683:, himself an impure intentionalist, explains this difference by distinguishing three aspects of intentional states: the intentional object, the intentional content, and the intentional mode. For example, seeing that an apple is round and tasting that this apple is sweet both have the same intentional object: the apple. But they involve different contents: the visual perception ascribes the property of roundness to the apple while the gustatory perception ascribes the property of sweetness to the apple. Touching the apple will also result in a perceptual experience ascribing roundness to the apple, but the roundness is presented in a different manner. So the visual perception and the haptic perception agree in both intentional object and intentional content but differ in intentional mode. Pure intentionalists may not agree with this distinction. They may argue, for example, that the difference in the last case also belongs to intentional content, because two different properties are ascribed to the apple: seen-roundness and felt-roundness.
590:(1958) both comment on this intermediary position. One such implication would be that there is, in principle, no deeper fact of the matter that could settle two interpretative strategies on what belief to attribute to a physical system. In other words, the behavior (including speech dispositions) of any physical system, in theory, could be interpreted by two different predictive strategies and both would be equally warranted in their belief attribution. This category can be seen to be a medial position between the realists and the eliminativists since it attempts to blend attributes of both into a theory of intentionality. Dennett, for example, argues in
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what an intentional state is about, and the "intender" the subject who is in the intentional state. An intentional state is transparent if it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) it is genuinely relational in that it entails the existence of not just the intender but the intendum as well, and (ii) substitutivity of identicals applies to the intendum (i.e. if the intentional state is about a, and a = b, then the intentional state is about b as well). An intentional state is translucent if it satisfies (i) but not (ii). An intentional state is opaque if it satisfies neither (i) nor (ii).
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a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.
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a mental state there are at least some non-intentional phenomenal properties, so-called "Qualia", which are not determined by intentional features. Pure and impure intentionalism disagree with each other concerning which intentional features are responsible for determining the phenomenal features. Pure intentionalists hold that only intentional content is responsible, while impure intentionalists assert that the manner or mode how this content is presented also plays a role.
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concrete mental objects. In this case, there exists a mental object corresponding to
Superman in Mary's mind. As Mary starts to think about Superman, she enters into a relationship with this mental object. One problem for both of these theories is that they seem to mischaracterize the experience of thinking. As Mary is thinking about Superman, she is neither thinking about a Platonic form outside space-time nor about a mental object. Instead, she
179:". However, most philosophers use "intentionality" to mean something with no teleological import. Thus, a thought of a chair can be about a chair without any implication of an intention or even a belief relating to the chair. For philosophers of language, what is meant by intentionality is largely an issue of how symbols can have meaning. This lack of clarity may underpin some of the differences of view indicated below.
436:. Adverbialism has been challenged on the grounds that it puts a strain on natural language and the metaphysical insights encoded in it. Another objection is that, by treating intentional objects as mere modifications of intentional states, adverbialism loses the power to distinguish between different complex intentional contents, the so-called many-property-problem.
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criterion of intentionality identified by the two aspects of
Brentano's thesis and defined by the logical properties that distinguish language describing psychological phenomena from language describing non-psychological phenomena. Chisholm's criteria for the intentional use of sentences are: existence independence, truth-value indifference, and
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752:. This privileged status can take two forms. In the moderate version, phenomenal intentionality is privileged because other types of intentionality depend on it or are grounded in it. They are therefore not intrinsically intentional. The stronger version goes further and denies that there are other types of intentionality.
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ground such realist claims about intentionality in a language of thought. Dennett comments on this issue, Fodor "attempt to make these irreducible realities acceptable to the physical sciences by grounding them (somehow) in the 'syntax' of a system of physically realized mental representations" (Dennett 1987, 345).
