19:
580:, CA a husband promised to make maintenance payments to his separated wife but failed to do so. The wife brought an action to enforce the promise invoking promissory estoppel. The court held that promissory estoppel does not create a cause of action and as such the requirement of consideration in formation of contract is still relevant. Promissory estoppel is a rule of evidence that prevents the promisor from denying the truth of statement on which the promisee had relied. Denning LJ said: "The principle does not create new causes of action where none existed before. It only prevents a party from insisting on his strict legal rights when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them". However, this requirement seemed changed in light of the decisions in
616:, a landlord made an oral promise to his tenants that if they bought a 99-year lease to their flats he would repair the roofs of the flats at his own expense. After the leases had been signed by the tenants, the landlord repaired the roof at a cost of ÂŁ15,000. The landlord then claimed a contribution from the tenants towards the cost of the repairs. The tenants refused to pay because of the promise made. The landlord claimed that Carr could not rely on her promise since she had not acted on his promise because she would have entered into the lease without any such promise having been made. However, Lord Denning was of the view that promissory estoppel may arise from promise made by parties negotiating contracts. Similar views was expressed in
671:
clearly defined. These consequences have caused the parameters of promissory estoppel to be no longer an established and well-settled area, which may interpret a huge problem to the development of contract law. The threats to the limitations of promissory estoppel, manifested from the continuing evolution of promissory estoppel, may pose turbulence in contract law and open the flood gate to litigation. Therefore, the application of the modern promissory estoppel replaces the traditional limitations set in the landmark cases. This equitable doctrine which originally acts as an exception to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction with subject to limitations now appears as an open and unlimited doctrine.
655:, The courts held that generally promissory estoppel will merely suspend legal rights rather than extinguish them. However, where periodic payments are involved and a promise has been made to reduce the payments because of pressing circumstances which are not likely to persist, promissory estoppel can be used to extinguish legal rights. This final limitation to the scope of estoppel operates in the sense that the doctrine applies to representations relating to past and present events only by excluding the future events executory promise. However, promissory estoppel may permanently extinguish the rights of the promisor to claim lump sum after part-payment. In
111:. These estoppels can be invoked when a promisee/represent wishes to enforce a promise/representation when no consideration was provided by him. The court will only enforce this lack-of-consideration promise if and only if it would be "unconscionable" for the promisor/representor to rescind from his promise/representation ("it's not fair!"). Estoppel when invoked in such a manner is often considered a rival or alternative to the doctrine of consideration under
565:. At the time the value of sterling and the Nigerian pound was equal. The buyers accepted the delivery and invoice without objection. Subsequently, the value of sterling fell quite dramatically in relation to the Nigerian pound. The buyers then sought to revert to sterling as stated in the contract. The buyers conduct in accepting the invoice unquestionably amounted to an implied clear and unambiguous promise to accept on those terms.
196:
the representee on the faith of such representation to alter his position to his detriment, the representor, in any litigation which may afterwards take place between him and the representee, is estopped, as against the representee, from making, or attempting to establish by evidence, any averment substantially at variance with his former representation, if the representee at the proper time, and in proper manner, objects thereto.
514:
to be argued for. Promissory estoppel provides a way in which promises can be legally binding even if no consideration has been given. Promissory estoppel relates to a form of future conduct. The doctrine of promissory estoppel may not make the total contract fully enforceable. The specific facts in the case must actually establish the elements of promissory estoppel before the contract becomes enforceable in law.
224:(ET) proceedings did not draw the conclusion that the appellant, Dr Srivatsa, intended to concede the merits of his claim when withdrawing his ET action. In allowing the appeal of Dr Srivatsa against a prior judgement of a cause of action or issue estoppel, and in respectful disagreement with the judge of first instance, he said that the effect of that judge's decision was that, in the words of
693:
clear basis for the contract itself and its subsequent performance. Where parties express an agreement of that kind in a contractual document neither can subsequently deny the existence of the facts and matters upon which they have agreed, at least so far as concerns those aspects of their relationship to which the agreement was directed. The contract itself gives rise to an estoppel: ...
349:
legitimate processes of legal reasoning, by analogy, induction and deduction, starting from the conceptual foundations of such principles... Under the law of the land... proprietary rights fall to be governed by principles of law and not by some mix of judicial discretion, subjective views about which party 'ought to win'... and the 'formless void' of individual moral opinion.
292:, a father encouraged his son to build a house on his own land, promising to leave that land to the son in his will. Subsequently, the son built a house and lived there for some 30 years. No transfer of land was made in the father's will when he died. It was held that despite this the personal representatives of the father were estopped from evicting the son.
771:
they both knew the other operated under the same, and (ii) they both regulated their subsequent dealings on the same. It has been said that estoppel by convention is not truly an estoppel but merely an instance of estoppel by representation, promissory estoppel or proprietary estoppel, though the first of the three is its most frequent manifestation.
640:, Denning detained that detriment is not an essential element of promissory estoppel. Therefore, for a plea of promissory estoppel to succeed, there must be a change in circumstances of the promisee. This elementary composition of promissory estoppel has been the core and central topic of discussion in the evolution of the doctrine.
591:. The promise or representation must be âpreciseâ and âunambiguousâ although it does not mean that such promise or representation must be expressly made. The concept of âwaiverâ has been recognised by both the common law and equity as a means by which certain rights can be suspended, but then revived by appropriate notice.
