Deep operation - Knowledge (XXG)

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Soviet armed forces. Along with those personalities, their ideas were also dispensed with. Some 35,000 personnel, about 50 percent of the officer corps, three out of five marshals; 13 out of 15 army group commanders; 57 out of 85 corps commanders; 110 out of 195 division commanders; 220 out of 406 brigade commanders were executed, imprisoned or discharged. Stalin thus destroyed the cream of the personnel with operational and tactical competence in the Red Army. Other sources state that 60 out of 67 corps commanders, 221 out of 397 brigade commanders, 79 percent of regimental commanders, 88 percent of regimental chiefs of staff, and 87 percent of all battalion commanders were excised from the army by various means.

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defend an area of 8–15 kilometres wide and 5–6 kilometres in depth. Successive defence belts would slow German forces down and force them to conduct slow and attritional battles to break through into the operational depths. Slowing the operational tempo of the enemy would also allow the Soviet intelligence analysts to keep track of German formations and their direction of advance, enabling Soviet reserve formations to be accurately positioned to prevent German spearheads breaking through each of the three main defence belts. Intelligence would also help when initiating their own offensives (

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seek to envelope the enemy tactical forces as yet-unengaged along the flanks of the breakthrough point. Other units would press on to occupy the operational zones and meet the enemy operational reserves as they moved through his rear to establish a new defence's line. While in the operational rear of the enemy, communications, and supply depots were prime targets for the Soviet forces. With his tactical zones isolated from reinforcements, reinforcements blocked from relieving them, the front would be indefensible. Such a method would instigate operational paralysis for the defender.

2790:, when initial breakthroughs were rendered useless by the exhaustion during the tactical effort, limited mobility, and a slow-paced advance and enemy reinforcements. The attacker was further unable to influence the fighting beyond the immediate battlefield because of the limited range, speed and reliability in the existing weapons. The attacker was often unable to exploit tactical success in even the most favourable circumstances, as his infantry could not push into the breach rapidly enough. Enemy reinforcements could then seal off the break in their lines. 3504:. Allowing the Germans to strike first at the target area allowed the Red Army the opportunity to wear down German Army formations against pre-prepared positions, thereby shaping the force in field ratio heavily against the enemy. Once the initiative had been achieved and the enemy had been worn down, strategic reserves would be committed to finish off the remaining enemy force. The success of this strategy would allow the Red Army to pursue its enemy into the economically rich area of Ukraine and recover the industrial areas, such as 2844:, was less concerned with developing the quantitative indices of deep battle but rather with the mechanics of the shock army's mission. Varfolomeev termed this as "launching an uninterrupted, deep and shattering blow" along the main axis of advance. Varfolomeev believed the shock army needed both firepower and mobility to destroy both enemy tactical defences, operational reserves and seize geographical targets or positions in harmony with other operationally independent, but strategically collaborative, offensives. 3536:

only a small number of tanks and self-propelled artillery were used to give the defences some mobility. They were distributed in small groups to enable localised counterattacks. Such tactics slowed the Germans, forcing them to expend strength and munitions on combating the Soviet forward zones. The Soviets had counted on the Germans being stopped within the tactical zones. To ensure that this occurred, they distributed large numbers of anti-AFV (armoured fighting vehicle) and anti-personnel mines to the defences.

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also penetrated into the German operational rear. Once there and reinforced by airborne or air-landed forces, they ruled the countryside, forests, and swamps but were unable to drive the more mobile Germans from the main communications arteries and villages. At best, they could force limited German withdrawals but only if in concert with pressure from forces along the front. At worst, these mobile forces were themselves encircled, only to be destroyed or driven from the German rear area when summer arrived.

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operational depth, which would be larger and more densely-occupied than the first by embracing the railheads and supply stations to a depth of 50–60 km. There, the main enemy forces were concentrated. The third zone, beyond the operational depth was known as the strategic depth and served as the vital link between the country's manpower reservoirs and industrial power-supply sites and the area of military operations. In this zone lay the headquarters of the strategic forces, which included the

3347: 2778: 3383:). The mission of the Red Army, then, was to create a formidable barrier between the cut off German army and any relief forces. The aim of the Soviets was to allow the German army to weaken in the winter conditions and inflict attrition on any attempt by the enemy to relieve the pocket. When it was judged the enemy had weakened sufficiently, a strong offensive would finish the enemy field army off. These siege tactics would remove enemy forces to their rear. 2280:, the next major war would almost certainly be one of attrition. He determined, however, that the vast size of the Soviet Union ensured that some mobility was still possible. Svechin accepted that and allowed for the first offensives to be fast and fluid; but ultimately he decided that it would come down to a war of position and attrition. That would require a strong economy and a loyal and politically-motivated population to outlast the enemy. 2829:, which retained its utility throughout the 1930s. Triandafilov assigned the shock army some 12–18 rifle divisions, in four to five corps. These units were supplemented with 16–20 artillery regiments and 8–12 tank battalions. By the time of his death in 1931, Triandafilov had submitted various strength proposals which included the assignment of aviation units to the front unit. This consisted of two or three aviation brigades of 3412: 2954:(focal point) as a means of rapidly defeating an enemy; deep battle emphasized the need for multiple breakthrough points and reserves to exploit the breach quickly. The difference in doctrine can be explained by the strategic circumstances for the Soviet Union and Germany at the time. Germany had a smaller population but a better-trained army, and the Soviet Union had a larger population but a less-trained army. As a result, 3295:. The Soviets intended to exploit with a cavalry corps (the 3rd Guards) in the north and two secretly formed and redeployed tank corps (the 21st and 23rd) and a cavalry corps (the 6th) in the south. Ultimately the two mobile groups were to link up west of Kharkov and entrap the German Sixth Army. Once this was achieved, a sustained offensive into the Ukraine would enable the recovery of industrial regions. 2276:, and others, like Tukhachevsky, who thought that a strategy of decisive destruction of the enemy forces was needed. The latter opinion was motivated in part by the condition of the Soviet Union's economy: the country was still not industrialized and thus was economically too weak to fight a long war of attrition. By 1928 Tukhachevsky's ideas had changed: he considered that given the nature and lessons of 3436:. However, it was logistically exhausted and fighting an enemy that was falling back on its rear areas. The lack of diversionary operations allowed the German Army to recognise the danger, concentrate powerful mobile forces, and dispatch sufficient reserves to Kharkov. With the Red Army's flanks exposed, the Germans easily pinched off the salient and destroyed many Soviet formations during the 2604:. The job of the holding echelons in that event was to weaken or halt the main enemy forces. If that was achieved, the enemy would be weakened sufficiently to be caught and impaled on the main defence lines. If that failed, and the enemy succeeded in sweeping aside the holding forces and breaching several of the main defence lines, mobile operational reserves, including tanks and 3241:

one motorized rifle brigade, totaling 168 tanks each. The Stavka placed these corps at the disposal of army and front commanders for use as mobile groups operating in tandem with older cavalry corps, which by now had also received a new complement of armour. The Stavka employed these new tank corps in an offensive role for the first time in early 1942.

3248:, a deception campaign to mislead the Stavka into believing that the main German attack in the summer would be aimed at Moscow. The Stavka were convinced that the offensive would involve Army Group South as a southern pincer against the Central Front protecting Moscow. To preempt the German assault, the Red Army launched two offensive operations, the 3403:, would be the next target. The operation would enable the Red Army to roll up the Germans' southern front, thereby achieving its strategic aim. The operation would be assisted by diversion operations in the central and northern sector to prevent the enemy from dispatching operational reserves to the threatened area in a timely fashion. 3547:

themselves. All actions are carried out with the following goals in mind: to retain the initiative, to defeat the pursued enemy in detail, and to surround and destroy his reserves after cutting them off. The job of complete liquidation is left to regular front-line troops, while the mechanized units go on to exploit the new success.

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new conditions. As Soviet military theorists and planners have long emphasised, logistic theory and practice are shaped by the same historical and technological developments that influence Soviet warfighting approaches at every level. In turn, they play a major role in defining directions and parameters for Soviet methods.

2805:), which emerged in 1936 and was placed within the context of deep battle in the 1936 Field Regulations. The deep operation was geared toward operations at the Army and or Front level and was larger, in terms of the forces engaged, than deep battle's tactical component, which used units not larger than corps size. 3315:, the Soviets mishandled their mobile forces. Soviet infantry penetrated German defences to the consternation of the German commanders, but the Soviets procrastinated and failed to commit the two tank corps for six days. The corps finally went into action on 17 May simultaneously with a massive surprise attack by 3386:

Having practised the deep battle phase which would destroy the enemy tactical units (the enemy corps and divisions) as well as the operational instrument, in this case the Sixth Army itself, it would be ready to launch the deep operation, striking into the enemy depth on a south-west course to Rostov

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Soviet military analysts and historians divide the war into three periods. The Red Army was primarily on the strategic defensive during the first period of war (22 June 1941 – 19 November 1942). By late 1942, the Soviets had recovered sufficiently to put their concept into practice. The second period

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The operation left the German tactical zones largely intact, but by occupying the German operational depth and preventing their retreat the German Army forces were isolated. Instead of reducing the pocket immediately, the Soviets tightened their grip on the enemy forces and preferred to let the enemy

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The development of Soviet operational logistics, the complex of rear service roles, missions, procedures, and resources intended to sustain military operations by army and front groupings) clearly occupied a prominent place within overall Soviet efforts to formulate or adapt warfighting approaches to

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Varfolomeev sought to organise the shock armies into two echelon formations. The first was to be the tactical breakthrough echelon, composed of several rifle corps. These would be backed up by a series of second line divisions from the reserves to sustain the tempo of advance and to maintain momentum

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was to encompass three echelons. The first echelon, acting as the first layer of forces, would come into immediate contact with opposing forces to break the tactical zones. The follow on echelons would support the breakthrough and the reserve would exploit it operationally. The holding group would be

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Isserson calculated that the Red Army's attack echelon must be 100 to 120 km deep. He estimated that enemy tactical defences, in about two lines, would be shallow in the first and stretch back 56 km. The second line would be formed behind and have 12–15 km of depth. Beyond that lay the

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Each operation served to divert enemy attention and keep the defender guessing about where the main effort and the main objective lay. In doing so, it prevented the enemy from dispatching powerful mobile reserves to the area. The army could then overrun vast regions before the defender could recover.