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argue that there is a deeper fact of the matter to both translation and belief attribution. In other words, manuals for translating one language into another cannot be set up in different yet behaviorally identical ways and ontologically there are intentional objects. Famously, Fodor has attempted to
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hold that having an intentional state involves standing in a relation to the intentional object. This is the most natural position for non-problematic cases. So if Mary perceives a tree, we might say that a perceptual relation holds between Mary, the subject of this relation, and the tree, the object
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relation between phenomenal features and intentional features, for example, that two intentional states cannot differ regarding their phenomenal features without differing at the same time in their intentional features. Qualia theories, on the other hand, assert that among the phenomenal features of
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Working on the intentionality of vision, belief, and knowledge, Pierre Le Morvan (2005) has distinguished between three basic kinds of intentionality that he dubs "transparent", "translucent", and "opaque" respectively. The threefold distinction may be explained as follows. Let's call the "intendum"
144:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning
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Advocates of the former, the
Normative Principle, argue that attributions of intentional idioms to physical systems should be the propositional attitudes that the physical system ought to have in those circumstances (Dennett 1987, 342). However, exponents of this view are still further divided into
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were critical of
Husserl's concept of intentionality and his many layers of consciousness. Ryle insisted that perceiving is not a process, and Ayer that describing one's knowledge is not to describe mental processes. The effect of these positions is that consciousness is so fully intentional that
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The latter is advocated by Grandy (1973) and Stich (1980, 1981, 1983, 1984), who maintain that attributions of intentional idioms to any physical system (e.g. humans, artifacts, non-human animals, etc.) should be the propositional attitude (e.g. "belief", "desire", etc.) that one would suppose one
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hold that intentional states are properties of subjects. So no independent objects are needed besides the subject, which is how adverbialists avoid the problem of non-existence. This approach has been termed "adverbialism" since the object of the intentional state is seen as a modification of this
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has revived the
Brentano thesis through linguistic analysis, distinguishing two parts to Brentano's concept, the ontological aspect and the psychological aspect. Chisholm's writings have attempted to summarize the suitable and unsuitable criteria of the concept since the Scholastics, arriving at a
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is the thesis that all mental states are intentional, i.e. that they are about something: about their intentional object. This thesis has also been referred to as "representationalism". Intentionalism is entailed by
Brentano's claim that intentionality is "the mark of the mental": if all and only
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Discussions of intentionalism often focus on the intentionality of conscious states. One can distinguish in such states their phenomenal features, or what it is like for a subject to have such a state, from their intentional features, or what they are about. These two features seem to be closely
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can play this role. Abstract objects have actual existence but they exist outside space and time. So when Mary thinks about
Superman, she is standing in a thinking relation to the abstract object or the Platonic form that corresponds to Superman. A similar solution replaces abstract objects with
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of this relation. Relations are usually assumed to be existence-entailing: the instance of a relation entails the existence of its relata. This principle rules out that we can bear relations to non-existing entities. One way to solve the problem is to deny this principle and argue for a kind of
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regards phenomenality itself, not intentionality, as the "mark of the mental" and thereby sidelines intentionality, since such anti-intentionalists "might accept the thesis that intentionality coincides with the mental, but they hold the view that intentionality derives from consciousness".
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and its implications, while the other positions so far mentioned do not. As Quine puts it, indeterminacy of radical translation is the thesis that "manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet
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content. Others are more skeptical of the human ability to make such an assertion, arguing that the kind of intentionality that emerges from self-organizing networks of automata will always be undecidable because it will never be possible to make our subjective introspective experience of
520:(1964) all adhere to the former position, namely that intentional idiom is problematic and cannot be integrated with the natural sciences. Members of this category also maintain realism in regard to intentional objects, which may imply some kind of dualism (though this is debatable).
167:, existing not externally but in the psychological state" (Jacquette 2004, p. 102), while others are more cautious, stating: "It is not clear whether in 1874 this ... was intended to carry any ontological commitment" (Chrudzimski and Smith 2004, p. 205).
308:: to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states. This is particularly relevant for cases involving objects that have no existence outside the mind, as in the case of mere fantasies or hallucinations.
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A more common relationalist solution is to look for existing objects that can play the role that the non-existing object was supposed to play. Such objects are sometimes called "proxies", "traces", or "ersatz objects". It has been suggested that
598:") is a predictive strategy and if such a strategy successfully and voluminously predicts the actions of a physical system, then that physical system can be said to have those beliefs attributed to it. Dennett calls this predictive strategy the
748:, which is often ascribed to e.g. language and unconscious states. The distinction is important to philosophers who hold that phenomenal intentionality has a privileged status over non-phenomenal intentionality. This position is known as the
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then failing to refer would result in a lack of meaning. The difficulty for such a position is to explain why it seems to Mary that she is thinking about something and how seeming to think is different from actual thinking.
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he phenomenal character of my pain intuitively is something that is given to me via introspection of what I experience in having the pain. But what I experience is what my experience represents. So, phenomenal character is
631:. Dennett (1969, 1971, 1975), Cherniak (1981, 1986), and the more recent work of Putnam (1983) recommend the Assumption of Rationality, which unsurprisingly assumes that the physical system in question is rational.
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like perceptions, beliefs or desires. For example, the perception of a tree has intentionality because it represents a tree to the perceiver. A central issue for theories of intentionality has been the problem of
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Williford, Kenneth. "The
Intentionality of Consciousness and Consciousness of Intentionality. In G. Forrai and G. Kampis, eds., Intentionality: Past and Future. Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 143–156. 2005.
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A major problem within discourse on intentionality is that participants often fail to make explicit whether or not they use the term to imply concepts such as agency or desire, i.e. whether it involves
776:. Cedric Evans contributed greatly to the discussion with his "The Subject of Self-Consciousness" in 1970. He centered his model on the idea that executive attention need not be propositional in form.
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deny that the example above is possible. It might seem to us and to Mary that she is thinking about something but she is not really thinking at all. Such a position could be motivated by a form of
562:, understand intentional idiom, such as "belief", "desire", and the like, to be replaceable either with behavioristic language (e.g. Quine) or with the language of neuroscience (e.g. Churchland).
