226:. If this threat were credible, it would discourage the rival from entering. However, the firm might not be able to commit its future self to taking such an action because if the rival does in fact end up entering, the firm's future self might determine that, given the fact that the rival is now actually in the market and there is no point in trying to discourage entry, it is now not in its interest to dramatically drop the price. As such, the threat would not be credible. The present self of the firm has preferences that would have the future self be committed to the threat, but the future self has preferences that have it not carry out the threat. Hence, the dynamic inconsistency.
955:) - and researchers analyzed patterns of choices made. In the absence of dynamic inconsistency, the choice would be expected to be the same regardless of the delay between the decision date and the consumption date. In practice, however, the outcome was different. When subjects had to choose a movie to watch immediately, the choice was consistently lowbrow for the majority of the subjects. But when they were asked to pick a movie to be watched at later date, highbrow movies were chosen far more often. Among movies picked four or more days in advance, over 70% were highbrow.
307:
this relative weighting be the same for one given self as it is for a different given self? If it is, then we have a case of time consistency. If the relative weightings of all pairs of utilities are all the same for all given selves, then the decision-maker has time-consistent preferences. If there exists a case of one relative weighting of utilities where one self has a different relative weighting of those utilities than another self has, then we have a case of time inconsistency and the decision-maker will be said to have time-inconsistent preferences.
802:
would prefer getting one day off in ten years or getting one and a half days off in ten years and one month. Suppose that then you would have taken the day and a half off. This would be a case of time inconsistency because your relative preferences for tomorrow versus one month from now would be different at two different points in time—namely now versus ten years ago. The decision made ten years ago indicates a preference for delayed gratification, but the decision made just before the fact indicates a preference for immediate pleasure.
25:
852:, often wish that the exam could be put off for one more day. If asked on that night, such students might agree to commit to paying, say, $ 10 on the day of the exam for it to be held the next day. Months before the exam is held, however, students generally do not care much about having the exam put off for one day. And, in fact, if the students were made the same offer at the beginning of the
127:
856:, that is, they could have the exam put off for one day by committing during registration to pay $ 10 on the day of the exam, they probably would reject that offer. The choice is the same, although made at different points in time. Because the outcome would change depending on the point in time, the students would exhibit time inconsistency.
825:
by assuming that they will remain at present levels. This leads to inconsistency as marginal utilities (for example, tastes) change over time in a way that the individual did not expect. For example, when individuals are asked to choose between a piece of fruit and an unhealthy snack (such as a candy
586:
that is, the ratio of utility values for a good at two different moments of time only depends on the interval between these times, but not on their choice. (If you're willing to pay 10% over list price to buy a new phone today instead of paying list price and having it delivered in a week, you'd also
101:
change over time in such a way that a preference can become inconsistent at another point in time. This can be thought of as there being many different "selves" within decision makers, with each "self" representing the decision-maker at a different point in time; the inconsistency occurs when not all
306:
of each self. Consider the possibility that for any given self, the weightings that self places on all the utilities could differ from the weightings that another given self places on all the utilities. The important consideration now is the relative weighting between two particular utilities. Will
958:
People display a consistent bias to believe that they will have more time in the future than they have today. Specifically, there is a persistent belief among people that they are "unusually busy in the immediate future, but will become less busy shortly". However, the amount of time you have this
834:
Theories of media choice have not explicitly dealt with choice inconsistency as it was defined by behavioral economics. However, an article by Gui et al. (2021) draws on behavioral economics literature to address blind spots in theorization of inconsistent media selection in media studies. It also
809:
One way that time-inconsistent preferences have been formally introduced into economic models is by first giving the decision-maker standard exponentially discounted preferences, and then adding another term that heavily discounts any time that is not now. Preferences of this sort have been called
801:
For example, consider having the choice between getting the day off work tomorrow or getting a day and a half off work one month from now. Suppose you would choose one day off tomorrow. Now suppose that you were asked to make that same choice ten years ago. That is, you were asked then whether you
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on this topic showed that people tend to discount investments of time more than money. They nicknamed this the "Yes...Damn!" effect because people tend to commit themselves to time-consuming activities like traveling to a conference under the false impression that they will be less busy in the
844:
In a game theory context, an announced government policy of never negotiating with terrorists over the release of hostages constitutes a time inconsistency example, since in each particular hostage situation the authorities face the dilemma of breaking the rule and trying to save the hostages.
