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manifold of possibilities open towards infinity; it remains forever in the status of creation, but is not a closed realm of things existing in themselves. That we blindly converted one into the other is the true source of our difficulties, including the antinomies – a source of more fundamental nature than Russell's vicious circle principle indicated. Brouwer opened our eyes and made us see how far classical mathematics, nourished by a belief in the 'absolute' that transcends all human possibilities of realization, goes beyond such statements as can claim real meaning and truth founded on evidence.
43: 154:, and therefore, the existence of an object is equivalent to the possibility of its construction. This contrasts with the classical approach, which states that the existence of an entity can be proved by refuting its non-existence. For the intuitionist, this is not valid; the refutation of the non-existence does not mean that it is possible to find a construction for the putative object, as is required in order to assert its existence. As such, intuitionism is a variety of 1346:. Imprint Moscow, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1954 Description 444 p. 28 cm. Added t.p. in Russian Translation of Works of the Mathematical Institute, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, v. 42. Original title: Teoriya algorifmov. A secondary reference for specialists: Markov opined that "The entire significance for mathematics of rendering more precise the concept of algorithm emerges, however, in connection with the problem of 455:, because any attempt to put the natural numbers into one-to-one correspondence with the real numbers will always fail: there will always be an infinite number of real numbers "left over". Any infinite set that can be placed in one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers is said to be "countable" or "denumerable". Infinite sets larger than this are said to be "uncountable". 560:. Frege had planned a three volume definitive work, but just as the second volume was going to press, Russell sent Frege a letter outlining his paradox, which demonstrated that one of Frege's rules of self-reference was self-contradictory. In an appendix to the second volume, Frege acknowledged that one of the axioms of his system did in fact lead to Russell's paradox. 506:
According to Weyl 1946, 'Brouwer made it clear, as I think beyond any doubt, that there is no evidence supporting the belief in the existential character of the totality of all natural numbers ... the sequence of numbers which grows beyond any stage already reached by passing to the next number, is a
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formally defined intuitionistic truth from a realist position, yet Brouwer would likely reject this formalization as meaningless, given his rejection of the realist/Platonist position. Intuitionistic truth therefore remains somewhat ill-defined. However, because the intuitionistic notion of truth is
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From van Heijenoort's commentary it is unclear whether or not Herbrand was a true "intuitionist"; Gödel (1963) asserted that indeed "...Herbrand was an intuitionist". But van Heijenoort says Herbrand's conception was "on the whole much closer to that of Hilbert's word 'finitary' ('finit') that to
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is considered to be purely the result of the constructive mental activity of humans rather than the discovery of fundamental principles claimed to exist in an objective reality. That is, logic and mathematics are not considered analytic activities wherein deep properties of objective reality are
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In a style more of Principia Mathematica – many symbols, some antique, some from German script. Very good discussions of intuitionism in the following locations: pages 51–58 in Section 4 Many Valued Logics, Modal Logics, Intuitionism; pages 69–73 Chapter III The Logic of Propostional Functions
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These controversies are strongly linked as the logical methods used by Cantor in proving his results in transfinite arithmetic are essentially the same as those used by Russell in constructing his paradox. Hence how one chooses to resolve Russell's paradox has direct implications on the status
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original intuitionism, the truth of a mathematical statement is a subjective claim: a mathematical statement corresponds to a mental construction, and a mathematician can assert the truth of a statement only by verifying the validity of that construction by
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and Systems), intuitionist mathematics is more rigorous than conventionally founded mathematics, where, ironically, the foundational elements which intuitionism attempts to construct/refute/refound are taken as intuitively given.
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revealed and applied, but are instead considered the application of internally consistent methods used to realize more complex mental constructs, regardless of their possible independent existence in an objective reality.
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To an intuitionist, the claim that an object with certain properties exists is a claim that an object with those properties can be constructed. Any mathematical object is considered to be a product of a construction of a
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refers to a mathematical procedure in which there is an unending series of steps. After each step has been completed, there is always another step to be performed. For example, consider the process of counting:
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more restrictive than that of classical mathematics, the intuitionist must reject some assumptions of classical logic to ensure that everything they prove is in fact intuitionistically true. This gives rise to
1312:, North-Holland Publishing Co. Amsterdam, 1965. The lead sentence tells it all "The constructive tendency in mathematics...". A text for specialists, but written in Kleene's wonderfully-clear style. 893: 1350:.... Markov believed that further applications of his work "merit a special book, which the author hopes to write in the future" (p. 3). Sadly, said work apparently never appeared. 406: 1453:
Definitive biography of Hilbert places his "Program" in historical context together with the subsequent fighting, sometimes rancorous, between the Intuitionists and the Formalists.
