

375:

Kennedy had a good image in Latin America. His successor was, as far as the region was concerned, less interested and more receptive to the opinions of American businessmen. He appointed

310: 5126: 1333: 5090: 686:

In November 1961 Brazil resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, at the end of a long process initiated by the Jânio government. The following year, it discussed with the

1037: 609:

to explain to Goulart the problems from the American point of view. For him and Gordon, the conversation went nowhere. In July 1963 the two presidents met at the inauguration of

422: 4892: 586:

A visit by Kennedy to Brazil was expected for July, but was postponed to November. Goulart's justification was the elections in both countries (general elections in Brazil and

497:

his assessments. Still, the ambassador's views were in harmony with the worldview of politicians in Washington, and his ideas were ultimately well-received in the government.

5473: 124:. It never reached Brazil due to the rapid deposition of Goulart beginning on March 31, 1964, but the withdrawal of the president was in part due to the knowledge that the 894:

In 1977 Lincoln Gordon admitted that between one and five million dollars had been spent on the election campaign. In 1994, he talked about five or six million. CIA agent

344: 19: 751:(Sumoc) became necessary, the processing of requests began and the remittance of profits abroad and the entry of new investments were practically paralyzed in 1963–1964. 899: 4851: 5031: 551:

The CIA followed Cuba's and the USSR's assessments of Brazil. According to a 1963 report, the Cubans favored a revolution of their own, while the Soviets opposed it.

319:

democratically, and even if not Marxist, but reformist or nationalist, were assumed as risks to the security and interests of the United States. Such were cases like

1738: 5242: 4798: 4456: 5468: 263: 703: 105:, became involved in Brazil's internal affairs. The important release of credit was hindered, different from the attitude taken for the previous government of 4719:"O Nordeste brasileiro entra na Guerra Fria: poder e fragmentação política nas relações Brasil-Estados Unidos diante da Aliança para o Progresso (1961-1964)" 4608:"Dois pesos, duas medidas: os acordos financeiros de maio de 1961 entre Brasil e Estados Unidos durante os governos Jânio Quadros e João Goulart (1961-1962)" 1765: 1356: 5448: 1447:, pp. 104-105. As noted on p. 234, already at that time there was demand for a genuinely Brazilian doctrine, which in fact was built in the 1960s and 1970s. 815:, with Goulart gaining freedom of action. The Americans had adopted a "step by step" policy, making the granting of credit conditional on political change. 595:, the American government no longer wanted to treat Goulart as a privileged ally. Goulart wanted Kennedy's presence, but it became a way of pressuring him. 1371:

With Castelo Branco's warning, Operation Brother Sam was dismantled. There was no resignation, but in the early hours of the 2nd the Brazilian Congress

633:

Conference, in January 1962, Brazil continued the IEP, abstaining from voting for the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS and opposing the use of sanctions.

556: 1483:. The stories sounded as if they were going to go down a path that we already knew, but I don't have any inside information on how that would happen". 473:

American president that Jango would receive "the reasonable benefit of the doubt". In the following years, the existing mistrust would only increase.

204:

and would not accept the political damage of supporting an unsuccessful coup in Brazil. In January the Republicans had criticized his reaction to the

4975: 1596:

is said to have the same conclusion as Carlos Fico, disagreeing, however, with his classification of this initial period as one of "destabilization".

653:

At Kennedy's request, in 1962 Goulart interceded with the Cuban government to prevent the execution of prisoners captured after participating in the

290:

campaign Kennedy criticized the American leadership's complacency with Latin America. In 1961 the military attempt to change the regime in Cuba, the

5463: 5356: 5262: 5222: 1393: 1372: 824: 443: 201: 185: 4989: 1123: 5483: 1577: 101:

and economic assistance was redirected to opposition state governments, the "islands of administrative sanity". The U.S. Embassy in Brazil, under

78: 4680:"The Alliance for Progress and President João Goulart's Three-Year Plan: the deterioration of U.S.-Brazilian Relations in Cold War Brazil (1962)" 302:

tipped the balance of power in the region in favor of the United States, which allowed pressure to be put on reluctant countries such as Brazil.

109:. Finally, the U.S. government sought allies among the Brazilian military, who were already plotting a coup d'état and offered support for their 1222:

same day, Lyndon Johnson approved a naval task force. The operation was in contact with Brazilians, with general José Pinheiro de Ulhoa Cintra,

5458: 5312: 5076: 1236: 746: 513:

The diplomats had an image based both on well-established interpretations of reality and on stereotypes also common among Brazilians, such as "

110: 5342: 914:

won the government of Pernambuco, the political and economic center of the region, even with IBAD's support for the candidacy of his opponent

4942: 3487: 1304:, four tankers, cargo planes, fighters, and airlift ammunition. The destination on the Brazilian coast could not be reached before April 10. 647: 401: 1172: 762:, providing for the suspension of financial assistance to countries that expropriated American companies without appropriate compensation. 115: 5328: 1032: 4952:"Entrevista: Lincoln Gordon. Castello perdeu a batalha: a presença da embaixada americana na deposição de João Goulart, em abril de 1964" 5212: 493: 98: 4883: 1196: 31: 5488: 5443: 1223: 878: 534: 286: 4320:. Retratos do Brasil (in Brazilian Portuguese). Vol. 108. Translated by Carlos Nayfield. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. 510:

unimportant". For the Alliance of Progress, Brazil, as the largest country in Latin America, was considered its most important edge.

1786: 1347:"We believe it is all over with democratic rebellion already 95 percent successful. First army solidly in favor and at 1640 general 1337: 1332:, this warning was one of the factors in Goulart's decision to leave Rio de Janeiro for Brasília, precipitating the collapse of his 1262:

transmit more information and all consulates to monitor the actions of the opposition. In the evening Niles Bond, Consul General in

1206: 1021: 234: 125: 4982: 271: 902:(IBAD), which sponsored candidates through Popular Democratic Action (ADEP), was even then suspected of having foreign backing. A 810: 5296: 1307:

The Brazilian president was aware of having the U.S. as an enemy. On the morning of the 1st, San Tiago Dantas informed him that:

966: 903: 485: 193: 177:, it was aggressive at the time, especially due to the great influence of conservative and militaristic representatives from the 174: 170: 39: 5032:

Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Cable, "Departure of Goulart from Porto Alegre for Montevideo," Secret, April 2, 1964

989: 492:. His incompetence would then lead to his deposition by the communists; it would be a "two-stage coup". The State Department's 324: 267: 129: 5083: 4777: 4563: 4540: 2977: 599: 2429: 1239:, in São Paulo, as the most likely opposing force. Gordon's response insisted that paramilitary forces be previously armed. 687: 1191: 1181: 5282: 4976:

White House, Transcript of Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin, July 30, 1962

5389: 5003: 4408: 1781: 984: 741: 396: 4541:"A Participação dos Estados Unidos no Golpe Civil-militar de 1964: breves apontamentos para uma revisão historiográfica" 4465: 4291:

O grande irmão: da Operação Brother Sam aos anos de chumbo. O governo dos Estados Unidos e a ditadura militar brasileira

1168: 978: 732:

in November 1961, was neither sanctioned nor vetoed by the president, even though he was favorable to it, being left to

729: 587: 406:, disseminated from the US military to their Latin American peers and taught in military schools along the lines of the 132:(1964–1985) was quickly recognized, and the U.S. acted diplomatically to facilitate its recognition by other countries. 60: 4718: 737: 733: 439: 279: 805: 754:

The issue of expropriations came to the fore in February 1962, with the seizure of a Rio Grande do Sul subsidiary of

5018:

CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Plans of Revolutionary Plotters in Minas Gerais," March 30, 1964 (IN 50 182)

143:

of 1959, and pressure within the country for a tough foreign policy, Washington sought to reassert its hegemony. In

4871: 973: 1176: 5335: 5319: 5158: 4607: 4368:"Ligações perigosas: a deterioração das relações entre os governos de João Goulart e John Kennedy no ano de 1962" 4263:(in Brazilian Portuguese). Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil. 1769: 1628: 411: 4484: 4367: 854:

received help from the Soviet bloc. Washington, realizing it had a strategic advantage, hardened its positions.

55: 5453: 5375: 5108: 1348: 1164: 942: 828: 545: 285:

In 1958, the booing received by Vice President Nixon on a tour of several Latin American countries alerted the

90: 5048: 205: 54:

with Kennedy. There were several points of attrition. Internationally, the Brazilian government continued its

5232: 4347: 4231:(2014). "O golpe militar de 1964 como fenômeno de política internacional". In Toledo, Caio Navarro de (ed.). 77:, but did not find the necessary American support for its success and hardened his position with the U.S. In 5272: 1396:, the "unanimous opposition of the constituted powers", the "vacancy of office" and the "unbloody victory". 1360: 1047: 660: 416: 5363: 5202: 4821: 1457: 1364: 759: 552: 469: 178: 166: 650:

to some extent, and a CIA report concluded that there was no Brazilian intention to approach the Cubans.

5349: 5172: 4306: 4279:

1964: O golpe que derrubou um presidente, pôs fim ao regime democrático e instituiu a ditadura no Brasil

1318: 1282: 793: 148: 121: 5252: 715: 5305: 4458:

A nação e o capital estrangeiro: um estudo sobre a lei de remessa de lucros no governo de João Goulart

4240: 1610:

Todo o leme a bombordo – marinheiros e ditadura civil-militar no Brasil: da rebelião de 1964 à Anistia

1073: 38:(1961–1964) gradually deteriorated, culminating in American support for the ousting of Goulart in the 5415: 4679: 1480: 1102:

The possibility of overthrow was discussed as recently as July 30, 1962, at a meeting in Washington:

695: 654: 435: 407: 361: 299: 291: 5024: 1804:

Costa e Silva actually took over the Ministry of War, delegating the First Army to General Ururahy (

1560: 1084: 501:

the evidence: "All the newspaper reports said, I don't know if we had any definitive confirmation".

