Deterrence theory - Knowledge (XXG)

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about the defending state's expected behaviour in future conflicts. The credibilities of a defending state's policies are arguably linked over time, and reputations for resolve have a powerful causal impact on an attacking state's decision whether to challenge either general or immediate deterrence. The second approach argues that reputations have a limited impact on deterrence outcomes because the credibility of deterrence is heavily determined by the specific configuration of military capabilities, interests at stake, and political constraints faced by a defending state in a given situation of attempted deterrence. The argument of that school of thought is that potential attacking states are not likely to draw strong inferences about a defending states resolve from prior conflicts because potential attacking states do not believe that a defending state's past behaviour is a reliable predictor of future behavior. The third approach is a middle ground between the first two approaches and argues that potential attacking states are likely to draw reputational inferences about resolve from the past behaviour of defending states only under certain conditions. The insight is the expectation that decisionmakers use only certain types of information when drawing inferences about reputations, and an attacking state updates and revises its beliefs when a defending state's unanticipated behavior cannot be explained by case-specific variables.

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regime security are better served by defiance, or there are domestic political gains to be made from improving relations with the defending state. The second factor is an economic calculation of the costs that military force, sanctions, and other coercive instruments can impose and the benefits that trade and other economic incentives may carry. That is partly a function of the strength and flexibility of the attacking state's domestic economy and its capacity to absorb or counter the costs being imposed. The third factor is the role of elites and other key domestic political figures within the attacking state. To the extent that such actors' interests are threatened with the defending state's demands, they act to prevent or block the defending state's demands.

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seemingly resolved adversary. If all defending states have such incentives, potential attacking states may discount statements made by defending states along with any movement of military forces as merely bluffs. In that regard, rational deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate the credibility of a defending state's resolve. Those are actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat. States that bluff are unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat and military action for fear of committing themselves to an armed conflict.

1458:, said: Deterrence is working in the Ukraine crisis, just not for the right side. The United States and its allies failed to deter Russia from invading. The purpose of deterrence strategy is to prevent the conflict entirely, and there Washington failed badly. On the other hand, Russian deterrence is enjoying spectacular success. Russia has convinced the West that even a whisper of NATO military action in Ukraine would bring disastrous consequences. Putin threatens, blusters, uses the word “nuclear,” and the West wilts. 624:

and military co-operation into a crisis or militarized confrontation that threatens armed conflict and possibly war. The prevention of crises of wars, however, is not the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending states must be able to resist the political and the military demands of a potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential attacking nation under the threat of war, it cannot be claimed that deterrence has succeeded.

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equally, if not more, the art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence. Schelling says the capacity to harm another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state's behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be summarized that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory and is most successful when it is held in reserve.

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persuade the other guy to give in, when the only method at your disposal—threatening to push him off the cliff—would doom you both? Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer to the edge. That way, you don't have to convince him that you would do something totally irrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff. You just have to convince him that you are prepared to take a higher risk than he is of accidentally falling off the cliff. If you can do that, you win."

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and interpret intentions, the advantage of offense over defense, and weak actors and non-state actors can develop considerable cyber capabilities. Scholars have also debated the feasibility of launching highly damaging cyber attacks and engaging in destructive cyber warfare, with most scholars expressing skepticism that cyber capabilities have enhanced the ability of states to launch highly destructive attacks. The most prominent cyber attack to date is the

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state's costs of compliance and the greater need for the defending state's strategy to increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits of compliance. That is a challenge, as deterrence is by definition a strategy of limited means. George (1991) goes on to explain that deterrence sometimes goes beyond threats to the actual use of military force, but if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall short of full-scale use to succeed.

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orientation of potential attacking states generally is for the short term and is driven by concerns about military cost and effectiveness. For successful deterrence, defending states need the military capacity to respond quickly and strongly to a range of contingencies. Deterrence often fails if either a defending state or an attacking state underestimates or overestimates the other's ability to undertake a particular course of action.

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at stake for the defending state that would justify the risks of a military conflict. The argument is that defending states that have greater interests at stake in a dispute are more resolved to use force and more willing to endure military losses to secure those interests. Even less well-established arguments are the specific interests that are more salient to state leaders such as military interests and economic interests.

38: 1341:(MAD). Therefore, the period of détente was characterized by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, which lasted from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence then characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and relations with Russia until the onset of the 1264:

Logan have challenged this assertion. A 2023 study found that a state with nuclear weapons is less likely to be targeted by non-nuclear states, but that a state with nuclear weapons is not less likely to target other nuclear states in low-level conflict. A 2022 study by Kyungwon Suh suggests that nuclear superiority may not reduce the likelihood that nuclear opponents will initiate nuclear crises.

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the extent of an attacking state's vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions. In broad terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of noncompliance that it can impose on and the benefits of compliance it can offer to another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance.

1497:, said that Western fears about nuclear weapons and World War III have left it "fully deterred" and Putin "completely undeterred." The West have "ceded the initiative to the enemy." No attempt was made by NATO to deter Moscow with the threat of military force, wondered another expert. To the contrary, it was Russia’s deterrence that proved to be successful. 789:

costs on an attacking state in an armed conflict, and the attacking state believes that the defending state is resolved to use its available military forces. Huth goes on to explain the four key factors for consideration under rational deterrence theory: the military balance, signaling and bargaining power, reputations for resolve, interests at stake.

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reductions without the state becoming vulnerable, but it has been noted that there comes a point that further reductions may be undesirable, once minimal deterrence is reached, as further reductions beyond that point increase a state's vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to expand

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Scholars have also argued that leaders do not behave in ways that are consistent with the predictions of nuclear deterrence theory. Scholars have also argued that rational deterrence theory does not grapple sufficiently with emotions and psychological biases that make accidents, loss of self-control,

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Scholars have debated how cyber capabilities alter traditional understandings of deterrence, given that it may be harder to attribute responsibility for cyber attacks, the barriers to entry may be lower, the risks and costs may be lower for actors who conduct cyber attacks, it may be harder to signal

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give nations the potential to destroy their enemies but also the rest of humanity without drawing immediate reprisal because of the lack of a conceivable defense system and the speed with which nuclear weapons can be deployed. A nation's credible threat of such severe damage empowers their deterrence

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The central problem for a state that seeks to communicate a credible deterrent threat by diplomatic or military actions is that all defending states have an incentive to act as if they are determined to resist an attack in the hope that the attacking state will back away from military conflict with a

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Deterrence is often directed against state leaders who have specific territorial goals that they seek to attain either by seizing disputed territory in a limited military attack or by occupying disputed territory after the decisive defeat of the adversary's armed forces. In either case, the strategic

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must be sufficiently credible to raise the attacking state's perceived costs of noncompliance. A defending state having a superior military capability or economic strength in itself is not enough to ensure credibility. Indeed, all three elements of a balanced deterrence strategy are more likely to be

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Definition of deterrence from the Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics by Michael Keane: "The prevention or inhibition of action brought about by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. It assumes

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where proposed steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. Kissinger has argued, "The classical notion of deterrence was that there was some consequences before which aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesn't operate in any comparable way." Shultz said,

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in 1985. They "agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to

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A 2022 study by Brian Blankenship and Erik Lin-Greenberg found that high-resolve, low-capability signals (such as tripwires) were not viewed as more reassuring to allies than low-resolve, high-capability alternatives (such as forces stationed offshore). Their study cast doubt on the reassuring value

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provides further detail in relation to those factors. Proportionality refers to the relationship between the defending state's scope and nature of the objectives being pursued and the instruments available for use to pursue them. The more the defending state demands of another state, the higher that

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A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In international security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed by the leaders of one

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Most of the innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s. Historically, scholarship on deterrence has tended to focus on nuclear deterrence. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an extension of deterrence scholarship to areas that are not specifically about

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immoral in nature. In addition, he observes that deterrence theories serve to perpetuate a state of mutual assured destruction between nations over time. Holmes further argues that it is therefore both irrational and immoral to utilize a methodology for perpetuating international peace which relies

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According to Lennart Maschmeyer, cyber weapons have limited coercive effectiveness due to a trilemma "whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. These constraints pose a trilemma for actors because a gain in one variable tends to produce losses across the other two variables."

