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offensive conduct". But this outrage must be expressed in an ordered fashion, for
America is a society of laws. Retribution is consistent with human dignity, because society believes that "certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death". And although it is difficult to determine statistically how much crime the death penalty actually deters, the Court found that in 1976 there was "no convincing empirical evidence" supporting either the view that the death penalty is an effective deterrent to crime or the opposite view. Still, the Court could not completely discount the possibility that for certain "carefully contemplated murderers", "the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act".
985:
punishment should remain in use. He also felt that the Court should defer to a state legislature's response to the problem of juror response to the prospect of capital punishment, rather than dictate that the Eighth
Amendment requires a particular response. White also disagreed that the Constitution required a separate penalty hearing before imposing the death penalty. "Even if the character of the accused must be considered under the Eighth Amendment, surely a State is not constitutionally forbidden to provide that the commission of certain crimes conclusively establishes that the criminal's character is such that he deserves death." He also saw no difference between Louisiana's definition of first-degree murder and Texas's definition of capital murder.
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866:(the state's highest criminal court, to which all death sentences in Texas are automatically and directly appealed) indicated that the "continuing threat to society" special issue would allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence to the jury. The Court concluded that this special issue would allow for the same extensive consideration of mitigating evidence as the Georgia and Florida schemes. Thus, Texas's death penalty scheme, though considerably different from Florida's and Georgia's, also complied with the
571:, including murder, was death. This rule traveled with the colonists to America, and was the law in all states at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791. By then, however, a problem with the common-law mandatory death penalty had crept into the legal system. If the jury has only two options—convicting a defendant of murder, where the penalty is death, or acquitting the defendant outright—it has no vehicle to express the sentiment that the defendant should be punished
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aggravating factors or other special-verdict questions would assist it in deciding on a sentence. The drafters of the Model Penal Code "concluded that it is within the realm of possibility to point to the main circumstances of aggravation and mitigation that should be weighed and weighed against each other when they are presented in a concrete case." For the Court, these factors adequately guarded against the risk of arbitrary imposition of the death sentence.
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decisional law that the court takes seriously its responsibility to ensure that the sentence imposed was not arbitrary. Currently, those states which still maintain a death penalty option have a mandatory appeal of the sentence (defendants sentenced to death cannot waive this appeal, but can waive appeals beyond this stage subject to a competency hearing).
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convicted first-degree murderers. This development spread, and by 1900, 23 states and the federal government had discretionary sentencing in capital cases. Fourteen more states followed in the first two decades of the 20th century, and by 1963, all death-penalty jurisdictions employed discretionary sentencing.
952:
Although
Louisiana had created a class of death-eligible crimes somewhat narrower than North Carolina had, it still had a mandatory death penalty for a significant range of crimes, which were aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping and treason; the lack of discretion in sentencing caused the Louisiana
780:
Second, the jury's role was only advisory; the judge could disregard the jury's sentencing recommendation, but had to explain the reasoning if they did. Under
Florida law, if the jury recommended life but the judge imposed a death sentence, "the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear
755:
The Court found that, because of the jury's finding at least one aggravating factor was a prerequisite for imposing the death penalty, Georgia's scheme adequately narrowed the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. Although there was admittedly some discretion as to the mitigation phase,
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in 1794. First-degree murder, a capital crime, was limited to all "willful, deliberate, and premeditated" murders. All other murder was second-degree murder, and not a capital crime. This development eased the tension created by the common-law mandatory death penalty, but some juries still refused to
560:
and unusual, it must still be carried out in a manner consistent with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. In the Court's view, the country's history with capital punishment suggests that those evolving standards of decency could not tolerate a return to the
559:
The Court was determined to simultaneously save capital punishment in the United States and impose some reasoned basis for carrying it out. That reasoning flows from the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. Although capital punishment, per se, was not found by the Court to be cruel
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guidelines. Subsequently, the five named defendants were convicted of murder and sentenced to death in their respective states. The respective state supreme courts upheld the death sentence. The defendants then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review their death sentence, asking the Court to go beyond
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The drawback of having juries rather than judges fix the penalty in capital cases is the risk that they will have no frame of reference for imposing the death penalty in a rational manner. Although this problem may not be totally correctible, the Court trusted that the guidance given the jury by the
642:
Although in most criminal cases the judge decides and imposes the sentence, "jury sentencing has been considered desirable in capital cases in order to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system—a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect
843:
whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society (under Texas law, "society" was defined as both inside and outside of the prison system; thus, a defendant who would pose a threat to persons inside prison –
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about the arbitrariness of the death penalty any more than North
Carolina's ignored them. He also disputed whether the appellate review of death sentences inherent in the systems the Court had approved could truly ensure that each death sentence satisfied those concerns. He finally took issue with
873:
