2010:
1015:
150:
990:
25:
1399:
1002:
1906:
In the unusual case of a tie where the formula above does not determine a single winner (if several candidates have exactly the same score), ties can be broken by binning together the 3 grades closest to the median, then repeating the tie-breaking procedure. In the example above, we would combine all
1628:
The tiebreaking rule can be explained using an analogy where every candidate is in a race. Each candidate takes 1 minute to run from one grade to the next, and they run at a constant speed when moving from one grade to the next. The winner is the first candidate to cross the finish line at 50% of the
1977:
This property makes the graduated majority judgment a more robust voting method in the face of accusations of fraud or demands of a recount of all votes. As small differences of votes are less likely to change the outcome of the election, candidates are less likely to contest results.
1096:
GMJ begins by counting all ballots for their first choice. If no candidate has a majority then later (second, third, etc.) preferences are added to first preferences until one candidate reaches 50% of the vote. The first candidate to reach a majority of the vote is the winner.
2146:"I propose to coin the term MEDIAN JUDGMENT for a voting rule that is known both as the "usual judgment" and the "graduated majority judgment". I have just had an Aha moment: this rule deserves the title of the best highest-median voting rule. Let me explain why"
1619:
Candidates A and B both cross the 50% threshold between 2 or 3, so we must invoke the tiebreaking procedure. When we do, we find that the median grades for candidates A, B, and C are 3.4, 3.1, and 2.0 respectively. Thus, Candidate A is declared the winner.
1348:
grade as the grade where a majority of voters would oppose giving the candidate a higher grade, but a majority would also oppose giving a lower grade. This rule means that the absolute majority of the electors judge that a candidates merits
1907:"Good," "Fair," and "Passable" grades into a new "Passable to Good" grade, then apply the same tie-breaking formula as before. This process can be repeated multiple times (binning more and more grades) until a winner is found.
1897:
1974:. In other words, a small change in the number of votes for each candidate is unlikely to change the winner of the election, because small changes in vote shares result in only small changes in the overall rating.
1986:
The additional tie-breaking procedures of graduated majority judgment mean that tied elections become extremely unlikely (far less likely than systems such as plurality). Whereas plurality votes,
1994:
can result in ties when working with small elections, the only way for two candidates to tie with usual judgment is to have all candidates receive exactly the same number of votes in
1043:
2227:
1789:
1682:
1078:
by Andrew
Jennings in 2010, then by Jameson Quinn, and later independently by the French social scientist Adrien Fabre in 2019. In 2024, the latter coined the name "
1784:
1709:
1757:
1733:
1655:
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42:
2445:
734:
2837:
2573:
2425:
766:
628:
623:
2672:
2450:
1036:
729:
2435:
2220:
411:
935:
2799:
186:
89:
2482:
61:
1029:
2213:
2078:
108:
2817:
1227:
When counting the votes, we calculate the share of each grade for each of the votes cast. This is the candidate's "merit profile":
930:
68:
2667:
2613:
1563:
1503:
1443:
1384:
920:
670:
641:
581:
2465:
2794:
652:
177:
2593:
715:
75:
46:
1387:, then draw lines connecting the points on this graph. The place where this plot intersects 50% is each candidate's score.
357:
342:
327:
2636:
2621:
2440:
973:
593:
516:
437:
57:
2687:
2410:
2261:
2034:
1951:
1939:
1927:
1921:
1361:
1106:
1086:
405:
387:
228:
1786:, is the share of grades falling below the median. Then the complete score for GMJ is given by the following formula:
958:
2652:
2343:
1934:, including its resistance to tactical voting. It also shares most of its disadvantages (for example, it fails the
1074:. It was invented independently three times in the early 21st century. It was first suggested as an improvement on
849:
832:
799:
779:
563:
551:
521:
322:
280:
213:
657:
35:
2702:
2657:
2603:
2515:
705:
698:
182:
2692:
2578:
2536:
2455:
2380:
2316:
2274:
1998:
grade category, implying the chances of an undetermined election fall exponentially with the number of grades.