1505:"Saving the Bay of Pigs Prisoners: Did JFK Send a Secret Warning to Fidel Castro – through Brazil?" 1270: 1017: 930: 925:. Arraes had no commitment to the Alliance for Progress, whose focus had to shift to other states. 298:

announced the implementation of socialism and his county's alignment with the Soviets. In 1962 the

226: 5140: 1323: 1131: 915: 4764: 4699: 4660: 4584: 4389: 4286: 1562:

The American Congress and foreigh policy-making; a case study of the Hickenlooper-Adair amendment

1548: 1301: 1025: 1006: 995: 514: 323:

in Guyana, Árbenz in Guatemala, and João Goulart in Brazil. The loss in Cuba was on the minds of

4565:

Revolução ás margens do capitalismo: a aliança para o progresso no nordeste do Brasil, 1961-1964

1202: 779: 4852:"Documentos indicam que João Goulart atuou como mediador secreto entre Kennedy e Fidel Castro" 4410:

A Participação dos Estados Unidos no golpe de estado de 1964 no Brasil: a operação Brother Sam

1278: 1130:

The CIA monitored plots for more than two years before the coup. In March 1963, it identified

1115: 1078: 1051: 954: 946: 837: 725: 602: 452: 392: 332: 197: 135:

The pressure on Goulart's government occurred when American foreign policy was defined by the

47: 4754: 4691: 4652: 4619: 4518:"Os Estados Unidos e o governo João Goulart: o Brasil como palco da Guerra Fria (1961–1963)" 4496: 4429: 4379: 1540: 1152: 634: 275: 258: 250: 140: 106: 4951: 4641:"The Alliance For or Against Progress? US-Brazilian Financial Relations in the Early 1960s" 4430:"A reformulação da Doutrina de Segurança Nacional pela Escola Superior de Guerra no Brasil" 1247: 245:

In this context, Latin America was important as a source of raw materials and votes in the

5427: 1274: 1160: 1089: 888: 642: 538: 357: 352: 254: 43: 5099: 592: 151:

or to favor their overthrow by local opposition, thus tolerating several military coups.

35: 4905: 5025:

Teleconference Between the Department of State and the Embassy in Brazil, April 1, 1964

5017: 5010: 4996: 4990:

CIA, Current Intelligence Memorandum, "Plotting Against Goulart," Secret, March 8, 1963

4779:

Política Externa Independente: as relações com os Estados Unidos na busca por autonomia

4325: 4228: 4214: 1251: 1055: 950: 638: 630: 621: 388: 376: 246: 102: 86: 82: 5422: 4517: 1630:

Um estudo sobre a participação da PMMG no movimento golpista de 1964 em Belo Horizonte

920: 664:

J. F. Kennedy (left) and João Goulart (right), Brazilian and American presidents, 1962

442:(IMF) were needed to run the government, which tied the Brazilian policy cycle to the 5437: 5403: 5133: 4768: 4703: 4664: 4393: 4384: 1290: 911: 863: 699: 489: 189: 144: 74: 4624: 4501: 1011: 1000: 4315: 4298: 4244: 4218: 1792: 1376: 1352: 1329: 1210: 1043: 850: 669: 610: 519: 320: 295: 249:, as well as being the last region that could be relied upon in case Europe became 230: 222: 66: 4983:

NSC, Memorandum, "U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil," Secret, December 11, 1962

4799:"Uma estranha no ninho: a Ação Democrática Popular nas eleições de 1962 no Brasil" 4695: 1608: 1263: 5056:(Monograph) (in Brazilian Portuguese). Brasília: Centro Universitário de Brasília 1136: 1124:

NSC Memorandum, "U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil," Secret, December 11, 1962

674: 147:, it tried to influence leftist governments through economic assistance from the 5181: 4293:(in Brazilian Portuguese) (2ª ed.). Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. 4281:(in Brazilian Portuguese) (1ª ed.). Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. 4272:(in Brazilian Portuguese) (4ª ed.). Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. 4223:(in Brazilian Portuguese) (4ª ed.). Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. 1286: 895: 842: 680: 606: 348: 336: 314:

Kennedy with Latin American representatives of the Alliance for Progress in 1963

239: 24: 16:

Relationships between the United States and Brazil detreeating from 1961 to 1964

4924: 3725: 4656: 3610: 1380: 1297: 846: 5068: 4485:"Reinventando a história: Lincoln Gordon e as suas múltiplas versões de 1964" 1420:, p. 25 uses "other Cubas" as the target of military reformulation, and 1328:

and Moniz Bandeira, both of whom heard it from Goulart himself. According to

1273:, in Minas Gerais, began the coup d'état in advance. At 11:30 AM, Dean Rusk, 1522: 1397: 845:. He thus managed to pressure the Americans into granting a large amount of 481: 5011:

State Department, Top Secret Cable from Amb. Lincoln Gordon, March 29, 1964

3726:"National Security Archive: Brazil Marks 50th Anniversary of Military Coup" 1343:

At 8:30 pm, in a conference call with Washington, the ambassador reported:

4823:

A Escola Superior de Guerra e a Doutrina de Segurança Nacional (1949-1966)

173:. Even if typically perceived as more moderate in foreign policy than the 938: 526: 136: 566:, was pointed out as a probable intermediary between Moscow and Havana. 4759: 4742: 1552: 1528: 755: 128:

would recognize a parallel government organized by the insurgents. The

4997:

State Department, Top Secret Cable from Rio De Janeiro, March 27, 1964

4235:(in Brazilian Portuguese) (2ª ed.). Campinas: Editora da Unicamp. 4008: 4000: 1736:, Annex I. A Portuguese language translation was published in 2007 at 728:. The new legislation governing foreign capital, though passed by the 188:, Democrat John F. Kennedy narrowly defeated his opponent, Republican 4464:(Thesis) (in Brazilian Portuguese). Campinas: Unicamp. Archived from 4092: 1529:"The Protection of Foreign Investment and the Hickenlooper Amendment" 1231: 1186:

and a friendly relationship at the very beginning of the new regime.

4309:(in Brazilian Portuguese) (2ª ed.). Rio de Janeiro: Intrínseca. 1544: 278:'s government in Guatemala by a paramilitary force organized by the 4258: 2909: 2907: 5050:

A influência dos Estados Unidos na crise brasileira de 1961 a 1964

4328:(2018). "The United States and the 1964 Brazilian Military Coup". 4254: 3595: 1246: 934: 877: 778: 714: 659: 620: 573: 327:

officials in 1964 and favored tougher decisions regarding Brazil.

309: 18: 3426: 1375:, swearing in Ranieri Mazzilli in Jango's place, who had gone to 668:

The U.S. used Brazil as an intermediary with Cuba. Thus, general

4249:(in Brazilian Portuguese) (1ª ed.). Porto Alegre: L&PM. 1492:

The III Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

1442:

Modernização e reestruturação do Exército brasileiro (1960-1980)

578:

Kennedy greets Goulart on his arrival in the United States, 1962

70: 5072: 3274: 3272: 3270: 2325: 2323: 4220:

O Governo João Goulart: As Lutas Sociais no Brasil (1961-1964)

2526: 2524: 2522: 3004: 3002: 1351:

ordered cessation military action against rebels. Ancora and

192:, and to do so he had to be tougher on foreign policy. After 81:

there was also concern about leftist forces such as governor

3306: 3304: 434:

foreign exchange was declining. Due to heavy spending under

69:

and disagreeing in part with the American proposals against

3697: 3209: 3207: 3205: 2989: 2987: 2985: 2807: 2805: 2756: 2754: 2705: 2703: 2701: 2238: 2236: 637:, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed the " 625:

San Tiago Dantas, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs

200:

took over. By 1964 the new president was worried about the

3708: 3706: 3091: 3089: 1636:(Thesis) (in Brazilian Portuguese). São João del Rei: UFSJ 3809: 3807: 3120: 3118: 3116: 2882: 2880: 4743:"The US Role in the 1964 Coup in Brazil: A Reassessment" 4585:"A "última chance": o Plano Trienal e o governo Kennedy" 4317:

1964: O Papel dos Estados Unidos no Golpe de 31 de Março

3410: 3408: 3406: 3291: 3289: 3287: 2553: 2551: 2061: 2059: 2057: 2044: 2042: 2040: 2027: 2025: 2023: 2021: 1996: 1994: 1981: 1979: 1894: 1892: 1890: 1723:, p. 12, don't believe it, as opposed to Flávio Tavares. 1379:. The CIA reported that Jango had left Porto Alegre for 242:

policy. It also aimed at reasserting American hegemony.

4785:(Dissertation) (in Brazilian Portuguese). Brasília: UnB 4115: 4113: 3924: 3922: 3920: 3918: 3467: 3465: 3452: 3450: 1042:

of the Goulart government, Ivo Acioly Corseuil, sailor

4945:(in Brazilian Portuguese). Rio de Janeiro. 1963-02-06. 4886:(in Brazilian Portuguese). Rio de Janeiro. 1962-06-17. 4571:(Dissertation) (in Brazilian Portuguese). Maringá: UEM 4348:"A Aliança para o Progresso para o Brasil (1961-1964)" 4330:

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History

3762: 1841: 1839: 1837: 1581: 379:

as the person responsible for Latin American affairs.

5479:

History of the foreign relations of the United States

5387: 2163: 2161: 2100: 2098: 957:, of São Paulo, gained prestige by visiting Kennedy. 4260:

Dicionário histórico-biográfico brasileiro, pós-1930

1033:

Federal Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service

391:

in the 1960s had an American-style organization and

5295: 5194: 5150: 5118: 4923:Hershberg, James G.; Kornbluh, Peter (2014-04-02). 4904:Hershberg, James G.; Kornbluh, Peter (2004-03-31). 4872:"Arquivo CIA: Fidel e URSS divergiram sobre Brasil" 4020: 4004: 3394: 2653: 1445:(Thesis) (in Brazilian Portuguese). Rio de Janeiro. 641:" of Cuba, so that it would keep its system but be 468:For most papers, the U.S. did not intervene in the 438:in the 1950s, now large loans from the U.S. or the 383:

Influence on the thinking of the Brazilian military

356:and so the U.S. acted against right-wing dictators 4143: 3798: 702:incident in 1962, after which Cuban support for a 5004:NSC, Memcon, "Brazil," Top Secret, March 28, 1964 4277:Ferreira, Jorge; Gomes, Angela de Castro (2014). 3988: 3786: 910:influence public opinion were a failure. Leftist 783:Moreira Salles, the Brazilian Minister of Finance 544:Special attention was reserved for the Brazilian 4925:"Brazil Marks 50th Anniversary of Military Coup" 4906:"Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup" 1616:(Thesis) (in Brazilian Portuguese). Niterói: UFF 694:For the White House, Brazil was approaching the 4416:(TCC) (in Brazilian Portuguese). Dourados: UFGD 3488:INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE AÇÃO DEMOCRÁTICA (IBAD) 1345: 1309: 1104: 225:had global scope and the goals of organizing a 4776:Resende, Carlos Augusto Rollemberg de (2009). 1428:" in the context of the Alliance for Progress. 1363:. First army command to be assumed by general 264:Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 5084: 4592:IX Congresso Brasileiro de História Econômica 4131: 3499: 2913: 1458:Campanha da Legalidade#International reaction 8: 4891:Silva, Carlos Eduardo Lins da (1994-03-27). 1114:Brazilian military. The envoy would then be 593:Brazilian behavior during the Missile Crisis 89:subsidiaries of American companies, and the 4009:Departamento de Estado, 29 de março de 1964 4001:Departamento de Estado, 27 de março de 1964 429:Relationship with Jânio Quadros' government 5474:United States involvement in regime change 5091: 5077: 5069: 4594:(in Brazilian Portuguese). Curitiba: ABPHE 4366:Domingos, Charles Sidarta Machado (2018). 4093:Departamento de Estado, 1 de abril de 1964 2530: 4758: 4623: 4500: 4383: 3483: 2973: 2425: 2353: 2329: 1766:1964 Brazilian coup in the Paraíba Valley 1067:The attitude in favor of the conspirators 900:Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action 5357:1964 vacancy in the Presidency of Brazil 5263:March of the Family with God for Liberty 4483:Green, James N.; Jones, Abigail (2009). 4080: 3738: 3625: 3614:, 31 de janeiro a 6 de fevereiro de 1963 3559: 3547: 3441: 3346: 3334: 3322: 3295: 3278: 3261: 3249: 3237: 3213: 3196: 3184: 3172: 3148: 3136: 3124: 3107: 3095: 3080: 3068: 3056: 3044: 3032: 3020: 2949: 2898: 2886: 2859: 2796: 2772: 2692: 2680: 2629: 2569: 2513: 2501: 2477: 2465: 2453: 2441: 2389: 2278: 2191: 2140: 2089: 2000: 1704: 1654: 1593: 282:(CIA). Both were considered successful. 5394: 5047:Souza, Antonio Lezuan Ferreira (2005). 4525:VII Congresso Internacional de História 4246:1964 visto e comentado pela Casa Branca 3928: 3813: 3774: 3661: 3649: 3637: 3471: 3414: 3310: 3225: 3160: 3008: 2993: 2961: 2937: 2871: 2847: 2835: 2823: 2811: 2784: 2760: 2745: 2733: 2709: 2668: 2641: 2581: 2542: 2413: 2401: 2242: 2065: 2048: 2031: 1985: 1958: 1910: 1898: 1869: 1857: 1845: 1828: 1821: 1805: 1720: 1708: 1667:Pequena história da ditadura brasileira 1410: 266:(TIAR), and a political component, the 4167: 4155: 4056: 4032: 2377: 2365: 2341: 1439:Pedrosa, Fernado Velôzo Gomes (2018). 5469:Cold War history of the United States 5376: Government of Ranieri Mazzilli→ 5109:← Government of Ranieri Mazzilli 4893:"EUA não conspiraram, diz embaixador" 4806:XIX Encontro de História da Anpuh-Rio 4119: 4044: 3976: 3952: 3897: 3873: 3849: 3750: 3712: 3685: 3571: 3456: 3370: 2721: 2489: 2290: 2116: 1881: 1533:University of Pennsylvania Law Review 756:International Telephone and Telegraph 7: 4354:(in Brazilian Portuguese) (9): 71–83 4191: 4179: 4104: 4068: 3964: 3940: 3909: 3885: 3861: 3837: 3825: 3673: 3583: 3535: 3523: 3511: 3382: 3358: 2925: 2617: 2605: 2593: 2557: 2314: 2302: 2266: 2254: 2227: 2215: 2203: 2179: 2167: 2152: 2128: 2104: 2077: 2012: 1970: 1946: 1934: 1922: 1752: 1733: 1690: 1421: 1417: 410:. In the Brazilian case, it was the 233:'s influence. The supporters of the 229:and preventing the expansion of the 212:U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America 4747:Bulletin of Latin American Research 1782:Os idos de março e a queda em abril 1607:Almeida, Anderson da Silva (2010). 742:Superintendency of Money and Credit 494:Bureau of Intelligence and Research 306:Kennedy and Johnson administrations 4844:Newspapers, magazines and websites 14: 4797:Ribeiro, Guilherme Leite (2020). 4717:Oliveira, Pedro Carvalho (2020). 4678:Loureiro, Felipe Pereira (2017). 4645:Journal of Latin American Studies 4639:Loureiro, Felipe Pereira (2014). 4606:Loureiro, Felipe Pereira (2013). 4583:Loureiro, Felipe Pereira (2011). 4455:Gennari, Adilson Marques (1997). 4407:Faria, Thamires Riter de (2018). 4346:Betfuer, Leonardo Laguna (2017). 1527:Lillich, Richard B. (June 1964). 1503:James G. Hershberg (2021-04-29). 1387:Recognition of the new government 1226:'s trusted man, as intermediary. 967:United States Information Service 533:Among the political parties, the 459:American interpretation of Brazil 65:, expanding its ties outside the 5421: 5409: 5397: 5243:Request for a state of exception 5166:Relations with the United States 4548:XV Encontro Regional de História 4385:10.1590/tem-1980-542x2018v240306 3698:Casa Branca, 30 de julho de 1962 2978:CAPITAL ESTRANGEIRO (legislação) 1627:Silva, André Gustavo da (2014). 1269:On the morning of the 31st, the 904:Parliamentary Inquiry Commission 23:Goulart meeting with Kennedy at 5464:Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson 4820:Tibola, Ana Paula Lima (2007). 4625:10.1590/S0104-06182013000200009 4502:10.1590/S0102-01882009000100003 2632:, pp. 447-449 and 453-455. 1732:The document was reproduced in 1062:Involvement with the deposition 395:. Among the influences was the 268:Organization of American States 130:Brazilian military dictatorship 5484:CIA activities in the Americas 5449:Brazil–United States relations 4950:Garcia, Roberto (1977-03-09). 4489:Revista Brasileira de História 4428:Fernandes, Ana Simões (2009). 4233:1964: Visões críticas do golpe 3550:, p. 116, nota de rodapé. 1373:declared the presidency vacant 1312:the free territory of Brazil. 1109:-Kennedy: "Against the Left." 360:in the Dominican Republic and 221:American foreign policy after 32:Brazil–United States relations 1: 5459:Presidency of John F. Kennedy 4929:The National Security Archive 4910:The National Security Archive 4696:10.1080/14682745.2016.1254620 4562:Lara, José Victor de (2019). 4539:Lara, José Victor de (2016). 4516:Lara, José Victor de (2015). 3989:Hershberg & Kornbluh 2004 3787:Hershberg & Kornbluh 2014 2456:, pp. 550-563 e 571-573. 2430:POLÍTICA EXTERNA INDEPENDENTE 1525:) in 1963 - it was used. See 1031:According to the head of the 898:talked about 20 million. The 882:Lincoln Gordon (left) in 1963 605:, Kennedy's brother, went to 4870:Garcez, Bruno (2007-06-26). 4741:Pereira, Anthony W. (2018). 1565:(thesis). McGill University. 1192:Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco 1175:within 30 days, a temporary 5336:Coast Artillery HQ Takeover 5159:Independent external policy 4725:(in Brazilian Portuguese). 4614:(in Brazilian Portuguese). 4491:(in Brazilian Portuguese). 4439:(in Brazilian Portuguese). 4314:Parker, Phyllis R. (1977). 