The defendant in this case, Jerry Jurek (TDCJ #508), would ultimately see his sentence commuted to life in prison. Texas would later amend its three questions, keeping the "continuing threat to society" question, adding a second question specifically dealing with mitigating evidence, and adding a
810:
did not adopt the "aggravating factors" approach outlined by the Model Penal Code. Instead, it chose to modify and severely narrow the legal definition of "capital murder", thus requiring certain objective elements to be present before one could be charged with capital murder and thus eligible for
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Finally, the Court considered whether the death penalty is "disproportionate in relation to the crime for which it is imposed". Although death is severe and irrevocable, the Court could not say that death was always disproportionate to the crime of deliberately taking human life. "It is an extreme
507:
only one basic idea could command a majority vote of the
Justices: capital punishment, as then practiced in the United States, was cruel and unusual punishment because there were no rational standards that determined when it was imposed and when it was not. The question the Court resolved in these
699:
Under the
Georgia scheme (which generally followed the Model Penal Code), after the defendant was convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, a capital crime (under the first part of the bifurcated trial proceeding), the second part of the bifurcated trial involved an additional hearing at which the jury
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and the companion cases, the Court approved three different schemes that had sufficiently narrow eligibility criteria and at the same time sufficiently broad discretion in selection. By contrast, the two schemes the Court disapproved had overly broad eligibility criteria and then no discretion in
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concluded that the now-familiar bifurcated procedure, in which the jury first considers the question of guilt without regard to punishment, and then determines whether the punishment should be death or life imprisonment, is the preferable model. This was the model that the Court approved in these
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The Court also found that the death penalty "comports with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the
Amendment". The death penalty serves two principal social purposes—retribution and deterrence. "In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly
788:
The Court concluded that, as the sentencer's discretion was limited in an objective fashion and directed in a reviewable manner, Florida's scheme also adequately narrowed the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. The Court noted that
Florida's scheme came closest to the Model Penal
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of an eligible defendant for the death penalty. A defendant is eligible for the death penalty once the jury has concluded that he is a member of that narrow class of criminal defendants who have committed the most morally outrageous of crimes. An eligible defendant is then selected for the death
638:
had held that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." The question the
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would have upheld North Carolina's and Louisiana's mandatory death penalties. He disputed the historical evidence adduced in support of the claim that American juries dislike mandatory death penalties. He also felt that the Court's decisions had an analytical flaw. The Court had struck down the
984:
countered that capital punishment cannot be unconstitutional because the Constitution expressly mentions it and because two centuries of Court decisions assumed that it was constitutional. Furthermore, for White the judgment of the legislatures of 35 states was paramount, and suggested that the
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remarked that there was not one case on which he would vote differently today, "with one exception... the Texas death-penalty case ." He went on to say that "we made a mistake in that case...I think upon reflection, we should have held the Texas statute... unconstitutional." Two years earlier,
973:, that the death penalty does not deter crime and that American society has evolved to the point that it is no longer an appropriate vehicle for expressing retribution. In every subsequent capital case that would come before the Court during their tenures, they would refer to their opinions in
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Recognizing that juries in capital cases found discretion in sentencing desirable, Tennessee, Alabama, and Louisiana afforded their juries this discretion in the 1840s. Finally, the jury could respond to mitigating factors about the crime or the criminal and withhold the death penalty even for
858:
The Court concluded that Texas's narrow legal definition of capital murder served the same purpose as the aggravating factors in the Georgia and Florida schemes, that being to adequately narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. The Court even observed that "the principal
677:
In addition to jury sentencing through the guidance of aggravating factors, a constitutional capital sentencing scheme must provide for appellate review of the death sentence, typically by the state's supreme court. This review must not be a rubber stamp; there must be evidence in the state's
895:
murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other
768:
Florida's scheme differed from Georgia's in two respects. First, at the sentencing hearing of a capital felon, the jury determined whether one or more aggravating factors exist, drawing on a list very similar to Georgia's. Then the jury was specifically asked to weigh the
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by holding once and for all that capital punishment was cruel and unusual punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment. However the Court responded that "The most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to
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If the defendant was convicted of capital murder, and if the prosecution sought the death penalty (which it has never been required to do in Texas), the second part of the bifurcated trial required the jury to consider two (or sometimes three) "special issues":
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Once the jury found that one or more of the aggravating factors existed beyond a reasonable doubt, then the defendant would be eligible for the death penalty. The jury may, but was not required to, then evaluate all the evidence it had heard, including
993:
mandatory death penalty because it took away discretion from the jury. Yet, Rehnquist pointed out, a jury in Georgia could reject the death penalty for no reason at all. Thus, Georgia's scheme did not alleviate the concerns articulated in
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was executed by a firing squad on January 17, 1977. Following his conviction and death sentence, Gilmore insisted he wanted to be executed, and for this reason some consider the national moratorium to have only ended in 1979 with
639:
Court confronted in these five cases was whether the procedures crafted by Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and Louisiana adequately minimized that risk. In all five cases, the Court's primary focus was on the jury.