759:
687:
676:
539:
526:
509:
486:
464:
427:
417:
2311:
2717:
2707:
2682:
2498:
2375:
1967:
1935:
885:
739:
422:
2758:
2697:
2560:
2503:
1395:
Consider the same election as before, but relabeling the verbal grades as numbers on a scale from 0 to 6:
914:
794:
724:
531:
82:
2662:
2583:
2348:
2163:
1950:
The tie-breaking formula of the graduated majority judgment presents specific advantages over the other
1402:
A plot showing how the overall score of a candidate can be calculated using graduated majority judgment.
822:
662:
546:
352:
331:
263:
241:
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1014:
880:
2732:
2301:
1373:
953:
940:
908:
172:
2712:
2306:
1971:
1963:
859:
693:
346:
2753:
2363:
2126:
2106:
2072:
2015:
1926:
As an electoral system, the graduated majority judgment shares most of its advantages with other
1660:
1019:
890:
501:
285:
2321:
2189:
968:
2722:
2631:
2588:
2508:
2430:
2353:
2338:
2296:
2145:
2029:
1931:
1377:
1075:
925:
895:
817:
754:
588:
315:
290:
273:
141:
2763:
2395:
2251:
2236:
2118:
1071:
1006:
963:
854:
842:
556:
432:
258:
252:
234:
223:
218:
206:
167:
129:
1762:
1687:
1684:(when there is a tie, we define the median as halfway between the neighboring grades). Let
2811:
2727:
2568:
2546:
2358:
2279:
2269:
2247:
1991:
1090:
994:
827:
682:
647:
568:
479:
382:
305:
247:
125:
2190:"A little more democracy? Cartoons by Marjolaine Leray on the topic of Majority Judgment"
1115:(rated) ballot, which ask voters to give each candidate a separate grade, such as :
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2626:
2331:
2291:
2023:
1742:
1718:
1640:
1066:
864:
804:
789:
600:
469:
444:
295:
989:
2831:
2370:
2130:
1987:
873:
573:
361:
199:
162:
137:
1892:{\displaystyle n_{c}=\alpha _{c}+{\frac {1}{2}}{\frac {p_{c}-q_{c}}{1-p_{c}-q_{c}}}}
2385:
2326:
2039:
1112:
613:
377:
370:
300:
1962:
The function defined by the graduated majority judgment tie-breaking formula is a
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2531:
2470:
2390:
2286:
1360:
If only one candidate has the highest median grade, they are elected (as in all
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392:
337:
24:
2122:
2061:
Monotonicity and
Manipulability of Ordinal and Cardinal Social Choice Functions
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2477:
2005:
2778:
2773:
1398:
459:
454:
1093:
in which the winner is decided by the median rating rather than the mean.
1001:
2598:
1376:
method to break ties. This rule is easier to explain than others such as
710:
2107:"Tie-breaking the highest median: alternatives to the majority judgment"
2059:
2460:
1970:), whereas the functions of majority judgment and typical judgment are
496:
2748:
1340:
1082:" for the rule, arguing it was the best highest median voting rule.
2205:
1385:
the share of voters who assign an approval less than the given score
1353:
its median grade, while half the electors judge that he deserves
2209:
18:
1383:
Graphically, we can represent this by drawing a plot showing
1735:
a score strictly better than the median grade. The share of
148:
1916:
Advantages and disadvantages common to highest-median rules
1364:). Otherwise, the election uses a tie-breaking procedure.
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1721:
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2741:
2645:
2612:
2559:
2524:
2491:
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2409:
2260:
49:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
1946:Specific advantages of graduated majority judgment
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2678:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
2067:. Arizona State University. pp. 25–30.
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1372:Graduated majority judgment uses a simple
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109:Learn how and when to remove this message
1715:) refer to the share of electors giving
1397:
1229:
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2673:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
2451:Sequential proportional approval voting
2050:
1408:
136:
2070:
1338:For each candidate, we determine the
7:
1966:(as well as being almost-everywhere
1637:Say the median grade of a candidate
47:adding citations to reliable sources
2483:Indirect single transferable voting
1380:, and also guarantees continuity.
14:
2188:Leray, Marjolaine; Hogg, Carol.
