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simulation showed the four signatures of consciousness described in Ch. 4 (p. 184). Consciousness seemed to behave like a "phase transition" between one unconscious stable state of low-level activity and another conscious state consisting of snowballing self-amplification and reverberation (p. 184). Subliminal stimuli fail to become conscious because by the time the higher layers try to amplify the signal, the original input stimulation has vanished (p. 193).
495:"Unless we assume that computers are conscious, the question remains why we are conscious when we perform certain functions, whereas computers can perform virtually the same functions without consciousness." Kalat also finds inadequate Dehaene's dismissal of the hard problem of consciousness "in barely over a page of text" without further exploration of the subject.
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Dehaene and colleagues have developed computer simulations of neural dynamics that successfully replicate the way in which distributed processing at the brain's periphery gives way to a stable, serial "thought" at higher levels due to feedback amplification of one signal and inhibition of others. The
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wave when a word is consciously seen but not when it remains unconscious. Dehaene compares conscious perception to breaking "through the dike of the frontal and parietal networks, suddenly flooding into a much larger expanse of cortex" (p. 124). There are actually two P3 waves, and they seem to
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Dehaene reviews historical intuitions that consciousness must be separate from matter. He explains how consciousness was not even mentioned in neuroscientific circles until the late 1980s, when a revolution in consciousness research began. Dehaene believes that "access consciousness" (being aware of
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Matthew Hutson calls
Dehaene's book "smart, thorough and lucid, though a terrible choice for beach reading." Hutson admires Dehaene's success with neural correlates of consciousness but feels that the hard problem remains unresolved. Like Kalat, Hutson finds Dehaene's dismissal of the hard problem
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Recent findings have shown that a few patients without any ability to move (not even to move their eyes) still show intact consciousness as seen by their ability to answer questions in an fMRI. The trick is to instruct the patients to think about their apartments if they want to say "no" and about
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is beautifully written, erudite, thoughtful, and likely to provoke discussion for years to come." Kalat explains how
Dehaene believes that consciousness is important for performing certain calculations that cannot be done unconsciously. However, Kalat suggests that this leaves us with a puzzle:
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Different tests can give different answers regarding whether a clinical patient is conscious, and responses may depend on time of day or other factors. Hence, Dehaene suggests "to develop a whole battery" of tests that can be applied in many contexts (pp. 214–215). fMRI tests are expensive and
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Dehaene suggests that computers could become more like animal brains if they had greater communication between processes, more learning plasticity, and more autonomy over decisions. Of these design changes, he suggests that "at least in principle, I see no reason why they would not lead to an
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Monkeys can be trained to "report" on their conscious experiences via actions rather than speech, and monkeys show the same sorts of brain and behavioral patterns as humans in response to consciousness tests. Dehaene adds that some animals, like monkeys and dolphins, show evidence not just of
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Consciousness seems to have a "tipping point" or "phase transition" of sorts, an all-or-nothing cutoff. Dehaene uses the phrase "global ignition" to describe the process of neurons bursting into widespread activation, similar to the way an audience begins with a few claps and then erupts into
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Reasoning through multi-step strategies and performing serial computations, such as the steps in figuring out that 12 x 13 = 156 in your head. Consciousness seems "to collect the information from various processors, synthesize it, and then broadcast the result – a conscious symbol – to other,
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meaning-based wave occurs for unexpected words even when masked or not attended to. Unconscious processing is not just bottom-up but can be enhanced when top-down attention is directed toward a target, even if the target never becomes conscious. Brains can even do some mathematical operations
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Alun
Anderson agrees with the critics of Dehaene who think that consciousness as "brain-wide information sharing" is not enough to resolve the hard problem. That said, he appreciates Dehaene's book and recommends to "read a chapter at a time because it is jam-packed with intuition-altering
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of consciousness. Dehaene proposes that "When we say that we are aware of a certain piece of information, what we mean is just this: the information has entered into a specific storage area that makes it available to the rest of the brain" (p. 163). He adds: "The flexible dissemination of
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responds to
Dehaene's criticism of pure qualia divorced from information processing by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can indeed play a functional role when it "greases the wheels of cognitive access" but that phenomenal consciousness can also exist without access.