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Code's recommendation of an ideal sentencing scheme, as it used a weighing scheme whereas Georgia's scheme did not, thus allowing for individual sentencing. Thus, Florida's death penalty scheme also complied with the
240:. If the jury is furnished with standards to direct and limit the sentencing discretion, and the jury's decision is subjected to meaningful appellate review, the death sentence may be constitutional. If, however, the
801:
Texas's scheme differed considerably from that suggested by the Model Penal Code and followed in large part by Georgia and Florida. In order to narrow the class of death penalty-eligible defendants as required by
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cases was not whether the death sentence imposed on each of the individual defendants was cruel, but rather whether the process by which those sentences were imposed was rational and objectively reviewable.
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First, the scheme must provide objective criteria to direct and limit the death sentencing discretion. The objectiveness of these criteria must in turn be ensured by appellate review of all death sentences.
543:. The fact that juries remained willing to impose the death penalty also contributed to the Court's conclusion that American society did not believe in 1976 that the death penalty was unconstitutional.
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that rape is not a capital crime, at least where the victim is not killed; the statutes mandating death penalty for first-degree arson and first-degree burglary were abrogated by the General Assembly.
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If all applicable special issues were answered in the affirmative, then the result would be an automatic death sentence; if any special issue was not answered in the affirmative, the sentence would be
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by either specifying factors to be weighed and procedures to be followed when imposing a death sentence, or dictating that the death penalty would be mandatory for specific crimes. Furthermore, a
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Also, unlike North Carolina, Louisiana law required the jury in all first-degree murder cases to be instructed on second-degree murder and manslaughter, crimes ineligible for the death penalty.
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whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
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penalty after the sentencer takes into account mitigating evidence about the character and record of the defendant in order to decide whether that individual is worthy of a death sentence.
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v. State of Georgia; Charles William Proffitt v. State of Florida; Jerry Lane Jurek v. State of Texas; James Tyrone Woodson, et al. v. State of North Carolina; Roberts, et al. v. Louisiana
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The July 2 Cases mark the beginning of the United States' modern legal conversation about the death penalty. Major subsequent developments include forbidding the death penalty for rape (
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analysis if the legislature removed the discretionary sentencing provision. However, it was the lack of discretion in sentencing that the Court used to rule the scheme unconstitutional.
891:(similar to the approach taken by the Texas Legislature) chose to adopt a narrow definition of "first-degree murder" which would be eligible for the death penalty, which was defined as:
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862:
However, the special issues feature and its automatic death sentence imposition (if all were answered in the affirmative) was the key issue in the Court's analysis. In its review, the
575:, but not executed. Faced with this dilemma, some juries would acquit the defendant in order to spare his life. Of course, this meant that an obviously guilty person would go free.
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difference between Texas and the other two States is that the death penalty is an available sentencing option – even potentially – for a smaller class of murders in Texas".
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and other aggravating evidence not supporting one of the ten factors beyond a reasonable doubt—and decide whether the defendant should live or die. This scheme is called a
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received additional evidence in aggravation and mitigation. In order for the defendant to be eligible for the death penalty, the jury needed to find the existence of
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and declare once and for all the death penalty to be "cruel and unusual punishment" and thus in violation of the Constitution; the Court agreed to hear the cases.
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if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
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that discretion is channeled in an objective way, and therefore provided for individualized sentencing. Thus, Georgia's death penalty scheme complied with the
466:'s dissent famously argued that "The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity
237:
1197:, there were six capital crimes in Georgia: murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, rape, treason, and aircraft hijacking. The Supreme Court's later decision in
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The crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."
