120:
strategy and may successfully advocate for a more traditional war-making role. Another challenge is that the strategy takes time, which a government may for various reasons lack. The strategy also requires significant numbers of on-the-ground "clearing" combat and "holding" police forces. Thompson and others have also argued that clear and hold operations can be successful by only isolating the population from insurgents, but some strategists point out that can have deleterious effects on public support for the government and its policies.
141:
and native forces defeat the enemy threat (clear), foreign and native forces keep the area clear of enemies (hold), and native democratic institutions are established that draw their legitimacy from the local people (build). Basic services such as electricity, sewer systems, fresh water, farms, and marketplaces were provided. By 2008, the strategy had "shown some results in Iraq." International affairs expert
57:. Only highly strategic areas are initially chosen for "clear and hold" operations; once they are secure, the operation gradually spreads to less strategic areas until the desired geographic unit (county, province, or nation) is under control. Once an area has been cleared, local police (rather than military) authority is re-established, and government authority re-asserted.
153:, capitalist, and materialistic and ignores such important beliefs as religion and cultural norms and institutions. Kaplan also concludes that too little discussion is given to local versus national government (especially regarding corruption and trustworthiness) and situations in which a majority of the population is on the side of the insurgents.
137:
and hold operations enable guerrilla forces to regroup militarily, limiting the combat effectiveness of the strategy. Some analysts have also voiced the concern that the strategy relies too heavily on physical security issues and ignores the role that ideology, nationalism, and other belief systems play in fomenting insurgency in the first place.
136:
While combat operations against insurgents are often successful, some authors conclude that combat operations themselves make it very difficult to win support for the government, "hold" operations are rarely successful, and guerrillas easily adapt. Others argue that the initial limited goals of clear
119:
Several critical elements of the clear and hold strategy have been identified. One element is to secure support for the strategy at all levels of the traditional military forces. Experience in
Vietnam has shown that traditional military forces dislike the limited role they play in the clear and hold
140:
More recently, American military strategists in both Iraq and
Afghanistan have proposed modifications to the strategy. Sometimes defined as "clear, hold and build" or "shape, clear, hold, and build," native forces identify the nature and strength of the enemy threat in a given area (shape), foreign
132:
has argued that clear and hold tactics were markedly successful in the
Vietnam War despite being implemented after a decade of conflict and under less than ideal conditions. His view is supported by others, who see the strategy as still viable in the 21st century.
145:
has noted less success in
Afghanistan, where many areas were still in the "shape", "clear", and "hold" stage after nine years, and only a few others in beginning, mixed "hold/build" stages. Journalist
41:, and then keep the area clear of insurgents while winning the support of the populace for the government and its policies. As defined by the
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96:, at which time the strategy became widely known. Clear and hold has also been used as a counter-insurgency tactic in
871:
866:
46:
674:
146:
501:
Maslin, Janet. "A General
Battles His Own Army: 'The Insurgents,' About David Petraeus, by Fred Kaplan."
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The success of clear and hold as a counter-insurgency strategy is hotly debated. Military historian
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26:
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A Better War: The
Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam.
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The Need to
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A Better War: The
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Daniel
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129:
112:. The strategy was used extensively by the United States and its allies during the
70:
580:
The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930–1975.
407:
The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930–1975,
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The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.
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Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn Blatt Young, eds. New York: New Press, 2007.
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Thompson invented the term. See Marston and Malkasian, "Introduction," in
113:
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American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War.
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American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War,
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Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives.
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Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.
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The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq.
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The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq,
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Marston, Daniel and Malkasian, Carter. "Introduction." In
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Santa Barbara, Calif.: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006.
747:
War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare.
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War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare,
88:, as part of the "pacification" effort conducted by the
371:, 1999; see also Elliott, "Parallel Wars? ..." in
81:
of 1952 to 1960. The strategy was also implemented by
636:
Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.
775:
Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency.
394:
Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency,
65:The clear and hold strategy was first developed by
664:Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000.
253:Tuohy, "Ky's Army Switches to Pacification Role,"
451:"'Clear And Hold' Showing Results 40 Years Later"
832:Reprint ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007.
707:Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq.
610:Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2004.
339:Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq,
749:Reprint ed. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002.
507:, accessed 2012-12-27; and, generally, Kaplan,
621:Ignatius, David. "A Better Strategy For Iraq."
211:2004, p. 254; see also, generally, Thompson,
790:. "Ky's Army Switches to Pacification Role."
524:War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History.
322:War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History,
8:
802:The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam.
420:The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam,
390:The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam,
335:The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam,
309:The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam,
45:, "clear and hold" contains three elements:
846:Reprint ed. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
804:Florence, Ky.: Taylor & Francis, 2002.
723:New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1999.
818:Reprint ed. New York: Random House, 2009.
594:Vietnam and America: A Documented History.
356:Vietnam and America: A Documented History,
734:"South Viet Nam: To Clear & to Hold."
596:2d rev. ed. New York: Grove Press, 1995.
437:Vietnam and America: A Documented History
269:
267:
236:
234:
582:2d ed. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007.
286:Ignatius, "A Better Strategy For Iraq,"
149:has argued that the revised doctrine is
681:New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012.
161:
648:The War for South Viet Nam, 1954–1975.
606:Headquarters. Department of the Army.
275:The War for South Viet Nam, 1954–1975,
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763:New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978.
693:Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare.
540:Darby, Pa.: DIANE Publishing, 2010.
526:Bloomington, Ind.: iUniverse, 2002.
475:Cordesman, Anthony (July 22, 2010).
226:Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare,
16:Counter-insurgency military strategy
554:Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002.
14:
61:Development and critical elements
449:Bowman, Tom (October 31, 2008).
709:New York: Penguin Group, 2006.
373:Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam
634:America and Guerrilla Warfare.
209:America and Guerrilla Warfare,
1:
830:State of Denial: Bush at War.
608:Counterinsurgency Operations.
377:State of Denial: Bush at War,
196:Counterinsurgency Operations,
183:Counterinsurgency Operations,
170:Counterinsurgency Operations,
844:The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990.
305:The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990,
92:and the US Army during the
888:
375:, 2007, p. 29; Woodward,
354:2000, p. 170; Gettleman,
47:civil-military operations
367:See, generally: Sorley,
290:November 4, 2005; West,
388:See, generally Walton,
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759:Thompson, Sir Robert.
307:1991, p. 83; Walton,
646:Joes, Anthony James.
632:Joes, Anthony James.
592:Gettleman, Marvin E.
578:Elliott, David W. P.
439:, 1995, pp. 211–212.
422:2002, p. 58; Taber,
337:2002, p. 55; Ricks,
625:The Washington Post
90:Republic of Vietnam
55:information warfare
773:Trinquier, Roger.
522:Asprey, Robert B.
255:Los Angeles Times,
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31:military personnel
24:counter-insurgency
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505:December 26, 2012
392:2002; Trinquier,
143:Anthony Cordesman
75:Malayan Emergency
51:combat operations
33:clear an area of
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828:Woodward, Bob.
745:Taber, Robert.
742:March 27, 1964.
719:Sorley, Lewis.
536:Bowman, Steve.
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503:New York Times.
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172:2004, p. 3–11.
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20:Clear and hold
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151:ethnocentric
139:
135:
130:Lewis Sorley
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118:
71:British Army
64:
19:
18:
486:January 24,
460:January 24,
435:Gettleman,
409:2007, p. 8.
194:U.S. Army,
181:U.S. Army,
168:U.S. Army,
147:Fred Kaplan
110:South Korea
106:Philippines
94:Vietnam War
73:during the
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157:References
124:Assessment
39:insurgents
35:guerrillas
405:Elliott,
240:Collins,
37:or other
29:in which
418:Walton,
350:Kaiser,
333:Walton,
320:Asprey,
114:Iraq War
69:and the
27:strategy
455:NPR.org
303:Young,
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98:Algeria
83:General
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273:Joes,
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108:, and
104:, the
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480:(PDF)
396:2006.
259:Time,
22:is a
848:ISBN
834:ISBN
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738:Time
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488:2017
462:2017
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