557:
and went to the threshold of runway 20 and drove along the runway looking for the aircraft, without success. They first went to the south of the runway, the last area where the aircraft had been sighted. After finding no signs of the aircraft, they went to the north of the runway to investigate the area. The search spread to the sides of the runway and the overshoot area. Meanwhile, majority of the passengers were still around the aircraft and many were drenched by the intense rain. One passenger later walked across the airfield to the terminal to seek help and told the staff the whereabouts of the crash site. The wreckage was eventually located 18 minutes after the accident. There was a further 14 minutes delay while the fire crews tried to gain access to the site. In all, transfer of passengers to the terminal building took an hour and ten minutes.
599:
window, they were shocked to discover that the airport had disappeared from their view. The environment outside of their aircraft was pitch black and there was no reference for the crew to use for the landing. With no visual cues on the airport's runway, the standard operating procedure stated that the crew should have immediately executed a missed approach. At the time, however, their altitude was already close to the ground level and they were merely seconds away from landing. Given with the extremely limited amount of time to process and to consider the next course of action, the crew could not process quickly enough what had happened and became disoriented with the condition. Eventually, this led to the increase of the aircraft's rate of descent to 1,000 ft/min.
29:
573:
comfort the passengers. The Red Cross had also been put on standby. A private area had been set up in
Cardiff for trauma counseling. Those who decided to go back to Wales would be provided with ÂŁ100 for each passenger and a food parcel. They also stated that there would be an arrangement with locksmiths as multiple house keys and car keys of the passengers were still inside the wreckage. A team of 42 people were sent to Girona to provide support to the families at the hotels. A dedicated telephone line was also established by Thomson following the crash.
587:
At least five people in
Catalonia had been killed by the storms, prompting the civil agency to issue a weather emergency throughout the region. The result of the analysis indicated that both turbulence and windshear had not significantly affected the performance of the aircraft during the approach. While the storm was not considered as one of the main causes of the crash, it did contribute to the crew's decision to conduct a missed approach, further decreasing the fuel of the aircraft and increasing the workload of the crew.
685:. Several of the recommendations called for modifications and improvements regarding the design of aircraft components including an improved design of overhead lockers, better pilot seat harness and improved battery supplies. The FAA was asked to take measures regarding the possibility of uncommanded forward thrust. EASA was asked to make a specific go-around procedure below decision height as a mandatory course. Other recommendations were also issued to Girona Airport and the Spanish National Meteorology Institute (INM).
603:
would have informed the crew on the remaining altitude left for the aircraft. The "SINK RATE" warning took priority over the altimeter callouts, causing it to override the automatic height warnings of 50, 40, 30 and 20 feet. When the GWPS had completed the "SINK RATE' warning, the radio altimeter finally sounded, blaring "10 feet," indicating that there was only 10 feet left between the aircraft and the ground. With such little altitude left, the crew couldn't do anything useful to decrease their rate of descent.
484:, the crew gave confirmation between each other regarding their role during the landing. The First Officer would monitor the aircraft instruments while Captain Nolan would look out for external reference for Runway 20. The aircraft was configured again for landing and the crew received landing clearance from the controller. At 23:46 local time, the aircraft descended below cloud and became visual with the runway at around 500 feet (150 m) above ground level. The
545:
715:
477:(FMC) warned the crew that the remaining fuel had depleted to an insufficient level and the first officer advised Captain Nolan on the situation. The aircraft began to capture the glidepath. Just before they managed to do so, Captain Nolan checked on the fuel again and realized that the fuel had decreased to 2,800 kg, approximately 200 kg short of the minimum fuel for a diversion to the alternate airport.
301:. Depending on the type of rotation, the pulley system would provide either forward thrust or reverse thrust to the engines. The two cables, consisted of cable A and cable B, would eventually go through the designated powerplant control units, one on each side of the aircraft. If the A cable was pulled by the pulley then the forward thrust would increase. Pulling the B cable would increase the reverse thrust.
