Intention - Knowledge (XXG)

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intentions and a mean multiple correlation of .76 for the equation predicting intentions from both attitudes and norms. With similar objectives but larger samples, Sheppard et al.'s and van den Putte's meta-analyses estimated correlations of .53 and .62 for the prediction of behavior and multiple correlations of .66 and .68, respectively, for the prediction of intentions. All these studies have reflected the strong correlation that exists between people's attitudes, social norms and their intentions, as well as between their intention and the prediction of their behaviors. However, these correlations do not remain unchanged across all the conditions in people's life. Although people are likely to develop intentions to perform the action in question if they have a favorable attitude and perceive the behavior as controllable, then people's perception of control would be irrelevant to intentions when people have negative attitudes and perceive normative pressure not to perform certain actions. Research has also shown that people are more likely to perform an action if they have previously formed the corresponding intentions. Their intentions to perform the action appear to derive from attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. To state an example: The reason one may be motivated to consume alcohol after work is determined by several factors: (1) Intention. The idea that drinking can help an individual relieve stress and enjoy one's time, for example, can greatly influence the attitude towards post-work drinking. (2) Subjective norms in one's surroundings. This factor is mainly cultural, so how much a society values and rewards drinking, but also strongly influenced by one's immediate social circle's values about this specific issue. (3) Perceived behavioural control towards the intended behaviour, specifically regarding the amounts of alcohol consumed. (4) Trends in behaviour. The longer the behaviour has been influenced by the previous factors, the more likely the behaviour is prone to be repeated as the original intention becomes reinforced.

283:. An action-desire is a desire to perform an action. On this view, to intend to do sport tomorrow is to have a desire to do sport tomorrow together with a belief that one will do sport tomorrow. Some accounts also hold that this belief is based on the desire: one believes that one will do it because one desires to do it. A similar definition sees intentions as "self-fulfilling expectations that are motivated by a desire for their fulfillment and that represent themselves as such". An important virtue of this approach is its simplicity and its explanatory power. It also manages to account for the fact that there seems to be a close relationship between what one believes, what one desires, and what one intends. But various arguments against this reduction have been presented in the contemporary literature. These often take the form of counterexamples, in which there is both a corresponding belief and a desire without an intention or an intention without one of these components. This is sometimes explained in relation to the idea that intentions involve a form of commitment to or settledness on the intended course of action by the agent. But this aspect is not present in beliefs and desires by themselves. For example, when considering whether to respond to an insult through retaliation, the agent may have both a desire to do so and a belief that they will end up doing this, based on how they acted in the past. But the agent may still lack the corresponding intention since they are not fully decided. It is also possible to have an intention to do something without believing that one actually will do it, for example, because the agent had similar intentions earlier and also failed to act on them back then or because the agent is unsure whether they will succeed. But it has been argued that a weaker relation between intentions and beliefs may be true, e.g. that intentions involve a belief that there is a chance of achieving what one intends. 349:

represents itself as the cause of going to the gym. One important motivation for accepting a self-referentiality theory is to explain a certain type of case: a case in which the behavior is just like it was intended, but the intention either did not cause the behavior at all or did not cause it in the right way. For example, the agent intends to shoot an intruder, is then startled by a moving shadow, which causes their finger to twitch, thereby shooting the intruder. It is often claimed that in such cases, the behavior in question does not constitute an intentional action, i.e. that the agent did not shoot the intruder intentionally, despite intending to shoot the intruder and shooting the intruder. This paradox can be solved through self-referentiality theories. The behavior in question is not an intentional action because the intention was not properly realized: it was part of the intention to cause the behavior, which did not happen in the right way. It is usually accepted that intentions have to cause the corresponding behavior in the right way for intentional actions to arise. But the claim that this happens on the level of the content of the intention, i.e. that the intention represents itself as causing the behavior, is often contested. Instead, it has been argued that the content of intentions consists only of the corresponding action plan without representing the intention itself and its causal relation to the execution of this plan.

557:. Deliberation involves formulating promising courses of action and assessing their value by considering the reasons for and against them. An example of this type of intention formation is a student who is up all night thinking about whether to major in English and then finally decides to do so. But not all decisions are preceded by deliberation and not every act of deliberation results in a decision. Another type of intention formation happens without making any explicit decision. In such cases, the agent just finds themselves committed to the corresponding course of action without consciously deciding for it or against its alternatives. This is the case for many actions done out of habit. For example, habitually unlocking the office door in the morning is usually an intentional action that happens without a prior explicit decision to do so. It has been argued that decisions can be understood as a type of mental action that consists in resolving uncertainty about what to do. Decisions are usually seen as a momentary change from not having the intention to having it. This contrasts with deliberation, which normally refers to a drawn-out process. But these technical distinctions are not always reflected in how the terms are used in ordinary language. 870:" refers to a specific form of language structure used for reference to the present and the future but also for ongoing and habitual events in the past. For example, ‘He writes/is writing/wrote/was writing/will write letters.’ People are more likely to interpret the event as ongoing, and likely to resume the action in the future when it has been described with the imperfective verb aspect. Similarly, using present tense to describe an action as ongoing may strengthen intentions to perform the same action in the future. Previous research has showed that both information on past behavior and their attitude towards such behavior play crucial roles in predicting people's future behavioral tendency. Recent research done by Carrera and others concluded that verb tense may not have direct influence on intentions, however it could still affect the type of information used as a basis of behavioral intentions. When participants described a past episode using the present tense, they consistently used the more concrete past behavior as a basis for their intentions. In contrast, when participants described a past episode using the past tense, they consistently used the more abstract attitude as a basis for their intentions. 573:. They also help guide the action itself and try to coordinate the agent's behavior over time. A similar function of intentions is to coordinate one's behavior with the behavior of other agents, either by forming intentions together or by reacting to the intentions others already have. This enables various complex forms of cooperation. Not every form of human behavior is guided by intentions. This concerns, for example, bodily reflexes like sneezing or other uncontrolled processes like digestion, which happen without following a previously devised mental plan. Intentions are intimately related to practical reason, i.e. to the reasons for which we act. These reasons are often explained in terms of beliefs and desires. For example, the agent's reason to cross a road may consist in their desire to reach the other side and their belief that this is achieved by crossing it. Because of this close connection to behavior, intentions are frequently used to explain why people engage in certain behavior. Such explanations are often teleological in the sense that they cited the intended goal as the reason for the behavior. 606:

or over shoot a target, or attempt to perform an action but their hand slipped. The aim of the study was to determine whether the children were able to interpret the intention of the adult, regardless of the actual action performed. Young children have a tendency to imitate other people's actions. The outcome measure was what the child chose to re-enact—the actual event (literal motions), or the adult's goal, which was not accomplished. The results of the study suggested that 18-month-olds are able to infer unseen goals and intentions of others based on their actions. Infants who saw unsuccessful attempts at a target act and infants who saw the target act imitated the act at a higher rate than infants who saw neither the act nor an attempt. Similar paradigms were conducted with children 9 months old and 15 months old. Nine-month-olds did not respond to the unsuccessful attempt demonstrations; however, 15-month-olds acted similarly to the 18-month-olds. This suggests that between 9 months and 15 months of age the ability to infer intentions in other people develops.

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many courses of action are too complex to be represented at once in full detail. Instead, usually only proximal intentions involve detailed representations while distal intentions may leave their object vague until it becomes more relevant to the task at hand. But distal intentions still play an important role in guiding the formation of proximal intentions. A simple plan to buy batteries at the close-by electronics store, for example, involves many steps, like putting on shoes, opening one's door, closing and locking it, going to the traffic light, turning left, etc. These steps are not represented in full detail while the agent is putting on their shoes. Central to this process is the agent's ability to monitor the progress in relation to the proximal intention and to adjust the current behavior accordingly. In this way, intention has the capacity to coordinate the agent's behavior over time. While both proximal and distal intentions are relevant for one's sense of agency, it has been argued that distal intentions lead to a stronger sense of agency.

383:. The agent's commitment to the course of action in question consists in their active execution of the plan. But not all forms of human behavior are intentional. Raising one's hand may happen intentionally or unintentionally, for example, when a student wants to signal to the teacher that they have a question in contrast to an involuntary bodily reflex. It is often held that a central aspect of immediate intentions is that the agent knows what they are doing and why they are doing it. This means that the action is accompanied by a certain form of knowledge that is absent in mere purposive behavior. This aspect is sometimes used to contrast the behavior of humans and animals. There is no general agreement that all intentional actions are accompanied by this type of knowledge. One reason to doubt this is that even for intentional actions, the agent is not always able to articulate what they are doing and why they are doing it. Some defenders try to explain this by holding that the corresponding knowledge is there, even if it is not conscious. 610:

desired. When outcomes are achieved without the action of the individual directed at the goal, intention is not attributed to the actor; rather, the event is considered an accident. Research by Astington and colleagues (1993) found that 3-year-olds are skilled at matching goals to outcomes to infer intention. If another individual's goals match an outcome, 3-year-olds are able to conclude that the action was done “on purpose.” Conversely, when goals do not match outcomes, the children labeled the individual's actions as accidental. Children may come to distinguish between desire and intention when they learn to view the mind as a medium for representations of the world. Astington argues that initially desire is undifferentiated from intention in that both function as a goal state. Children then develop a more mature command of understanding other's intentions when they are able to represent an action as caused by a prior intention that is separate from desire.

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actually drinks the toxin the next day, all that matters is that they have the intention to do so by the end of today. The puzzle concerns the question of whether it is possible to really form this intention. The reason for doubting this is that once the agent has formed the intention and received the money, they have no reason anymore to actually drink the toxin: this step is optional. But if they know all along that they will not drink the toxin after all, it is highly questionable whether they can actually form the corresponding intention. This is closely related to the idea that intending something entails believing that one will do it. But since the agent has no reason to actually do it once they have received the money, they would not believe that they would do it. This counts against the idea that they can intend it to begin with.

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pointing intended to direct and share intention rather than request an object), reveals the understanding of others as attentional and intentional agents (e.g. Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007). This understanding is indicated by object-directed reactions to pointing (rather than focusing on the hand). Pointing is also thought to denote perspective-taking ability and understanding of intention, as the individual must be able to understand that the actor is attending to the object and, perhaps most importantly, that the actor is attempting to communicate information regarding the referent. The development of pointing is thought to reach a critical stage at around 9 to 12 months in normally developing children (e.g. Leung & Rheingold, 1981; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Schaffer, 2005). Liszkowski,

319:. The claim that intentions are accompanied by desires is generally accepted. But there are various arguments against the claim that intentions are nothing but desires. They often focus on cases where people intend to do something different from their predominant desire. For example, the agent may intend to go to the gym even though they have a much stronger desire to go to the pub instead. This may be the case because the agent thinks that going to the gym is better even though this is not in tune with their desires. Another counterexample comes from cases where the agent has not yet formed an intention even though one desire is predominant. A closely related theory understands intentions as dispositions to act and desires as dispositions to form intentions, i.e. as higher-order dispositions to act. 299:, sees intentions as evaluative attitudes. On his view, desires are conditional evaluative attitudes while intentions are unconditional evaluative attitudes. This means that desires see their object as positive in a certain respect while intentions see their object as positive overall or all things considered. So the agent may have a desire to go to the gym because it is healthy whereas their intention to go to the gym is based on the evaluation that it is good all things considered. This theory is closely related to the belief-desire theory explained above since it also includes the idea that beliefs are involved in intentions. Here the belief in question is not a belief that one will do the action but a belief that the action in question is a means towards the positively evaluated end. 235:

share the same content with other mental states, like beliefs and desires. But the different mental states are distinguished from each other concerning their attitudes. Admiring the idea of helping the poor, for example, is different from intending to help the poor, even though both states share the same plan as their content. One difference between desires and intentions is that intentions impose more restrictions on their contents. This includes that intentions are directed at possible courses of action, i.e. that they involve something the agent can do or at least thinks they can do. Desires, on the other hand, do not involve this form of restriction. In this sense, it is possible to desire sunny weather for tomorrow but not to intend sunny weather for tomorrow.

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all-out judgment that the intended course of action is good. On this view, intentions evaluate their intended course of action as good all things considered. This aspect stands in contrast to desires, which evaluate their object merely as good in some sense but leave it open whether it is bad in another sense. Someone who is still deliberating whether to perform a certain action, for example, has not yet committed themselves to performing it and therefore lacks the corresponding intention. It has been argued that this form of commitment or being-settled-on is unique to intentions and is not found in other mental states like beliefs or desires. In this sense, intentions may be based on or accompanied by beliefs and desires but are not reducible to them.