600:, It can be seen that this case did not involve a "promise" as such, but merely an "understanding". It had been suggested that Hughes could be restricted to "relief against forfeiture" cases, but this was specifically rejected in the later cases. This case was the one on which Denning placed considerable reliance in the
115:. Only proprietary estoppel can create a cause of action in English law, though the other two can act in support of a cause of action or a reply to a defence. Under American jurisprudence, equitable estoppel is available only as a defence, while promissory estoppel can be used as the basis of a cause of action.
481:. This arises when a party to a contract indicates that they have some knowledge about the value or the potential success/failure of a contract to the other party, but refuses to share this knowledge or 'nol'. The party with the 'nol' is estopped from their non-disclosure and is forced to impart it equitably.
529:
was concerned with the modification of the rent payable on a block of flats during the Second World War. The importance of the case, however, lies in an obiter statement of principle which
Denning LJ set out, âa promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted on, and in fact acted on, is binding
770:
as understood in
English law (also known as estoppel by agreement) occurs where two parties negotiates or operates a contract based on a shared assumption or mutual understanding of a legal effect (or interpretation) of that contract, they are bound by that belief, assumption or understanding if (i)
496:
A legally binding contract occurs when one party makes an offer and receives an acceptance from the other party. A contract must consist of an offer and acceptance, the intention to create legal relations and consideration all must be present to make the contract legally enforceable. In contract law
213:
A representation can be made by statement or conduct. Although the representation must be clear and unambiguous, a representation can be inferred from silence where there is a duty to speak or from negligence where a duty of care arises. Under
English law, estoppel by representation of fact is not
670:
To conclude, the above limitations help to clearly outline its parameters. This essay has defined with the use of cases to demonstrate the successful attempts to depart from the traditional approach set by the Hughes and the High Trees cases. The parameters of this doctrine seem presently not to be
513:
Promissory estoppel is a term used in contract law that applies where there may not otherwise be an enforceable contract. The importance of promissory estoppel in contract law is that it has enabled legal obligations, which fall into the category of contract law but fail to show any consideration,
365:
He then found that that was exactly what the Court of Appeal, no less, had done. Once the proprietary right is established, then and only then will the court consider the conduct of the party seeking to deny the right and if that conduct is wanting, will estop him from denying the right. The court
282:
in
Chancery a father promised a property to his son, who took possession, expended a large sum of money on the house and otherwise improved the property. The father never actually gifted the property to the son. After his death the son, claiming to be the equitable owner, obtained a court judgment
195:
where one person (âthe representorâ) has made a representation of fact to another person (âthe representeeâ) in words or by acts or conduct, or (being under a duty to the representee to speak or act) by silence or inaction, with the intention (actual or presumptive) and with the result of inducing
692:
There is no reason in principle why parties to a contract should not agree that a certain state of affairs should form the basis for the transaction, whether it be the case or not. For example, it may be desirable to settle a disagreement as to an existing state of affairs in order to establish a
208:
An estoppel by representation will arise between A and B if the following elements are made out. First, A makes a false representation of fact to B or to a group of which B was a member. Second, in making the representation, A intended or knew that it was likely to be acted upon. Third, B,
132:
Estoppel by representation of fact and promissory estoppel are mutually exclusive: the former is based on representation of existing fact (or of mixed fact and law), while the latter is based on a promise not to enforce some pre-existing right (i.e., an intention as to the future). Proprietary
360:
A finding of proprietary estoppel, based on the unconscionability of the behaviour of the person against whom the finding was made but without any coherent formulation of the content of the estoppel or of the proprietary interest that the estoppel was designed to protect invites, in my opinion,
348:
The fact that the constructive trust remains predominantly remedial does not, however, mean that it represents a medium for the indulgence of idiosyncratic notions of fairness and justice. As an equitable remedy, it is available only when warranted by established equitable principles or by the
330:
the House overturned the decision of a fairly heavy-weight Court of Appeal on the very issue of estoppel, thereby illustrating the level of confusion about the meaning of the doctrine. Lord Scott of
Foscote, with whom the other Lords agreed, described at length that someone who seeks to rely on
743:
The inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the
382:
is generally not enforceable, and is known as a gratuitous promise. For example, a car salesman promises not to sell a car over the weekend, but does so, the promise cannot be enforced. If however, the car salesman accepts one pound in consideration for the promise, the promise is binding and
59:
from relying on their legal right to repayment, as the creditor has represented that he no longer treats the debt as extant. A landlord may tell his tenant that he is not required to pay rent for a period of time ("you don't need to pay rent until the war is over"). Until the war is over, the
410:. This promise to accept a lesser rent was unsupported by consideration. At the end of the war the flats became fully let, and the claimants demanded the return to payment of full rent. Denning J held that they were entitled to this from the last two quarters of 1945. Denning mentioned in an
573:
The full force application of the equitable maxim estoppel only allows a litigant to âuse it as a shield and not as a swordâ restricts the application of this doctrine to as far as only to provide a defence to a party and not to be used as a cause of action against another. In
71:
notes that "unconscionability ... provides the link between them." But they nevertheless have "separate requirements and different terrains of application." The courts have generally abandoned any attempt to create a single general underlying rationale or principle; in
128:(iii) the representation must have caused the represent to act in such a way that it would be "unconscionable" for the representor to resile. Detriment is measured at the time when the promisor proposes to withdraw his promise, not at the time when the promise is made.
497:
consideration is concerned with the bargain of the contract, each party to a contract must be both a promisor and a promisee. They must each receive a benefit and each suffers a detriment. The classic definition of consideration was given by the court in the case of
416:
that had the plaintiffs tried to be reimbursed for the full amount they would have been estopped from doing so even though no consideration was present. This is because the plaintiff represented that he would accept half the rent and the defendant acted upon this.
