Knowledge (XXG)

Cooperative Engagement Capability

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guiding missiles from other aircraft to any target that is identified as long as they are in range; work on weapons that are more survivable and longer-ranged is underway to increase their effectiveness in the data-link-centric battle strategy. This can allow forward-deployed Super Hornets or Lightning IIs to receive data and launch weapons without needing to even have their own radars active. E-2Ds act as the central node of NIFC-CA to connect the strike group with the carrier, but every aircraft is connected to all others through their own links. Two Advanced Hawkeyes would move data using the tactical targeting network technology (TTNT) waveform to share vast amounts of data over long distances with very low latency. Other aircraft would be connected to the E-2D through
251:(UCAVs); those platforms have, or are planned to have, wideband stealth using geometrical features such as large size and a tailless configuration to enable them to stay undetected when confronted by VHF radars. Even with the possibility of cyber and electronic attack to hack or jam data-links, passive detection systems to locate aircraft based on their electronic emissions, and long-range anti-radiation missiles, the flexibility of "network-centric" cooperative engagement concepts allows additional systems and platforms to be "plugged or unplugged" as required, offering increased survivability and growth potential for new methods of countering countermeasures to be integrated into new or existing concepts. 223:(SEAD) aircraft to locate and target it. Poor operational discipline on the US's part also contributed, including the F-117 flying the same flight path on different missions, communicating on unencrypted channels that could be (and were) monitored by hostile forces, and the absence of standoff electronic warfare support aircraft to be properly aligned with enemy radars to support a stealth intrusion. 207:. The low-frequency VHF acquisition radar detected it some 30–37 mi (48–60 km) away, then cued the higher-frequency S-band engagement radar, which small stealth planes are optimized to avoid detection, although at 8 mi (13 km) away sufficient lock was achieved to fire several missiles until the third one struck the Nighthawk. The creation of digital 697: 138:; all cannot be jammed, so the parts that are not can home in on the jamming energy and target it for destruction. The network is built with redundancy to make it difficult to jam over a broad geographic area. If an enemy tries to disrupt it by targeting space-based communications, a line-of-sight network can be created. 312:
radars and launched several missiles at those targets. What was different was that only one of the ships controlled the engagement, intercepting different aerial targets at extended ranges by the missiles fired from both ships using the systems’ JTC mode. The test demonstrated the ability of MRSAM to
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VHF acquisition radars, including the Russian ground-based 3D Nebo SVU and Chinese ship-borne Type 517M, offering detection at greater ranges, faster and more accurate cueing of engagement radars, enhanced resistance to jamming, and improved mobility contribute to the perceived vulnerability of small
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to provide stand-off jamming or at least degradation of early warning radars. When targets are detected by the F-35C, they would transmit weapons-quality track to the E-2D and pass that information on to Super Hornets or other F-35Cs. The F/A-18E/F fighters would penetrate as far as they could into
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and F-35 are optimized to avoid detection from higher frequencies in the Ku, X, C, and parts of the S bands, but not from longer wavelengths like L, UHF, and VHF. Previously these bands might see stealth aircraft but not clearly enough to generate a missile lock, but with improved computing power,
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without that vessel having to actually detect it themselves. Not needing to fire on targets only once a ship's own sensors see them allows for shorter time needed to shoot, increased standoff distance to begin firing, and enables a whole fleet to intercept threats, like high-speed cruise missiles,
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or concurrent multi-netting-4 (CMN-4), a variant of four Link 16 radio receivers "stacked up" on top of each other. Growlers would coordinate with each other using data-links to locate hostile radar emitters on land or on the ocean surface. Having several sensors widely dispersed also hardens the
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NIFC-CA relies on the use of data-links to provide every aircraft and ship with a picture of the entire battlespace. Aircraft deploying weapons may not need to control missiles after releasing them, as an E-2D would guide them by a data-stream to the target. Other aircraft are also capable of
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AESA radar that can act as a narrowband jammer and can be used against engagement radars. Under NIFC-CA, F-35Cs will routinely be supported by Growlers and Super Hornets to jam and destroy enemy targets beyond the range of surface-to-air missiles. Data-links used to share information are
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wherein the missiles of both ships were controlled by one ship to intercept different aerial targets at extended ranges. The trial was carried out by the Indian Navy, DRDO and Israel Aerospace Industries. The capability would be rolled out on all future major warships of the Indian Navy.