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More generally, humans have a systematic tendency to switch towards "vices" (products or activities which are pleasant in the short term) from "virtues" (products or activities which are seen as valuable in the long term) as the moment of consumption approaches, even if this involves changing
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are believed to be advantageous for a country. Indeed, "a central bank with a high degree of discretion in conducting monetary policy would find itself under constant political pressure to boost the economy and reduce unemployment, but since the economy cannot exceed its potential GDP or its
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bar) for a future meal, the choice is strongly affected by their "current" level of hunger. Individuals may become addicted to smoking or drugs because they underestimate future marginal utilities of these habits (such as craving for cigarettes) once they become addicted.
787:, since they imply that all of a decision-maker's selves will agree with the choices made by each self. Any decision that the individual makes for himself in advance will remain valid (i.e., an optimal choice) as time advances, unless utilities themselves change.
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week is generally representative of the time you have in future weeks. When people are estimating their time and when deciding if they will make a commitment, they anticipate more "time slack" in future weeks than the present week. Experiments by
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highlights that inconsistent choice is even more frequent and relevant in the digital environment, as higher stimulation and multitasking makes it easier to opt for immediate gratification even in the presence of different long-term preferences.
1698:
Yeung, David W. K.; Petrosyan, Leon A. Subgame
Consistent Economic Optimization: An Advanced Cooperative Dynamic Game Analysis (Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications), Birkhäuser Boston; 2012.
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of the ship. Most importantly, he orders his men not to heed his cries while they pass the Sirens; recognizing that in the future he may behave irrationally, Odysseus limits his future agency and binds himself to a
748:
845:
Assuming the government acted consistently in not ever breaking the rule, it would make it irrational for a terrorist group to take hostages. (Of course, in the real world terrorists might not act rationally.)
936:(i.e., the mast) to survive this perilous example of dynamic inconsistency. This example has been used by economists to explain the benefits of commitment mechanisms in mitigating dynamic inconsistency.
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379:
780:, that relationship also holds at all other times. (If you'd rather eat broccoli than cake tomorrow for lunch, you'll also pick broccoli over cake if you're hungry right now.)
260:, however, people are not always consistent. People tend to choose "500 dollars today" and "505 dollars 366 days later", which is different from the time-consistent answer.
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preferences. This would imply disagreement by people's different selves on decisions made and a rejection of the time consistency aspect of rational choice theory.
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Time inconsistency basically means that there is disagreement between a decision-maker's different selves about what actions should be taken. Formally, consider an
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is the "discount factor", which is the same for all goods and constant over time. Mathematically, it is the unique continuous function that satisfies the equation
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408:
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1317:
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Exponential discounting yields time-consistent preferences. Exponential discounting and, more generally, time-consistent preferences are often assumed in
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1716:
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927:. Curious to hear the Sirens' songs but mindful of the danger, Odysseus orders his men to stop their ears with beeswax and ties himself to the
238:, time inconsistency is related to how each different self of a decision-maker may have different preferences over current and future choices.
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943:. In the experiment, subjects of the study were offered free rentals of movies which were classified into two categories - "lowbrow" (e.g.,
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where a player's best plan for some future period will not be optimal when that future period arrives. A dynamically inconsistent game is
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model is another commonly used model that allows one to obtain more realistic results with regard to human decision-making.
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318:. Exponential discounting posits that the decision maker assigns future utility of any good according to the formula
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One common way in which selves may differ in their preferences is they may be modeled as all holding the view that "
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When this question is asked, to be time-consistent, one must make the same choice for (b) as for (a). According to
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Petrosjan, Leon; Zaccour, Georges (2003). "Time-consistent
Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction".
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A different form of dynamic inconsistency arises as a consequence of "projection bias" (not to be confused with a
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literature relies heavily on this type of time inconsistency, and it relates to a variety of topics including
271:". As a result, the present self will care too much about itself and not enough about its future selves. The
267:" has especially high value compared to any future time. This is sometimes called the "immediacy effect" or "
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Simaan, M.; Cruz, J. B. Jr. (1973b). "Additional
Aspects of the Stackelberg Strategy in Nonzero-Sum Games".
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Loewenstein, G.; Prelec, D. (1992). "Anomalies in
Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation".
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in the future. But once tomorrow comes lowering inflation may have negative effects, such as increasing
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be willing to pay extra 10% to get it one week sooner if you were ordering it six months in advance.)
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248:(b) Which do you prefer, to be given 500 dollars 365 days from now or 505 dollars 366 days from now?
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One famous example in literature of a mechanism for dealing with dynamic inconsistency is that of
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Rogoff, Kenneth (1985). "The
Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target".
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1525:"Mixing virtue and vice: combining the immediacy effect and the diversification heuristic"
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Simaan, M.; Cruz, J. B. Jr. (1973a). "On the
Stackelberg Strategy in Nonzero-Sum Games".