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Frege, the story goes, plunged into depression and did not publish the third volume of his work as he had planned. For more see Davis (2000) Chapters 3 and 4: Frege:
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In Cantor's formulation of set theory, there are many different infinite sets, some of which are larger than others. For example, the set of all real numbers
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in depth. Throughout the rest of the book he treats, and compares, both Formalist (classical) and Intuitionist logics with an emphasis on the former.
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The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of intuitionism is its interpretation of what it means for a mathematical statement to be true. In
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Partial translation: Montgomery Furth, 1964. The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Univ. of California Press. Translation of selected sections in
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is some mathematical statement that an intuitionist has not yet proved or disproved, then that intuitionist will not assert the truth of "
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is different in intuitionist logic than in classical logic. In classical logic, the negation of a statement asserts that the statement is
1564: 1540: 2186: 1127:. Complete translation of both volumes: Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, 2013, Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Oxford University Press. 1106:. Complete translation of both volumes: Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, 2013, Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Oxford University Press. 1898: 1605: 1369: 1277: 1255: 1232: 978: 86: 64: 1155:, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1967. Reprinted with corrections, 1977. The following papers appear in van Heijenoort: 729: 459: 300:
Among the different formulations of intuitionism, there are several different positions on the meaning and reality of infinity.
945:, Raven Press, Hewlett, NY. Compilation of original papers by Gödel, Church, Kleene, Turing, Rosser, and Post. Republished as 287:. Thus, contrary to the first impression its name might convey, and as realized in specific approaches and disciplines (e.g. 1138:(1960) . "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik: Nachwort" [Frege on Russell's Paradox]. In Geach, Peter; Black, Max (eds.). 744: 1891: 1598: 966: 938: 824: 659: 579: 495:
of natural numbers. Most modern constructive mathematicians accept the reality of countably infinite sets (however, see
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This article is about Intuitionism in mathematics and philosophical logic. For the term in moral epistemology, see
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refers to a completed mathematical object which contains an infinite number of elements. An example is the set of
701: 691: 100: 1481: 1078: 552:'s effort to reduce all of mathematics to a logical formulation via set theory and its derailing by a youthful 57: 51: 359: 1039:'s impact and the impact of the formalists. Goldstein notes that the intuitionists were even more opposed to 2115: 1657: 1293: 1044: 930: 706: 591: 496: 470: 1305: 137:. The vagueness of the intuitionistic notion of truth often leads to misinterpretations about its meaning. 1935: 530: 223: 68: 537:
and its subsequent rejection by a number of prominent mathematicians including most famously his teacher
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On the significance of the principle of excluded middle in mathematics, especially in function theory
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Although not directly germane, in his (1923) Brouwer uses certain words defined in this paper.
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Brouwer rejected the concept of actual infinity, but admitted the idea of potential infinity.
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Intuitionism's history can be traced to two controversies in nineteenth century mathematics.
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includes the axiom of infinity from ZFC (or a revised version of this axiom) and the set
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with which not all the steps in a proof are mechanical, some being intuitive". Later,
2165: 1504: 1396: 1386: 1353: 1241: 1135: 1114: 1091: 993: 669: 621: 595: 587: 549: 1006:, Dawson gives an excellent "A Capsule History of the Development of Logic to 1928". 925:, with respect to the 20th century Anglin gives very precise, short descriptions of 2105: 1723: 1531: 1339: 1316: 1059: 1036: 774: 769: 719: 534: 280: 272: 1095: 2100: 1990: 1960: 1741: 1667: 1512: 1477: 754: 603: 116: 2145: 2135: 2042: 2017: 1970: 1680: 1471:
Section 1 Informal Introduction; and p. 146-151 Section 7 the Axiom of Choice.
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See van Heijenoort for the original works and van Heijenoort's commentary.