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The nature of this new doctrine was to be political. The Soviets were to fuse the military with the Bolshevik ideal, which would define the nature of war for the Soviet Union. The Soviets believed their most likely enemy would be the capitalist states of the west they had to defend themselves against

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For the first time in the war, at Kursk the Soviets eschewed a preemptive offensive and instead prepared an imposing strategic defense, unparalleled in its size and complexity, in order to crush the advancing Germans. Once the German offense stalled, Soviet forces planned to go over to the offensive

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was forced to endure severe losses, which forced the OKW to strip its flanks to secure its centre. This left its poorly equipped Axis allies to defend its centre of gravity—its operational depth. When Soviet intelligence had reason to believe the Axis front was at its weakest, it would strike at the

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The Stavka judged that these operations had failed because of the Red Army's lack of large, coherent, mechanized, and armored formations capable of performing sustained operational maneuver. To remedy the problem, in April 1942 the Soviets fielded new tank corps consisting of three tank brigades and

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The Soviets consider that armored forces are most effectively employed in the enemy operational depth. After intensive artillery preparation, the infantry assault penetrates into enemy defenses. Then, armored forces strike in the direction of the deepest infantry penetration on a narrow front from a

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The outcome in modern war will be attained not through the physical destruction of the opponent but rather through a succession of developing manoeuvres that will aim at inducing him to see his ability to comply further with his operational goals. The effect of this mental state leads to operational

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To avoid such a situation, echelon forces were to strike at the flanks of enemy concentrations for the first few days of the assault, while the main mobile forces caught up. The aim of this was to avoid a head-on clash and tie down enemy forces from reaching the tactical zones. The expected scope of

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The goal of the defence in depth concept was to blunt the elite enemy forces, which would be first to breach the Soviet lines, several times, causing them to exhaust themselves. Once the enemy had become bogged down in Soviet defences, the operational reserves came into play. Being positioned behind

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at Kursk and in other sectors. The script played as the Soviets wrote it. The titanic German effort at Kursk failed at huge cost, and a wave of Soviet counteroffensives rippled along the Eastern Front ultimately driving German forces through Smolensk and Kharkov back to the line of the Dnepr River.

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Soviet theory recognised the need for logistic theory and practice that were consistent with other components of strategy, operational art, and tactics. Despite the many changes in the political, economic, and military environment and the quickening pace of technological change, logistical doctrine

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Varfolomeev noted that deep and echeloned tactical and operational defences should call for equal or similar counter responses from the attacker. That allowed the attacker to deliver a deep blow at the concentrating point. The new technological advances would allow the echelon forces to advance the

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would make a breakthrough along a front of 30 km. The breakthrough zone (only under favourable conditions) might be expanded to 48–50 km with another rifle corps. Under these conditions, a rifle corps would attack along a 10–12 km front, with each division in the corps' first echelon

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era of linear strategy. The continuous front that developed in the First World War would not allow the flanking moves of the pre-1914 period. Isserson argued that the front had become devoid of open flanks and military art faced a challenge to develop new methods to break through a deeply echeloned

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Unlike Tukhachevsky, Svechin determined the next war could be won only by attrition, not by a single or several decisive battles. Svechin also argued that a theory of alternating defensive and offensive action was needed. Within that framework, Svechin also recognised the theoretical distinction of

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During the exploitation period, mechanized units encounter the enemy's tactical reserves and also rear reserves rushed up by motor, rail, or even air. Therefore, in the process of exploitation mechanized units have to carry out bitter actions, sometimes to defend themselves, sometimes to disengage

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The tactical level relied heavily on fortified and static defences composed of infantry and artillery. Anti-tank guns were mounted throughout the entire depth of the defences. Few tanks were committed to the tactical zones and the nature of the defences would have robbed them of mobility. Instead,

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involved all three levels of warfare coherently fused together. Soviet strategy, the top end of military art, was concerned with gaining the strategic initiative which would then allow the Red Army to stage further military operations to liberate Soviet territory lost in 1941 and 1942. To do this,

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combined both the defensive and offensive side of deep battle. The nature of Soviet operations in the summer, 1943 was to gain the initiative and to hold it indefinitely. This meant achieving permanent superiority in the balance of forces, in operational procedure and maintaining initiative on the

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against the southern flank of the Soviet salient. Over the next two days, the two tank corps disengaged, retraced their path, and engaged the new threat. But it was too late. The German counterattack encircled and destroyed the better part of three Soviet armies, the two tank corps and two cavalry

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In fact, primarily due to Stalin's overriding his subordinates' suggestions, the Stavka fell for the German ruse. Instead of attacking the southern pincer of the suspected Moscow operation, they ran into heavy concentrations of German forces that were to strike southward to the Soviet oilfields in

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Soviet rifle forces penetrated German tactical defenses and pushed into the operational depths on foot at slow speed. They were, however, deficient in staying power. Soon, growing infantry casualties brought every advance to an abrupt end. Soviet cavalry corps reinforced by rifle and tank brigades

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halted the Northern and Southern Army Groups but was confronted with the German forces approaching the Soviet capital. The Soviet strategy was the defence of the capital and if possible, the defeat and destruction of Army Group Centre. By late November the German pincers either side of the capital

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Having organized the operational forces and secured a tactical breakthrough into the operational rear of the enemy front, several issues took shape about how the Red Army would engage the main operational enemy forces. Attacking in echelon formation denied the Soviet forces the chance to bring all

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operational reserve) and an independent mechanized brigade; three Cavalry divisions; a light-bomber brigade, two brigades of assault aviation, two squadrons of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft; six tank battalions; five artillery regiments; plus two heavy artillery battalions; two battalions of

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The first echelon used raw firepower and mass to break the layered enemy defences, but the second echelon operational reserves combined firepower and mobility, which was lacking in the former. Operational units were heavily formed from mechanized, motorised and Cavalry forces. The forces would now

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The concept of deep battle was not just offensive. The theory took into account all forms of warfare and decided both the offensive and defensive should be studied and incorporated into deep battle. The defensive phase of deep battle involved identifying crucial strategic targets and securing them

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The operational method revolved around outmanoeuvring their opponents. The nature of the bulge meant the Red Army could build strong fortifications in depth along the German axis of advance. Two rifle divisions defended the first belt, and one defended the second. A first belt division would only

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and advanced 100 kilometers deep into the Kaluga region. During the second phase of the Moscow counter offensive in January 1942, the 11th, 2nd Guards, and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps penetrated deep into the German rear area in an attempt to encircle German Army Group Center. Despite the commitment

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In 1937–1938 ...all commanders of the armed forces, members of the military councils, and chiefs of the political departments of the military districts, the majority of the chiefs of the central administrations of the People's Commissariat of Defense, all corps commanders, almost all division and

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is his concepts about all operations theory including the "operational art". Tukhachevsky is the first who used 'operational' as a systematic concept. According to McPadden, the main skill of a military commander is dependent on Tukhachevsky's theory, which is the ability to integrate tactics and

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Soviet analysts recognised that it was not enough to break through the enemy tactical zone. Although that was the crucial first step, tactical deep battle offered no solution about how a force could sustain an advance beyond it and into the operational and strategic depths of an enemy front. The

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The forces used to carry out the tactical assignments varied from 1933 to 1943. The number of shock armies, rifle corps, and divisions (mechanized and infantry) given to a strategic front constantly changed. By 1943, the year that the Red Army began to practice deep battle properly, the order of

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was essential to the tactical method. As the largest tactical unit it formed the central component of the tactical deep battle. The rifle corps usually formed part of a larger operational effort and would be reinforced with tanks, artillery and other weapons. Several corps would take part in the

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Once the strategic objectives had been determined and operational preparation completed the Red Army would be tasked with assaulting the tactical zones of the enemy front in order to break through into its rear, allowing operationally mobile forces to invade the undefended enemy-held area to the

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The concept of the deep operation had not yet been fully understood by Stalin. However, Stalin recognised his own error, and from this point onward, stood back from military decision-making for the most part. The defeat meant the deep operation would fail to realise its strategic aim. The Third

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of 1937 to 1939 removed many of the leading officers of the Red Army, including Svechin, Varfolomeev and Tukhachevsky. The purge of the Soviet military liquidated the generation of officers that had given the Red Army the deep battle strategy, operations and tactics and who also had rebuilt the

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If the attack proved successful at pinning the enemy in place and defeating its forces in battle, mechanized forces would break the flank and surround the enemy with infantry to consolidate the success. As the defender withdrew, mechanized cavalry and motorised forces would harass, cut off, and

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By the early 1930s, however, new weapons had come into circulation. Improvements in the speed and range of offensive weaponry matched those of its defensive counterparts. New tanks, aircraft and motorised vehicles were entering service in large numbers to form divisions and corps of air fleets,

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The Deep Operation. The corps's forces breach the tactical front defences (in blue) and the fresh second echelon (mechanized operational exploitation forces) follows through the gap. Air strikes hit enemy reserves before the second echelon engages them. Other corps launch delaying and diversion

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Nevertheless, despite the diversion being a primary mission, the limited forces conducting holding actions would be assigned geographical objectives. Once the main thrust had defeated the enemy's main defence, the tactical holding forces were to merge with the main body of forces conducting the

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In principle, the Red Army would seek to destroy the enemy's operational reserves and its operational depth and occupy as much of his strategic depth as possible. Within the Soviet concept of deep operations was the principle of strangulation if the situation demanded it, instead of physically

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and ground forces to launch a "simultaneous blow throughout the entire depth of the enemy's operational defense" to delay its strongest forces positioned in the area of operations by defeating them in detail; to surround and destroy those units at the front (the tactical zone, by occupying the

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Isserson much like Varfolomeev divided his shock armies, one for the task of breaking the enemy forward (or frontline defences) and the other to exploit the breakthrough and occupy the operational zone, while destroying enemy reserve concentrations as they attempted to counter the assault. The

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In the south, the Soviet plan did not work as effectively and the contingency plan had to be put into effect. The German formations succeeded in penetrating all three Soviet defence belts. This denied the Soviets the opportunity to pin them down in the tactical defence belts and release their

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and Tukhachevsky formed a partnership to create a coherent system of principles from the concept formed by Svechin. Tukhachevsky was to elaborate the principles of the tactical and operational phases of deep battle. In response to his efforts and in acceptance of the methodology, the Red Army

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In operational terms, by drawing the German Army into the city of Stalingrad, they denied them the chance to practice their greater experience in mobile warfare. The Red Army was able to force its enemy to fight in a limited area, hampered by the city landscape, unable to use its mobility or

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Front operation formation (1942): 4–6 armies spread across a front stretching 250–450 km wide and up to 150 km deep, with each army given 2 defensive bands. In the second echelon, a reserve army with rifle divisions, 1–2 Cavalry corps and 1–2 Tank corps. An air army is based in the

2332:. The supporting operations had significant strategic objectives themselves and supporting units were to continue their offensive actions until they were unable to progress any further. However, they were still subordinated to the main/decisive strategic objective determined by the 2979:

principle of battlefield destruction and the annihilation of enemy field forces, which obsessed the Germans. Instead deep operations stressed the ability to create conditions whereby the enemy loses the will to mount an operational defence. An example of the theory in practice is

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success of tactical action counted for little in an operational defensive zone that extended dozens of kilometres and in which the enemy held large reserves. Such enemy concentrations could prevent the exploitation of a tactical breakthrough and threaten the operational advance.

