620:… There is no doubt that such words as 'you ought to do so-and-so' may be used as one's means of so inducing a person to behave a certain way. But if we are to do justice to the meaning of 'right' or 'ought', we must take account also of such modes of speech as 'he ought to do so-and-so', 'you ought to have done so-and-so', 'if this and that were the case, you ought to have done so-and-so', 'if this and that were the case, you ought to do so-and-so', 'I ought to do so-and-so.' Where the judgement of obligation has referenced either a third person, not the person addressed, or to the past, or to an unfulfilled past condition, or to a future treated as merely possible, or to the speaker himself, there is no plausibility in describing the judgement as command.
698:
impossibly difficult if we consider the kinds of things that count as virtue and vice? Consider, for instance, the cardinal virtues, prudence, temperance, courage and justice. Obviously any man needs prudence, but does he not also need to resist the temptation of pleasure when there is harm involved? And how could it be argued that he would never need to face what was fearful for the sake of some good? It is not obvious what someone would mean if he said that temperance or courage were not good qualities, and this not because of the 'praising' sense of these words, but because of the things that courage and temperance are.
1423:, 25: "These are methods in which we scrutinise the factual beliefs that mediate between our fundamental and our derivative moral attitudes; where we argue about the truth of the morally relevant facts that are called upon in support of our or other people's derivative moral attitudes, eg. as when we argue about whether or not there is a causal connection between pornography and sexual violence." The moral "beliefs" Stevenson spoke of are referred to as "derivative moral attitudes" by Wilks in an attempt to avoid confusion between moral beliefs and "factual beliefs".
218:, intending to defend the importance of rational moral argumentation against the "propaganda" he saw encouraged by Stevenson, who thought moral argumentation was sometimes psychological and not rational. But Hare's disagreement was not universal, and the similarities between his noncognitive theory and the emotive one — especially his claim, and Stevenson's, that moral judgments contain commands and are thus not purely descriptive — caused some to regard him as an emotivist, a classification he denied:
526:, she may conclude that he is a thief, and there would be no inconsistency between her attitude (that thieves are bad people) and her belief (that Edward is a bad person because he is a thief). However, it may be that Edward recognized the wallet as belonging to a friend, to whom he promptly returned it. Such a revelation would likely change the observer's belief about Edward, and even if it did not, the attempt to reveal such facts would count as a rational psychological form of moral argumentation.
1132:, 14–15: "The suggestion, that the function of moral judgments was to persuade, led to a difficulty in distinguishing their functions from that of propaganda. … It does not matter whether the means used to persuade are fair or foul, so long as they do persuade. And therefore the natural reaction to the realization that someone is trying to persuade us is 'He's trying to get at me; I must be on my guard …' Such a reaction to moral judgments should not be encouraged by philosophers." After Pepper,
307:
further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money," in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. … If now I generalise my previous statement and say, "Stealing money is wrong," I produce a sentence that has no factual meaning—that is, expresses no proposition that can be either true or false. … I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments.
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571:, at least, should be viewed as statements." He thinks that emotivism cannot explain why most people, historically speaking, have considered ethical sentences to be "fact-stating" and not just emotive. Furthermore, he argues that people who change their moral views see their prior views as mistaken, not just different, and that this does not make sense if their attitudes were all that changed:
1062:, 1: "… I do not take Ayer's ethical theory to hinge in any necessarily dependent sense upon his verificationist thesis … I take his ethical theory to hinge upon his verificationist thesis only to the extent that it assumes logic and empirical verification (and combinations thereof) to be the only means of firmly establishing the truth or falsity of any claim to knowledge."
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be criminal or innocent? But after every circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no further room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itself. The approbation or blame which then ensues, cannot be the work of the judgement, but of the heart; and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment.
111:
651:, written after Ross's book but before Brandt's and Urmson's, states that emotive terms are "not always used for purposes of exhortation." For example, in the sentence "Slavery was good in Ancient Rome", Stevenson thinks one is speaking of past attitudes in an "almost purely descriptive" sense. And in some discussions of
632:" into a command, imperative, or recommendation - to do so might require a radical change in the meaning of these ethical statements. Under this criticism, it would appear as if emotivist and prescriptivist theories are only capable of converting a relatively small subset of all ethical claims into imperatives.