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Greatly amplified brain activity in many regions, including parietal and prefrontal circuits. Unconscious perception is like a wave that peters out upon reaching shore, while conscious perception is more like an avalanche that gains momentum as it
26:
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consciousness but also of metacognition. He speculates that maybe what makes human cognition unique is "the peculiar way we explicitly formulate our ideas using nested or recursive structures of symbols" (p. 250).
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and able to report on information) is the right definition to start with for scientific investigation. While some philosophers insist that access consciousness differs from "phenomenal consciousness" (e.g., the way
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of consciousness are actually insufficient, because many things can correlate with conscious perception, including even brain states prior to presentation of a stimulus. Dehaene is most interested in neural
478:"just seems hard because it engages ill-defined intuitions", and it "will evaporate" as people better understand "cognitive neuroscience and computer simulations" (p. 262). Dehaene also defends a
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analysis shows strong bidirectional causality, with signals traveling both bottom-up (to relay sensory information to higher areas) and top-down (perhaps as attention or confirmation signals).
455:"I would not be surprised if we discovered that all mammals, and probably many species of birds and fish, show evidence of a convergent evolution to the same sort of conscious workspace ."
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Sharing the contents of our minds with others, via language and non-verbal signals. Brains can make confidence assessments in their opinions, which helps with combining judgments optimally.
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communication methods (p. 215) and other brain-computer interfaces (p. 216). Dehaene and colleagues also developed a simple test for consciousness based on novelty of patterns in sounds.
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Dehaene reviews evidence that young infants are indeed conscious, although their global workspaces may run 3–4 times slower than in adults, perhaps because their
334:, gamma waves around 40 Hz do not appear only during consciousness. But when they show up in unconscious processing, they do have a much reduced intensity.
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occupy bandwidth that prevents comprehension of other stimuli at the same time, which explains the attentional blink and the serial nature of consciousness.
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unjustified because consciousness is "unique" in being "inherently private, subjective", unlike other phenomena that can be reductively explained.
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feel), Dehaene considers the access/phenomenal distinction "highly misleading" and feels it "leads down a slippery slope to dualism" (p. 10).
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Dehaene suggests that noise fluctuations in neural activity can be amplified and give rise to randomness in our streams of thought (p. 190).
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summarizes much low-level data into a single brief for the president of the United States. Convergence on a single interpretation of local
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Dehaene distinguishes conscious access from related but not identical ideas: "attention, wakefulness, vigilance, self-consciousness, and
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unconsciously, and sitting on a problem to let the unconscious mind work out an answer has proved helpful in several experiments.
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illustrates this because we can predict future positions of moving objects but not those of objects that suddenly appear.
202:"Based on what we now know, virtually all the brain's regions can participate in both conscious and unconscious thought."
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compares this with an echo chamber. In contrast, unconscious information decays away exponentially within about a second.
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on out-of-body experiences explore an example where conscious experience changes while external stimuli stay the same.
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While some view consciousness as an epiphenomenon of brains, Dehaene sees it as playing functional roles, such as
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notion of free will and suggests even that free will "can be implemented in a standard computer" (p. 264).
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playing tennis if they want to say "yes", and the corresponding differences in brain activity can be observed.
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and intracranial electrodes for patients undergoing surgery to directly create perceptions. An example is
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Collapsing many lower-level probability assessments into one conscious perception sampled from the
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111:. It summarizes research on the neuroscience of consciousness, particularly from recent decades.
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To prove causation between brain states and conscious experiences, neuroscientists have used
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611:"Books about the brain: 'Ha!,' 'Joy, Guilt, Anger, Love' and 'Consciousness and the Brain'"
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starting at about 300 milliseconds after a stimulus. Contrary to an initial hypothesis by
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can be processed unconsciously and concludes based on his own research that it can be. An
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of consciousness that represent the consciousness brain processing itself. (p. 142)
547:"BOOK REVIEW: Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes our Thoughts"
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posterior distribution, allowing us to make a single decision, in a similar way as the
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Dehaene reviews unconscious brain processing of various forms: subliminal perception,
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information, I argue, is a characteristic property of the conscious state" (p. 165).