536:. The aircraft then passed through the fence, re-landed in a field and both main landing gears collapsed. It finally stopped after a 244-metre (801 ft) slide across the field, 1,900 metres (6,200 ft) from the second touchdown. During the crash, Captain Nolan was thrown from his seat, causing him to strike his head against the left windscreen, knocking him unconscious.
729:
757:
743:
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which was attached to the landing gear, immediately rotated backwards following the collapse of the gear, crashing through the aircraft's main electrical component which was located directly behind it and severely damaging it. As a result, the aircraft suffered a complete electrical failure. Due to the failure, the flight recorders immediately stopped recording.
620:
forward fuselage, damaging the flight electrical component and causing loss of battery supplies. It disabled multiple deceleration system of the aircraft, including the autobrake, anti-skid and the spoilers. Despite the damage, analysis from the accident indicated that the aircraft should have been able to stop within the remaining runway distance.
612:
limit of 1.8 G. Following the first impact, both the aircraft's yoke and thrust levers were pushed forward, possibly involuntary due to the forward load that had been caused by the impact. The aircraft initially bounced back into the air, but due to the forward input on the aircraft's pitch it came back down to the runway with a nose down pitch.
595:
glide angle. This deviation was noticed by the crew and they attempted to correct the glidepath by pushing the yoke to lower the nose, momentarily increasing the aircraft's rate of descent. The crew needed to monitor their instruments to know whether they had flown their aircraft to the correct glidepath.
644:
It is considered that the most probable cause of the accident was the destabilisation of the approach below decision height with loss of external visual references and automatic height callouts immediately before landing, resulting in touchdown with excessive descent rate in a nose down attitude. The
602:
Due to the high rate of descent, the aircraft rapidly lost its altitude. At a height of 80ft from the ground, approximately four seconds before the crash, the GPWS warning sounded the "SINK RATE" warning, indicating a high rate of descent. The crew couldn't hear the automatic altimeter callouts which
586:
The presence of stormy condition during the crash raised question on whether the storm had significantly affected the aircraft's performance, causing it to suffer a hard landing. The storm on that particular day of the crash was a part of a series of storms that had swept Spain for the past few days.
556:
The tower controller, aware shortly after touchdown that something was amiss, tried to contact the crew of Flight 226A, but to no avail. She then pressed the button to activate the emergency alarm. To her surprise, the emergency bell did not ring. Fire crews were alerted by a dedicated telephone line
507:
The crew was monitoring their instruments when the airfield lighting suddenly failed due to a power cut. When
Captain Nolan glanced back to his window, he was stunned to find that the airport runway had disappeared from his vision. With few seconds left for a landing, at an altitude between 80 and 54
450:
had been set to 5 degree. The controller gave the crew on the updated weather report and the crew realized that the weather condition had deteriorated. Visibility had gone down from 5 km to 4 km and the thunderstorm had moved right above the airport. Captain Nolan then checked the remaining
394:
Approaching Girona, the crew asked for the updated weather information. Girona ATC indicated that the thunderstorm near the airport would prevail during the approach and landing phase. The storm was located at the southwest of the airport. The controller later advised the crew to make an ILS approach
623:
Traces that had been left on the ground by the aircraft indicated that the aircraft had left the runway at a significantly high speed, probably between 142 and 191 knots. The findings suggested that the aircraft had been accelerating instead of decelerating during the 1,000 meters run. Investigators
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While the aircraft was following the glidepath, the autothrottle was disconnected and the crew set the power setting to 1.51 EPR, a little bit higher than the normal 1.2 EPR. The higher power setting led the aircraft to deviate from the glidepath as the aircraft flew a little higher than the correct
293:
The nose landing gear support structure was attached to the wheel well. At the aft of the wheel well was a structure that was referred as the "doghouse". The structure was a robust, rectangular shape which made up the aircraft's wheel well. Located directly behind the doghouse was the main equipment
615:
The aircraft impacted the runway for the second time with its nose landing gear first. This time, the impact was much worse, exceeding the design limit for the aircraft's nose landing gear. The forces that struck the nose landing gear caused the gear to collapse to the back. The doghouse structure,
552:
Damage was substantial: the fuselage was fractured in two places and the landing gear and both engines detached. Captain Nolan regained his consciousness shortly after the crash and the first officer immediately ordered an evacuation. Despite considerable damage to the cabin, the crew evacuated the
523:
Immediately after the second hard landing, all of the aircraft lighting went off. The emergency cabin light was activated. In the cockpit, the first officer shouted that the autobrake system was not working. Captain Nolan tried to stop the aircraft by applying brakes manually, but the aircraft kept
472:
Following request from the crew for an approach to Runway 20, the controller cleared them and advised the crew regarding another wind change, this time the wind had increased to 15 knots. The crew agreed that they would divert the flight to
Barcelona if they failed to land at their second attempt.
