538:
rightness and wrongness), so that moral statements (such as "honesty is good" and "slavery is unjust") purport to represent moral facts, and express propositions that are true or false (or approximately true, largely false and so on). The alethic thesis: Some moral propositions are in fact true. The metaphysical thesis: Moral propositions are true when actions and other objects of moral assessment have the relevant moral properties (so that the relevant moral facts obtain), where these facts and properties are robust: their metaphysical status, whatever it is, is not relevantly different from that of (certain types of ordinary non-moral facts and properties).
474:
rightness and wrongness), so that moral statements (such as "honesty is good" and "slavery is unjust") purport to represent moral facts, and express propositions that are true or false (or approximately true, largely false and so on). The alethic thesis: Some moral propositions are in fact true. The metaphysical thesis: Moral propositions are true when actions and other objects of moral assessment have the relevant moral properties (so that the relevant moral facts obtain), where these facts and properties are robust: their metaphysical status, whatever it is, is not relevantly different from that of (certain types of ordinary non-moral facts and properties).
593:
true (success theory). (See Sayre-McCord 1986; also his entry for "moral realism" in this encyclopedia.) His motivation for this is that to make "mind-independence" a requirement of realism in general would lead to counter-intuitive implications. "Independence from the mental may be a plausible requirement for realism when we're talking about macro-physical objects but it's a non-starter when it comes to realism in psychology (psychological facts won't be independent of the mental)" (1986: 3). Sayre-McCord is motivated by the desire for a realism/anti-realism "template," which can be applied with equal coherence to any domain.
173:. Ethical subjectivism claims that the truth or falsehood of ethical claims is dependent on the mental states and attitudes of people, but these ethical truths may be universal (i.e. one person or group's mental states may determine what is right or wrong for everyone). The term "ethical subjectivism" covers two distinct theories in ethics. According to cognitive versions of ethical subjectivism, the truth of moral statements depends upon people's values, attitudes, feelings, or beliefs. Some forms of cognitivist ethical subjectivism can be counted as forms of realism, others are forms of anti-realism.
1058:...the non-objectivist need not be a relativist. Suppose the moral facts depend on the attitudes or opinions of a particular group or individual (e.g., "X is good" means "Caesar approves of X," or "The Supreme Court rules in favor of X," etc.), and thus moral truth is an entirely mind-dependent affair. Since, in this case, all speakers' moral utterances are made true or false by the same mental activity, then this is not strictly speaking a version of relativism, but is, rather, a relation-designating account of moral terms (see Stevenson 1963: 74 for this distinction).
202:
mental states), but they would not be a moral relativist (right and wrong are the same for everyone). Conversely, a moral relativist could deny moral subjectivism if they thought that the morally right thing to do was to follow the written laws of your country (this morality is relativist since "the laws of your country" picks out different laws for different individuals, but not subjectivist since it is dependent on the written laws, which are not in anyone's head).
2345:
150:, when I say stealing is wrong, it is only true if stealing is not acceptable in my culture), or indexed to an individual (individualistic relativism). Furthermore, moral relativism is the view where an actor's moral codes are locally derived from their culture. The rules within moral codes are equal to each other and are only deemed "right" or "wrong" within their specific moral codes. Relativism is opposite to
133:
psychological facts which are necessarily mind-dependent, which would make ethical subjectivism a version of moral realism. This has led to a distinction being made between robust moral realism (which requires all three of the theses) and minimal moral realism (which requires only the first two, and is therefore compatible with ethical subjectivism).