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A reevaluation of intuitionism, from the point of view (among others) of
1028: 802:, p. 2, 1.5. Intuitionistic mathematics is constructive mathematics. 542: 231: 162: 2037: 2027: 2022: 2005: 1827: 1272:(Tenth impression 1991 ed.). Amsterdam NY: North-Holland Pub. Co. 1225:
Gnomes in the Fog. The Reception of Brouwer's Intuitionism in the 1920s
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From Frege to Gödel, A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931
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brought forth a more rational consideration of intuitionism in his
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certainly cannot be refutable. But even if it can be shown that
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Jacques Herbrand, (1931b), "On the consistency of arithmetic",
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Engines of Logic: Mathematicians and the origin of the Computer
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Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege
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Goldstein gives further historical context. As a Platonist
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Proofs and Refutations The Logic of Mathematical Discovery
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EncyclopĂŠdia Britannica 2006 Ultimate Reference Suite DVD
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cannot be refuted, this does not constitute a proof of
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A Critique of Mathematic Reasoning, §11. The paradoxes
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and is associated with a transition from the proof of
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is adopting intuitionist mathematics to reinterpret
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Incompleteness: The Proof and Paradox of Kurt Godel
458:Cantor's set theory led to the axiomatic system of 210:holds, to an intuitionist, is to claim that either 1465:, Dover Publications Inc, Mineola, New York, 1950. 487: 447: 425: 400: 338: 169:; to an intuitionist, it means the statement is 1532:"Intuitionism in the Philosophy of Mathematics" 1121:(in German). Vol. 2. Jena: Hermann Pohle. 1100:(in German). Vol. 1. Jena: Hermann Pohle. 504: 249:". However, the intuitionist will accept that " 27:Approach in philosophy of mathematics and logic 1486:Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 1899: 1606: 1310:The Foundations of Intuitionistic Mathematics 913:Mathematics: A Concise history and Philosophy 575:accorded to Cantor's transfinite arithmetic. 8: 1362:Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings 395: 371: 1401:The intuitionist foundations of mathematics 1382:Symposium on the foundations of mathematics 1018:, Atlas Books, W.W. Norton, New York, 2005. 1906: 1892: 1884: 1613: 1599: 1591: 1432:Consciousness, philosophy, and mathematics 1187:On the domains of definitions of functions 1035:of the Vienna Circle. Goldstein discusses 267:substitutes constructability for abstract 1348:a constructive foundation for mathematics 872: 481: 480: 478: 441: 440: 438: 419: 418: 416: 364: 363: 361: 313: 87:Learn how and when to remove this message 1411:The formalist foundations of mathematics 529:The first of these was the invention of 401:{\displaystyle \mathbb {N} =\{1,2,...