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The engine thrust increase had probably been caused by damage on the powerplant control unit of the aircraft's pulley system. The system had been damaged by the dislodged doghouse as the doghouse severed the B cable. The A cable, meanwhile, remained intact. The severed B cable caused tension to be
619:
Even though the nose landing gear had collapsed to the back, the nose didn't continuously scrape the runway. The nose landing gear had collapsed in such a way that it still managed to support the nose of the aircraft from scraping the ground. However, the landing gear had also been lodged into the
572:
Thomson
Holidays sent two aircraft to Girona to pick up the passengers who intended to go back home to Cardiff. Many of those who were unharmed in the crash decided to continue their journey to Girona and Barcelona for vacation. The company announced that they had prepared counsellors and staff to
611:
The aircraft entered a high rate of descent and the crew could not conduct the appropriate flaring due to their predicament. The aircraft touched down nose first at a speed of 141 knots and a descent rate of 840 feet per minute, causing forces up to 3G to hit the aircraft, higher than the maximum
434:
was deployed and the aircraft reached the VOR at 23:22 local time while descending through 7,200 ft. After passing the VOR, the crew decided to follow the next step of the approach procedure. While turning back towards the VOR, the turbulence didn't dissipate. The aircraft kept shaking, hard
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with 236 passengers and 9 crew members on board. Before taking off from
Cardiff, the crew had been briefed on the weather forecast in Girona. The briefing concluded that thunderstorms would be present at the destination airport and all three alternate airports. The crew had taken an additional 15
598:
While monitoring their instruments, a sudden electrical failure struck the airport, causing all lights to go out. The crew initially didn't realize that the airport's electricity had failed as their attention was directed to their instruments. By the time they shifted their attention back to the
323:
Brendan Nolan. Described by fellow pilots as one of the most experienced pilots in
Britannia Airways, he had accumulated a total of 16,700 flying hours, of which 3,562 hours were on the type. The name of the 33-year-old co-pilot was undisclosed, but he was far less experienced, having just 1,494
519:
The aircraft touched down hard, first with its nose gear and then with the rest of the landing gears, at a speed of 141 knots. Forces up to 3G rocked the entire aircraft. It then bounced back to the air with a slight roll to the right and went down again in a full nose down input. It struck the
463:
instead due to the aircraft being misaligned with the runway. They notified the ATC and headed to the north of the airport for an approach to Runway 20. Upon request by the crew, the controller gave the weather information in
Barcelona, where the weather condition had improved. They decided to
410:. The weather was poor and the aircraft was shaking. During the approach, one of the cabin crew informed the pilots that the right side of the aircraft had been struck by lightning. Despite this, the aircraft continued the approach to Girona. Several preceding flights had diverted to
253:. Of the 236 passengers and nine crew on board, two were seriously injured and 41 sustained minor injuries. One of the passengers who had apparently sustained only minor injuries died five days later of unsuspected internal injuries. The aircraft involved in the crash, Boeing 757-204
527:
The Boeing 757 then veered to the right and left the runway at high speed, approximately 1,000 metres (3,300 ft) from the second touchdown point. It then ran 343 metres (1,125 ft) across flat grassland beside the runway, before going diagonally over a substantial earth
560:
There were no immediate fatalities and the injuries were few: two serious and 42 minor injuries. However, one passenger, who had been admitted to hospital with apparently minor injuries and discharged the following day, died five days later from unsuspected internal injuries.