682:
An individualistic relativism sees the vital difference as lying in the persons making the utterance or in the persons about whom the judgment is made; a cultural relativism sees the difference as stemming from the culture that the speaker inhabits or from the culture of those about whom the judgment
217:
is considered by some to be a form of ethical subjectivism, defenders of the perspective that divine command theory is not a form of ethical subjectivism say this is based on a misunderstanding: that divine command proponents claim that moral propositions are about what attitudes God holds, but this
652:
Relativism holds that moral claims contain an essential indexical element, such that the truth of any such claim requires relativization to some individual or group. According to such a view, it is possible that when John asserts "Stealing is wrong" he is saying something true, but that when Jenny
592:
Another general debate that the above characterization prompts is whether the "non-objectivism clause" deserves to be there. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, for example, thinks that moral realism consists of endorsing just two claims: that moral judgments are truth apt (cognitivism) and that they are often
305:
have been used more vaguely, confusedly, and in more different senses than the others we are considering. We suggest as a convenient usage, however, that a theory be called subjectivist if and only if, according to it, any ethical assertion implies that somebody does, or somebody of a certain sort
96:
that denies the "metaphysical thesis" of moral realism, (the claim that moral truths are ordinary facts about the world). Instead ethical subjectivism claims that moral truths are based on the mental states of individuals or groups of people. The moral realist is committed to some version of the
537:
No single description is likely to capture all realist views, but a reasonably accurate rule is to understand moral realism as the conjunction of three theses: The semantic thesis: The primary semantic role of moral predicates (such as "right" and "wrong") is to refer to moral properties (such as
473:
No single description is likely to capture all realist views, but a reasonably accurate rule is to understand moral realism as the conjunction of three theses: The semantic thesis: The primary semantic role of moral predicates (such as "right" and "wrong") is to refer to moral properties (such as
230:
There is some debate among philosophers around the use of the term "ethical subjectivism" as this term has historically referred to the more specific position that ethical statements are merely reports of one's own mental states (saying that killing is wrong just means you disapprove of killing).
201:
While moral relativism and ethical subjectivism positions are often held together, they do not entail each other. For example, someone that claims that whatever their king wants to happen is the morally right thing for everyone to do would be an ethical subjectivist (right and wrong are based on
265:
Non-objectivism (as it will be called here) allows that moral facts exist but holds that they are, in some manner to be specified, constituted by mental activity...The present discussion uses the label "non-objectivism" instead of the simple "subjectivism" since there is an entrenched usage in
132:
There is some debate as to whether moral realism should continue to require the metaphysical thesis, and therefore if ethical subjectivists should be considered moral realists. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord argues that moral realism should not require mind-independence since there are morally relevant
1143:
The present discussion uses the label "non-objectivism" instead of the simple "subjectivism" since there is an entrenched usage in metaethics for using the latter to denote the thesis that in making a moral judgment one is reporting (as opposed to expressing) one's own mental attitudes (e.g.,
377:
Cognitivism is the denial of non-cognitivism. Thus it holds that moral statements do express beliefs and that they are apt for truth and falsity. But cognitivism need not be a species of realism since a cognitivist can be an error theorist and think all moral statements
120:
Moral anti-realism is the denial of at least one of these claims. Ethical subjectivists deny the third claim, instead arguing that moral facts are not metaphysically ordinary, but rather dependent on mental states, (individual's beliefs about what is right and wrong).
231:
While this is an ethically subjective position (the truth of your statement does depend on your mental states), it is not the only one. Due to this ambiguity, some philosophers have advocated that the general position discussed here be referred to as non-objectivism.
177:
is a foundational figure for cognitive ethical subjectivism. On a standard interpretation of his theory, a trait of character counts as a moral virtue when it evokes a sentiment of approbation in a sympathetic, informed, and rational human observer. Similarly,
622:
In deference to the influence that Sayre-McCord's views have had on recent metaethics, perhaps the judicious terminological decision is to distinguish minimal moral realism—which denies (i) and (ii)—from robust moral realism—which in addition denies
194:). According to non-cognitive versions of ethical subjectivism, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism, ethical statements cannot be true or false, at all: rather, they are expressions of personal feelings or commands. For example, on
145:
in the same way that the truth of the statement "I am in
Senegal" is dependent on who is making that statement. Depending on the variety of moral relativism, these statements may be indexed to a particular society (i.e.,
347:
A subjectivist ethical theorist is a theory according to which moral judgements about men or their actions are judgements about the way people react to these men and actions - that is, the way they think or feel about
266:
metaethics for using the latter to denote the thesis that in making a moral judgment one is reporting (as opposed to expressing) one's own mental attitudes (e.g., "Stealing is wrong" means "I disapprove of stealing").