697:
Philosophers who have supposed that actual action was required if 'good' were to be used in a sincere evaluation have got into difficulties over weakness of will, and they should surely agree that enough has been done if we can show that any man has reason to aim at virtue and avoid vice. But is this
517:
Logical methods involve efforts to show inconsistencies between a person's fundamental attitudes and their particular moral beliefs. For example, someone who says "Edward is a good person" who has previously said "Edward is a thief" and "No thieves are good people" is guilty of inconsistency until he
456:
If told to close the door, one may ask "Why?" and receive some such reason as "It is too drafty," or "The noise is distracting." … These reasons cannot be called "proofs" in any but a dangerously extended sense, nor are they demonstratively or inductively related to an imperative; but they manifestly
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meaning when they are made to change in a listener's attitude—saying that is incorrect in explaining "evaluative force in purely causal terms". This is Urmson's fundamental criticism, and he suggests that
Stevenson would have made a stronger case by explaining emotive meaning in terms of "commending
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ones, so
Stevenson's explanation of ethical sentences is unsatisfactory. Colin Wilks has responded that Stevenson's distinction between first-order and second-order statements resolves this problem: a person who says "Sharing is good" may be making a second-order statement like "Sharing is approved
492:
In second-pattern analysis, rather than judge an action directly, the speaker is evaluating it according to a general principle. For instance, someone who says "Murder is wrong" might mean "Murder decreases happiness overall"; this is a second-pattern statement that leads to a first-pattern one: "I
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In moral deliberations we must be acquainted beforehand with all the objects, and all their relations to each other; and from a comparison of the whole, fix our choice or approbation. … While we are ignorant whether a man were aggressor or not, how can we determine whether the person who killed him
687:
It may seem that the only way to make a necessary connexion between 'injury' and the things that are to be avoided, is to say that it is only used in an 'action-guiding sense' when applied to something the speaker intends to avoid. But we should look carefully at the crucial move in that argument,
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Rational psychological methods examine facts that relate fundamental attitudes to particular moral beliefs; the goal is not to show that someone has been inconsistent, as with logical methods, but only that they are wrong about the facts that connect their attitudes to their beliefs. To modify the
358:
to a specific case, not about the value systems themselves, because any dispute about values can only be resolved by judging that one value system is superior to another, and this judgment itself presupposes a shared value system. If Moore is wrong in saying that there are actual disagreements of
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The imperative is used to alter the hearer's attitudes or actions. … The supporting reason then describes the situation the imperative seeks to alter, or the new situation the imperative seeks to bring about; and if these facts disclose that the new situation will satisfy a preponderance of the
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The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any
222:
I did, and do, follow the emotivists in their rejection of descriptivism. But I was never an emotivist, though I have often been called one. But unlike most of their opponents I saw that it was their irrationalism, not their non-descriptivism, which was mistaken. So my main task was to find a
707:
As an offshoot of his fundamental criticism of
Stevenson's magnetic influence thesis, Urmson wrote that ethical statements had two functions—"standard using", the application of accepted values to a particular case, and "standard setting", the act of proposing certain values as those that
1006:, paragraph 20: "The communicating of Ideas marked by Words is not the chief and only end of Language, as is commonly supposed. There are other Ends, as the raising of some Passion, the exciting to, or deterring from an Action, the putting the Mind in some particular Disposition …"
1272:, 25: "It might be suggested that there are two broad types of ethical emotivism. The first, represented by Stevenson, is well grounded in philosophical and psychological theory relating to ethics … The second, represented by Ayer, is an unorthodox spin-off of logical positivism."
335:, of approval. While an assertion of approval may always be accompanied by an expression of approval, expressions can be made without making assertions; Ayer's example is boredom, which can be expressed through the stated assertion "I am bored" or through non-assertions including
655:
attitudes, "agreement in attitude can be taken for granted," so a judgment like "He was wrong to kill them" might describe one's attitudes yet be "emotively inactive", with no real emotive (or imperative) meaning. Stevenson is doubtful that sentences in such contexts qualify as
603:
Brandt criticized what he termed "the 'magnetic influence' thesis", the idea of
Stevenson that ethical statements are meant to influence the listener's attitudes. Brandt contends that most ethical statements, including judgments of people who are not within listening range, are
717:
of by the community", the sort of standard-using statement Urmson says is most typical of moral discourse. At the same time, their statement can be reduced to a first-order, standard-setting sentence: "I approve of whatever is approved of by the community; do so as well."
343:, and various other verbal statements. He sees ethical statements as expressions of the latter sort, so the phrase "Theft is wrong" is a non-propositional sentence that is an expression of disapproval but is not equivalent to the proposition "I disapprove of theft".
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and query the suggestion that someone might happen not to want anything for which he would need the use of hands or eyes. Hands and eyes, like ears and legs, play a part in so many operations that a man could only be said not to need them if he had no wants at all.
465:
The purpose of these supports is to make the listener understand the consequences of the action they are being commanded to do. Once they understand the command's consequences, they can determine whether or not obedience to the command will have desirable results.
302:. But he differs from intuitionists by discarding appeals to intuition as "worthless" for determining moral truths, since the intuition of one person often contradicts that of another. Instead, Ayer concludes that ethical concepts are "mere pseudo-concepts":
993:, 79: "… while Hare was, no doubt, a critic of the , he was, in the eyes of his own critics, a kind of emotivist himself. His theory, as a consequence, has sometimes been depicted as a reaction against emotivism and at other times as an extension of it."