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to the back and caused it to crash onto the aircraft's main electrical unit, resulting in an electrical failure that disabled all deceleration systems and in a sudden production of unwanted forward thrust. The aircraft was unable to stop and eventually veered off the runway.
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The crew eventually fully configured the aircraft for landing and completed the landing checklist. However, the controller reported that the wind direction had changed. The wind now favoured the opposite runway and was blowing at 12 knots. She advised the crew to make an
524:
rolling down the runway. Meanwhile, the controller, who earlier had lost sight of the aircraft during the electrical failure at the airport, realized that Flight 226A had rolled down the runway with flashes and sparks coming out from the left side of the aircraft.
499:. The First Officer noticed that the aircraft was above the ILS glidepath and warned Captain Nolan that they had deviated from the correct path. Captain Nolan momentarily pushed the nose down before he finally brought the yoke back up to the neutral position.
590:
The investigation eventually attributed the causes of aircraft's high rate of descent to three main factors which were a destabilized approach, loss of external reference due to the airport's electrical failure, and the automatic callouts failure.
645:
resulting displacement of the nose landing gear support structure caused disruption to aircraft systems that led to uncommanded forward thrust increase and other effects that severely aggravated the consequences of the initial event.
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centre (MEC), which housed the aircraft's electrical power control and electronic units. The unit powered many essential units of the aircraft, including the autobrake, antiskid, spoilers, and the flight recorders.
1215:
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turbofan engines were installed on the aircraft. It was configured with 235 passenger seats, most being triple seat units. The aircraft had accumulated a total airframe hours of 26,429 hours or 9,816 cycles.
637:
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The thrust of the engines, including the amount of thrust and the type of thrust, was controlled by the pilots through cables that ran under the fuselage. The cables were controlled with tensioned
265:
268:(CIAIAC), concluded that the crash had been caused by destabilized approach, loss of external reference and loss of automatic height callouts while landing in Girona. The aircraft entered a
1920:
520:
runway with its nose landing gear again. The second impact was a lot more powerful than the last. As a result, the nose landing gear collapsed and the aircraft skidded through the runway.
285:
The aircraft was a Boeing 757-204 with a registration of G-BYAG. It was manufactured in 1992 with a manufacturer serial number of 26965 and was delivered to
Britannia Airways in 1993. Two
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released from the cable and produced tension on the A cable. The resulting tension rotated the pulley in a direction that would have caused an increase in forward thrust.
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The effect of shock or mental incapacitation on the pilot flying at the failure of the runway lights which may have inhibited him from making a decision to go around.
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sounded "ten", indicating that there were only 10 ft left between the aircraft and the ground. Both thrust levers were immediately put to the idle position.
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to Runway 20, but the crew elected to choose Runway 02, the same runway from the opposite direction, after considering the wet runway condition, downslope and
532:
adjacent to the airport boundary, becoming semi-airborne as a result. Beyond the mound it hit a number of medium-sized trees and the right engine struck the
702:
at 1,500 feet, 1–2 octas cumulonimbus at 3,000 feet, 5–7 octas at 4,000 feet, temperature 20 °C/ dewpoint 20 °C, QNH 1010 mb, remarks recent rain.
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Impairment of the runway visual environment as a result of darkness and torrential rain and the extinguishing of runway lights immediately before landing.
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Airport authorities were criticised after the accident, particularly for the fact it took rescue crews more than an hour to reach and evacuate the scene.
1304:
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A total of 236 passengers were on board the aircraft, all of whom were part of a tour that had been organized by
Thomson Travel. Spanish newspaper
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Insufficient evaluation of the weather conditions, particularly the movement and severity of the storm affecting the destination airport.
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The indicated weather report at the time was surface wind 350/6 kt, visibility 4 km, thunderstorm with heavy rain, cloud 3–4
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aircraft efficiently. However, three of the eight emergency exits could not be opened and several escape slides did not inflate.