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status of the contents of mental phenomena. According to some interpreters the "in-" of "in-existence" is to be read as locative, i.e. as indicating that "an intended object ... exists in or has
672:
These theories can roughly be divided into three categories: pure intentionalism, impure intentionalism, and qualia theories. Both pure and impure intentionalism hold that there is a
327:(that Superman fiction exists is beside the point). Various theories have been proposed in order to reconcile these conflicting intuitions. These theories can roughly be divided into
73:, and with his tenets distinguishing between objects that exist in the understanding and objects that exist in reality. The idea fell out of discussion with the end of the medieval
1321:"On the Referential Competence of Some Machines", in Integration of Natural Language and Vision Processing: Theory and Grounding Representations, Volume 3, edited by Paul Mc Kevitt
453:. Most, if not all, current theories on intentionality accept Brentano's thesis of the irreducibility of intentional idiom. From this thesis the following positions emerge:
362:, the view that the meaning of a term, or in this example the content of a thought, is determined by factors external to the subject. If meaning depends on successful
1348:"Ends and Means in Machine-Like Systems", in New Perspectives on Cybernetics: Self-Organization, Autonomy and Connectionism, edited by Gertrudis Van de Vijver
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A further form argues that some unusual states of consciousness are non-intentional, although an individual might live a lifetime without experiencing them.
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the mental act has been emptied of all content, and that the idea of pure consciousness is that it is nothing. (Sartre also referred to "consciousness" as "
339:. Eliminativists deny that this kind of problematic mental state is possible. Relationalists try to solve the problem by interpreting intentional states as
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Stich, Stephen. "Relativism, Rationality, and the Limits of
Intentional Description". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65, pp. 211–35. 1984.
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related to each other, which is why intentionalists have proposed various theories in order to capture the exact form of this relatedness.
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thinking about a concrete physical being. A related solution sees possible objects as intentional objects. This involves a commitment to
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The latter position, which maintains the unity of intentionality with the natural sciences, is further divided into three standpoints:
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Several authors have attempted to construct philosophical models describing how intentionality relates to the human capacity to be
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695:, have proposed various apparent counterexamples to intentionalism: states that are considered mental but lack intentionality.
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For example, assume that Mary is thinking about Superman. On the one hand, it seems that this thought is intentional: Mary is
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279:, intentionality is sometimes linked with questions of semantic inference, with both skeptical and supportive adherents.
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intentionality and decision making coincide with our objective observation of the behavior of a self-organizing machine.
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Dreyfus, Georges. "Is Perception Intentional? (A Preliminary Exploration of Intentionality in Indian Philosophy)." 2006.
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that are thus "psychical" or "mental" phenomena, by which they may be set apart from "physical" or "natural" phenomena.
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Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Barry Smith (2004) "Brentano’s Ontology: from Conceptualism to Reism" in Jacquette (ed.)
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is also a vital component of consciousness, and that it is not intentional. (The latter claim is itself disputed by
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about intentionality, the view that intentional properties are reducible to natural properties as studied by the
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94:. Today, intentionality is a live concern among philosophers of mind and language. A common dispute is between
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Koons, Robert C.; Pickavance, Timothy (9 February 2017). "12 The Non-Existent and the Vaguely Existent".
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234:, and being in the world identifies their ontological significance, in contrast to that which is merely
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102:, and the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that intentionality is grounded in consciousness.
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Churchland, Paul M.; Churchland, Patricia Smith (1981). "Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality".
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ontologically there is nothing intentional, but that the language of intentionality is indispensable
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is the type of intentionality grounded in phenomenal or conscious mental states. It contrasts with
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58:: to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states.
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mental states are intentional then it is surely the case that all mental states are intentional.
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followed on Brentano, and gave the concept of intentionality more widespread attention, both in
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Strawson, Galen (2008). "Real Intentionality 3: Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness".
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Bourget, David (2019). "Relational Vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality".
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offers a taxonomy of the current theories about intentionality in Chapter 10 of his book
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To bear out further the diversity of sentiment evoked from the notion of intentionality,
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Forman, Robert Kc (1990). "Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting".
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state, which can be linguistically expressed through adverbs. Instead of saying that
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Kriegel, Uriah (2013). "Chapter 1: The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program".
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is the mental ability to refer to or represent something. Sometimes regarded as the
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1690:"Extended Modal Realism — a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence"
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Le Morvan, Pierre (2005). "Intentionality: Transparent, Translucent, and Opaque".
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Brentano coined the expression "intentional inexistence" to indicate the peculiar
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Jacquette, Dale (2004) "Brentano’s Concept of Intentionality" in Jacquette (ed.)
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in which awareness exists, but has no object, is not awareness "of" anything.
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Davidson, Donald. "Truth and Meaning". Synthese, XVII, pp. 304–23. 1967.
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136:(1874). Brentano described intentionality as a characteristic of all acts of
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The concept of intentionality was reintroduced in 19th-century contemporary
36:
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Chalmers, David J. (2004). "The Representational Character of Experience".
635:(1967, 1973, 1974, 1985) and Lewis (1974) defend the Principle of Charity.
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intentional idiom is not problematic for science, which is divided into:
292:
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adherence to Normative Principle (epistemology), which is divided into:
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175:. Dennett (see below) explicitly invokes teleological concepts in the "
2457:. Vol. 24: p. 195-201. Reprinted in Marras, Ausonio. Ed. (1972)
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Fodor, J. "The Language of Thought". Harvard University Press. 1980.