460:, like urges or experiences of dizziness, which are outside the domain of rationality. Various criteria for the rationality of intentions have been proposed. Some hold that intentions are based on desires and beliefs and that, therefore, their rationality depends on these desires and beliefs. On this view, desires present certain goals, beliefs present the means needed to achieve these goals and intentions constitute commitments to realize the means towards these goals. In this sense, an intention that is based on irrational states is itself irrational. For example, the intention to heal oneself through the power of crystals is irrational if it is based on an irrational belief concerning the 888:

getting rid of a despised enemy. Opponents may claim that the moral difference in question only concerns the evaluation of the doctor as a person but not of their action. On this view, there is a difference between the moral values of persons and of actions: intentions concern the moral value of persons but not of actions. The intention principle is usually also rejected by consequentialists. They hold that only the consequences of an action matter but not how it was motivated. According to utilitarians, for example, an action is right if it produces the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In some cases, even actions performed with bad intentions may have this effect.

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reason. The question then is whether doing something for a reason is possible without having a corresponding intention. This is especially relevant for simple actions that are part of bigger routines. Walking to the cinema, for example, involves taking various steps. According to this argument, each step is an intentional action but the agent does not form a distinct intention for each step. Instead, most of them are not explicitly represented by the mind. Another counterexample against the thesis that performing an action intentionally involves intending to perform this action is based on the awareness of unintended side-effects, sometimes referred to as

375:. In some cases, the intention may point very far into the future, as when a teenager decides they want to become president one day. In other cases, the formation of the prospective intention only slightly precedes the action, as when the agent intends to scratch their back and does so right away. The commitment to the course of action is reversible. So if the agent encounters good reasons later on for not going through with it, the intention may be dropped or reformulated. In this sense, having a prospective intention to perform a specific action does not ensure that this action will actually be performed later on. 340:

a different appointment at the same time at a different location. Another objection is based on the observation that not all intentions are successful, i.e. that one can intend to do something but fail to do it. For example, one may intend to follow the shortest route home but take a wrong turn and thereby fail to perform the corresponding action. In such cases, it may be argued that the intention was present whereas the action was absent, i.e. the agent intended to take the shortest route but did not take the shortest route. The possibility of the two coming apart would suggest that they are not identical.

920:, but not a means. On this view, for example, terror bombing an ammunition factory in order to weaken the enemy's resolve by killing all the civilians working in it is impermissible. But performing the same attack as a tactical bombing in order to reduce the enemy's ammunition supply is permissible, even if the same amount of civilian deaths were foreseen as a side effect. Many of the arguments directed at the intention principle also apply to the doctrine of double effect. Additional arguments focus on the difficulty of drawing a general distinction between intended means and foreseen side-effects. 597:. Theory of mind research attempts to map how children come to understand the mind as a representational device for the world. This research has focused on the development of knowledge that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are different from one's own. A basic ability to comprehend other people's intentions based on their actions is critical to the development of theory of mind. Social, cognitive and developmental psychological research has focused on the question: How do young children develop the ability to understand other people's behaviors and intentions? 533:. For example, an intention to go to the supermarket may be based on another intention: the intention to eat. Because of this dependence, the agent would not have formed the earlier intention if the latter intention had been absent. In normal cases, the instrumental intention disappears if the intention it is based on does not exist anymore. In the example above, the agent may drop the intention to go to the supermarket if their doctor recommends them to start fasting. But there are special cases in which the instrumental intention persists nonetheless, sometimes referred to as 590:

conceptualize how people and animals differ from objects. Much of behavior is caused by intentions, and understanding intentions helps to interpret these behaviors. Second, intentions are integral to an understanding of morality. Children learn to assign praise or blame based on whether actions of others are intentional. Intention is also necessary to understand and predict the plans and future actions of others. Understanding the intentions and motives of others aids in the interpretation of communication, and the achievement of cooperative goals.

740:, a specific intent is required. This distinction is closely related to the difference between direct and indirect intent, but not identical to it. Direct intent refers to the desire to bring about a specific outcome. Indirect intent is about an almost certain outcome of an action that the agent is aware of but does not actively want. For example, if Ben intends to murder Ann with a stone by throwing it at her through a closed window then murdering Ann is a direct intent while breaking the window is an indirect intent. 255:" even though the two are closely related. Intentionality is the more general term: it refers to the power of minds to represent or to stand for things, properties, and states of affairs. Intentions are one form of intentionality since their contents represent possible courses of action. But there are other forms of intentionality, like simple beliefs or perceptions, that do not involve intentions. The adjective "intentional" is ambiguous since it can refer either to intentions or to intentionality. 650:

to predict the internal mental states and potential future actions of others. Research on biological motion has found cells in the primate superior temporal polysensory area (STP) that respond specifically to biological motion. In addition, there are brain regions, including the superior temporal sulcus, that respond to biological but not non-biological motion. These findings suggest that humans may have a biologically-based affinity for spotting and interpreting purposeful, biological motions.

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been suggested how intentions are related to beliefs. On the one hand, it seems impossible to intend to do something one beliefs to be impossible. Some accounts go even further and suggest that intentions involve the belief that one will perform the action in question. Besides that, it has been suggested that beliefs are necessary for intentions to connect the behavior to the intended goal. On this view, intentions involve the belief that the intended behavior would cause the intended goal.

686:, or neural regions, including the premotor cortex, and parietal cortex, that activate both when individuals are engaging in an action, and when they are observing the actions of others. This suggests individuals may be simulating the motor movements via internal representations of their own motor movements. Thus, research indicates that humans are hard-wired to notice biological motion, infer intention, and use previous mental representations to predict future actions of others. 505:, like declaring a meeting to be closed when one intends to open it. Freud sees such phenomena not as unintentional errors but ascribes to them a deeper meaning as expressions of unconscious wishes. As a window to the unconscious, interpreting the unconscious intentions behind such phenomena and raising the patient's awareness of them are important aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis. But there is no general agreement as to whether this type of behavior should be seen as 307:, i.e. that people do not always do what they believe would be best to do. An example of akrasia is an author who believes it would be best to work on his new book but ends up watching TV instead, despite his unconditional evaluative attitude in favor of working. In this sense, intentions cannot be unconditional evaluative attitudes since it is possible to intend to do one alternative while having an unconditional evaluative attitude towards another alternative. 833:

to form the intention today but not a reason to perform the action tomorrow. So the reason for forming the intention is different from the reason for performing the action. This is sometimes expressed by saying that the agent has the "wrong type of reason" to form the intention. On this account, it is impossible to form the intention because the right type of reason for the intention is derivative of the reason for the action itself, which is absent.

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in a certain behavior. Understanding the behavior of others in terms of intentions already happens in early childhood. Important in this context is the role of gestures, pointing, attention, and eye movement to understand the intentions of others and to form shared intentions. In the philosophy of action, a central question is whether it is true for all intentional actions that they are caused or accompanied by intentions. The

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this goal. At first, unconscious intentions are usually ascribed to the agent by spectators and may only be avowed by the agent themselves retrospectively. But this form of explanation is not always conclusive, since, at least for some cases, other explanations are available as well. For example, some behavior may be explained as the execution of a blind habit, which may occur with neither consciousness nor intention.

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Pelphrey, 2005). Intention may be ascribed to an individual based on where in space that individual is attending. Intention is understood not only through actions and the manipulation of objects, but by tracking eye movements. Research in this area is focused on how humans develop the understanding that eye gaze indicates that the observer may be psychologically connected to the referent.

424:: they involve side effects that the agent puts up with in order to realize their main intention. For example, Ted is unaware that smoking causes bladder cancer, but he is aware that it helps him to deal with stress and that it causes lung cancer. His reason for smoking is to deal with stress. Increasing his risk of lung cancer is a side effect he puts up with. So when smoking, Ted 469:

to become healthy but is unwilling to exercise. In such a case, it may still be rational for the agent to desire to become healthy, but intending it is not. This principle is expressed in the proverb "he who wills the end, wills the means". It has also been suggested that additional requirements of rationality concern the consistency between one's beliefs and one's intentions.

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incorrectly predicting one's own behavior. But various belief-desire theories are unable to explain this normative difference. Other arguments focus on the dissimilarities between these states. For example, one can desire impossible things but one cannot intend to do what one thinks is impossible. And whereas beliefs can be true or false, this does not apply to intentions.

5373: 804:, an action is an event that is intentional under some description. On this view, it is a central aspect of actions that they are caused by an agent's mental state: their intention. Another important aspect is that this causation happens in the right way, i.e. that the intention causes the event it planned and that the event is caused by employing the agent's 464:. But irrationality can also arise if two intentions are not consistent with each other, i.e. if the agent intends both to perform one action and to perform another action while believing that these two actions are incompatible with each other. A closely related form of irrationality applies to the relation between means and ends. This so-called 6408: 367:

this action since the agent has committed themselves to following them when the time comes. In this sense, it is sometimes held that desires evaluate their object only concerning one specific aspect while the commitments in intentions are based on an all-out evaluation. On this view, the intended course of action is not just evaluated as

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intention" itself. On this view, it is incoherent to talk of the mental states in question as unconscious intentions. The reason given for this is that intending something must be accompanied by some form of self-knowledge on the side of the agent about what is intended. This would not be possible if the mental state is unconscious.

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intention and not drink the toxin or (2) form the intention and drink the toxin. Since the second option maximizes utility, it is rational to follow it and drink the toxin. The difficulty for this approach concerns explaining how the agent can hold onto their intention to drink the toxin after they have received the money.

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intention. Having the unconditional intention to return the book, on the other hand, involves planning to return it independent of the friend's behavior. Unconditional intentions are stronger in the sense that the agent is fully committed to the course of action without relying on the presence of a triggering condition.

117:. It states that intending to do something consists in desiring it the most. Opponents of this approach have articulated various counterexamples with the goal of showing that intentions do not always coincide with the agent's strongest desire. A different approach to the theories mentioned so far is due to 887:

to a suffering and terminally ill patient who consents. Defenders of the intention principle may claim that it depends on the doctor's intention whether this action is permissible. Specifically, this concerns whether it is done with the intention to relieve the patient's pain or with the intention of

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value of the corresponding actions. This is sometimes termed the "intention principle": the thesis that whether an action is morally permissible sometimes depends on the agent's intention for performing this action. On this view, an otherwise permissible act may be impermissible if it is motivated by

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Various philosophers agree that it is impossible to form this type of intention. Their goal is often to find a general principle explaining why this is the case. Various accounts focus on the idea that the reason to perform the action is absent when it is time to perform it. So the agent has a reason

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Gestures are often recognized as a tool indicative of higher social reasoning. In order to engage in or understand a gesture, an individual has to recognize it as an indicator of an object or event separate from the self or the actor. It is thought that pointing, especially declarative pointing (i.e.

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Thus, research suggests that by the age of fifteen months, humans are capable of understanding intentional acts in others. The ability to distinguish between intention and desire develops in early childhood. Gestures and object-directed actions have also been studied in connexion with the development

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From an early age, typically-developing children parse human actions in terms of goals, rather than in terms of movements in space, or muscle movements. Meltzoff (1995) conducted a study in which 18-month-olds were shown an unsuccessful act. For instance, children watched an adult accidentally under

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intentions. Unconscious intentions are often used to explain cases where an agent behaves a certain way without being aware of this. This is especially relevant if the behavior is clearly directed at a goal while the agent does not consciously intend to pursue this goal or is not even aware of having

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holds that it is irrational to intend to perform one action without intending to perform another action while believing that this latter action is necessary to achieve the former action. For example, it would be irrational to intend to become healthy if the agent believes that exercising is necessary

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consequences intended obliquely carry more weight on a moral level than unintentional bad consequences. There is no consensus whether obliquely intended behavior constitutes an intentional action, e.g. whether it is correct to state that smokers aware of the dangers intentionally damage their health.

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An important difference among intentions is that between prospective and immediate intentions. Prospective intentions, also called "prior intentions", are forward-looking: they are plans held by the agent to perform some kind of action in the future. They are different from merely desiring to perform

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are concerned with a more remote future. Immediate intentions, on the other hand, are intentions that guide the agent while they are performing the action in question. They are also called "intentions-in-action" or "act-related" intentions. The term "intention" usually refers to anticipated means or

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Some philosophers have rejected this close link between action and intention. This criticism is based on the idea that a person can perform an action intentionally without having a corresponding intention to perform this action. Doing something intentionally is usually associated with doing it for a

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Neuroimaging research suggests that biological motion is processed differently from other types of motion. Biological motion is processed as a category in which individuals are able to infer intention. An evolutionary perspective of this phenomenon is that humans survived on the basis of being able

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Thus, it seems pointing may be more complex than a straightforward indicator of social understanding. Early pointing may not indicate an understanding of intention; rather it may indicate an association between the gesture and interesting objects or events. However, an understanding of intention may

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These distinctions are relevant for morality and the law. Committing a crime unintentionally, for example, is usually seen as a less serious offense than committing the same crime intentionally. This is often referred to as negligence in contrast to having bad intentions. It is usually held that bad

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Some difficulties in understanding intentions are due to various ambiguities and inconsistencies in how the term is used in ordinary language. For this reason, theorists often distinguish various types of intentions in order to avoid misunderstandings and to clearly specify what is being researched.