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The strategic objective, or mission, was to secure the primary strategic target. The primary target usually consisted of a geographical objective and the destruction of a proportion of the enemy armed forces. Usually the strategic missions of each operation were carried out by a

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In official literature Varfolomeev stated that the forces pursuing the enemy operational depth must advance between 20–25 km a day. Forces operating against the flanks of enemy tactical forces must advance as much as 40–45 km a day to prevent the enemy from escaping.

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in the city, which caused attrition that would force it to weaken its flanks to secure its centre. Meanwhile, reserves were built up, which then struck at the weak flanks. The Soviets broke through the German flanks, exploited the operational depth, and closed the pocket at

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operational art that lay between tactics and strategy. In his opinion the role of the operation was to group and direct tactical battles toward a series of simultaneous operational objectives along a wide frontage, either directly or indirectly, in order to achieve the

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Field Regulations. Deep operations had two phases: the tactical deep battle, followed by the exploitation of tactical success, known as the conduct of deep battle operations. Deep battle envisaged the breaking of the enemy's forward defenses, or tactical zones, through

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The pursuit would be pushed as far into the enemy depth as possible until exhaustion set in. With the tactical zones defeated, and the enemy operational forces either destroyed or incapable of further defence, the Soviet forces could push into the strategic depth.

2971:) at the tactical level, and by combining a frontal holding force with a mobile column to penetrate the opponent's depth at the operational level. The element of depth is a dominant factor in the conduct of deep operations both in the offensive and defensive. 3576:. The Germans failed to breach the main defence lines, stalling at the third belt. The German armies had been forced to commit their mobile reserves to the breakthrough. This allowed the Soviets to conduct the operational and offensive phase of their plan; 3731:

by deep battle offensive operations, envisaging a rapid drive deep towards the latter's main industrial centers before they could have a chance to mount a credible defense or even stage a counterattack. However, the extremely vast numbers of the Chinese

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allocated a 6 kilometre frontage. A fifth supporting rifle corps would make diversionary attacks along the flanks of the main thrust to tie down counterresponses, confuse the enemy as to the area of the main thrust and delay its reserves from arriving.

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against attack from all directions. As with the offensive methods of deep battle, the target area would be identified and dissected into operational and tactical zones. In defence, the tactical zones, forward of the objective would be fortified with

2324:-size formations simultaneously. It was not meant to deliver a victory in a single operation; instead, multiple operations, which might be conducted in parallel or successively, would induce a catastrophic failure in the enemy's defensive system. 3776:

came to the conclusion that the US needed "strategic pre-emption", defined as the "use of airpower to delay the enemy long enough for early arriving ground forces to position themselves between the enemy and his initial operational objectives."

3596:'s front. However the Germans were able to stem the advance by committing their mobile reserves and organize a withdrawal. Still, the two German armies had been worn down, and the Soviet forces in the north had won the strategic initiative. 2820:

The central composition of the deep operation was the shock army, which acted either in co-operation with others or independently as part of a strategic front operation. Several shock armies would be subordinated to a strategic front.

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strategy. This involves the capability of a commander on "the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles."

3221:, the cavalry corps failed to link up and became encircled in the German rear area. The ambitious Soviet operation failed to achieve its ultimate strategic aim, due largely to the fragile nature of Soviet operational mobile forces. 2129:

abilities and render the defence of their front more difficult, impossible or irrelevant. Unlike most other doctrines, deep battle stressed combined arms cooperation at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.

2159:(1853–1856), Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the First World War (1914–1918), and the Polish-Soviet War (1918-1921) highlighted the weaknesses in Russian and Soviet military training, organization, and methodology . 3108:) subjected the Red Army to six months of disasters. The Red Army was shattered during the first two months. It then faced the task of surviving, reviving and maturing into an instrument that could compete with the 3702:

divisions would be given the task, rather unusually, of avoiding engagements with the enemy and simply to advancing as far and as fast as possible, therefore enabling a victory before any replacement aircraft and

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by some 4,000 tanks supported by 5,000 planes on a 50-mile front. Large Red Army armored forces advanced as far as 125 miles in 3 days under conditions of continuous and intensive combat against the German Army.

3120:, was a transitional period marked by alternating attempts by both sides to secure strategic advantage. After that, deep battle was used to devastating effect, allowing the Red Army to destroy hundreds of 2178:, also raised the technical standards of Soviet arms industries to the level of other European nations. Once that had been achieved, the Soviets turned their attention to solving the problem of military 3620:

With improved material means and tactical aptitude enabling complicated large-unit maneuvers, the following later campaigns were able to exhibit an improved application of the Deep operation doctrine:

2861:. Once they had been defeated, the Red Army Front was ready to release its fresh, and uncommitted operational forces to pass through the conquered tactical zone and exploit the enemy operational zones. 3008:

In that sense, the Soviet deep battle, in the words of one historian, "was radically different to the nebulous 'blitzkrieg'" method but produced similar, if more strategically-impressive, results.

2941:, which is not accepted as a coherent military doctrine, was similar to Soviet deep operations. The only similarities of the two doctrines were an emphasis on mobile warfare and offensive posture. 3001:

weaken and surrender, starve him completely, or a combination of those methods before they delivered a final destructive assault. In that way, the Soviet tactical and operational method opted to

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during the 1920s and 1930s. It was a tenet that emphasized destroying, suppressing or disorganizing enemy forces not only at the line of contact but also throughout the depth of the battlefield.

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Glantz 1991a, p. 89: "Pomnit' uroki istorii. Vsemerno ukrepliat' boevuiu gotovnost'" – Remember the Lessons of History. Strengthen Combat Readiness in every possible way, VIZh, No. 6, 1988, 6.

2444:, usually 12 kilometres from the main objective. In the zone 1–3 km from the main objective, shock forces, which contained the bulk of the Soviet combat formations, would be positioned. 2101:) focused on developing new methods for the conduct of war. This new approach not only considered military strategy and tactics, but also introduced a new intermediate level of military art: 2083:. The concept of deep operations was a state strategy, tailored to the economic, cultural and geopolitical position of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of major military failures in the 3532:) once the Germans had been bogged down in Soviet defences. The overwhelming contingent of Soviet armour and mechanised divisions was given to the operational reserves for this purpose. 3744:

and 1979 respectively, the Soviets were rather hesitant to go to war and invade China, thanks to the fact that both possessed huge armed forces and nuclear weapons at their disposal.

2608:, would be committed. These forces would be allocated to holding and shock groups alike and were often positioned behind the main defences to engage the battle worn enemy thrust. 3516:

military operations. The elimination of these allies or a successful advance to their borders would deny Germany military resources, or at least destabilise the Axis bloc in the

2347:. The front itself usually had several shock armies attached to it, which were to converge on the target and encircle or assault it. The means of securing it was the job of the 2233:. Frunze's position eventually found favour with the officer elements that had experienced the poor command and control of Soviet forces in the conflict with Poland during the 3196:

decided to launch a counter offensive. The operational goals were to strike into the enemy operational rear and envelop or destroy the German armies spearheading the attack on

3132:. The Red Army maintained the strategic initiative during the third and final period of war (1944–1945) and ultimately played the central role in the Allied victory in Europe. 2174:(founded in 1918) combined the old and new methods. It still relied on the country's enormous manpower reserves; however, the Soviet program to develop heavy industry, which 2877:

Chemical troops. The shock army would number some 300,000 men, 100,000 horses, 1,668 smaller-calibre and 1,550 medium and heavy calibre guns, 722 aircraft and 2,853 tanks.

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into offensive action before it was ready. Logistically the Soviets were not yet prepared and the diversion operations further north were not yet ready to go into action.

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The Kharkov debacle demonstrated to Stalin and Soviet planners that they not only had to create larger armoured units, but they also had to learn to employ them properly.

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concealed centralized position, develop the breakthrough, and strike at the enemy's rear to destroy him. The scale of operations may reach mammoth proportions as in the

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shock or system paralysis, and ultimately to the disintegration of his operational system. The success of the operational manoeuvre is attained through all-arms combat (

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The breadth of the attack zone was an important factor in Soviet calculations. Isserson asserted an attack over a frontage of 70–80 km would be best. Three or four

2853:

penetration of the enemy tactical zones quickly, denying the enemy defender the time to establish a new defensive line and bring up reinforcements to seal the breach.

3046:

brigade commanders, about one-third of the regimental commissars, many teachers of higher or middle military and military-political schools were judged and destroyed.

2105:. The Soviet Union's military was the first to officially distinguish the third level of military thinking which occupied the position between strategy and tactics. 4024: 2958:

emphasized narrow front attacks in which quality could be decisive, but deep battle emphasized wider front attacks in which quantity could be used effectively.

3212:

No encirclements ensued, and German forces halted the Soviet advance at the Mius River defenses. South of Moscow, the Red Army penetrated into the rear of the

2339:

Each of the operations along the front would have secondary strategic goals, and one of those operations would usually be aimed towards the primary objective.

4508:

https://www.academia.edu/31966162/The_Conduct_of_War_Re_emergence_of_Russian_Military_Strength_Warrants_Study_of_Soviet_Operational_Theory_in_the_Interwar_Era

3508:, which had been lost in 1941. Moreover, Soviet strategists recognised that Ukraine offered the best route through which to reach Germany's allies, such as 3432:

Nevertheless, Stalin's orders stood. Forced into premature action, the Red Army was able to concentrate enough forces to create a narrow penetration toward

3059: 2440:

and infantry forces. The outer and forwardmost defences would be heavily mined, making a very strong static defence position. The tactical zones would have

3268:

north east of the city. A southern attack would be made from bridgeheads seized by the winter-counter offensive in 1941. The operation was to encircle the

2197:(1893–1937). They promoted the development of military scientific societies and identified groups of talented officers. Many of these officers entered the 2147:

had kept pace with its enemies and allies and performed well in its major conflicts up to the 19th century. However, despite some notable victories in the

4502:

Blythe, Wilson C. Jr. “The Conduct of War: Reemergence of Russian Military Strength Warrants Study of Soviet Operational Theory in the Interwar Era”, in

3612:. While the tactical deployment and operational plan had not worked as flawlessly as it had in the north, the strategic initiative had still been won. 3500:

the Stavka decided to achieve the goal through defensive means. The bulge in the front line around Kursk made it an obvious and tempting target to the

60: 2872:

According to a report by the Staff of the Urals Military district in 1936, a shock army would number 12 rifle divisions; a mechanized corps (from its

984: 2283:

The doctrine pursued by the Soviets was offensively oriented. Tukhachevsky's neglect of defense pushed the Red Army toward the decisive battle and

4534: 4519: 1411: 2543:

defence. To this end he wrote that "we are at the dawn of a new epoch in military art, and must move from a linear strategy to a deep strategy."