\}} 50:This article includes a list of general 1391:The logicist foundations of mathematics 1204:Intuitionistic reflections on formalism 992:Logical Dilemmas: The Life and Work of 811: 799: 792: 1142:(2 ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 860: 848: 681:Branches of intuitionistic mathematics 513: 1124: 1103: 1025:Chapter II Hilbert and the Formalists 1002:Less readable than Goldstein but, in 836: 7: 1482:"Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals" 1292:, Kleene discusses Intuitionism and 1123:Translation of selected sections in 1031:was reticent in the presence of the 997:, A. K. Peters, Wellesley, MA, 1997. 1565:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1541:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1488:. 2. Vol. 45. pp. 161–228 1177:On the principle of excluded middle 1463:The Elements of Mathematical Logic 916:, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1994. 56:it lacks sufficient corresponding 25: 602:(see various sources re Gödel). 598:offered opinions referred to as 464:foundation of modern mathematics 41: 1505:"Intuitionism: An Inspiration?" 1270:Introduction to metamathematics 616:Introduction to metamathematics 578:In the early twentieth century 261:as they do in classical logic. 158:; but it is not the only kind. 1503:Veldman, Wim (February 2021). 951:. Courier Dover Publications. 1: 1378:The foundation of mathematics 1248:Intuitionism: An Introduction 1223:Hesseling, Dennis E. (2003). 606:considers: "non-constructive 594:position—see van Heijenoort. 193:is a stronger statement than 2182:Constructivism (mathematics) 1070:La MathĂ©matique Non-standard 825:Cardinality of the continuum 565:From Breakthrough to Despair 488:{\displaystyle \mathbb {N} } 448:{\displaystyle \mathbb {N} } 426:{\displaystyle \mathbb {R} } 1760:Ontology (computer science) 1513:10.13140/RG.2.2.12313.54881 1425:Intuitionnism and formalism 1119:Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1097:Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 947:Davis, Martin, ed. (2004). 730:Brouwer–Hilbert controversy 462:(ZFC), now the most common 460:Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory 277:truth in modern mathematics 156:mathematical constructivism 2203: 1653:Intuitionistic type theory 750:Foundations of mathematics 697:Intuitionistic type theory 200:Similarly, to assert that 29: 2187:Philosophy of mathematics 2033:Parsimony (Occam's razor) 929:(with respect to Godel), 702:Intuitionistic set theory 692:Intuitionistic arithmetic 101:philosophy of mathematics 1246:Heyting, Arend (1971) . 1079:constructive mathematics 745:Curry–Howard isomorphism 569:Detour through Infinity. 548:The second of these was 499:for a counter-example). 115:), is an approach where 1658:Constructive set theory 1072:, Ă©ditions du C.N.R.S.) 890:EncyclopĂŠdia Britannica 707:Intuitionistic analysis 497:Alexander Esenin-Volpin 471:constructive set theory 339:{\displaystyle 1,2,...} 71:more precise citations. 1556:"Intuitionistic Logic" 923:Chapter 39 Foundations 531:transfinite arithmetic 519: 489: 449: 427: 402: 340: 224:law of excluded middle 161:The interpretation of 2088:Theories of deduction 1643:Constructive analysis 1306:Richard Eugene Vesley 1083:non-standard analysis 898:Constructive analysis 765:Intuition (knowledge) 626:quantum indeterminacy 490: 450: 428: 403: 341: 222:. In particular, the 1696:Fuzzy set operations 1691:Fuzzy finite element 1638:Intuitionistic logic 1554:(16 December 2022). 