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702:, are based on the argument that phenomenal conscious experience or
428:, it would be more precise, according to adverbialists, to say that
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Chisholm, Roderick M. (1963). "Notes on the Logic of Believing" in
2234:"A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character"
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argues that some of the unusual states of consciousness typical of
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incompatible with one another" (Quine 1960, 27). Quine (1960) and
235:
208:, stating that the two were indistinguishable. German philosopher
24:
439:
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Malle, B. F., Moses, L. J., & Baldwin, D. A. (Eds.) (2003).
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154:, edited by Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 68.
20:
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Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition.
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Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality
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Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in honor of Brian Loar
1092:
Perception: And Our Knowledge Of The External World, Volume 3
291:
operations that occurred in a computer would provide it with
2150:"Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception"
2324:
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition)
2290:
The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy
479:
Quinean double standard (see below) which is divided into:
440:
Dennett's taxonomy of current theories about intentionality
1735:
The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics
639:
would have in the same circumstances (Dennett 1987, 343).
1265:
Religion and Human Purpose: A Cross Disciplinary Approach
544:(1975), as well as Burge, Dretske, Kripke, and the early
304:
A central issue for theories of intentionality has been
1439:"Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality"
2318:
Bourget, David; Mendelovici, Angela (29 August 2016).
1921:"Intentionality: Transparent, Translucent, And Opaque"
1400:
Crane, Tim (2013). "1. The Problem of Non-Existence".
194:. In contrast to Brentano's view, French philosopher
1234:
Philosophy of Mind: An Overview for Cognitive Science
1151:. Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University
1124:. Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University
61:
An early theory of intentionality is associated with
1979:. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 474–93.
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3170:
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1815:
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
1544:"Actualism, Presentism and the Grounding Objection"
698:Some anti-intentionalist theories, such as that of
35:. For the idea of doing something with a goal, see
2439:Chisholm, Roderick M. (1967). "Intentionality" in
1231:
2626:Ancient and Medieval Theories of Internationality
2530:Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology
1811:"The Limits of Adverbialism About Intentionality"
643:Basic intentionality types according to Le Morvan
2201:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
2010:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
1598:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
1514:Priest, Graham (2016). "3. Objects of Thought".
908:Chisholm, Roderick M. (1967). "Intentionality".
2592:The Concept of Intentionality: A Critical Study
1761:"Symposium: The Adverbial Theory of Perception"
142:
1663:Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise
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2054:. Oxford University Press. pp. 153–181.
1976:The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind
8:
1263:Horosz, William and Tad S. Clements (1986).
325:thinking about something that does not exist
122:who is generally regarded as the founder of
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230:condition where an individual's existence,
16:Ability of the mind to form representations
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605:They are further divided into two theses:
287:thought experiment, according to which no
2594:. St. Louis, MO: Warren H. Green, 1972.
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1884:
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1149:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP)
1122:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP)
77:, but in recent times was resurrected by
23:to form representations. For the related
19:This article is about the ability of the
2658:Historical Introduction to Phenomenology
2455:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
2190:
2188:
2107:Mitchell, Jonathan (12 September 2020).
1968:
1966:
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430:Mary is thinking in a superman-ly manner
241:Other 20th-century philosophers such as
2434:Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
2430:Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte
2079:Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint
1375:Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint
1211:. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1068:. New York: HarperCollins. p. 26.
874:
485:who makes an Assumption of Rationality;
152:Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
133:Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
2656:Sajama, Seppo & Kamppinen, Matti.
2570:The Journal of Philosophical Research,
2293:. Oxford University Press. p. 8.
2214:
2204:
2023:
2013:
1949:from the original on 27 September 2012
1611:
1601:
1209:Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia
343:while Adverbialists interpret them as
306:the problem of intentional inexistence
300:The problem of intentional inexistence
3356:Philosophy of artificial intelligence
2611:. De Gruyter, Berlin - Boston, 2017.
2353:. New York: Oxford University Press.
2109:"Another Look at Mode Intentionalism"
1973:Crane, Tim (2009). "Intentionalism".
1641:from the original on 11 November 2020
1299:from the original on 25 December 2012
1184:from the original on 26 November 2013
1043:. John Wiley & Sons. p. 84.
768:Intentionality and self-consciousness
691:Critics of intentionalism, so-called
457:intentional idiom is problematic for
7:
2703:Intentionality in Ancient Philosophy
2330:from the original on 19 October 2020
1289:"Might the Singularity never occur?"
987:Smith, David Woodruff (2006-12-04).
713:Another form of anti-intentionalism
687:Mental states without intentionality
583:indeterminacy of radical translation
319:. This suggests that Mary either is
2715:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2692:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2557:The Cambridge Companion to Brentano
2487:The Cambridge Companion to Brentano
1635:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1406:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
993:. New York: Routledge. p. 10.
888:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
594:(1981) that intentional idiom (or "
3442:Concepts in the philosophy of mind
2660:. New York, NY: Croom Helm, 1987.
2459:Intentionality, mind, and language
2264:from the original on 21 April 2014
1777:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1975.tb00242.x
1324:. New York: Springer. p. 31.
1267:. New York: Springer. p. 35.
1238:. Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum. pp.
1145:"Consciousness and Intentionality"
573:Those who adhere to the so-called
497:adherence to Projective Principle.