2008:
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1000:
988:
936:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
582:Semi-proportional representation
214:First preference plurality (FPP)
23:
2838:Single-winner electoral systems
34:needs additional citations for
2594:Mixed ballot transferable vote
974:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
931:Moulin's impossibility theorem
896:Conflicting majorities paradox
16:Single-winner electoral system
1:
2077:: CS1 maint: date and year (
1111:Votes should be cast using a
800:Frustrated majorities paradox
58:"Graduated majority judgment"
2795:Comparison of voting systems
2637:Satisfaction approval voting
2622:Single non-transferable vote
2441:Proportional approval voting
1059:(GMJ), sometimes called the
969:Condorcet dominance theorems
909:Social and collective choice
2401:Graduated majority judgment
2035:Highest median voting rules
1952:highest-median voting rules
1928:highest-median voting rules
1922:Highest median voting rules
1677:{\displaystyle \alpha _{c}}
1362:highest median voting rules
1107:Highest median voting rules
1057:Graduated majority judgment
635:By mechanism of combination
406:Proportional representation
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2653:Condorcet winner criterion
2344:First-past-the-post voting
2133:– via Springer Link.
2123:10.1007/s00355-020-01269-9
1919:
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1087:highest median voting rule
833:Multiple districts paradox
564:Fractional approval voting
552:Interactive representation
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2800:Voting systems by country
2703:Mutual majority criterion
2658:Condorcet loser criterion
2604:Vote linkage mixed system
2516:Largest remainders method
2243:
2164:"Le jugement majoritaire"
2111:Social Choice and Welfare
2058:Jennings, Andrew (2010).
1911:Properties and advantages
1559:
1499:
1439:
780:Paradoxes and pathologies
629:Mixed-member proportional
624:Mixed-member majoritarian
619:By results of combination
510:Approval-based committees
2693:Majority loser criterion
2579:Additional member system
2537:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
2456:Single transferable vote
2381:Positional voting system
2317:Minimax Condorcet method
2275:Combined approval voting
959:Condorcet's jury theorem
760:Double simultaneous vote
735:Rural–urban proportional
730:Dual-member proportional
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648:Parallel (superposition)
540:Fractional social choice
527:Expanding approvals rule
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2718:Resolvability criterion
2708:Participation criterion
2683:Later-no-harm criterion
2499:Highest averages method
2026:, a similar voting rule
1936:participation criterion
1902:Additional tie-breaking
886:Tyranny of the majority
663:Fusion (majority bonus)
480:Quota-remainder methods
2759:First-preference votes
2698:Monotonicity criterion
2668:Independence of clones
2371:Simple majoritarianism
2105:Fabre, Adrien (2021).
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1020:Mathematics portal
926:Majority impossibility
915:Impossibility theorems
711:Negative vote transfer
532:Method of equal shares
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2663:Consistency criterion
2584:Alternative vote plus
2349:Instant-runoff voting
1894:
1781:
1779:{\displaystyle q_{c}}
1754:
1730:
1706:
1704:{\displaystyle p_{c}}
1679:
1652:
1401:
1070:, is a single-winner
823:Best-is-worst paradox
812:Pathological response
547:Direct representation
200:Single-winner methods
152:
2733:Seats-to-votes ratio
2504:Webster/Sainte-Laguë
1942:arbitrarily badly).
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1633:Mathematical formula
1007:Economics portal
954:Median voter theorem
173:Comparative politics
43:improve this article
2713:Plurality criterion
2312:Kemeny–Young method
1964:continuous function
1938:, and can fail the
995:Politics portal
706:Vote linkage system
677:Seat linkage system
264:Ranked-choice (RCV)
2754:Election threshold
2688:Majority criterion
2364:Supplementary vote
2016:Mathematics portal
1940:majority criterion
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1357:its median grade.
