Jerry Fodor - Knowledge (XXG)

1206:. Fodor claims that there is no lexical structure to such verbs as "keep", "get", "make" and "put". He suggests that, alternatively, "keep" simply expresses the concept KEEP (Fodor capitalizes concepts to distinguish them from properties, names or other such entities). If there is a straightforward one-to-one mapping between individual words and concepts, "keep your clothes on", "keep your receipt" and "keep washing your hands" will all share the same concept of KEEP under Fodor's theory. This concept presumably locks on to the unique external property of keeping. But, if this is true, then RETAIN must pick out a different property in RETAIN YOUR RECEIPT, since one can't retain one's clothes on or retain washing one's hands. Fodor's theory also has a problem explaining how the concept FAST contributes, 924:: if in the extension of "horse" there are no cows, then it cannot be required for the meaning of "horse" that cows be called horses. On the other hand, if "horse" did not mean that which it means, and if it were an error for horses, it would never be possible for a cow to be called "horse". Putting the two things together, it can be seen that the possibility of falsely saying "this is a horse" presupposes the existence of a semantic basis for saying it truly, but not vice versa. If we put this in terms of the crude causal theory, the fact that cows cause one to say "horse" depends on the fact that horses cause one to say "horse"; but the fact that horses cause one to say "horse" does 440:, or "organs", which he defines by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs. 970:

the fact that radically different physical systems can find themselves in the identical mental state. Besides being deeply anthropocentric (why should humans be the only thinking organisms in the universe?), the identity-type theory also failed to deal with accumulating evidence in the neurosciences that every single human brain is different from all the others. Hence, the impossibility of referring to common mental states in different physical systems manifests itself not only between different species but also between organisms of the same species.

3963: 3973: 974: 648:, among many others. But Fodor complained that Pinker, Plotkin and other members of what he sarcastically called "the New Synthesis" have taken modularity and similar ideas way too far. He insisted that the mind is not "massively modular" and that, contrary to what these researchers would have us believe, the mind is still a very long way from having been explained by the 1172:

attitudes. During a game of chess with a computer program, we often attribute such attitudes to the computer, saying such things as "It thinks that the queen should be moved to the left." We attribute propositional attitudes to the computer and this helps us to explain and predict its behavior in various contexts. Yet no one would suggest that the computer is actually

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non-intentional and non-semantic terms. If this goal is to be achieved within a representational theory of the mind, then the challenge is to devise a causal theory which can establish the interpretation of the primitive non-logical symbols of the LOT. Fodor's initial proposal is that what determines that the symbol for "water" in Mentalese expresses the property H

33: 1160:? On the other hand, if such a representational substrate is not required for the LOT, then why should it be required for the learning of natural languages? In this case, the LOT would be superfluous. Fodor, in response, argues that the LOT is unique in that it does not have to be learned via an antecedent language because it is 583:

judgment remains a judgment whether it is judgment about a perceptual experience or a judgment about the understanding of language. The second can be described as a "vertical" view because it claims that our mental faculties are domain specific, genetically determined, associated with distinct neurological structures, and so on.

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must be ambiguous because look at the difference between 'chairs exist' and 'numbers exist'. A familiar reply goes: the difference between the existence of chairs and the existence of numbers seems, on reflection, strikingly like the difference between numbers and chairs. Since you have the latter to

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and models of its architecture. If the sentences of Mentalese require unique processes of elaboration then they require a computational mechanism of a certain type. The syntactic notion of mental representations goes hand in hand with the idea that mental processes are calculations which act only on

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More important than productivity is systematicity since it does not rely on questionable idealizations about human cognition. The argument states that a cognizer is able to understand some sentence in virtue of understanding another. For example, no one who understands "John loves Mary" is unable to

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and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses. He also emerged as a prominent critic of

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suggested in an article in 1984 that since Fodor explains the learning of natural languages as a process of formation and confirmation of hypotheses in the LOT, this leaves him open to the question of why the LOT itself should not be considered as just such a language which requires yet another and

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doesn't express just the property A, but the disjunction of properties A or B. The crude causal theory is therefore incapable of distinguishing the case in which the content of a symbol is disjunctive from the case in which it isn't. This gives rise to what Fodor calls the "problem of disjunction".