283:argued for this position with the
204:) identified intentionality with
14:
2473:Perceiving: A Philosophical Study
2407:from the original on 3 March 2016
2376:Real materialism and other essays
1928:Journal of Philosophical Research
1351:. New York: Sringer. p. 39.
1095:. London: Routledge. p. 28.
963:"Franz Brentano – Britannica.com"
404:, for example in the form of the
2708:Consciousness and Intentionality
2432:Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot (
2007:Consciousness and Intentionality
1455:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x
786:
754:Phenomenal intentionality theory
750:phenomenal intentionality theory
581:), accept Quine's thesis of the
2590:Mohanty, Jitendra Nath (1972).
2297:from the original on 2020-11-10
2174:from the original on 2020-11-17
2167:10.1590/S0101-31732016000200005
2086:from the original on 2020-11-20
2058:from the original on 2020-11-10
1983:from the original on 2020-11-10
1901:from the original on 2021-06-23
1861:"A New Perceptual Adverbialism"
1841:from the original on 2021-08-16
1791:from the original on 2021-08-30
1714:from the original on 2020-11-14
1670:from the original on 2021-08-24
1574:from the original on 2021-08-30
1524:from the original on 2021-08-28
1496:from the original on 2021-08-30
1492:. Routledge. pp. 137–166.
1461:from the original on 2020-11-16
1410:from the original on 2020-10-22
1382:from the original on 2020-11-20
969:from the original on 2016-03-20
426:Mary is thinking about Superman
2624:Perler, Dominik (ed.) (2001),
2471:Chisholm, Roderick M. (1957).
2441:The Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2401:"The Subject of Consciousness"
910:The Encyclopedia of Philosophy
315:. On the other hand, Superman
218:), defined intentionality as "
1:
3213:Hard problem of consciousness
1827:10.1080/0020174X.2016.1140071
746:non-phenomenal intentionality
381:intentionality exceptionalism
2475:. Cornell University Press.
1592:Menzel, Christopher (2018).
756:is commonly contrasted with
627:and those who adhere to the
534:(1960) and Churchland (1981)
434:Mary is thinking superman-ly
321:not thinking about something
89:phenomenological philosopher
2501:Dennett, Daniel C. (1989).
2378:. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2320:"Phenomenal Intentionality"
1859:D'Ambrosio, Justin (2019).
1666:. Oxford University Press.
1520:. Oxford University Press.
941:10.5840/philtopics198112146
715:associated with John Searle
3490:
2238:Philosophical Perspectives
2126:10.1007/s10670-020-00314-4
1707:10.1007/s11406-019-00126-z
1688:Thomas, Andrew D. (2020).
1660:Yagisawa, Takashi (2009).
1443:Philosophical Perspectives
882:Jacob, P. (Aug 31, 2010).
408:model or as envisioned by
118:(a German philosopher and
18:
3376:
2935:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
2925:David Lewis (philosopher)
2726:Collective Intentionality
2609:Intentionality and Action
2351:Phenomenal intentionality
2051:The Future for Philosophy
2004:Siewert, Charles (2017).
1919:Pierre Le Morvan (2005).
1738:. John Wiley & Sons.
1560:10.1007/s10670-018-0016-6
1295:. Singularity Institute.
1230:Bechtel, William (1988).
1039:Martin Heidegger (1967).
1014:Jean-Paul Sartre (2012).
813:Collective intentionality
742:Phenomenal intentionality
737:Phenomenal intentionality
731:pure consciousness events
625:Assumption of Rationality
3467:Philosophy of psychology
3432:Concepts in epistemology
2528:Husserl, Edmund (1962).
2428:Brentano, Franz (1874).
2076:Brentano, Franz (1874).
1809:Woodling, Casey (2016).
1372:Brentano, Franz (1874).
550:those who adhere to the
313:thinking about something
3437:Metaphysical properties
3063:Eliminative materialism
2544:Logical Investigations.
2148:Chediak, Karla (2016).
1877:10.5840/jphil2019116826
1759:Jackson, Frank (1975).
1437:Kriegel, Uriah (2007).
1318:Marconi, Diego (1996).
668:Forms of intentionalism
575:Quinean double standard
560:eliminative materialism
552:Quinean double standard
528:Eliminative materialism
474:Epistemological realism
468:Eliminative materialism
273:artificial intelligence
56:intentional inexistence
3315:Propositional attitude
3310:Problem of other minds
3218:Hypostatic abstraction
2503:The Intentional Stance
2195:Jacob, Pierre (2019).
1403:The Objects of Thought
848:Antonio Millan-Puelles
450:The Intentional Stance
157:
79:empirical psychologist
3386:Philosophers category
3290:Mental representation
3053:Biological naturalism
2940:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
2915:Frank Cameron Jackson
1865:Journal of Philosophy
1016:Being and Nothingness
858:Shared intentionality
808:Héctor-Neri Castañeda
201:Being and Nothingness
84:and later adopted by
3068:Emergent materialism
2638:Quine, W.V. (1960).
2607:, M. Gaffal (eds.),
2572:30, p. 283-302.
2232:Michael Tye (1995).
1542:Emery, Nina (2020).