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anything towards realizing this plan. Defenders have rejected this argument by trying to elucidate how even minimal preparatory steps may already be seen as part of the action. Such steps may include, for example, not making any other plans that may interfere with the plan in question, like planning

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and her followers provide an alternative account that denies the distinction between intentions and actions. On this view, to intend a goal is already a form of acting towards this goal and therefore not a distinct mental state. This means that when one intends to visit the zoo next Thursday, one is

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is sometimes preceded by the deliberation of promising alternative courses of action and may happen in decisions, in which the agent chooses between these alternatives. Intentions are responsible for initiating, sustaining, and terminating actions and are frequently used to explain why people engage

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How people think about and verbally communicate their own intentions also impacts these intentions. For example, asking a question about prior behaviors using the imperfective aspect of language seems to be able to bring out stronger intentions to perform such a behavior in the future. According to

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A central aspect of intentions concerning the attitude towards their content is that the agent has committed themselves to the plan in question. This is different from merely wanting to do something and thinking that doing it would be good. It is sometimes argued that this commitment consists in an

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The predictive validity of the theory of Reasoned Action has been examined in numerous studies that have previously served as literature for at least three quantitative reviews. Ajzen and Fishbein (1973) reviewed 10 studies and reported a .63 average correlation for the prediction of behavior from

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Intentions are closely related to other mental states, like beliefs and desires. It is generally accepted that intentions involve some form of desire: the intended action is seen as good or desirable in some sense. This aspect makes it possible for intentions to motivate actions. Various ways have

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Johansson devised a way to study biological motion without interference from other characteristics of humans such as body shape, or emotional expression. He attached dots of light to actors' joints and recorded the movements in a dark environment, so that only the dots of light were visible. The

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Critics of the notion of "unconscious intentions" have raised doubts about the empirical evidence cited in favor of unconscious intentions, which is often based on interpretations resting on various controversial assumptions. Another line of argument is directed against the concept of "unconscious

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plan further ahead. The same intention can be both proximal and distal if it is directed both at what to do right now and what to do later. For example, deciding to start watching a movie now in one sitting involves an intention that is both proximal and distal. This distinction is important since

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The self-referentiality theory asserts that one central feature of intentions is that they are self-referential. This means that the intentions do not just represent the intended course of action but also represent themselves as the cause of the action. On this view, the intention to go to the gym

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Another important aspect of intentions is that they have conditions of satisfaction, like beliefs and desires. This means that intentions are either successful or unsuccessful. An intention that produces the intended action is a successful intention. But if the produced behavior falls short of its

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must prove that there was intent (or another form of mens rea) in addition to showing that the accused physically committed the crime. There are different ways in which intent can be proved or disproved depending on the case and the type of intent involved. One way to do so is to look at previous

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Intentions, like various other mental states, can be understood as consisting of two components: a content and an attitude towards this content. On this view, the content of an intention is the action plan in question and the attitude involves a commitment to executing this action. Intentions may

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Although human behavior is extremely complex and still remains unpredictable, psychologists are trying to understand the influential factors in the process of forming intentions and performing actions. The theories of Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior are comprehensive theories that specify a

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In criminal law, an important distinction is between general and specific intent. General intent is the weaker term. It implies that the person meant to act the way they did. It does not imply that they wanted to cause harm or that they were trying to achieve a particular result, unlike specific

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what their own actions and intentions might be in the situation. Individuals connect their own actions to internal mental states through the experience of sensory information when movements are carried out; this sensory information is stored and connected to one's own intentions. Since internal

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In one experiment, 18-month-olds observed either a human or a mechanical arm attempting to perform actions, but failing to achieve a goal. The children imitated the action to complete the intended goal when the arm was human, but not when it was mechanical. This suggests that from a young age,

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Research suggests that faces are pivotal in offering social cues necessary for children's cognitive, language, and social development. These cues may offer information on another's emotional state, focus of attention, and potential intentions (For a discussion see Mosconi, Mack, McCarthy, &

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is the traditionally dominant approach. According to a simple version of it, having an intention is nothing but having a desire to perform a certain action and a belief that one will perform this action. Belief-desire theories are frequently criticized based on the fact that neither beliefs nor

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The development of understanding intention has also been studied in toddlers. As mentioned previously, an intentional action is based on the belief that the course of action will satisfy a desire. In that case, what was intended can be interpreted as a function of an understanding for what was

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and denies the distinction between intentions and actions. On her view, to intend a goal is already a form of acting towards this goal and therefore not a distinct mental state. This account struggles to explain cases in which intentions and actions seem to come apart, as when the agent is not

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But not everyone agrees that forming the intention is impossible. According to the rationalist solution, for example, it is possible to form the intention because there is a decisive reason to drink the toxin. The idea behind this approach is that there are two options today: (1) not form the

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due to Gregory Kavka. It involves a billionaire offering the agent one million dollars for forming the intention by the end of the day to drink a vial of toxin the following day. The toxin makes a person ill for one day but has no lasting effect otherwise. It does not matter whether the agent

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Humans have a tendency to infer intention from motion, even in the absence of other distinguishing features (e.g. body shape, emotional expression). This was demonstrated in a study by Heider and Simmel; they had observers view videos of moving triangles, and found that participants tended to

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Various other distinctions among types of intentions are found in the academic literature. Conditional intentions are intentions to do something just in case a certain condition obtains. Planning to return a book to a friend on the condition that she asks for it is an example of a conditional

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is, among other things, concerned with how children learn to ascribe intentions to others. Understanding intention is thought to be pivotal in understanding social contexts in numerous ways. First, acquiring an understanding of intention is important for development in that it helps children

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Another objection focuses on the normative difference between beliefs and intentions. This is relevant for cases where the agent fails to act according to the intended course of action, for example, due to having a weak will. This type of failure is different from the mere epistemic error of

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towards this content. Other mental states can have action plans as their content, as when one admires a plan, but differ from intentions since they do not involve a practical commitment to realizing this plan. Successful intentions bring about the intended course of action while unsuccessful

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that involve action plans to which the agent has committed themselves. As action plans, they can guide behavior. The action plan constitutes the content of the intention while the commitment is the agent's attitude towards this content. The term "intention" can be used both for prospective

906:). On this view, donating a lot of money to charities is still in some sense morally flawed if it is done with the intention of impressing other people. According to Kant, the main intention should always be to do one's duty: the good will consist in doing one's duty for the sake of duty. 627:

and colleagues (2004) found that human children begin to point at around one year of age and do so with a multiple motives, including sharing attention and interest. Earlier pointing may be different in nature and is thought to develop from a learned association between reaching and adult

850:, intention is influenced by people's attitude toward performing the behavior and the subjective norm. However, the level of perceived control is believed to be influential on people's behavioral intention along with their attitude and subjective norms, according to the 915:

is a closely related principle. It states that there are cases in which the agent may not intend to harm others, even if this harm is used as means to a greater good. But in otherwise equivalent cases it is permissible to harm others if this harm is a side effect, or a

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goal, the intention is unsuccessful. The content of the intention determines its conditions of satisfaction. Success is usually not fully up to the agent since various factors outside the agent's control and awareness may influence the success of the attempted action.

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suggests that intentions are self-referential, i.e. that they do not just represent the intended course of action but also represent themselves as the cause of the action. But the claim that this happens on the level of the content of the intention has been contested.

553:. In this case, various alternatives are considered by the agent, who then chooses the most favorable one. This choice results in a commitment to the chosen plan of action and thereby constitutes the formation of an intention. Often the choice itself is preceded by 816:. One example consists of a chairman deciding to endorse a new project to boost profits despite its negative impact on the environment. In this case, it has been argued that the chairman intentionally harms the environment without an intention to do so. 614:

of the understanding of intention. The development of the ability to use gestures and object-directed actions in social situations has been studied from numerous perspectives, including the embodiment perspective and the social-cognitive perspective.

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Baron-Cohen, Simon; Wheelwright, Sally; Hill, Jacqueline; Raste, Yogini; Plumb, Ian (February 2001). "The 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' Test Revised Version: A Study with Normal Adults, and Adults with Asperger Syndrome or High-functioning Autism".

808:. These additional requirements are needed to exclude so-called "wayward" causal chains, i.e. cases in which the intended behavior happens but the corresponding intention either did not cause the behavior at all or did not cause it in the right way. 332:

already on the way to doing so. An important strength of this account is that it gives a unified explanation of intentions: it does not need to distinguish between prospective and immediate intentions since all intentions are immediate intentions.

4823:Östen Dahl, Viveka Velupillai. 2013. Perfective/Imperfective Aspect. In: Dryer, Matthew S. & Haspelmath, Martin (eds.) The World Atlas of Language Structures Online. Leipzig: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. Retrieved from 846:

limited number of psychological variables that can influence behavior, namely (a) intention; (b) attitude toward the behavior; (c) subjective norm; (d) perceived behavioral control; and (e) behavioral, normative and control beliefs. In the

4647:, Kanfer, F. H., Becker, M. H., & Middlestadt, S. E. (1992). Factors influencing behavior and behavior change (Report prepared for the National Institute of Mental Health).Bethesda, MD: National Institute of Mental Health. 569:. Some theorists of intentions even base their definition of intentions on the functions they execute. Intentions are responsible for initiating, sustaining, and terminating actions. In this sense, they are closely related to 419:

in that they constitute the agent's reason for performing the action. A third type involves consequences of which the agent is aware but which play no important role for the agent's motivation. These are the objects of

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mental states, such as intention, cannot be understood directly through observing movements, it is hypothesized that these internal states are inferred based on one's own stored representations of those movements.

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This theory has been criticized based on the idea that there is a difference between evaluating a course of action and committing oneself to a course of action. This difference is important for explaining cases of

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are to be defined, i.e. how they differ from other types of events like a sunrise, a car breaking down, or digestion. The most common approach to this question defines actions in terms of intentions. According to

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Mosconi, Matthew W.; Mack, Peter B.; McCarthy, Gregory; Pelphrey, Kevin A. (August 2005). "Taking an 'intentional stance' on eye-gaze shifts: A functional neuroimaging study of social perception in children".

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and idolizing women who killed men could be used as evidence of intent. Certain forms of evidence can also be employed by the defense to show that intent was not present. For example, a person suffering from

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Johansson figures, as they came to be known, have been used to demonstrate that individuals attribute mental states, such as desires and intentions to movements, that are otherwise disconnected from context.

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The intentional actions performed by agents usually carry a vast number of major or minor consequences with them. The agent is usually unaware of many of them. In relation to these consequences, the agent is

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Immediate intentions, also known as "intentions-in-action" or "act-related" intentions, are intentions that guide the agent while they are performing the action in question. They are closely related to the

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during the crime, this may be used as a defense by claiming that no specific intent was present. This is based on the idea that the defendant was mentally too impaired to form a specific intent.

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Another distinction can be drawn between intentions that act as means to other intentions and intentions to do something for its own sake. This is closely related to the difference between

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Meltzoff, A.N.; Brooks, R. (2001). ""Like me" as a building block for understanding other minds: Bodily acts, attention, and intention". In Malle, B.F.; Moses, L.J.; Baldwin, D.A. (eds.).

509:. Unconscious intentions are also sometimes used to explain apparently irrational behavior. In this sense, it has been claimed that excessive hand washing seen in some people with the 6212: 4730:

van den Putte, B. (1991). 20 years of the theory of reasoned action of Fishbein and Ajzen: A meta-analysis. Unpublished manuscript. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands

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Sheppard, B. H.; Hartwick, J.; Warshaw, P. R. (1988). "The theory of reasoned action: A meta-analysis of past research with recommendations for modifications and future research".

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tries to overcome this problem by explaining intentions in terms of unconditional evaluations. That is to say that intentions do not just present the intended course of action as

113:, i.e. that agents do not always intend what they see as the best course of action. A closely related theory identifies intentions not with unconditional evaluations but with 226:. This can be understood in terms of causal chains, i.e. that desires cause intentions, intentions cause actions, and actions cause the realization of the desired outcome. 4789:

Conner, M.; Godin, G.; Norman, P.; Sheeran, P. (2011). "Using the question-behavior effect to promote disease prevention behaviors: two randomized controlled trials".

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Jenkins, J.; Greenbuam, R. (1991). "Intention and emotion in child psychopathology: Building cooperative plans". In Zelazo, P.D.; Astington, J.W.; Olson, D.R. (eds.).

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is a famous defender of the intention principle. For him, it is central that one does not just act outwardly in accordance with one's duty, which he terms "legality" (

720:. The severity of criminal offenses often depends on the type and the degree of intent involved. But the specific characterizations and the role of intent differ from 2255:

Vinding, Mikkel C.; Pedersen, Michael N.; Overgaard, Morten (1 September 2013). "Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agency".