214:
a cause of action, though it may be a defence or acts in support of a cause of action. There is some debate whether under
English law courts will take into account unconscionability under estoppel by representation of fact, although Australian courts clearly do.
712:(literally translated as "the fact has been decided") is relatively uncontroversial. It expresses a general public interest that the same issue should not be litigated more than once even when the parties are different. The criminal law application, called
432:
the plaintiff company was able to restore payment of full rent (although estopped back rent was lost) from early 1945, but would have been able to restore full rent at any time after the initial promise provided a suitable period of notice had been given.
312:
In June 2008 the House of Lords re-visited the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, and in the process was quite fierce in describing its limits. In that light, it must be very doubtful that Mr
Jennings would have got the result he did: properly understood,
405:
In this case, the claimants let a block of flats to the defendants at an annual rent of ÂŁ2,500. However, they agreed to accept a reduction in rent to ÂŁ1,250, because the defendants were unable to find enough tenants due to the evacuation of London during
236:
by a neat, technical swipe the would have eliminated a substantial claim without any tribunal or court having heard any evidence or argument about it. That seems to be a decision to which this court is not driven by any principle of cause of action
530:
so far as its terms properly applyâ. Applying this principle, Denning held that a promise to accept a lower rent during the war years was binding on the landlord, regardless of the fact that the tenant had supplied no consideration for it.
507:: âA valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other".
648:
This doctrine does not operate to completely extinguish the original rights of the parties accruing from the contract. It only provides for the suspension of such right, which can subsequently be revived after a certain event or time. In
734:
applied when the Six sued West
Midlands Police for damages for assault. However, in their earlier criminal trial they had claimed to have been assaulted to gain confessions, and that court had rejected the allegation of assault.
451:
Promissory estoppel is not available when one party promises to accept a lesser sum in full payment of a debt, unless the debtor offers payment at an earlier date than was previously agreed. This is the rule formulated in
80:
said: "the attempt... to demonstrate that all estoppels... are now subsumed in the single and all-embracing estoppel by representation and that they are all governed by the same principle never won general acceptance."
209:
believing the representation, acts to its detriment in reliance on the representation. Fourth, A subsequently seeks to deny the truth of the representation. Fifth, no defence to the estoppel can be raised by A.
295:
While the courts will generally uphold the expectations of parties, if the parties are themselves not clear about their expectations the court's starting point will be the detriment incurred by the parties (per
777:
is a rule of evidence. A statement in a deed, usually facts stated in the recital of a deed, is evidentially conclusive against the parties of the deed. The parties are estopped from asserting otherwise.
665:
Promisor would not be allowed to revert to his strict legal rights and that the promissory estoppel will be final if promisee understood the promise to mean final extinguishing of promisor's strict legal
122:(i) the representor must have intended (actual or presumed) the represent, or have been reasonably understood by the represent as having intended him, to act on the relevant representation (or promise),
510:
The doctrine of consideration can therefore be seen as a set of rules, which play the principal role in the decision by the courts as to which agreements or promises are found to be legally binding.
378:
that prevents a party from acting in a certain way because the first party promised not to, and the second party relied on that promise and acted upon it. In
English law, a promise made without
67:
There are a huge array of different types of estoppel which can arise under
English law. It has been judicially noted on more than one occasions that the link between them is often tenuous.
133:
estoppel can operate only between parties who, at the time of representation, were in a pre-existing relationship, while this is not a pre-requisite under estoppel by representation of fact.
624:
held that contractual relationship is irrelevant provided that there is âa pre-existing legal relationship which could, in certain circumstances, give rise to liabilities and penaltiesâ.
1049:
917:
525:
398:
266:) that B will expend money or otherwise act to his detriment in reliance of the supposed or promised gift, so much so that it would be "unconscionable" not to enforce the expectation (
260:
Proprietary estoppel arises when A purports to give but fails to effectively convey, or promises to give property or an interest in property, to B, while being generally aware (
604:
case. It never applied to situations of part payment of debts, however, under modern law the concept of waiver has been effectively considered within "promissory estoppel".
550:
There must be a clear promise intended to alter the contracted obligation. The court assesses intention objectively rather than taking evidence on the party's state of mind.
174:"Estoppel by representation of fact" is a term coined by George Spencer Bower. This species of estoppel is also referred to as "common law estoppel by representation" in
1262:
140:
taking into account many factors, including the behaviour, state of mind, and circumstances of the parties. Generally, the following eight factors are determinative:
636:
the Privy Council ruled that there was no estoppel where the promisee alters his position as a result of relying on the promise yet suffers no overall detriment. In
1481:
1760:
18:
331:
proprietary estoppel must establish an actual or certain interest in the property to which he claimed a right. Without that, he is not off the starting blocks.
268:
60:
landlord would be "estopped" from claiming rents during the war period. Estoppel is often important in insurance law, where some actions by the insurer or the
621:
297:
760:(literally âby act of notoriety", or "solemn formal actâ) is the historical root of common law estoppel by representation and equitable estoppel. Estoppel
448:
Denning elaborated on the equitable nature of estoppel by refusing to allow its use as a "sword" by an ex-wife to extract funds from the destitute husband.
1798:
1116:
466:
721:
420:
Promissory estoppel requires (1) an unequivocal promise by words or conduct, (2) a change in position of the promisee as a result of the promise (
983:
517:
The promises within a contract will be enforced under the promissory estoppel doctrine, when enforcing the contract promises avoids injustice.