1172:"Sartre and Freedom"
929:Philosophical Topics
693:anti-intentionalists
629:Principle of Charity
617:Projective Principle
490:Principle of Charity
360:semantic externalism
67:ontological argument
63:Anselm of Canterbury
3452:Metaphysics of mind
3422:Action (philosophy)
3265:Language of thought
3015:Ludwig Wittgenstein
2845:Patricia Churchland
2399:C.O. Evans (1970).
1940:10.5840/jpr20053039
1631:"Modal Metaphysics"
1118:"Alfred Jules Ayer"
1116:Macdonald, Graham.
1089:Locke, Don (2002).
1064:Ayer, A.J. (1984).
1018:. Open Road Media.
727:mystical experience
611:Normative Principle
266:referential opacity
192:analytic philosophy
3447:Enactive cognition
3093:Neurophenomenology
2764:Philosophy of mind
2605:Padilla Gálvez, J.
2436:, Routledge, 1973.
1345:Atlan, H. (1991).
1143:Siewert, Charles.
723:Robert K.C. Forman
623:those who make an
600:intentional stance
558:Proponents of the
277:philosophy of mind
177:intentional stance
47:mark of the mental
3472:Psycholinguistics
3457:Mind–body problem
3404:
3403:
3300:Mind–body problem
3198:Cognitive closure
3162:Substance dualism
2780:G. E. M. Anscombe
2651:978-0-262-67001-2
2634:978-9-00412-295-6
2628:, Leiden, Brill.
2617:978-3-11-056028-2
2600:978-0-87527-115-6
2585:978-0-262-63267-6
2551:978-1-57392-866-3
2542:Husserl, Edmund.
2538:978-0-415-29544-4
2532:. Collier Books.
2511:978-0-262-54053-7
2505:. The MIT Press.
2481:978-0-8014-0077-3
2449:978-0-02-894990-1
2403:. Mental States.
2275:representational.
2207:cite encyclopedia
2016:cite encyclopedia
1745:978-1-119-11611-0
1604:cite encyclopedia
863:Superintelligence
838:Mind–body problem
794:Philosophy portal
615:adherence to the
609:adherence to the
506:Roderick Chisholm
261:Roderick Chisholm
75:scholastic period
49:, it is found in
3479:
3152:Representational
3147:Property dualism
3140:Type physicalism
3105:New mysterianism
3073:Epiphenomenalism
2895:Martin Heidegger
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884:"Intentionality"
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789:
762:natural sciences
488:who follows the
410:Takashi Yagisawa
389:abstract objects
210:Martin Heidegger
196:Jean-Paul Sartre
155:
150:Franz Brentano,
100:natural sciences
71:existence of God
3489:
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3285:Mental property
3178:Abstract object
3166:
3036:
2990:Wilfrid Sellars
2865:Donald Davidson
2850:Paul Churchland
2810:George Berkeley
2766:
2761:
2688:
2645:The MIT Press.
2641:Word and Object
2579:The MIT Press.
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2423:Further reading
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596:folk psychology
588:Wilfrid Sellars
540:, advocated by
530:, supported by
510:G.E.M. Anscombe
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128:intentionalism
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3415:
3414:
3412:
3397:
3394:
3392:
3389:
3387:
3384:
3382:
3379:
3378:
3375:
3369:
3365:
3361:
3357:
3354:
3352:
3349:
3348:
3346:
3342:
3336:
3333:
3331:
3330:Understanding
3328:
3326:
3323:
3321:
3318:
3316:
3313:
3311:
3308:
3306:
3303:
3301:
3298:
3296:
3293:
3291:
3288:
3286:
3283:
3281:
3278:
3276:
3273:
3271:
3268:
3266:
3263:
3261:
3258:
3256:
3255:Introspection
3253:
3251:
3248:
3244:
3241:
3239:
3236:
3235:
3234:
3231:
3229:
3226:
3224:
3221:
3219:
3216:
3214:
3211:
3209:
3208:Consciousness
3206:
3204:
3201:
3199:
3196:
3194:
3191:
3189:
3186:
3184:
3181:
3179:
3176:
3175:
3173:
3169:
3163:
3160:
3158:
3155:
3153:
3150:
3148:
3145:
3141:
3138:
3137:
3136:
3133:
3131:
3130:Phenomenology
3128:
3126:
3125:Phenomenalism
3123:
3121:
3118:
3116:
3115:Occasionalism
3113:
3111:
3108:
3106:
3103:
3101:
3098:
3094:
3091:
3090:
3089:
3088:NaĂŻve realism
3086:
3084:
3081:
3079:
3078:Functionalism
3076:
3074:
3071:
3069:
3066:
3064:
3061:
3059:
3056:
3054:
3051:
3049:
3046:
3045:
3043:
3039:
3033:
3032:
3028:
3026:
3023:
3021:
3020:Stephen Yablo
3018:
3016:
3013:
3011:
3008:
3006:
3003:
3001:
2998:
2996:
2993:
2991:
2988:
2986:
2983:
2981:
2978:
2976:
2975:Richard Rorty
2973:
2971:
2970:Hilary Putnam
2968:
2966:
2963:
2961:
2958:
2956:
2953:
2951:
2948:
2946:
2945:Marvin Minsky
2943:
2941:
2938:
2936:
2933:
2931:
2928:
2926:
2923:
2921:
2920:Immanuel Kant
2918:
2916:
2913:
2911:
2910:William James
2908:
2906:
2903:
2901:
2898:
2896:
2893:
2891:
2888:
2886:
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2881:
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2838:
2836:
2833:
2831:
2828:
2826:
2823:
2821:
2818:
2816:
2815:Henri Bergson
2813:
2811:
2808:
2806:
2803:
2801:
2798:
2796:
2793:
2791:
2788:
2786:
2783:
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2704:
2701:
2699:
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2695:
2693:
2690:
2689:
2685:
2681:
2680:90-420-1817-8
2677:
2672:
2669:
2667:
2666:0-7099-4443-8
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2564:0-521-00765-8
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2500:
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2494:0-521-00765-8
2491:
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2474:
2470:
2468:
2467:0-252-00211-3
2464:
2460:
2456:
2452:
2450:
2446:
2443:. Macmillan.