4976:"The present projects past behavior into the future while the past projects attitudes into the future: How verb tense moderates predictors of drinking intentions" 3407:

Liszkowski, Ulf; Carpenter, Malinda; Henning, Anne; Striano, Tricia; Tomasello, Michael (June 2004). "Twelve-month-olds point to share attention and interest".

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attribute intentions and even personality traits to the shapes based on their movements. The movement had to be animate, meaning self-propelled and non-linear.

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ends that motivate the agent. But in some cases, it can refer to anticipated side-effects that are neither means nor ends to the agent. In this case, the term "

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D’Olimpio, Francesca; Mancini, Francesco (November 2014). "Role of Deontological Guilt in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder–Like Checking and Washing Behaviors".

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in which a person commits themselves to a course of action. Having the plan to visit the zoo tomorrow is an example of an intention. The action plan is the

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Most theories of intention see intentions as mental states that are closely related to actions but may occur without the corresponding action in question.

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Psychological research suggests that understanding intentions of others may be a prerequisite for a higher-level understanding of other people's minds or

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Moll, H.; Tomasello, M. (2007). "Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis". In Emery, N.; Clayton, N.; Frith, C (eds.).

142:. Prospective intentions, also known as "prior intentions", involve plans for the future. They can be subdivided according to how far they plan ahead: 2915:

Feinfield, Kristin A; Lee, Patti P; Flavell, Eleanor R; Green, Frances L; Flavell, John H (July 1999). "Young Children's Understanding of Intention".

2304: 3264:

Liszkowski, Ulf; Carpenter, Malinda; Tomasello, Michael (March 2007). "Pointing out new news, old news, and absent referents at 12 months of age".

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are the paradigmatic form of intention: in them, the agent is aware of their goals. But it has been suggested that actions can also be guided by

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Liroz, F. (2010). Web created by F. Liroz Professor in Spanish Language Department at American School of Madrid, Spain, (date Feb. 6, 2012),

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could claim that, when they hit another person, they did not do so intentionally but under the effect of a seizure. If the perpetrator was

222:, and intentions. This explanation is based on the idea that desires motivate behavior and beliefs direct the behavior towards the desired 513:

may be motivated by an unconscious intention to wash away one's guilt, even though the person may cite very different reasons when asked.

716:. Some form of mens rea is usually required for criminal offenses but legal transgressions committed without it can still be grounds for 2217:

Plaks, Jason E.; Robinson, Jeffrey S. (1 September 2017). "Proximal and Distal Intent: Toward a New Folk Theory of Intentional Action".

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Another theory focuses exclusively on the relation between intention and desire. It states that intending to do something consists in

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holds that in order to understand intention in others, individuals must observe an action, and then infer the actor's intentions by

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Oram, MW; Perrett, DI (1994). "Responses of Anterior Superior Temporal Polysensory (STPa) Neurons to "Biological Motion" Stimuli".

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Woodward, Amanda L.; Guajardo, Jose J. (January 2002). "Infants' understanding of the point gesture as an object-directed action".

436:. Motivational intentions are the paradigmatic form of intentions and are the main focus of the academic literature on intentions. 200:

intentions, which are not yet executed, and for the intentions guiding the behavior as it happens, so-called immediate intentions,

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was present. For example, if a female employee is accused of murdering her male boss, then her previous blog posts condemning the

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aims to predict behavior based on how pre-existing attitudes and subjective norms determine behavioral intentions. In ethics, the

6809: 3525:; Jarrett, Nicholas (1991). "What minds have in common is space: Spatial mechanisms serving joint visual attention in infancy". 6192: 4218: 4271: 1215:

Mele, Alfred R. (2009). "Intention and Intentional Action". In Beckermann, Ansgar; McLaughlin, Brian P.; Walter, Sven (eds.).

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states that whether an action is morally permissible sometimes depends on the agent's intention for performing this action.

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desires involve a practical commitment to performing an action, which is often illustrated in various counterexamples. The

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develop as the child develops a theory of mind and begins to use pointing to convey meaning about referents in the world.

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Ajzen, Icek; Fishbein, Martin (2000). "Attitudes and the Attitude-Behavior Relation: Reasoned and Automatic Processes".

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Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne; Decety, Jean (August 2001). "From the perception of action to the understanding of intention".

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Liao, S. Matthew (2012). "Intentions and Moral Permissibility: The Case of Acting Permissibly with Bad Intentions".

854:. Not surprisingly, in most studies, intention is driven by attitudes to a greater extent than by subjective norms. 728:

intent. For some offenses, general intent is sufficient while for others, specific intent is required. For example,

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The term "intention" refers to a group of related phenomena. For this reason, theorists often distinguish various

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Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers

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Theories of intention try to capture the characteristic features of intentions. Some accounts focus more either

6607: 6468: 6367: 6302: 939: 695: 586: 59: 1412: 204:. Intending to study tomorrow is an example of prospective intentions while trying to win a game by scoring a 6728: 6232: 6162: 6043: 5828: 5508: 825: 47: 4669:

Ajzen, I.; Fishbein, M. (1973). "Attitudinal and normative variables as predictors of specific behaviors".

900:). Instead, the agent should also be inwardly motivated by the right intention, which he terms "morality" ( 335:

An obvious counterargument to this position is that, in the example of the zoo above, one is not currently

6698: 6500: 6104: 5998: 5978: 5855: 5783: 5728: 5651: 5433: 4927:"The cognitive impact of past behavior: influences on beliefs, attitudes, and future behavioral decisions" 3818: 867: 766: 205: 5453: 6748: 6713: 6493: 6478: 6292: 6202: 6073: 5763: 5708: 5703: 5661: 5589: 5523: 3136: 671: 51: 5377: 4124: 4080:

Gallese, V; Goldman, A (1 December 1998). "Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading".

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humans are able to infer intention specifically as a biological mechanism between motions and goals.

545:

Intentions can arise in different ways. The paradigmatic type of intention formation happens through

3823: 6743: 6182: 6018: 5983: 5963: 5918: 5898: 5733: 5723: 5693: 3598: 1707: 1681: 796: 757: 502: 3762:"Organization of visual inputs to the inferior temporal and posterior parietal cortex in macaques" 6789: 6769: 6372: 6362: 6132: 6122: 5626: 5538: 5321: 5294: 5104: 5086: 5055: 4907: 4713: 4626: 4582: 4449: 4105: 3988: 3980: 3893: 3844: 3742: 3698: 3639: 3599:"The mutual influence of gaze and head orientation in the analysis of social attention direction" 3504: 3442: 3356: 3106: 2991: 2862: 2806: 2633: 2595: 2280: 2234: 2199: 2164: 1974: 1966: 1924: 1916: 1543: 969: 944: 328: 118: 6142: 3913:"Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children" 3339:

Leung, Eleanor H.; Rheingold, Harriet L. (1981). "Development of pointing as a social gesture".

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Zaczyk, Rainer (2006). "Einheit des Grundes, Grund der Differenz von Moralität und Legalität".

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Shantz, C.U. (1983). "Social cognition". In Mussen, P.H.; Flavell, J.H.; Markman, E.M. (eds.).

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A well-known thought experiment concerning the relation between intention and action is the

704:. It refers to the state of mind of the perpetrator, specifically to their plan to commit a 546: 490: 122:

currently doing anything towards realizing their plan or in the case of failed actions. The

4742:"Theories of Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior as models of condom use: A meta-analysis" 2495: 2003:

Conradie, Niel Henk (2014). "1. Five requirements for an convincing account of intention".

6677: 6622: 6592: 6580: 6545: 6540: 6535: 6520: 6152: 6083: 6068: 5988: 5968: 5943: 5753: 5563: 5498: 4644: 3429: 3286: 2479: 729: 717: 550: 461: 380: 211: 5074: 3038:"Having intentions, understanding intentions, and understanding communicative intentions" 2316: 2100:"The sense of agency is action–effect causality perception based on cross-modal grouping" 6282: 6063: 6053: 5908: 5893: 5838: 5609: 5468: 5355: 5185: 5000: 4975: 4951: 4926: 4766: 4741: 3937: 3912: 3786: 3777: 3761: 3538: 3209: 3184: 2766: 2739: 2715: 2688: 2406: 2147:

Mele, Alfred (1 February 2008). "Proximal Intentions, Intention-reports, and Vetoing".

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while others aim at providing a unified account of these different types of intention.

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Heider, Fritz; Simmel, Marianne (1944). "An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior".

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Barresi, John; Moore, Chris (2010). "Intentional relations and social understanding".

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Malle, Bertram F.; Knobe, Joshua (March 1997). "The Folk Concept of Intentionality".

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in order to avoid misunderstandings. The most-discussed distinction is that between

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Stuchlik, Joshua (2013). "From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action".

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The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. A, Human Experimental Psychology

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Nolfi, Kate (2015). "Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?".

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It is often suggested that the agent's intentions play a central role in the

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intentions fail to do so. Intentions, like many other mental states, have

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Albarracin, D.; Johnson, B. T.; Fishbein, M.; Muellerleile, P. (2001).

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Developing theories of intention: Social understanding and self-control

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The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality

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Prospective intentions can be categorized by how far they plan ahead.

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Moore, C. (1999). Zelazo, P.D.; Astington, J.W.; Olson, D.R. (eds.).

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is to deal with stress whereas increasing his risk of lung cancer is

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Wilson, George; Shpall, Samuel; Piñeros Glasscock, Juan S. (2016).

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explains human behavior on the basis of mental states, including

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Lanham, David; Wood, David; Bartal, Bronwyn; Evans, Rob (2006).

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The emergence of symbols: Cognition and communication in infancy

2689:"Agency via Awareness: A Unifying Meta-Process in Psychotherapy" 1413:"Propositional attitudes - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy" 566: 251:

The meaning of the term "intention" is different from the term "

223: 6427: 5392: 2954:

Handbook of child psychology: Volume III. Cognitive Development

565:

Intentions have various psychological functions in the agent's

5388: 5314:

Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics

4824: 3241:

Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of social cognition

3165:

Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition

1443:

Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet

92:

try to capture the characteristic features of intentions. The

6273:

Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments

5234:"Kant's Moral Philosophy: 2. Good Will, Moral Worth and Duty" 5079:

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

4563:"On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle" 2393:

Audi, Robert (2003). "Précis of the Architecture of Reason".

4405:

Miller, J. Mitchell; Wright, Richard A. (17 December 2013).

2827:

Audi, Robert (2001). "3.6 Desires, Intentions, and Values".

1899:

Mele, Alfred R. (1987). "Are Intentions Self-Referential?".

1799:

McCann, Hugh (1995). "Intention and Motivational Strength".

628:

responsiveness to the child's desire for a referent object.

413:. Other consequences are anticipated by the agent. Some are 395:

involve plans for what one wants to do straightaway whereas

146:

involve plans for what one wants to do straightaway whereas

4351:

Lerner, K. Lee; Lerner, Brenda Wilmoth (2006). "Mens Rea".

275:

The traditionally dominant approach reduces intentions to

27:

Mental state representing commitment to perform an action

3243:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 85–103. 3167:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 171–191. 3040:. In Zelazo, P.D.; Astington, J.W.; Olson, D.R. (eds.). 2660:

Siegler, Frederick A. (1967). "Unconscious Intentions".

1600:"Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe: 4. Action Theory" 6213:

A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

4839:"How does verb aspect constrain event representations?" 3076: 3074: 3072: 3070: 3068: 3066: 2863:"Practical Reason: 1. Practical and Theoretical Reason" 2616:

Gustafson, Donald (1973). "On Unconscious Intentions".

2104:

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

1843:

Miller, Christian (June 2008). "Motivation in Agents".

5073:

Halpern, Joseph; Kleiman-Weiner, Max (25 April 2018).

2967:

Velleman, J. David; Bratman, Michael E. (April 1991).