1028:
In short, the non-objectivism vs. objectivism and the relativism vs. absolutism polarities are orthogonal to each other, and it is the former pair that is usually taken to matter when it comes to characterizing
1144:"Stealing is wrong" means "I disapprove of stealing"). So understood, subjectivism is a kind of non-objectivist theory, but, as we shall see below, there are many other kinds of non-objectivist theory, too.
2138:
162:, coined the phrase "If God doesn't exist, everything is permissible". That phrase was his view of the consequences for rejecting theism as a basis of ethics. American anthropologist
410:
As a first approximation, then, moral anti-realism can be identified as the disjunction of three theses: i) moral noncognivitism ii) moral error theory iii) moral non-objectivism.
809:
Non-objectivism (as it will be called here) allows that moral facts exist but holds that they are, in some manner to be specified, constituted by mental activity.
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893:
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perhaps what determines the relevant difference is an entirely mind-independent affair, making for an objectivist (and potentially realist) relativism.
969:
2146:
1110:"Mark Murphy further explains that a command from God suffices as an 'objective property of actions', as opposed to the attitude within a mind".
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222:
who claims that divine command theory is concerned with whether a moral command is or isn't "contrary to the commands of (a loving) God".
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because it validates every moral code that exists whereas nihilism does not. When it comes to relativism, Russian philosopher and writer,
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190:, another ethical subjectivist, held that an end is good (to or for a person) just in the case it is desired by that person (see also
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72:(because ethical statements are the types of things that can be true or false). Ethical subjectivism stands in opposition to
1098:"George Hourani is one such philosopher who claims this by referring to Divine Command theory as 'theistic subjectivism'.".
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The metaphysical status of moral facts is robust and ordinary, not importantly different from other facts about the world.
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213:(which claims that moral propositions are about what attitudes a hypothetical ideal observer would hold). Although
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Moral statements have meaning, they express propositions, or are the kind of things that can be true or false.
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198:'s emotivism, the statement, "Murder is wrong" is equivalent in meaning to the emotive, "Murder, Boo!"
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517:. Donald M. Borchert (2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA. pp. 379–382.
453:. Donald M. Borchert (2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA. pp. 379–382.
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argued that there is no single objective morality and that moral codes necessarily vary by culture.
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Moral relativism claims that statements are true or false based on who is saying them: they include
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because there is not a single moral code for every agent to follow. Relativism differs from
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held that right acts are those that an impartial, rational observer would approve of.
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of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical)
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under certain conditions would, take some specified attitude toward something.
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1072:"Moral Anti-Realism (Supplement on Moral Objectivity and Moral Relativism)"
1043:"Moral Anti-Realism (Supplement on Moral Objectivity and Moral Relativism)"
1013:"Moral Anti-Realism (Supplement on Moral Objectivity and Moral Relativism)"
856:
769:"Moral Anti-Realism (Supplement on Moral Objectivity and Moral Relativism)"
667:"Moral Anti-Realism (Supplement on Moral Objectivity and Moral Relativism)"
637:"Moral Anti-Realism (Supplement on Moral Objectivity and Moral Relativism)"
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80:, which denies that any moral propositions are true in any sense; and to
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954:
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1134:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1078:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1049:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1019:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
800:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
775:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
673:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
643:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
613:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
583:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
558:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
494:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
401:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
256:(Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
368:(Fall 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1877:
1867:
53:
84:, which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all.
1917:
1833:
1679:
1674:
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300:
1156:
327:(2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA.
1843:
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283:
Ethical theory; the problems of normative and critical ethics
2139:
169:
Ethical subjectivism is a completely distinct concept from
653:
asserts "Stealing is wrong" she is saying something false.
1152:
894:"A Substantive Revision to Firth's Ideal Observer Theory"
702:
Wreen, Michael (July 2018). "What Is Moral
Relativism?".