4270:João Goulart: uma biografia 3763:NSC, 11 de dezembro de 1962 3562:, pp. 532-533 and 538. 1582:NSC, 11 de dezembro de 1962 688:People's Republic of Poland 555:, general secretary of the 464:Opinion about the president 455:or Juscelino in the 1950s. 440:International Monetary Fund 280:Central Intelligence Agency 5505: 5283:Meeting at Automóvel Clube 5100:Government of João Goulart 4961:(in Brazilian Portuguese). 4899:(in Brazilian Portuguese). 4878:(in Brazilian Portuguese). 4829:(Thesis). Passo Fundo: UPF 4723:Revista História e Cultura 1257:, one of the fuel carriers 617:Independent Foreign Policy 397:National Security Doctrine 217:Until the Cuban Revolution 186:1960 presidential election 56:Independent Foreign Policy 40:1964 coup d'état in Brazil 5489:Cold War in Latin America 5444:Fourth Brazilian Republic 5373: 5106: 4858:(in Brazilian Portuguese) 4808:(in Brazilian Portuguese) 4657:10.1017/S0022216X14000029 4550:(in Brazilian Portuguese) 4527:(in Brazilian Portuguese) 4132:Ferreira & Gomes 2014 3943:, pp. 94-95 and 101. 3500:Ferreira & Gomes 2014 2914:Ferreira & Gomes 2014 2620:, pp. 7-9 e 185-187. 1711:have a similar reasoning. 1578:National Security Council 775:During parliamentarianism 557:Brazilian Communist Party 535:National Democratic Union 428: 412:Escola Superior de Guerra 287:Eisenhower administration 34:during the presidency of 4850:Duchiade, André (2021). 4618:(2). Campinas: 547–576. 4495:(57). São Paulo: 67–89. 4268:Ferreira, Jorge (2011). 4021:CIA, 30 de março de 1964 4005:NSC, 28 de março de 1964 1277:, Secretary of Defense, 829:William Henry Draper Jr. 160:U.S. domestic conditions 5233:Revolt of the sergeants 4378:(3). Niterói: 525–545. 4303:A Ditadura Envergonhada 4144:CIA, 2 de abril de 1964 3799:CIA, 8 de março de 1963 2952:, pp. 564 and 572. 1559:McInnis, Donna (1973). 1243:At the time of the coup 1203:José de Magalhães Pinto 1044:José Anselmo dos Santos 949:. Opposition governors 194:Kennedy's assassination 5364:Revolutionary 3rd Army 5203:Campanha da Legalidade 4856:Instituto João Goulart 2531:Green & Jones 2009 2368:, pp. 41 and 114. 1369: 1314: 1258: 1111: 883: 827:, a commission led by 823:After the anticipated 784: 760:Hickenlooper Amendment 720: 665: 626: 579: 570:Presidential relations 423:School of the Americas 325:Johnson administration 315: 208:as lacking toughness. 28: 5350:Operation Farroupilha 5343:in the Paraíba Valley 5173:Operation Brother Sam 3912:, pp. 93 and 98. 3599:, 17 de junho de 1962 3430:, 27 de março de 1994 2657:, 26 de junho de 2007 2305:, pp. 6 and 185. 2230:, pp. 18 and 98. 1973:, pp. 3622–3623. 1925:, pp. 3621–3622. 1283:Joint Chiefs of Staff 1250: 1173:presidential election 881: 794:Walter Moreira Salles 782: 718: 663: 624: 577: 313: 169:was dominated by the 149:Alliance for Progress 126:U.S. State Department 122:Operation Brother Sam 22: 4884:"Diário de Notícias" 4612:Economia e Sociedade 3398:, 9 de março de 1977 1217:Latest conversations 1201:, according to whom 1048:1964 Sailors' Revolt 953:, of Guanabara, and 696:Non-Aligned Movement 655:Bay of Pigs Invasion 436:Juscelino Kubitschek 408:National War College 300:Cuban Missile Crisis 292:Bay of Pigs invasion 253:. Realist theorists 5313:Military operations 4352:Revista Historiador 4340:Articles and papers 4194:, pp. 127–135. 4182:, pp. 108–109. 4170:, pp. 111–115. 4083:, pp. 180–181. 3628:, pp. 135–139. 3514:, pp. 140–146. 3349:, pp. 338–339. 3337:, pp. 346–347. 3281:, pp. 342–345. 3187:, pp. 570–571. 3175:, pp. 568–571. 3151:, pp. 567–568. 3110:, pp. 565–566. 3071:, pp. 572–573. 3059:, pp. 564–565. 3035:, pp. 342–343. 3011:, pp. 136–143. 2964:, pp. 172–174. 2940:, pp. 122–123. 2928:, pp. 149–150. 2826:, pp. 105–120. 2775:, pp. 526–528. 2683:, pp. 527–530. 2608:, pp. 103–106. 2516:, pp. 335–337. 2480:, pp. 563–564. 2444:, pp. 327–328. 2380:, Resumo and p. 15. 2332:, pp. 836–837. 2281:, pp. 107–111. 1271:4th Military Region 1232:Executive Committee 1169:Chamber of Deputies 1167:, president of the 931:Rio Grande do Norte 730:Chamber of Deputies 719:Goulart and Brizola 711:Foreign investments 553:Luís Carlos Prestes 111:military operations 5253:Comício da Central 5127:Military apparatus 4760:10.1111/blar.12518 4307:As Ilusões Armadas 4035:, pp. 99–100. 3676:, pp. 99–100. 3597:Diário de Notícias 2787:, pp. 93–100. 2695:, p. 530-542. 1319:João Pinheiro Neto 1302:helicopter carrier 1259: 985:Diário de Notícias 884: 874:Opposition funding 806:parliamentarianism 785: 770:Economic diplomacy 721: 666: 627: 580: 537:(UDN), opposed to 486:Secretary of State 335:, as if they were 316: 206:protests in Panama 29: 5385: 5384: 5329:in Rio de Janeiro 5213:General elections 5119:Domestic Policies 4897:Folha de S. Paulo 4241:Corrêa, Marcos Sá 4047:, pp. 65–66. 3967:, pp. 94–97. 3955:, pp. 63–64. 3900:, pp. 62–63. 3888:, pp. 91–93. 3876:, pp. 60–63. 3864:, pp. 89–93. 3852:, pp. 60–62. 3840:, pp. 86–89. 3753:, pp. 58–59. 3715:, pp. 57–58. 3586:, pp. 80–84. 3526:, pp. 78–79. 3428:Folha de S. Paulo 3361:, pp. 75–76. 3313:, pp. 75–77. 2996:, pp. 77–78. 2838:, pp. 49–51. 2814:, pp. 68–69. 2763:, pp. 75–76. 2748:, pp. 80–81. 2736:, pp. 77–78. 2712:, pp. 12–13. 2671:, pp. 65–67. 2596:, pp. 42–46. 2560:, pp. 41–42. 2533:, pp. 73–80. 2317:, pp. 31–34. 2293:, pp. 44–45. 2245:, pp. 72–73. 2182:, pp. 31–38. 2155:, pp. 25–26. 1949:, pp. 19–22. 1884:, pp. 38–39. 1872:, pp. 14–15. 1052:agent provocateur 1005:, in a column in 955:Adhemar de Barros 819:Late 1962 to 1963 726:Rio Grande do Sul 704:guerrilla project 648:Portuguese Africa 646:intermediary for 603:Robert F. Kennedy 470:succession crisis 393:military doctrine 362:François Duvalier 333:counterinsurgency 198:Lyndon B. Johnson 48:Lyndon B. Johnson 27:on April 3, 1962. 5496: 5426: 5425: 5414: 5413: 5412: 5402: 5401: 5400: 5393: 5380: 5366: 5359: 5352: 5345: 5338: 5331: 5322: 5320:Operation Popeye 5315: 5308: 5306:Caicó Detachment 5297:1964 coup d'état 5288: 5287: 5278: 5277: 5268: 5267: 5258: 5257: 5248: 5247: 5238: 5237: 5228: 5227: 5218: 5217: 5208: 5207: 5187: 5186: 5175: 5168: 5161: 5143: 5136: 5129: 5113: 5093: 5086: 5079: 5070: 5064: 5062: 5061: 5055: 5034: 5027: 5020: 5013: 5006: 4999: 4992: 4985: 4978: 4962: 4956: 4946: 4938: 4936: 4935: 4919: 4917: 4916: 4900: 4887: 4879: 4866: 4864: 4863: 4837: 4835: 4834: 4828: 4816: 4814: 4813: 4803: 4793: 4791: 4790: 4784: 4772: 4762: 4737: 4735: 4734: 4713: 4711: 4710: 4684:Cold War History 4674: 4672: 4671: 4635: 4633: 4632: 4627: 4602: 4600: 4599: 4589: 4579: 4577: 4576: 4570: 4558: 4556: 4555: 4545: 4535: 4533: 4532: 4522: 4512: 4510: 4509: 4504: 4479: 4477: 4476: 4470: 4463: 4451: 4449: 4448: 4434: 4424: 4422: 4421: 4415: 4403: 4401: 4400: 4387: 4362: 4360: 4359: 4333: 4321: 4310: 4294: 4282: 4273: 4264: 4250: 4236: 4224: 4195: 4189: 4183: 4177: 4171: 4165: 4159: 4153: 4147: 4141: 4135: 4129: 4123: 4117: 4108: 4102: 4096: 4090: 4084: 4078: 4072: 4066: 4060: 4054: 4048: 4042: 4036: 4030: 4024: 4018: 4012: 3998: 3992: 3986: 3980: 3974: 3968: 3962: 3956: 3950: 3944: 3938: 3932: 3926: 3913: 3907: 3901: 3895: 3889: 3883: 3877: 3871: 3865: 3859: 3853: 3847: 3841: 3835: 3829: 3823: 3817: 3811: 3802: 3796: 3790: 3784: 3778: 3772: 3766: 3760: 3754: 3748: 3742: 3736: 3730: 3729: 3722: 3716: 3710: 3701: 3695: 3689: 3683: 3677: 3671: 3665: 3659: 3653: 3647: 3641: 3635: 3629: 3623: 3617: 3608: 3602: 3593: 3587: 3581: 3575: 3569: 3563: 3557: 3551: 3545: 3539: 3533: 3527: 3521: 3515: 3509: 3503: 3497: 3491: 3481: 3475: 3469: 3460: 3454: 3445: 3439: 3433: 3424: 3418: 3412: 3401: 3392: 3386: 3380: 3374: 3368: 3362: 3356: 3350: 3344: 3338: 3332: 3326: 3320: 3314: 3308: 3299: 3293: 3282: 3276: 3265: 3264:, pp. 9–17. 