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are usually seen as general intent offenses while for

4655: 4653: 3239:. In Malle, B.F.; Moses, L.J.; Baldwin, D.A. (eds.). 2520:"APA Dictionary of Psychology: unconscious intention" 2049:"What Is the Sense of Agency and Why Does it Matter?" 1682:"Intentionality: 1. Why is intentionality so-called?" 1512:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bradford Books/MIT Press. 1497:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 448:

Intentions are rationally evaluable: they are either

4126:

Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity

3659:

Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind

1441:. In Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Nadel, Lynn (eds.). 109:. This approach has problems in explaining cases of 6686: 6653: 6561: 6459: 6315: 6114: 5854: 5582: 5426: 5285:Weigelin, Ernst (1917). "Legalität und Moralität". 4159:(2nd ed.). New York: Macmillan Reference USA. 2662:

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy

2545:"APA Dictionary of Psychology: conscious intention" 2956:(4th ed.). New York: Wiley. pp. 495–555. 1734:"Enkratic Rationality Is Instrumental Rationality" 1521: 1519: 1471:Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind 46:Several terms redirect here. For other uses, see 4217:Phelps, Shirelle, ed. (2005). "Specific Intent". 3760:Baizer, JS; Ungerleider, LG; Desimone, R (1991). 3307: 3305: 2822: 2820: 2425:"Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality" 2376:Audi, Robert (2001). "5.1 Desire and intention". 2371: 2369: 2367: 2365: 2363: 1473:. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1390:Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition 4509:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 4381:Criminal Evidence: From Crime Scene to Courtroom 4270:Phelps, Shirelle, ed. (2005). "General Intent". 2578:Hamlyn, D. W. (1971). "Unconscious Intentions". 1775:"Akrasia - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy" 5240:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 5192:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 5139:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 4600: 4598: 4596: 3402: 3400: 2869:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 2305:"Distinguishing Intended from Advertent Action" 2028:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 1688:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 1633:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 1606:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 1139:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 645:Intention-ascription based on biological motion 4265: 4263: 4212: 4210: 4208: 4180: 4178: 4176: 4123:Bergsmo, Morten (2005). Shelton, Dinah (ed.). 3230: 3228: 1437:Pacherie, Elisabeth; Haggard; Patrick (2011). 752:statements by the accused to assess whether a 264: 201: 6439: 5404: 5287:Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 4607:"So Why Can'T You Intend to Drink the Toxin?" 2431:. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13–36. 2311:. Oxford University Press. pp. 348–376. 813: 86:: they represent possible states of affairs. 77:of the intention while the commitment is the 8: 5337: 5335: 5126: 5124: 5122: 5120: 5118: 4931:Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4671:Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2611: 2609: 1998: 1996: 1994: 1992: 1990: 1988: 1870: 1868: 1866: 1826:Mele AR (2003). "7. Motivational Strength". 1571: 1569: 1567: 1565: 1563: 1561: 1559: 1557: 1382: 1380: 1378: 1376: 1374: 1372: 1370: 1368: 1366: 1364: 1362: 1360: 1358: 1356: 1354: 1352: 1350: 1348: 1346: 1344: 1342: 1340: 1338: 1336: 1334: 1296: 1294: 1292: 1290: 1288: 1286: 1284: 1282: 1280: 1278: 1276: 1274: 1272: 1270: 1268: 1266: 1264: 901: 895: 5227: 5225: 4185:Elliott, Catherine; Quinn, Frances (2008). 4148: 4146: 4041:"Action recognition in the premotor cortex" 3527:British Journal of Developmental Psychology 3178: 3176: 3174: 2418: 2416: 2298: 2296: 2294: 1488: 1486: 1484: 1482: 1480: 1445:. Oxford University Press. pp. 70–84. 1332: 1330: 1328: 1326: 1324: 1322: 1320: 1318: 1316: 1314: 1262: 1260: 1258: 1256: 1254: 1252: 1250: 1248: 1246: 1244: 1210: 1208: 1206: 1204: 1202: 1200: 1198: 1196: 1194: 1192: 1190: 1188: 1186: 1184: 1182: 1180: 1178: 1176: 1174: 1126: 1124: 1122: 1120: 1118: 1116: 1114: 1112: 1110: 1108: 1106: 1104: 1102: 1100: 1098: 1096: 1094: 1092: 1090: 1088: 1086: 1084: 1082: 1080: 1078: 1076: 1074: 1072: 1070: 1068: 1066: 1064: 1062: 1060: 456:. In this sense, they stand in contrast to 6446: 6432: 6424: 5411: 5397: 5389: 5384:Online works of Immanuel Kant on Gutenberg 4527:"Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle" 3675:Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 3556:. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 3376:Social intelligence: From brain to culture 2655: 2653: 2651: 2649: 2647: 2451:Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2250: 2248: 1172: 1170: 1168: 1166: 1164: 1162: 1160: 1158: 1156: 1154: 1058: 1056: 1054: 1052: 1050: 1048: 1046: 1044: 1042: 1040: 89: 5090: 4999: 4980:Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 4950: 4854: 4765: 4378:Regensburger, Derek (14 September 2022). 4324:Pollock, Joycelyn M. (28 December 2020). 4056: 4023: 3958: 3956: 3936: 3879: 3822: 3785: 3625: 3428: 3285: 3208: 2936: 2765: 2755: 2714: 2704: 2573: 2571: 2569: 2567: 2565: 2462: 2123: 2074: 2064: 2009:(PhD Thesis). University of Stellenbosch. 2006:Towards a Convincing Account of Intention 1881:(PhD Thesis). University of Stellenbosch. 1878:Towards a Convincing Account of Intention 1749: 1708:"Collins English Dictionary: Intentional" 1675: 1673: 1593: 1591: 1589: 1582:(PhD Thesis). University of Stellenbosch. 1579:Towards a Convincing Account of Intention 1528:Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1217:The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind 1022: 1020: 1018: 1016: 1014: 1012: 1010: 1008: 1006: 1004: 265:on prospective or on immediate intentions 5033: 5031: 5029: 5027: 5025: 5023: 5021: 5019: 4925:Albarracin, D.; Wyer, R. S. Jr. (2000). 4556: 4554: 4552: 4550: 4548: 4546: 4544: 4520: 4518: 4516: 3158: 3156: 3154: 3152: 3150: 3012:How children learn the meanings of words 2969:"Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason" 2687:Gorlin, Eugenia I.; Békés, Vera (2021). 2395:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1464: 1462: 1002: 1000: 998: 996: 994: 992: 990: 988: 986: 984: 743:For most criminal offenses, to ensure a 682:This theory is supported by research on 131: 5238:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 5232:Johnson, Robert; Cureton, Adam (2021). 5190:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 5137:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 4879:http://fernando.liroz.es/m/estverbo.htm 4507:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3586:. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3015:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 2867:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2484:"He who WILLS the end, wills the means" 2440: 2438: 2026:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1944: 1942: 1940: 1938: 1686:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1631:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1604:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1510:Understanding the representational mind 1225:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0041 1137:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 980: 700:Intention or intent is a key aspect in 4487:The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 4484:Audi, Robert (1999). "action theory". 3661:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 3569:On-line Cognition in Person Perception 3122: 3120: 2478:Speake, Jennifer (17 September 2015). 1406: 1404: 1402: 1400: 1387:Borchert, Donald (2006). "Intention". 6243:Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics 3391:The child's entry into a social world 105:, as is the case for desires, but as 7: 6343:Interpretations of quantum mechanics 6263:The World as Will and Representation 4892:European Review of Social Psychology 4470:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 4384:. Aspen Publishing. pp. 377–8. 4129:. Macmillan Reference. p. 524. 2496:10.1093/acref/9780198734901.001.0001 1304:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1027:Honderich, Ted (2005). "Intention". 577:Knowledge of the intention of others 5164:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 4273:West's Encyclopedia of American Law 4220:West's Encyclopedia of American Law 1301:Craig, Edward (1996). "Intention". 712:, and not to the physical element, 497:Various prominent examples, due to 295:Another prominent approach, due to 208:involves an act-related intention. 31:For the philosophical concept, see 6780:Concepts in the philosophy of mind 5356:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00783.x 5184:Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2021). 4837:Madden, C.J.; Zwaan, R.A. (2003). 3965:The American Journal of Psychology 3778:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.11-01-00168.1991 3571:. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 3539:10.1111/j.2044-835X.1991.tb00862.x 2407:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00031.x 2317:10.1093/oso/9780198853145.003.0015 2047:Moore, James W. (29 August 2016). 1030:The Oxford Companion to Philosophy 864:World Atlas of Language Structures 531:intrinsic and instrumental desires 25: 4974:Carrera, P.; et al. (2012). 4156:Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 3811:Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 1801:Journal of Philosophical Research 1495:The child's discovery of the mind 171:of which the agent is not aware. 6406: 6396: 6395: 5371: 4579:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01340.x 4467:Craig, Edward (1996). "Action". 4303:. Federation Press. p. 58. 