2442:
2438:
2435:
2431:
2427:
2426:
2422:
2406:
2402:
2395:
2392:
2387:
2385:9780199267422
2381:
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2360:9780199764297
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2191:
2189:
2185:
2173:
2168:
2163:
2160:(2): 87–100.
2159:
2155:
2151:
2144:
2141:
2136:
2132:
2127:
2122:
2118:
2114:
2110:
2103:
2101:
2097:
2085:
2082:. Routledge.
2081:
2080:
2072:
2069:
2057:
2053:
2052:
2044:
2042:
2040:
2038:
2034:
2029:
2017:
2009:
2008:
2000:
1998:
1994:
1982:
1978:
1977:
1969:
1967:
1965:
1961:
1945:
1941:
1937:
1933:
1929:
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1900:
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1629:Parent, Ted.
1625:
1622:
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1605:
1597:
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1573:
1569:
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1381:
1378:. Routledge.
1377:
1376:
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1354:
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1203:Byrne, Alex.
1199:
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833:Ruth Millikan
831:
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800:
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674:supervenience
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584:
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577:(namely that
576:
571:
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563:
561:
553:
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546:Hilary Putnam
543:
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421:Adverbialists
415:
413:
411:
407:
403:
402:modal realism
399:
394:
390:
384:
382:
377:
371:Relationalism
370:
368:
365:
361:
357:
351:Eliminativism
350:
348:
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342:
338:
334:
333:relationalism
330:
329:eliminativism
326:
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206:consciousness
203:
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146:
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138:consciousness
135:
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101:
97:
93:
90:
87:
83:
80:
76:
72:
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59:
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52:
51:mental states
48:
44:
38:
34:
31:concept, see
30:
26:
22:
3366: /
3362: /
3358: /
3275:Mental image
3270:Mental event
3249:
3233:Intelligence
3183:Chinese room
3029:
2980:Gilbert Ryle
2960:Derek Parfit
2950:Thomas Nagel
2880:Fred Dretske
2800:J. L. Austin
2772:Philosophers
2657:
2639:
2625:
2608:
2591:
2576:
2569:
2556:
2543:
2529:
2502:
2486:
2472:
2458:
2454:
2440:
2433:
2429:
2409:. Retrieved
2394:
2375:
2369:
2350:
2344:
2332:. Retrieved
2323:
2299:. Retrieved
2289:
2282:
2273:
2266:. Retrieved
2241:
2237:
2227:
2197:
2176:. Retrieved
2157:
2153:
2143:
2116:
2112:
2088:. Retrieved
2078:
2071:
2060:. Retrieved
2050:
2006:
1985:. Retrieved
1975:
1951:. Retrieved
1931:
1927:
1914:
1903:. Retrieved
1868:
1864:
1854:
1843:. Retrieved
1818:
1814:
1804:
1793:. Retrieved
1768:
1764:
1754:
1734:
1727:
1716:. Retrieved
1697:
1693:
1683:
1672:. Retrieved
1662:
1655:
1643:. Retrieved
1634:
1624:
1594:
1587:
1576:. Retrieved
1554:(1): 23–43.
1551:
1547:
1537:
1526:. Retrieved
1516:
1509:
1498:. Retrieved
1488:
1463:. Retrieved
1446:
1442:
1412:. Retrieved
1402:
1395:
1384:. Retrieved
1374:
1367:
1347:
1340:
1320:
1313:
1301:. Retrieved
1292:
1283:
1264:
1258:
1233:
1225:
1213:. Retrieved
1208:
1198:
1186:. Retrieved
1165:
1153:. Retrieved
1148:
1138:
1126:. Retrieved
1121:
1111:
1091:
1084:
1065:
1059:
1040:
1034:
1015:
1009:
989:
982:
971:. Retrieved
957:
932:
928:
922:
913:
909:
903:
891:. Retrieved
887:
877:
843:Thomas Nagel
818:Directedness
771:
753:
749:
745:
741:
740:
730:
720:
712:
697:
692:
690:
679:
671:
662:
656:
655:
646:
637:
628:
624:
621:
616:
610:
604:
591:
578:
574:
572:
566:
564:
559:
557:
551:
537:
527:
522:
516:(1957), and
504:
448:
443:
433:
429:
425:
420:
419:
416:Adverbialism
397:
385:
380:
375:
374:
355:
354:
337:adverbialism
336:
332:
328:
324:
320:
316:
312:
310:
305:
303:
285:Chinese room
270:
256:
243:Gilbert Ryle
240:
223:
213:
199:
181:
169:
165:in-existence
164:
158:
151:
143:
131:
127:
123:
120:psychologist
109:
86:contemporary
60:
55:
46:
42:
41:
3360:information
3351:Metaphysics
3325:Tabula rasa
3135:Physicalism
3120:Parallelism
3048:Behaviorism
3005:Michael Tye
3000:Alan Turing
2985:John Searle
2860:Dharmakirti
2835:Tyler Burge
2830:C. D. Broad
2411:21 December
2268:21 December
1953:21 December
1934:: 283–302.