1344:Theory of algorithms 1068:(first published in 1004:Chapter III Excursis 687:Intuitionistic logic 556:, the discoverer of 477: 437: 415: 360: 312: 265:Intuitionistic logic 144:intuitionistic logic 32:Ethical intuitionism 1915:Philosophical logic 1873:Non-monotonic logic 1622:Non-classical logic 1302:Stephen Cole Kleene 1171:Andrei Nikolaevich 735:Computability logic 612:Stephen Cole Kleene 1979:Unity of opposites 1868:Intermediate logic 1648:Heyting arithmetic 1586:. Quanta Magazine. 1584:QuantaMagazine.org 1576:Wolchover, Natalie 1430:L. E. J. Brouwer, 1423:L. E. J. Brouwer, 1407:Johann von Neumann 1266:Kleene, Stephen C. 1149:van Heijenoort, J. 1033:logical positivism 839:, pp. 234–244 740:Constructive logic 725:BHK interpretation 630:information theory 485: 445: 423: 398: 336: 305:potential infinity 177:is provable, then 2159: 2158: 2011:List of fallacies 1996:Explanatory power 1923:Critical thinking 1881: 1880: 1863:Inquisitive logic 1858:Dynamic semantics 1811:Three-state logic 1765:Ontology language 1552:Moschovakis, Joan 1330:978-1-107-11346-6 1065:Intuitionnisme 84 1012:Rebecca Goldstein 958:978-0-486-43228-1 780:Ultraintuitionism 558:Russell's paradox 539:Leopold Kronecker 97: 96: 89: 16:(Redirected from 2194: 2141:Platonic realism 1908: 1901: 1894: 1885: 1816:Tri-state buffer 1615: 1608: 1601: 1592: 1587: 1578:(7 April 2020). 1569: 1560:Zalta, Edward N. 1545: 1536:Zalta, Edward N. 1530:(11 June 2019). 1528:Iemhoff, Rosalie 1516: 1497: 1495: 1493: 1334: 1283: 1261: 1238: 1143: 1129: 1108: 1054: 984: 962: 876: 870: 864: 858: 852: 846: 840: 833: 827: 821: 815: 809: 803: 797: 660:L. E. J. Brouwer 608:systems of logic 582:represented the 580:L. E. J. Brouwer 554:Bertrand Russell 517: 516:, pp. 48–49 494: 492: 491: 486: 484: 454: 452: 451: 446: 444: 432: 430: 429: 424: 422: 407: 405: 404: 399: 367: 345: 343: 342: 337: 259:de Morgan's laws 92: 85: 81: 78: 72: 67:this article by 58:inline citations 45: 44: 37: 21: 2202: 2201: 2197: 2196: 2195: 2193: 2192: 2191: 2162: 2161: 2160: 2155: 2126:Logical atomism 2082: 1975:Socratic method 1926: 1917: 1912: 1882: 1877: 1846: 1797: 1769: 1746: 1728: 1719:Relevance logic 1714:Structural rule 1700: 1676:Degree of truth 1662: 1624: 1619: 1574: 1550: 1526: 1523: 1502: 1491: 1489: 1478:Turing, Alan M. 1476: 1459:Paul Rosenbloom 1416:Arend Heyting, 1358:Paul Benacerraf 1331: 1315: 1288:In Chapter III 1280: 1264: 1258: 1245: 1235: 1222: 1134: 1113: 1090: 1056:Jacques Hartong 1052: 981: 965: 959: 949:The Undecidable 946: 943:The Undecidable 896:15 June 2006, " 885: 880: 879: 871: 867: 859: 855: 847: 843: 834: 830: 822: 818: 810: 806: 798: 794: 789: 784: 715: 683: 665:Michael Dummett 654:conventionalism 650:preintuitionism 642: 634:physics of time 524: 518: 511: 475: 474: 435: 434: 433:is larger than 413: 412: 358: 357: 354:natural numbers 350:actual infinity 310: 309: 298: 285:Michael Dummett 126: 124:Truth and proof 113:preintuitionism 109:neointuitionism 93: 82: 76: 73: 63:Please help to 62: 46: 42: 35: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 2200: 2198: 2190: 2189: 2184: 2179: 2174: 2164: 2163: 2157: 2156: 2154: 2153: 2148: 2143: 2138: 2133: 2128: 2123: 2118: 2113: 2108: 2103: 2098: 