529:
Non-rational psychological methods revolve around language with psychological influence but no necessarily logical connection to the listener's attitudes. Stevenson called the primary such method "'persuasive,' in a somewhat broadened sense", and wrote:
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retracts one of his statements. Similarly, a person who says "Lying is always wrong" might consider lies in some situations to be morally permissible, and if examples of these situations can be given, his view can be shown to be logically inconsistent.
580:. If, on the other hand, he remembers regarding irreligion or divorce as wicked, and now does not, he regards his former view as erroneous and unfounded. … Ethical statements do not look like the kind of thing the emotive theory says they are.
692:
Foot argues that the virtues, like hands and eyes in the analogy, play so large a part in so many operations that it is implausible to suppose that a committal in a non-naturalist dimension is necessary to demonstrate their goodness.
1049:, many philosophers who were persuaded by the former ended up abandoning cognitivism altogether in favor of the position that distinctively ethical discourse is not cognitive at all, but rather an expression of attitude or emotion."
616:. Ross suggests that the emotivist theory seems to be coherent only when dealing with simple linguistic acts, such as recommending, commanding, or passing judgement on something happening at the same point of time as the utterance.
501:
For
Stevenson, moral disagreements may arise from different fundamental attitudes, different moral beliefs about specific cases, or both. The methods of moral argumentation he proposed have been divided into three groups, known as
488:'This is good' has the meaning of 'This has qualities or relations X, Y, Z … ,' except that 'good' has as well a laudatory meaning, which permits it to express the speaker's approval, and tends to evoke the approval of the hearer.
790:, 125: "'Good' is alleged to stand for a unique, unanalyzable concept … is the subject matter of ethics. This peculiar ethical use of 'good' is, we suggest, a purely emotive use. … Thus, when we so use it in the sentence, '
547:
Persuasion may involve the use of particular emotion-laden words, like "democracy" or "dictator", or hypothetical questions like "What if everyone thought the way you do?" or "How would you feel if you were in their shoes?"
395:, Stevenson suggested in his 1937 essay "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" that any ethical theory should explain three things: that intelligent disagreement can occur over moral questions, that moral terms like
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Suppose, for instance, as a child a person disliked eating peas. When he recalls this as an adult he is amused and notes how preferences change with age. He does not say, however, that his former attitude was
286:
He focuses on propositions of the first class—moral judgments—saying that those of the second class belong to science, those of the third are mere commands, and those of the fourth (which are considered in
683:. Not just anything counts as an injury. There must be some impairment. When we suppose a man wants the things the injury prevents him from obtaining, have not we fallen into the old naturalist fallacy?
534:
depends on the sheer, direct emotional impact of words—on emotive meaning, rhetorical cadence, apt metaphor, stentorian, stimulating, or pleading tones of voice, dramatic gestures, care in establishing
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position, criticizing the idea that when evaluation is superposed on fact there has been a "committal in a new dimension." She introduces, by analogy, the practical implications of using the word
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be accepted—and that
Stevenson confused them. According to Urmson, Stevenson's "I approve of this; do so as well" is a standard-setting statement, yet most moral statements are actually standard-
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192:
early in the 20th century led some philosophers to conclude that ethical statements, being incapable of empirical verification, were cognitively meaningless. This criterion was fundamental to
802:, and perhaps evoking similar attitudes in other persons, or inciting them to actions of one kind or another." This quote appears in an extended form just before the preface of Stevenson's
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rationalist kind of non-descriptivism, and this led me to establish that imperatives, the simplest kinds of prescriptions, could be subject to logical constraints while not descriptive.
1019:, 273: "Of all traditional philosophers, Hume has most clearly asked the questions that here concern us, and has most nearly reached a conclusion that the present writer can accept."
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295:) are too concrete for ethical philosophy. While class three statements were irrelevant to Ayer's brand of emotivism, they would later play a significant role in Stevenson's.
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in independent works on ethics in 1934. However, it is the later works of Ayer and especially
Stevenson that are the most developed and discussed defenses of the theory.
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hearer's desires, he will hesitate to obey no longer. More generally, reasons support imperatives by altering such beliefs as may in turn alter an unwillingness to obey.
437:
Under his first pattern of analysis an ethical statement has two parts: a declaration of the speaker's attitude and an imperative to mirror it, so "'This is good' means
350:'s argument that ethical disputes are clearly genuine disputes and not just expressions of contrary feelings. Ayer's defense is that all ethical disputes are about
200:, which contains his statement of emotivism. However, positivism is not essential to emotivism itself, perhaps not even in Ayer's form, and some positivists in the
1045:, x: "Although this critique had a powerful impact, the appeal of Moore's nonnaturalistic cognitivism was, by contrast, relatively weak. In the decades following
1785:
131:
441:" The first half of the sentence is a proposition, but the imperative half is not, so Stevenson's translation of an ethical sentence remains a noncognitive one.