1886:1885/214157
1694:Philosophia
1645:12 November
1303:28 December
1215:28 December
1188:28 December
1155:28 December
1128:28 December
893:21 December
708:Michael Tye
565:Holders of
542:Jerry Fodor
514:Peter Geach
281:John Searle
271:In current
188:continental
161:ontological
3411:Categories
3396:Task Force
3364:perception
3238:Artificial
3188:Creativity
3110:Nondualism
3010:Vasubandhu
2930:John Locke
2900:David Hume
2855:Andy Clark
2334:13 October
2301:2020-11-10
2244:: 223–39.
2178:2020-11-10
2113:Erkenntnis
2090:2020-11-10
2062:2020-11-10
1987:2020-11-10
1905:2020-11-11
1845:2020-11-11
1795:2020-11-11
1718:2020-11-11
1674:2020-11-11
1578:2020-11-11
1548:Erkenntnis
1528:2020-11-11
1500:2020-11-11
1465:2020-11-11
1414:2020-11-11
1386:2020-11-10
1050:0631197702
973:2016-04-16
870:References
758:naturalism
532:W.V. Quine
345:properties
112:philosophy
96:naturalism
3427:Cognition
3417:Intention
3260:Intuition
3193:Cognition
3157:Solipsism
2820:Ned Block
2790:Armstrong
2785:Aristotle
2217:ignored (
2135:1572-8420
2026:ignored (
1895:204526763
1835:171200406
1785:1467-9973
1614:ignored (
1595:Actualism
1568:125607032
803:Aboutness
700:Ned Block
681:Tim Crane
364:reference
341:relations
289:syntactic
258:Platonist
247:A.J. Ayer
232:facticity
173:teleology
37:Intention
33:Intension
3462:Ontology
3381:Category
3228:Identity
3171:Concepts
3041:Theories
3025:Zhuangzi
2955:Alva Noë
2405:Archived
2328:Archived
2295:Archived
2262:Archived
2172:Archived
2084:Archived
2056:Archived
1981:Archived
1944:Archived
1899:Archived
1839:Archived
1789:Archived
1712:Archived
1668:Archived
1639:Archived
1572:Archived
1522:Archived
1494:Archived
1459:Archived
1408:Archived
1380:Archived
1297:Archived
1179:Archived
967:Archived
949:43153848
780:See also
512:(1957),
508:(1956),
432:or that
406:Lewisian
293:semantic
228:sentient
148:—
106:Overview
69:for the
29:semantic
3391:Project
3344:Related
3203:Concept
3058:Dualism
3031:more...
2890:Goldman
2258:2214219
990:Husserl
567:realism
538:Realism
459:science
252:nothing
184:Husserl
25:logical
3335:Zombie
3320:Qualia
2678:
2664:
2649:
2632:
2615:
2598:
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947:
916:: 201.
704:qualia
335:, and
323:or is
3243:Human
2965:Plato
2885:Fodor
2254:JSTOR
1947:(PDF)
1924:(PDF)
1891:S2CID
1831:S2CID
1564:S2CID
1242:–47.
1182:(PDF)
1175:(PDF)
945:JSTOR
236:ontic
226:), a
224:Sorge
3368:self
3305:Pain
3295:Mind
3223:Idea
2676:ISBN
2662:ISBN
2647:ISBN
2630:ISBN
2613:ISBN
2596:ISBN
2581:ISBN
2560:ISBN
2547:ISBN
2534:ISBN
2520:ISBN
2507:ISBN
2490:ISBN
2477:ISBN
2463:ISBN
2445:ISBN
2413:2012
2380:ISBN
2355:ISBN
2336:2020
2270:2012
2219:help
2131:ISSN
2028:help
1955:2012
1781:ISSN
1740:ISBN
1647:2020
1616:help
1353:ISBN
1326:ISBN
1305:2012
1269:ISBN
1244:ISBN
1217:2012
1190:2012
1157:2012
1130:2012
1097:ISBN
1070:ISBN
1045:ISBN
1020:ISBN
995:ISBN
895:2012
729:are
275:and
254:").
245:and
220:care
190:and
21:mind
2246:doi
2162:doi
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1936:doi
1881:hdl
1873:doi
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1451:doi
937:doi
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391:or
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114:by
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