2096:Constructivism 2092: 2090: 2084: 2083: 2081: 2080: 2075: 2070: 2065: 2060: 2055: 2050: 2045: 2040: 2035: 2030: 2025: 2020: 2015: 2014: 2013: 2003: 1998: 1993: 1988: 1983: 1982: 1981: 1963: 1958: 1953: 1948: 1943: 1938: 1932: 1930: 1928:informal logic 1919: 1918: 1913: 1911: 1910: 1903: 1896: 1888: 1879: 1878: 1876: 1875: 1870: 1865: 1860: 1854: 1852: 1848: 1847: 1845: 1844: 1843: 1842: 1832: 1831: 1830: 1820: 1819: 1818: 1807: 1805: 1799: 1798: 1796: 1795: 1790: 1785: 1779: 1777: 1771: 1770: 1768: 1767: 1762: 1756: 1754: 1748: 1747: 1745: 1744: 1738: 1736: 1734:Paraconsistent 1730: 1729: 1727: 1726: 1721: 1716: 1710: 1708: 1702: 1701: 1699: 1698: 1693: 1688: 1683: 1678: 1672: 1670: 1664: 1663: 1661: 1660: 1655: 1650: 1645: 1640: 1634: 1632: 1630:Intuitionistic 1626: 1625: 1620: 1618: 1617: 1610: 1603: 1595: 1589: 1588: 1571: 1570: 1547: 1546: 1522: 1521:External links 1519: 1518: 1517: 1499: 1498: 1473: 1472: 1467: 1466: 1455: 1454: 1450: 1449: 1442:Constance Reid 1438: 1437: 1436: 1435: 1428: 1421: 1414: 1404: 1394: 1373: 1372: 1351: 1336: 1335: 1329: 1313: 1298: 1297: 1285: 1284: 1278: 1262: 1256: 1239: 1233: 1227:. BirkhĂ€user. 1219: 1218: 1217: 1216: 1211: 1210: 1207: 1200:L.E.J. Brouwer 1196: 1195: 1191: 1190: 1183:L.E.J. Brouwer 1180: 1169: 1163:L.E.J. Brouwer 1157: 1156: 1145: 1144: 1136:Frege, Gottlob 1131: 1130: 1115:Frege, Gottlob 1110: 1109: 1092:Frege, Gottlob 1087: 1086: 1074: 1073: 1049: 1048: 1020: 1019: 1008: 1007: 999: 998: 988:John W. Dawson 985: 979: 963: 957: 941:(ed.) (1965), 935: 934: 918: 917: 905: 884: 881: 878: 877: 873:Wolchover 2020 865: 853: 851:, p. 216. 841: 828: 816: 804: 791: 790: 788: 785: 783: 782: 777: 772: 767: 762: 760:Game semantics 757: 752: 747: 742: 737: 732: 727: 722: 716: 714: 711: 710: 709: 704: 699: 694: 689: 682: 679: 678: 677: 675:Stephen Kleene 672: 667: 662: 657: 646:Henri PoincarĂ© 641: 638: 523: 520: 509: 483: 443: 421: 397: 394: 391: 388: 385: 382: 379: 376: 373: 370: 366: 335: 332: 329: 326: 323: 320: 317: 297: 294: 125: 122: 95: 94: 77:September 2014 49: 47: 40: 26: 24: 18:Intuitionistic 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 2199: 2188: 2185: 2183: 2180: 2178: 2175: 2173: 2170: 2169: 2167: 2152: 2149: 2147: 2144: 2142: 2139: 2137: 2134: 2132: 2129: 2127: 2124: 2122: 2119: 2117: 2114: 2112: 2109: 2107: 2104: 2102: 2099: 2097: 2094: 2093: 2091: 2089: 2085: 2079: 2076: 2074: 2071: 2069: 2066: 2064: 2061: 2059: 2056: 2054: 2051: 2049: 2046: 2044: 2041: 2039: 2036: 2034: 2031: 2029: 2026: 2024: 2021: 2019: 2016: 2012: 2009: 2008: 2007: 2004: 2002: 1999: 1997: 1994: 1992: 1989: 1987: 1984: 1980: 1976: 1972: 1969: 1968: 1967: 1964: 1962: 1959: 1957: 1954: 1952: 1949: 1947: 1944: 1942: 1939: 1937: 1934: 1933: 1931: 1929: 1924: 1920: 1916: 1909: 1904: 1902: 1897: 1895: 1890: 1889: 1886: 1874: 1871: 1869: 1866: 1864: 1861: 1859: 1856: 1855: 1853: 1849: 1841: 1838: 1837: 1836: 1833: 1829: 1826: 1825: 1824: 1821: 1817: 1814: 1813: 1812: 1809: 1808: 1806: 1804: 1803:Digital logic 1800: 1794: 1791: 1789: 1786: 1784: 1781: 1780: 1778: 1776: 1772: 1766: 1763: 1761: 1758: 1757: 1755: 1753: 1749: 1743: 1740: 1739: 1737: 1735: 1731: 1725: 1722: 1720: 1717: 1715: 1712: 1711: 1709: 1707: 1706:Substructural 1703: 1697: 1694: 1692: 1689: 1687: 1684: 1682: 1679: 1677: 1674: 1673: 1671: 1669: 1665: 1659: 1656: 1654: 1651: 1649: 1646: 1644: 1641: 1639: 1636: 1635: 1633: 1631: 