3740:, made such a drive the Soviets were to execute extremely unlikely. Although both sides nearly went to war in three separate occasions in 1968, 2241: 3022:

Deep operations were first formally expressed as a concept in the Red Army's "Field Regulations" of 1929 and more fully developed in the 1935

4554: 4450: 3698:

would clear the way for the torrent of tank and motor-rifle divisions that would soon cross the border. The forward units of these tank and

2460:

and either destroy it by attacking its flank or drive it out of the Soviet tactical zone and into enemyheld territory as far as possible.

3682:

in around 48 hours. While massive air strikes using enormous numbers of aircraft would devastate NATO infrastructure and reinforcements,

3358:, by October 1942, was allowing the Soviets an ever tighter grip on the course of events. Soviet strategy was simple: elimination of the 3164: 3050:

The deep operation concept was thrown out of Soviet military strategy, as it was associated with the denounced figures that created it.

1767: 2585:

attack, some with defensive missions and others with offensive assignments. They were known as holding and shock groups, respectively.

3096:

The abandonment of deep operations had a huge impact on Soviet military capability. Fully engaging in the Second World War (after the

3030:

of 1936. By 1937, the Soviet Union had the largest mechanized army in the world and a sophisticated operational system to operate it.

2714:

These forces numbered some 80,000–130,000 men, 1,500–2,000 guns and mortars, 48-497 rocket launchers, and 30-226 self-propelled guns.

1962: 1740: 355: 4482: 4464: 4436: 4418: 4387: 4369: 3866: 3288: 3218: 2534:

Isserson concentrated on depth and the role it played in operations and strategy. According to his view, strategy had moved on from

1416: 3625: 3264:. The Kharkov operation was designed to attack the northern flank of German forces around Kharkov, to seize bridgeheads across the 2593:

positioned on either flank of the combat zone to tie down enemy reinforcements via means of diversion attacks or blocking defence.

4512: 3601: 3529: 1494: 4025:

https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/LWP-56-Mikhail-Nikolayevich-Tukhachevsky-1893-1937-Practitioner-and-Theorist-of-War.pdf

2857:

pressure upon the enemy. These forces would strike 15–20 km into enemy tactical defences to engage his forward and reserve

1477: 4490:

Feeling the Full Force of a Four Point Offensive: Re-Interpreting The Red Army's 1944 Belorussian and L'vov-Przemyśl Operations

3635: 3450:

operations. Such diversions and deception techniques became a hallmark of Soviet offensive operations for the rest of the war.

2708: 1839: 1264: 109: 3419:

Operation Uranus, the tactical deep battle plan, worked. However, the General Staff's deep operation plan was compromised by

2539: 2523:(1898–1976) was a prolific writer on military tactics and operations. Among his most important works on operational art were 1603: 3768:. The combat operations featured no land warfare, and therefore no front line can be said to have existed. The air war over 2765:

The division numbered some 9,380 men (10,670 in a guards rifle division), 44 field guns, 160 mortars and 48 anti-tank guns.

3801: 3657: 2841: 2269: 2202: 2186: 2020: 1467: 3605: 3260:. Both were directly linked as a spoiling offensives to break up and exhaust German formations before they could launch 3068: 1957: 421: 3376: 4549: 3741: 2170:

regime sought to establish an entirely new military system that reflected the Bolshevik revolutionary spirit. The new

1967: 1154: 956: 827: 365: 3733: 3640: 3077: 4559: 4530: 4428: 3446: 2817:

operational depth to its rear); and to continue the offensive into the defender's operational and strategic depth.

2581: 1431: 2520: 3828: 3737: 2453: 2163: 1541: 1049: 398: 272: 126: 2108:

Using these templates, the Soviets developed the concept of deep battle, and by 1936, it had become part of the

4564: 4410: 3291:. The South Western Front was to attack out of bridgeheads across the Northern Donets River north and south of 3281: 3058: 2102: 1992: 1859: 1406: 1099: 917: 765: 3415:

Third Kharkov. The shallow penetration was destroyed. The Soviets had not practised deep operations properly.

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There are three standard doctrines about the military that help understand deep battle, as adopted by the

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manual in 1933. This was the first time that "deep battle" was mentioned in official Red Army literature.

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assaults, which would be followed up by fresh uncommitted mobile operational reserves sent to exploit the

2068: 1812: 1787: 1509: 1421: 1294: 1169: 770: 747: 193: 92: 2234: 2092: 3609: 2284: 1401: 1334: 1287: 941: 904: 867: 785: 737: 621: 431: 239: 148: 2808:

The forces used in the operational phase were much larger. The Red Army proposed to use the efforts of

2209:(1894–1931), who made significant contributions to the use of technology in deep offensive operations. 3256:, and the Kharkov offensive operation (known officially as the Barvenkovo-Lozovaia offensive) against 3786: 3585: 3569: 3371: 3359: 3355: 3273: 3117: 3105: 3101: 2989: 2567: 2244: 2194: 2179: 2175: 1792: 1694: 1551: 1546: 1364: 1329: 1064: 884: 742: 678: 532: 502: 99: 3346: 2777: 2251:

before and that such a conflict was unavoidable. The nature of the war raised four major questions:

3823: 3699: 3671: 3630: 2976: 2886:

their units to bear. That might lead to the defeat of a shock army against a superior enemy force.

2449: 2348: 2344: 2321: 2061: 1643: 1628: 1504: 1391: 1369: 1344: 1304: 1214: 1024: 929: 879: 646: 636: 601: 393: 383: 153: 77: 3919: 3553:

Technical Manual, TM 30-530. Handbook on USSR Military Forces: Chapter V, Tactics. 1 November 1945

3200:. It was hoped a thrust deeper into the German rear would induce a collapse of Army Group Centre. 2798:

strategists to attempt to solve the problem of maintaining operational tempo with new technology.

2600:

In defence, the same principles would apply. The holding group would be positioned forward of the

3772:

was a "deep battle" as Air Force bombed strategic targets and fielded forces. Army Major General

3509: 3391:

as a springboard. The occupation of the former would enable the Red Army to trap the majority of

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several senior Soviet Commanders called for a unified military doctrine. The most prominent was

2255:

Would the next war be won in one decisive campaign or would it be a long struggle of attrition?

4492:. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. ISSN 1351-8046 4478: 4460: 4446: 4432: 4414: 4383: 4365: 3862: 3720: 3704: 3600:

operational reserves to engage the enemy on favourable terms. Instead, operational forces for

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Both similarities differentiated the doctrines from French and British doctrine of the time.

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during Tukhachevsky's tenure as its commandant in 1921–1922. Others came later, particularly

4407:

Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939

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allies used their massive superiority in numbers and the idea of Deep Battle to intimidate

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Operation Barbarossa had inflicted a series of severe defeats on the Red Army. The German

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destroy his retreating columns which would also be assaulted by powerful aviation forces.

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saw German innovations in the tactical arena. The methodology used by the Germans in the

2125:. The goal of a deep operation was to inflict a decisive strategic defeat on the enemy's 3478:

Glantz, David M., Col (rtd.) Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle,

3411: 3116:

of war (19 November 1942 – 31 December 1943), which commenced with the Soviet strategic

3691: 3679: 3584:, the Soviet's fresh operational forces, heavily mechanized, threatened to cut off the 3261: 2994: 2535: 2240: 2226: 2190: 2144: 1982: 1972: 1720: 1144: 1104: 1082: 1069: 1059: 1029: 899: 702: 693: 584: 537: 517: 507: 477: 444: 332: 289: 244: 116: 49: 4543: 3806: 3708: 3420: 3168: 2968: 2556: 2114: 1819: 1807: 1663: 1583: 1499: 1482: 1339: 1194: 1174: 857: 852: 832: 812: 727: 698: 673: 549: 527: 512: 487: 327: 249: 212: 207: 104: 3564:

The Germans began their offensive, as predicted, on 5 July 1943, under the codename

4357: 3765: 2962:

encircling the enemy and destroying him immediately. Triandafillov stated in 1929:

2508: 2484:

The lowest level is tactical, an aspect of individual skill and organization size.

2351:

and its tactical components, which Soviet deep battle termed the tactical mission.

2230: 2057: 2006: 1932: 1912: 1907: 1802: 1747: 1381: 1376: 1199: 1114: 862: 596: 497: 294: 198: 3604:

that were intended for the southern counteroffensive, were ordered to at and near

3128:, the Soviets had firmly secured the strategic initiative and advanced beyond the 3736:

and their knowledge of the terrain, coupled with their then-recent possession of

3557: 3087: 3675: 3663: 3513: 3277: 3129: 3121: 3034: 3017: 2950: 2924: 2295:

ultimate strategic target(s). This became the blueprint for Soviet deep battle.

2277: 2237:. That turn of events prompted Trotsky's replacement by Frunze in January 1925. 2156: 1917: 1668: 1633: 1472: 1159: 1124: 837: 780: 683: 467: 188: 183: 17: 4526: 3833: 3568:. The Soviets succeeded in limiting them to a slow advance. In the north, the 3104:, the Soviets struggled to relearn the concept. The surprise German invasion ( 3097: 3005:

the enemy into submission, rather than destroy it physically and immediately.

2985: 2933: 2548: 1874: 1844: 1566: 935: 3588:. Had they succeeded, nothing would have stood between the Red Army and the 3156: 2920: 2809: 2656: 2437: 2287:

mentality, which along with other events, caused enormous problems in 1941.

2167: 1864: 1688: 1638: 1588: 1578: 1573: 1438: 1229: 1224: 1189: 631: 317: 284: 173: 2456:, and powerful tactical air support would engage the worn down enemy in a 2328:

The diversion operations also frustrated an opponent trying to conduct an

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times and the strategy of a single point (the decisive battle) and the

2469: 1889: 1849: 1613: 1447: 1443: 790: 775: 651: 312: 307: 277: 216: 178: 4457:

In Pursuit of Military Excellence; The Evolution of Operational Theory

4533:, a lecture by Dr. Richard Harrison, via the official channel of the 3769: 3753: 3724: 3425: 3400: 3265: 3197: 3184: 2830: 2733: 2507:

According to Colonel McPadden (US Army), the most precious legacy of

2097: 2071:, an influential military writer, who worked with others to create a 1396: 797: 614: 350: 3350:

Operation Uranus, which achieved great success in its initial stages

4379:

The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver: Spearhead of the Offensive

3444:

Battle of Kharkov had demonstrated the importance of diversion, or

2825:

created this layout of force allocation for deep operations in his

3728: 3573: 3496: 3410: 3345: 3057: 2776: 2671: 2496:

operation and the leadership of organization and of a government.