3259: 3253: 3247: 3241: 3235: 3229: 3223: 3217: 3211: 3200: 3194: 3188: 3182: 3176: 3170: 3164: 3158: 3152: 3146: 3140: 3134: 3128: 3122: 3111: 3105: 3099: 3093: 3084: 3078: 3072: 3066: 3060: 3054: 3048: 3042: 3036: 3030: 3024: 3018: 3012: 3006: 2997: 2991: 2980: 2971: 2965: 2959: 2953: 2947: 2941: 2935: 2929: 2923: 2917: 2911: 2902: 2896: 2890: 2884: 2875: 2869: 2863: 2857: 2851: 2845: 2839: 2833: 2827: 2821: 2815: 2809: 2800: 2794: 2788: 2782: 2776: 2770: 2764: 2758: 2749: 2743: 2737: 2731: 2725: 2719: 2713: 2707: 2696: 2690: 2684: 2678: 2672: 2666: 2660: 2651: 2645: 2639: 2633: 2627: 2621: 2615: 2609: 2603: 2597: 2591: 2585: 2579: 2573: 2567: 2561: 2555: 2546: 2540: 2534: 2528: 2517: 2511: 2505: 2499: 2493: 2487: 2481: 2475: 2469: 2463: 2457: 2451: 2445: 2439: 2433: 2423: 2417: 2411: 2405: 2399: 2393: 2387: 2381: 2375: 2369: 2363: 2357: 2351: 2345: 2339: 2333: 2327: 2318: 2312: 2306: 2300: 2294: 2288: 2282: 2276: 2270: 2264: 2258: 2252: 2246: 2240: 2231: 2225: 2219: 2213: 2207: 2201: 2195: 2189: 2183: 2177: 2171: 2165: 2156: 2150: 2144: 2138: 2132: 2126: 2120: 2114: 2108: 2102: 2093: 2087: 2081: 2075: 2069: 2063: 2052: 2046: 2035: 2029: 2016: 2010: 2004: 1998: 1989: 1983: 1974: 1968: 1962: 1961:, pp. 9–10. 1956: 1950: 1944: 1938: 1932: 1926: 1920: 1914: 1908: 1902: 1896: 1885: 1879: 1873: 1867: 1861: 1855: 1849: 1843: 1832: 1826: 1809: 1802: 1796: 1790: 1779: 1773: 1770:Operation Popeye 1762: 1756: 1749: 1743: 1730: 1724: 1718: 1712: 1700: 1694: 1688: 1682: 1676: 1670: 1664: 1658: 1652: 1646: 1644: 1642: 1641: 1635: 1624: 1622: 1621: 1615: 1603: 1597: 1591: 1585: 1574: 1568: 1566: 1556: 1539:(8): 1116–1131. 1519: 1513: 1512: 1499: 1493: 1490: 1484: 1476: 1470: 1467: 1461: 1454: 1448: 1446: 1435: 1429: 1415: 1327: 1200: 1185: 1177:military control 1153:Benjamin H. Read 1140: 1093: 1082: 1074:José Paulo Netto 1046:, leader of the 1041: 1018:Francisco Julião 1015: 1004: 993: 982: 924: 814: 750: 678: 635:San Tiago Dantas 600:Attorney General 565: 523: 480:In a message to 420: 405: 294:, failed, while 175:Republican Party 171:Democratic Party 141:Cuban Revolution 119: 64: 5504: 5503: 5499: 5498: 5497: 5495: 5494: 5493: 5454:1960s in Brazil 5434: 5433: 5432: 5420: 5410: 5408: 5398: 5396: 5388: 5386: 5381: 5378: 5369: 5362: 5355: 5348: 5341: 5334: 5327: 5318: 5311: 5304: 5291: 5285: 5281: 5275: 5273:Sailors' Revolt 5271: 5265: 5261: 5255: 5251: 5245: 5241: 5235: 5231: 5225: 5221: 5215: 5211: 5205: 5201: 5190: 5184: 5180: 5171: 5164: 5157: 5151:External policy 5146: 5139: 5132: 5125: 5114: 5111: 5102: 5097: 5067: 5059: 5057: 5053: 5046: 5042: 5037: 5030: 5023: 5016: 5009: 5002: 4995: 4988: 4981: 4974: 4965: 4954: 4949: 4941: 4933: 4931: 4922: 4914: 4912: 4903: 4890: 4882: 4869: 4861: 4859: 4849: 4840: 4832: 4830: 4826: 4819: 4811: 4809: 4801: 4796: 4788: 4786: 4782: 4775: 4740: 4732: 4730: 4716: 4708: 4706: 4677: 4669: 4667: 4638: 4630: 4628: 4605: 4597: 4595: 4587: 4582: 4574: 4572: 4568: 4561: 4553: 4551: 4543: 4538: 4530: 4528: 4520: 4515: 4507: 4505: 4482: 4474: 4472: 4468: 4461: 4454: 4446: 4444: 4432: 4427: 4419: 4417: 4413: 4406: 4398: 4396: 4365: 4357: 4355: 4345: 4336: 4326:Spektor, Matias 4324: 4313: 4297: 4285: 4276: 4267: 4253: 4239: 4229:Bandeira, Moniz 4227: 4215:Bandeira, Moniz 4213: 4204: 4199: 4198: 4190: 4186: 4178: 4174: 4166: 4162: 4154: 4150: 4142: 4138: 4130: 4126: 4118: 4111: 4103: 4099: 4091: 4087: 4079: 4075: 4067: 4063: 4055: 4051: 4043: 4039: 4031: 4027: 4019: 4015: 3999: 3995: 3987: 3983: 3975: 3971: 3963: 3959: 3951: 3947: 3939: 3935: 3927: 3916: 3908: 3904: 3896: 3892: 3884: 3880: 3872: 3868: 3860: 3856: 3848: 3844: 3836: 3832: 3824: 3820: 3812: 3805: 3797: 3793: 3785: 3781: 3773: 3769: 3761: 3757: 3749: 3745: 3737: 3733: 3724: 3723: 3719: 3711: 3704: 3696: 3692: 3684: 3680: 3672: 3668: 3660: 3656: 3652:, pp. 6–7. 3648: 3644: 3636: 3632: 3624: 3620: 3609: 3605: 3594: 3590: 3582: 3578: 3570: 3566: 3558: 3554: 3546: 3542: 3534: 3530: 3522: 3518: 3510: 3506: 3498: 3494: 3482: 3478: 3470: 3463: 3455: 3448: 3440: 3436: 3425: 3421: 3413: 3404: 3393: 3389: 3381: 3377: 3369: 3365: 3357: 3353: 3345: 3341: 3333: 3329: 3321: 3317: 3309: 3302: 3294: 3285: 3277: 3268: 3260: 3256: 3252:, pp. 2–3. 3248: 3244: 3240:, pp. 7–9. 3236: 3232: 3224: 3220: 3212: 3203: 3195: 3191: 3183: 3179: 3171: 3167: 3159: 3155: 3147: 3143: 3135: 3131: 3123: 3114: 3106: 3102: 3094: 3087: 3079: 3075: 3067: 3063: 3055: 3051: 3043: 3039: 3031: 3027: 3019: 3015: 3007: 3000: 2992: 2983: 2972: 2968: 2960: 2956: 2948: 2944: 2936: 2932: 2924: 2920: 2912: 2905: 2897: 2893: 2885: 2878: 2870: 2866: 2858: 2854: 2846: 2842: 2834: 2830: 2822: 2818: 2810: 2803: 2795: 2791: 2783: 2779: 2771: 2767: 2759: 2752: 2744: 2740: 2732: 2728: 2720: 2716: 2708: 2699: 2691: 2687: 2679: 2675: 2667: 2663: 2652: 2648: 2640: 2636: 2628: 2624: 2616: 2612: 2604: 2600: 2592: 2588: 2580: 2576: 2568: 2564: 2556: 2549: 2541: 2537: 2529: 2520: 2512: 2508: 2500: 2496: 2488: 2484: 2476: 2472: 2464: 2460: 2452: 2448: 2440: 2436: 2424: 2420: 2412: 2408: 2400: 2396: 2388: 2384: 2376: 2372: 2364: 2360: 2352: 2348: 2340: 2336: 2328: 2321: 2313: 2309: 2301: 2297: 2289: 2285: 2277: 2273: 2265: 2261: 2253: 2249: 2241: 2234: 2226: 2222: 2218:, p. 3624. 2214: 2210: 2202: 2198: 2190: 2186: 2178: 2174: 2166: 2159: 2151: 2147: 2139: 2135: 2127: 2123: 2115: 2111: 2103: 2096: 2088: 2084: 2076: 2072: 2064: 2055: 2047: 2038: 2030: 2019: 2015:, p. 3622. 2011: 2007: 1999: 1992: 1984: 1977: 1969: 1965: 1957: 1953: 1945: 1941: 1933: 1929: 1921: 1917: 1909: 1905: 1901:, pp. 8–9. 1897: 1888: 1880: 1876: 1868: 1864: 1860:, pp. 7–8. 1856: 1852: 1844: 1835: 1827: 1823: 1818: 1813: 1812: 1803: 1799: 1793:pages 62 and 63 1784: 1780: 1776: 1763: 1759: 1750: 1746: 1731: 1727: 1719: 1715: 1701: 1697: 1689: 1685: 1677: 1673: 1665: 1661: 1653: 1649: 1639: 1637: 1633: 1626: 1619: 1617: 1613: 1606: 1604: 1600: 1592: 1588: 1575: 1571: 1558: 1545:10.2307/3310530 1526: 1520: 1516: 1502: 1500: 1496: 1491: 1487: 1477: 1473: 1468: 1464: 1455: 1451: 1438: 1436: 1432: 1416: 1412: 1407: 1389: 1334:military scheme 1321: 1281:, Chief of the 1275:Robert McNamara 1245: 1219: 1194: 1179: 1165:Ranieri Mazzili 1161:Henry Kissinger 1148: 1134: 1087: 1076: 1069: 1064: 1035: 1009: 998: 987: 976: 963: 918: 876: 821: 808: 777: 772: 744: 736:. According to 713: 672: 619: 572: 559: 517: 507: 466: 461: 431: 414: 399: 385: 358:Rafael Trujillo 308: 255:Hans Morgenthau 219: 214: 162: 157: 120:in the form of 113: 91:Peasant Leagues 58: 44:John F. Kennedy 17: 12: 11: 5: 5502: 5500: 5492: 5491: 5486: 5481: 5476: 5471: 5466: 5461: 5456: 5451: 5446: 5436: 5435: 5431: 5430: 5418: 5406: 5383: 5382: 5374: 5371: 5370: 5368: 5367: 5360: 5353: 5346: 5339: 5332: 5325: 5324: 5323: 5309: 5301: 5299: 5293: 5292: 5290: 5289: 5279: 5269: 5259: 5249: 5239: 5229: 5219: 5209: 5198: 5196: 5192: 5191: 5189: 5188: 5178: 5177: 5176: 5162: 5154: 5152: 5148: 5147: 5145: 5144: 5137: 5130: 5122: 5120: 5116: 5115: 5107: 5104: 5103: 5098: 5096: 5095: 5088: 5081: 5073: 5066: 5065: 5043: 5041: 5040:External links 5038: 5036: 5035: 5028: 5021: 5014: 5007: 5000: 4993: 4986: 4979: 4971: 4970: 4966: 4964: 4963: 4947: 4939: 4920: 4901: 4888: 4880: 4867: 4846: 4845: 4841: 4839: 4838: 4817: 4794: 4773: 4738: 4714: 4675: 4651:(2): 323–351. 