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Dehaene explores consciousness in human babies, non-human animals, and machines.
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Brain-wide synchronization of information in what is called a "brain web".
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Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our
Thoughts
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Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our
Thoughts
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over superficial changes that leave the content intact" (p. 149).
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The Future of the Brain: Essays by the World's
Leading Neuroscientists
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artificial consciousness" (p. 261). Dehaene suggests that the
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arbitrarily selected processors" (p. 105). This resembles a
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Consciousness is slower than events in the external world. The
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Neuroscientists have found four "signatures of consciousness":
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using paradigms like minimal contrasts of images, masking (
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A 2017 review in
Science S Dehaene, H Law & S Kouider
588:"Hot on the trail of consciousness in brain and machine"
634:"Consciousness, Big Science and Conceptual Clarity"
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The
Journal of Undergraduate Neuroscience Education
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525:What is consciousness and could machines have it?
431:burdensome, so researchers are exploring easier
236:), etc. Dehaene discusses a debate over whether
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274:Creating lasting thoughts that can remain in
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302:Ch. 4: The Signatures of a Conscious Thought
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356:Conscious percepts have properties of "
160:. The attentional blink relates to the
144:He introduces the project of measuring
251:Ch. 3: What Is Consciousness Good For?
387:Dehaene discusses his version of the
271:data does not occur under anesthesia.
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346:synchronous applause (p. 131).
196:Ch. 2: Fathoming Unconscious Depths
133:Ch. 1: Consciousness Enters the Lab
439:Ch. 7: The Future of Consciousness
322:A marked increase in the power of
228:, subliminal priming, unconscious
146:neural correlates of consciousness
120:Introduction: The Stuff of Thought
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373:transcranial magnetic stimulation
609:Hutson, Matthew (21 Mar 2014).
545:Kalat, James W. (Spring 2014).
383:Ch. 5: Theorizing Consciousness
162:psychological refractory period
586:Anderson, Alun (10 Mar 2014).
16:2014 book by Stanislas Dehaene
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643:. Princeton University Press.
476:hard problem of consciousness
183:In Ch. 4, Dehaene notes that
492:Consciousness and the Brain
462:Consciousness and the Brain
209:Consciousness and the Brain
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560:(2): R5–R6. Archived from
417:minimally conscious states
671:Books about consciousness
450:is not well established.
278:for use at a later time.
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403:Ch. 6: The Ultimate Test
220:'s pinprick experiment,
490:James W. Kalat thinks "
389:Global Workspace Theory
292:artificial intelligence
166:inattentional blindness
666:English-language books
661:2014 non-fiction books
520:Dehaene–Changeux model
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460:Stanislas Dehaene,
364:across trials, and
314:Ignition of a late
226:hemispatial neglect
207:Stanislas Dehaene,
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676:Viking Press books
421:locked-in syndrome
407:Dehaene discusses
351:flash lag illusion
150:subliminal stimuli
107:is a 2014 book by
613:. Washington Post
413:vegetative states
339:Granger causality
288:production system
218:Édouard Claparède
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115:Book outline
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65:Viking Press
55:neuroscience
360:over time,
324:gamma waves
311:progresses.
174:Olaf Blanke
655:Categories
366:invariance
222:blindsight
190:signatures
185:correlates
507:Ned Block
486:Reactions
377:phosphene
358:stability
61:Publisher
514:See also
464:, p. 246
261:Bayesian
617:25 July
594:25 July
571:25 July
239:meaning
230:binding
211:, p. 53
178:studies
47:Subject
448:myelin
419:, and
168:, and
156:, and
127:qualia
37:Author
637:(PDF)
565:(PDF)
550:(PDF)
532:Notes
81:Pages
619:2014
596:2014
573:2014
409:coma
330:and
244:N400
90:ISBN
76:2014
433:EEG
290:in
265:FBI
176:'s
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