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Furthermore, Huth argues that both supporters and critics of rational deterrence theory agree that an unfavorable assessment of the domestic and international status quo by state leaders can undermine or severely test the success of deterrence. In a rational choice approach, if the expected utility

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Although costly signaling and bargaining power are more well established arguments in rational deterrence theory, the interests of defending states are not as well known. Attacking states may look beyond the short-term bargaining tactics of a defending state and seek to determine what interests are

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argue, two key sets of factors for successful deterrence are important: a defending state strategy that balances credible coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility and minimizes international and domestic constraints and

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While the army was dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took on a broader multinational dimension. The US policy on deterrence after the Cold War was outlined in 1995 in the

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columnist and one of Schelling's former students, anecdotally summarizes Schelling's reorientation of game theory thus: "ou're standing at the edge of a cliff, chained by the ankle to someone else. You'll be released, and one of you will get a large prize, as soon as the other gives in. How do you

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A successful deterrence policy must be considered in military terms but also political terms: International relations, foreign policy and diplomacy. In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic

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Scholars have debated whether having a superior nuclear arsenal provides a deterrent against other nuclear-armed states with smaller arsenals. Matthew Kroenig has argued that states with nuclear superiority are more likely to win nuclear crises, whereas Todd Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann and David C.

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is a key concept in rational deterrence theory. It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. This occurs because rational actors want to avoid

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There are three different arguments that have been developed in relation to the role of reputations in influencing deterrence outcomes. The first argument focuses on a defending state's past behavior in international disputes and crises, which creates strong beliefs in a potential attacking state

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Deterrence theorists have consistently argued that deterrence success is more likely if a defending state's deterrent threat is credible to an attacking state. Huth outlines that a threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial

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that must be taken into consideration is the domestic political and economic conditions in the attacking state affecting its vulnerability to deterrence policies and the attacking state's ability to compensate unfavourable power balances. The first factor is whether internal political support and

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As outlined by Huth, a policy of deterrence can fit into two broad categories: preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory (known as direct deterrence) or preventing an armed attack against another state (known as extended deterrence). Situations of direct deterrence often occur if

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Intrawar deterrence is deterrence within a war context. It means that war has broken out but actors still seek to deter certain forms of behavior. In the words of Caitlin Talmadge, "intra-war deterrence failures... can be thought of as causing wars to get worse in some way." Examples of intrawar

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becomes involved. The latter case has generated most interest in academic literature. Building on the two broad categories, Huth goes on to outline that deterrence policies may be implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat (known as immediate deterrence) or as strategy to prevent a

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brought his background in game theory to the subject of studying international deterrence. Schelling's (1966) classic work on deterrence presents the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now

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Deterrence theory has been criticized by numerous scholars for various reasons, the most basic being skepticism that decision makers are rational. A prominent strain of criticism argues that rational deterrence theory is contradicted by frequent deterrence failures, which may be attributed to

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Proponents of nuclear deterrence theory argue that newly nuclear-armed states may pose a short- or medium-term risk, but that "nuclear learning" occurs over time as states learn to live with new nuclear-armed states. Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller have however argued that there is a weak

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International relations scholars Dan Reiter and Paul Poast have argued that so-called "tripwires" do not deter aggression. Tripwires entail that small forces are deployed abroad with the assumption that an attack on them will trigger a greater deployment of forces. Dan Altman has argued that

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outlines that reciprocity involves an explicit understanding of linkage between the defending state's carrots and the attacking state's concessions. The balance lies in not offering too little, too late or for too much in return and not offering too much, too soon, or for too little return.

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Finally, coercive credibility requires that in addition to calculations about costs and benefits of co-operation, the defending state convincingly conveys to the attacking state that failure to co-operate has consequences. Threats, uses of force, and other coercive instruments such as

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was established, with peaceful co-existence was sought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although all of those factors contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of

1431:) not to threaten the United States, its interests, or allies. The document explains that such threats must also be used to ensure that nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining 1168:

In 1966, Schelling is prescriptive in outlining the impact of the development of nuclear weapons in the analysis of military power and deterrence. In his analysis, before the widespread use of assured second strike capability, or immediate reprisal, in the form of

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military force or action refrains from doing so. Scholars distinguish between "extended deterrence" (the protection of allies) and "direct deterrence" (protection of oneself). Rational deterrence theory holds that an attacker will be deterred if they believe

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An example shows that the problem extends to the perception of the third parties as well as main adversaries and underlies the way in which attempts at deterrence can fail and even backfire if the assumptions about the others' perceptions are incorrect.

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Timo S. Koster who served at NATO as Director of Defence Policy & Capabilities similarly argued: A massacre is taking place in Europe and the strongest military alliance in the world is staying out of it. We are deterred and Russia is not.

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argued in 1994 that nuclear weapons were obsolete in the "new world disorder" after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and he advocated reliance on precision guided munitions to secure a permanent military advantage over future adversaries.

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refers to the scholarship and practice of how threats of using force by one party can convince another party to refrain from initiating some other course of action. The topic gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the

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have all called upon governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and created the Nuclear Security Project to advance that agenda. In 2010, the four were featured in a documentary film entitled

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and loss of control over others likely. Frank C. Zagare has argued that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent and empirically inaccurate. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for

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There is a risk of unintended escalation in cyberspace due to difficulties in discerning the intent of attackers, and complexities in state-hacker relationships. According to political scientists Joseph Brown and

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deterrence include deterring adversaries from resorting to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons attacks or attacking civilian populations indiscriminately. Broadly, it involves any prevention of escalation.

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otherwise take an action refrains from doing so due to the consequences that the deterrer is perceived likely to take. "Immediate deterrence" is considered successful when an actor seriously contemplating

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the findings reinforce a key theoretical tenet of the nuclear revolution: Once states have achieved a secure second-strike capability, nuclear superiority does not confer additional political benefits.

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Since the consequence of a breakdown of the nuclear deterrence strategy is so catastrophic for human civilisation, it is reasonable to employ the strategy only if the chance of breakdown is zero.

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Deterrence is most likely to be successful when a prospective attacker believes that the probability of success is low and the costs of attack are high. Central problems of deterrence include the

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would devastate both parties. The central problem of deterrence revolves around how to credibly threaten military action or nuclear punishment on the adversary despite its costs to the deterrer.

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nuclear wars, and thus they neither start major conflicts nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into major conflicts—thus making it safe to engage in minor conflicts. For instance, during the

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of not using force is reduced by a declining status quo position, deterrence failure is more likely since the alternative option of using force becomes relatively more attractive.

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would be met with a nuclear response. Later Ukrainian attacks on the same fleet using a different communications system also caused deterrence, this time to the Russian Navy.

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The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats in limited force by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action. In

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Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly

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between neighboring states in which major powers like the United States do not directly intervene. On the other hand, situations of extended deterrence often occur when a

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in which a state possesses no more nuclear weapons than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking is presently the most common form of deterrence practiced by

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misperceptions. Here it's argued that misestimations of perceived costs and benefits by analysts contribute to deterrence failures, as exemplified in case of

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state to the leaders of another in an attempt to prevent the other state from resorting to the use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.

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The two most prominent deterrent strategies are "denial" (denying the attacker the benefits of attack) and "punishment" (inflicting costs on the attacker).

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tripwires do work to deter aggression, citing the Western deployment of forces to Berlin in 1948–1949 to deter Soviet aggression as a successful example.

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A successful nuclear deterrent requires a country to preserve its ability to retaliate by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or ensuring a

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Glenn Snyder also offers a broad definition of deterrence, as he argues that deterrence involves both the threat of sanction and the promise of reward.

4254: 6298: 1155: 415: 1661:"If you think of the people who are doing suicide attacks, and people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by definition not deterrable." 1357:'s arms build-up during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify the policy by concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the post-1979 6641: 6056:"Reviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. Holmes; Paths to Peace: Exploring the Feasibility of Sustainable Peace, Richard Smoke, Willis Harman" 4440: 1909: 1098: 6406: 6401: 6396: 7877: 7842: 6328: 1454:, many western hawks expressed the view that deterrence worked in that war but only in one way – in favor of Russia. Former US security advisor, 581:

often depends upon a president withstanding "the inevitable charges of appeasement that accompany any decision to negotiate with hostile powers.