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scheme, because the sentencer is not required to weigh the statutory aggravating factors against mitigating evidence before imposing a death sentence.
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and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." The trial judge must independently reweigh the aggravating factors against the
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when the offender has a specific intent to kill and is engaged in the perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, or armed robbery;
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adopted the approach taken by North Carolina, by redefining first-degree murder as the killing of a human being in one of five circumstances:
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Second, the scheme must allow the sentencer (whether judge or jury) to take into account the character and record of an individual defendant.
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decision, 35 states reenacted death penalty statutes. There was a significant shift in the attitudes towards capital punishment between
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when the offender has a specific intent to kill and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life sentence;
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618:, the Court found that the capital sentencing schemes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, respectively, met these criteria; whereas in
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The Court set out two broad guidelines that legislatures must follow in order to craft a constitutional capital sentencing scheme:
1214: (1978), invalidated Georgia's death penalty for rape (and probably also for robbery, at least where death does not result).
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when the offender has a specific intent to kill and has been offered or has received anything of value for committing the murder
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decision, the states of Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and Louisiana amended their death penalty statutes to meet the
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Certiorari to the Supreme Courts of Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, and Louisiana, and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
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The proposition that the death penalty was not always cruel and unusual punishment was just the beginning of the discussion.
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Utah was the first state to resume executions after capital punishment was reinstated in the United States in 1976, when
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convict defendants who were clearly guilty of first-degree murder because that crime carried a mandatory death penalty.
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441:. The court set forth the two main features that capital sentencing procedures must employ in order to comply with the
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244:, such that there is no provision for mercy based on the characteristics of the offender, then it is unconstitutional.
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The Court has subsequently considered at great length the extent to which the Texas special issues allow the jury to
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cases had been made out of respect for precedent within the court that held capital punishment to be constitutional.
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when the offender has a specific intent to kill a fireman or police officer engaged in the performance of his duties;
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At the time Texas had (and still has) separate courts with final power of review over civil and criminal cases; the
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North Carolina had also enacted a mandatory death penalty for first-degree rape, but the Court later ruled in
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1084:), and requiring the jury to decide whether aggravating factors have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt (
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The crimes punished by death in Florida are first-degree murder and sexual battery of a child under eleven.
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Liebman, James S. (2006). "Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006".
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the idea that the fact that "death is different" requires any extra safeguards in the sentencing process.
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when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on more than one person; and
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the death penalty. The 1976 law defined capital murder in Texas as involving one of the five situations:
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The defendant has previously been convicted of a capital felony or has a history of committing serious
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the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The drafters of the
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was decided, a mere four years later in 1976, 66 percent of the public favored capital punishment.
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presented against the statutory aggravating factors that have been proved. This scheme is called a
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The defendant committed the crime for the purpose of receiving money or anything else of value.
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such as other inmates or correctional officers – would be eligible for the death penalty); and
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murder committed in the course of committing kidnapping, burglary, robbery, rape, or arson;
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The capital felony was committed while the defendant was committing another capital felony.
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has been described as a "judicial surrender to political pressure". In the wake of the
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626:, the Court found that the sentencing schemes of North Carolina and Louisiana did not.
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In the July 2 Cases, the Court's goal was to provide guidance to states in the wake of
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Stevens had come out in opposition to the death penalty, writing that his vote in the
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The defendants in each of the five cases urged the Court to go further than it had in
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was decided, public support for the death penalty was around 50 percent. By the time
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murder committed while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal institution; and
1056:) from the death penalty, removing virtually all limitations on the presentation of
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The defendant killed a police officer, prison guard, or fireman in the line of duty.
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third question applicable only if the defendant was convicted as an accessory.
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in California had overturned the California Supreme Court's earlier decision (
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scheme to suffer the same unconstitutional infirmities as North Carolina's.
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The defendant killed a judge or prosecutor exercising his official duties.
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murder committed by a prison inmate when the victim is a prison employee.
525:." Both Congress and 35 states had complied with the Court's dictates in
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The imposition of the death penalty does not, automatically, violate the
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was (and remains) the court with final review power over criminal cases.
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To mitigate the harshness of the common-law rule, Pennsylvania divided
1929:
709:
470:... An executed person has indeed 'lost the right to have rights.'"
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Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.
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in the sentencing process, an approval that persisted until 2002's
483:
All five cases share the same basic procedural history. After the
456:
on the death penalty imposed by the Court in its 1972 decision in
1422:""Death Stands Condemned:" Justice Brennan and the Death Penalty"
1223:
The vagueness of this language was at issue in the later case of
1072:), requiring precision in the definition of aggravating factors (
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The offense was committed by someone who had escaped from prison.
