Knowledge (XXG)

Constitutional hardball

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25: 90:, because it undermines shared understanding of democratic norms and undermines the expectation that the other side will comply with democratic norms. As a result, the use of constitutional hardball by one side of partisans encourages other partisans to respond in similar fashion. 85:
is the exploitation of procedures, laws and institutions by political actors for partisan gain in ways which violate pre-established norms and push the bounds of legality. Legal scholars and political scientists have characterized constitutional hardball as a threat to
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has strengthened the role of the executive in policy-making, as the President becomes more likely to use the powers of office to circumvent the legislature; Obama's use of executive orders is mentioned as an example of constitutional hardball.
153: 406: 212: 35: 281: 301: 558: 407:"Republicans in Wisconsin and Michigan want to weaken incoming Democratic governors. Here's what's the usual partisan politics — and what isn't" 641: 530: 234: 69: 323: 385: 347: 137:, wrote in 2018 that "the concept of constitutional hardball seemed to be passing into common usage" in the United States. 578: 169: 47: 636: 393: 51: 218: 437: 502: 144:
to force others to agree to one's demands (hostage-taking), disenfranchising voters for the opposing party (
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administrations and legislatures to curb the powers of incoming legislators and administrations, using
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shifted to authoritarianism in part through constitutional hardball, as
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It has been suggested that the use of constitutional hardball in the
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Pierson, Paul; Hacker, Jacob S.; Persily, Nathaniel, Editor (2015).
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powers on oneself or one's associates, and refusal to commit to the
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Questionable actions taken by political actors for personal gain
559:"What happens when losers of elections won't relinquish power?" 389: 18: 34:
deal primarily with the United States and do not represent a
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Examples of constitutional hardball include the use of the
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Levitsky, Steven; Ziblatt, Daniel (January 27, 2018).
125:used legal court-packing schemes to cement power. 579:"Democracy's Undemocratic Transition of Power" 503:"Democrats: Prepare to Pack the Supreme Court" 32:The examples and perspective in this article 8: 324:"Constitutional Hardball Is Back. Look Out" 300:Levitsky, Steven; Ziblatt, Daniel (2018). 101:. Harvard University political scientists 280:CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( 93:The concept stems from a 2004 article by 70:Learn how and when to remove this message 322:Bernstein, Jonathan (December 4, 2018). 200: 270: 259: 249: 295: 293: 291: 109:have argued that democracies such as 7: 470: 468: 431: 429: 405:Glassman, Matt (December 11, 2018). 341: 339: 337: 206: 204: 214:Confronting Asymmetric Polarization 603:Yglesias, Matt (October 8, 2015). 14: 475:Pozen, David (October 11, 2018). 356:. Vol. April/May/June 2018. 133:David Pozen, Professor of Law at 529:Matthews, Dylan (July 2, 2018). 23: 477:"Hardball and/as Anti-Hardball" 392:37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523-553 348:"Trump Meets Political Science" 605:"American democracy is doomed" 438:"How Wobbly Is Our Democracy?" 1: 642:Political science terminology 346:Valelly, Rick (2018-04-08). 227:10.1017/cbo9781316091906.003 170:peaceful transition of power 501:Lemieux, Scott (May 2018). 