3731:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.03.027 3554:Developing theories of intention 3421:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00349.x 3278:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00552.x 1857:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00679.x 885:doctor administers a lethal drug 466:principle of means-end coherence 428:his risk of bladder cancer, his 6193:Meditations on First Philosophy 4567:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4244:Crump, David (1 January 2010). 4191:. Pearson Longman. p. 16. 3862:Grossman, ED; Blake, R (2002). 883:bad intentions. For example, a 5344:Southern Journal of Philosophy 5261:"6.2.2 Praktische Philosophie" 4605:Rudy-Hiller, Fernando (2019). 4012:Perception & Psychophysics 3430:11858/00-001M-0000-0013-2524-6 3287:11858/00-001M-0000-0013-2510-1 2844:Audi, Robert (2001). "Notes". 2791:Clinical Psychological Science 2464:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.016 1: 4623:10.1080/13869795.2019.1656280 4490:. Cambridge University Press. 4094:10.1016/s1364-6613(98)01262-5 3881:10.1016/s0896-6273(02)00897-8 3489:Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3326:10.1016/S0885-2014(02)00074-6 2929:10.1016/S0885-2014(99)00015-5 2488:Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs 511:obsessive-compulsive disorder 6608:Perception as interpretation 6378:Philosophy of space and time 4698:Journal of Consumer Research 4082:Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3466:. New York: Academic Press. 2309:Fundamentals of Criminal Law 2269:10.1016/j.concog.2013.05.003 2219:Review of General Psychology 1653:"Britannica: intentionality" 795:, a central question is how 247:Intention and intentionality 6253:The Phenomenology of Spirit 5133:"Doctrine of Double Effect" 4825:http://wals.info/chapter/65 4758:10.1037/0033-2909.127.1.142 4643:Fishbein, M., Bandura, A., 4408:Encyclopedia of Criminology 3766:The Journal of Neuroscience 3083:Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2490:. Oxford University Press. 2257:Consciousness and Cognition 955:Intentions (disambiguation) 601:Infancy and early childhood 56:Intentions (disambiguation) 6826: 4992:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.04.001 4611:Philosophical Explorations 4300:Criminal Laws in Australia 4153:Robinson, Paul H. (2002). 4006:Johansson, Gunnar (1973). 3929:10.1037/0012-1649.31.5.838 3353:10.1037/0012-1649.17.2.215 3201:10.1037/0012-1649.31.5.838 2850:. Oxford University Press. 2833:. Oxford University Press. 2382:. Oxford University Press. 2020:Schlosser, Markus (2019). 1832:. Oxford University Press. 1738:Philosophical Perspectives 1033:. Oxford University Press. 852:theory of planned behavior 773:Relation to other concepts 693: 636:Attention and eye movement 485:is the difference between 373:good all things considered 344:Self-referentiality theory 124:self-referentiality theory 107:good all things considered 45: 40:Intention (disambiguation) 29: 6391: 5131:McIntyre, Alison (2019). 5052:10.1007/s10982-012-9134-5 4904:10.1080/14792779943000116 4446:10.1007/s11406-013-9414-9 4411:. Routledge. p. 74. 4354:World of Forensic Science 4330:. Routledge. p. 68. 3584:Emotion in the Human Face 3501:10.1017/S0140525X00041790 3393:. London: Academic Press. 2738:Lumer, Christoph (2019). 2706:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.698655 2674:10.1080/00201746708601492 2630:10.1017/S0031819100060642 2592:10.1017/S0031819100001662 2423:Bratman, Michael (2009). 2196:10.1007/s11098-018-1153-0 2161:10.1080/09515080701867914 1712:www.collinsdictionary.com 930:Collective intentionality 912:doctrine of double effect 848:theory of reasoned action 841:Theory of reasoned action 477:Of special importance to 473:Conscious and unconscious 462:healing power of crystals 426:unintentionally increases 362:Prospective and immediate 181:theory of reasoned action 6368:Philosophy of psychology 6303:Simulacra and Simulation 5101:10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11557 4943:10.1037/0022-3514.79.1.5 4525:Mele, Alfred R. (1996). 4246:"What Does Intent Mean?" 3917:Developmental Psychology 3911:Meltzoff, A. N. (1995). 3833:10.1162/jocn.1994.6.2.99 3657:Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). 3341:Developmental Psychology 3235:Astington, J.W. (2001). 3189:Developmental Psychology 2976:The Philosophical Review 2902:10.1215/00318108-1539089 2861:Wallace, R. Jay (2020). 2803:10.1177/2167702614529549 2757:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02777 2149:Philosophical Psychology 2066:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272 1493:Astington, J.W. (1993). 940:Intention (criminal law) 696:Intention (criminal law) 587:Developmental psychology 582:Developmental psychology 404:Motivational and oblique 60:Purpose (disambiguation) 6810:Concepts in metaphysics 6729:Relational frame theory 6704:Higher nervous activity 6233:Critique of Pure Reason 5216:Encyclopædia Britannica 4058:10.1093/brain/119.2.593 3687:10.1111/1469-7610.00715 3389:Schaffer, H.R. (2005). 3183:Meltzoff, A.N. (1995). 2744:Frontiers in Psychology 2693:Frontiers in Psychology 2053:Frontiers in Psychology 1963:10.1023/A:1018336525240 1131:Setiya, Kieran (2018). 561:Psychological functions 541:Formation of intentions 458:arational mental states 444:Rational and irrational 311:Strongest-desire theory 176:formation of intentions 48:Intent (disambiguation) 6699:Experiential avoidance 5824:Type–token distinction 5652:Hypostatic abstraction 5434:Abstract object theory 4843:Memory & Cognition 4746:Psychological Bulletin 3597:Langton, S.R. (2000). 3567:Bassili, J.N. (1989). 3036:Tomasello, M. (1999). 2303:Simester, A P (2021). 2116:10.1098/rspb.2013.0991 1680:Jacob, Pierre (2019). 1625:Jacob, Pierre (2019). 1598:Driver, Julia (2018). 1540:10.1006/jesp.1996.1314 1439:"What are intentions?" 902: 896: 430:motivational intention 411:acting unintentionally 230:Content and commitment 206:three-point field goal 169:unconscious intentions 6714:Ironic process theory 6479:Cognitive flexibility 6413:Philosophy portal 6293:Being and Nothingness 5709:Mental representation 3409:Developmental Science 3314:Cognitive Development 3266:Developmental Science 2917:Cognitive Development 2184:Philosophical Studies 1951:Philosophical Studies 1901:Philosophical Studies 1829:Motivation and Agency 1779:www.rep.routledge.com 1469:Searle, J.R. (1983). 1417:www.rep.routledge.com 672:simulation hypothesis 618:Gestures and pointing 259:Theories of intention 90:Theories of intention 52:Intentionally (horse) 6338:Feminist metaphysics 5380:at Wikimedia Commons 5259:Altwicker, Tilmann. 2890:Philosophical Review 2445:Lee, Wooram (2018). 2342:Philosophical Issues 1219:. pp. 691–710. 868:Imperfective Aspects 793:philosophy of action 535:motivational inertia 507:intentional behavior 317:desiring it the most 271:Belief-desire theory 165:Conscious intentions 140:immediate intentions 103:good in some respect 94:belief-desire theory 38:For other uses, see 6800:Metaphysics of mind 6775:Analytic philosophy 6744:Thought suppression 6183:Daneshnameh-ye Alai 5694:Linguistic modality 3523:Butterworth, George 3378:. pp. 245–260. 1813:10.5840/jpr_1995_19 1508:Perner, J. (1991). 778:Beliefs and desires 758:patriarchal society 503:slips of the tongue 393:Proximal intentions 387:Proximal and distal 353:Types of intentions 185:intention principle 144:proximal intentions 132:types of intentions 115:predominant desires 6373:Philosophy of self 6363:Philosophy of mind 5627:Embodied cognition 5539:Scientific realism 5186:"Consequentialism" 5160:"Consequentialism" 5040:Law and Philosophy 4856:10.3758/BF03196106 4561:Levy, Ken (2009). 4250:Hofstra Law Review 4025:10.3758/BF03212378 3582:Ekman, P. (1982). 3009:Bloom, P. (2000). 2549:dictionary.apa.org 2524:dictionary.apa.org 2429:Reasons for Action 2354:10.1111/phis.12051 2231:10.1037/gpr0000122 2110:(1763): 20130991. 1913:10.1007/BF00354051 1751:10.1111/phpe.12136 1657:www.britannica.com 970:Telos (philosophy) 945:Intentional stance 814:oblique intentions 434:obliquely intended 422:oblique intentions 329:Elizabeth Anscombe 323:Intending as doing 202:as discussed below 119:Elizabeth Anscombe 58:, and 6757: 6756: 6516:Critical thinking 6484:Cognitive liberty 6421: 6420: 5600:Category of being 5569:Truthmaker theory 5376:Media related to 5158:Haines, William. 4791:Health Psychology 4418:978-1-135-45543-9 4391:978-1-5438-4906-6 4364:978-1-4144-0295-6 4337:978-1-000-28383-9 4310:978-1-86287-558-6 4198:978-1-4058-5871-7 4136:978-0-02-865992-3 3618:10.1080/713755908 2505:978-0-19-873490-1 2326:978-0-19-885314-5 2190:(11): 2833–2853. 1452:978-0-19-538164-1 1234:978-0-19-926261-8 724:to jurisdiction. 666:Simulation theory 397:distal intentions 291:Evaluation theory 153:oblique intention 148:distal intentions 99:evaluation theory 16:(Redirected from 6817: 6795:Mental processes 6454:Mental processes 6448: 6441: 6434: 6425: 6411: 6410: 6409: 6399: 6398: 6308: 6298: 6288: 6278: 6268: 6258: 6248: 6238: 6228: 6218: 6208: 6198: 6188: 6178: 6168: 6158: 6148: 6138: 6128: 5804:Substantial form 5616:Cogito, ergo sum 5559:Substance theory 5413: 5406: 5399: 5390: 5375: 5360: 5359: 5339: 5330: 5329: 5309: 5303: 5302: 5282: 5276: 5275: 5273: 5271: 5256: 5250: 5249: 5247: 5245: 5229: 5220: 5219: 5212:"utilitarianism" 5208: 5202: 5201: 5199: 5197: 5181: 5175: 5174: 5172: 5170: 5155: 5149: 5148: 5146: 5144: 5128: 5113: 5112: 5094: 5070: 5064: 5063: 5035: 5014: 5013: 5003: 4986:(5): 1196–1200. 4971: 4965: 4964: 4954: 4922: 4916: 4915: 4887: 4881: 4875: 4869: 4868: 4858: 4834: 4828: 4821: 4815: 4814: 4803:10.1037/a0023036 4786: 4780: 4779: 4769: 4737: 4731: 4728: 4722: 4721: 4693: 4687: 4686: 4683:10.1037/h0034440 4666: 4660: 4657: 4648: 4641: 4635: 4634: 4602: 4591: 4590: 4558: 4539: 4538: 4522: 4511: 4510: 4498: 4492: 4491: 4481: 4475: 4474: 4464: 4458: 4457: 4429: 4423: 4422: 4402: 4396: 4395: 4375: 4369: 4368: 4357:. Thomson/Gale. 4348: 4342: 4341: 4321: 4315: 4314: 4294: 4288: 4287: 4276:. Thomson/Gale. 4267: 4258: 4257: 4241: 4235: 4234: 4223:. Thomson/Gale. 4214: 4203: 4202: 4182: 4171: 4170: 4150: 4141: 4140: 4120: 4114: 4113: 4077: 4071: 4070: 4060: 4036: 4030: 4029: 4027: 4003: 3997: 3996: 3960: 3951: 3950: 3940: 3908: 3902: 3901: 3883: 3859: 3853: 3852: 3826: 3806: 3800: 3799: 3789: 3757: 3751: 3750: 3713: 3707: 3706: 3669: 3663: 3662: 3654: 3648: 3647: 3629: 3603: 3594: 3588: 3587: 3579: 3573: 3572: 3564: 3558: 3557: 3549: 3543: 3542: 3519: 3513: 3512: 3484: 3478: 3477: 3457: 3451: 3450: 3432: 3404: 3395: 3394: 3386: 3380: 3379: 3371: 3365: 3364: 3336: 3330: 3329: 3320:(1): 1061–1084. 