1302:, 21: "Both imperative and ethical sentences are used more for encouraging, altering, or redirecting people's aims and conduct than for simply describing them."
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1075:, 23: "Utilitarian, rationalist and cognitivist positions are in fact maintained by the members of the Vienna Circle who wrote in the fields of ethics,
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with the hearer or audience, and so on. … A redirection of the hearer's attitudes is sought not by the mediating step of altering his beliefs, but by
1259:, 1: "Stevenson's version, which was intended to qualify the earlier views of Ayer (and others) … will then be treated as an elaboration of Ayer's."
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Having argued that his theory of ethics is noncognitive and not subjective, he accepts that his position and subjectivism are equally confronted by
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philosophers only comparatively late and had no early influence) was, so far as I know, that given by I. A. Richards in a general linguistic and
798:, and the addition of "is good" makes no difference whatever to our reference … it serves only as an emotive sign expressing our attitude to
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Ayer argues that moral judgments cannot be translated into non-ethical, empirical terms and thus cannot be verified; in this he agrees with
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ethical sentences, maintaining that "for the contexts that are most typical of normative ethics, the ethical terms have a function that is
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work has been seen both as an elaboration upon Ayer's views and as a representation of one of "two broad types of ethical emotivism." An
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273:"Propositions that express definitions of ethical terms, or judgements about the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions"
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595:, "a work of great value" with "a few serious mistakes led Stevenson consistently to distort his otherwise valuable insights".
429:; the concepts are the same. Terminology aside, Stevenson interprets ethical statements according to two patterns of analysis.
388:
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980:, 221: "A recent book by R. M. Hare has proposed a view, otherwise very similar to the emotive theory, with modifications …"
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former example, consider the person who holds that all thieves are bad people. If she sees Edward pocket a wallet found in a
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component intended to change the listener's feelings and that this component is of greater importance. Where Ayer spoke of
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425:, or rational disputes over the application of certain values to a particular case, Stevenson speaks of differences in
409:. In it, he agrees with Ayer that ethical sentences express the speaker's feelings, but he adds that they also have an
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1194:, 206: "The earliest suggestions of the theory in the century have been made by W. H. F. Barnes and A. Duncan-Jones."
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181:, but his case against ethical naturalism steered other philosophers toward noncognitivism, particularly emotivism.
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567:. His first is that "ethical utterances are not obviously the kind of thing the emotive theory says they are, and
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375:, then we may get him to condemn a particular action A, by bringing forward arguments to show that A is of type
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902:
777:, chapter 9 ("Noncognitivism") regard the ethical theories of Ayer, Stevenson and Hare as noncognitivist ones.
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wrote that language in general often serves to inspire feelings as well as communicate ideas. Decades later,
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disagrees with
Stevenson's "causal theory" of emotive meaning—the theory that moral statements only have
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is insufficient for verifying moral claims. Stevenson's own theory was fully developed in his 1944 book
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tradition (as opposed to statements in such continental writers as
Haegerstroem, which became known to
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theory and will probably go down in the history of ethics as the most representative for this school."
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Philosophy of
Meaning, Knowledge and Value in the Twentieth Century: Routledge History of Philosophy
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Emotivism reached prominence in the early 20th century, but it was born centuries earlier. In 1710,
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an imperative. They "back it up," or "establish it," or "base it on concrete references to fact."
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265:'s version of emotivism is given in chapter six, "Critique of Ethics and Theology", of
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According to this view, it would make little sense to translate a statement such as "
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made with the intention to alter the attitudes of others. Twenty years earlier, Sir
135:, Hume considered morality not to be related to fact but "determined by sentiment":
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If our opponent concurs with us in expressing moral disapproval of a given type
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Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics
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1704:(1959). "Noncognitivism: The Job of Ethical Sentences Is Not to State Facts".
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and recommending attitudes", not in terms of "the power to evoke attitudes".
276:"Propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience, and their causes"
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1965:
1920:(1937). "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms". In Stevenson, C. L. (ed.).
867:, 277: " was stated in its simplest and most striking form by A. J. Ayer."
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disapprove of anything that decreases happiness overall. Do so as well."
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117:'s statements on ethics foreshadowed those of 20th century emotivists.
71:. It stands in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism (such as
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so that the listener understands that they are not wholly arbitrary:
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Stevenson's second pattern of analysis is used for statements about
363:, we are left with the claim that there are actual disagreements of
888:, 288, says it "was the first really systematic development of the
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espoused ideas similar to Stevenson's later ones. In his 1751 book
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884:"the most important statement of the emotive theory", and Pepper,
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but emotional attitudes. Hence, it is colloquially known as the
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204:, which had great influence on Ayer, held non-emotivist views.