326:
632:
The proof of possible detriment or prejudice, which will appear if the promisor is allowed to revert to his original promise, is required. In
442:
the courts refused to recognise a promise to accept a part payment of ÂŁ300 on a debt of ÂŁ482 on the basis that it was extracted by duress. In
1831:
1826:
1511:
1411:
1375:
353:
1871:
1846:
1711:
726:
991:, WLR 1752, 31 EG 88, 1 All ER (Comm) 205, 36 EG 142, 4 All ER 713, 1 WLR 1752, WTLR 1461, NPC 95, 35 EG 142 (30 July 2008)
651:
1974:
1753:
1728:
1486:
1803:
1635:
1592:
1907:
1902:
1818:
1458:
1028:
596:
535:
388:
1938:
1912:
1922:
1665:
1525:
1964:
1746:
1535:
1520:
1352:
262:
176:
1836:
1788:
1066:
787:
657:
438:
305:). Proprietary estoppel claims, therefore do not necessarily result in the transfer of the property to the claimant; in
77:
1234:
Emmamuel Ayodeji Ajayi trading under the name and style of the Colony Carrier Company v R. T. Briscoe (Nigeria) Limited
1969:
344:"repay careful reading" (his Lordship said they applied to proprietary estoppel as they do to constructive trusts):
1917:
1516:
520:
393:
716:
provides that a person should not be tried twice for the same offence. A notable case occurred in relation to the
1876:
1695:
1530:
1467:
37:, or upon a set of facts (e.g. words said or actions performed) which is different from an earlier set of facts.
1853:
1783:
1675:
1588:
587:
Early cases indicated that there had to be a clear and unequivocal undertaking. However, this was overruled in
533:
There are limitations which must be satisfied to this doctrine which derived from both Lord Cairns in the case
246:
As noted above, under English law, promissory and proprietary estoppel are both species of equitable estoppel.
436:
Estoppel is an equitable (as opposed to common law) construct and is therefore discretionary. In the case of
1897:
1640:
1496:
1403:
1010:
867:
858:
1808:
1433:, website of swarb.co.uk "Estoppel, in its various forms including proprietary and equitable estoppels".
612:
It remains unsettled whether promissory estoppel may arise in pre-contractual relationships. In the case
1619:
1615:
1597:
503:, referred to consideration as consisting of a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor,
22:
Estoppel forms part of the rules of equity, which were originally administered in the Chancery courts.
1881:
1769:
1601:
1569:
1451:
807:
288:
255:
118:
The requirement of inducement and reliance are broadly the same for all reliance-based estoppels:
1716:
221:
1313:
1863:
1670:
1650:
1610:
1574:
1565:
1556:
1001:
931:
428:â it cannot be used as the basis of an action on its own. It also does not extinguish rights. In
340:
278:
1283:
55:
is forgiven, but then later insists upon repayment. In a case such as this, the creditor may be
1959:
1583:
1407:
1371:
165:
steps, if any, taken by the promisor/representor to ensure he has not caused preventible harm.
89:
Under English law, estoppel by, promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel are regarded as '
1841:
1655:
1606:
1578:
1560:
1395:
1084:
454:
1335:
1006:
863:
484:
Yet proprietary estoppel has also arisen by acquiescence. The leading case in this area is
1680:
1540:
1444:
1121:
965:
899:
301:
61:
1237:
970:
886:
936:
1338: at para. 86, 1 WLR 637, EMLR 287, WLR 637, 1 All ER 945 (10 February 2005)
1071:
952:
904:
717:
562:
558:
1953:
1645:
1240:, 3 All ER 556, 1 WLR 1326, WLR 1326 (28 July 1964) (on appeal from Nigera)
1172:
1146:
1098:
871:
576:
499:
460:
444:
412:
379:
335:
220:, in his judgment as to the circumstances obtaining at the time of the withdrawal of
33:
that may be used in certain situations to prevent a person from relying upon certain
1299:
988:
1690:
1660:
1267:
1106:, 9 App Cas 605, (1883-84) LR 9 App Cas 605, (1884) 9 App Cas 605 (16 May 1884)
1103:
1033:
736:
703:
557:
held that a contract for the sale of some coffee beans was agreed to be payable in
407:
225:
112:
973:, 1 P & CR 100, 1 P & CR 8, WTLR 367, 1 FCR 501 (22 February 2002)
1491:
1429:
504:
217:
1280:
Peekay Intermark Ltd. & Anor v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.
1685:
1367:
317:
is a bit of a muddle, probably concerning promissory estoppel, with a bit of
1506:
1501:
1436:
584:, here the courts held "that promissory estoppel can be a cause of action."
424:), (3) inequity if the promisor were to go back on the promise. Estoppel is
764:
and equitable estoppel are used interchangeably in American legal parlance.
464:. This rule has, however, been thrown into doubt by the 2007 decision of
375:
44:
40:
30:
955:, 1 All ER 446, 2 WLR 212, 2 QB 29, EWCA Civ 4 (13 January 1965)
1738:
523:
is a leading figure in the field of promissory estoppel in the case of
561:. The sellers mistakenly sent an invoice stating price was payable in
383:
enforceable in court. Estoppel is one of the exceptions to this rule.
744:
administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people.
48:
34:
125:(ii) the form of reliance must have been reasonable or intended, and
1286: at para. 56, 2 Lloyd's Rep 511, 1 CLC 582 (6 April 2006)
1124:, 1 WLR 643, NPC 136, WLR 643, BPIR 1452 (14 December 2007)
686:
Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd
17:
361:
criticism of the sort directed by Deane J in the passage cited...