3309: 3300: 3299: 3289: 3261: 3255: 3254: 3232: 3223: 3222: 3212: 3180: 3169: 3168: 3160: 3145: 3144: 3124: 3115: 3114: 3095:10.1038/35086023 3078: 3061: 3060: 3052: 3046: 3045: 3033: 3027: 3026: 3006: 3000: 2999: 2973: 2964: 2958: 2957: 2949: 2943: 2942: 2940: 2912: 2906: 2905: 2885: 2879: 2878: 2876: 2874: 2858: 2852: 2851: 2841: 2835: 2834: 2824: 2815: 2814: 2786: 2780: 2779: 2769: 2759: 2735: 2729: 2728: 2718: 2708: 2684: 2678: 2677: 2668:(1–4): 251–267. 2657: 2642: 2641: 2624:(184): 178–182. 2613: 2604: 2603: 2575: 2560: 2559: 2557: 2555: 2541: 2535: 2534: 2532: 2530: 2516: 2510: 2509: 2480:Speake, Jennifer 2475: 2469: 2468: 2466: 2442: 2433: 2432: 2420: 2411: 2410: 2390: 2384: 2383: 2373: 2358: 2357: 2337: 2331: 2330: 2300: 2289: 2288: 2252: 2243: 2242: 2214: 2208: 2207: 2179: 2173: 2172: 2144: 2138: 2137: 2127: 2095: 2089: 2088: 2078: 2068: 2044: 2038: 2037: 2035: 2033: 2017: 2011: 2010: 2000: 1983: 1982: 1946: 1933: 1932: 1896: 1883: 1882: 1872: 1861: 1860: 1840: 1834: 1833: 1823: 1817: 1816: 1796: 1790: 1789: 1787: 1785: 1770: 1764: 1763: 1753: 1729: 1723: 1722: 1720: 1718: 1704: 1698: 1697: 1695: 1693: 1677: 1668: 1667: 1665: 1663: 1649: 1643: 1642: 1640: 1638: 1627:"Intentionality" 1622: 1616: 1615: 1613: 1611: 1595: 1584: 1583: 1573: 1552: 1551: 1523: 1514: 1513: 1505: 1499: 1498: 1490: 1475: 1474: 1466: 1457: 1456: 1434: 1428: 1427: 1425: 1423: 1408: 1395: 1394: 1384: 1309: 1308: 1298: 1239: 1238: 1212: 1149: 1148: 1146: 1144: 1128: 1035: 1034: 1024: 905: 899: 547:practical reason 43: 36: 21: 6825: 6824: 6820: 6819: 6818: 6816: 6815: 6814: 6760: 6759: 6758: 6753: 6682: 6649: 6557: 6536:Problem solving 6521:Decision-making 6455: 6452: 6422: 6417: 6407: 6405: 6387: 6311: 6306: 6296: 6286: 6276: 6266: 6256: 6246: 6236: 6226: 6216: 6206: 6196: 6186: 6176: 6166: 6156: 6153:De rerum natura 6146: 6136: 6126: 6110: 5850: 5754:Physical object 5590:Abstract object 5578: 5564:Theory of forms 5499:Meaning of life 5422: 5417: 5368: 5363: 5341: 5340: 5333: 5311: 5310: 5306: 5284: 5283: 5279: 5269: 5267: 5258: 5257: 5253: 5243: 5241: 5231: 5230: 5223: 5210: 5209: 5205: 5195: 5193: 5183: 5182: 5178: 5168: 5166: 5157: 5156: 5152: 5142: 5140: 5130: 5129: 5116: 5072: 5071: 5067: 5037: 5036: 5017: 4973: 4972: 4968: 4924: 4923: 4919: 4889: 4888: 4884: 4876: 4872: 4836: 4835: 4831: 4822: 4818: 4788: 4787: 4783: 4739: 4738: 4734: 4729: 4725: 4695: 4694: 4690: 4668: 4667: 4663: 4658: 4651: 4645:Triandis, H. C. 4642: 4638: 4604: 4603: 4594: 4560: 4559: 4542: 4531:Proto Sociology 4524: 4523: 4514: 4500: 4499: 4495: 4483: 4482: 4478: 4466: 4465: 4461: 4431: 4430: 4426: 4419: 4404: 4403: 4399: 4392: 4377: 4376: 4372: 4365: 4350: 4349: 4345: 4338: 4323: 4322: 4318: 4311: 4296: 4295: 4291: 4284: 4269: 4268: 4261: 4243: 4242: 4238: 4231: 4216: 4215: 4206: 4199: 4184: 4183: 4174: 4167: 4152: 4151: 4144: 4137: 4122: 4121: 4117: 4088:(12): 493–501. 4079: 4078: 4074: 4038: 4037: 4033: 4005: 4004: 4000: 3977:10.2307/1416950 3962: 3961: 3954: 3910: 3909: 3905: 3861: 3860: 3856: 3824:10.1.1.330.4410 3808: 3807: 3803: 3759: 3758: 3754: 3715: 3714: 3710: 3671: 3670: 3666: 3656: 3655: 3651: 3601: 3596: 3595: 3591: 3581: 3580: 3576: 3566: 3565: 3561: 3551: 3550: 3546: 3521: 3520: 3516: 3486: 3485: 3481: 3474: 3459: 3458: 3454: 3406: 3405: 3398: 3388: 3387: 3383: 3373: 3372: 3368: 3338: 3337: 3333: 3311: 3310: 3303: 3263: 3262: 3258: 3251: 3234: 3233: 3226: 3182: 3181: 3172: 3162: 3161: 3148: 3126: 3125: 3118: 3080: 3079: 3064: 3054: 3053: 3049: 3035: 3034: 3030: 3023: 3008: 3007: 3003: 2988:10.2307/2185304 2971: 2966: 2965: 2961: 2951: 2950: 2946: 2914: 2913: 2909: 2887: 2886: 2882: 2872: 2870: 2860: 2859: 2855: 2843: 2842: 2838: 2826: 2825: 2818: 2788: 2787: 2783: 2737: 2736: 2732: 2686: 2685: 2681: 2659: 2658: 2645: 2615: 2614: 2607: 2577: 2576: 2563: 2553: 2551: 2543: 2542: 2538: 2528: 2526: 2518: 2517: 2513: 2506: 2477: 2476: 2472: 2444: 2443: 2436: 2422: 2421: 2414: 2392: 2391: 2387: 2375: 2374: 2361: 2339: 2338: 2334: 2327: 2302: 2301: 2292: 2254: 2253: 2246: 2216: 2215: 2211: 2181: 2180: 2176: 2146: 2145: 2141: 2097: 2096: 2092: 2046: 2045: 2041: 2031: 2029: 2019: 2018: 2014: 2002: 2001: 1986: 1948: 1947: 1936: 1898: 1897: 1886: 1874: 1873: 1864: 1842: 1841: 1837: 1825: 1824: 1820: 1798: 1797: 1793: 1783: 1781: 1772: 1771: 1767: 1731: 1730: 1726: 1716: 1714: 1706: 1705: 1701: 1691: 1689: 1679: 1678: 1671: 1661: 1659: 1651: 1650: 1646: 1636: 1634: 1624: 1623: 1619: 1609: 1607: 1597: 1596: 1587: 1575: 1574: 1555: 1525: 1524: 1517: 1507: 1506: 1502: 1492: 1491: 1478: 1468: 1467: 1460: 1453: 1436: 1435: 1431: 1421: 1419: 1410: 1409: 1398: 1386: 1385: 1312: 1300: 1299: 1242: 1235: 1214: 1213: 1152: 1142: 1140: 1130: 1129: 1038: 1026: 1025: 982: 978: 926: 876: 843: 822: 802:Donald Davidson 789: 780: 775: 718:civil liability 698: 692: 690:In criminal law 668: 647: 638: 620: 603: 584: 579: 563: 549:in the form of 543: 523: 475: 446: 406: 389: 381:sense of agency 369:good in one way 364: 355: 346: 325: 313: 297:Donald Davidson 293: 273: 261: 249: 232: 212:Folk psychology 195:Intentions are 193: 63: 44: 37: 30: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 6823: 6821: 6813: 6812: 6807: 6802: 6797: 6792: 6787: 6782: 6777: 6772: 6762: 6761: 6755: 6754: 6752: 6751: 6746: 6741: 6736: 6731: 6726: 6724:Mental fatigue 6721: 6716: 6711: 6706: 6701: 6696: 6690: 6688: 6684: 6683: 6681: 6680: 6675: 6670: 6665: 6659: 6657: 6651: 6650: 6648: 6647: 6642: 6641: 6640: 6635: 6630: 6620: 6615: 6610: 6605: 6595: 6590: 6585: 6584: 6583: 6573: 6567: 6565: 6559: 6558: 6556: 6555: 6550: 6549: 6548: 6543: 6533: 6528: 6523: 6518: 6513: 6508: 6503: 6498: 6497: 6496: 6486: 6481: 6476: 6471: 6465: 6463: 6457: 6456: 6453: 6451: 6450: 6443: 6436: 6428: 6419: 6418: 6416: 6415: 6403: 6392: 6389: 6388: 6386: 6385: 6380: 6375: 6370: 6365: 6360: 6355: 6350: 6345: 6340: 6335: 6330: 6325: 6319: 6317: 6316:Related topics 6313: 6312: 6310: 6309: 6299: 6289: 6283:Being and Time 6279: 6269: 6259: 6249: 6239: 6229: 6219: 6209: 6199: 6189: 6179: 6169: 6159: 6149: 6139: 6129: 6118: 6116: 6112: 6111: 6109: 6108: 6101: 6096: 6091: 6086: 6081: 6076: 6071: 6066: 6061: 6056: 6051: 6046: 6041: 6036: 6031: 6026: 6021: 6016: 6011: 6006: 6001: 5996: 5991: 5986: 5981: 5976: 5971: 5966: 5961: 5956: 5951: 5946: 5941: 5936: 5931: 5926: 5921: 5916: 5911: 5906: 5901: 5896: 5891: 5886: 5881: 5876: 5871: 5866: 5860: 5858: 5856:Metaphysicians 5852: 5851: 5849: 5848: 5841: 5836: 5831: 5826: 5821: 5816: 5811: 5806: 5801: 5796: 5791: 5786: 5781: 5776: 5771: 5766: 5761: 5756: 5751: 5746: 5741: 5736: 5731: 5726: 5721: 5716: 5711: 5706: 5701: 5696: 5691: 5686: 5681: 5676: 5675: 5674: 5664: 5659: 5654: 5649: 5644: 5639: 5634: 5629: 5624: 5619: 5612: 5610:Causal closure 5607: 5602: 5597: 5592: 5586: 5584: 5580: 5579: 5577: 5576: 5571: 5566: 5561: 5556: 5551: 5546: 5541: 5536: 5531: 5526: 5521: 5516: 5511: 5506: 5501: 5496: 5491: 5486: 5484:Libertarianism 5481: 5476: 5471: 5469:Existentialism 5466: 5461: 5456: 5451: 5446: 5441: 5436: 5430: 5428: 5424: 5423: 5418: 5416: 5415: 5408: 5401: 5393: 5387: 5386: 5381: 5367: 5366:External links 5364: 5362: 5361: 5350:(2): 147–168. 5331: 5304: 5293:(4): 367–376. 5277: 5265:www.rwi.uzh.ch 5251: 5221: 5218:. 8 June 2023. 5203: 5176: 5150: 5114: 5065: 5046:(6): 703–724. 5015: 4966: 4917: 4882: 4870: 4849:(5): 663–672. 4829: 4827:on 2015-07-15. 4816: 4797:(3): 300–309. 4781: 4752:(1): 142–161. 4732: 4723: 4710:10.1086/209170 4704:(3): 325–343. 4688: 4661: 4649: 4636: 4617:(3): 294–311. 4592: 4573:(2): 267–289. 4540: 4512: 4493: 4476: 4459: 4440:(3): 867–886. 4424: 4417: 4397: 4390: 4370: 4363: 4343: 4336: 4316: 4309: 4289: 4282: 4259: 4236: 4229: 4204: 4197: 4172: 4165: 4142: 4135: 4115: 4072: 4051:(2): 593–609. 4031: 4018:(2): 201–211. 3998: 3952: 3923:(5): 838–850. 3903: 3874:(6): 1167–75. 3854: 3801: 3752: 3725:(1): 247–252. 3708: 3681:(2): 241–251. 3664: 3649: 3589: 3574: 3559: 3544: 3514: 3495:(1): 107–154. 3479: 3472: 3452: 3415:(3): 297–307. 3396: 3381: 3366: 3347:(2): 215–220. 3331: 3301: 3256: 3249: 3224: 3195:(5): 838–850. 3170: 3146: 3116: 3089:(8): 561–567. 3062: 3047: 3028: 3021: 3001: 2959: 2944: 2938:2027.42/150591 2923:(3): 463–486. 2907: 2896:(2): 209–239. 2880: 2853: 2836: 2816: 2797:(6): 727–739. 2781: 2730: 2679: 2643: 2605: 2586:(175): 12–22. 2561: 2536: 2511: 2504: 2470: 2434: 2412: 2401:(1): 177–180. 2385: 2359: 2332: 2325: 2290: 2263:(3): 810–815. 2244: 2225:(3): 242–254. 2209: 2174: 2139: 2090: 2039: 2012: 1984: 1934: 1907:(3): 309–329. 1884: 1862: 1851:(2): 222–266. 1835: 1818: 1791: 1765: 1744:(1): 164–183. 1732:Lee W (2020). 1724: 1699: 1669: 1644: 1617: 1585: 1553: 1534:(2): 101–121. 1515: 1500: 1476: 1458: 1451: 1429: 1411:Oppy, Graham. 