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An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
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In the 1950s, emotivism appeared in a modified form in the
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offered several criticisms of emotivism in his 1959 book
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about those attitudes; Ayer thinks ethical sentences are
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of actions, not specific actions. Under this pattern,
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in the 20th century, the theory was stated vividly by
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Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
773:, chapter 13 ("Noncognitivist Theories") and Brandt,
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Zangwill, Nick (1993). "Quasi-Realist Explanation".
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1794:Moore, G. E. (2005) . "Editor's Introduction". In
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591:also disagreed with many of Stevenson's points in
315:in saying that ethical statements are necessarily
1898:Seanor, Douglas; Fotion, D.; Hare, R. M. (1988).
232:Influential statements of emotivism were made by
2050:Emotivism definition in philosophyprofessor.com
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399:are "magnetic" in encouraging action, and that
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319:to individual attitudes, but he says they lack
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1786:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
543:, whether obvious or subtle, crude or refined.
323:because they cannot be properly understood as
132:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
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1166:, 15: "The earliest statement of the emotive
8:
3017:Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel
1654:(1952) . "Critique of Ethics and Theology".
612:offered much the same criticism in his book
367:, and Ayer accepts this without hesitation:
2077:
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2044:Emotivism, Intuitionism and Prescriptivism
1733:Garner, Richard T.; Bernard Rosen (1967).
1032:, "Appendix I. Concerning moral sentiment"
421:, and where Ayer spoke of disagreement of
628:should not have been forced to recant on
153:in 1903 and argued that the attempts of
3049:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
2031:"Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism"
1586:Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
762:
354:regarding the proper application of a
63:Emotivism can be considered a form of
1849:. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
7:
3065:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
2036:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
703:Standard using and standard setting
56:, but its development owes more to
190:verifiability criterion of meaning
14:
439:I approve of this; do so as well.
157:to translate ethical terms (like
3246:
3245:
1584:Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs,"
240:in their 1923 book on language,
1883:: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
210:unfolded his ethical theory of
3033:The Theory of Moral Sentiments
2403:Value monism – Value pluralism
2004:: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
279:"Exhortations to moral virtue"
165:) into non-ethical ones (like
79:), as well as to all forms of
38:. Influenced by the growth of
26:view that claims that ethical
1:
1979:Hutchinson University Library
1588:, vol. 59 (1958), pp. 83-104.
1380:, 15, gives a similar example
794:is good,' we merely refer to
668:Philippa Foot's moral realism
667:
3097:On the Genealogy of Morality
3057:Critique of Practical Reason
1975:The Emotive Theory of Ethics
589:The Emotive Theory of Ethics
196:'s defense of positivism in
1902:. Oxford University Press.
1841:Pepper, Stephen C. (1960).
1834:Harcourt, Brace & World
747:Prescriptivism (philosophy)
3303:
3025:A Treatise of Human Nature
1998:Emotion, Truth and Meaning
1762:. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
664:emotive and descriptive."
282:"Actual ethical judgments"
3241:
1657:Language, Truth and Logic
1106:"Ethics - Existentialism"
880:, 239, calls Stevenson's
512:nonrational psychological
267:Language, Truth and Logic
198:Language, Truth and Logic
53:Language, Truth and Logic
2376:Universal prescriptivism
1875:Satris, Stephen (1987).
817:"Emotivism | philosophy"
514:forms of argumentation.
497:Methods of argumentation
448:, but they can still be
212:universal prescriptivism
96:universal prescriptivism
77:universal prescriptivism
2165:Artificial intelligence
1769:Modern Moral Philosophy
1391:Modern Moral Philosophy
1287:Modern Moral Philosophy
1110:Encyclopedia Britannica
821:Encyclopedia Britannica
476:Second pattern analysis
1973:Urmson, J. O. (1968).
1830:The Meaning of Meaning
1767:Hudson, W. D. (1970).
1758:The Language of Morals
1184:The Meaning of Meaning
752:Verification principle
700:
690:
635:Like Ross and Brandt,
622:
582:
545:
508:rational psychological
490:
473:
463:
444:Imperatives cannot be
433:First pattern analysis
381:
309:
243:The Meaning of Meaning
225:
216:The Language of Morals
142:
118:
3089:The Methods of Ethics
2327:Divine command theory
2322:Ideal observer theory
1996:Wilks, Colin (2002).
1958:Yale University Press
1926:Yale University Press
1864:Foundations of Ethics
1773:Macmillan and Co. Ltd
614:Foundations of Ethics
401:the scientific method
300:ethical intuitionists
113:
3206:Political philosophy
1862:Ross, David (1939).
1754:Hare, R. M. (1952).