153:
parties' relative interest in the relevant activities in reliance
1387:
Protecting Reliance: The Emergent Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel
144:
how the promise/representation and reliance upon it were induced
52:
1742:
1440:
1198:
Secretary of State for Employment v Globe Elastic Thread Co Ltd
589:
Secretary of State for Employment v Globe Elastic Thread Co Ltd
1296:
Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police & Ors
1160:
Woodhouse Israel Cocoa Ltd v Nigerian Produce Marketing Board
1036:, 2 App Cas 439, (1876-77) LR 2 App Cas 439 (5 June 1877)
555:
Woodhouse Israel Cocoa Ltd v Nigerian Produce Marketing Board
366:
should not begin with an examination of a party's behaviour.
1074:, 2 WLR 28, 2 QB 617, 3 All ER 837 (12 November 1965)
1302:, 3 All ER 727, 3 WLR 906, AC 529 (19 November 1981)
939:, 45 ER 1284, (1862) 4 De GF & J 517 (12 July 1862)
889:, WLR(D) 255, EWCA Civ 936, ICR 1660 (26 April 2018)
684:
The law relating to contractual estoppel was summarised in
386:
The doctrine of promissory estoppel was first developed in
644:
Temporary suspension of contractual obligations and rights
473:
Note that promissory estoppel should not be confused with
334:
In particular he remarked that the following rationes of
1270:, WLR 761, 1 WLR 761, 2 All ER 657 (16 June 1955)
1050:
Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd
918:
Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd
526:
Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd
399:
Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd
569:
The doctrine can only be used as a âshield not a swordâ
392:
but was lost for some time until it was resurrected by
727:
Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police
1931:
1890:
1862:
1817:
1776:
1704:
1628:
1549:
1474:
883:
Srivatsa v Secretary of State for Health & Anor
1312:
1263:ETool Metal Mfg Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd
1316:McIlkenny v Chief Constable of the West Midlands
283:forcing the trustees to convey the land to him.
741:
690:
663:
358:
346:
234:
206:
193:
156:nature and context of the parties' relationship
1364:The Law relating to Estoppel by Representation
984:Yeoman's Row Management Ltd & Anor v Cobbe
845:
201:
1754:
1452:
1061:
1059:
866:, (1990) 170 CLR 394 (5 September 1990),
269:Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees
184:
107:describe all three estoppels collectively as
104:
8:
1044:
1042:
1009:, (1985) 160 CLR 583 (6 December 1985),
1117:Collier v P & M J Wright (Holdings) Ltd
907:, Ch 179, 3 All ER 865 (23 July 1975)
1761:
1747:
1739:
1459:
1445:
1437:
1332:Polanski v Conde Nast Publications Limited
628:Detrimental reliance on the representation
1400:The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel
1023:
1021:
1019:
147:the content of the promise/representation
475:estoppel for non-disclosure of knowledge
64:estop the insurer from denying a claim.
1250:Alan Co. Ltd v El Nasr & Import Co.
798:
708:The civil law use of issue estoppel or
638:Alan Co. Ltd v El Nasr & Import Co.
833:
159:parties' relative strength of position
7:
1712:Legal services in the United Kingdom
1222:Durham Fancy Goods v Michael Jackson
618:Durham Fancy Goods v Michael Jackson
309:itself, there was a monetary award.
200:A second definition can be found at
162:history of the parties' relationship
661:, Lord Denning expressed that the:
652:Tool Metal Manufacturing v Tungsten
327:Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd
43:could arise in a situation where a
822:First National Bank plc v Thompson
422:not necessarily to their detriment
370:Promissory estoppel (contract law)
189:estoppel by representation of fact
74:First National Bank plc v Thompson
14:
150:relative knowledge of the parties
1029:Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co
937:[1862] EWHC J67 (Ch)
608:Contractual / legal relationship
597:Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co
536:Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co
389:Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co
1430:Estoppel (England) â 1980- 1984
1362:Spencer Bower, George (2004).
1:
1842:Good faith & fair dealing
1210:Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr
1067:D & C Builders Ltd v Rees
900:Crabb v Arun District Council
811:(14th ed.). 2015. 3-090.
658:D & C Builders Ltd v Rees
614:Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr
439:D & C Builders Ltd v Rees
263:Crabb v Arun District Council
230:Sajid v Sussex Muslim Society
136:English courts will consider
1186:Evenden v Guildford City AFC
1122:[2007] EWCA Civ 1329
846:Wilken & Villiers (2002)
788:Consideration in English law
582:Evenden v Guildford City AFC
321:thrown in for good measure.
202:Wilken & Villiers (2002)
1799:Creation of legal relations
1729:United Kingdom law category
1284:[2006] EWCA Civ 386
971:[2002] EWCA Civ 159
887:[2018] EWCA Civ 936
374:Promissory estoppel is the
180:, vol 16(2), 2003 reissue.
109:estoppels by representation
1991:
1593:English administrative law
1353:Halsbury's Laws of England
701:
338:in the Australian case of
253:
177:Halsbury's Laws of England
170:Estoppel by representation
97:Halsbury's Laws of England
1975:English legal terminology
1725:
1482:Parliamentary sovereignty
1468:Law of the United Kingdom
1389:. Oxford. pp. 60â66.
1072:[1965] EWCA Civ 3
966:Jennings v Rice & Ors
953:[1965] EWCA Civ 4
949:Inwards & Ors v Baker
905:[1975] EWCA Civ 7
99:, Vol 16(2), 2003. Both
92:reliance-based estoppels'
1891:Setting aside a contract
1385:Spence, Michael (1999).