324:
flying hours, most of which were on the Boeing 757. A women named German Marion survived and appears on air crash investigation.
319:. There were also 9 crew members on board, consisted of 2 flight crew and 7 cabin crew. The pilot was identified as 57-year-old
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The absence of specific flight crew training in flight simulators to initiate a go-around when below landing decision height.
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443:, had fallen to the cockpit floor. Captain Nolan eventually had to ask his first officer to read the approach chart to him.
28:
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909:[55 tourists injured when a plane went off the runway in Girona] (in Spanish). El Mundo. 15 September 1999
399:. Captain Nolan knew that the approach to Runway 02 would be difficult so he took over control from his co-pilot.
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1328:
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approach to runway 20. Captain Nolan had acquired visual contact with the runway, but later decided to conduct a
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fuel on board and advised his co-pilot to divert to one of the alternate airports in case of a missed approach.
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stated that the acceleration might have been caused by an increase in forward thrust of both engines.
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blared "SINK RATE", warning the crew on the excessive rate of descent. Shortly after the warning, the
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The flight was scheduled to take off on 14 September 1999 for Girona-Costa Brava Airport, with
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out of its holder. The chart, which had been clipped by the holder onto Captain Nolan's
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with a nose down attitude, creating an impact that was violent enough to dislodge the
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Subsequent tests estimated the lighting outage at approx. 11 seconds in duration.
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Around 23:29 local time, the aircraft had levelled at 3,400 ft and the
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reported that there were 3 children on board and all 236 passengers were of
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aircraft suffered a crash landing and broke apart during a thunderstorm in
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asked the crew to prepare and announced to passengers that there would be
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The CIAIAC issued 10 recommendations to multiple parties, including the
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At 250 feet (76 m) above ground level, the crew disconnected the
264:
The body that was responsible for the investigation of the crash, the
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was turned on and the ATC reported that the aircraft was in sight.
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235:
231:
699:
371:
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907:"55 turistas heridos al salirse de la pista un aviĂłn en Girona"
771:
Accidents related to accidental forward thrust during landing:
33:
G-BYAG, the Boeing 757 involved in the accident, seen in 1996.
638:
Civil Aviation Accident and Incident Investigation Commission
332:
Flight 226A was a passenger flight from the Welsh capital of
266:
Civil Aviation Accident and Incident Investigation Commission
877:. CIAIAC (Spanish Investigation Commission). Archived from
963:. Air Accidents Investigation Branch. 2000. Archived from
649:
The following contributing factors were also determined:
640:(CIAIAC). In its final report, the CIAIAC's finding was:
1182:
AAIB Bulletin No: S1/2000 Ref: EW/A99/9/2 Category: 1.1
355:, the flight had been chartered by UK's travel company
656:
Suppression of some automatic height callouts by the
386:. The flight took off from Cardiff Airport at 20:40
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1409:
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958:"Special Bulletin S1/2000 – Boeing 757-204, G-BYAG"
426:, the aircraft was 16 nautical miles from Girona's
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69:
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38:
1921:Accidents and incidents involving the Boeing 757
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1209:
636:The accident was investigated by the Spanish
391:minutes of fuel reserve for possible delays.
8:
340:, serving the popular tourist region of the
21:
1126:Appendix A: Photographs, figures and graphs
226:was an international passenger flight from
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1466:
1216:
1202:
1194:
1048:"Plane crash holidaymakers and pilot home"
464:continue their attempt to land at Girona.
27:
20:
1911:Aviation accidents and incidents in Spain
1224:Aviation accidents and incidents in Spain
1916:Aviation accidents and incidents in 1999
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1297:Scandinavian Airlines System Flight 130
1140:Appendix B: Meteorological Radar Images
1026:"Flight lucky to avoid 'major tragedy'"
901:
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816:
814:
812:
810:
808:
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804:
802:
800:
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1070:"Plane crash stewardesses return home"
359:. Passengers aboard the aircraft were
1305:Tenerife Spantax Convair CV-990 crash
1152:Official Spanish report: Appendix C:
7:
1522:China Southwest Airlines Flight 4509
1321:Imperial Iranian Air Force Flight 48
363:that had been organized by Thomson.