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1983:
1944:
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Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and death penalty case law
431:. The set of cases is referred to by a leading scholar as the
26:
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The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest.
1627:"Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring)"
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After Georgia revised its death penalty law in response to
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had ruled that its capital sentencing scheme could survive
427:, upholding, in particular, the death sentence imposed on
423:. It reaffirmed the Court's acceptance of the use of the
129:
1976 U.S. Supreme Court case upholding the death penalty
1391:"Furman v. Georgia: A Postmortem on the Death Penalty"
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expressed their views, which they also articulated in
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requirements and was thus also approved by the Court.
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requirements and was thus also approved by the Court.
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The defendant created a grave risk of death to others.
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United States Supreme Court cases of the Burger Court
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1147:
List of landmark court decisions in the United States
1142:
List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 428
419:, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), is a landmark decision of the
1609:"In Reversal, Stevens Says He Opposes Death Penalty"
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in support of their vote against the death penalty.
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564:for murder that had prevailed in medieval England.
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Historical disapproval of mandatory death sentences
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57:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
1583:"Sandra Day O'Connor Interviews John Paul Stevens"
760:requirements and was thus approved by the Court.
1935:Landmark Cases: Historic Supreme Court Decisions
878:Capital punishment schemes rejected by the Court
690:Capital punishment schemes approved by the Court
336:White (in judgment), joined by Burger, Rehnquist
539:) holding that the death penalty violated the
1956:
435:, and elsewhere referred to by the lead case
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648:cases—although it tacitly approved a model
567:In 18th century Britain, the penalty for a
512:Capital punishment and the Eighth Amendment
2843:Capital punishment in Georgia (U.S. state)
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117:Learn how and when to remove this message
1513:"Nation: At Issue: Crime and Punishment"
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1352:
1158:
1044:), exempting the mentally handicapped (
665:Every death sentence involves first an
815:murder of a police officer or fireman;
449:". The decision essentially ended the
2848:Legal history of Georgia (U.S. state)
2118:Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber
1389:Scafidi, Nicholas (January 1, 1973).
1168:provides information on the crime in
134:1976 United States Supreme Court case
7:
1581:Newsweek Staff (December 17, 2010).
1420:Pokorak, Jeffrey (January 1, 1991).
957:Other views expressed in these cases
630:Constitutional sentencing procedures
55:adding citations to reliable sources
821:murder committed for remuneration (
425:death penalty in the United States
152:Supreme Court of the United States
25:
2828:United States Supreme Court cases
1884:325 (1976) is available from:
1833:280 (1976) is available from:
1782:262 (1976) is available from:
1731:242 (1976) is available from:
1680:153 (1976) is available from:
1607:Barnes, Robert (April 17, 2008).
1119:In a 2010 interview with Justice
1034:), restricting the death penalty
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1494:Death Penalty Information Center
145:
31:
1182:Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
889:North Carolina General Assembly
864:Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
344:Burger, Rehnquist (in judgment)
42:needs additional citations for
2853:1976 in United States case law
2598:City of Grants Pass v. Johnson
1972:United States Eighth Amendment
1542:Lain, Corinna Barrett (2007).
1519:. June 4, 1979. Archived from
1019:, who resisted his execution.
1:
1426:California Western Law Review
727:The defendant hired a killer.
569:vast number of serious crimes
447:cruel and unusual punishments
1985:Cruel and unusual punishment
911:North Carolina Supreme Court
704:of ten aggravating factors:
650:without any jury involvement
2687:United States v. Bajakajian
2869:
1916:Oyez (oral argument audio)
1865:Oyez (oral argument audio)
1814:Oyez (oral argument audio)
1763:Oyez (oral argument audio)
1712:Oyez (oral argument audio)
1050:) and juvenile murderers (
242:death penalty is mandatory
2627:
2616:
2550:South Carolina v. Gathers
2222:Skipper v. South Carolina
1990:
1979:
1823:Woodson v. North Carolina
1036:in cases of felony murder
669:determination and then a
410:Woodson v. North Carolina
377:
253:
228:
144:
2703:Tyler v. Hennepin County
2650:United States v. Salerno
2622:Excessive bail and fines
1069:Holmes v. South Carolina
379:U.S. Const. amends. VIII
328:Stewart, Powell, Stevens
159:Argued March 30–31, 1976
2679:Austin v. United States
2214:Caldwell v. Mississippi
2075:Montgomery v. Louisiana
1477:"Death Row Information"
562:mandatory death penalty
541:California constitution
2662:Excessive Fines Clause
2526:Robinson v. California
2142:California v. Anderson
2126:McGautha v. California
2011:Robinson v. California
2003:Weems v. United States
536:California v. Anderson
352:Blackmun (in judgment)
268:William J. Brennan Jr.