942:
European
Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
321:
Harrison, Jonathan (2006). Borchert, Donald M. (ed.).
285:. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. p. 153.
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2091:
1857:
1582:
1511:
1373:
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1190:
1100:
218:understanding is deemed incorrect by some, such as
938:"William James on Truth and Invention in Morality"
1168:
8:
2115:Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel
970:"24.231 Ethics – Handout 3 Ayer's Emotivism"
1175:
1161:
1153:
68:This makes ethical subjectivism a form of
953:
846:
137:Moral relativism and ethical subjectivism
2147:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
1132:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1076:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1047:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1017:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
798:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
773:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
671:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
641:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
611:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
581:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
556:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
492:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
399:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
366:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
362:"Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism"
254:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
240:
993:
982:
748:. University of California, Santa Cruz
697:
695:
693:
691:
1121:
1119:
977:Massachusetts Institute of Technology
936:Marchetti, Sarin (21 December 2010).
7:
388:
386:
316:
314:
2163:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
911:: 55–61. April 2010. Archived from
827:Review of Philosophy and Psychology
746:"Moral Relativism and Objectivism"
92:Ethical subjectivism is a form of
88:Relationship to moral anti-realism
14:
110:Some moral propositions are true.
2344:
2343:
876:Macalester Journal of Philosophy
49:Some such propositions are true.
2131:The Theory of Moral Sentiments
1501:Value monism – Value pluralism
823:"How to Measure Moral Realism"
209:forms of subjectivism include
1:
1130:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
1074:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
1045:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
1015:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
796:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
771:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
669:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
639:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
609:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
579:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
554:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
490:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
397:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
364:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
252:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
2195:On the Genealogy of Morality
2155:Critique of Practical Reason
125:deny the first claim, while
97:following three statements:
2396:
2123:A Treatise of Human Nature
514:Encyclopedia of philosophy
450:Encyclopedia of philosophy
324:Encyclopedia of philosophy
2339:
872:"Hume's Moral Philosophy"
839:10.1007/s13164-018-0401-8
716:10.1017/S0031819117000614
360:van Roojen, Mark (2018),
1474:Universal prescriptivism
511:Vayrynen, Pekka (2006).
447:Vayrynen, Pekka (2006).
114:The metaphysical thesis:
34:view which claims that:
1263:Artificial intelligence
1126:Joyce, Richard (2016),
1112:Theological Voluntarism
1070:Joyce, Richard (2016),
1041:Joyce, Richard (2016),
1011:Joyce, Richard (2016),
821:Thomas Pölzler (2018).
792:Joyce, Richard (2016),
767:Joyce, Richard (2016),
665:Joyce, Richard (2016),
635:Joyce, Richard (2016),
605:Joyce, Richard (2016),
575:Joyce, Richard (2016),
550:Joyce, Richard (2016),
486:Joyce, Richard (2016),
393:Joyce, Richard (2016),
248:Joyce, Richard (2016),
129:deny the second claim.
992:Cite journal requires
123:Moral non-cognitivists
16:Philosophical position
2187:The Methods of Ethics
1425:Divine command theory
1420:Ideal observer theory
909:Ball State University
215:divine command theory
211:ideal observer theory
184:ideal observer theory
28:moral non-objectivism
2304:Political philosophy
1128:"Moral Anti-Realism"
870:Rayner, Sam (2005).