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Fodor has made many and varied criticisms of holism. He identifies the central problem with all the different notions of holism as the idea that the determining factor in semantic evaluation is the notion of an "epistemic bond". Briefly, P is an epistemic bond of Q if the meaning of P is considered

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There is ... a standard objection to instrumentalism ...: it is difficult to explain why the psychology of beliefs/desires works so well, if the psychology of beliefs/desires is, in fact, false.... As Putnam, Boyd and others have emphasized, from the predictive successes of a theory to the truth of

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makes it possible to hold together all of the elements necessary to the solution of this problem. Further, mental representations are not only the objects of beliefs and desires, but are also the domain over which mental processes operate. They can be considered the ideal link between the syntactic

500:, are necessary to explain this relational nature of mental states. Fodor considers two alternative hypotheses. The first completely denies the relational character of mental states and the second considers mental states as two-place relations. The latter position can be further subdivided into the 1226:

Some critics find it difficult to accept Fodor's insistence that a large, perhaps implausible, number of concepts are primitive and undefinable. For example, Fodor considers such concepts as EFFECT, ISLAND, TRAPEZOID, and WEEK to be all primitive, innate and unanalyzable because they all fall into

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mental states and such causation seems to be essential to psychological explanation, especially if one considers that behavior is not an effect of a single mental event/cause but is rather the effect of a chain of mental events/causes. The type-identity theory, on the other hand, failed to explain

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O is that the occurrences of that symbol are in certain causal relations with water. The intuitive version of this causal theory is what Fodor calls the "Crude Causal Theory". According to this theory, the occurrences of symbols express the properties which are the causes of their occurrence. The

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between the causal roles of such contents and the inferential web of beliefs. Among modern philosophers of mind, the majority view seems to be that the first of these two assertions is false, but that the second is true. Fodor departs from this view in accepting the truth of the first thesis but

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and causal account of the notion of mental content. The main idea, in other words, is that the properties of the contents of mental states can depend, rather than exclusively on the internal relations of the system of which they are a part, also on their causal relations with the external world.

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For Fodor, this formal notion of thought processes also has the advantage of highlighting the parallels between the causal role of symbols and the contents which they express. In his view, syntax plays the role of mediation between the causal role of the symbols and their contents. The semantic

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Historically, questions about mental architecture have been divided into two contrasting theories about the nature of the faculties. The first can be described as a "horizontal" view because it sees mental processes as interactions between faculties which are not domain specific. For example, a

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had formulated another argument against the LOT. Dennett suggested that it would seem, on the basis of the evidence of our behavior toward computers but also with regard to some of our own unconscious behavior, that explicit representation is not necessary for the explanation of propositional

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of their epistemic bonds, the consequence will be that two people (or, for that matter, two temporal sections of the same person) will never be in the same intentional state. Therefore, two people can never be subsumed under the same intentional generalizations. And, therefore, intentional

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position with respect to mental content and meaning. For Fodor, in recent years, the problem of naturalization of the mental is tied to the possibility of giving "the sufficient conditions for which a piece of the world is relative to (expresses, represents, is true of) another piece" in

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understand "Mary loves John", and no one who understands "P and Q" is unable to understand "P". Systematicity itself is rarely challenged as a property of natural languages and logics, but some challenge that thought is systematic in the same way languages are. Still others from the

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term "horse", for example, says of a horse that it is a horse. In order to do this, it is necessary and sufficient that certain properties of an occurrence of the symbol "horse" be in a law-like relation with certain properties which determine that something is an occurrence of

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The main problem with this theory is that of erroneous representations. There are two unavoidable problems with the idea that "a symbol expresses a property if it is ... necessary that all and only the presences of such a property cause the occurrences". The first is that not