891:Discursive dilemma
850:Lesser evil voting
725:Supermixed systems
428:Largest remainders
286:Round-robin voting
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2723:Reversal symmetry
2632:Cumulative voting
2614:Semi-proportional
2589:Mixed single vote
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2554:
2431:Mixed single vote
2339:Exhaustive ballot
2302:Copeland's method
2297:Condorcet methods
2237:Electoral systems
2030:Majority judgment
1932:majority judgment
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1728:{\displaystyle c}
1650:{\displaystyle c}
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881:Dominance paradox
818:Perverse response
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388:Majority judgment
316:Positional voting
274:Condorcet methods
142:electoral systems
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2547:Imperiali quota
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2270:Approval voting
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1091:cardinal voting
1080:median judgment
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921:Arrow's theorem
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785:Spoiler effects
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569:Maximal lottery
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1243:
1240:
1237:
1234:
1223:
1222:
1220:
1218:
1216:
1213:
1211:
1209:
1207:
1203:
1202:
1200:
1197:
1195:
1193:
1191:
1189:
1187:
1183:
1182:
1180:
1178:
1176:
1174:
1172:
1170:
1167:
1163:
1162:
1159:
1157:
1155:
1153:
1151:
1149:
1147:
1143:
1142:
1139:
1136:
1133:
1130:
1127:
1124:
1121:
1105:Main article:
1102:
1099:
1089:, a system of
1067:Bucklin voting
1061:usual judgment
1052:
1051:
1049:
1048:
1041:
1034:
1026:
1023:
1022:
1010:
1009:
997:
984:
981:
980:
977:
976:
971:
966:
961:
956:
944:
943:
938:
933:
928:
923:
912:
907:
906:
903:
902:
899:
898:
893:
888:
883:
868:
867:
865:Turkey-raising
862:
857:
852:
838:
837:
836:
835:
825:
820:
808:
807:
805:Center squeeze
802:
797:
792:
790:Spoiler effect
783:
778:
777:
774:
773:
770:
769:
764:
763:
762:
749:By ballot type
745:
744:
743:
742:
737:
732:
722:
721:
720:
719:
718:
713:
703:
702:
701:
690:
667:
666:
665:
660:
655:
650:
632:
631:
626:
617:
612:
611:
608:
607:
604:
603:
601:Limited voting
598:
597:
596:
577:
576:
571:
566:
561:
560:
559:
554:
535:
534:
529:
524:
519:
505:
504:
499:
494:
489:
475:
474:
473:
472:
470:Localized list
467:
462:
457:
452:
442:
441:
440:
438:Biproportional
435:
430:
425:
409:
404:
403:
400:
399:
396:
395:
390:
385:
380:
366:
365:
350:
335:
311:
310:
309:
308:
303:
298:
293:
283:
269:
268:
267:
266:
255:
242:Instant-runoff
239:
238:
237:
229:Jungle primary
216:
205:Single vote -
203:
198:
197:
194:
193:
191:
190:
180:
175:
170:
165:
159:
156:
155:
145:
144:
134:
133:
117:
116:
31:
29:
22:
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2850:
2839:
2836:
2835:
2833:
2820:
2819:
2814:
2813:
2807:
2801:
2798:
2796:
2793:
2792:
2790:
2786:
2780:
2777:
2775:
2772:
2770:
2767:
2765:
2762:
2760:
2757:
2755:
2752:
2750:
2747:
2746:
2744:
2740:
2734:
2731:
2729:
2726:
2724:
2721:
2719:
2716:
2714:
2711:
2709:
2706:
2704:
2701:
2699:
2696:
2694:
2691:
2689:
2686:
2684:
2681:
2679:
2676:
2674:
2671:
2669:
2666:
2664:
2661:
2659:
2656:
2654:
2651:
2650:
2648:
2644:
2638:
2635:
2633:
2630:
2628:
2625:
2623:
2620:
2619:
2617:
2615:
2611:
2605:
2602:
2600:
2597:
2595:
2592:
2590:
2587:
2585:
2582:
2580:
2577:
2575:
2572:
2570:
2567:
2566:
2564:
2562:
2558:
2548:
2545:
2543:
2540:
2538:
2535:
2533:
2530:
2529:
2527:
2523:
2517:
2514:
2510:
2507:
2505:
2502:
2501:
2500:
2497:
2496:
2494:
2490:
2484:
2481:
2479:
2476:
2472:
2469:
2467:
2464:
2462:
2459:
2458:
2457:
2454:
2452:
2449:
2447:
2444:
2442:
2439:
2437:
2434:
2432:
2429:
2427:
2424:
2423:
2421:
2417:
2414:
2412:
2408:
2402:
2399:
2397:
2394:
2392:
2389:
2387:
2384:
2382:
2379:
2377:
2374:
2372:
2369:
2365:
2362:
2360:
2357:
2355:
2352:
2351:
2350:
2347:
2345:
2342:
2340:
2337:
2333:
2330:
2328:
2325:
2323:
2320:
2318:
2315:
2313:
2310:
2308:
2305:
2303:
2300:
2299:
2298:
2295:
2293:
2290:
2288:
2285:
2281:
2278:
2276:
2273:
2272:
2271:
2268:
2267:
2265:
2263:
2262:Single-winner
2259:
2255:
2253:
2249:
2242:
2238:
2231:
2226:
2224:
2219:
2217:
2212:
2211:
2208:
2198:
2191:
2184:
2181:
2169:
2165:
2159:
2156:
2151:
2147:
2140:
2137:
2132:
2128:
2124:
2120:
2116:
2112:
2108:
2101:
2099:
2097:
2095:
2093:
2091:
2089:
2085:
2080:
2074:
2063:
2062:
2054:
2051:
2045:
2041:
2038:
2036:
2033:
2031:
2028:
2025:
2022:
2021:
2017:
2011:
2006:
2001:
1999:
1997:
1993:
1989:
1988:ranked voting
1981:
1979:
1975:
1973:
1972:discontinuous
1969:
1965:
1957:
1955:
1953:
1945:
1943:
1941:
1937:
1933:
1929:
1923:
1915:
1910:
1908:
1901:
1899:
1881:
1877:
1873:
1868:
1864:
1860:
1857:
1850:
1846:
1842:
1837:
1833:
1824:
1821:
1816:
1811:
1807:
1803:
1798:
1794:
1771:
1767:
1746:
1738:
1722:
1714:
1696:
1692:
1669:
1665:
1644:
1632:
1630:
1623:
1621:
1612:
1609:
1607:
1604:
1601:
1598:
1595:
1592:
1591:
1587:
1584:
1581:
1578:
1575:
1572:
1569:
1567:
1565:
1564:Running total
1558:
1554:
1551:
1548:
1546:
1543:
1541:
1538:
1535:
1532:
1531:
1527:
1524:
1521:
1518:
1515:
1512:
1509:
1507:
1505:
1504:Running total
1498:
1494:
1491:
1488:
1486:
1483:
1481:
1478:
1475:
1472:
1471:
1467:
1464:
1461:
1458:
1455:
1452:
1449:
1447:
1445:
1444:Running total
1438:
1434:
1431:
1428:
1425:
1422:
1419:
1416:
1407:
1400:
1396:
1390:
1388:
1386:
1381:
1379:
1375:
1367:
1365:
1363:
1358:
1356:
1352:
1347:
1343:
1342:
1331:
1328:
1325:
1322:
1319:
1316:
1313:
1310:
1309:
1305:
1302:
1299:
1296:
1293:
1290:
1287:
1284:
1283:
1279:
1276:
1273:
1270:
1267:
1264:
1261:
1258:
1257:
1253:
1250:
1247:
1244:
1241:
1238:
1235:
1232:
1231:
1228:
1221:
1219:
1217:
1214:
1212:
1210:
1208:
1205:
1204:
1201:
1198:
1196:
1194:
1192:
1190:
1188:
1185:
1184:
1181:
1179:
1177:
1175:
1173:
1171:
1168:
1165:
1164:
1160:
1158:
1156:
1154:
1152:
1150:
1148:
1145:
1144:
1140:
1137:
1134:
1131:
1128:
1125:
1122:
1120:
1119:
1116:
1114:
1108:
1100:
1098:
1094:
1092:
1088:
1083:
1081:
1077:
1073:
1069:
1068:
1062:
1058:
1047:
1042:
1040:
1035:
1033:
1028:
1027:
1025:
1024:
1021:
1016:
1008:
1003:
998:
996:
991:
986:
985:
983:
982:
975:
972:
970:
967:
965:
964:May's theorem
962:
960:
957:
955:
952:
951:
950:
949:
942:
939:
937:
934:
932:
929:
927:
924:
922:
919:
918:
917:
916:
910:
905:
904:
897:
894:
892:
889:
887:
884:
882:
879:
878:
877:
876:
875:
874:majority rule
872:Paradoxes of
866:
863:
861:
858:
856:
853:
851:
848:
847:
846:
845:
844:
834:
831:
830:
829:
826:
824:
821:
819:
816:
815:
814:
813:
806:
803:
801:
798:
796:
793:
791:
788:
787:
786:
781:
776:
775:
768:
765:
761:
758:
757:
756:
753:
752:
751:
750:
741:
738:
736:
733:
731:
728:
727:
726:
723:
717:
714:
712:
709:
708:
707:
704:
700:
695:
691:
689:
684:
680:
679:
678:
675:
674:
673:
672:
668:
664:
661:
659:
656:
654:
651:
649:
646:
645:
644:
643:
638:
637:
636:
630:
627:
625:
622:
621:
620:
615:
614:Mixed systems
610:
609:
602:
599:
595:
592:
591:
590:
587:
586:
585:
584:
583:
575:
574:Random ballot
572:
570:
567:
565:
562:
558:
555:
553:
550:
549:
548:
545:
544:
543:
542:
541:
533:
530:
528:
525:
523:
520:
518:
515:
514:
513:
512:
511:
503:
500:
498:
495:
493:
490:
488:
485:
484:
483:
482:
481:
471:
468:
466:
463:
461:
458:
456:
453:
451:
448:
447:
446:
443:
439:
436:
434:
431:
429:
426:
424:
421:
420:
419:
418:Apportionment
416:
415:
414:
413:
407:
402:
401:
394:
391:
389:
386:
384:
381:
379:
376:
375:
374:
373:
372:
363:
359:
354:
353:Antiplurality
351:
348:
344:
339:
336:
333:
329:
324:
321:
320:
319:
318:
317:
307:
304:
302:
299:
297:
294:
292:
289:
288:
287:
284:
282:
281:Condorcet-IRV
279:
278:
277:
276:
275:
265:
260:
256:
254:
249:
245:
244:
243:
240:
236:
233:
232:
230:
225:
220:
217:
215:
212:
211:
210:
208:
201:
196:
195:
188:
184:
181:
179:
176:
174:
171:
169:
166:
164:
163:Social choice
161:
160:
158:
157:
151:
147:
146:
143:
139:
138:Social choice
135:
131:
127:
123:
122:
113:
110:
102:
91:
88:
84:
81:
77:
74:
70:
67:
63:
60: –
59:
55:
54:Find sources:
48:
44:
38:
37:
32:This article
30:
26:
21:
20:
2816:
2810:
2426:Mixed-member
2411:Proportional
2400:
2386:Score voting
2327:Ranked pairs
2246:Part of the
2245:
2196:
2183:
2172:. Retrieved
2167:
2158:
2149:
2139:
2114:
2110:
2060:
2053:
2040:Range voting
1995:
1985:
1976:
1961:
1949:
1925:
1905:
1736:
1712:
1636:
1627:
1624:Race analogy
1618:
1605:
1561:
1544:
1539:
1501:
1484:
1479:
1441:
1394:
1382:
1374:line-drawing
1371:
1368:Tie-breaking
1359:
1354:
1350:
1345:
1339:
1337:
1226:
1206:Candidate D
1186:Candidate C
1166:Candidate B
1146:Candidate A
1110:
1095:
1084:
1079:
1064:
1060:
1056:
1055:
947:
946:
913:
871:
870:
855:Exaggeration
841:
840:
811:
810:
784:
748:
747:
716:Mixed ballot
671:Compensatory
669:
642:compensatory
639:
634:
618:
580:
579:
538:
537:
508:
507:
478:
477:
465:List-free PR
410:
378:Score voting
369:
368:
314:
313:
301:Ranked pairs
272:
271:
204:
105:
99:January 2024
96:
86:
79:
72:
65:
53:
41:Please help
36:verification
33:
2769:Spoilt vote
2532:Droop quota
2471:Schulze STV
2446:Rural–urban
2391:STAR voting
2287:Borda count
2170:(in French)
2117:: 101–124.