1170:terms in the modern
1149:, 210. After Wilks,
786:Ogden and Richards,
393:analytic philosopher
175:naturalistic fallacy
89:ethical subjectivism
3282:Analytic philosophy
3176:Evolutionary ethics
3137:Reasons and Persons
3113:A Theory of Justice
2267:Uncertain sentience
2046:A clear explanation
1949:Ethics and Language
1091:, Viktor Kraft and
882:Ethics and Language
843:. Routledge. 2012.
804:Ethics and Language
727:Analytic philosophy
649:Ethics and Language
593:Ethics and Language
406:Ethics and Language
155:ethical naturalists
40:analytic philosophy
3171:Ethics in religion
3166:Descriptive ethics
3001:Nicomachean Ethics
1928:(published 1963).
1870:: Clarendon Press.
1662:Dover Publications
940:10.1007/BF01064071
769:Garner and Rosen,
732:Logical positivism
610:William David Ross
599:Magnetic influence
186:logical positivism
119:
44:logical positivism
3259:
3258:
3226:Social philosophy
3211:Population ethics
3201:Philosophy of law
3181:History of ethics
2664:Political freedom
2341:Euthyphro dilemma
2132:Suffering-focused
1877:Ethical Emotivism
1393:, 130–31; Wilks,
1270:Ethical Emotivism
1190:, 16–17; Brandt,
1073:Ethical Emotivism
311:Ayer agrees with
184:The emergence of
173:) committed the "
50:in his 1936 book
36:hurrah/boo theory
16:Meta-ethical view
3294:
3287:Ethical theories
3249:
3248:
3196:Moral psychology
3141:
3133:
3125:
3121:Practical Ethics
3117:
3109:
3105:Principia Ethica
3101:
3093:
3085:
3077:
3069:
3061:
3053:
3045:
3037:
3029:
3021:
3013:
3009:Ethics (Spinoza)
3005:
2644:Moral imperative
2102:Consequentialism
2079:
2072:
2065:
2056:
2040:
2027:Zalta, Edward N.
2015:
1992:
1969:
1944:Stevenson, C. L.
1939:
1922:Facts and Values
1918:Stevenson, C. L.
1913:
1900:Hare and Critics
1894:
1871:
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1688:Berkeley, George
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289:normative ethics
150:Principia Ethica
83:(including both
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2679:Self-discipline
2639:Moral hierarchy
2587:Problem of evil
2532:Double standard
2522:Culture of life
2480:
2409:
2356:Non-cognitivism
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1168:theory of value
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384:C. L. Stevenson
260:
252:A. Duncan-Jones
248:W. H. F. Barnes
230:
177:". Moore was a
123:George Berkeley
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30:do not express
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2019:
2013:
2011:1-4020-0916-X
2007:
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1994:
1990:
1988:0-09-087430-7
1984:
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1976:
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1963:
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1935:0-8371-8212-3
1931:
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1909:0-19-824780-X
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1890:90-247-3413-4
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1077:social theory
1074:
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1038:
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850:9781134935727
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776:
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748:
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743:
742:Moral realism
740:
738:
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728:
725:
724:
720:
718:
715:
711:
702:
699:
694:
689:
684:
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677:moral realist
674:
673:Philippa Foot
665:
663:
659:
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645:
642:
638:
633:
631:
627:
621:
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611:
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598:
596:
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587:'s 1968 book
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349:
344:
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341:body language
338:
337:tone of voice
334:
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313:subjectivists
308:
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202:Vienna Circle
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105:
103:
101:
97:
92:
90:
86:
85:moral realism
82:
78:
74:
73:quasi-realism
70:
66:
61:
59:
55:
54:
49:
45:
41:
37:
33:
29:
25:
21:
3230:
3186:Human rights
3129:After Virtue
2855:Schopenhauer
2629:Moral agency
2502:Common sense
2398:Universalism
2366:Expressivism
2360:
2346:Intuitionism
2317:Subjectivism
2262:Terraforming
2237:Professional
2034:
1997:
1974:
1947:
1921:
1899:
1876:
1863:
1844:
1832:. New York:
1829:
1822:Ogden, C. K.