4636: 4603: 4580: 4559: 4536: 4513: 4480: 4452: 4425: 4404: 4363: 4342: 4341: 4337: 4335: 4334: 4322: 4311: 4295: 4283: 4274: 4265: 4251: 4237: 4225: 4210: 4209: 4205: 4203: 4200: 4197: 4196: 4184: 4172: 4160: 4158:, p. 133. 4148: 4136: 4124: 4109: 4097: 4085: 4073: 4061: 4059:, p. 101. 4049: 4037: 4025: 4013: 3993: 3981: 3969: 3957: 3945: 3933: 3914: 3902: 3890: 3878: 3866: 3854: 3842: 3830: 3818: 3803: 3791: 3779: 3767: 3755: 3743: 3731: 3717: 3702: 3690: 3678: 3666: 3654: 3642: 3630: 3618: 3603: 3588: 3576: 3564: 3552: 3540: 3538:, p. 152. 3528: 3516: 3504: 3492: 3484:CPDOC FGV 2001 3476: 3461: 3446: 3444:, p. 531. 3434: 3419: 3402: 3387: 3375: 3363: 3351: 3339: 3327: 3325:, p. 571. 3315: 3300: 3283: 3266: 3254: 3242: 3230: 3218: 3216:, p. 339. 3201: 3199:, p. 338. 3189: 3177: 3165: 3153: 3141: 3139:, p. 334. 3129: 3112: 3100: 3085: 3083:, p. 326. 3073: 3061: 3049: 3047:, p. 345. 3037: 3025: 3013: 2998: 2981: 2974:CPDOC FGV 2001 2966: 2954: 2942: 2930: 2918: 2903: 2901:, p. 341. 2891: 2876: 2874:, p. 120. 2864: 2852: 2840: 2828: 2816: 2801: 2789: 2777: 2765: 2750: 2738: 2726: 2714: 2697: 2685: 2673: 2661: 2646: 2634: 2622: 2610: 2598: 2586: 2574: 2562: 2547: 2535: 2518: 2506: 2504:, p. 572. 2494: 2482: 2470: 2468:, p. 330. 2458: 2446: 2434: 2426:CPDOC FGV 2001 2418: 2406: 2394: 2382: 2370: 2358: 2356:, p. 844. 2354:Fernandes 2009 2346: 2344:, p. 114. 2334: 2330:Fernandes 2009 2319: 2307: 2295: 2283: 2271: 2259: 2257:, p. 184. 2247: 2232: 2220: 2208: 2196: 2194:, p. 453. 2184: 2172: 2157: 2145: 2143:, p. 120. 2133: 2121: 2109: 2094: 2082: 2070: 2053: 2036: 2017: 2005: 1990: 1975: 1963: 1951: 1939: 1927: 1915: 1913:, p. 123. 1903: 1886: 1874: 1862: 1850: 1833: 1831:, p. 7-8. 1820: 1819: 1817: 1814: 1811: 1810: 1797: 1774: 1757: 1744: 1725: 1713: 1695: 1683: 1671: 1659: 1647: 1625:. p. 138, and 1598: 1586: 1569: 1514: 1494: 1485: 1471: 1462: 1449: 1430: 1426:no second Cuba 1424:, p. 6, " 1409: 1408: 1406: 1403: 1388: 1385: 1279:Maxwell Taylor 1244: 1241: 1224:Castelo Branco 1218: 1215: 1147: 1144: 1116:Vernon Walters 1095:only in 1963. 1085:Flávio Tavares 1068: 1065: 1063: 1060: 1056:Brazilian Navy 962: 961:Other measures 959: 951:Carlos Lacerda 875: 872: 820: 817: 776: 773: 771: 768: 738:Moniz Bandeira 712: 709: 639:Finlandization 631:Punta del Este 629:At the Second 618: 615: 571: 568: 506: 503: 465: 462: 460: 457: 453:Getúlio Vargas 430: 427: 389:Brazilian Army 384: 381: 377:Thomas C. Mann 349:Walt W. Rostow 307: 304: 247:United Nations 218: 215: 213: 210: 179:American South 161: 158: 156: 153: 103:Lincoln Gordon 99:1962 elections 83:Leonel Brizola 75:Triennial Plan 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 5501: 5490: 5487: 5485: 5482: 5480: 5477: 5475: 5472: 5470: 5467: 5465: 5462: 5460: 5457: 5455: 5452: 5450: 5447: 5445: 5442: 5441: 5439: 5429: 5424: 5419: 5417: 5416:United States 5407: 5405: 5395: 5391: 5377: 5372: 5365: 5361: 5358: 5354: 5351: 5347: 5344: 5340: 5337: 5333: 5330: 5326: 5321: 5317: 5316: 5314: 5310: 5307: 5303: 5302: 5300: 5298: 5294: 5284: 5280: 5274: 5270: 5264: 5260: 5254: 5250: 5244: 5240: 5234: 5230: 5224: 5220: 5214: 5210: 5204: 5200: 5199: 5197: 5193: 5183: 5179: 5174: 5170: 5169: 5167: 5163: 5160: 5156: 5155: 5153: 5149: 5142: 5138: 5135: 5134:Plano Trienal 5131: 5128: 5124: 5123: 5121: 5117: 5110: 5105: 5101: 5094: 5089: 5087: 5082: 5080: 5075: 5074: 5071: 5052: 5051: 5045: 5044: 5039: 5033: 5029: 5026: 5022: 5019: 5015: 5012: 5008: 5005: 5001: 4998: 4994: 4991: 4987: 4984: 4980: 4977: 4973: 4972: 4968: 4967: 4960: 4953: 4948: 4944: 4943:"O Semanário" 4940: 4930: 4926: 4921: 4911: 4907: 4902: 4898: 4894: 4889: 4885: 4881: 4877: 4873: 4868: 4857: 4853: 4848: 4847: 4843: 4842: 4825: 4824: 4818: 4807: 4800: 4795: 4781: 4780: 4774: 4770: 4766: 4761: 4756: 4752: 4748: 4744: 4739: 4728: 4724: 4720: 4715: 4705: 4701: 4697: 4693: 4689: 4685: 4681: 4676: 4666: 4662: 4658: 4654: 4650: 4646: 4642: 4637: 4626: 4621: 4617: 4613: 4609: 4604: 4593: 4586: 4581: 4567: 4566: 4560: 4549: 4542: 4537: 4526: 4519: 4514: 4503: 4498: 4494: 4490: 4486: 4481: 4471:on 2021-07-09 4467: 4460: 4459: 4453: 4442: 4438: 4431: 4426: 4412: 4411: 4405: 4395: 4391: 4386: 4381: 4377: 4373: 4369: 4364: 4353: 4349: 4344: 4343: 4339: 4338: 4331: 4327: 4323: 4319: 4318: 4312: 4308: 4304: 4300: 4299:Gaspari, Elio 4296: 4292: 4288: 4284: 4280: 4275: 4271: 4266: 4262: 4261: 4256: 4252: 4248: 4247: 4242: 4238: 4234: 4230: 4226: 4222: 4221: 4216: 4212: 4211: 4207: 4206: 4201: 4193: 4188: 4185: 4181: 4176: 4173: 4169: 4164: 4161: 4157: 4152: 4149: 4145: 4140: 4137: 4133: 4128: 4125: 4122:, p. 66. 4121: 4116: 4114: 4110: 4107:, p. 98. 4106: 4101: 4098: 4094: 4089: 4086: 4082: 4081:Bandeira 1978 4077: 4074: 4071:, p. 72. 4070: 4065: 4062: 4058: 4053: 4050: 4046: 4041: 4038: 4034: 4029: 4026: 4022: 4017: 4014: 4010: 4006: 4002: 3997: 3994: 3990: 3985: 3982: 3979:, p. 64. 3978: 3973: 3970: 3966: 3961: 3958: 3954: 3949: 3946: 3942: 3937: 3934: 3930: 3925: 3923: 3921: 3919: 3915: 3911: 3906: 3903: 3899: 3894: 3891: 3887: 3882: 3879: 3875: 3870: 3867: 3863: 3858: 3855: 3851: 3846: 3843: 3839: 3834: 3831: 3828:, p. 86. 3827: 3822: 3819: 3816:, p. 14. 3815: 3810: 3808: 3804: 3800: 3795: 3792: 3788: 3783: 3780: 3777:, p. 11. 3776: 3771: 3768: 3764: 3759: 3756: 3752: 3747: 3744: 3741:, p. 11. 3740: 3739:Loureiro 2017 3735: 3732: 3727: 3721: 3718: 3714: 3709: 3707: 3703: 3699: 3694: 3691: 3688:, p. 57. 3687: 3682: 3679: 3675: 3670: 3667: 3663: 3658: 3655: 3651: 3646: 3643: 3640:, p. 12. 3639: 3634: 3631: 3627: 3626:Bandeira 1978 3622: 3619: 3615: 3613: 3607: 3604: 3600: 3598: 3592: 3589: 3585: 3580: 3577: 3574:, p. 52. 3573: 3568: 3565: 3561: 3560:Domingos 2018 3556: 3553: 3549: 3548:Bandeira 2014 3544: 3541: 3537: 3532: 3529: 3525: 3520: 3517: 3513: 3508: 3505: 3501: 3496: 3493: 3489: 3485: 3480: 3477: 3473: 3468: 3466: 3462: 3459:, p. 51. 3458: 3453: 3451: 3447: 3443: 3442:Domingos 2018 3438: 3435: 3431: 3429: 3423: 3420: 3416: 3411: 3409: 3407: 3403: 3399: 3397: 3391: 3388: 3385:, p. 77. 3384: 3379: 3376: 3373:, p. 55. 3372: 3367: 3364: 3360: 3355: 3352: 3348: 3347:Loureiro 2014 3343: 3340: 3336: 3335:Loureiro 2014 3331: 3328: 3324: 3323:Loureiro 2013 3319: 3316: 3312: 3307: 3305: 3301: 3297: 3296:Loureiro 2011 3292: 3290: 3288: 3284: 3280: 3279:Loureiro 2014 3275: 3273: 3271: 3267: 3263: 3262:Loureiro 2017 3258: 3255: 3251: 3250:Loureiro 2017 3246: 3243: 3239: 3238:Loureiro 2017 3234: 3231: 3228:, p. 78. 3227: 3222: 3219: 3215: 3214:Loureiro 2014 3210: 3208: 3206: 3202: 3198: 3197:Loureiro 2014 3193: 3190: 3186: 3185:Loureiro 2013 3181: 3178: 3174: 3173:Loureiro 2013 3169: 3166: 3163:, p. 76. 3162: 3157: 3154: 3150: 3149:Loureiro 2013 3145: 3142: 3138: 3137:Loureiro 2014 3133: 3130: 3126: 3125:Loureiro 2017 3121: 3119: 3117: 3113: 3109: 3108:Loureiro 2013 3104: 3101: 3098:, p. 17. 