4639: 4303:"An explosive Elon Musk biography is just hitting shelves. But the book's acclaimed author is already walking back a major claim | CNN Business" 3526: 3468: 1439:. The current tensions with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs are caused partly by the continuation of the policy of deterrence. 6661: 3928: 2736: 2272: 1068: 1058: 334: 5518: 1385:, who were fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, and several anticommunist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow of the 6760: 6271: 6235: 6177: 6149: 5538: 5490: 5388: 5342: 5296: 5159: 4460: 4220: 4180: 3946: 3768: 3682: 3558: 3090: 2855: 2774: 2722: 2676: 2600: 2258: 2204: 2158: 2112: 2061: 2023: 1970: 1927: 1084: 1073: 1063: 841: 486: 3717: 7659: 6666: 6656: 4528: 1257: 988: 408: 4903: 4280: 3402: 3032:

See, for example, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989)

2005: 1621:, which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation. 478:. Compellence has been characterized as harder to successfully implement than deterrence. Deterrence also tends to be distinguished from 7872: 6651: 6504: 6494: 2519: 1474: 1119: 1037: 578: 4837: 7476: 7011: 6809: 6421: 6411: 5696:

Zagare, Frank C. (2004), "Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory",

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Tavberidze, Vazha, (2022). "Former NATO Commander Says Western Fears Of Nuclear War Are Preventing A Proper Response To Putin,"

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One approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models of decision making (see

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attack on Iran's nuclear program. By 2019, the only publicly acknowledged case of a cyber attack causing a power outage was the

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Part of a state's nuclear arsenal must appear to be able to survive an attack by the adversary and be used for a retaliatory

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NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice

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The final expression of the full impact of deterrence during the cold war can be seen in the agreement between Reagan and

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throughout most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. One notable conflict was the

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under the belief that the United States will refuse to risk its own cities by assisting Western Europe in a nuclear war.

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exclusively upon the continuous development of new iterations of the very weapons which it is designed to prohibit.

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This article is about Deterrent in peace and conflict studies and nuclear weapons. For legal theory of justice, see

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era, philosophical objections to the reliance upon deterrence theories in general have also been raised on purely

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Since the early 2000s, there has been an increased focus on cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence has two meanings:

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Mueller, Karl (2021), Osinga, Frans; Sweijs, Tim (eds.), "The Continuing Relevance of Conventional Deterrence",

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during World War II, was thinking about how the next war would be fought. He said in a speech that month to the

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From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons

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The use of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of

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Huth, P. K. (1999), "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debate",

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Rynning, Sten (2021). "Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia". In Osinga, Frans; Sweijs, Tim (eds.).

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Deterrence is widely defined as any use of threats (implicit or explicit) or limited force intended to

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communication of threats and assurance. Deterrence does not necessarily require military superiority.

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Norms: the establishment and maintenance of norms that establish appropriate standards of behavior

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policies and fuels political coercion and military deadlock, which can produce proxy warfare.

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Entanglement and interdependence: interdependence between actors can have a deterrent effect

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Denial: preventing adversaries from achieving military objectives by defending against them

1250:

and spent substantial amounts of money and manpower on gaining relative influence over the

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presumption which prohibits the killing of innocent life. Consequently, such theories are

1706: 1646: 1601: 1470: 1428: 1174: 939: 806: 801: 733:

are supportive, and opposition within the defending state's domestic politics is limited.

556:

A distinction is sometimes made between nuclear deterrence and "conventional deterrence."

444: 356: 263: 247: 187: 48: 7559: 4987:"#SorryNotSorry: Why states neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations" 4452: 2015: 1919: 1697:

during arms negotiations between the United States and Russia allows each state to make

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The main source of disproportionality is an objective that goes beyond policy change to

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have noted that the implementation of such theories is inconsistent with a fundamental

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argued Musk had been deterred by Russia after the country's ambassador warned him an

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wrote in 1959 that a credible nuclear deterrent must be always ready but never used.

1215: 1190: 1182: 695: 655: 651: 647: 381: 371: 182: 5727: 5126: 4833: 4585: 4524: 4144: 3797:"Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes" 3149: 2515: 2377: 2214: 2194: 2168: 2148: 573:

and Kenneth Osgood, "Munich and appeasement have become among the dirtiest words in

470:

an actor from taking an action (i.e. maintain the status quo). Deterrence is unlike

7649: 7644: 7499: 7074: 6616: 6536: 6489: 6198: 4746: 4714: 4553: 4105:"The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?" 3065: 1783: 1506: 1219: 620:

military conflict or short-term threat from arising (known as general deterrence).

528: 376: 227: 84: 37: 5465: 5433: 5416: 5252: 5110: 4730: 4664: 4619: 4569: 4207:

Bell, Mark S.; Miller, Nicholas L. (2022), Narang, Vipin; Sagan, Scott D. (eds.),

3506: 3448: 2558: 2541: 5480: 5378: 5286: 4680: 4215:, Deterrence in the New Nuclear Age, Cornell University Press, pp. 209–229, 4170: 3758: 3672: 3586: 3548: 3080: 2666: 2590: 2051: 1960: 7766: 7569: 7564: 7544: 7340: 7325: 7134: 7104: 7039: 7029: 6859: 6794: 6770: 6702: 6581: 6561: 6474: 6459: 6374: 5449: 5236: 5094: 4066:"Nuclear balance and the initiation of nuclear crises: Does superiority matter?" 3674:

The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon

3490: 3432: 3403:"The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter Aggression" 2846: 2766: 1734: 1510: 1455: 1382: 1342: 1325: 1289: 1251: 1231: 750: 616: 566: 511: 391: 386: 339: 217: 197: 133: 99: 74: 65: 6097: 6055: 6013: 5482:

The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War

1551:

Escalation: raising the probability that costs will be imposed on the adversary

27:

Military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons

7395: 7049: 6586: 5530: 4941: 4875: 4081: 3878: 3812: 3141: 1778: 1669: 1605: 1386: 1378: 1333: 1305: 1301: 1227: 1223: 5719: 5597: 5260: 5213: 5118: 5060: 5010: 4949: 4883: 4825: 4817: 4786: 4738: 4688: 4627: 4577: 4516: 4128: 4120: 4008: 3886: 3820: 3638: 3514: 3456: 3279: 3213: 2961: 2895: 2640: 2567: 2542:"Strategies of Extended Deterrence: How States Provide the Security Umbrella" 2507: 2438: 2369: 2306: 2293:

Glaser, Bonnie S.; Weiss, Jessica Chen; Christensen, Thomas J. (2023-11-30).

7300: 7220: 7044: 6692: 6447: 6215: 5926: 4777: 4764: 4065: 1843: 1462: 1390: 324: 237: 232: 222: 111: 5873: 4801: 2499: 2336:"Active Denial: Redesigning Japan's Response to China's Military Challenge" 2122: 2094: 6256: 5897:"IS IT TIME TO JUNK OUR NUKES? THE NEW WORLD DISORDER MAKES THEM OBSOLETE" 5188:"The Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of Expectations" 5151: 4050: 3938: 2714: 2250: 800:

In an article celebrating Schelling's Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics,

7735: 7235: 6499: 6437: 6416: 5770: 5740: 5324: 5204: 5187: 4508: 3999: 3982: 3760:

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters

3433:"Advancing without Attacking: The Strategic Game around the Use of Force" 2483: 2360: 2351: 1718: 1638: 1432: 1277: 1211: 440: 163: 128: 6738: 5334: 5068: 5044: 5002: 4136: 4104: 3894: 3862: 3828: 3796: 3177:, Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 3–14 3173:

George, A (1991), "The General Theory and Logic of Coercive Diplomacy",

3019: 3003: 2104: 7456: 7446: 7124: 6124: 6082: 6040: 5998: 5605: 5573: 4033:

Lee, Kyung Suk; Kim, James D.; Jin, Hwalmin; Fuhrmann, Matthew (2023).

3646: 3614: 3385: 3287: 3255: 3221: 3189: 2969: 2937: 2903: 2871: 2446: 2414: 2335: 1722: 1528: 1394: 1195:

The state must not respond to false alarms of a strike by the adversary

914: 643:

threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks.