1004:"Passengers tell of miracle escape"
1612:Hinduja Cargo Services Flight 8533
1171:Air Accidents Investigation Branch
14:
1498:Aviation accidents and incidents
1254:Transair Douglas Dakota accident
755:
741:
727:
713:
607:Hard landing and failure to stop
259:damaged beyond economical repair
1926:September 1999 events in Europe
1702:Edinburgh Air Charter Flight 3W
1453:2015 Seville Airbus A400M crash
1418:Binter Mediterráneo Flight 8261
402:As the approach commenced, the
1812:Cubana de AviaciĂłn Flight 1216
992:. BBC News. 15 September 1999.
414:due to the stormy conditions.
1:
1842:Cubana de AviaciĂłn Flight 310
1722:Britannia Airways Flight 226A
1622:Martha's Vineyard plane crash
1592:American Airlines Flight 1420
1399:Britannia Airways Flight 226A
1246:Aviaco SNCASE Languedoc crash
508:feet above ground level, the
224:Britannia Airways Flight 226A
22:Britannia Airways Flight 226A
1822:Korean Air Cargo Flight 8509
1662:Pakistani Atlantic shootdown
1632:All Nippon Airways Flight 61
1582:Korean Air Cargo Flight 6316
1562:Turkish Airlines Flight 5904
1532:Minerva Airlines Flight 1553
245:. On 14 September 1999, the
65:due to destabilised approach
1802:SATA Air Açores Flight 530M
1154:Flight Simulator Evaluation
1112:Technical Report A-054/1999
47:14 September 1999
1947:
1832:Indian Airlines Flight 814
1752:South Dakota Learjet crash
660:"SINK RATE" audio caution.
475:Flight Management Computer
251:Girona-Costa Brava Airport
163:Girona–Costa Brava Airport
74:Girona–Costa Brava Airport
1851:
1672:China Airlines Flight 642
1513:
1329:Tenerife airport disaster
1176:AAIB preliminary findings
1138:Official Spanish report:
1124:Official Spanish report:
1110:Official Spanish report:
990:"BBC report of air crash"
26:
1602:Tramore helicopter crash
1792:Asian Spirit Flight 100
1095:Aviation Safety Network
1542:Korean Air Flight 1533
1372:Madrid runway disaster
776:S7 Airlines Flight 778
647:
549:
16:1999 aviation accident
1426:Flightline Flight 101
721:United Kingdom portal
642:
547:
1712:Necon Air Flight 128
1091:Accident description
938:SRG Safety Plan 2008
582:High rate of descent
480:After capturing the
435:enough to knock the
270:high rate of descent
1883: /
1860:► 2000
1854:1998 ◄
1762:EgyptAir Flight 990
1642:Air Fiji Flight 121
1572:Avianca Flight 9463
1434:Spanair Flight 5022
1348:Dan-Air Flight 1008
1281:Dan-Air Flight 1903
943:6 June 2011 at the
305:Passengers and crew
23:
1887:41.8991°N 2.7557°E
1857:
1782:Si Fly Flight 3275
1742:Air Botswana crash
1682:Uni Air Flight 873
1364:Avianca Flight 011
1356:Spantax Flight 995
550:
548:Wreckage of G-BYAG
384:alternate airports
90:Aircraft type
1866:
1865:
1463:
1462:
1380:Iberia Flight 610
1313:Aviaco Flight 118
1289:Iberia Flight 602
1262:Iberia Flight 401
1166:Report in Spanish
970:on 9 January 2013
353:Britannia Airways
274:nose landing gear
243:Britannia Airways
221:
220:
152:Vale of Glamorgan
104:Britannia Airways
1938:
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1897:
1895:
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1884:
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1879:
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1772:TAESA Flight 725
1692:LAPA Flight 3142
1652:TACV Flight 5002
1552:F-117A shootdown
1508:
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1401:(September 1999)
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1358:(September 1982)
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1299:(September 1972)
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746:
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737:
732:
731:
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723:
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697:
346:United Kingdom's
240:charter airliner
154:, United Kingdom
63:Runway excursion
54:
52:
31:
24:
1946:
1945:
1941:
1940:
1939:
1937:
1936:
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1901:
1900:
1892:41.8991; 2.7557
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1732:Qantas Flight 1
1729:
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1397:
1386:
1382:(February 1985)
1378:
1374:(December 1983)
1370:
1366:(November 1983)
1362:
1354:
1346:
1335:
1327:
1319:
1311:
1307:(December 1972)
1303:
1295:
1287:
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1252:
1248:(December 1958)
1244:
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945:Wayback Machine
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781:TAM Flight 3054
763:Aviation portal
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514:radio altimeter
505:
470:
468:Second approach
461:missed approach
420:
350:charter airline
330:
307:
283:
148:Cardiff Airport
118:ICAO flight No.