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radars of guided missile cruisers and destroyers are linked together into a single network to share data as a whole. This allows targets detected by one ship, as well as those seen by aircraft, to be identified by another ship and fired upon with long-range missiles like the
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have both high and low-frequency radars to find aircraft detectable by both wavelength ranges. This would make it difficult for the Navy F-35C to survive in a low-frequency radar environment. The entire NIFC-CA concept is also vulnerable to
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in the early 1970s. The concept was originally called Battle Group Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) Coordination. The first critical at-sea experiment with a system prototype occurred in 1990. The CEC became a Navy acquisition program in 1992.
549: 109: 230:, and gives the pilot enhanced situational awareness from its ability to communicate and process data obtained from onboard sensors and from other platforms. While the F-117 had no radar, the F-35C uses an 313:
operate wide area air defense, distributing assets and control over different platforms and locations. Previous MRSAM firing trials were conducted on a single platform, in the stand-alone mode.
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can threaten the radar-equipped E-2D, the central node of the NIFC-CA network. These threats may give impetus to calls for building the UCLASS as an all-aspect broadband stealth aircraft.
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On September 12, 2016 Lockheed used a separate ground station to relay the F-35's Multi-Function Advanced Data Link (MADL) targeting data to an Aegis system for a SM-6 launch.
717: 108:(A2/AD) environment, a carrier air wing would launch all of its aircraft. The F-35C would use its stealth to fly deep into enemy airspace and use its sensors to gather 77:
In the future, CEC will form a key pillar of the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) capability, which will allow stealthy sensor platforms such as the
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in an attack, with the Navy using the EA-18G as a dedicated EW platform in contested airspace, and the Air Force contributing other stealth platforms including the
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There is serious concern among the U.S. Navy that key parts of the CEC can be countered by sophisticated electronics. Russian and Chinese advancements in
125:, then launch stand-off weapons. The UCLASS would use aerial refueling capabilities to extend the range of the strike force and use its own ISR sensors. 215:
Several important factors made the intercept in 1999 possible, including engagement radars being active for no more than 20 seconds to avoid location by
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capabilities by combining data from multiple battle force air search sensors on CEC-equipped units into a single, real-time, composite track picture (
305:‘Cooperative Engagement’ operating mode. The trial comprised two complex scenarios involving multiple platforms and several simultaneous targets. 383: 629: 525: 220: 78: 439: 219:
electronic warfare aircraft, and the use of decoys and frequent movement of the missile battery to make it difficult for NATO
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It is feared that the stealth F-35C could be targeted by low-frequency radar-guided missiles, like during the
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fire control radars could discern targets more precisely by the 2020s or 2030s. Warships like the Chinese
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high-bandwidth and jam-resistant to maintain contact. The Navy would also work with the
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The test employed the full Joint Taskforce Coordination (JTC) mode which implements the
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Cooperative engagement also applies to ship-based protective features where
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more difficult and allocating defensive missiles on a battle group basis.