492:Estoppel by acquiescence
477:, colloquially known as
85:Reliance-based estoppels
1620:English civil procedure
1497:Law of Northern Ireland
1404:Oxford University Press
1007:[1985] HCA 78
870:(Australia) at 444 per
864:[1990] HCA 39
859:Commonwealth v Verwayen
547:There must be a promise
396:in the leading case of
191:is defined as follows:
27:Estoppel in English law
1832:Interpreting contracts
1827:Incorporation of terms
1636:British Virgin Islands
1336:[2005] UKHL 10
1318:[1982] AC 529"
1300:[1981] UKHL 13
1238:[1964] UKPC 39
989:[2008] UKHL 55
768:Estoppel by convention
746:
695:
668:
539:and Denning LJ in the
426:"a shield not a sword"
363:
351:
239:
211:
198:
23:
1847:Unfair contract terms
1357:. Vol. 16. 2003.
1355:Cumulative Supplement
1268:[1955] UKHL 5
1104:[1884] UKHL 1
1034:[1877] UKHL 1
21:
1965:English contract law
1882:Specific performance
1770:English contract law
1602:English criminal law
1570:English contract law
1088:(1602) 5 Co Rep 117a
808:Treitel on Contracts
680:Contractual estoppel
521:Lord Justice Denning
467:Collier v Wright Ltd
256:Proprietary estoppel
250:Proprietary estoppel
218:Lord Justice Lewison
187:at paragraph I.2.2,
185:Spencer Bower (2004)
105:Spencer Bower (2004)
69:Treitel on Contracts
1903:Iniquitous pressure
1794:Promissory estoppel
1150:(1875) LR 10 Ex 153
222:employment tribunal
204:at paragraph 9.02:
1970:Equitable defenses
1872:Measure of damages
1864:Breach of contract
1611:English family law
1487:Constitutional law
1136:(1866) LR 1 HL 129
1002:Muschinski v Dodds
932:Dillwyn v Llewelyn
479:nolissory estoppel
458:, and affirmed in
341:Muschinski v Dodds
279:Dillwyn v Llewelyn
242:Equitable estoppel
24:
1947:
1946:
1908:Misrepresentation
1819:Contractual terms
1736:
1735:
1717:British penal law
1427:David Swarbrick.
1413:978-0-19-925321-0
1396:Villiers, Theresa
1377:978-0-406-04361-0
543:case. They are:
138:unconscionability
1982:
1763:
1756:
1749:
1740:
1696:English case law
1579:English land law
1561:English tort law
1461:
1454:
1447:
1438:
1417:
1402:(2nd ed.).
1390:
1381:
1366:(4th ed.).
1358:
1339:
1329:
1323:
1322:
1320:
1309:
1303:
1293:
1287:
1277:
1271:
1259:
1253:
1247:
1241:
1231:
1225:
1219:
1213:
1207:
1201:
1195:
1189:
1183:
1177:
1169:
1163:
1157:
1151:
1143:
1137:
1131:
1125:
1113:
1107:
1095:
1089:
1081:
1075:
1063:
1054:
1046:
1037:
1025:
1014:
998:
992:
980:
974:
962:
956:
946:
940:
928:
922:
914:
908:
896:
890:
880:
874:
855:
849:
843:
837:
836:, pp. 60â66
831:
825:
819:
813:
812:
803:
775:Estoppel by deed
298:Robert Walker LJ
276:For example, in
1990:
1989:
1985:
1984:
1983:
1981:
1980:
1979:
1950:
1949:
1948:
1943:
1927:
1923:Undue influence
1886:
1858:
1813:
1772:
1767:
1737:
1732:
1721:
1700:
1681:Anglo-Saxon law
1629:Related systems
1624:
1550:Parallel fields
1545:
1541:Retained EU law
1526:Competition law
1512:Civil liberties
1470:
1465:
1424:
1422:Further reading
1414:
1393:
1384:
1378:
1361:
1350:
1347:
1342:
1330:
1326:
1311:
1310:
1306:
1294:
1290:
1278:
1274:
1260:
1256:
1248:
1244:
1232:
1228:
1220:
1216:
1212:2 All ER 753 CA
1208:
1204:
1196:
1192:
1184:
1180:
1170:
1166:
1158:
1154:
1144:
1140:
1134:Ramadan v Dyson
1132:
1128:
1114:
1110:
1096:
1092:
1082:
1078:
1064:
1057:
1047:
1040:
1026:
1017:
999:
995:
981:
977:
963:
959:
947:
943:
929:
925:
915:
911:
897:
893:
881:
877:
856:
852:
844:
840:
832:
828:
820:
816:
805:
804:
800:
796:
784:
751:
749:Other estoppels
714:double jeopardy
706:
700:
682:
677:
675:Other estoppels
646:
634:Ajayi v Briscoe
630:
610:
571:
563:Nigerian pounds
494:
486:Ramadan v Dyson
372:
315:Jennings v Rice
307:Jennings v Rice
302:Jennings v Rice
289:Inwards v Baker
258:
252:
244:
228:in the case of
172:
87:
12:
11:
5:
1988:
1986:
1978:
1977:
1972:
1967:
1962:
1952:
1951:
1945:
1944:
1942:
1941:
1935:
1933:
1929:
1928:
1926:
1925:
1920:
1915:
1910:
1905:
1900:
1894:
1892:
1888:
1887:
1885:
1884:
1879:
1874:
1868:
1866:
1860:
1859:
1857:
1856:
1851:
1850:
1849:
1844:
1834:
1829:
1823:
1821:
1815:
1814:
1812:
1811:
1806:
1801:
1796:
1791:
1786:
1780:
1778:
1774:
1773:
1768:
1766:
1765:
1758:
1751:
1743:
1734:
1733:
1726:
1723:
1722:
1720:
1719:
1714:
1708:
1706:
1702:
1701:
1699:
1698:
1693:
1688:
1683:
1678:
1673:
1668:
1663:
1658:
1653:
1651:European Union
1648:
1643:
1638:
1632:
1630:
1626:
1625:
1623:
1622:
1613:
1604:
1595:
1586:
1581:
1572:
1563:
1553:
1551:
1547:
1546:
1544:
1543:
1538:
1536:Commercial law
1533:
1528:
1523:
1521:insolvency law
1514:
1509:
1504:
1499:
1494:
1489:
1484:
1478:
1476:
1472:
1471:
1466:
1464:
1463:
1456:
1449:
1441:
1435:
1434:
1423:
1420:
1419:
1418:
1412:
1394:Wilken, Sean;
1391:
1382:
1376:
1359:
1346:
1343:
1341:
1340:
1324:
1304:
1288:
1272:
1254:
1252:(1972) 2 QB 18
1242:
1226:
1214:
1202:
1190:
1178:
1164:
1152:
1138:
1126:
1108:
1090:
1076:
1055:
1038:
1015:
993:
975:
957:
941:
923:
909:
891:
875:
850:
838:
826:
814:
797:
795:
792:
791:
790:
783:
780:
779:
778:
772:
765:
750:
747:
732:issue estoppel
722:House of Lords
718:Birmingham Six
702:Main article:
699:
698:Issue estoppel
696:
681:
678:
676:
673:
645:
642:
629:
626:
609:
606:
570:
567:
552:
551:
548:
493:
490:
371:
368:
319:quantum meruit
254:Main article:
251:
248:
243:
240:
171:
168:
167:
166:
163:
160:
157:
154:
151:
148:
145:
130:
129:
126:
123:
86:
83:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1987:
1976:
1973:
1971:
1968:
1966:
1963:
1961:
1958:
1957:
1955:
1940:
1937:
1936:
1934:
1930:
1924:
1921:
1919:
1916:
1914:
1911:
1909:
1906:
1904:
1901:
1899:
1896:
1895:
1893:
1889:
1883:
1880:
1878:
1875:
1873:
1870:
1869:
1867:
1865:
1861:
1855:
1852:
1848:
1845:
1843:
1840:
1839:
1838:
1837:Implied terms
1835:
1833:
1830:
1828:
1825:
1824:
1822:
1820:
1816:
1810:
1807:
1805:
1802:
1800:
1797:
1795:
1792:
1790:
1789:Consideration
1787:
1785:
1782:
1781:
1779:
1775:
1771:
1764:
1759:
1757:
1752:
1750:
1745:
1744:
1741:
1731:
1730:
1724:
1718:
1715:
1713:
1710:
1709:
1707:
1703:
1697:
1694:
1692:
1689:
1687:
1684:
1682:
1679:
1677:
1676:United States
1674:
1672:
1669:
1667:
1664:
1662:
1659:
1657:
1654:
1652:
1649:
1647:
1644:
1642:
1639:
1637:
1634:
1633:
1631:
1627:
1621:
1617:
1614:
1612:
1608:
1605:
1603:
1599:
1596:
1594:
1590:
1587:
1585:
1582:
1580:
1576:
1573:
1571:
1567:
1564:
1562:
1558:
1555:
1554:
1552:
1548:
1542:
1539:
1537:
1534:
1532:
1529:
1527:
1524:
1522:
1518:
1515:
1513:
1510:
1508:
1505:
1503:
1500:
1498:
1495:
1493:
1490:
1488:
1485:
1483:
1480:
1479:
1477:
1475:Common fields
1473:
1469:
1462:
1457:
1455:
1450:
1448:
1443:
1442:
1439:
1432:
1431:
1426:
1425:
1421:
1415:
1409:
1405:
1401:
1397:
1392:
1388:
1383:
1379:
1373:
1369:
1365:
1360:
1356:
1354:
1349:
1348:
1344:
1337:
1333:
1328:
1325:
1319:
1317:
1308:
1305:
1301:
1297:
1292:
1289:
1285:
1281:
1276:
1273:
1269:
1265:
1264:
1258:
1255:
1251:
1246:
1243:
1239:
1235:
1230:
1227:
1223:
1218:
1215:
1211:
1206:
1203:
1199:
1194:
1191:
1187:
1182:
1179:
1175:
1174:
1173:Combe v Combe
1168:
1165:
1161:
1156:
1153:
1149:
1148:
1147:Currie v Misa
1142:
1139:
1135:
1130:
1127:
1123:
1119:
1118:
1112:
1109:
1105:
1101:
1100:
1099:Foakes v Beer
1094:
1091:
1087:
1086:
1085:Pinnel's Case
1080:
1077:
1073:
1069:
1068:
1062:
1060:
1056:
1052:
1051:
1045:
1043:
1039:
1035:
1031:
1030:
1024:
1022:
1020:
1016:
1012:
1008:
1004:
1003:
997:
994:
990:
986:
985:
979:
976:
972:
968:
967:
961:
958:
954:
950:
945:
942:
938:
934:
933:
927:
924:
921:(1982) QB 133
920:
919:
913:
910:
906:
902:
901:
895:
892:
888:
884:
879:
876:
873:
869:
865:
861:
860:
854:
851:
847:
842:
839:
835:
834:Spence (1999)
830:
827:
824:Ch 231 CA 236
823:
818:
815:
810:
809:
802:
799:
793:
789:
786:
785:
781:
776:
773:
769:
766:
763:
759:
758:
753:
752:
748:
745:
740:
738:
733:
729:
728:
723:
719:
715:
711:
705:
697:
694:
689:
687:
679:
674:
672:
667:
662:
660:
659:
654:
653:
643:
641:
639:
635:
627:
625:
623:
619:
615:
607:
605:
603:
599:
598:
592:
590:
585:
583:
579:
578:
577:Combe v Combe
568:
566:
564:
560:
556:
549:
546:
545:
544:
542:
538:
537:
531:
528:
527:
522:
518:
515:
511:
508:
506:
502:
501:
500:Currie v Misa
491:
489:
487:
482:
480:
476:
471:
469:
468:
463:
462:
461:Foakes v Beer
457:
456:
455:Pinnel's Case
449:
447:
446:
445:Combe v Combe
441:
440:
434:
431:
427:
423:
418:
415:
414:
413:obiter dictum
409:
403:
401:
400:
395:
391:
390:
384:
381:
380:consideration
377:
369:
367:
362:
357:
355:
350:
345:
343:
342:
337:
332:
329:
328:
322:
320:
316:
310:
308:
304:
303:
299:
293:
291:
290:
286:Similarly in
284:
281:
280:
274:
272:
270:
265:
264:
257:
249:
247:
241:
238:
233:
231:
227:
223:
219:
215:
210:
205:
203:
197:
192:
190:
186:
181:
179:
178:
169:
164:
161:
158:
155:
152:
149:
146:
143:
142:
141:
139:
134:
127:
124:
121:
120:
119:
116:
114:
110:
106:
102:
98:
94:
93:
84:
82:
79:
75:
70:
65:
63:
58:
54:
50:
46:
42:
38:
36:
32:
28:
20:
16:
1793:
1727:
1557:Scots delict
1428:
1399:
1386:
1363:
1351:
1345:Bibliography
1331:
1327:
1315:
1307:
1295:
1291:
1279:
1275:
1261:
1257:
1249:
1245:
1233:
1229:
1221:
1217:
1209:
1205:
1197:
1193:
1185:
1181:
1171:
1167:
1159:
1155:
1145:
1141:
1133:
1129:
1115:
1111:
1097:
1093:
1083:
1079:
1065:
1048:
1027:
1000:
996:
982:
978:
964:
960:
948:
944:
930:
926:
916:
912:
898:
894:
882:
878:
857:
853:
841:
829:
821:
817:
806:
801:
774:
767:
761:
756:
754:
742:
737:Lord Diplock
731:
725:
713:
710:res judicata
709:
707:
704:Res judicata
691:
685:
683:
669:
664:
656:
650:
647:
637:
633:
631:
617:
613:
611:
601:
595:
593:
588:
586:
581:
575:
572:
554:
553:
540:
534:
532:
524:
519:
516:
512:
509:
498:
495:
485:
483:
478:
474:
472:
465:
459:
453:
450:
443:
437:
435:
429:
425:
421:
419:
411:
408:World War II
404:
397:
394:Lord Denning
387:
385:
373:
364:
359:
352:
347:
339:
333:
325:
323:
318:
314:
311:
306:
300:
294:
287:
285:
277:
275:
267:
261:
259:
245:
235:
229:
216:
212:
207:
199:
194:
188:
182:
175:
173:
137:
135:
131:
117:
113:contract law
108:
100:
96:
91:
90:
88:
78:Lord Millett
73:
68:
66:
56:
39:
26:
25:
15:
1918:Frustration
1671:New Zealand
1492:English law
1013:(Australia)
848:, para 9-03
622:Donaldson J
1954:Categories
1877:Remoteness
1686:Common law
1531:Labour law
1368:LexisNexis
1011:High Court
868:High Court
794:References
720:where the
602:High Trees
541:High Trees
430:High Trees
354:Lord Scott
226:Mummery LJ
101:Halsbury's
76:Ch 231 CA
47:informs a
1854:Penalties
1804:Certainty
1784:Agreement
1777:Formation
1656:Hong Kong
1641:Australia
1507:Welsh law
1502:Scots law
755:Estoppel
724:ruled in
237:estoppel.
1960:Estoppel
1898:Capacity
1705:See also
1398:(2002).
1224:2 QB 839
1176:2 KB 215
782:See also
620:, where
559:sterling
376:doctrine
57:estopped
45:creditor
41:Estoppel
31:doctrine
1939:History
1913:Mistake
1809:Privity
1666:Ireland
1517:Company
872:Deane J
762:in pais
757:in pais
356:added:
336:Deane J
51:that a
1691:Equity
1646:Canada
1584:Trusts
1410:
1374:
1200:AC 506
1188:QB 917
1162:AC 741
1053:KB 130
739:said:
666:rights
505:Lush J
49:debtor
35:rights
1932:Other
1661:India
1616:Scots
1607:Scots
1598:Scots
1589:Scots
1575:Scots
1566:Scots
1334:
1298:
1282:
1266:
1236:
1120:
1102:
1070:
1032:
1005:
987:
969:
951:
935:
903:
885:
862:
730:that
62:agent
29:is a
1618:and
1609:and
1600:and
1591:and
1577:and
1568:and
1559:and
1519:and
1408:ISBN
1372:ISBN
103:and
53:debt
594:In
324:In
183:In
95:by
1956::
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1058:^
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1018:^
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1762:e
1755:t
1748:v
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1314:"
271:)
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