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Strotz, R. H. (1955–56). "Myopia and
Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization".
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1310:"Resource Slack and Propensity to Discount Delayed Investments of Time Versus Money"
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1425:(1974). "The Honest Government's Guide to the Revenue From the Creation of Money".
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245:(a) Which do you prefer, to be given 500 dollars today or 505 dollars tomorrow?
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research makes a strong case that time inconsistency is, in fact, standard in
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When a decision-maker's future preferences can contradict earlier preferences
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by the leader or dominant player, as shown in Simaan and Cruz (
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1717:
Stoerger, Jan (2006): The Time
Consistency Problem - Monetary Policy Models
1338:
1731:
1554:
10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199912)12:4<257::AID-BDM327>3.0.CO;2-6
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that involve decision-making over time to assume that decision-makers are
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is the utility assigned to the good if it were consumed immediately, and
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151: in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
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A curious case of dynamic inconsistency in psychology is described by
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of the same name). Humans have a tendency to mispredict their future
1726:. Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering.
1675:
1586:
1090:"Theorizing inconsistent media selection in the digital environment"
1007:
743:{\displaystyle U_{A}(t_{1})/U_{B}(t_{1})=U_{A}(t_{2})/U_{B}(t_{2});}
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1440:
1219:
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over time, this policy would instead only lead to higher inflation
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1291:"Watch Out for the 'Yes, Damn!' Effect. It's a Credibility Killer"
1189:"Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans"
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753:
that is, if good A is assigned higher utility than good B at time
219:
1523:
Read, Daniel; Loewenstein, George; Kalyanaraman, Shobana (1999).
105:
The term "dynamic inconsistency" is more closely affiliated with
849:
1781:
109:, whereas "time inconsistency" is more closely affiliated with
1466:"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model"
120:
18:
1139:"The Evolution of Central Bank Governance Around the World"
940:
878:, so they do not make much effort to lower it. This is why
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expectations, as politicians are best off promising lower
1361:"When Do You Want It? Time, Decisions, and Public Policy"
610:
is the same for all goods, then it is also the case that
218:
might want to commit itself to dramatically dropping the
576:{\displaystyle U(t_{1})/U(t_{2})=U(t_{1}+c)/U(t_{2}+c);}
191:. In this context, the inconsistency is primarily about
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Gui, Marco; Shanahan, James; Tsay-Vogel, Mina (2021).
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619:
596:
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445:
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894:". The first paper on this subject was published by
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1917:
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1037:Loewenstein, G.; O'Donoghue, T.; Rabin, M. (2003).
908:in 1977, which eventually led to their winning the
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772:
742:
602:
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451:
431:
402:
373:
1137:Crowe, Christopher; Meade, Ellen E. (Fall 2007).
222:of a product it sells if a rival firm enters its
1510:"Time consistency of monetary and fiscal policy"
1308:Zauberman, Gal; Lynch, John G. (February 2005).
1264:. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. p.
1722:Yeung, David W. K.; Petrosyan, Leon A. (2006).
1633:Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
1604:Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
241:Consider, for example, the following question:
199:. This manifests itself through a violation of
1359:Lynch, John G.; Zauberman, Gal (Spring 2006).
1039:"Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility"
960:
866:makers suffer from dynamic inconsistency with
1793:
8:
183:, dynamic inconsistency is a situation in a
1464:Barro, Robert J.; Gordon, David B. (1983).
1318:Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
941:Read, Loewenstein & Kalyanaraman (1999)
208:
204:
1800:
1786:
1778:
1724:Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games
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910:Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
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167:Learn how and when to remove this message
69:Learn how and when to remove this message
1759:Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
1515:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
1368:Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
32:This article includes a list of general
986:
1532:Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
1289:McIntyre, Wayne (December 18, 2011).
7:
374:{\displaystyle U(t)=U(0)e^{-\rho t}}
149:adding citations to reliable sources
1849:First-player and second-player win
1046:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
996:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
810:"present-biased preferences". The
38:it lacks sufficient corresponding
14:
201:Bellman's Principle of Optimality
1956:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
1144:Journal of Economic Perspectives
125:
23:
136:needs additional citations for
1966:Evolutionarily stable strategy
1564:Quarterly Journal of Economics
848:Students, the night before an
734:
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703:
690:
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661:
643:
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548:
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1:
1894:Simultaneous action selection
1771:10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00053-7
1106:10.1080/01972243.2021.1922565
2826:List of games in game theory
2006:Quantal response equilibrium
1996:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
1931:Bayes correlated equilibrium
1473:Journal of Political Economy
1428:Journal of Political Economy
1254:"The Market Crosses Borders"
1197:Journal of Political Economy
961:Zauberman & Lynch (2005)
905:Journal of Political Economy
888:natural rate of unemployment
298:with different mathematical
2295:Optional prisoner's dilemma
2026:Self-confirming equilibrium
914:Monetary policy credibility
806:decisions made in advance.