3097: 3096:Loureiro 2017 3092: 3090: 3086: 3082: 3081:Loureiro 2014 3077: 3074: 3070: 3069:Loureiro 2013 3065: 3062: 3058: 3057:Loureiro 2013 3053: 3050: 3046: 3045:Loureiro 2014 3041: 3038: 3034: 3033:Ferreira 2011 3029: 3026: 3023:, p. 10. 3022: 3021:Loureiro 2011 3017: 3014: 3010: 3005: 3003: 2999: 2995: 2990: 2988: 2986: 2982: 2979: 2975: 2970: 2967: 2963: 2958: 2955: 2951: 2950:Loureiro 2013 2946: 2943: 2939: 2934: 2931: 2927: 2922: 2919: 2915: 2910: 2908: 2904: 2900: 2899:Loureiro 2014 2895: 2892: 2889:, p. 18. 2888: 2887:Loureiro 2017 2883: 2881: 2877: 2873: 2868: 2865: 2862:, p. 12. 2861: 2860:Loureiro 2017 2856: 2853: 2850:, p. 13. 2849: 2844: 2841: 2837: 2832: 2829: 2825: 2820: 2817: 2813: 2808: 2806: 2802: 2798: 2797:Duchiade 2021 2793: 2790: 2786: 2781: 2778: 2774: 2773:Domingos 2018 2769: 2766: 2762: 2757: 2755: 2751: 2747: 2742: 2739: 2735: 2730: 2727: 2724:, p. 59. 2723: 2718: 2715: 2711: 2706: 2704: 2702: 2698: 2694: 2693:Domingos 2018 2689: 2686: 2682: 2681:Domingos 2018 2677: 2674: 2670: 2665: 2662: 2658: 2656: 2650: 2647: 2643: 2638: 2635: 2631: 2630:Oliveira 2020 2626: 2623: 2619: 2614: 2611: 2607: 2602: 2599: 2595: 2590: 2587: 2584:, p. 73. 2583: 2578: 2575: 2571: 2570:Loureiro 2017 2566: 2563: 2559: 2554: 2552: 2548: 2544: 2539: 2536: 2532: 2527: 2525: 2523: 2519: 2515: 2514:Loureiro 2014 2510: 2507: 2503: 2502:Loureiro 2013 2498: 2495: 2492:, p. 44. 2491: 2486: 2483: 2479: 2478:Loureiro 2013 2474: 2471: 2467: 2466:Loureiro 2014 2462: 2459: 2455: 2454:Loureiro 2013 2450: 2447: 2443: 2442:Loureiro 2014 2438: 2435: 2431: 2427: 2422: 2419: 2416:, p. 74. 2415: 2410: 2407: 2403: 2398: 2395: 2391: 2390:Loureiro 2017 2386: 2383: 2379: 2374: 2371: 2367: 2362: 2359: 2355: 2350: 2347: 2343: 2338: 2335: 2331: 2326: 2324: 2320: 2316: 2311: 2308: 2304: 2299: 2296: 2292: 2287: 2284: 2280: 2279:Bandeira 2014 2275: 2272: 2269:, p. 28. 2268: 2263: 2260: 2256: 2251: 2248: 2244: 2239: 2237: 2233: 2229: 2224: 2221: 2217: 2212: 2209: 2206:, p. 26. 2205: 2200: 2197: 2193: 2192:Oliveira 2020 2188: 2185: 2181: 2176: 2173: 2170:, p. 27. 2169: 2164: 2162: 2158: 2154: 2149: 2146: 2142: 2141:Bandeira 2014 2137: 2134: 2131:, p. 42. 2130: 2125: 2122: 2119:, p. 40. 2118: 2113: 2110: 2107:, p. 25. 2106: 2101: 2099: 2095: 2092:, p. 14. 2091: 2090:Loureiro 2017 2086: 2083: 2080:, p. 23. 2079: 2074: 2071: 2068:, p. 10. 2067: 2062: 2060: 2058: 2054: 2051:, p. 72. 2050: 2045: 2043: 2041: 2037: 2034:, p. 75. 2033: 2028: 2026: 2024: 2022: 2018: 2014: 2009: 2006: 2002: 2001:Loureiro 2017 1997: 1995: 1991: 1988:, p. 71. 1987: 1982: 1980: 1976: 1972: 1967: 1964: 1960: 1955: 1952: 1948: 1943: 1940: 1937:, p. 10. 1936: 1931: 1928: 1924: 1919: 1916: 1912: 1907: 1904: 1900: 1895: 1893: 1891: 1887: 1883: 1878: 1875: 1871: 1866: 1863: 1859: 1854: 1851: 1847: 1842: 1840: 1838: 1834: 1830: 1825: 1822: 1815: 1807: 1801: 1798: 1794: 1788: 1783: 1778: 1775: 1771: 1767: 1761: 1758: 1754: 1748: 1745: 1741: 1740: 1735: 1729: 1726: 1722: 1717: 1714: 1710: 1706: 1705:Loureiro 2013 1699: 1696: 1692: 1687: 1684: 1680: 1679:1964: o golpe 1675: 1672: 1668: 1663: 1660: 1656: 1655:Bandeira 1978 1651: 1648: 1645:. p. 154-155. 1632: 1631: 1612: 1611: 1602: 1599: 1595: 1594:Loureiro 2014 1590: 1587: 1583: 1579: 1573: 1570: 1564: 1563: 1554: 1550: 1546: 1542: 1538: 1534: 1530: 1524: 1518: 1515: 1510: 1506: 1498: 1495: 1489: 1486: 1482: 1475: 1472: 1466: 1463: 1459: 1453: 1450: 1444: 1443: 1434: 1431: 1427: 1423: 1419: 1414: 1411: 1404: 1402: 1399: 1395: 1386: 1384: 1382: 1378: 1374: 1368: 1366: 1365:Costa e Silva 1362: 1358: 1354: 1350: 1344: 1341: 1339: 1335: 1331: 1325: 1320: 1313: 1308: 1305: 1303: 1299: 1295: 1294: 1288: 1284: 1280: 1276: 1272: 1267: 1265: 1256: 1255: 1249: 1242: 1240: 1238: 1233: 1227: 1225: 1216: 1214: 1212: 1208: 1204: 1198: 1193: 1187: 1183: 1178: 1174: 1170: 1166: 1162: 1156: 1154: 1145: 1143: 1138: 1133: 1128: 1125: 1119: 1117: 1110: 1107: 1103: 1100: 1096: 1091: 1086: 1080: 1075: 1066: 1061: 1059: 1057: 1053: 1049: 1045: 1039: 1034: 1029: 1027: 1026:American Army 1023: 1019: 1013: 1008: 1002: 997: 994:, journalist 991: 986: 980: 975: 970: 968: 960: 958: 956: 952: 948: 944: 940: 936: 932: 926: 922: 917: 913: 912:Miguel Arraes 907: 905: 901: 897: 892: 890: 880: 873: 871: 867: 865: 864:David E. Bell 859: 855: 852: 848: 844: 839: 833: 830: 826: 818: 816: 812: 807: 801: 797: 795: 789: 781: 774: 769: 767: 763: 761: 757: 752: 748: 743: 739: 735: 731: 727: 717: 710: 708: 705: 701: 697: 692: 689: 684: 682: 676: 671: 662: 658: 656: 651: 649: 644: 640: 636: 632: 623: 616: 614: 612: 608: 604: 601: 598:In December, 596: 594: 589: 584: 576: 569: 567: 563: 558: 554: 549: 547: 542: 540: 536: 531: 529: 528: 521: 516: 511: 504: 502: 498: 495: 491: 487: 483: 478: 474: 471: 463: 458: 456: 454: 448: 445: 444:U.S. Treasury 441: 437: 426: 424: 418: 413: 409: 403: 398: 394: 390: 382: 380: 378: 373: 369: 365: 363: 359: 354: 350: 346: 340: 338: 334: 328: 326: 322: 312: 305: 303: 301: 297: 293: 288: 283: 281: 277: 276:Jacobo Árbenz 273: 269: 265: 260: 259:George Kennan 256: 252: 251:anti-American 248: 243: 241: 236: 232: 228: 224: 216: 211: 209: 207: 203: 199: 195: 191: 190:Richard Nixon 187: 182: 180: 176: 172: 168: 159: 154: 152: 150: 146: 145:Latin America 142: 138: 133: 131: 127: 123: 117: 112: 108: 107:Jânio Quadros 104: 100: 94: 92: 88: 84: 80: 76: 72: 68: 62: 57: 51: 49: 45: 41: 37: 33: 26: 21: 5141:Base reforms 5058:. Retrieved 5049: 4958: 4932:. Retrieved 4928: 4913:. Retrieved 4909: 4896: 4875: 4860:. Retrieved 4855: 4831:. Retrieved 4822: 4810:. Retrieved 4805: 4787:. Retrieved 4778: 4750: 4746: 4731:. Retrieved 4729:(2): 447–463 4726: 4722: 4707:. Retrieved 4687: 4683: 4668:. Retrieved 4648: 4644: 4629:. Retrieved 4615: 4611: 4596:. Retrieved 4591: 4573:. Retrieved 4564: 4552:. Retrieved 4547: 4529:. Retrieved 4524: 4506:. Retrieved 4492: 4488: 4473:. Retrieved 4466:the original 4457: 4445:. Retrieved 4443:(9): 831–856 4440: 4436: 4418:. Retrieved 4409: 4397:. Retrieved 4375: 4371: 4356:. Retrieved 4351: 4329: 4316: 4302: 4290: 4287:Fico, Carlos 4278: 4269: 4259: 4245: 4232: 4219: 4187: 4175: 4163: 4151: 4139: 4127: 4100: 4088: 4076: 4064: 4052: 4040: 4028: 4016: 3996: 3984: 3972: 3960: 3948: 3936: 3929:Gaspari 2014 3905: 3893: 3881: 3869: 3857: 3845: 3833: 3821: 3814:Pereira 2018 3794: 3782: 3775:Pereira 2018 3770: 3758: 3746: 3734: 3720: 3693: 3681: 3669: 3664:, p. 1. 3662:Spektor 2018 3657: 3650:Pereira 2018 3645: 3638:Spektor 2018 3633: 3621: 3611: 3606: 3596: 3591: 3579: 3567: 3555: 3543: 3531: 3519: 3507: 3495: 3479: 3472:Ribeiro 2020 3437: 3427: 3422: 3417:, p. 7. 3415:Spektor 2018 3400:, p. 6. 3395: 3390: 3378: 3366: 3354: 3342: 3330: 3318: 3311:Resende 2009 3257: 3245: 3233: 3226:Betfuer 2017 3221: 3192: 3180: 3168: 3161:Betfuer 2017 3156: 3144: 3132: 3127:, p. 5. 3103: 3076: 3064: 3052: 3040: 3028: 3016: 3009:Gennari 1997 2994:Betfuer 2017 2969: 2962:Gennari 1997 2957: 2945: 2938:Resende 2009 2933: 2921: 2894: 2872:Resende 2009 2867: 2855: 2848:Pereira 2018 2843: 2836:Resende 2009 2831: 2824:Resende 2009 2819: 2812:Resende 2009 2792: 2785:Resende 2009 2780: 2768: 2761:Betfuer 2017 2746:Resende 2009 2741: 2734:Resende 2009 2729: 2717: 2710:Pereira 2018 2688: 2676: 2669:Resende 2009 2664: 2654: 2649: 2644:, p. 4. 