2239: 872: 408: 403: 4525:"Georgii Isserson: Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II": 3033:

However, the death of Triandafillov in an airplane crash and the

2612:

battle for each tactical unit under the command of a front were:

3757: 3667: 3505: 3091:, Chapter V, Tactics. 1 November 1945, page V-73, OCLC: 19989681 168: 163: 3026:. The concept was finally codified by the army in 1936 in the 2794:

motorised and mechanized divisions. Those trends prompted the

41: 3088:

Technical Manual, TM 30-530. Handbook on USSR Military Forces

2429:

Operational-tactical unit (shock army/corps/army division)

4362:

Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle

2448:

the tactical zones, the fresh mobile forces consisting of

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in the Caucasus. The only escape route left, through the

4445:. Center of Military History, United States Army. 2006. 4081: 4079: 3963: 3961: 3942: 3940: 2531:(1933). The latter work remains classified to this day. 2504:

Operational is the bridge between tactics and strategy.

2258:

Should the Red Army be primarily offensive or defensive?

2915:

Intended outcomes; differences with other methodologies

2782:

assaults on either flank of the enemy tactical defence.

2305:

Provisional Instructions for Organizing the Deep Battle

2268:

The discussion evolved into debate between those, like

2264:

Would mechanized or infantry forces be more important?

3678:

could use a mixture of speed and surprise to overrun

3370:

firepower as effectively as in the open country. The

4185: 4183: 3920:"Military Doctrine or Pseudo-Military Doctrinairism" 3859:

Deep battle: The brainchild of Marshal Tuchachevskii

4475:

Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevsky

3861:. Bassey's Defence Publishers, London. p. 24. 3719:Ever since the 1960s when the Sino-Soviet alliance 2948:emphasized the importance of a single strike on a 4425:The Russian Way of War: Operational Art 1904–1940 3078:breakthrough of German defenses on the River Oder 27:Soviet military strategy from the 1920s and 1930s 3102:German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 2701:10 separate tank or self-propelled gun regiments 4477:. London; Washington: Brassey's Defence, 1987. 3544: 3469: 3073: 2848:Varfolomeev and composition of deep operations 2320:Deep battle encompassed manoeuvre by multiple 2261:Would the nature of battle be fluid or static? 2185:Primary advocates of the development included 2911:was an important feature of Soviet thinking. 2014: 8: 3674:. Some Western observers predicted that the 3495:The Soviet plan for the defence of the city 4261:Glantz in Krause and Phillips 2006, p. 248. 2555:exploitation phase would be carried out by 4443:Historical Perspectives of Operational Art 3250:Rzhev–Vyazma strategic offensive operation 2801:The concept was termed "deep operations" ( 2442:several defence lines, one after the other 2360: 2021: 2007: 31: 3752:In the spring of 1999 came the crisis in 2355:Terminology, force allocation and mission 2221:as well as experiences gained during the 4382:(1. publ. ed.). London u.a.: Cass. 2988:was allocated enough forces to hold the 2919:During the 1930s, the resurgence of the 2890:the operation could be 150–200 km. 2827:Character of Operations of Modern Armies 985:List of military strategies and concepts 4535:U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center 4520:United States Army Combined Arms Center 3849: 3320:corps, totaling more than 250,000 men. 3244:During this time, the Germans launched 2937:. There is a common misconception that 2833:aircraft and six to eight squadrons of 39: 4506:(Winter 2015), accessible online at: 4342: 3311:Although the offensive surprised the 7: 4441:Krause, Michael and Phillips, Cody. 3423:himself. Stalin's impatience forced 3308:, the actual aim of Operation Blue. 2415:Operational unit (shock army/corps) 2401:Operational-strategic unit (front) 4401:. Air & Space Forces Magazine. 3327:Operation Uranus and Third Kharkov 3287:The battlefield plan involved the 2529:Fundamentals of the Deep Operation 2229:. The call prompted opposition by 2217:In the aftermath of the wars with 25: 4297:Krause and Phillips 2006, p. 251. 3041:Soviet sources admitted in 1988: 2786:That was demonstrated during the 4514:The Evolution of Operational Art 4279:Glantz & House 1995, p. 106. 4270:Krause and Phillips 2006, p. 250 3690:("special purpose troops", i.e. 3602:Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev 3530:Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev 2641:anti-aircraft artillery regiment 2525:The Evolution of Operational Art 2492:The highest level, an aspect of 59: 3636:Second Jassy-Kishinev Offensive 3512:, with its oilfields, vital to 2975:The theory moved away from the 4397:Grant, Rebecca (1 June 2001). 3118:counteroffensive at Stalingrad 1: 4364:, Frank Cass, London, 1991a. 3802:Nikolai Efimovich Varfolomeev 3658:Seven Days to the River Rhine 3276:as they advanced towards the 3028:Provisional Field Regulations 2842:Nikolai Efimovich Varfolomeev 2516:Isserson; the factor of depth 4555:Military of the Soviet Union 3899:Cody and Krauz 2006, p. 229. 3857:Simpkin, Richard E. (1987). 3626:Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive 3069:Eastern Front (World War II) 2635:One field artillery regiment 2521:Georgii Samoilovich Isserson 4288:Glantz & House, p. 106. 4145:Harrison 2001, pp. 197–198. 3976:Harrison 2001, pp. 187–194. 3955:Harrison 2001, pp. 129–131. 3280:. The operation led to the 3024:Instructions on Deep Battle 2670:One aviation communication 2151:(1803–1815) and in various 1478:Military–industrial complex 957:Operational manoeuvre group 4581: 4429:University Press of Kansas 4376:Glantz, David M. (1991b). 3707:units came to Europe from 3655: 3555:page V-83, OCLC: 19989681 3457: 3330: 3289:Soviet South Western Front 3228: 3217:into combat of the entire 3139: 3066: 3015: 2881:Deep operations engagement 2840:Triandafilov's successor, 2761:One reconnaissance company 2689:3 tank destroyer regiments 2638:One anti-tank gun regiment 2412:Army-size operation battle 2164:Russian Revolution of 1917 3829:Mechanized Corps (Soviet) 3662:The Soviet Union and its 2984:in 1942. The Red Army in 2704:2 anti-aircraft divisions 2678:Stavka operational forces 2095:the Soviet High Command ( 2075:with its own specialized 2041: 1542:Loss-of-strength gradient 399:Combat information center 4516:by Georgii Isseson, 1936 4411:Cornell University Press 4324:Watt 2008, pp. 675, 677. 4306:V.M Kulish 1974, p. 168. 3924:Marxist Internet Archive 3734:People's Liberation Army 3375:flanks and encircle the 3282:Second Battle of Kharkov 2683:1–2 artillery divisions 1860:Military science fiction 1345:Technology and equipment 766:List of military tactics 4207:Watt 2008, pp. 677–678. 3890:Harrison 2001, pp. 4–5. 3438:Third Battle of Kharkov 3337:Third Battle of Kharkov 3136:Moscow counteroffensive 2752:One anti-tank battalion 2387:Strategic unit (front) 2199:Soviet Military Academy 1928:Wartime sexual violence 1684:Full-spectrum dominance 1495:Supply-chain management 4455:Naveh, Shimon (1997). 4243:Harrison 2001, p. 220. 4177:Harrison 2001, p. 200. 4163:Harrison 2001, p. 199. 4154:Harrison 2001, p. 198. 4136:Harrison 2001, p. 197. 4122:Harrison 2001, p. 196. 4113:Harrison 2001, p. 195. 4101:Harrison 2001, p. 194. 4073:Harrison 2001, p. 190. 4061:Harrison 2001, p. 189. 4052:Harrison 2001, p. 205. 4040:Harrison 2001, p. 204. 4015:Harrison 2001, p. 193. 3994:Watt 2008, p. 673–674. 3985:Harrison 2001, p. 187. 3967:Harrison 2001, p. 140. 3946:Harrison 2001, p. 126. 3918:Trotsky, Leon (1921). 3908:Harrison 2001, p. 123. 3792:Vladimir Triandafillov 3762:Operation Allied Force 3641:Vistula–Oder Offensive 3549: 3474: 3416: 3351: 3225:Rzhev–Vyazma offensive 3183:and was closing in on 3163:was occupying most of 3083: 3064: 3048: 2973: 2783: 2749:One artillery regiment 2726:One artillery regiment 2563:and motorised forces. 2463: 2300:Vladimir Triandafillov 2247: 2207:Vladimir Triandafillov 2069:Vladimir Triandafillov 1840:Awards and decorations 1813:Peace through strength 1788:Low-intensity conflict 1422:Conscientious objector 1295:Area of responsibility 4423:Harrison, Richard W. 4333:Glantz 1991a, p. 136. 4315:Glantz 1991a, p. 135. 4085:Glantz 1991a, p. 124. 3721:came to an abrupt end 3610:Battle of Prokhorovka 3414: 3349: 3124:divisions. After the 3112:and achieve victory. 3061: 3043: 2964: 2780: 2729:One signals battalion 2686:3 artillery regiments 2464:Tukhachevsky's legacy 2409:Operational direction 2381:Theatre of operations 2285:cult of the offensive 2274:strategy of attrition 2243: 432:Torpedo data computer 422:Ship gun fire-control 4518:– PDF, available on 4459:. London: Francass. 4234:Glantz 1991a, p. 88. 4225:Glantz 1991a, p. 89. 4216:Glantz 1991a, p. 25. 4003:Glantz 1991a, p. 40. 3881:Harrison 2001, p. 4. 3787:Mikhail Tukhachevsky 3727:considered invading 3572:advanced south from 3362:and the collapse of 3356:Battle of Stalingrad 3106:Operation Barbarossa 2931:was named by others 2803:glubokaya operatsiya 2755:One sapper battalion 2624:7–12 rifle divisions 2602:main defensive lines 2575:Tactical deep battle 2559:teams of mechanized 2527:(1932 and 1937) and 2245:Mikhail Tukhachevsky 2213:Roots of deep battle 2195:Mikhail Tukhachevsky 2180:operational mobility 2067:The term comes from 2046:glubokaya operatsiya 1958:Military occupations 1793:Military engineering 1695:Unrestricted Warfare 1552:Force multiplication 450:Military manoeuvrers 3824:Tank Corps (Soviet) 3725:Soviet High Command 3672:Inner German border 3631:Operation Bagration 2644:One mortar regiment 2450:mechanized infantry 2406:Operational mission 2395:Strategic direction 2384:Strategic operation 2203:Nikolai Varfolomeev 1644:Penal military unit 1629:Rules of engagement 1305:Command and control 930:Operations research 394:Director (military) 384:Fire-control system 154:Command and control 35:Part of a series on 4550:Military doctrines 4427:. Lawrence, Kan.: 4198:Watt 2008, p. 675. 4189:Watt 2008, p. 677. 3686:(airborne units), 3608:. This led to the 3417: 3352: 3270:Fourth Panzer Army 3219:4th Airborne Corps 3214:Second Panzer Army 3065: 2923:in the era of the 2784: 2758:One signal company 2696:self-propelled gun 2655:One communication 2582:Soviet rifle corps 2272:, who advocated a 2248: 2153:Russo-Turkish Wars 2139:Before deep battle 2085:Russo-Japanese War 2050:Soviet deep battle 1753:Counter-insurgency 1674:Command of the sea 1619:Jewish laws on war 1594:Geneva Conventions 1130:Divide and conquer 925:Military operation 890:Tactical objective 389:Fire-control radar 366:Electronic-warfare 4560:Military strategy 4451:978-0-16-072564-7 3594:Army Group Centre 3578:Operation Kutuzov 3566:Operation Citadel 3526:Operation Kutuzov 3372:German Sixth Army 3317:First Panzer Army 3274:German Sixth Army 3254:Army Group Centre 3246:Operation Kremlin 3192:had stalled. The 3181:Operation Typhoon 3177:Army Group Centre 3171:, the key to the 2990:German Sixth Army 2746:3 Rifle regiments 2723:3 Rifle divisions 2561:airborne infantry 2458:counter-offensive 2452:, foot infantry, 2433: 2432: 2392:Strategic mission 2373:Force allocation 2322:Soviet Army front 2270:Alexander Svechin 2235:Polish–Soviet War 2223:Russian Civil War 2193:(1885–1925), and 2187:Alexander Svechin 2155:, defeats in the 2093:Polish–Soviet War 2073:military strategy 2056:developed by the 2048:), also known as 2042:Глубокая операция 2031: 2030: 1923:Horses in warfare 1870:Anti-war movement 1773:Gunboat diplomacy 1763:Disaster response 1711:Philosophy of war 1706:Principles of war 1679:Deterrence theory 1624:Right