1396: 1310: 1240: 1233: 1150: 1036: 979: 977: 974: 973: 972: 967: 962: 957: 952: 950:Intentionality 947: 942: 937: 932: 925: 922: 875: 872: 842: 839: 821: 818: 788: 785: 779: 776: 774: 771: 694:Main article: 691: 688: 684:mirror neurons 667: 664: 646: 643: 637: 634: 619: 616: 602: 599: 595:theory of mind 583: 580: 578: 575: 562: 559: 542: 539: 522: 519: 483:psychoanalysis 474: 471: 445: 442: 405: 402: 388: 385: 363: 360: 354: 351: 345: 342: 324: 321: 312: 309: 292: 289: 272: 269: 260: 257: 253:intentionality 248: 245: 231: 228: 192: 189: 84:intentionality 33:Intentionality 26: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 6822: 6811: 6808: 6806: 6803: 6801: 6798: 6796: 6793: 6791: 6788: 6786: 6783: 6781: 6778: 6776: 6773: 6771: 6768: 6767: 6765: 6750: 6747: 6745: 6742: 6740: 6737: 6735: 6732: 6730: 6727: 6725: 6722: 6720: 6717: 6715: 6712: 6710: 6707: 6705: 6702: 6700: 6697: 6695: 6692: 6691: 6689: 6685: 6679: 6676: 6674: 6671: 6669: 6666: 6664: 6663:Consolidation 6661: 6660: 6658: 6656: 6652: 6646: 6643: 6639: 6636: 6634: 6631: 6629: 6626: 6625: 6624: 6621: 6619: 6616: 6614: 6611: 6609: 6606: 6603: 6599: 6596: 6594: 6591: 6589: 6586: 6582: 6579: 6578: 6577: 6574: 6572: 6569: 6568: 6566: 6564: 6560: 6554: 6551: 6547: 6544: 6542: 6539: 6538: 6537: 6534: 6532: 6529: 6527: 6524: 6522: 6519: 6517: 6514: 6512: 6511:Consciousness 6509: 6507: 6506:Comprehension 6504: 6502: 6499: 6495: 6492: 6491: 6490: 6487: 6485: 6482: 6480: 6477: 6475: 6472: 6470: 6467: 6466: 6464: 6462: 6458: 6449: 6444: 6442: 6437: 6435: 6430: 6429: 6426: 6414: 6404: 6402: 6394: 6393: 6390: 6384: 6381: 6379: 6376: 6374: 6371: 6369: 6366: 6364: 6361: 6359: 6358:Phenomenology 6356: 6354: 6351: 6349: 6346: 6344: 6341: 6339: 6336: 6334: 6331: 6329: 6326: 6324: 6321: 6320: 6318: 6314: 6305: 6304: 6300: 6295: 6294: 6290: 6285: 6284: 6280: 6275: 6274: 6270: 6265: 6264: 6260: 6255: 6254: 6250: 6245: 6244: 6240: 6235: 6234: 6230: 6225: 6224: 6220: 6215: 6214: 6210: 6205: 6204: 6200: 6195: 6194: 6190: 6185: 6184: 6180: 6175: 6174: 6170: 6165: 6164: 6160: 6155: 6154: 6150: 6145: 6144: 6140: 6135: 6134: 6130: 6125: 6124: 6120: 6119: 6117: 6115:Notable works 6113: 6107: 6106: 6102: 6100: 6097: 6095: 6092: 6090: 6087: 6085: 6082: 6080: 6077: 6075: 6072: 6070: 6067: 6065: 6062: 6060: 6057: 6055: 6052: 6050: 6047: 6045: 6042: 6040: 6037: 6035: 6032: 6030: 6027: 6025: 6022: 6020: 6017: 6015: 6012: 6010: 6007: 6005: 6002: 6000: 5997: 5995: 5992: 5990: 5987: 5985: 5982: 5980: 5977: 5975: 5972: 5970: 5967: 5965: 5962: 5960: 5957: 5955: 5952: 5950: 5947: 5945: 5942: 5940: 5937: 5935: 5932: 5930: 5927: 5925: 5922: 5920: 5917: 5915: 5912: 5910: 5907: 5905: 5902: 5900: 5897: 5895: 5892: 5890: 5887: 5885: 5882: 5880: 5877: 5875: 5872: 5870: 5867: 5865: 5862: 5861: 5859: 5857: 5853: 5847: 5846: 5842: 5840: 5837: 5835: 5832: 5830: 5827: 5825: 5822: 5820: 5817: 5815: 5812: 5810: 5807: 5805: 5802: 5800: 5797: 5795: 5792: 5790: 5787: 5785: 5782: 5780: 5777: 5775: 5772: 5770: 5767: 5765: 5762: 5760: 5757: 5755: 5752: 5750: 5747: 5745: 5742: 5740: 5737: 5735: 5732: 5730: 5727: 5725: 5722: 5720: 5717: 5715: 5712: 5710: 5707: 5705: 5702: 5700: 5697: 5695: 5692: 5690: 5687: 5685: 5682: 5680: 5677: 5673: 5670: 5669: 5668: 5665: 5663: 5660: 5658: 5655: 5653: 5650: 5648: 5645: 5643: 5640: 5638: 5635: 5633: 5630: 5628: 5625: 5623: 5620: 5618: 5617: 5613: 5611: 5608: 5606: 5603: 5601: 5598: 5596: 5593: 5591: 5588: 5587: 5585: 5581: 5575: 5572: 5570: 5567: 5565: 5562: 5560: 5557: 5555: 5552: 5550: 5547: 5545: 5542: 5540: 5537: 5535: 5532: 5530: 5527: 5525: 5522: 5520: 5519:Phenomenalism 5517: 5515: 5512: 5510: 5507: 5505: 5502: 5500: 5497: 5495: 5492: 5490: 5487: 5485: 5482: 5480: 5477: 5475: 5472: 5470: 5467: 5465: 5462: 5460: 5457: 5455: 5452: 5450: 5447: 5445: 5442: 5440: 5439:Action theory 5437: 5435: 5432: 5431: 5429: 5425: 5421: 5414: 5409: 5407: 5402: 5400: 5395: 5394: 5391: 5385: 5382: 5379: 5374: 5370: 5369: 5365: 5357: 5353: 5349: 5345: 5338: 5336: 5332: 5327: 5323: 5319: 5315: 5308: 5305: 5300: 5296: 5292: 5288: 5281: 5278: 5266: 5262: 5255: 5252: 5239: 5235: 5228: 5226: 5222: 5217: 5213: 5207: 5204: 5191: 5187: 5180: 5177: 5165: 5161: 5154: 5151: 5138: 5134: 5127: 5125: 5123: 5121: 5119: 5115: 5110: 5106: 5102: 5098: 5093: 5088: 5084: 5080: 5076: 5069: 5066: 5061: 5057: 5053: 5049: 5045: 5041: 5034: 5032: 5030: 5028: 5026: 5024: 5022: 5020: 5016: 5011: 5007: 5002: 4997: 4993: 4989: 4985: 4981: 4977: 4970: 4967: 4962: 4958: 4953: 4948: 4944: 4940: 4936: 4932: 4928: 4921: 4918: 4913: 4909: 4905: 4901: 4897: 4893: 4886: 4883: 4880: 4874: 4871: 4866: 4862: 4857: 4852: 4848: 4844: 4840: 4833: 4830: 4826: 4820: 4817: 4812: 4808: 4804: 4800: 4796: 4792: 4785: 4782: 4777: 4773: 4768: 4763: 4759: 4755: 4751: 4747: 4743: 4736: 4733: 4727: 4724: 4719: 4715: 4711: 4707: 4703: 4699: 4692: 4689: 4684: 4680: 4676: 4672: 4665: 4662: 4656: 4654: 4650: 4646: 4640: 4637: 4632: 4628: 4624: 4620: 4616: 4612: 4608: 4601: 4599: 4597: 4593: 4588: 4584: 4580: 4576: 4572: 4568: 4564: 4557: 4555: 4553: 4551: 4549: 4547: 4545: 4541: 4536: 4532: 4528: 4521: 4519: 4517: 4513: 4508: 4504: 4497: 4494: 4489: 4488: 4480: 4477: 4472: 4471: 4463: 4460: 4455: 4451: 4447: 4443: 4439: 4435: 4428: 4425: 4420: 4414: 4410: 4409: 4401: 4398: 4393: 4387: 4383: 4382: 4374: 4371: 4366: 4360: 4356: 4355: 4347: 4344: 4339: 4333: 4329: 4328: 4320: 4317: 4312: 4306: 4302: 4301: 4293: 4290: 4285: 4283:9780787663674 4279: 4275: 4274: 4266: 4264: 4260: 4256:(4): 1060–81. 4255: 4251: 4247: 4240: 4237: 4232: 4230:9780787663674 4226: 4222: 4221: 4213: 4211: 4209: 4205: 4200: 4194: 4190: 4189: 4181: 4179: 4177: 4173: 4168: 4166:9780028653198 4162: 4158: 4157: 4149: 4147: 4143: 4138: 4132: 4128: 4127: 4119: 4116: 4111: 4107: 4103: 4099: 4095: 4091: 4087: 4083: 4076: 4073: 4068: 4064: 4059: 4054: 4050: 4046: 4042: 4035: 4032: 4026: 4021: 4017: 4013: 4009: 4002: 3999: 3994: 3990: 3986: 3982: 3978: 3974: 3970: 3966: 3959: 3957: 3953: 3948: 3944: 3939: 3934: 3930: 3926: 3922: 3918: 3914: 3907: 3904: 3899: 3895: 3891: 3887: 3882: 3877: 3873: 3869: 3865: 3858: 3855: 3850: 3846: 3842: 3838: 3834: 3830: 3825: 3820: 3817:(2): 99–116. 3816: 3812: 3805: 3802: 3797: 3793: 3788: 3783: 3779: 3775: 3772:(1): 168–90. 3771: 3767: 3763: 3756: 3753: 3748: 3744: 3740: 3736: 3732: 3728: 3724: 3720: 3712: 3709: 3704: 3700: 3696: 3692: 3688: 3684: 3680: 3676: 3668: 3665: 3660: 3653: 3650: 3645: 3641: 3637: 3633: 3628: 3623: 3619: 3615: 3612:(3): 825–45. 3611: 3607: 3600: 3593: 3590: 3585: 3578: 3575: 3570: 3563: 3560: 3555: 3548: 3545: 3540: 3536: 3532: 3528: 3524: 3518: 3515: 3510: 3506: 3502: 3498: 3494: 3490: 3483: 3480: 3475: 3473:9781483267302 3469: 3465: 3464: 3456: 3453: 3448: 3444: 3440: 3436: 3431: 3426: 3422: 3418: 3414: 3410: 3403: 3401: 3397: 3392: 3385: 3382: 3377: 3370: 3367: 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Routledge. 4469: 4462: 4437: 4433: 4427: 4407: 4400: 4380: 4373: 4353: 4346: 4327:Criminal Law 4326: 4319: 4299: 4292: 4272: 4253: 4249: 4239: 4219: 4188:Criminal Law 4187: 4155: 4125: 4118: 4085: 4081: 4075: 4048: 4044: 4034: 4015: 4011: 4001: 3968: 3964: 3920: 3916: 3906: 3871: 3867: 3857: 3814: 3810: 3804: 3769: 3765: 3755: 3722: 3718: 3711: 3678: 3674: 3667: 3658: 3652: 3609: 3605: 3592: 3583: 3577: 3568: 3562: 3553: 3547: 3533:(1): 55–72. 3530: 3526: 3517: 3492: 3488: 3482: 3462: 3455: 3412: 3408: 3390: 3384: 3375: 3369: 3344: 3340: 3334: 3317: 3313: 3272:(2): F1–F7. 3269: 3265: 3259: 3240: 3192: 3188: 3164: 3132: 3128: 3086: 3082: 3056: 3050: 3041: 3031: 3011: 3004: 2979: 2975: 2962: 2953: 2947: 2920: 2916: 2910: 2893: 2889: 2883: 2871:. Retrieved 2866: 2856: 2846: 2839: 2829: 2794: 2790: 2784: 2747: 2743: 2733: 2696: 2692: 2682: 2665: 2661: 2621: 2617: 2583: 2579: 2552:. Retrieved 2548: 2539: 2527:. 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Retrieved 1136: 1029: 917: 910: 908: 890: 877: 863: 860: 856: 844: 835: 831: 826:toxin puzzle 823: 820:Toxin puzzle 810: 790: 781: 742: 734:manslaughter 726: 722:jurisdiction 702:criminal law 699: 681: 669: 660: 656: 652: 648: 639: 630: 621: 612: 608: 604: 592: 585: 564: 555:deliberation 544: 534: 528: 524: 515: 506: 496: 476: 465: 447: 438: 433: 429: 425: 421: 416:motivational 414: 410: 407: 396: 392: 390: 377: 372: 368: 365: 356: 347: 336: 334: 326: 314: 301: 294: 285: 274: 262: 250: 241: 237: 233: 210: 194: 184: 180: 175: 173: 168: 164: 160: 156: 152: 147: 143: 139: 135: 129: 123: 114: 106: 102: 98: 93: 88: 78: 74: 71:mental state 66: 64: 6785:Determinism 6553:Prospection 6526:Imagination 6489:Forecasting 6469:Association 6163:Metaphysics 6147:(c. 200 BC) 6137:(c. 350 BC) 6127:(c. 350 BC) 6014:Collingwood 5919:Malebranche 5667:Information 5595:Anima mundi 5574:Type theory 5529:Physicalism 5494:Materialism 5449:Determinism 5420:Metaphysics 5320:: 311–321. 5196:10 November 5169:10 November 5143:10 November 4937:(1): 5–22. 4434:Philosophia 2873:15 November 2554:11 November 2529:11 November 2155:(1): 1–14. 1807:: 571–583. 1773:Steward H. 1717:13 November 1692:13 November 1662:13 November 1637:13 November 1610:15 November 1422:13 November 1133:"Intention" 767:intoxicated 749:prosecution 491:unconscious 279:and action- 136:prospective 6764:Categories 6734:Mental set 6613:Peripheral 6563:Perception 6546:strategies 6223:Monadology 6157:(c. 80 BC) 5864:Parmenides 5749:Perception 5647:Experience 5534:Relativism 5509:Naturalism 5459:Enactivism 5270:9 November 5092:1810.05903 3971:(2): 243. 3719:NeuroImage 3627:1893/21047 2982:(2): 277. 2618:Philosophy 2580:Philosophy 1143:7 November 976:References 960:Motivation 745:conviction 714:actus reus 676:estimating 571:motivation 501:, involve 479:psychology 454:irrational 191:Definition 161:irrational 6790:Free will 6770:Intention 6709:Intention 6694:Attention 6628:Harmonics 6581:RGB model 6531:Intuition 6501:Foresight 6494:affective 6474:Awareness 6461:Cognition 6383:Teleology 6348:Mereology 6328:Cosmology 6187:(c. 1000) 6084:Plantinga 6074:Armstrong 6024:Heidegger 5999:Whitehead 5984:Nietzsche 5904:Descartes 5874:Aristotle 5829:Universal 5759:Principle 5729:Necessity 5689:Intention 5642:Existence 5605:Causality 5544:Solipsism 5474:Free will 5378:Intention 5060:144540970 4912:144702714 4677:: 41–57. 4631:202259118 4454:144779235 3993:143057281 3819:CiteSeerX 3509:145165393 3361:145185720 3141:618996982 2811:146962812 2638:251062551 2600:170742495 2285:206955309 2239:148919243 2204:149780291 2169:144771278 2032:9 October 1979:169717685 1929:170415727 1760:1520-8583 935:Entention 903:Moralität 897:Legalität 806:abilities 625:Carpenter 551:decisions 487:conscious 67:intention 6749:Volition 6739:Thinking 6719:Learning 6668:Encoding 6401:Category 6323:Axiology 6177:(c. 270) 6105:more ... 6059:Anscombe 6054:Strawson 6049:Davidson 5944:Berkeley 5884:Plotinus 5845:more ... 5784:Relation 5764:Property 5739:Ontology 5662:Identity 5583:Concepts 5514:Nihilism 5479:Idealism 5427:Theories 5326:43593317 5299:23683644 5010:23606757 4961:10909874 4898:: 1–33. 4865:12956232 4811:21553974 4776:11271752 4718:55744406 4587:55654286 4537:: 39–52. 4503:"Action" 4110:10108122 4102:21227300 3947:25147406 3898:14169352 3890:12354405 3849:18583392 3841:23962364 3747:25792636 3739:16023041 3695:11280420 3636:10994231 3439:15595371 3296:17286836 3219:25147406 3137:ProQuest 3135:(12–B). 3111:53690941 3103:11483999 2776:30846963 2750:: 2777. 2725:34335416 2699:: 2587. 2277:23732190 2134:23740784 2085:27621713 2059:: 1272. 2022:"Agency" 1548:14173135 965:Scienter 924:See also 874:Morality 763:seizures 710:mens rea 450:rational 157:rational 79:attitude 6805:Thought 6673:Storage 6541:methods 6173:Enneads 6167:(c. 50) 6133:Timaeus 6123:Sophist 6069:Dummett 6064:Deleuze 6004:Russell 5994:Bergson 5989:Meinong 5969:Bolzano 5929:Leibniz 5909:Spinoza 5894:Aquinas 5879:Proclus 5809:Thought 5799:Subject 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