794:"Moral Anti-Realism"
607:"Moral Anti-Realism"
577:"Moral Anti-Realism"
552:"Moral Anti-Realism"
488:"Moral Anti-Realism"
395:"Moral Anti-Realism"
250:"Moral Anti-Realism"
102:The semantic thesis:
20:Ethical subjectivism
2274:Evolutionary ethics
2235:Reasons and Persons
2211:A Theory of Justice
1365:Uncertain sentience
148:cultural relativism
108:The alethic thesis:
2269:Ethics in religion
2264:Descriptive ethics
2099:Nicomachean Ethics
94:moral anti-realism
24:moral subjectivism
2357:
2356:
2324:Social philosophy
2309:Population ethics
2299:Philosophy of law
2279:History of ethics
1762:Political freedom
1439:Euthyphro dilemma
1230:Suffering-focused
955:10.4000/ejpap.910
160:Fyodor Dostoevsky
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2380:Ethical theories
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2294:Moral psychology
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2219:Practical Ethics
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1742:Moral imperative
1200:Consequentialism
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1737:Moral hierarchy
1685:Problem of evil
1630:Double standard
1620:Culture of life
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586:
584:
574:
573:
569:
561:
559:
549:
548:
544:
525:
510:
509:
505:
497:
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485:
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480:
461:
446:
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431:
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421:
420:
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404:
402:
392:
391:
384:
371:
369:
359:
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320:
319:
312:
293:
277:
276:
272:
259:
257:
247:
246:
242:
237:
228:
139:
127:error theorists
90:
82:non-cognitivism
22:(also known as
17:
12:
11:
5:
2393:
2391:
2383:
2382:
2377:
2372:
2362:
2361:
2355:
2354:
2352:
2351:
2340:
2337:
2336:
2334:
2333:
2326:
2321:
2319:Secular ethics
2316:
2314:Rehabilitation
2311:
2306:
2301:
2296:
2291:
2286:
2281:
2276:
2271:
2266:
2261:
2256:
2250:
2248:
2244:
2243:
2241:
2240:
2232:
2224:
2216:
2208:
2200:
2192:
2184:
2179:Utilitarianism
2176:
2168:
2160:
2152:
2144:
2136:
2128:
2120:
2112:
2104:
2095:
2093:
2089:
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2086:
2085:
2080:
2075:
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2065:
2060:
2055:
2050:
2045:
2040:
2035:
2030:
2025:
2020:
2015:
2010:
2005:
2000:
1995:
1990:
1985:
1980:
1975:
1970:
1965:
1960:
1955:
1950:
1945:
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1935:
1930:
1925:
1920:
1915:
1910:
1905:
1900:
1895:
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1864:
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1677:
1667:
1662:
1657:
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1607:
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1597:
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1580:
1579:
1577:
1576:
1571:
1566:
1561:
1556:
1551:
1546:
1541:
1539:Existentialist
1536:
1531:
1526:
1521:
1515:
1513:
1509:
1508:
1506:
1505:
1504:
1503:
1493:
1488:
1483:
1478:
1477:
1476:
1471:
1466:
1461:
1451:
1446:
1441:
1436:
1434:Constructivism
1431:
1430:
1429:
1428:
1427:
1422:
1412:
1411:
1410:
1408:Non-naturalism
1405:
1390:
1385:
1379:
1377:
1371:
1370:
1368:
1367:
1362:
1357:
1352:
1347:
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1337:
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1307:
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1300:
1290:
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1275:
1270:
1265:
1260:
1254:
1252:
1246:
1245:
1243:
1242:
1237:
1235:Utilitarianism
1232:
1227:
1222:
1217:
1212:
1207:
1202:
1196:
1194:
1188:
1187:
1182:
1180:
1179:
1172:
1165:
1157:
1149:
1148:
1115:
1103:
1091:
1062:
1033:
1003:
994:|journal=
961:
928:
885:
862:
833:(3): 647–670.
813:
784:
759:
737:
710:(3): 337–354.