79: 4802:"Invisible Digital Front: Can Cyber Attacks Shape Battlefield Events?" 4034: 6591: 6479: 5523:

Before and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold War

4715:"Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace" 4420:

Bar, Shmuel, (2022). "Deterrence after Ukraine—a critical analysis,"

1494: 1292:

of communism, an aggressive stance on behalf of the US especially on

1288:

The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by the

675: 659: 6116: 6074: 6032: 5990: 5589: 4255:"The Nautilus Institute Nuclear Strategy Project: US FOIA Documents" 3630: 3491:"Trivial Tripwires?: Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance" 3377: 3271: 3205: 2953: 2887: 2430: 1328:

from Vietnam, the normalization of US relations with China, and the

5380:

Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition

4765:"The role of effects, saliencies and norms in US Cyberwar doctrine" 3744:"The Anatomy of Deterrence" as found in Strategy in the Missile Age 1268:

theoretical and empirical basis for notions of "nuclear learning."

569:

failed, contributes to deterrence theory. In the words of scholars

463:

context is the application of deterrence theory to avoid conflict.

7225: 6566: 6323: 5977:

Ullman, Richard H. (Summer 1989). "The Covert French Connection".

5288:

Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II

2802:"How Does Nuclear Deterrence Differ from Conventional Deterrence?" 1185:, there are three requirements for successful nuclear deterrence: 810: 667: 663: 36: 4172:

When Proliferation Causes Peace: The Psychology of Nuclear Crises

451:, according to which a full-scale nuclear attack on a power with 6343: 5517:

Jervis, Robert (2021), Bartel, Fritz; Monteiro, Nuno P. (eds.),

3175:

Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War

2872:"Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe" 1693:, such as China, India, Pakistan, Britain, and France. Pursuing 1370: 1362: 1345:

in the early 2010s. Since then, relations have been less clear.

1170: 730: 550: 492:"General deterrence" is considered successful when an actor who 6742: 6260: 6623: 1911:

Introduction: Cross-Domain Deterrence, from Practice to Theory

1332:, the policy of containment was abandoned and a new policy of 192: 89: 772:: interactions tend to be between dyads (or triads) of states 553:

was founded 1949 with a role including deterring aggression.

541:

No air attack, once it is launched, can be completely stopped

5450:"A New Concert for Europe: Security and Order After the War" 5045:"Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace" 2668:

The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics

2053:

The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics

726: 650:

capability. A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a

2759:

NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020

1493:, a retired four-star U.S. Air Force general and a former 3746:, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 264–304 3190:"Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies" 2007:

Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity

736:

The other important considerations outlined by Jentleson

51:(shown at Pier 86 in New York, its home as a museum ship) 5925:

Kristensen, Hans M, Robert S Norris, and Ivan Oelrich. "

6098:"Reviewed work: On War and Morality., Robert L. Holmes" 4209:"The Limits of Nuclear Learning in the New Nuclear Age" 1312:, who is taken to be the founder of this policy in his 6014:"Reviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. Holmes" 1538:

There are various ways to engage in cyber deterrence:

725:

achieved if other major international actors like the

4602:

Borghard, Erica D.; Lonergan, Shawn W. (2021-08-03).

3256:"Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference" 2938:"Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe" 2415:"What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980" 2056:. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 3–5. 678:, have only sea-based and air-based nuclear weapons. 654:, as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the 6205:. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 270 pp. 3364:

Jervis, Robert (1982). "Deterrence and Perception".

3004:"THE GHOST OF MUNICH: America's Appeasement Complex" 1545:

Punishment: the imposition of costs on the adversary

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(2016). 2150:Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War 1637:, have criticized nuclear deterrence theory. 1149: 778:: actors consider the choices of other actors 518:Costs × P(Costs) > Benefits × P(Benefits) 416: 8: 5801:"Documentary Advances Nuclear Free Movement" 4985:Brown, Joseph M.; Fazal, Tanisha M. (2021). 4447:, Oxford University Press, pp. 95–120, 4393:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( 3927:Sechser, Todd S.; Fuhrmann, Matthew (2017). 3861:Sechser, Todd S.; Fuhrmann, Matthew (2013). 3119: 3117: 3115: 3113: 3046: 3044: 3042: 3040: 3038: 2665:Art, Robert J.; Greenhill, Kelly M. (2015). 2050:Art, Robert J.; Greenhill, Kelly M. (2015). 1705:France has developed and maintained its own 4763:Farrell, Henry; Glaser, Charles L. (2017). 3002:Logevall, Fredrik; Osgood, Kenneth (2010). 2295:"Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence" 1300:. 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Other countries, such as the 7878:Subfields of political science 7843:International relations theory 6927:Evolutionarily stable strategy 6144:. Princeton University Press. 5964:Journal of Conflict Resolution 5485:. Cambridge University Press. 5383:. Princeton University Press. 5329:. Princeton University Press. 4806:Journal of Conflict Resolution 4334:Applebaum, Anne (2023-09-11). 3407:Texas National Security Review 3326:Schelling, T. C. (1966), "2", 3085:. Princeton University Press. 3066:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.25 2870:Huntington, Samuel P. (1983). 2627:Rhodes, Richard (1995-06-11). 1702:its nuclear arsenal secretly. 1443: 1403:International Court of Justice 827:Signaling and bargaining power 300:Alternative dispute resolution 1: 6855:Simultaneous action selection 6212:. Cambridge University Press. 5777:. 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Cornell University Press. 5241:Journal of Strategic Studies 5186:Maschmeyer, Lennart (2021). 4681:10.1080/09636412.2013.816122 4608:Journal of Strategic Studies 4301:Darcy, Oliver (2023-09-12). 3677:. Cornell University Press. 2703:Shimshoni, Jonathan (1988). 2239:Shimshoni, Jonathan (1988). 1759:Confidence-building measures 1683:mutually assured destruction 1533:2015 Ukraine power grid hack 1473:by denying to enable needed 637:mutually assured destruction 7256:Optional prisoner's dilemma 6987:Self-confirming equilibrium 5049:Strategic Studies Quarterly 3763:. Oxford University Press. 3619:Political Science Quarterly 3553:. W.W. Norton. p. 20. 2847:10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_4 2809:Strategic Studies Quarterly 2767:10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_3 2589:Glaser, Charles L. (1990). 2010:. Oxford University Press. 1959:Morgan, Patrick M. (1977). 1598:Russian invasion of Ukraine 7894: 7873:Peace and conflict studies 7721:Principal variation search 7437:Aumann's agreement theorem 7100:Strategy-stealing argument 7012:Trembling hand equilibrium 6942:Markov perfect equilibrium 6937:Mertens-stable equilibrium 6723:Peace and conflict studies 6339:Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 6183:Freedman, Lawrence. 2004. 5829:Ben Goddard (2010-01-27). 5235:Talmadge, Caitlin (2019). 4169:Cohen, Michael D. (2017). 4103:Horowitz, Michael (2009). 3867:International Organization 3801:International Organization 2488:International Interactions 1725:grounds. Scholars such as 1681:As opposed to the extreme 1588: 1504: 1408:Nicaragua v. United States 1339:mutual assured destruction 895:Mutual assured destruction 884: 839: 745:Rational deterrence theory 627:Furthermore, as Jentleson 449:mutual assured destruction 443:with regard to the use of 367:Peace and conflict studies 274:Mutual assured destruction 29: 7757:Combinatorial game theory 7416:Princess and monster game 6972:Quasi-perfect equilibrium 6897:Bayesian Nash equilibrium 6294: 6203:Psychology and Deterrence 6187:. New York: Polity Press. 6054:Rock, Stephen R. (1989). 6012:Meyers, Diana T. (1992). 5531:10.1017/9781108910194.008 4942:10.1017/S0002930000016894 4876:10.1017/S0002930000016894 4082:10.1177/00223433211067899 4070:Journal of Peace Research 3879:10.1017/S0020818312000392 3813:10.1017/S0020818312000367 3795:Kroenig, Matthew (2013). 3757:Kroenig, Matthew (2018). 3328:The Diplomacy of Violence 3142:10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.47 3079:Snyder, Glenn H. (1966). 2099:. Yale University Press. 1612:Misprediction of behavior 1604:can be seen as rewarding 881:Nuclear deterrence theory 782:Cost-benefit calculations 527:By November 1945 general 7838:Geopolitical terminology 7772:Evolutionary game theory 7505:Antoine Augustin Cournot 7391:Guess 2/3 of the average 7188:Strictly determined game 6982:Satisfaction equilibrium 6800:Escalation of commitment 6021:The Philosophical Review 5720:10.1177/0951629804041117 5572:Sagan, Scott D. (1994). 5454:The Washington Quarterly 4818:10.1177/0022002717737138 4769:Journal of Cybersecurity 4663:Lindsay, Jon R. (2013). 4121:10.1177/0022002708330388 3981:Logan, David C. (2022). 2147:Pape, Robert A. (1996). 1885:A Dictionary of Aviation 1883:Wragg, David W. (1973). 1450:By the beginning of the 1397:in Nicaragua led to the 1198:The state must maintain 764:Unitary actor assumption 537:Ohio Society of New York 453:second-strike capability 362:Non-aggression principle 320:Conflict style inventory 124:Nonviolent Communication 7777:Glossary of game theory 7376:Stackelberg competition 7002:Strong Nash equilibrium 6698:Foreign policy analysis 6510:International community 6288:International relations 6208:Morgan, Patrick. 2003. 5864:"The new abolitionists" 5377:Jervis, Robert (1976). 5323:Carson, Austin (2018). 4491:Nye, Joseph S. (2017). 4445:Cross-Domain Deterrence 4231:10.7591/j.ctv310vm0j.11 3671:Jervis, Robert (1989). 3613:Jervis, Robert (1979). 2196:Conventional Deterrence 1769:International relations 836:Reputations for resolve 792:The American economist 461:international relations 209:International relations 139:Speaking truth to power 7848:International security 7802:Tragedy of the commons 7782:List of game theorists 7762:Confrontation analysis 7472:Sprague–Grundy theorem 6992:Sequential equilibrium 6912:Correlated equilibrium 5901:washingtonpost dot com 5672:International Security 5578:International Security 5448:Jung, Karsten (2023). 5192:International Security 4497:International Security 4064:Suh, Kyungwon (2022). 3987:International Security 3366:International Security 3130:International Security 3082:Deterrence and Defense 2942:International Security 2876:International Security 2540:Lee, Do Young (2021). 2500:10.1080/03050620210390 2482:Fearon, James (2002). 2340:International Security 1819:Peace through strength 1591:Salami slicing tactics 776:Strategic interactions 591:international security 520: 508: 52: 7575:Jean-François Mertens 5152:10.1017/9781316422724 5043:Lin, Herbert (2012). 4778:10.1093/cybsec/tyw015 3939:10.1017/9781316227305 2800:Wirtz, James (2018). 