1799:
1796:William Shaw
1784:
1768:
1757:
1737:. New York:
1734:
1707:
1691:
1660:. New York:
1655:
1635:
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1251:
1243:
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1225:
1217:
1212:
1204:
1199:
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1187:
1186:…"; Urmson,
1183:
1171:
1163:
1158:
1150:
1146:
1141:
1133:
1129:
1124:
1113:. Retrieved
1109:
1100:
1089:Otto Neurath
1081:value theory
1072:
1067:
1059:
1054:
1046:
1042:
1037:
1029:
1024:
1016:
1011:
1003:
998:
990:
985:
977:
972:
931:
927:
921:
910:. Retrieved
906:
897:
885:
881:
877:
872:
864:
859:
840:
835:
824:. Retrieved
820:
811:
803:
799:
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791:
787:
782:
774:
770:
765:
713:
709:
706:
696:
691:
686:
680:
671:
661:
657:
652:
648:
647:Stevenson's
646:
640:
634:
623:
619:
613:
605:
602:
592:
588:
585:James Urmson
583:
577:
574:
564:
559:philosopher
555:
546:
540:
536:
533:
528:
524:public place
520:
516:
511:
507:
503:
500:
491:
487:
481:
479:
469:
464:
458:
455:
449:
445:
443:
438:
436:
426:
422:
418:
414:
410:
404:
396:
387:
376:
372:
370:
364:
360:
356:value system
351:
345:
332:
328:
325:propositions
324:
316:
310:
305:
297:
285:
266:
261:
241:
231:
221:
215:
206:
197:
183:
170:
166:
162:
158:
148:
143:
138:
130:
120:
93:
69:expressivism
62:
51:
35:
32:propositions
24:meta-ethical
19:
18:
3004:(c. 322 BC)
2870:Kierkegaard
2689:Stewardship
2466:Rousseauian
2383:Rationalism
2295:Cognitivism
2242:Programming
2217:Meat eating
2190:Engineering
1781:Hume, David
1652:Ayer, A. J.
1571:Stevenson,
1555:Stevenson,
1543:, 38–40, 64
1528:Foundations
1458:Stevenson,
1445:Stevenson,
1432:Stevenson,
1406:Stevenson,
1363:Stevenson,
1350:Stevenson,
1337:Stevenson,
1324:Stevenson,
1298:Stevenson,
1281:Stevenson,
1093:Karl Menger
1015:Stevenson,
569:prima facie
557:Utilitarian
541:exhortation
389:Stevenson's
348:G. E. Moore
329:expressions
321:truth value
293:meta-ethics
234:C. K. Ogden
179:cognitivist
171:displeasing
145:G. E. Moore
81:cognitivism
3272:Metaethics
3266:Categories
2900:Bonhoeffer
2609:Immorality
2552:Eudaimonia
2512:Conscience
2507:Compassion
2393:Skepticism
2388:Relativism
2305:Naturalism
2285:Absolutism
2257:Technology
2107:Deontology
1977:. London:
1802:. Oxford:
1645:References
1115:2020-05-28
1083:, namely,
1002:Berkeley,
912:2020-05-28
826:2020-05-28
411:imperative
333:assertions
263:A. J. Ayer
258:A. J. Ayer
228:Proponents
214:in 1952's
208:R. M. Hare
127:David Hume
115:David Hume
100:R. M. Hare
48:A. J. Ayer
3161:Casuistry
3073:Either/Or
2980:Korsgaard
2975:Azurmendi
2940:MacIntyre
2880:Nietzsche
2810:Augustine
2805:Confucius
2785:Aristotle
2761:Ethicists
2719:Intrinsic
2684:Suffering
2594:Happiness
2567:Free will
2547:Etiquette
2492:Authority
2436:Epicurean
2431:Confucian
2426:Christian
2361:Emotivism
2185:Discourse
2122:Pragmatic
2094:Normative
2002:Dordrecht
1954:New Haven
1881:Dordrecht
1828:(1946) .
1739:Macmillan
1612:., p. 97.
1600:., p. 96.
1047:Principia
948:0039-7857
675:adopts a
658:normative
552:Criticism
450:supported
419:attitudes
246:, and by
194:A.J. Ayer
28:sentences
20:Emotivism
3251:Category
3191:Ideology
3156:Axiology
2985:Nussbaum
2935:Frankena
2930:Anscombe
2920:Williams
2875:Sidgwick
2795:Valluvar
2790:Diogenes
2775:Socrates
2699:Theodicy
2694:Sympathy
2659:Pacifism
2649:Morality
2562:Fidelity
2542:Equality
2497:Autonomy
2485:Concepts
2446:Feminist
2421:Buddhist
2351:Nihilism
2290:Axiology
2247:Research
2180:Computer
2175:Business
1946:(1944).
1855:60006796
1783:(1751).
1747:67018887
1726:59010075
1690:(1710).
1680:52000860
1621:Urmson,
1539:Urmson,
1513:Urmson,
1500:Brandt,
1484:Brandt,
1449:, 139–40
1436:, 118–29
1410:, 115–18
1389:Hudson,
1289:, 114–15
1268:Satris,
1244:Language
1231:Language
1218:Language
1205:Language
1162:Urmson,
1130:Language
1071:Satris,
1004:Treatise
976:Brandt,
964:46955963
956:20117846
928:Synthese
876:Brandt,
863:Pepper,
721:See also
578:mistaken
188:and its
167:pleasing
3277:Emotion
3149:Related
2895:Tillich
2860:Bentham
2835:Spinoza
2830:Aquinas
2815:Mencius
2729:Western
2704:Torture
2669:Precept
2624:Loyalty
2619:Liberty
2614:Justice
2527:Dignity
2517:Consent
2461:Kantian
2451:Islamic
2414:Schools
2300:Realism
2232:Nursing
2227:Medical
2212:Machine
2152:Applied
2029:(ed.).