2633:Excessive Bail Clause
2374:Panetti v. Quarterman
2254:Maynard v. Cartwright
927:Louisiana Legislature
591:Decision of the Court
580:murder into "degrees"
2764:Georgia (U.S. state)
2390:Kennedy v. Louisiana
2286:Whitmore v. Arkansas
2278:Stanford v. Kentucky
2262:Thompson v. Oklahoma
2246:Lowenfield v. Phelps
2091:Jones v. Mississippi
2035:Harmelin v. Michigan
1874:Roberts v. Louisiana
1395:Villanova Law Review
1031:Kennedy v. Louisiana
416:Roberts v. Louisiana
161:Decided July 2, 1976
51:improve this article
2566:Helling v. McKinney
2491:Hudson v. McMillian
2457:Corporal punishment
2446:Bucklew v. Precythe
2182:Spaziano v. Florida
2083:Virginia v. LeBlanc
2043:Ewing v. California
1907:Library of Congress
1856:Library of Congress
1805:Library of Congress
1754:Library of Congress
1721:Proffitt v. Florida
1703:Library of Congress
1613:The Washington Post
1523:on January 19, 2008
1363:Columbia Law Review
1288:that evidence. See
1121:Sandra Day O'Connor
1058:mitigating evidence
771:mitigating evidence
746:mitigating evidence
398:Proffitt v. Florida
300:Lewis F. Powell Jr.
197:96 S. Ct. 2909; 49
2558:Payne v. Tennessee
2483:Ingraham v. Wright
2438:Madison v. Alabama
2310:Atkins v. Virginia
2302:Herrera v. Collins
2230:Ford v. Wainwright
2206:Glass v. Louisiana
2174:Godfrey v. Georgia
2051:Lockyer v. Andrade
1499:2008-04-21 at the
1226:Godfrey v. Georgia
1075:Godfrey v. Georgia
1047:Atkins v. Virginia
963:William J. Brennan
783:mitigating factors
421:U.S. Supreme Court
264:Associate Justices
66:"Gregg v. Georgia"
2721:
2720:
2717:
2716:
2713:
2712:
2612:
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2608:
2607:
2574:Farmer v. Brennan
2542:Estelle v. Gamble
2467:Jackson v. Bishop
2358:Hill v. McDonough
2326:Tennard v. Dretke
2294:Walton v. Arizona
2190:Enmund v. Florida
2134:Furman v. Georgia
2110:Wilkerson v. Utah
2067:Miller v. Alabama
2059:Graham v. Florida
2019:Rummel v. Estelle
1659:Works related to
1325:Tennard v. Dretke
1125:John Paul Stevens
1081:Walton v. Arizona
1041:Enmund v. Florida
990:William Rehnquist
967:Thurgood Marshall
853:life imprisonment
808:Texas Legislature
459:Furman v. Georgia
388:
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304:William Rehnquist
288:Thurgood Marshall
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2695:Timbs v. Indiana
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2590:Kahler v. Kansas
2475:Gates v. Collier
2414:Hurst v. Florida
2406:Glossip v. Gross
2334:Roper v. Simmons
2270:Penry v. Lynaugh
2238:Tison v. Arizona
2198:Pulley v. Harris
2158:Coker v. Georgia
2150:Gregg v. Georgia
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1200:Coker v. Georgia
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1053:Roper v. Simmons
1025:Coker v. Georgia
903:Coker v. Georgia
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645:Model Penal Code
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392:Gregg v. Georgia
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2534:Powell v. Texas
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2398:Hall v. Florida
2366:Kansas v. Marsh
2350:Oregon v. Guzek
2345:(5th Cir. 2005)
2342:Bigby v. Dretke
2318:Ring v. Arizona
2166:Lockett v. Ohio
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667:eligibility
349:Concurrence
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107:August 2024
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1631:Justia Law
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474:Background
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1974:case law
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988:Justice
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775:weighing
710:felonies
612:Proffitt
462:(1972).
451:de facto
445:ban on "
368:Marshall
2776:Florida
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1889:Findlaw
1838:Findlaw
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896:felony.
764:Florida
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