of conquest 1547:Lanchester's laws 1315:Principles of war 1005:Counter-offensive 990:Military campaign 895:Target saturation 818:Counterinsurgency 427:Gun data computer 361:Close air support 323:Aircraft carriers 16:(Redirected from 4572: 4471:Simpkin, Richard 4402: 4393: 4358:Glantz, David M. 4346: 4340: 4334: 4331: 4325: 4322: 4316: 4313: 4307: 4304: 4298: 4295: 4289: 4286: 4280: 4277: 4271: 4268: 4262: 4259: 4253: 4250: 4244: 4241: 4235: 4232: 4226: 4223: 4217: 4214: 4208: 4205: 4199: 4196: 4190: 4187: 4178: 4175: 4164: 4161: 4155: 4152: 4146: 4143: 4137: 4134: 4123: 4120: 4114: 4111: 4102: 4099: 4086: 4083: 4074: 4071: 4062: 4059: 4053: 4050: 4041: 4038: 4027: 4022: 4016: 4013: 4004: 4001: 3995: 3992: 3986: 3983: 3977: 3974: 3968: 3965: 3956: 3953: 3947: 3944: 3935: 3934: 3932: 3930: 3915: 3909: 3906: 3900: 3897: 3891: 3888: 3882: 3879: 3873: 3872: 3854: 3797:Georgii Isserson 3781:Major proponents 3774:Robert H. Scales 3560: 3483: 3465:Deep battle plan 3393:Army Group South 3381:Operation Uranus 3364:Army Group South 3360:enemy field army 3342:Deep battle plan 3333:Operation Uranus 3258:Army Group South 3236:Deep battle plan 3231:Battles of Rzhev 3167:and threatening 3161:Army Group South 3153:Army Group North 3147:Deep battle plan 3142:Battle of Moscow 3092: 3012:Impact of purges 2982:Operation Uranus 2929:Second World War 2835:fighter aircraft 2709:mechanized corps 2606:assault aviation 2420:Tactical mission 2361: 2205:(1890–1939) and 2043: 2023: 2016: 2009: 1778:Humanitarian aid 1716:Security dilemma 1537:Power projection 1320:Economy of force 1300:Chain of command 1015:Defence in depth 1000:Commerce raiding 823:Defeat in detail 159:Defense ministry 63: 54: 53: 44: 32: 21: 4580: 4579: 4575: 4574: 4573: 4571: 4570: 4569: 4565:Military theory 4540: 4539: 4499: 4396: 4390: 4375: 4354: 4349: 4341: 4337: 4332: 4328: 4323: 4319: 4314: 4310: 4305: 4301: 4296: 4292: 4287: 4283: 4278: 4274: 4269: 4265: 4260: 4256: 4251: 4247: 4242: 4238: 4233: 4229: 4224: 4220: 4215: 4211: 4206: 4202: 4197: 4193: 4188: 4181: 4176: 4167: 4162: 4158: 4153: 4149: 4144: 4140: 4135: 4126: 4121: 4117: 4112: 4105: 4100: 4089: 4084: 4077: 4072: 4065: 4060: 4056: 4051: 4044: 4039: 4030: 4023: 4019: 4014: 4007: 4002: 3998: 3993: 3989: 3984: 3980: 3975: 3971: 3966: 3959: 3954: 3950: 3945: 3938: 3928: 3926: 3917: 3916: 3912: 3907: 3903: 3898: 3894: 3889: 3885: 3880: 3876: 3869: 3856: 3855: 3851: 3847: 3842: 3819:Operational art 3815: 3783: 3764:as a result of 3750: 3738:nuclear weapons 3717: 3660: 3654: 3649: 3618: 3616:Other campaigns 3590:strategic depth 3586:German 9th Army 3582:2nd Panzer Army 3580:. Striking the 3570:German 9th Army 3562: 3551: 3542: 3489:Battle of Kursk 3485: 3476: 3467: 3462: 3460:Battle of Kursk 3456: 3409: 3397:Kerch Peninsula 3344: 3339: 3331:Main articles: 3329: 3301: 3238: 3233: 3227: 3206: 3149: 3144: 3138: 3126:Battle of Kursk 3094: 3085: 3071: 3056: 3020: 3014: 2921:German military 2917: 2904: 2883: 2859:tactical forces 2850: 2814:airborne forces 2788:First World War 2771: 2651:signal regiment 2590:order of battle 2577: 2518: 2474:US Marine Corps 2466: 2398:Front operation 2357: 2330:elastic defence 2318: 2313: 2215: 2149:Napoleonic Wars 2141: 2136: 2119:strategic depth 2089:First World War 2077:operational art 2054:military theory 2027: 1998: 1997: 1948: 1938: 1937: 1903: 1895: 1894: 1835: 1825: 1824: 1798:Multilateralism 1783:Law enforcement 1743: 1733: 1732: 1701:Just war theory 1659: 1649: 1648: 1599:Geneva Protocol 1569: 1559: 1558: 1532: 1522: 1521: 1463: 1453: 1452: 1360: 1350: 1349: 1290: 1280: 1279: 1245: 1235: 1234: 1165:Network-centric 1085: 1075: 1074: 982: 972: 971: 920: 910: 909: 858:Rapid dominance 763: 753: 752: 708:Electromagnetic 617: 607: 606: 593: 546: 494: 470: 460: 459: 455:Combat training 436: 413: 379:Combat systems: 375: 337: 333:Auxiliary ships 299: 259: 255:Military police 221: 144: 134: 133: 73: 47: 46: 45: 40: 28: 23: 22: 18:Deep operations 15: 12: 11: 5: 4578: 4576: 4568: 4567: 4562: 4557: 4552: 4542: 4541: 4538: 4537: 4523: 4510: 4498: 4497:External links 4495: 4494: 4493: 4488:Watt, Robert. 4486: 4468: 4453: 4439: 4421: 4405:Habeck, Mary. 4403: 4394: 4388: 4373: 4353: 4350: 4348: 4347: 4335: 4326: 4317: 4308: 4299: 4290: 4281: 4272: 4263: 4254: 4245: 4236: 4227: 4218: 4209: 4200: 4191: 4179: 4165: 4156: 4147: 4138: 4124: 4115: 4103: 4087: 4075: 4063: 4054: 4042: 4028: 4017: 4005: 3996: 3987: 3978: 3969: 3957: 3948: 3936: 3910: 3901: 3892: 3883: 3874: 3867: 3848: 3846: 3843: 3841: 3838: 3837: 3836: 3831: 3826: 3821: 3814: 3811: 3810: 3809: 3804: 3799: 3794: 3789: 3782: 3779: 3749: 3746: 3716: 3713: 3696:naval infantry 3692:special forces 3680:Western Europe 3653: 3652:Central Europe 3650: 3648: 3645: 3644: 3643: 3638: 3633: 3628: 3617: 3614: 3543: 3541: 3538: 3468: 3466: 3463: 3458:Main article: 3455: 3452: 3408: 3405: 3343: 3340: 3328: 3325: 3300: 3297: 3262:Operation Blue 3237: 3234: 3229:Main article: 3226: 3223: 3205: 3202: 3155:was besieging 3148: 3145: 3140:Main article: 3137: 3134: 3072: 3055: 3052: 3013: 3010: 2995:Kalach-na-Donu 2916: 2913: 2903: 2900: 2882: 2879: 2849: 2846: 2770: 2769:Deep operation 2767: 2763: 2762: 2759: 2756: 2753: 2750: 2747: 2741:Rifle division 2738: 2737: 2730: 2727: 2724: 2712: 2711: 2705: 2702: 2699: 2692: 2691: 2690: 2687: 2675: 2674: 2668: 2659: 2653: 2647: 2646: 2645: 2642: 2639: 2636: 2627: 2626: 2625: 2621:3 rifle corps 2576: 2573: 2517: 2514: 2500:3. Operational 2465: 2462: 2454:armored forces 2431: 2430: 2427: 2424: 2421: 2417: 2416: 2413: 2410: 2407: 2403: 2402: 2399: 2396: 2393: 2389: 2388: 2385: 2382: 2379: 2375: 2374: 2371: 2368: 2365: 2356: 2353: 2317: 2314: 2312: 2309: 2266: 2265: 2262: 2259: 2256: 2227:Mikhail Frunze 2214: 2211: 2191:Mikhail Frunze 2145:Russian Empire 2140: 2137: 2135: 2132: 2034:Deep operation 2029: 2028: 2026: 2025: 2018: 2011: 2003: 2000: 1999: 1996: 1995: 1990: 1985: 1980: 1975: 1970: 1965: 1963:Military terms 1960: 1955: 1949: 1944: 1943: 1940: 1939: 1936: 1935: 1930: 1925: 1920: 1915: 1910: 1904: 1901: 1900: 1897: 1896: 1893: 1892: 1887: 1882: 1877: 1872: 1867: 1862: 1857: 1852: 1847: 1842: 1836: 1831: 1830: 1827: 1826: 1823: 1822: 1817: 1816: 1815: 1810: 1800: 1795: 1790: 1785: 1780: 1775: 1770: 1765: 1760: 1755: 1750: 1744: 1739: 1738: 1735: 1734: 1731: 1730: 1725: 1724: 1723: 1721:Tripwire force 1713: 1708: 1703: 1698: 1691: 1686: 1681: 1676: 1671: 1666: 1660: 1655: 1654: 1651: 1650: 1647: 1646: 1641: 1636: 1631: 1626: 1621: 1616: 1611: 1606: 1601: 1596: 1591: 1586: 1581: 1576: 1570: 1565: 1564: 1561: 1560: 1557: 1556: 1555: 1554: 1544: 1539: 1533: 1528: 1527: 1524: 1523: 1520: 1519: 1518: 1517: 1512: 1507: 1497: 1492: 1491: 1490: 1485: 1475: 1470: 1464: 1459: 1458: 1455: 1454: 1451: 1450: 1441: 1436: 1435: 1434: 1424: 1419: 1414: 1409: 1404: 1399: 1394: 1389: 1384: 1379: 1374: 1373: 1372: 1361: 1356: 1355: 1352: 1351: 1348: 1347: 1342: 1337: 1332: 1327: 1322: 1317: 1312: 1307: 1302: 1297: 1291: 1286: 1285: 1282: 1281: 1278: 1277: 1272: 1267: 1262: 1257: 1252: 1246: 1243:Administrative 1241: 1240: 1237: 1236: 1233: 1232: 1227: 1222: 1217: 1212: 1207: 1202: 1197: 1192: 1187: 1182: 1177: 1172: 1170:New generation 1167: 1162: 1157: 1152: 1147: 1145:Fleet in being 1142: 1137: 1132: 1127: 1122: 1117: 1112: 1107: 1102: 1097: 1092: 1086: 1083:Grand strategy 1081: 1080: 1077: 1076: 1073: 1072: 1070:Scorched earth 1067: 1062: 1057: 1052: 1047: 1042: 1037: 1032: 1027: 1022: 1017: 1012: 1007: 1002: 997: 992: 983: 978: 977: 974: 973: 970: 969: 964: 959: 954: 949: 947:Deep operation 944: 939: 932: 927: 921: 916: 915: 912: 911: 908: 907: 902: 897: 892: 887: 882: 877: 876: 875: 865: 860: 855: 850: 845: 840: 835: 830: 825: 820: 815: 810: 805: 800: 795: 794: 793: 788: 783: 773: 764: 759: 758: 755: 754: 751: 750: 748:Unconventional 745: 740: 735: 730: 725: 720: 715: 710: 705: 696: 694:Disinformation 691: 686: 681: 676: 671: 666: 665: 664: 659: 649: 644: 639: 634: 629: 624: 618: 613: 612: 609: 608: 605: 604: 599: 592: 591: 590: 589: 588: 587: 577: 572: 567: 562: 557: 545: 544: 543: 542: 541: 540: 530: 525: 520: 515: 510: 505: 493: 492: 491: 490: 485: 480: 471: 466: 465: 462: 461: 458: 457: 452: 447: 445:Basic training 442: 435: 434: 429: 424: 419: 412: 411: 406: 401: 396: 391: 386: 381: 374: 373: 371:Reconnaissance 368: 363: 358: 353: 348: 343: 336: 335: 330: 325: 320: 315: 310: 305: 298: 297: 292: 290:Special forces 287: 282: 281: 280: 270: 265: 258: 257: 252: 247: 245:Reconnaissance 242: 237: 232: 227: 220: 219: 210: 205: 196: 191: 186: 181: 176: 171: 166: 161: 156: 151: 145: 140: 139: 136: 135: 132: 131: 130: 129: 124: 114: 113: 112: 107: 97: 96: 95: 88:Post-classical 85: 80: 74: 69: 68: 65: 64: 56: 55: 37: 36: 26: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 4577: 4566: 4563: 4561: 4558: 4556: 4553: 4551: 4548: 4547: 4545: 4536: 4532: 4528: 4524: 4521: 4517: 4515: 4511: 4509: 4505: 4501: 4500: 4496: 4491: 4487: 4484: 4483:0-08-031193-8 4480: 4476: 4472: 4469: 4466: 4465:0-7146-4727-6 4462: 4458: 4454: 4452: 4448: 4444: 4440: 4438: 4437:0-7006-1074-X 4434: 4430: 4426: 4422: 4420: 4419:0-8014-4074-2 4416: 4412: 4408: 4404: 4400: 4399:"Deep Strife" 4395: 4391: 4389:0-7146-3373-9 4385: 4381: 4380: 4374: 4371: 4370:0-7146-4077-8 4367: 4363: 4360:, Col (rtd.) 4359: 4356: 4355: 4351: 4344: 4339: 4336: 4330: 4327: 4321: 4318: 4312: 4309: 4303: 4300: 4294: 4291: 4285: 4282: 4276: 4273: 4267: 4264: 4258: 4255: 4249: 4246: 4240: 4237: 4231: 4228: 4222: 4219: 4213: 4210: 4204: 4201: 4195: 4192: 4186: 4184: 4180: 4174: 4172: 4170: 4166: 4160: 4157: 4151: 4148: 4142: 4139: 4133: 4131: 4129: 4125: 4119: 4116: 4110: 4108: 4104: 4098: 4096: 4094: 4092: 4088: 4082: 4080: 4076: 4070: 4068: 4064: 4058: 4055: 4049: 4047: 4043: 4037: 4035: 4033: 4029: 4026: 4021: 4018: 4012: 4010: 4006: 4000: 3997: 3991: 3988: 3982: 3979: 3973: 3970: 3964: 3962: 3958: 3952: 3949: 3943: 3941: 3937: 3925: 3921: 3914: 3911: 3905: 3902: 3896: 3893: 3887: 3884: 3878: 3875: 3870: 3868:0-08-031193-8 3864: 3860: 3853: 3850: 3844: 3839: 3835: 3832: 3830: 3827: 3825: 3822: 3820: 3817: 3816: 3812: 3808: 3807:Georgy Zhukov 3805: 3803: 3800: 3798: 3795: 3793: 3790: 3788: 3785: 3784: 3780: 3778: 3775: 3771: 3767: 3763: 3759: 3755: 3747: 3745: 3743: 3739: 3735: 3730: 3726: 3722: 3714: 3712: 3710: 3709:North America 3706: 3701: 3697: 3693: 3689: 3685: 3681: 3677: 3673: 3669: 3665: 3659: 3651: 3646: 3642: 3639: 3637: 3634: 3632: 3629: 3627: 3624: 3623: 3622: 3615: 3613: 3611: 3607: 3603: 3597: 3595: 3591: 3587: 3583: 3579: 3575: 3571: 3567: 3561: 3559: 3558: 3554: 3548: 3539: 3537: 3533: 3531: 3527: 3521: 3519: 3515: 3511: 3507: 3503: 3498: 3493: 3492:battlefield. 