687:
657:
627:
597:
567:
542:
523:
503:
478:
459:
439:
423:"Subjectivism"
414:
382:
352:
333:
310:
291:
279:Richard Brandt
270:
239:
238:
236:
233:
227:
224:
192:ethical egoism
180:Roderick Firth
138:
135:
118:
117:
111:
105:
89:
86:
66:
65:
50:
47:
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2392:
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2262:
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2257:
2255:
2252:
2251:
2249:
2245:
2236:
2233:
2228:
2225:
2220:
2217:
2212:
2209:
2204:
2201:
2196:
2193:
2188:
2185:
2180:
2177:
2172:
2169:
2164:
2161:
2156:
2153:
2148:
2145:
2140:
2137:
2132:
2129:
2124:
2121:
2116:
2113:
2108:
2105:
2100:
2097:
2096:
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2090:
2084:
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2079:
2076:
2074:
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2069:
2066:
2064:
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2059:
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2049:
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2044:
2041:
2039:
2036:
2034:
2031:
2029:
2026:
2024:
2021:
2019:
2016:
2014:
2011:
2009:
2006:
2004:
2001:
1999:
1996:
1994:
1991:
1989:
1986:
1984:
1981:
1979:
1976:
1974:
1971:
1969:
1966:
1964:
1961:
1959:
1956:
1954:
1951:
1949:
1946:
1944:
1941:
1939:
1936:
1934:
1931:
1929:
1926:
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1921:
1919:
1916:
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1911:
1909:
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1765:
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1760:
1758:
1755:
1753:
1750:
1748:
1745:
1743:
1740:
1738:
1735:
1733:
1732:Moral courage
1730:
1728:
1725:
1723:
1720:
1718:
1715:
1713:
1710:
1708:
1705:
1703:
1700:
1698:
1695:
1693:
1690:
1686:
1683:
1681:
1678:
1676:
1673:
1672:
1671:
1670:Good and evil
1668:
1666:
1663:
1661:
1658:
1656:
1655:Family values
1653:
1651:
1648:
1646:
1643:
1641:
1638:
1636:
1633:
1631:
1628:
1626:
1623:
1621:
1618:
1616:
1613:
1611:
1608:
1606:
1603:
1601:
1598:
1596:
1593:
1591:
1588:
1587:
1585:
1581:
1575:
1572:
1570:
1567:
1565:
1562:
1560:
1557:
1555:
1552:
1550:
1547:
1545:
1542:
1540:
1537:
1535:
1532:
1530:
1527:
1525:
1522:
1520:
1517:
1516:
1514:
1510:
1502:
1499:
1498:
1497:
1494:
1492:
1489:
1487:
1484:
1482:
1479:
1475:
1472:
1470:
1469:Quasi-realism
1467:
1465:
1462:
1460:
1457:
1456:
1455:
1452:
1450:
1447:
1445:
1442:
1440:
1437:
1435:
1432:
1426:
1423:
1421:
1418:
1417:
1416:
1413:
1409:
1406:
1404:
1401:
1400:
1399:
1396:
1395:
1394:
1391:
1389:
1386:
1384:
1381:
1380:
1378:
1376:
1372:
1366:
1363:
1361:
1358:
1356:
1353:
1351:
1348:
1346:
1343:
1341:
1338:
1336:
1333:
1331:
1328:
1326:
1323:
1321:
1318:
1316:
1313:
1311:
1308:
1306:
1303:
1299:
1296:
1295:
1294:
1293:Environmental
1291:
1289:
1286:
1284:
1281:
1279:
1276:
1274:
1271:
1269:
1266:
1264:
1261:
1259:
1256:
1255:
1253:
1251:
1247:
1241:
1238:
1236:
1233:
1231:
1228:
1226:
1223:
1221:
1218:
1216:
1215:Particularism
1213:
1211:
1208:
1206:
1203:
1201:
1198:
1197:
1195:
1193:
1189:
1185:
1178:
1173:
1171:
1166:
1164:
1159:
1158:
1155:
1145:
1133:
1129:
1122:
1120:
1116:
1113:
1107:
1104:
1101:
1095:
1092:
1088:
1077:
1073:
1066:
1063:
1059:
1048:
1044:
1037:
1034:
1030:
1029:anti-realism.