2715:10.7591/9781501737831 2251:10.7591/9781501737831 1691:nuclear weapon states 1657:Nuclear Tipping Point 1491:Philip Breedlove 1393:. The funding of the 760:: actors are rational 516: 504: 284:Nuclear proliferation 40: 32:Deterrence (penology) 7828:Cold War terminology 7704:Search optimizations 7580:Jennifer Tour Chayes 7467:Revelation principle 7462:Purification theorem 7401:Nash bargaining game 7366:Bertrand competition 7351:El Farol Bar problem 7316:Electronic mail game 7281:Lewis signaling game 6825:Hierarchy of beliefs 6688:Comparative politics 6096:Lee, Steven (1992). 5205:10.1162/isec_a_00418 5140:Maurer, Tim (2018). 4509:10.1162/isec_a_00266 4261:on December 8, 2008. 4000:10.1162/isec_a_00434 3431:Altman, Dan (2018). 2352:10.1162/isec_a_00313 2215:10.7591/j.ctt1rv61v2 2169:10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v 1038:Nuclear-armed states 715:Coercive credibility 706:Secondly, Jentleson 350:Paradox of tolerance 7752:Bounded rationality 7371:Cournot competition 7321:Rock paper scissors 7296:Battle of the sexes 7286:Volunteer's dilemma 7158:Perfect information 7085:Dominant strategies 6922:Epsilon-equilibrium 6805:Extensive-form game 6470:Collective security 6354:United Nations (UN) 6141:On War and Morality 5876:on 17 February 2014 5335:10.2307/j.ctv346p45 5003:10.1017/eis.2021.18 4051:10.1093/isq/sqac067 3354:, October 12, 2005. 3352:The Washington Post 2105:10.2307/j.ctt5vm52s 1764:Decapitation strike 1631:nuclear disarmament 1585:Deterrence failures 1571:Intrawar deterrence 1298:sphere of influence 1200:command and control 891:Massive retaliation 641:massive retaliation 613:territorial dispute 531:, who led American 279:Nuclear disarmament 178:Conflict escalation 155:Conflict management 59:Conflict resolution 7731:Paranoid algorithm 7711:Alpha–beta pruning 7590:John Maynard Smith 7421:Rendezvous problem 7261:Traveler's dilemma 7251:Gift-exchange game 7246:Prisoner's dilemma 7163:Large Poisson game 7130:Bargaining problem 7035:Backward induction 7007:Subgame perfection 6962:Proper equilibrium 5945:2017-09-21 at the 5932:2015-06-20 at the 5903:. WP Company LLC. 3346:2019-09-25 at the 2096:Arms and Influence 1824:Prisoner's dilemma 1754:Chainstore paradox 1713:Ethical objections 1695:minimal deterrence 1687:minimum deterrence 1677:Minimum deterrence 1665:Stronger deterrent 1619:perfect deterrence 1437:biological weapons 1429:pre-emptive action 1399:Iran-Contra Affair 1377:, support for the 1294:developing nations 855:Interests at stake 722:economic sanctions 598:Arms and Influence 533:air raids on Japan 397:Track II diplomacy 345:Prisoner's dilemma 315:Conflict continuum 310:Conflict avoidance 95:Dispute resolution 53: 7853:Military strategy 7823:Cold War policies 7810: 7809: 7716:Aspiration window 7685:Suzanne Scotchmer 7640:Oskar Morgenstern 7535:Donald B. Gillies 7477:Zermelo's theorem 7406:Induction puzzles 7361:Fair cake-cutting 7336:Public goods game 7266:Coordination game 7140:Intransitive game 7070:Forward induction 6952:Pareto efficiency 6932:Gibbs equilibrium 6902:Berge equilibrium 6850:Simultaneous game 6736: 6735: 6708:International law 6577:Right of conquest 6542:National interest 6485:Deterrence theory 6383: 6382: 6370:League of Nations 6242:Waltz, Kenneth N. 6236:978-0-226-65002-9 6220:Patrick M. Morgan 6178:978-0-8179-1845-3 6151:978-1-4008-6014-2 5862:(30 March 2012). 5747:. June 16, 2011. 5540:978-1-108-90677-7 5519:"The Nuclear Age" 5492:978-1-108-48986-7 5390:978-1-4008-8511-4 5344:978-0-691-18424-1 5298:978-0-8014-2938-5 5161:978-1-107-12760-9 4462:978-0-19-090864-5 4409:Radio Free Europe 4222:978-1-5017-6701-2 4182:978-1-62616-495-6 3948:978-1-107-10694-9 3770:978-0-19-084918-4 3723:on 12 August 2017 3709:Krepon, Michael. 3684:978-0-8014-9565-6 3560:978-0-393-03810-1 3092:978-1-4008-7716-4 2857:978-94-6265-419-8 2776:978-94-6265-418-1 2724:978-1-5017-3783-1 2678:978-1-4422-3306-5 2602:978-1-4008-6202-3 2260:978-1-5017-3783-1 2206:978-1-5017-1325-5 2160:978-0-8014-3134-0 2114:978-0-300-00221-8 2063:978-1-4422-3306-5 2025:978-0-19-090960-4 1972:978-0-8039-0819-2 1929:978-0-19-090960-4 1809:Nuclear terrorism 1789:Nuclear blackmail 1774:Launch on warning 1749:Balance of terror 1707:nuclear deterrent 1699:nuclear stockpile 1423:document called " 1416:Mikhail Gorbachev 1330:Sino-Soviet Split 1166: 1165: 930:Nuclear explosion 899:Flexible response 579:US foreign policy 575:American politics 571:Frederik Logevall 547:nuclear weapons. 436:Deterrence theory 433: 432: 305:Anti-war movement 269:Nuclear blackmail 173:Communal violence 49:Regulus I missile 16:(Redirected from 7885: 7863:Nuclear strategy 7797:Topological game 7792:No-win situation 7690:Thomas Schelling 7670:Robert B. Wilson 7630:Merrill M. Flood 7600:John von Neumann 7510:Ariel Rubinstein 7495:Albert W. Tucker 7346:War of attrition 7306:Matching pennies 6947:Nash equilibrium 6870:Mechanism design 6835:Normal-form game 6790:Cooperative game 6763: 6756: 6749: 6740: 6728:Security studies 6520:Internationality 6515:Internationalism 6314: 6281: 6274: 6267: 6258: 6195:Richard N. Lebow 6172:, Hoover Press, 6156: 6155: 6135: 6129: 6128: 6102: 6093: 6087: 6086: 6069:(4): 1447–1448. 6060: 6051: 6045: 6044: 6018: 6009: 6003: 6002: 5974: 5968: 5956: 5950: 5923: 5917: 5916: 5914: 5912: 5892: 5886: 5885: 5883: 5881: 5872:. 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Holmes 1602:Frozen conflicts 1501:Cyber deterrence 1483:attack on Crimea 1446:-Cold War period 1445: 1310:George F. Kennan 1158: 1151: 1144: 1095: 989:Target selection 917: 903: 887:Nuclear strategy 818:Military balance 794:Thomas Schelling 563:Lesson of Munich 425: 418: 411: 55: 21: 7893: 7892: 7888: 7887: 7886: 7884: 7883: 7882: 7868:Nuclear warfare 7858:Military ethics 7813: 7812: 7811: 7806: 7740: 7726:max^n algorithm 7699: 7695:William Vickrey 7655:Reinhard Selten 7610:Kenneth Binmore 7525:David K. Levine 7520:Daniel Kahneman 7487: 7481: 7457:Negamax theorem 7447:Minimax theorem 7425: 7386:Diner's dilemma 7241:All-pay auction 7207: 7193:Stochastic game 7145:Mean-field game 7116: 7109: 7080:Markov strategy 7016: 6882: 6874: 6845:Sequential game 6830:Information set 6815:Game complexity 6785:Congestion game 6773: 6767: 6737: 6732: 6676: 6667:Postcolonialism 6628: 6557:Non-state actor 6552:Non-belligerent 6547:Neutral country 6532:Interventionism 6465:Co-belligerence 6426: 6379: 6358: 6303: 6290: 6285: 6255: 6199:Janice G. Stein 6165: 6163:Further reading 6160: 6159: 6152: 6137: 6136: 6132: 6117:10.2307/2216042 6100: 6095: 6094: 6090: 6075:10.2307/1961738 6058: 6053: 6052: 6048: 6033:10.2307/2185583 6016: 6011: 6010: 6006: 5991:10.2307/1148862 5976: 5975: 5971: 5959:Nalebuff, Barry 5957: 5953: 5947:Wayback Machine 5934:Wayback Machine 5924: 5920: 5910: 5908: 5894: 5893: 5889: 5879: 5877: 5858: 5857: 5853: 5844: 5842: 5828: 5827: 5823: 5814: 5812: 5799: 5798: 5794: 5784: 5782: 5769: 5768: 5764: 5754: 5752: 5739: 5738: 5734: 5711:10.1.1.335.7353 5695: 5694: 5690: 5681: 5679: 5666: 5665: 5661: 5652: 5650: 5637: 5636: 