1627: 1623: 1616: 1611: 1609: 1604: 1602: 1597: 1596: 1593: 1585: 1581: 1577: 1573: 1572: 1567: 1566: 1561: 1557: 1553: 1549: 1548: 1543: 1542: 1537: 1533: 1529: 1525: 1524: 1520: 1514: 1510: 1506: 1501: 1500: 1487: 1483: 1479: 1475: 1474: 1469: 1468: 1464: 1460: 1457: 1456: 1452: 1451: 1447: 1443: 1440: 1439: 1433: 1429: 1426: 1422: 1419: 1415: 1412: 1408: 1405: 1402: 1398: 1397:Arend Heyting 1395: 1392: 1388: 1387:Rudolf Carnap 1385: 1384: 1383: 1379: 1375: 1374: 1371: 1370:0-521-29648-X 1367: 1363: 1359: 1355: 1354:Hilary Putnam 1352: 1349: 1345: 1341: 1338: 1337: 1332: 1326: 1322: 1318: 1317:Lakatos, Imre 1314: 1311: 1307: 1303: 1300: 1299: 1295: 1291: 1287: 1286: 1281: 1279:0-7204-2103-9 1275: 1271: 1267: 1263: 1259: 1257:0-7204-2239-6 1253: 1249: 1243: 1242:Arend Heyting 1240: 1236: 1234:3-7643-6536-6 1230: 1226: 1221: 1220: 1213: 1212: 1208: 1205: 1201: 1198: 1197: 1193: 1192: 1188: 1184: 1181: 1178: 1174: 1170: 1168: 1164: 1161: 1160: 1159: 1158: 1154: 1150: 1147: 1146: 1141: 1137: 1133: 1132: 1128: 1126: 1120: 1116: 1112: 1111: 1107: 1105: 1099: 1098: 1093: 1089: 1088: 1084: 1080: 1076: 1075: 1071: 1067: 1066: 1061: 1057: 1051: 1050: 1046: 1042: 1038: 1034: 1030: 1026: 1022: 1021: 1017: 1013: 1010: 1009: 1005: 1001: 1000: 996: 995: 989: 986: 982: 980:0-393-32229-7 976: 972: 968: 964: 960: 954: 950: 944: 940: 937: 936: 932: 928: 924: 920: 919: 915: 914: 909: 906: 903: 899: 895: 891: 887: 886: 882: 874: 869: 866: 862: 857: 854: 850: 845: 842: 838: 832: 829: 826: 823:explained at 820: 817: 813: 808: 805: 801: 796: 793: 786: 781: 778: 776: 773: 771: 768: 766: 763: 761: 758: 756: 753: 751: 748: 746: 743: 741: 738: 736: 733: 731: 728: 726: 723: 721: 718: 717: 712: 708: 705: 703: 700: 698: 695: 693: 690: 688: 685: 684: 680: 676: 673: 671: 670:Arend Heyting 668: 666: 663: 661: 658: 655: 651: 647: 644: 643: 639: 637: 635: 631: 627: 623: 622:Nicolas Gisin 619: 617: 613: 609: 605: 601: 597: 593: 589: 588:David Hilbert 586:position and 585: 581: 576: 572: 570: 566: 561: 559: 555: 551: 550:Gottlob Frege 546: 544: 541:—a confirmed 540: 536: 532: 527: 521: 515: 508: 503: 500: 498: 472: 467: 465: 461: 456: 409: 392: 389: 386: 383: 380: 377: 374: 368: 355: 351: 346: 333: 330: 327: 324: 321: 318: 315: 306: 301: 295: 293: 290: 286: 282: 278: 274: 270: 266: 262: 260: 256: 252: 248: 244: 240: 236: 233: 229: 225: 221: 217: 213: 209: 206: 203: 198: 196: 192: 188: 184: 180: 176: 172: 168: 164: 159: 157: 153: 147: 145: 140: 136: 131: 123: 121: 118: 114: 110: 106: 102: 91: 88: 80: 70: 66: 60: 59: 53: 48: 39: 38: 33: 19: 2177:Epistemology 2172:Intuitionism 2121:Intuitionism 2120: 2106:Fictionalism 1783:Three-valued 1724:Linear logic 1629: 1583: 1563: 1539: 1490:. Retrieved 1485: 1462: 1445: 1431: 1424: 1417: 1410: 1400: 1390: 1381: 1377: 1361: 1347: 1343: 1340:A. A. Markov 1320: 1309: 1289: 1269: 1247: 1224: 1203: 1186: 1176: 1166: 1152: 1139: 1125:Frege (1960) 1122: 1118: 1104:Frege (1960) 1101: 1096: 1069: 1064: 1060:Georges Reeb 1037:Wittgenstein 1024: 1015: 1003: 991: 970: 967:Martin Davis 948: 942: 939:Martin Davis 922: 911: 908:W. S. Anglin 889: 888:"Analysis." 