3490: 3484: 3482: 3479: 3473: 3464: 3461: 3453: 3451: 3449: 3448: 3441: 3439: 3435: 3430: 3428: 3427: 3422: 3421:Joseph Stalin 3413: 3406: 3404: 3402: 3398: 3394: 3390: 3384: 3382: 3378: 3373: 3367: 3365: 3361: 3357: 3348: 3341: 3338: 3334: 3326: 3324: 3321: 3318: 3314: 3309: 3307: 3298: 3296: 3294: 3290: 3285: 3283: 3279: 3275: 3271: 3267: 3263: 3259: 3255: 3251: 3247: 3242: 3235: 3232: 3224: 3222: 3220: 3215: 3210: 3203: 3201: 3199: 3195: 3190: 3186: 3182: 3179:had launched 3178: 3174: 3170: 3169:Rostov-on-Don 3166: 3162: 3158: 3154: 3146: 3143: 3135: 3133: 3131: 3127: 3123: 3119: 3113: 3111: 3107: 3103: 3099: 3093: 3090: 3089: 3082: 3079: 3070: 3060: 3053: 3051: 3047: 3042: 3039: 3036: 3031: 3029: 3025: 3019: 3011: 3009: 3006: 3004: 2998: 2996: 2991: 2987: 2983: 2978: 2977:Clausewitzian 2972: 2970: 2969:combined arms 2963: 2959: 2957: 2953: 2952: 2947: 2942: 2940: 2936: 2935: 2930: 2926: 2922: 2914: 2912: 2908: 2901: 2899: 2895: 2891: 2887: 2880: 2878: 2875: 2870: 2866: 2862: 2860: 2854: 2847: 2845: 2843: 2838: 2836: 2832: 2828: 2824: 2818: 2815: 2811: 2806: 2804: 2799: 2797: 2791: 2789: 2779: 2775: 2768: 2766: 2760: 2757: 2754: 2751: 2748: 2745: 2744: 2743: 2742: 2735: 2731: 2728: 2725: 2722: 2721: 2720: 2719: 2715: 2710: 2706: 2703: 2700: 2697: 2693: 2688: 2685: 2684: 2682: 2681: 2680: 2679: 2673: 2669: 2667: 2664: 2660: 2658: 2654: 2652: 2648: 2643: 2640: 2637: 2634: 2633: 2632: 2628: 2623: 2622: 2620: 2619: 2618: 2617: 2613: 2609: 2607: 2603: 2598: 2594: 2591: 2586: 2583: 2574: 2572: 2569: 2564: 2562: 2558: 2557:combined arms 2552: 2550: 2544: 2541: 2537: 2532: 2530: 2526: 2522: 2515: 2513: 2510: 2505: 2502: 2501: 2497: 2495: 2490: 2489: 2485: 2482: 2481: 2477: 2475: 2471: 2461: 2459: 2455: 2451: 2445: 2443: 2439: 2428: 2425: 2422: 2419: 2418: 2414: 2411: 2408: 2405: 2404: 2400: 2397: 2394: 2391: 2390: 2386: 2383: 2380: 2378:Strategic aim 2377: 2376: 2372: 2369: 2366: 2363: 2362: 2359: 2354: 2352: 2350: 2346: 2340: 2337: 2335: 2331: 2325: 2323: 2315: 2310: 2308: 2306: 2303:produced the 2301: 2296: 2294: 2288: 2286: 2281: 2279: 2275: 2271: 2263: 2260: 2257: 2254: 2253: 2252: 2246: 2242: 2238: 2236: 2232: 2228: 2224: 2220: 2212: 2210: 2208: 2204: 2200: 2196: 2192: 2189:(1878–1938), 2188: 2183: 2181: 2177: 2176:began in 1929 2173: 2169: 2165: 2160: 2158: 2154: 2150: 2146: 2138: 2133: 2131: 2128: 2124: 2120: 2116: 2115:combined arms 2111: 2106: 2104: 2100: 2099: 2094: 2090: 2086: 2082: 2078: 2074: 2070: 2065: 2063: 2059: 2055: 2051: 2047: 2039: 2035: 2024: 2019: 2017: 2012: 2010: 2005: 2004: 2002: 2001: 1994: 1991: 1989: 1986: 1984: 1981: 1979: 1976: 1974: 1971: 1969: 1966: 1964: 1961: 1959: 1956: 1954: 1951: 1950: 1947: 1942: 1941: 1934: 1931: 1929: 1926: 1924: 1921: 1919: 1916: 1914: 1911: 1909: 1906: 1905: 1899: 1898: 1891: 1888: 1886: 1883: 1881: 1878: 1876: 1873: 1871: 1868: 1866: 1863: 1861: 1858: 1856: 1853: 1851: 1850:Warrior caste 1848: 1846: 1843: 1841: 1838: 1837: 1834: 1829: 1828: 1821: 1820:Show of force 1818: 1814: 1811: 1809: 1808:Peacebuilding 1806: 1805: 1804: 1801: 1799: 1796: 1794: 1791: 1789: 1786: 1784: 1781: 1779: 1776: 1774: 1771: 1769: 1766: 1764: 1761: 1759: 1756: 1754: 1751: 1749: 1746: 1745: 1742: 1737: 1736: 1729: 1726: 1722: 1719: 1718: 1717: 1714: 1712: 1709: 1707: 1704: 1702: 1699: 1697: 1696: 1692: 1690: 1687: 1685: 1682: 1680: 1677: 1675: 1672: 1670: 1667: 1665: 1664:Air supremacy 1662: 1661: 1658: 1653: 1652: 1645: 1642: 1640: 1637: 1635: 1632: 1630: 1627: 1625: 1622: 1620: 1617: 1615: 1612: 1610: 1607: 1605: 1604:Islamic rules 1602: 1600: 1597: 1595: 1592: 1590: 1587: 1585: 1584:Court-martial 1582: 1580: 1577: 1575: 1572: 1571: 1568: 1563: 1562: 1553: 1550: 1549: 1548: 1545: 1543: 1540: 1538: 1535: 1534: 1531: 1526: 1525: 1516: 1513: 1511: 1508: 1506: 1503: 1502: 1501: 1498: 1496: 1493: 1489: 1486: 1484: 1483:Arms industry 1481: 1480: 1479: 1476: 1474: 1471: 1469: 1466: 1465: 1462: 1457: 1456: 1449: 1445: 1442: 1440: 1437: 1433: 1430: 1429: 1428: 1425: 1423: 1420: 1418: 1415: 1413: 1410: 1408: 1405: 1403: 1400: 1398: 1395: 1393: 1390: 1388: 1385: 1383: 1380: 1378: 1375: 1371: 1368: 1367: 1366: 1363: 1362: 1359: 1354: 1353: 1346: 1343: 1341: 1338: 1336: 1333: 1331: 1328: 1326: 1323: 1321: 1318: 1316: 1313: 1311: 1308: 1306: 1303: 1301: 1298: 1296: 1293: 1292: 1289: 1284: 1283: 1276: 1273: 1271: 1268: 1266: 1263: 1261: 1258: 1256: 1253: 1251: 1248: 1247: 1244: 1239: 1238: 1231: 1228: 1226: 1223: 1221: 1218: 1216: 1213: 1211: 1208: 1206: 1203: 1201: 1198: 1196: 1193: 1191: 1188: 1186: 1183: 1181: 1178: 1176: 1173: 1171: 1168: 1166: 1163: 1161: 1158: 1156: 1153: 1151: 1148: 1146: 1143: 1141: 1138: 1136: 1133: 1131: 1128: 1126: 1123: 1121: 1118: 1116: 1113: 1111: 1108: 1106: 1103: 1101: 1100:Broken-backed 1098: 1096: 1093: 1091: 1088: 1087: 1084: 1079: 1078: 1071: 1068: 1066: 1063: 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The 2549:army group 2536:Napoleonic 2311:Principles 2166:, the new 2162:After the 2127:logistical 2103:operations 2091:, and the 1978:War crimes 1968:Operations 1875:Foot drill 1845:Battle cry 1758:deterrence 1417:Harassment 1392:Specialism 1215:Technology 1210:Succession 1155:Liberation 1090:Asymmetric 1025:Empty fort 936:Blitzkrieg 905:Withdrawal 868:Investment 647:Camouflage 642:Biological 580:Underwater 555:Amphibious 474:Aerospace 341:Air units: 318:Submarines 127:fourth-gen 122:industrial 110:napoleonic 3845:Citations 3670:over the 3502:Wehrmacht 3399:and into 3313:Wehrmacht 3157:Leningrad 3110:Wehrmacht 2902:Logistics 2736:battalion 2663:telegraph 2657:battalion 2631:regiments 2480:1. Tactic 2438:artillery 2367:Territory 2298:In 1929, 2168:Bolshevik 1865:War novel 1768:Grey-zone 1728:War games 1689:Overmatch 1639:War crime 1589:Desertion 1579:Ceasefire 1574:Armistice 1461:Logistics 1439:Mercenary 1427:Volunteer 1358:Personnel 1330:Engineers 1275:Sociology 1230:World war 1225:Total war 1205:Strategic 1195:Religious 1180:Political 1175:Perpetual 1150:Irregular 1065:Offensive 1040:Defensive 1035:Deception 995:Attrition 848:Guerrilla 843:Formation 786:Airbridge 718:Loitering 632:Artillery 285:Artillery 235:Engineers 203:Irregular 174:Air force 4431:, 2001. 4413:, 2003. 3929:29 April 3813:See also 3705:REFORGER 3688:Spetsnaz 3647:Cold War 3306:Caucasus 3252:against 3173:Caucasus 2796:Red Army 2698:brigades 2472:and the 2349:division 2316:Doctrine 2293:stavka's 2172:Red Army 2110:Red Army 2060:for its 2052:, was a 1880:War song 1855:War film 1488:Materiel 1407:Children 1387:Training 1325:Medicine 1310:Doctrine 1265:Training 1200:Resource 1185:Princely 1135:Economic 1120:Conquest 1115:Colonial 1110:Cold war 1095:Blockade 980:Strategy 952:Maneuver 713:Infantry 669:Chemical 523:Mountain 483:Airborne 346:Fighters 313:Warships 268:Infantry 194:Reserves 142:Military 4531:YouTube 3540:Outcome 3518:Balkans 3510:Romania 3480:p. 122 3434:Kharkov 3407:Outcome 3389:Kharkov 3299:Outcome 3293:Kharkov 3204:Outcome 3165:Ukraine 3003:besiege 2666:company 2551:level. 2494:theater 2470:US Army 2370:Actions 2364:Mission 2134:History 2081:tactics 2038:Russian 1993:Writers 1988:Weapons 1953:Battles 1902:Related 1890:Wargame 1885:Uniform 1833:Culture 1614:Perfidy 1609:Justice 1530:Science 1515:Outpost 1468:History 1448:Warrior 1444:Soldier 1432:foreign 1370:counter 1270:Service 1220:Theater 1160:Limited 1140:Endemic 1055:Nuclear 828:Foxhole 803:Cavalry 791:Airdrop 776:Airlift 761:Tactics 733:Nuclear 723:Missile 652:Cavalry 637:Barrage 615:Weapons 575:Surface 356:Command 351:Bombers 308:Frogman 278:Cavalry 250:Medical 217:Militia 199:Regular 179:Marines 93:castles 83:Ancient 71:History 50:outline 4481: 4463: 4449: 4435: 4417: 4386: 4368: 3865: 3770:Serbia 3754:Kosovo 3723:, the 3694:) and 3426:Stavka 3401:Crimea 3387:using 3198:Moscow 3194:Stavka 3189:Stavka 3187:. The 3185:Moscow 3175:, and 3159:, the 2874:Stavka 2831:bomber 2734:sapper 2540:Moltke 2426:Battle 2334:Stavka 2098:Stavka 2087:, the 1973:Sieges 1657:Theory 1397:Morale 1255:Policy 1250:Branch 1030:Mosaic 1020:Fabian 967:Covert 900:Trench 885:Screen 808:Charge 798:Battle 771:Aerial 689:Denial 657:Horses 585:Seabed 538:Tunnel 518:Jungle 508:Desert 478:Aerial 4527:Video 3729:China 3497:Kursk 3454:Kursk 2672:troop 2219:Japan 2123:front 1946:Lists 1402:Women 1340:Ranks 1260:Staff 1190:Proxy 1105:Class 1060:Naval 1045:Depth 880:Swarm 873:Siege 853:Naval 833:Drone 728:Music 703:Robot 699:Drone 684:Cyber 627:Armor 597:Cyber 570:Green 565:Brown 528:Urban 488:Space 409:Radar 404:Sonar 273:Armor 230:Staff 208:Ranks 4479:ISBN 4461:ISBN 4447:ISBN 4433:ISBN 4415:ISBN 4384:ISBN 4366:ISBN 3931:2024 3863:ISBN 3758:NATO 3756:and 3742:1969 3715:Asia 3668:NATO 3574:Orel 3528:and 3514:Axis 3506:Kiev 3487:The 3354:The 3335:and 3304:the 3272:and 3122:Axis 3063:rear 2732:One 2707:1–2 2661:One 2649:One 2588:The 2143:The 2079:and 1983:Wars 1500:Base 1050:Goal 962:Raid 560:Blue 498:Land 169:Navy 164:Army 4529:on 3760:’s 3684:VDV 1567:Law 1510:FOB 1505:MOB 550:Sea 42:War 4546:: 4473:. 4409:. 4182:^ 4168:^ 4127:^ 4106:^ 4090:^ 4078:^ 4066:^ 4045:^ 4031:^ 4008:^ 3960:^ 3939:^ 3922:. 3711:. 3520:. 3440:. 3366:. 3284:. 2997:. 2837:. 2812:, 2476:: 2336:. 2182:. 2044:, 2040:: 1446:/ 701:/ 215:/ 201:/ 4485:. 4467:. 4392:. 4372:. 4345:. 3933:. 3871:. 3379:( 2036:( 2022:e 2015:t 2008:v 52:) 48:( 20:)

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