5632: 5623: 5621: 5590:10.2307/2539178 5571: 5570: 5566: 5558: 5556: 5541: 5516: 5515: 5511: 5502: 5500: 5493: 5478: 5477: 5473: 5447: 5446: 5442: 5414: 5413: 5409: 5400: 5398: 5391: 5376: 5375: 5371: 5362: 5360: 5345: 5322: 5321: 5317: 5308: 5306: 5299: 5281: 5280: 5276: 5234: 5233: 5229: 5185: 5184: 5180: 5171: 5169: 5162: 5139: 5138: 5134: 5092: 5091: 5087: 5078: 5076: 5042: 5041: 5037: 5028: 5026: 4984: 4983: 4976: 4967: 4965: 4923: 4922: 4918: 4909: 4907: 4857: 4856: 4852: 4843: 4841: 4799: 4798: 4794: 4762: 4761: 4754: 4712: 4711: 4704: 4662: 4661: 4654: 4645: 4643: 4601: 4600: 4593: 4551: 4550: 4543: 4534: 4532: 4490: 4489: 4480: 4472: 4470: 4463: 4438: 4437: 4428: 4419: 4415: 4406: 4402: 4385: 4379: 4377: 4363: 4362: 4358: 4349: 4347: 4333: 4332: 4325: 4316: 4314: 4300: 4299: 4295: 4286: 4284: 4271: 4270: 4266: 4253: 4252: 4248: 4240: 4238: 4223: 4206: 4205: 4201: 4192: 4190: 4183: 4168: 4167: 4163: 4154: 4152: 4102: 4101: 4097: 4063: 4062: 4058: 4032: 4031: 4027: 3980: 3979: 3975: 3966: 3964: 3949: 3926: 3925: 3921: 3912: 3910: 3860: 3859: 3855: 3846: 3844: 3794: 3793: 3789: 3780: 3778: 3771: 3756: 3755: 3751: 3741: 3740: 3736: 3726: 3724: 3720: 3713: 3708: 3707: 3703: 3694: 3692: 3685: 3670: 3669: 3665: 3656: 3654: 3631:10.2307/2149629 3612: 3611: 3607: 3598: 3596: 3584: 3583: 3579: 3570: 3568: 3561: 3546: 3545: 3541: 3532: 3530: 3488: 3487: 3483: 3474: 3472: 3430: 3429: 3425: 3416: 3414: 3401: 3400: 3393: 3378:10.2307/2538549 3363: 3362: 3358: 3348:Wayback Machine 3339: 3335: 3325: 3323: 3314: 3305: 3303: 3272:10.2307/2010511 3253: 3252: 3248: 3239: 3237: 3206:10.2307/2010405 3187: 3186: 3182: 3172: 3171: 3167: 3159: 3157: 3126:"Who Won Libya" 3123: 3122: 3111: 3102: 3100: 3093: 3078: 3077: 3073: 3050: 3049: 3036: 3031: 3027: 3001: 3000: 2996: 2987: 2985: 2954:10.2307/2538686 2935: 2934: 2930: 2921: 2919: 2888:10.2307/2538699 2869: 2868: 2864: 2858: 2835: 2834: 2830: 2821: 2819: 2815: 2804: 2799: 2798: 2794: 2777: 2756: 2755: 2751: 2742: 2740: 2725: 2702: 2701: 2697: 2688: 2686: 2679: 2664: 2663: 2659: 2650: 2648: 2626: 2625: 2621: 2612: 2610: 2603: 2588: 2587: 2583: 2539: 2538: 2534: 2525: 2523: 2481: 2480: 2473: 2464: 2462: 2431:10.2307/2010184 2412: 2411: 2396: 2387: 2385: 2333: 2332: 2325: 2316: 2314: 2299:Foreign Affairs 2292: 2291: 2287: 2278: 2276: 2261: 2238: 2237: 2233: 2224: 2222: 2207: 2192: 2191: 2187: 2178: 2176: 2161: 2146: 2145: 2141: 2132: 2130: 2115: 2092: 2091: 2082: 2073: 2071: 2064: 2049: 2048: 2044: 2035: 2033: 2026: 2003: 2002: 1991: 1982: 1980: 1973: 1958: 1957: 1948: 1939: 1937: 1930: 1907: 1906: 1902: 1895: 1882: 1881: 1877: 1872: 1867: 1861: 1857: 1853: 1848: 1829:Reagan Doctrine 1814:Nuclear warfare 1744: 1715: 1679: 1667: 1647:Henry Kissinger 1627: 1625:Suicide attacks 1614: 1593: 1587: 1582: 1573: 1513: 1505:Main articles: 1503: 1471:Black Sea fleet 1469:on the Russian 1448: 1351: 1322: 1286: 1274: 1175:nuclear weapons 1162: 1113: 1093: 1083: 1052: 907:Nuclear weapons 901: 885:Main articles: 883: 870: 857: 844: 838: 829: 820: 807:Washington Post 802:Michael Kinsley 747: 717: 704: 684: 682:Proportionality 587: 525: 445:nuclear weapons 429: 357:Liaison officer 264:Nuclear warfare 248:Multilateralism 188:Just war theory 35: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 7891: 7889: 7881: 7880: 7875: 7870: 7865: 7860: 7855: 7850: 7845: 7840: 7835: 7830: 7825: 7815: 7814: 7808: 7807: 7805: 7804: 7799: 7794: 7789: 7784: 7779: 7774: 7769: 7764: 7759: 7754: 7748: 7746: 7742: 7741: 7739: 7738: 7733: 7728: 7723: 7718: 7713: 7707: 7705: 7701: 7700: 7698: 7697: 7692: 7687: 7682: 7677: 7672: 7667: 7662: 7660:Robert Axelrod 7657: 7652: 7647: 7642: 7637: 7635:Olga Bondareva 7632: 7627: 7625:Melvin Dresher 7622: 7617: 7615:Leonid Hurwicz 7612: 7607: 7602: 7597: 7592: 7587: 7582: 7577: 7572: 7567: 7562: 7557: 7552: 7550:Harold W. Kuhn 7547: 7542: 7540:Drew Fudenberg 7537: 7532: 7530:David M. Kreps 7527: 7522: 7517: 7515:Claude Shannon 7512: 7507: 7502: 7497: 7491: 7489: 7483: 7482: 7480: 7479: 7474: 7469: 7464: 7459: 7454: 7452:Nash's theorem 7449: 7444: 7439: 7433: 7431: 7427: 7426: 7424: 7423: 7418: 7413: 7408: 7403: 7398: 7393: 7388: 7383: 7378: 7373: 7368: 7363: 7358: 7353: 7348: 7343: 7338: 7333: 7328: 7323: 7318: 7313: 7311:Ultimatum game 7308: 7303: 7298: 7293: 7291:Dollar auction 7288: 7283: 7278: 7276:Centipede game 7273: 7268: 7263: 7258: 7253: 7248: 7243: 7238: 7233: 7231:Infinite chess 7228: 7223: 7217: 7215: 7209: 7208: 7206: 7205: 7200: 7198:Symmetric game 7195: 7190: 7185: 7183:Signaling game 7180: 7178:Screening game 7175: 7170: 7168:Potential game 7165: 7160: 7155: 7147: 7142: 7137: 7132: 7127: 7121: 7119: 7111: 7110: 7108: 7107: 7102: 7097: 7095:Mixed strategy 7092: 7087: 7082: 7077: 7072: 7067: 7062: 7057: 7052: 7047: 7042: 7037: 7032: 7026: 7024: 7018: 7017: 7015: 7014: 7009: 7004: 6999: 6994: 6989: 6984: 6979: 6977:Risk dominance 6974: 6969: 6964: 6959: 6954: 6949: 6944: 6939: 6934: 6929: 6924: 6919: 6914: 6909: 6904: 6899: 6894: 6888: 6886: 6876: 6875: 6873: 6872: 6867: 6862: 6857: 6852: 6847: 6842: 6837: 6832: 6827: 6822: 6820:Graphical game 6817: 6812: 6807: 6802: 6797: 6792: 6787: 6781: 6779: 6775: 6774: 6768: 6766: 6765: 6758: 6751: 6743: 6734: 6733: 6731: 6730: 6725: 6720: 6715: 6710: 6705: 6700: 6695: 6690: 6684: 6682: 6678: 6677: 6675: 6674: 6669: 6664: 6659: 6654: 6649: 6647:English school 6644: 6642:Constructivism 6638: 6636: 6630: 6629: 6627: 6626: 6621: 6620: 6619: 6614: 6612:Non-aggression 6609: 6604: 6599: 6589: 6584: 6579: 6574: 6569: 6564: 6559: 6554: 6549: 6544: 6539: 6534: 6529: 6528: 6527: 6522: 6512: 6507: 6502: 6497: 6492: 6487: 6482: 6477: 6472: 6467: 6462: 6457: 6456: 6455: 6450: 6445: 6434: 6432: 6428: 6427: 6425: 6424: 6419: 6414: 6409: 6404: 6399: 6393: 6391: 6385: 6384: 6381: 6380: 6378: 6377: 6372: 6366: 6364: 6360: 6359: 6357: 6356: 6351: 6346: 6341: 6336: 6331: 6326: 6320: 6318: 6311: 6305: 6304: 6302: 6301: 6295: 6292: 6291: 6286: 6284: 6283: 6276: 6269: 6261: 6254: 6253:External links 6251: 6250: 6249: 6239: 6224:James J. Wirtz 6213: 6210:Deterrence Now 6206: 6191:Jervis, Robert 6188: 6181: 6164: 6161: 6158: 6157: 6150: 6130: 6111:(4): 559–562. 6088: 6046: 6027:(2): 481–484. 6004: 5979:Foreign Policy 5969: 5951: 5918: 5887: 5860:Hugh Gusterson 5851: 5821: 5792: 5762: 5732: 5704:(2): 107–141, 5688: 5659: 5645:. 2023-02-26. 5630: 5564: 5539: 5509: 5491: 5471: 5440: 5427:(4): 544–560. 5407: 5389: 5369: 5343: 5315: 5297: 5283:Legro, Jeffrey 5274: 5247:(6): 864–887. 5227: 5178: 5160: 5132: 5105:(3): 452–481. 5085: 5035: 4997:(4): 401–417. 4974: 4936:(3): 425–479. 4916: 4870:(3): 425–479. 4850: 4812:(2): 317–347. 4792: 4752: 4725:(2): 316–348. 4702: 4675:(3): 365–404. 4652: 4614:(3): 534–569. 4591: 4564:(3): 452–481. 4541: 4478: 4461: 4426: 4413: 4400: 4356: 4323: 4293: 4279:. 2022-03-09. 4264: 4246: 4221: 4199: 4181: 4161: 4115:(2): 234–257. 4095: 4076:(2): 337–351. 4056: 4025: 3993:(4): 172–215. 3973: 3947: 3919: 3873:(1): 173–195. 3853: 3807:(1): 141–171. 3787: 3769: 3749: 3734: 3701: 3683: 3663: 3625:(4): 617–633. 