204: 669:"Japanese destroyers intercept ballistic missiles in tests with US Navy" 322: 309: 276: 130: 526:"You Spot, I Shoot: Aegis Ships Share Data To Destroy Cruise Missiles" 203:
became the first stealth plane to be shot down when it was hit by an
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In a Joint test, Japan's Cooperative Engagement Capability allowed
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are increasingly able to detect stealth aircraft; fighters like the
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heavily contested airspace, which is still further than an ordinary
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capability that is intended to significantly improve battle force
576:"Chinese and Russian Radars On Track To See Through U.S. Stealth" 216: 275:
conducted the maiden cooperative engagement firing of the
42:). This will greatly enhance fleet air defense by making 419:"JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 16, NUMBER 4" 279:. The firing was undertaken on the Western Seaboard by 2 308:
The destroyers detected multiple targets using their
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intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
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Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
600: 598: 596: 471:"Navy: F-35C Will Be Eyes and Ears of the Fleet" 393:. dote.osd.mil. pp. 171–174. Archived from 85:with their observations channeled through the 494: 492: 8: 718:Computer systems of the United States Navy 328:to detect and track a ballistic missile; 426:Johns Hopkins applied physics laboratory 259:France has developed its own CEC system 16:Military sensor network and fire control 440:"CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability" 361: 89:to less stealthy platforms such as the 524:Jr, Sydney J. Freedberg (2014-10-24). 26:) is a sensor network with integrated 7: 556:. Lockheed Martin. 13 September 2016 469:Majumdar, Dave (December 31, 2013). 446:. United States Navy. Archived from 261:tenue de situation multi plateformes 384:"Navy Programs – Ship Self-Defense" 151:once only a single ship sees them. 197:1999 downing of an F-117 Nighthawk 14: 702:Cooperative Engagement Capability 221:suppression of enemy air defenses 59:The CEC concept was conceived by 20:Cooperative Engagement Capability 695: 500:"Inside the Navy's Next Air War" 100:In a combat situation where the 249:unmanned combat aerial vehicles 391:DOT&E FY2011 Annual Report 55:Origins of the US Navy program 1: 606:"The F-35 vs. The VHF Threat" 123:fourth-generation jet fighter 95:Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 226:The F-35C was designed for 104:would need to penetrate an 739: 654:"Press Information Bureau" 199:. In that incident, the 158:Potential countermeasures 148:Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) 667:Yeo, Mike (2022-11-22). 350:Ship Self-Defense System 281:Kolkata-class destroyers 345:Global Information Grid 237:United States Air Force 228:network-centric warfare 190:anti-radiation missiles 106:anti-access/area denial 40:network-centric warfare 554:www.lockheedmartin.com 477:. U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE 247:, and future stealthy 118:Next Generation Jammer 723:Anti-aircraft warfare 87:E-2D Advanced Hawkeye 704:at Wikimedia Commons 271:On 15 May 2019, the 164:low-frequency radars 177:Type 52D Luyang III 450:on 11 January 2014 212:stealth fighters. 