1966:5184534
1798:(ed.).
1638:, 45–46
1636:Emotion
1634:Wilks,
1625:, 64–71
1530:, 33–34
1473:Emotion
1471:Wilks,
1421:Emotion
1419:Wilks,
1397:, 25–26
1395:Emotion
1378:Emotion
1376:Wilks,
1354:, 27–28
1313:Emotion
1311:Wilks,
1257:Emotion
1255:Wilks,
1151:Emotion
1060:Emotion
1058:Wilks,
1041:Moore,
1030:Enquiry
991:Emotion
989:Wilks,
788:Meaning
653:current
641:emotive
626:Galileo
537:rapport
504:logical
459:support
317:related
106:History
3140:(1984)
3132:(1981)
3124:(1979)
3116:(1971)
3108:(1903)
3100:(1887)
3092:(1874)
3084:(1861)
3076:(1843)
3068:(1820)
3060:(1788)
3052:(1785)
3044:(1780)
3036:(1759)
3028:(1740)
3020:(1726)
3012:(1677)
2970:Taylor
2955:Parfit
2950:Singer
2925:Mackie
2800:Cicero
2741:Virtue
2674:Rights
2599:Honour
2456:Jewish
2252:Sexual
2160:Animal
2142:Virtue
2086:Ethics
2008:
1985:
1964:
1932:
1906:
1887:
1868:Oxford
1853:
1845:Ethics
1810:
1800:Ethics
1745:
1724:
1678:
1668:
1573:Ethics
1557:Ethics
1526:Ross,
1460:Ethics
1447:Ethics
1434:Ethics
1408:Ethics
1365:Ethics
1352:Ethics
1339:Ethics
1326:Ethics
1242:Ayer,
1229:Ayer,
1216:Ayer,
1203:Ayer,
1182:work,
1136:, 297.
1134:Ethics
1128:Hare,
1043:Ethics
1028:Hume,
1017:Ethics
962:
954:
946:
886:Ethics
865:Ethics
847:
710:should
681:injury
637:Urmson
446:proved
427:belief
415:values
331:, not
3232:Index
2994:Works
2965:Adams
2960:Nagel
2915:Dewey
2910:Rawls
2890:Barth
2885:Moore
2850:Hegel
2825:Xunzi
2780:Plato
2770:Laozi
2751:Wrong
2724:Japan
2714:Value
2709:Trust
2604:Ideal
2471:Stoic
2222:Media
2207:Legal
1504:, 226
1488:, 225
1462:, 141
1367:, 207
1300:Facts
1283:Facts
1246:, 111
1233:, 107
1220:, 106
1207:, 103
1153:, 79.
960:S2CID
952:JSTOR
758:Notes
714:using
482:types
361:value
352:facts
22:is a
2945:Hare
2905:Foot
2865:Mill
2845:Kant
2840:Hume
2820:Mozi
2736:Vice
2654:Norm
2582:Evil
2577:Good
2537:Duty
2277:Meta
2200:Land
2127:Role
2112:Care
2006:ISBN
1983:ISBN
1962:OCLC
1930:ISBN
1904:ISBN
1885:ISBN
1851:LCCN
1808:ISBN
1743:LCCN
1722:LCCN
1676:LCCN
1666:ISBN
1610:ibid
1598:ibid
1575:, 84
1559:, 83
1517:, 38
1475:, 26
1341:, 27
1328:, 21
1315:, 20
1079:and
944:ISSN
845:ISBN
800:this
796:this
792:This
662:both
510:and
423:fact
397:good
365:fact
250:and
236:and
169:and
161:and
159:good
87:and
75:and
42:and
2746:Vow
2476:Tao
2170:Bio
936:doi
606:not
457:do
163:bad
98:of
91:).
67:or
3268::
2033:.
2000:.
1981:.
1960:.
1956::
1952:.
1924:.
1879:.
1866:.
1824:;
1806:.
1771:.
1741:.
1720:.
1716::
1712:.
1674:.
1664:.
1564:^
1548:^
1493:^
1108:.
1095:."
1087:,
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950:.
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932:97
930:.
905:.
819:.
506:,
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102:.
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2078:e
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2039:.
2014:.
1991:.
1968:.
1938:.
1912:.
1893:.
1857:.
1836:.
1816:.
1789:.
1775:.
1749:.
1728:.
1696:.
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966:.
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829:.
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373:t
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