2642:Spektor 2018 2637: 2625: 2613: 2601: 2589: 2582:Betfuer 2017 2577: 2572:, p. 2. 2565: 2545:, p. 9. 2543:Spektor 2018 2538: 2509: 2497: 2485: 2473: 2461: 2449: 2437: 2421: 2414:Betfuer 2017 2409: 2404:, p. 3. 2402:Spektor 2018 2397: 2392:, p. 4. 2385: 2373: 2361: 2349: 2337: 2310: 2298: 2286: 2274: 2262: 2250: 2243:Betfuer 2017 2223: 2211: 2199: 2187: 2175: 2148: 2136: 2124: 2112: 2085: 2073: 2066:Pereira 2018 2049:Betfuer 2017 2032:Betfuer 2017 2008: 2003:, p. 1. 1986:Betfuer 2017 1966: 1959:Pereira 2018 1954: 1942: 1930: 1918: 1911:Resende 2009 1906: 1899:Pereira 2018 1877: 1870:Pereira 2018 1865: 1858:Pereira 2018 1853: 1848:, p. 6. 1846:Spektor 2018 1829:Pereira 2018 1824: 1806:Gaspari 2014 1800: 1777: 1760: 1751:Annex II em 1747: 1739:Folha Online 1737: 1728: 1721:Pereira 2018 1716: 1709:Pereira 2018 1698: 1686: 1678: 1674: 1666: 1662: 1650: 1638:. Retrieved 1629: 1618:. Retrieved 1609: 1601: 1589: 1580:memorandum ( 1572: 1561: 1536: 1532: 1517: 1508: 1497: 1488: 1474: 1465: 1452: 1441: 1433: 1425: 1413: 1394:Family March 1390: 1377:Porto Alegre 1370: 1346: 1342: 1330:Elio Gaspari 1315: 1310: 1306: 1292: 1268: 1260: 1253: 1228: 1220: 1211:Minas Gerais 1188: 1157: 1149: 1132:Odílio Denys 1129: 1120: 1112: 1108: 1105: 1101: 1097: 1070: 1050:, was a CIA 1030: 1022:Green Berets 974:José Joffily 971: 964: 927: 916:João Cleofas 908: 893: 889:Stephen Rabe 885: 868: 860: 856: 834: 822: 802: 798: 790: 786: 764: 753: 722: 693: 685: 670:Albino Silva 667: 652: 628: 611:Pope Paul VI 597: 585: 581: 550: 543: 532: 525: 512: 508: 505:Other issues 499: 479: 475: 467: 449: 432: 386: 374: 370: 366: 341: 337:gendarmeries 329: 321:Cheddi Jagan 317: 296:Fidel Castro 284: 244: 238:through the 231:Soviet Union 223:World War II 220: 183: 163: 134: 95: 67:Western bloc 52: 36:João Goulart 30: 5185:(1961-1963) 5182:Lobster War 4753:(1): 5–17. 4168:Parker 1977 4156:Corrêa 1977 4057:Parker 1977 4033:Parker 1977 3612:O Semanário 2378:Tibola 2007 2366:Tibola 2007 2342:Tibola 2007 1785: [ 1509:NSA Archive 1501:Read also: 1481:Estado Novo 1359:at 1800 in 1322: [ 1287:John McCone 1237:Second Army 1195: [ 1180: [ 1135: [ 1088: [ 1077: [ 1036: [ 1010: [ 1007:O Semanário 999: [ 996:José Frejat 988: [ 977: [ 919: [ 896:Philip Agee 809: [ 745: [ 681:Soviet bloc 673: [ 643:neutralized 588:legislative 560: [ 518: [ 415: [ 400: [ 347:. Based on 240:containment 227:world order 114: [ 59: [ 25:White House 5438:Categories 5223:Referendum 5060:2020-09-29 4934:2021-07-31 4915:2021-08-06 4862:2021-11-27 4833:2021-07-22 4812:2021-07-02 4789:2021-07-08 4733:2021-07-01 4709:2021-06-30 4670:2021-07-26 4631:2021-06-30 4598:2021-07-28 4575:2021-06-20 4554:2021-07-09 4531:2021-07-09 4508:2021-06-20 4475:2021-07-08 4447:2021-07-22 4420:2021-06-20 4399:2021-07-01 4358:2021-07-01 4134:, cap. 22. 4120:Faria 2018 4045:Faria 2018 3977:Faria 2018 3953:Faria 2018 3898:Faria 2018 3874:Faria 2018 3850:Faria 2018 3751:Faria 2018 3713:Faria 2018 3686:Faria 2018 3572:Faria 2018 3457:Faria 2018 3371:Faria 2018 2916:, cap. 21. 2722:Faria 2018 2490:Faria 2018 2291:Faria 2018 2117:Faria 2018 1882:Faria 2018 1816:References 1640:2020-06-05 1620:2021-09-01 1381:Montevideo 1338:First Army 1298:destroyers 1171:, until a 847:Lend-Lease 825:plebiscite 700:Dianopolis 539:laboriousm 515:cordiality 490:Juan Perón 364:in Haiti. 79:Washington 4969:Documents 4769:156246728 4704:157566383 4690:: 61–79. 4665:143487769 4437:Antíteses 4394:197756017 4255:CPDOC FGV 4192:Fico 2008 4180:Fico 2008 4105:Fico 2008 4069:Fico 2008 3965:Fico 2008 3941:Fico 2008 3910:Fico 2008 3886:Fico 2008 3862:Fico 2008 3838:Fico 2008 3826:Fico 2008 3674:Fico 2008 3584:Fico 2008 3536:Lara 2019 3524:Fico 2008 3512:Lara 2019 3502:, cap. 8. 3383:Fico 2008 3359:Fico 2008 2926:Lara 2019 2618:Lara 2019 2606:Lara 2019 2594:Fico 2008 2558:Fico 2008 2315:Fico 2008 2303:Lara 2019 2267:Fico 2008 2255:Lara 2019 2228:Lara 2019 2216:Lara 2015 2204:Fico 2008 2180:Lara 2019 2168:Fico 2008 2153:Fico 2008 2129:Lara 2019 2105:Fico 2008 2078:Fico 2008 2013:Lara 2015 1971:Lara 2015 1947:Fico 2008 1935:Lara 2016 1923:Lara 2015 1753:Fico 2008 1734:Fico 2008 1691:Fico 2008 1576:Later, a 1523:Sri Lanka 1456:See also 1422:Lara 2019 1418:Fico 2008 1398:Itamaraty 1293:Forrestal 1264:São Paulo 1254:Chepachet 1146:The plans 1024:from the 947:Guanabara 943:Southeast 941:; in the 546:Northeast 482:Dean Rusk 272:overthrow 196:in 1963, 87:took over 5428:Politics 4301:(2014). 4289:(2008). 4257:(2001). 4243:(1977). 4217:(1978). 1791:(1964), 1207:governor 734:Congress 707:policy. 607:Brasília 527:jeitinho 202:election 167:Congress 137:Cold War 5390:Portals 4202:Sources 1681:(2014). 1669:(2014). 1553:3310530 1361:Rezende 1336:in the 972:Deputy 851:Germans 838:default 524:" and " 235:realist 184:In the 155:Context 5404:Brazil 5379:(1964) 5286:(1964) 5276:(1964) 5266:(1964) 5256:(1964) 5246:(1963) 5236:(1963) 5226:(1963) 5216:(1962) 5206:(1961) 5195:Events 5112:(1961) 4767: 4702: 4663: 4392: 1557:, and 1551: 1349:Ancora 1300:, one 1296:, six 1285:, and 1205:, the 1016:, and 139:, the 85:, who 5054:(PDF) 4955:(PDF) 4827:(PDF) 4802:(PDF) 4783:(PDF) 4765:S2CID 4700:S2CID 4661:S2CID 4588:(PDF) 4569:(PDF) 4544:(PDF) 4521:(PDF) 4469:(PDF) 4462:(PDF) 4433:(PDF) 4414:(PDF) 4390:S2CID 4372:Tempo 4208:Books 1789:] 1634:(PDF) 1614:(PDF) 1549:JSTOR 1405:Notes 1355:will 1353:Kruel 1326:] 1252:USNS 1199:] 1184:] 1139:] 1092:] 1081:] 1040:] 1014:] 1003:] 992:] 983:, to 981:] 939:Ceará 935:Bahia 923:] 813:] 749:] 677:] 564:] 522:] 419:] 404:] 345:USAID 118:] 63:] 4959:Veja 4007:and 3396:Veja 1768:and 1764:See 1707:and 1605:See 1437:See 1357:meet 1291:USS 1083:and 965:The 937:and 843:Axis 387:The 353:land 257:and 71:Cuba 4876:BBC 4755:doi 4692:doi 4653:doi 4620:doi 4497:doi 4380:doi 2655:BBC 1541:doi 1537:112 1209:of 274:of 5440:: 4957:. 4927:. 4908:. 4895:. 4874:. 4854:. 4804:. 4763:. 4751:37 4749:. 4745:. 4721:. 4698:. 4688:17 4686:. 4682:. 4659:. 4649:46 4647:. 4643:. 4616:22 4610:. 4590:. 4546:. 4523:. 4493:29 4487:. 4435:. 4388:. 4376:24 4374:. 4370:. 4350:. 4305:. 4112:^ 4003:, 3917:^ 3806:^ 3705:^ 3486:, 3464:^ 3449:^ 3405:^ 3303:^ 3286:^ 3269:^ 3204:^ 3115:^ 3088:^ 3001:^ 2984:^ 2976:, 2906:^ 2879:^ 2804:^ 2753:^ 2700:^ 2550:^ 2521:^ 2428:. 2322:^ 2235:^ 2160:^ 2097:^ 2056:^ 2039:^ 2020:^ 1993:^ 1978:^ 1889:^ 1836:^ 1808:). 1787:pt 1547:. 1535:. 1531:. 1507:. 1340:. 1324:pt 1197:pt 1182:pt 1137:pt 1090:pt 1079:pt 1058:. 1038:pt 1012:pt 1001:pt 990:pt 979:pt 945:, 933:, 921:pt 811:pt 747:pt 675:pt 562:pt 520:pt 484:, 425:. 417:pt 402:pt 339:. 181:. 116:pt 93:. 61:pt 5392:: 5092:e 5085:t 5078:v 5063:. 4937:. 4918:. 4865:. 4836:. 4815:. 4792:. 4771:. 4757:: 4736:. 4727:9 4712:. 4694:: 4673:. 4655:: 4634:. 4622:: 4601:. 4578:. 4557:. 4534:. 4511:. 4499:: 4478:. 4450:. 4441:2 4423:. 4402:. 4382:: 4361:. 4332:. 4146:. 4095:. 4023:. 4011:. 3991:. 3931:. 3801:. 3789:. 3765:. 3728:. 3700:. 3616:. 3601:. 3490:. 3474:. 3432:. 3298:. 2799:. 2659:. 2432:. 1795:. 1772:. 1755:. 1742:. 1693:. 1657:. 1643:. 1623:. 1567:. 1555:. 1543:: 1511:. 1460:. 46:/

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.

Knowledge (XXG)

Brazil–United States relations during the João Goulart government

Index