186:electronic attacks 173:Type 52C Luyang II 136:electronic warfare 102:United States Navy 79:F-35C Lightning II 700:Media related to 310:EL/M-2248 MF-STAR 83:forward observers 730: 699: 683: 682: 680: 679: 664: 658: 657: 650: 644: 643: 641: 639: 634: 626: 620: 619: 617: 616: 602: 591: 590: 588: 587: 572: 566: 565: 563: 561: 546: 540: 539: 537: 536: 530:Breaking Defense 521: 515: 514: 512: 511: 496: 487: 486: 484: 482: 466: 460: 459: 457: 455: 436: 430: 429: 423: 415: 409: 408: 406: 405: 399: 388: 380: 374: 373: 366: 738: 737: 733: 732: 731: 729: 728: 727: 708: 707: 692: 687: 686: 677: 675: 666: 665: 661: 652: 651: 647: 637: 635: 632: 628: 627: 623: 614: 612: 610:thediplomat.com 604: 603: 594: 585: 583: 574: 573: 569: 559: 557: 548: 547: 543: 534: 532: 523: 522: 518: 509: 507: 498: 497: 490: 480: 478: 468: 467: 463: 453: 451: 438: 437: 433: 421: 417: 416: 412: 403: 401: 397: 386: 382: 381: 377: 368: 367: 363: 358: 341: 319: 269: 257: 201:F-117 Nighthawk 160: 75: 70: 57: 52: 36:missile defense 17: 12: 11: 5: 736: 734: 726: 725: 720: 710: 709: 706: 705: 691: 690:External links 688: 685: 684: 659: 645: 621: 592: 567: 541: 516: 488: 461: 431: 410: 375: 360: 359: 357: 354: 353: 352: 347: 340: 337: 335:shot it down. 318: 315: 268: 265: 256: 253: 159: 156: 116:would use the 114:EA-18G Growler 74: 71: 69: 66: 56: 53: 51: 48: 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 735: 724: 721: 719: 716: 715: 713: 703: 698: 694: 693: 689: 674: 670: 663: 660: 655: 649: 646: 631: 625: 622: 611: 607: 601: 599: 597: 593: 581: 577: 571: 568: 555: 551: 545: 542: 531: 527: 520: 517: 505: 501: 495: 493: 489: 476: 472: 465: 462: 449: 445: 441: 435: 432: 427: 420: 414: 411: 400:on 2013-11-11 396: 392: 385: 379: 376: 371: 365: 362: 355: 351: 348: 346: 343: 342: 338: 336: 334: 333: 327: 326: 316: 314: 311: 306: 304: 299: 296: 295: 289: 288: 282: 278: 274: 266: 264: 262: 254: 252: 250: 246: 242: 238: 233: 229: 224: 222: 218: 213: 210: 206: 202: 198: 193: 191: 187: 183: 182:cyber warfare 178: 174: 169: 165: 157: 155: 152: 149: 144: 139: 137: 132: 126: 124: 119: 115: 111: 107: 103: 98: 96: 92: 88: 84: 80: 72: 68:United States 67: 65: 62: 54: 49: 47: 45: 41: 37: 33: 29: 25: 21: 676:. Retrieved 673:Defense News 672: 662: 648: 636:. Retrieved 624: 613:. Retrieved 609: 584:. Retrieved 582:. 2014-07-29 579: 570: 560:13 September 558:. Retrieved 553: 544: 533:. Retrieved 529: 519: 508:. Retrieved 506:. 2014-01-23 503: 479:. Retrieved 474: 464: 452:. Retrieved 448:the original 443: 434: 425: 413: 402:. Retrieved 395:the original 390: 378: 364: 331: 324: 320: 307: 300: 293: 286: 270: 260: 258: 225: 214: 194: 161: 153: 140: 127: 99: 76: 58: 28:fire control 23: 19: 18: 638:October 11, 273:Indian Navy 245:B-21 Raider 168:F-22 Raptor 112:data. The 50:Development 712:Categories 678:2023-01-03 615:2023-01-03 586:2023-01-03 535:2023-01-03 510:2023-01-03 481:10 January 454:10 January 404:2013-12-13 356:References 241:B-2 Spirit 134:system to 81:to act as 580:USNI News 504:USNI News 292:INS  285:INS  232:AN/APG-81 475:usni.org 444:navy.mil 339:See also 330:JS  323:JS  263:(TSMPF) 205:SA-3 Goa 428:. 1995. 303:Barak 8 294:Chennai 277:Barak 8 131:Link 16 73:NIFC-CA 44:jamming 332:Haguro 255:France 91:UCLASS 633:(PDF) 422:(PDF) 398:(PDF) 387:(PDF) 317:Japan 287:Kochi 267:India 143:Aegis 640:2016 562:2016 483:2014 456:2014 325:Maya 290:and 217:NATO 209:AESA 184:and 175:and 34:and 93:or 32:air 24:CEC 714:: 671:. 608:. 595:^ 578:. 552:. 528:. 502:. 491:^ 473:. 442:. 424:. 389:. 283:, 243:, 97:. 681:. 656:. 642:. 618:. 589:. 564:. 538:. 513:. 485:. 458:. 407:. 372:. 22:(

Index

fire control
air
missile defense
network-centric warfare
jamming
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
F-35C Lightning II
forward observers
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye
UCLASS
Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
United States Navy
anti-access/area denial
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
EA-18G Growler
Next Generation Jammer
fourth-generation jet fighter
Link 16
electronic warfare
Aegis
Standard Missile 6 (SM-6)
low-frequency radars
F-22 Raptor
Type 52C Luyang II
Type 52D Luyang III
cyber warfare
electronic attacks
anti-radiation missiles
1999 downing of an F-117 Nighthawk
F-117 Nighthawk

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