2883:
2760:Principal variation search
2476:Aumann's agreement theorem
2139:Strategy-stealing argument
2051:Trembling hand equilibrium
1981:Markov perfect equilibrium
1976:Mertens-stable equilibrium
1663:Review of Economic Studies
1331:10.1037/0096-3445.134.1.23
1068:10.1162/003355303322552784
93:is a situation in which a
2796:Combinatorial game theory
2455:Princess and monster game
2011:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
1936:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
102:preferences are aligned.
2811:Evolutionary game theory
2544:Antoine Augustin Cournot
2430:Guess 2/3 of the average
2227:Strictly determined game
2021:Satisfaction equilibrium
1839:Escalation of commitment
949:) and "highbrow" (e.g.,
2867:Intertemporal economics
2816:Glossary of game theory
2415:Stackelberg competition
2041:Strong Nash equilibrium
1260:Why Globalization Works
1094:The Information Society
316:exponential discounters
230:In behavioral economics
53:more precise citations.
2841:Tragedy of the commons
2821:List of game theorists
2801:Confrontation analysis
2511:Sprague–Grundy theorem
2031:Sequential equilibrium
1951:Correlated equilibrium
812:hyperbolic discounting
785:rational choice theory
774:
744:
604:
577:
453:
433:
404:
375:
2614:Jean-François Mertens
1732:10.1007/0-387-27622-X
1423:Auernheimer, Leonardo
775:
773:{\displaystyle t_{1}}
745:
605:
603:{\displaystyle \rho }
578:
454:
452:{\displaystyle \rho }
434:
405:
376:
87:dynamic inconsistency
2743:Search optimizations
2619:Jennifer Tour Chayes
2506:Revelation principle
2501:Purification theorem
2440:Nash bargaining game
2405:Bertrand competition
2390:El Farol Bar problem
2355:Electronic mail game
2320:Lewis signaling game
1864:Hierarchy of beliefs
1508:Klein, Paul (2009).
1390:10.1509/jppm.25.1.67
934:commitment mechanism
757:
617:
594:
466:
443:
432:{\displaystyle U(0)}
414:
388:
325:
269:temporal discounting
236:behavioral economics
145:improve this article
111:behavioral economics
2791:Bounded rationality
2410:Cournot competition
2360:Rock paper scissors
2335:Battle of the sexes
2325:Volunteer's dilemma
2197:Perfect information
2124:Dominant strategies
1961:Epsilon-equilibrium
1844:Extensive-form game
1185:Prescott, Edward C.
1158:10.1257/jep.21.4.69
912:in 2004. (See also
403:{\displaystyle t=0}
2770:Paranoid algorithm
2750:Alpha–beta pruning
2629:John Maynard Smith
2460:Rendezvous problem
2300:Traveler's dilemma
2290:Gift-exchange game
2285:Prisoner's dilemma
2202:Large Poisson game
2169:Bargaining problem
2074:Backward induction
2046:Subgame perfection
2001:Proper equilibrium
1645:10.1007/BF00935561
1616:10.1007/BF00935665
946:The Breakfast Club
900:Edward C. Prescott
823:marginal utilities
770:
740:
600:
573:
449:
429:
400:
371:
254:George Loewenstein
234:In the context of
179:In the context of
91:time inconsistency
2849:
2848:
2755:Aspiration window
2724:Suzanne Scotchmer
2679:Oskar Morgenstern
2574:Donald B. Gillies
2516:Zermelo's theorem
2445:Induction puzzles
2400:Fair cake-cutting
2375:Public goods game
2305:Coordination game
2179:Intransitive game
2109:Forward induction
1991:Pareto efficiency
1971:Gibbs equilibrium
1941:Berge equilibrium
1889:Simultaneous game
1705:978-0-8176-8261-3
1275:978-0-300-10252-9
1077:on June 16, 2012.
839:Stylized examples
819:defense mechanism
287:, and saving for
189:subgame imperfect
177:
176:
169:
79:
78:
71:
2874:
2836:Topological game
2831:No-win situation
2729:Thomas Schelling
2709:Robert B. Wilson
2669:Merrill M. Flood
2639:John von Neumann
2549:Ariel Rubinstein
2534:Albert W. Tucker
2385:War of attrition
2345:Matching pennies
1986:Nash equilibrium
1909:Mechanism design
1874:Normal-form game
1829:Cooperative game
1802:
1795:
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1571:(4): 1169–1189.