394:John Marshall School of Law 46:, discuss the issue on the 658: 219:Cambridge University Press 386:Constitutional Hardball 154:refusal of appointments 83:Constitutional hardball 583:Brown Political Review 190:Democratic backsliding 177:United States Congress 148:), routine use of the 302:"How Democracies Die" 129:In the United States 52:create a new article 44:improve this article 564:The Washington Post 412:The Washington Post 135:Columbia Law School 637:Constitutional law 443:The New York Times 353:Washington Monthly 306:Penguin Publishing 262:has generic name ( 221:. pp. 59–70. 99:Harvard Law School 146:voter suppression 80: 79: 72: 54:, as appropriate. 649: 622: 621: 619: 617: 600: 594: 593: 591: 590: 575: 569: 568: 554: 548: 547: 545: 543: 526: 520: 519: 517: 515: 508:The New Republic 498: 492: 491: 489: 487: 472: 463: 462: 460: 458: 433: 424: 423: 421: 419: 402: 396: 382:Tushnet, Mark V. 379: 373: 372: 370: 368: 343: 332: 331: 319: 313: 312: 297: 286: 285: 278: 272: 267: 261: 257: 255: 247: 245: 243: 208: 75: 68: 64: 61: 55: 27: 26: 19: 657: 656: 652: 651: 650: 648: 647: 646: 627: 626: 625: 615: 613: 602: 601: 597: 588: 586: 577: 576: 572: 556: 555: 551: 541: 539: 528: 527: 523: 513: 511: 500: 499: 495: 485: 483: 474: 473: 466: 456: 454: 435: 434: 427: 417: 415: 404: 403: 399: 380: 376: 366: 364: 345: 344: 335: 321: 320: 316: 299: 298: 289: 279: 269: 258: 248: 241: 239: 237: 210: 209: 202: 198: 186: 131: 107:Steven Levitsky 76: 65: 59: 56: 41: 28: 24: 17: 12: 11: 5: 655: 653: 645: 644: 639: 629: 628: 624: 623: 595: 570: 549: 521: 493: 464: 425: 397: 374: 333: 314: 287: 271:|website= 235: 199: 197: 194: 193: 192: 185: 182: 130: 127: 103:Daniel Ziblatt 78: 77: 38:of the subject 36:worldwide view 31: 29: 22: 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 654: 643: 640: 638: 635: 634: 632: 612: 611: 606: 599: 596: 584: 580: 574: 571: 566: 565: 560: 557:Melber, Ari. 553: 550: 538: 537: 532: 525: 522: 510: 509: 504: 497: 494: 482: 478: 471: 469: 465: 453: 449: 445: 444: 439: 432: 430: 426: 414: 413: 408: 401: 398: 395: 391: 387: 383: 378: 375: 363: 359: 355: 354: 349: 342: 340: 338: 334: 329: 325: 318: 315: 310: 307: 303: 296: 294: 292: 288: 283: 276: 265: 260:|first3= 253: 238: 236:9781107087118 232: 228: 224: 220: 216: 215: 207: 205: 201: 195: 191: 188: 187: 183: 181: 178: 173: 171: 167: 163: 160:, actions by 159: 158:court-packing 155: 151: 147: 143: 138: 136: 128: 126: 124: 120: 116: 112: 108: 104: 100: 96: 91: 89: 84: 74: 71: 63: 53: 49: 45: 39: 37: 30: 21: 20: 614:. 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Retrieved 213: 174: 142:debt ceiling 139: 132: 95:Mark Tushnet 92: 82: 81: 66: 57: 33: 616:January 19, 514:January 13, 418:January 16, 123:Hugo Chavez 631:Categories 589:2020-12-10 542:January 7, 486:January 7, 457:January 7, 367:January 7, 242:January 6, 196:References 152:, routine 150:filibuster 119:Juan Perón 452:0362-4331 362:0043-0633 328:Bloomberg 273:ignored ( 252:cite book 166:pardoning 162:lame-duck 115:Venezuela 111:Argentina 88:democracy 60:July 2021 48:talk page 184:See also 42:You may 481:Lawfare 384:(2004) 450:  360:  233:  50:, or 618:2019 544:2019 516:2019 488:2019 459:2019 448:ISSN 420:2019 369:2019 358:ISSN 282:link 275:help 264:help 244:2019 231:ISBN 121:and 113:and 105:and 610:Vox 536:Vox 390:PDF 223:doi 97:of 633:: 607:. 581:. 561:. 533:. 505:. 479:. 467:^ 446:. 440:. 428:^ 409:. 388:, 350:. 336:^ 326:. 304:. 290:^ 268:; 256:: 254:}} 250:{{ 229:. 217:. 203:^ 172:. 156:, 620:. 592:. 567:. 546:. 518:. 490:. 461:. 422:. 371:. 330:. 311:. 284:) 277:) 266:) 246:. 225:: 73:) 67:( 62:) 58:( 40:.

Index

worldwide view
improve this article
talk page
create a new article
Learn how and when to remove this message
democracy
Mark Tushnet
Harvard Law School
Daniel Ziblatt
Steven Levitsky
Argentina
Venezuela
Juan Perón
Hugo Chavez
Columbia Law School
debt ceiling
voter suppression
filibuster
refusal of appointments
court-packing
lame-duck
pardoning
peaceful transition of power
United States Congress
Democratic backsliding


Confronting Asymmetric Polarization
Cambridge University Press
doi

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