1248:Acceptable
1135:Acceptable
1065:continuous
755:Single vote
658:Conditional
653:Coexistence
502:Quota Borda
492:Schulze STV
450:Closed list
393:STAR voting
338:Borda count
2788:Comparison
2542:Hare quota
2492:Allocation
2478:Spare vote
2466:Hare-Clark
2436:Party-list
2174:2021-02-08
2046:References
1958:Continuity
1759:, written
1713:proponents
1254:Excellent
1242:Tolerable
1233:Candidate
1141:Excellent
1129:Tolerable
860:Truncation
589:Cumulative
412:Party-list
187:By country
178:Comparison
69:newspapers
2779:Unseating
2774:Sortition
2376:Plurality
2252:Economics
2131:226196615
2073:cite book
1982:Rare ties
1874:−
1861:−
1843:−
1808:α
1737:opponents
1666:α
1413:Candidate
767:Dual-vote
460:Panachage
455:Open list
445:List type
323:Plurality
219:Two-round
207:plurality
130:Economics
2832:Category
2646:Criteria
2599:Scorporo
2248:politics
2002:See also
1930:such as
1351:at least
1346:majority
1245:Neutral
1132:Neutral
1113:cardinal
1085:It is a
487:Hare STV
126:Politics
124:A joint
2818:Project
2509:D'Hondt
2461:CPO-STV
2419:Systems
1391:Example
1355:at most
497:CPO-STV
347:Baldwin
296:Schulze
291:Minimax
209:methods
83:scholar
2812:Portal
2749:Ballot
2525:Quotas
2254:series
2129:
1990:, and
1629:vote.
1341:median
1236:Awful
1123:Awful
362:Coombs
132:series
85:
78:
71:
64:
56:
2742:Other
2561:Mixed
2193:(PDF)
2127:S2CID
2065:(PDF)
1996:every
1613:100%
1555:100%
1495:100%
1410:Grade
1251:Good
1138:Good
699:'MMP'
688:'AMS'
90:JSTOR
76:books
2250:and
2079:link
1610:75%
1602:35%
1599:20%
1596:10%
1588:25%
1585:25%
1582:15%
1579:15%
1576:10%
1552:76%
1549:64%
1536:19%
1528:24%
1525:12%
1522:13%
1519:13%
1516:19%
1513:17%
1492:85%
1489:68%
1476:17%
1468:15%
1465:18%
1459:20%
1456:21%
1453:15%
1332:25%
1329:25%
1326:15%
1323:15%
1320:10%
1306:24%
1303:12%
1300:13%
1297:13%
1294:19%
1291:17%
1280:15%
1277:18%
1271:20%
1268:21%
1265:15%
1239:Bad
1126:Bad
640:Non-
594:SNTV
183:List
140:and
128:and
62:news
2574:MMP
2119:doi
1739:of
1657:is
1606:50%
1593:1%
1573:9%
1570:1%
1545:51%
1540:38%
1533:2%
1510:2%
1485:58%
1480:39%
1473:2%
1462:9%
1450:2%
1344:or
1317:9%
1314:1%
1288:2%
1274:9%
1262:2%
1063:or
358:el.
343:el.
332:IRV
328:el.
45:by
2834::
2815:—
2195:.
2166:.
2148:.
2125:.
2115:56
2113:.
2109:.
2087:^
2075:}}
2071:{{
1954:.
1566:)
1560:C
1506:)
1500:B
1446:)
1440:A
1435:6
1432:5
1429:4
1426:3
1423:2
1420:1
1417:0
1311:C
1285:B
1259:A
1215:X
1199:X
1169:X
1161:X
694:NZ
683:UK
259:US
248:UK
231:)
224:US
2229:e
2222:t
2215:v
2199:.
2177:.
2152:.
2150:X
2121::
2081:)
1882:c
1878:q
1869:c
1865:p
1858:1
1851:c
1847:q
1838:c
1834:p
1825:2
1822:1
1817:+
1812:c
1804:=
1799:c
1795:n
1772:c
1768:q
1747:c
1723:c
1697:c
1693:p
1670:c
1645:c
1562:(
1502:(
1442:(
1045:e
1038:t
1031:v
696::
685::
364:)
355:(
349:)
340:(
334:)
325:(
261::
250::
226::
221:(
189:)
185:(
112:)
106:(
101:)
97:(
87:·
80:·
73:·
66:·
39:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