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1409:
1408:
1406:
1400:. Archived from
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1347:
1341:. Archived from
1314:
1305:
1299:
1298:
1295:FunnelBoard Blog
1286:
1280:
1279:
1263:
1246:
1240:
1239:
1213:
1193:
1181:Kydland, Finn E.
1177:
1171:
1170:
1160:
1134:
1128:
1127:
1117:
1085:
1079:
1078:
1076:
1070:. Archived from
1061:
1052:(4): 1209–1248.
1043:
1034:
1028:
1027:
991:
952:Schindler's List
830:In media studies
779:
777:
776:
771:
769:
768:
749:
747:
746:
741:
733:
732:
720:
719:
710:
702:
701:
689:
688:
673:
672:
660:
659:
650:
642:
641:
629:
628:
609:
607:
606:
601:
582:
580:
579:
574:
560:
559:
544:
530:
529:
508:
507:
492:
484:
483:
458:
456:
455:
450:
438:
436:
435:
430:
410:is the present,
409:
407:
406:
401:
380:
378:
377:
372:
370:
369:
310:It is common in
197:credible threats
172:
165:
161:
158:
152:
129:
121:
74:
67:
63:
60:
54:
49:this article by
40:inline citations
27:
26:
19:
2882:
2881:
2877:
2876:
2875:
2873:
2872:
2871:
2852:
2851:
2850:
2845:
2779:
2765:max^n algorithm
2738:
2734:William Vickrey
2694:Reinhard Selten
2649:Kenneth Binmore
2564:David K. Levine
2559:Daniel Kahneman
2526:
2520:
2496:Negamax theorem
2486:Minimax theorem
2464:
2425:Diner's dilemma
2280:All-pay auction
2246:
2232:Stochastic game
2184:Mean-field game
2155:
2148:
2119:Markov strategy
2055:
1921:
1913:
1884:Sequential game
1869:Information set
1854:Game complexity
1824:Congestion game
1812:
1806:
1756:
1742:
1721:
1713:
1711:Further reading
1676:10.2307/2295722
1659:
1630:
1601:
1587:10.2307/1885679
1578:10.1.1.375.4121
1560:
1545:10.1.1.419.4327
1527:
1522:
1518:(2nd ed.).
1507:
1468:
1463:
1421:
1418:
1413:
1412:
1404:
1381:10.1.1.167.4955
1363:
1358:
1357:
1353:
1345:
1312:
1307:
1306:
1302:
1288:
1287:
1283:
1276:
1248:
1247:
1243:
1211:10.1.1.603.6853
1191:
1179:
1178:
1174:
1136:
1135:
1131:
1087:
1086:
1082:
1074:
1041:
1036:
1035:
1031:
1008:10.2307/2118482
993:
992:
988:
983:
975:Time preference
971:
896:Finn E. Kydland
892:in the long run
864:Monetary policy
841:
832:
760:
755:
754:
724:
711:
693:
680:
664:
651:
633:
620:
615:
614:
592:
591:
551:
521:
499:
475:
464:
463:
441:
440:
412:
411:
386:
385:
355:
323:
322:
312:economic models
277:procrastination
232:
214:For example, a
173:
162:
156:
153:
142:
130:
119:
75:
64:
58:
55:
45:Please help to
44:
28:
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
2880:
2878:
2870:
2869:
2864:
2854:
2853:
2847:
2846:
2844:
2843:
2838:
2833:
2828:
2823:
2818:
2813:
2808:
2803:
2798:
2793:
2787:
2785:
2781:
2780:
2778:
2777:
2772:
2767:
2762:
2757:
2752:
2746:
2744:
2740:
2739:
2737:
2736:
2731:
2726:
2721:
2716:
2711:
2706:
2701:
2699:Robert Axelrod
2696:
2691:
2686:
2681:
2676:
2674:Olga Bondareva
2671:
2666:
2664:Melvin Dresher
2661:
2656:
2654:Leonid Hurwicz
2651:
2646:
2641:
2636:
2631:
2626:
2621:
2616:
2611:
2606:
2601:
2596:
2591:
2589:Harold W. Kuhn
2586:
2581:
2579:Drew Fudenberg
2576:
2571:
2569:David M. Kreps
2566:
2561:
2556:
2554:Claude Shannon
2551:
2546:
2541:
2536:
2530:
2528:
2522:
2521:
2519:
2518:
2513:
2508:
2503:
2498:
2493:
2491:Nash's theorem
2488:
2483:
2478:
2472:
2470:
2466:
2465:
2463:
2462:
2457:
2452:
2447:
2442:
2437:
2432:
2427:
2422:
2417:
2412:
2407:
2402:
2397:
2392:
2387:
2382:
2377:
2372:
2367:
2362:
2357:
2352:
2350:Ultimatum game
2347:
2342:
2337:
2332:
2330:Dollar auction
2327:
2322:
2317:
2315:Centipede game
2312:
2307:
2302:
2297:
2292:
2287:
2282:
2277:
2272:
2270:Infinite chess
2267:
2262:
2256:
2254:
2248:
2247:
2245:
2244:
2239:
2237:Symmetric game
2234:
2229:
2224:
2222:Signaling game
2219:
2217:Screening game
2214:
2209:
2207:Potential game
2204:
2199:
2194:
2186:
2181:
2176:
2171:
2166:
2160:
2158:
2150:
2149:
2147:
2146:
2141:
2136:
2134:Mixed strategy
2131:
2126:
2121:
2116:
2111:
2106:
2101:
2096:
2091:
2086:
2081:
2076:
2071:
2065:
2063:
2057:
2056:
2054:
2053:
2048:
2043:
2038:
2033:
2028:
2023:
2018:
2016:Risk dominance
2013:
2008:
2003:
1998:
1993:
1988:
1983:
1978:
1973:
1968:
1963:
1958:
1953:
1948:
1943:
1938:
1933:
1927:
1925:
1915:
1914:
1912:
1911:
1906:
1901:
1896:
1891:
1886:
1881:
1876:
1871:
1866:
1861:
1859:Graphical game
1856:
1851:
1846:
1841:
1836:
1831:
1826:
1820:
1818:
1814:
1813:
1807:
1805:
1804:
1797:
1790:
1782:
1776:
1775:
1765:(3): 381–398.
1754:
1740:
1719:
1712:
1709:
1708:
1707:
1696:
1670:(3): 165–180.
1657:
1639:(6): 613–626.
1628:
1610:(5): 533–555.
1599:
1558:
1538:(4): 257–273.
1520:
1505:
1485:10.1086/261167
1479:(4): 589–610.
1461:
1441:10.1086/260216
1435:(3): 598–606.
1417:
1414:
1411:
1410:
1407:on 2011-11-04.
1351:
1348:on 2011-11-04.
1300:
1281:
1274:
1241:
1220:10.1086/260580
1204:(3): 473–492.
1172:
1129:
1100:(4): 247–261.
1080:
1059:10.1.1.573.669
1029:
1002:(2): 573–597.
985:
984:
982:
979:
978:
977:
970:
967:
966:
965:
956:
937:
917:
858:
857:
846:
840:
837:
831:
828:
767:
763:
751:
750:
739:
736:
731:
727:
723:
718:
714:
709:
705:
700:
696:
692:
687:
683:
679:
676:
671:
667:
663:
658:
654:
649:
645:
640:
636:
632:
627:
623:
599:
584:
583:
572:
569:
566:
563:
558:
554:
550:
547:
543:
539:
536:
533:
528:
524:
520:
517:
514:
511:
506:
502:
498:
495:
491:
487:
482:
478:
474:
471:
448:
428:
425:
422:
419:
399:
396:
393:
382:
381:
368:
365:
362:
358:
354:
351:
348:
345:
342:
339:
336:
333:
330:
302:placed on the
296:economic model
250:
249:
246:
231:
228:
175:
174:
133:
131:
124:
118:
117:In game theory
115:
95:decision-maker
77:
76:
31:
29:
22:
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2879:
2868:
2865:
2863:
2860:
2859:
2857:
2842:
2839:
2837:
2834:
2832:
2829:
2827:
2824:
2822:
2819:
2817:
2814:
2812:
2809:
2807:
2804:
2802:
2799:
2797:
2794:
2792:
2789:
2788:
2786:
2784:Miscellaneous
2782:
2776:
2773:
2771:
2768:
2766:
2763:
2761:
2758:
2756:
2753:
2751:
2748:
2747:
2745:
2741:
2735:
2732:
2730:
2727:
2725:
2722:
2720:
2719:Samuel Bowles
2717:
2715:
2714:Roger Myerson
2712:
2710:
2707:
2705:
2704:Robert Aumann
2702:
2700:
2697:
2695:
2692:
2690:
2687:
2685:
2682:
2680:
2677:
2675:
2672:
2670:
2667:
2665:
2662:
2660:
2659:Lloyd Shapley
2657:
2655:
2652:
2650:
2647:
2645:
2644:Kenneth Arrow
2642:
2640:
2637:
2635:
2632:
2630:
2627:
2625:
2624:John Harsanyi
2622:
2620:
2617:
2615:
2612:
2610:
2607:
2605:
2602:
2600:
2597:
2595:
2594:Herbert Simon
2592:
2590:
2587:
2585:
2582:
2580:
2577:
2575:
2572:
2570:
2567:
2565:
2562:
2560:
2557:
2555:
2552:
2550:
2547:
2545:
2542:
2540:
2537:
2535:
2532:
2531:
2529:
2523:
2517:
2514:
2512:
2509:
2507:
2504:
2502:
2499:
2497:
2494:
2492:
2489:
2487:
2484:
2482:
2479:
2477:
2474:
2473:
2471:
2467:
2461:
2458:
2456:
2453:
2451:
2448:
2446:
2443:
2441:
2438:
2436:
2433:
2431:
2428:
2426:
2423:
2421:
2418:
2416:
2413:
2411:
2408:
2406:
2403:
2401:
2398:
2396:
2395:Fair division
2393:
2391:
2388:
2386:
2383:
2381:
2378:
2376:
2373:
2371:
2370:Dictator game
2368:
2366:
2363:
2361:
2358:
2356:
2353:
2351:
2348:
2346:
2343:
2341:
2338:
2336:
2333:
2331:
2328:
2326:
2323:
2321:
2318:
2316:
2313:
2311:
2308:
2306:
2303:
2301:
2298:
2296:
2293:
2291:
2288:
2286:
2283:
2281:
2278:
2276:
2273:
2271:
2268:
2266:
2263:
2261:
2258:
2257:
2255:
2253:
2249:
2243:
2242:Zero-sum game
2240:
2238:
2235:
2233:
2230:
2228:
2225:
2223:
2220:
2218:
2215:
2213:
2212:Repeated game
2210:
2208:
2205:
2203:
2200:
2198:
2195:
2193:
2191:
2187:
2185:
2182:
2180:
2177:
2175:
2172:
2170:
2167:
2165:
2162:
2161:
2159:
2157:
2151:
2145:
2142:
2140:
2137:
2135:
2132:
2130:
2129:Pure strategy
2127:
2125:
2122:
2120:
2117:
2115:
2112:
2110:
2107:
2105:
2102:
2100:
2097:
2095:
2094:De-escalation
2092:
2090:
2087:
2085:
2082:
2080:
2077:
2075:
2072:
2070:
2067:
2066:
2064:
2062:
2058:
2052:
2049:
2047:
2044:
2042:
2039:
2037:
2036:Shapley value
2034:
2032:
2029:
2027:
2024:
2022:
2019:
2017:
2014:
2012:
2009:
2007:
2004:
2002:
1999:
1997:
1994:
1992:
1989:
1987:
1984:
1982:
1979:
1977:
1974:
1972:
1969:
1967:
1964:
1962:
1959:
1957:
1954:
1952:
1949:
1947:
1944:
1942:
1939:
1937:
1934:
1932:
1929:
1928:
1926:
1924:
1920:
1916:
1910:
1907:
1905:
1904:Succinct game
1902:
1900:
1897:
1895:
1892:
1890:
1887:
1885:
1882:
1880:
1877:
1875:
1872:
1870:
1867:
1865:
1862:
1860:
1857:
1855:
1852:
1850:
1847:
1845:
1842:
1840:
1837:
1835:
1832:
1830:
1827:
1825:
1822:
1821:
1819:
1815:
1811:
1803:
1798:
1796:
1791:
1789:
1784:
1783:
1780:
1772:
1768:
1764:
1760:
1755:
1751:
1747:
1743:
1741:0-387-27620-3
1737:
1733:
1729:
1725:
1720:
1718:
1715:
1714:
1710:
1706:
1702:
1697:
1693:
1689:
1685:
1681:
1677:
1673:
1669:
1665:
1664:
1658:
1654:
1650:
1646:
1642:
1638:
1634:
1629:
1625:
1621:
1617:
1613:
1609:
1605:
1600:
1596:
1592:
1588:
1584:
1579:
1574:
1570:
1566:
1565:
1559:
1555:
1551:
1546:
1541:
1537:
1533:
1526:
1521:
1517:
1516:
1511:
1506:
1502:
1498:
1494:
1490:
1486:
1482:
1478:
1474:
1467:
1462:
1458:
1454:
1450:
1446:
1442:
1438:
1434:
1430:
1429:
1424:
1420:
1419:
1415:
1403:
1399:
1395:
1391:
1387:
1382:
1377:
1373:
1369:
1362:
1355:
1352:
1344:
1340:
1336:
1332:
1328:
1324:
1320:
1319:
1311:
1304:
1301:
1296:
1292:
1285:
1282:
1277:
1271:
1267:
1262:
1261:
1255:
1251:
1245:
1242:
1237:
1233:
1229:
1225:
1221:
1217:
1212:
1207:
1203:
1199:
1198:
1190:
1187:(June 1977).