1018:
1014:
1007:
1004:
999:
986:
978:
971:
965:
962:
956:
951:
947:
943:
939:
932:
929:
918:on 2019-06-12
914:
910:
906:
902:
895:
889:
886:
881:
877:
873:
866:
863:
858:
854:
849:
844:
840:
836:
832:
828:
824:
817:
814:
810:
799:
795:
788:
785:
774:
770:
763:
760:
747:
741:
738:
733:
729:
725:
721:
717:
713:
709:
705:
698:
696:
694:
692:
688:
684:
672:
668:
661:
658:
654:
642:
638:
631:
628:
624:
612:
608:
601:
598:
594:
582:
578:
571:
568:
557:
553:
546:
543:
539:
534:
530:
526:
524:0-02-865780-2
520:
516:
515:
507:
504:
493:
489:
482:
479:
475:
470:
466:
462:
460:0-02-865780-2
456:
452:
451:
443:
440:
428:
424:
418:
415:
411:
400:
396:
389:
387:
383:
379:
367:
363:
356:
353:
349:
344:
340:
336:
334:0-02-865780-2
330:
326:
325:
317:
315:
311:
307:
302:
298:
294:
288:
284:
280:
274:
271:
267:
255:
251:
244:
241:
234:
232:
225:
223:
221:
216:
212:
208:
203:
199:
197:
193:
189:
188:William James
185:
181:
176:
172:
167:
165:
164:Ruth Benedict
161:
157:
153:
149:
144:
136:
134:
130:
128:
124:
115:
112:
109:
106:
103:
100:
99:
98:
95:
87:
85:
83:
79:
75:
74:moral realism
71:
63:
59:
55:
51:
48:
45:
41:
37:
36:
35:
33:
29:
25:
21:
2370:Subjectivism
2328:
2284:Human rights
2227:After Virtue
1953:Schopenhauer
1727:Moral agency
1600:Common sense
1496:Universalism
1464:Expressivism
1444:Intuitionism
1415:Subjectivism
1414:
1360:Terraforming
1335:Professional
1142:
1136:, retrieved
1131:
1106:
1094:
1086:
1080:, retrieved
1075:
1065:
1057:
1051:, retrieved
1046:
1036:
1027:
1021:, retrieved
1016:
1006:
985:cite journal
964:
945:
941:
931:
920:. Retrieved
913:the original
904:
900:
888:
879:
875:
865:
830:
826:
816:
808:
802:, retrieved
797:
787:
777:, retrieved
772:
762:
750:. Retrieved
740:
707:
703:
681:
675:, retrieved
670:
660:
651:
645:, retrieved
640:
630:
621:
615:, retrieved
610:
600:
591:
585:, retrieved
580:
570:
560:, retrieved
555:
545:
536:
513:
506:
496:, retrieved
491:
481:
472:
449:
442:
430:. Retrieved
417:
409:
403:, retrieved
398:
376:
370:, retrieved
365:
355:
346:
323:
304:
282:
273:
264:
258:, retrieved
253:
243:
229:
220:Robert Adams
207:universalist
204:
200:
168:
152:Universalism
140:
131:
119:
113:
107:
101:
91:
78:error theory
67:
44:propositions
32:meta-ethical
27:
23:
19:
18:
2102:(c. 322 BC)
1968:Kierkegaard
1787:Stewardship
1564:Rousseauian
1481:Rationalism
1393:Cognitivism
1340:Programming
1315:Meat eating
1288:Engineering
752:20 February
432:20 February
226:Terminology
70:cognitivism
2375:Metaethics
2364:Categories
1998:Bonhoeffer
1707:Immorality
1650:Eudaimonia
1610:Conscience
1605:Compassion
1491:Skepticism
1486:Relativism
1403:Naturalism
1383:Absolutism
1355:Technology
1205:Deontology
1138:2021-03-08
1082:2021-03-08
1053:2021-03-08
1023:2021-03-08
922:2023-06-28
882:(1): 6–21.
804:2021-03-08
779:2021-03-08
732:2056736032
704:Philosophy
677:2021-03-08
647:2021-03-08
617:2021-03-08
587:2021-03-08
562:2021-03-08
498:2021-03-08
405:2021-03-08
372:2021-03-08
292:0132904039
260:2021-03-08
235:References
196:A. J. Ayer
175:David Hume
143:indexicals
64:of people.