110:IATA flight No.
50:
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17:
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1428:(October 2001)
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1291:(January 1972)
1285:
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1258:
1250:
1242:
1238:Hubert Le Blon
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884:on 1 June 2012
872:"Final report"
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534:boundary fence
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469:
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437:approach chart
419:
418:First approach
416:
361:part of a tour
357:Thomson Travel
344:. Operated by
329:
326:
317:British origin
306:
303:
282:
279:
261:and scrapped.
247:Boeing 757-204
238:, operated by
219:
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209:43 (2 serious)
207:
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129:Britannia 226A
127:
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101:
97:
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94:Boeing 757-204
91:
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40:
36:
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15:
13:
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6:
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3:
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1932:
1931:1999 in Spain
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1486:
1484:
1479:
1477:
1472:
1471:
1468:
1454:
1450:
1449:
1447:
1443:
1436:(August 2008)
1435:
1431:
1427:
1423:
1420:(August 2001)
1419:
1415:
1414:
1412:
1408:
1400:
1396:
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1357:
1353:
1349:
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1344:
1342:
1338:
1330:
1326:
1322:
1318:
1315:(August 1973)
1314:
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1306:
1302:
1298:
1294:
1290:
1286:
1282:
1278:
1277:
1275:
1271:
1263:
1259:
1256:(August 1959)
1255:
1251:
1247:
1243:
1239:
1235:
1234:
1232:
1228:
1219:
1214:
1212:
1207:
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1199:
1196:
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823:
821:
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801:
799:
795:
788:
782:
779:
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774:
773:
772:
769:
768:
764:
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750:
744:
739:
736:
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639:
631:
629:
625:
621:
617:
613:
606:
604:
600:
596:
592:
588:
581:
577:Investigation
576:
574:
567:
565:
562:
558:
554:
546:
539:
537:
535:
531:
525:
521:
517:
515:
511:
503:Crash landing
502:
500:
498:
494:
489:
487:
486:landing light
483:
478:
476:
467:
465:
462:
458:
452:
449:
444:
442:
438:
433:
429:
425:
417:
415:
413:
409:
405:
404:first officer
400:
398:
392:
389:
385:
381:
377:
373:
369:
364:
362:
358:
354:
351:
347:
343:
339:
335:
327:
325:
322:
318:
314:
313:
304:
302:
300:
299:pulley system
295:
291:
288:
280:
278:
275:
271:
267:
262:
260:
256:
252:
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244:
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200:
196:
192:
188:
184:
180:
176:
172:
168:
164:
161:
157:
153:
149:
146:
144:Flight origin
142:
138:
136:
132:
128:
124:
120:
116:
112:
108:
105:
102:
98:
95:
92:
88:
83:
79:
75:
72:
68:
64:
61:
57:
46:
42:
37:
30:
25:
19:
1868:
1721:
1398:
1350:(April 1980)
1331:(March 1977)
1240:(April 1910)
1156:(in English)
1153:
1142:(in English)
1139:
1128:(in English)
1125:
1114:(in English)
1111:
1086:
1074:. Retrieved
1064:
1052:. Retrieved
1042:
1030:. Retrieved
1020:
1008:. Retrieved
998:
984:
974:27 September
972:. Retrieved
965:the original
952:
932:
923:
911:. Retrieved
886:. Retrieved
879:the original
770:
749:1990s portal
735:Spain portal
695:
672:
648:
643:
635:
632:Final report
626:
622:
618:
614:
610:
601:
597:
593:
589:
585:
571:
563:
559:
555:
551:
526:
522:
518:
506:
497:autothrottle
490:
479:
471:
453:
445:
421:
401:
393:
365:
331:
310:
308:
296:
292:
284:
263:
257:G-BYAG, was
255:registration
223:
222:
135:Registration
18:
1890: /
1283:(July 1970)
1230:Before 1970
342:Costa Brava
287:Rolls-Royce
234:to Girona,
159:Destination
1905:Categories
1875:41°53′57″N
1455:(May 2015)
1323:(May 1976)
1264:(May 1965)
947:(PDF file)
789:References
540:Post-crash
482:glideslope
432:speedbrake
424:local time
408:turbulence
198:Fatalities
182:Passengers
51:1999-09-14
1878:2°45′21″E
1076:23 August
1054:23 August
1032:23 August
1010:23 August
913:23 August
493:autopilot
422:At 23:18
412:Barcelona
368:Barcelona
214:Survivors
174:Occupants
126:Call sign
941:Archived
707:See also
568:Response
495:and the
397:tailwind
376:Toulouse
348:largest
312:El Mundo
281:Aircraft
206:Injuries
100:Operator
85:Aircraft
39:Accident
1502: (
1500:in 1999
1186:Archive
1160:Archive
1146:Archive
1132:Archive
1118:Archive
1104:Sources
1093:at the
888:17 July
334:Cardiff
321:Captain
228:Cardiff
169:, Spain
121:BAL226A
80:, Spain
59:Summary
49: (
1838:Dec 25
1828:Dec 24
1818:Dec 22
1808:Dec 21
1798:Dec 11
1778:Nov 12
1758:Oct 31
1748:Oct 25
1738:Oct 11
1728:Sep 23
1718:Sep 14
1688:Aug 31
1678:Aug 24
1668:Aug 22
1658:Aug 10
1638:Jul 24
1628:Jul 23
1618:Jul 16
1578:Apr 15
1568:Apr 12
1548:Mar 27
1538:Mar 15
1528:Feb 25
1518:Feb 24
683:Boeing
430:. The
380:France
338:Girona
328:Flight
167:Girona
139:G-BYAG
113:BY226A
78:Girona
1788:Dec 7
1768:Nov 9
1708:Sep 5
1698:Sep 3
1648:Aug 7
1608:Jul 7
1598:Jul 2
1588:Jun 1
1558:Apr 7
1445:2010s
1410:2000s
1391:1990s
1340:1980s
1273:1970s
1072:. BBC
1050:. BBC
1028:. BBC
1006:. BBC
968:(PDF)
961:(PDF)
882:(PDF)
875:(PDF)
700:octas
689:Notes
530:mound
448:flaps
236:Spain
232:Wales
1504:1999
1184:." (
1078:2022
1056:2022
1034:2022
1012:2022
976:2006
936:CAA
915:2022
890:2009
681:and
679:EASA
658:GPWS
510:GPWS
473:The
441:yoke
374:and
372:Reus
190:Crew
70:Site
44:Date
675:FAA
457:ILS
428:VOR
388:BST
382:as
378:in
336:to
217:244
185:236
177:245
1907::
898:^
797:^
677:,
370:,
230:,
165:,
150:,
76:,
1506:)
1489:e
1482:t
1475:v
1217:e
1210:t
1203:v
1188:)
1180:"
1162:)
1158:(
1148:)
1144:(
1134:)
1130:(
1120:)
1116:(
1080:.
1058:.
1036:.
1014:.
978:.
917:.
892:.
201:1
193:9
53:)
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