1186:
1182:
1176:
1173:
1168:
1164:
1159:
1154:
1150:
1146:
1145:
1140:
1133:
1130:
1125:
1121:
1116:
1111:
1107:
1103:
1099:
1095:
1091:
1084:
1081:
1073:
1069:
1065:
1060:
1055:
1051:
1047:
1040:
1033:
1030:
1025:
1021:
1017:
1013:
1009:
1005:
1001:
997:
990:
987:
980:
976:
973:
972:
968:
962:
957:
954:
953:
948:
947:
942:
938:
935:
930:
926:
922:
918:
915:
911:
907:
906:
901:
897:
893:
889:
884:
883:central banks
881:
877:
873:
869:
865:
862:
861:
860:
855:
851:
847:
843:
842:
838:
836:
829:
827:
824:
820:
815:
813:
807:
803:
799:
797:
793:
788:
786:
781:
765:
761:
737:
729:
725:
716:
712:
707:
698:
694:
685:
681:
677:
669:
665:
656:
652:
647:
638:
634:
625:
621:
613:
612:
611:
597:
588:
570:
564:
561:
556:
552:
545:
541:
534:
531:
526:
522:
515:
512:
504:
500:
493:
489:
480:
476:
469:
462:
461:
460:
446:
423:
417:
397:
394:
391:
366:
363:
360:
356:
349:
343:
340:
334:
328:
321:
320:
319:
317:
313:
308:
305:
301:
297:
292:
290:
286:
283:, efforts at
282:
278:
274:
270:
266:
261:
259:
258:Drazen Prelec
255:
247:
244:
243:
242:
239:
237:
229:
227:
225:
221:
217:
212:
210:
206:
202:
198:
194:
190:
186:
182:
171:
168:
160:
157:February 2009
150:
146:
140:
139:
134:This section
132:
128:
123:
122:
116:
114:
112:
108:
103:
100:
96:
92:
88:
84:
73:
70:
62:
59:November 2014
52:
48:
42:
41:
35:
30:
21:
20:
2689:Peyton Young
2684:Paul Milgrom
2599:Hervé Moulin
2539:Amos Tversky
2481:Folk theorem
2192:-player game
2189:
2114:Grim trigger
1762:
1758:
1723:
1667:
1661:
1636:
1632:
1607:
1603:
1568:
1562:
1535:
1531:
1514:
1476:
1472:
1432:
1426:
1416:Bibliography
1402:the original
1374:(1): 67–78.
1371:
1367:
1354:
1343:the original
1325:(1): 23–37.
1322:
1316:
1303:
1294:
1284:
1259:
1250:Wolf, Martin
1244:
1201:
1195:
1175:
1151:(4): 69–90.
1148:
1142:
1132:
1115:10281/302429
1097:
1093:
1083:
1072:the original
1049:
1045:
1032:
999:
995:
989:
950:
944:
903:
876:unemployment
859:
833:
816:
808:
804:
800:
789:
782:
752:
589:
585:
383:
309:
293:
273:self control
262:
251:
240:
233:
213:
185:dynamic game
178:
163:
154:
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2862:Game theory
2806:Coopetition
2609:Jean Tirole
2604:John Conway
2584:Eric Maskin
2380:Blotto game
2365:Pirate game
2174:Global game
2144:Tit for tat
2079:Bid shading
2069:Appeasement
1919:Equilibrium
1899:Solved game
1834:Determinacy
1817:Definitions
1810:game theory
880:independent
285:weight loss
181:game theory
107:game theory
99:preferences
51:introducing
2856:Categories
2450:Trust game
2435:Kuhn poker
2104:Escalation
2099:Deterrence
2089:Cheap talk
2061:Strategies
1879:Preference
1808:Topics of
981:References
300:weightings
289:retirement
193:commitment
34:references
2634:John Nash
2340:Stag hunt
2084:Collusion
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792:empirical
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2469:Theorems
2420:Deadlock
2275:Checkers
2156:of games
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