2259:Casuistry
2171:Either/Or
2078:Korsgaard
2073:Azurmendi
2038:MacIntyre
1978:Nietzsche
1908:Augustine
1903:Confucius
1883:Aristotle
1859:Ethicists
1817:Intrinsic
1782:Suffering
1692:Happiness
1665:Free will
1645:Etiquette
1590:Authority
1534:Epicurean
1529:Confucian
1524:Christian
1459:Emotivism
1283:Discourse
1220:Pragmatic
1192:Normative
724:171526831
62:attitudes
40:sentences
30:) is the
2349:Category
2289:Ideology
2254:Axiology
2083:Nussbaum
2033:Frankena
2028:Anscombe
2018:Williams
1973:Sidgwick
1893:Valluvar
1888:Diogenes
1873:Socrates
1797:Theodicy
1792:Sympathy
1757:Pacifism
1747:Morality
1660:Fidelity
1640:Equality
1595:Autonomy
1583:Concepts
1544:Feminist
1519:Buddhist
1449:Nihilism
1388:Axiology
1345:Research
1278:Computer
1273:Business
857:30220945
728:ProQuest
683:is made.
533:61151356
469:61151356
343:61151356
301:59010075
281:(1959).
156:Nihilism
42:express
38:Ethical
2247:Related
1993:Tillich
1958:Bentham
1933:Spinoza
1928:Aquinas
1913:Mencius
1827:Western
1802:Torture
1767:Precept
1722:Loyalty
1717:Liberty
1712:Justice
1625:Dignity
1615:Consent
1559:Kantian
1549:Islamic
1512:Schools
1398:Realism
1330:Nursing
1325:Medical
1310:Machine
1250:Applied
848:6132410
58:falsity
2238:(1984)
2230:(1981)
2222:(1979)
2214:(1971)
2206:(1903)
2198:(1887)
2190:(1874)
2182:(1861)
2174:(1843)
2166:(1820)
2158:(1788)
2150:(1785)
2142:(1780)
2134:(1759)
2126:(1740)
2118:(1726)
2110:(1677)
2068:Taylor
2053:Parfit
2048:Singer
2023:Mackie
1898:Cicero
1839:Virtue
1772:Rights
1697:Honour
1554:Jewish
1350:Sexual
1258:Animal
1240:Virtue
1184:Ethics
901:Stance
855:
845:
730:
722:
623:(iii).
531:
521:
467:
457:
378:false.
341:
331:
299:
289:
2330:Index
2092:Works
2063:Adams
2058:Nagel
2013:Dewey
2008:Rawls
1988:Barth
1983:Moore
1948:Hegel
1923:Xunzi
1878:Plato
1868:Laozi
1849:Wrong
1822:Japan
1812:Value
1807:Trust
1702:Ideal
1569:Stoic
1320:Media
1305:Legal
973:(PDF)
948:(2).
916:(PDF)
897:(PDF)
720:S2CID
348:them.
205:Some
54:truth
2043:Hare
2003:Foot
1963:Mill
1943:Kant
1938:Hume
1918:Mozi
1834:Vice
1752:Norm
1680:Evil
1675:Good
1635:Duty
1375:Meta
1298:Land
1225:Role
1210:Care
998:help
853:PMID
754:2019
529:OCLC
519:ISBN
465:OCLC
455:ISBN
434:2019
339:OCLC
329:ISBN
297:LCCN
287:ISBN
52:The
26:and
1844:Vow
1574:Tao
1268:Bio
950:doi
843:PMC
835:doi
712:doi
427:BBC
182:'s
56:or
2366::
1141:,
1118:^
1085:,
1056:,
1026:,
989::
987:}}
983:{{
975:.
946:II
944:.
940:.
907:.
903:.
899:.
880:14
878:.
874:.
851:.
841:.
829:.
825:.
807:,
726:.
718:.
708:93
706:.
690:^
680:,
650:,
620:,
590:,
535:.
527:.
471:.
463:.
425:.
408:,
385:^
375:,
345:.
337:.
313:^
303:.
295:.
263:,
1176:e
1169:t
1162:v
1000:)
996:(
979:.
958:.
952::
925:.
905:3
859:.
837::
831:9
756:.
734:.
714::
436:.
46:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.