3605: 3577: 3559: 3539: 3481: 3423: 3409:. 2021-06-02. 3391: 3356: 3333: 3312: 3266:(4): 466–501. 3260:World Politics 3246: 3200:(2): 143–169. 3194:World Politics 3180: 3165: 3109: 3091: 3071: 3034: 3025: 2994: 2928: 2862: 2856: 2828: 2792: 2775: 2749: 2723: 2695: 2677: 2657: 2633:The New Yorker 2619: 2601: 2581: 2552:(5): 761–796. 2532: 2471: 2425:(4): 496–526. 2419:World Politics 2394: 2346:(4): 128–169. 2323: 2285: 2259: 2231: 2205: 2185: 2159: 2139: 2113: 2080: 2062: 2042: 2024: 1989: 1971: 1946: 1928: 1900: 1893: 1874: 1873: 1871: 1868: 1866: 1865: 1854: 1852: 1849: 1847: 1846: 1841: 1839:Tripwire force 1836: 1831: 1826: 1821: 1816: 1811: 1806: 1801: 1796: 1794:Nuclear ethics 1791: 1786: 1781: 1776: 1771: 1766: 1761: 1756: 1751: 1745: 1743: 1740: 1714: 1711: 1678: 1675: 1666: 1663: 1629:Advocates for 1626: 1623: 1613: 1610: 1586: 1583: 1581: 1578: 1572: 1569: 1556: 1555: 1552: 1549: 1546: 1543: 1524: 1523: 1520: 1502: 1499: 1479:Anne Applebaum 1447: 1441: 1389:government in 1367:Saddam Hussein 1361:government of 1350: 1347: 1321: 1318: 1285: 1282: 1273: 1270: 1258:Bernard Brodie 1203: 1202: 1196: 1193: 1164: 1163: 1161: 1160: 1153: 1146: 1138: 1135: 1134: 1133: 1132: 1127: 1122: 1117: 1107: 1106: 1101: 1096: 1087: 1077: 1076: 1071: 1066: 1064:United Kingdom 1061: 1056: 1041: 1040: 1034: 1033: 1032: 1031: 1026: 1021: 1016: 1011: 1006: 1001: 996: 991: 986: 980: 979: 974: 969: 963: 962: 957: 952: 947: 942: 937: 932: 924: 923: 919: 918: 910: 909: 882: 879: 877:of tripwires. 869: 866: 856: 853: 840:Main article: 837: 834: 828: 825: 819: 816: 786: 785: 779: 773: 767: 761: 746: 743: 716: 713: 703: 700: 683: 680: 672:United Kingdom 586: 583: 524: 521: 512:game-theoretic 431: 430: 428: 427: 420: 413: 405: 402: 401: 400: 399: 394: 389: 384: 379: 374: 369: 364: 359: 354: 353: 352: 347: 337: 332: 330:Family therapy 327: 322: 317: 312: 307: 302: 294: 293: 289: 288: 287: 286: 281: 276: 271: 266: 258: 257: 253: 252: 251: 250: 245: 240: 235: 230: 225: 220: 212: 211: 205: 204: 203: 202: 201: 200: 190: 185: 180: 175: 167: 166: 160: 159: 158: 157: 149: 148: 144: 143: 142: 141: 136: 131: 126: 121: 120: 119: 117:Party-directed 109: 108: 107: 102: 97: 87: 82: 77: 69: 68: 62: 61: 26: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 7890: 7879: 7876: 7874: 7871: 7869: 7866: 7864: 7861: 7859: 7856: 7854: 7851: 7849: 7846: 7844: 7841: 7839: 7836: 7834: 7831: 7829: 7826: 7824: 7821: 7820: 7818: 7803: 7800: 7798: 7795: 7793: 7790: 7788: 7785: 7783: 7780: 7778: 7775: 7773: 7770: 7768: 7765: 7763: 7760: 7758: 7755: 7753: 7750: 7749: 7747: 7745:Miscellaneous 7743: 7737: 7734: 7732: 7729: 7727: 7724: 7722: 7719: 7717: 7714: 7712: 7709: 7708: 7706: 7702: 7696: 7693: 7691: 7688: 7686: 7683: 7681: 7680:Samuel Bowles 7678: 7676: 7675:Roger Myerson 7673: 7671: 7668: 7666: 7665:Robert Aumann 7663: 7661: 7658: 7656: 7653: 7651: 7648: 7646: 7643: 7641: 7638: 7636: 7633: 7631: 7628: 7626: 7623: 7621: 7620:Lloyd Shapley 7618: 7616: 7613: 7611: 7608: 7606: 7605:Kenneth Arrow 7603: 7601: 7598: 7596: 7593: 7591: 7588: 7586: 7585:John Harsanyi 7583: 7581: 7578: 7576: 7573: 7571: 7568: 7566: 7563: 7561: 7558: 7556: 7555:Herbert Simon 7553: 7551: 7548: 7546: 7543: 7541: 7538: 7536: 7533: 7531: 7528: 7526: 7523: 7521: 7518: 7516: 7513: 7511: 7508: 7506: 7503: 7501: 7498: 7496: 7493: 7492: 7490: 7484: 7478: 7475: 7473: 7470: 7468: 7465: 7463: 7460: 7458: 7455: 7453: 7450: 7448: 7445: 7443: 7440: 7438: 7435: 7434: 7432: 7428: 7422: 7419: 7417: 7414: 7412: 7409: 7407: 7404: 7402: 7399: 7397: 7394: 7392: 7389: 7387: 7384: 7382: 7379: 7377: 7374: 7372: 7369: 7367: 7364: 7362: 7359: 7357: 7356:Fair division 7354: 7352: 7349: 7347: 7344: 7342: 7339: 7337: 7334: 7332: 7331:Dictator game 7329: 7327: 7324: 7322: 7319: 7317: 7314: 7312: 7309: 7307: 7304: 7302: 7299: 7297: 7294: 7292: 7289: 7287: 7284: 7282: 7279: 7277: 7274: 7272: 7269: 7267: 7264: 7262: 7259: 7257: 7254: 7252: 7249: 7247: 7244: 7242: 7239: 7237: 7234: 7232: 7229: 7227: 7224: 7222: 7219: 7218: 7216: 7214: 7210: 7204: 7203:Zero-sum game 7201: 7199: 7196: 7194: 7191: 7189: 7186: 7184: 7181: 7179: 7176: 7174: 7173:Repeated game 7171: 7169: 7166: 7164: 7161: 7159: 7156: 7154: 7152: 7148: 7146: 7143: 7141: 7138: 7136: 7133: 7131: 7128: 7126: 7123: 7122: 7120: 7118: 7112: 7106: 7103: 7101: 7098: 7096: 7093: 7091: 7090:Pure strategy 7088: 7086: 7083: 7081: 7078: 7076: 7073: 7071: 7068: 7066: 7063: 7061: 7058: 7056: 7055:De-escalation 7053: 7051: 7048: 7046: 7043: 7041: 7038: 7036: 7033: 7031: 7028: 7027: 7025: 7023: 7019: 7013: 7010: 7008: 7005: 7003: 7000: 6998: 6997:Shapley value 6995: 6993: 6990: 6988: 6985: 6983: 6980: 6978: 6975: 6973: 6970: 6968: 6965: 6963: 6960: 6958: 6955: 6953: 6950: 6948: 6945: 6943: 6940: 6938: 6935: 6933: 6930: 6928: 6925: 6923: 6920: 6918: 6915: 6913: 6910: 6908: 6905: 6903: 6900: 6898: 6895: 6893: 6890: 6889: 6887: 6885: 6881: 6877: 6871: 6868: 6866: 6865:Succinct game 6863: 6861: 6858: 6856: 6853: 6851: 6848: 6846: 6843: 6841: 6838: 6836: 6833: 6831: 6828: 6826: 6823: 6821: 6818: 6816: 6813: 6811: 6808: 6806: 6803: 6801: 6798: 6796: 6793: 6791: 6788: 6786: 6783: 6782: 6780: 6776: 6772: 6764: 6759: 6757: 6752: 6750: 6745: 6744: 6741: 6729: 6726: 6724: 6721: 6719: 6716: 6714: 6711: 6709: 6706: 6704: 6701: 6699: 6696: 6694: 6691: 6689: 6686: 6685: 6683: 6679: 6673: 6670: 6668: 6665: 6663: 6660: 6658: 6655: 6653: 6650: 6648: 6645: 6643: 6640: 6639: 6637: 6635: 6631: 6625: 6622: 6618: 6615: 6613: 6610: 6608: 6605: 6603: 6600: 6598: 6595: 6594: 6593: 6590: 6588: 6585: 6583: 6580: 6578: 6575: 6573: 6570: 6568: 6565: 6563: 6560: 6558: 6555: 6553: 6550: 6548: 6545: 6543: 6540: 6538: 6535: 6533: 6530: 6526: 6523: 6521: 6518: 6517: 6516: 6513: 6511: 6508: 6506: 6503: 6501: 6498: 6496: 6493: 6491: 6488: 6486: 6483: 6481: 6478: 6476: 6473: 6471: 6468: 6466: 6463: 6461: 6458: 6454: 6451: 6449: 6446: 6444: 6441: 6440: 6439: 6436: 6435: 6433: 6429: 6423: 6420: 6418: 6415: 6413: 6410: 6408: 6405: 6403: 6400: 6398: 6395: 6394: 6392: 6390: 6386: 6376: 6373: 6371: 6368: 6367: 6365: 6361: 6355: 6352: 6350: 6347: 6345: 6342: 6340: 6337: 6335: 6332: 6330: 6327: 6325: 6322: 6321: 6319: 6315: 6312: 6310: 6309:Organizations 6306: 6300: 6297: 6296: 6293: 6289: 6282: 6277: 6275: 6270: 6268: 6263: 6262: 6259: 6252: 6247: 6243: 6240: 6237: 6233: 6229: 6225: 6221: 6217: 6214: 6211: 6207: 6204: 6200: 6196: 6192: 6189: 6186: 6182: 6179: 6175: 6171: 6167: 6166: 6162: 6153: 6147: 6143: 6142: 6134: 6131: 6126: 6122: 6118: 6114: 6110: 6106: 6099: 6092: 6089: 6084: 6080: 6076: 6072: 6068: 6064: 6057: 6050: 6047: 6042: 6038: 6034: 6030: 6026: 6022: 6015: 6008: 6005: 6000: 5996: 5992: 5988: 5984: 5980: 5973: 5970: 5966: 5965: 5960: 5955: 5952: 5948: 5944: 5941: 5940: 5935: 5931: 5928: 5922: 5919: 5906: 5902: 5898: 5895:Nitze, Paul. 5891: 5888: 5875: 5871: 5870: 5865: 5861: 5855: 5852: 5840: 5836: 5832: 5825: 5822: 5810: 5806: 5802: 5796: 5793: 5780: 5776: 5775:The Economist 5772: 5766: 5763: 5750: 5746: 5745:The Economist 5742: 5736: 5733: 5729: 5725: 5721: 5717: 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