868: 856: 844: 831: 819: 812:Lakatos 2015 807: 800:Veldman 2021 795: 775:Topos theory 770:Model theory 720:Anti-realism 640:Contributors 620: 615: 599: 584:intuitionist 583: 577: 573: 568: 567:and Cantor: 564: 562: 547: 535:Georg Cantor 528: 525: 505: 501: 468: 457: 410: 347: 302: 299: 281:Anti-realism 275:to abstract 273:model theory 263: 254: 250: 246: 242: 238: 234: 227: 219: 215: 211: 207: 201: 199: 194: 190: 186: 182: 178: 174: 170: 166: 160: 148: 127: 111:(opposed to 108: 105:intuitionism 104: 98: 83: 74: 55: 2101:Dialetheism 1991:Explanation 1961:Credibility 1823:Four-valued 1793:Ɓukasiewicz 1788:Four-valued 1775:Many-valued 1752:Description 1742:Dialetheism 1418:Disputation 1202:, 1927(2), 1053:(in French) 902:Ian Stewart 861:Kleene 1991 849:Turing 1939 755:Fuzzy logic 604:Alan Turing 514:Kleene 1991 117:mathematics 69:introducing 2166:Categories 2146:Pragmatism 2136:Nominalism 2043:Propaganda 2018:Hypothesis 1971:Antithesis 1681:Fuzzy rule 1492:17 January 1173:Kolmogorov 994:Kurt Gödel 883:References 837:Frege 1960 596:Kurt Gödel 289:Fuzzy Sets 52:references 2116:Formalism 2078:Vagueness 2058:Relevance 2053:Reasoning 1966:Dialectic 1941:Ambiguity 1835:IEEE 1164 1686:Fuzzy set 1319:(2015) . 1294:Formalism 1268:(1991) . 1045:Formalism 1041:Platonism 931:Formalism 927:Platonism 904:, author) 600:Platonist 592:formalist 348:The term 303:The term 195:not-not-P 171:refutable 135:intuition 130:Brouwer's 2131:Logicism 2111:Finitism 2063:Rhetoric 2048:Prudence 1986:Evidence 1946:Argument 1936:Analysis 1480:(1939). 1376:Part I. 1185:, 1927, 1175:, 1925, 1165:, 1923, 1117:(1903). 1094:(1893). 969:(2000). 892:. 2006. 713:See also 632:and the 618:(1952). 543:finitist 510:—  296:Infinity 253:and not 163:negation 2151:Realism 2038:Premise 2028:Opinion 2023:Inquiry 2006:Fallacy 1828:Verilog 1562:(ed.). 1538:(ed.). 1446:Hilbert 1434:, p. 90 1427:, p. 77 1420:, p. 66 1413:, p. 61 1403:, p. 52 1393:, p. 41 1342:(1954) 522:History 469:Modern 245:or not 218:can be 189:. Thus 99:In the 65:improve 2073:Theory 1951:Belief 1851:Others 1368:  1327:  1276:  1254:  1231:  977:  955:  512:  220:proved 139:Kleene 54:, but 2068:Rigor 1668:Fuzzy 1558:. In 1534:. In 1043:than 1029:Gödel 990:Jr., 787:Notes 269:truth 167:false 107:, or 2001:Fact 1956:Bias 1840:VHDL 1494:2024 1366:ISBN 1356:and 1325:ISBN 1304:and 1274:ISBN 1252:ISBN 1229:ISBN 1081:and 1058:and 975:ISBN 953:ISBN 835:See 590:the 152:mind 1925:and 1509:doi 1023:In 921:In 900:" ( 533:by 283:of 232:not 230:or 226:, " 214:or 2168:: 1977:, 1973:, 1582:. 1507:. 1484:. 1461:, 1444:, 1409:, 1399:, 1389:, 1380:, 1360:, 1308:, 1244:: 1206:, 1189:, 1179:, 1151:, 1062:, 1014:, 910:, 636:. 628:, 545:. 408:. 356:, 205:or 197:. 146:. 103:, 1907:e 1900:t 1893:v 1614:e 1607:t 1600:v 1568:. 1544:. 1515:. 1511:: 1496:. 1333:. 1282:. 1260:. 1237:. 1085:. 1047:. 983:. 961:. 875:. 863:. 814:. 656:) 652:/ 648:( 482:N 442:N 420:R 396:} 393:. 390:. 387:. 384:, 381:2 378:, 375:1 372:{ 369:= 365:N 334:. 331:. 328:. 325:, 322:2 319:, 316:1 255:A 251:A 247:A 243:A 239:A 235:A 228:A 216:B 212:A 208:B 202:A 191:P 187:P 183:P 179:P 175:P 90:) 84:( 79:) 75:( 61:. 34:. 20:)

Index

Intuitionistic
Ethical intuitionism
references
inline citations
improve
introducing
Learn how and when to remove this message
philosophy of mathematics
preintuitionism
mathematics
Brouwer's
intuition
Kleene
intuitionistic logic
mind
mathematical constructivism
negation
or
law of excluded middle
not
de Morgan's laws
Intuitionistic logic
truth
model theory
truth in modern mathematics
Anti-realism
Michael Dummett
Fuzzy Sets
potential infinity
actual infinity

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