672:(1990), Fodor takes up another of his central notions: the question of the reality of mental representations. Fodor needs to justify representational realism to justify the idea that the contents of mental states are expressed in symbolic structures such as those of the LOT. 704:. Dennett maintains that it is possible to be realist with regard to intentional states without having to commit oneself to the reality of mental representations. Now, according to Fodor, if one remains at this level of analysis, then there is no possibility of explaining 896:

Fodor responds to this problem with what he defines as "a slightly less crude causal theory". According to this approach, it is necessary to break the symmetry at the base of the crude causal theory. Fodor must find some criterion for distinguishing the occurrences of

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hypotheses, and he is recognized as having had "an enormous influence on virtually every portion of the philosophy of mind literature since 1960." At the time of his death in 2017, he held the position of State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, at

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the category of what he calls "lexical concepts" (those for which our language has a single word). Against this view, Bach argues that the concept VIXEN is almost certainly composed out of the concepts FEMALE and FOX, BACHELOR out of SINGLE and MALE, and so on.

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of the mental. Under this view, for example, I and a computer can both instantiate ("realize") the same functional state though we are made of completely different material stuff (see graphic at right). On this basis functionalism can be classified as a form of

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of the symbols which they elaborate. And this is the computational theory of the mind. Consequently, the defence of a model of architecture based on classic artificial intelligence passes inevitably through a defence of the reality of mental representations.

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Productivity refers to a representational system's unbounded ability to generate new representations from a given set of symbols. "John", "loves", and "Mary" allow for the construction of the sentences "John loves Mary" and "Mary loves John". Fodor's

624:, make it possible to tie together questions of functional architecture with those of mental content. The ability to elaborate information independently from the background beliefs of individuals that these two properties allow Fodor to give an 730:

arguments in favour of the reality of mental representations in terms of the LOT. He maintains that if language is the expression of thoughts and language is systematic, then thoughts must also be systematic. Fodor draws on the work of

594:. Gall claimed that mental faculties could be associated with specific physical areas of the brain. Hence, someone's level of intelligence, for example, could be literally "read off" from the size of a particular bump on his posterior 488:

In his article "Propositional Attitudes" (1978), Fodor introduced the idea that mental states are relations between individuals and mental representations. Despite the changes in many of his positions over the years, the idea that

1028:'s theory of evolution that "it overestimates the contribution the environment makes in shaping the phenotype of a species and correspondingly underestimates the effects of endogenous variables". Evolutionary biologist 1148:

more fundamental representational substrate in which to form and confirm hypotheses so that the LOT itself can be learned. If natural language learning requires some representational substrate (the LOT) in order for

684:. This view is characterized, according to Fodor, by two distinct assertions. One of these regards the internal structure of mental states and asserts that such states are non-relational. The other concerns the 1210:, to the contents of FAST CAR, FAST DRIVER, FAST TRACK, and FAST TIME. Whether or not the differing interpretations of "fast" in these sentences are specified in the semantics of English, or are the result of 816:

by someone to be relevant for the determination of the meaning of Q. Meaning holism strongly depends on this notion. The identity of the content of a mental state, under holism, can only be determined by the

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theory in play which is predictively crowned with success. It is not obvious ... why such a presumption should not militate in favour of a realist conception ... of the interpretations of beliefs/desires.

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Fodor revived the idea of modularity, without the notion of precise physical localizability, in the 1980s, and became one of the most vocal proponents of it with the 1983 publication of his

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Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, in his later years he devoted much of his writing and study to the

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If people differ in an absolutely general way in their estimations of epistemic relevance, and if we follow the holism of meaning and individuate intentional states by way of the

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describes this book as "a profoundly misguided critique of natural selection" and "as biologically uninformed as it is strident". Moral philosopher and anti-scientism author

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Fodor's notions of mental modularity, informational encapsulation and domain specificity were taken up and expanded, much to Fodor's chagrin, by cognitive scientists such as

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The fact that systematicity and productivity depend on the compositional structure of language means that language has a combinatorial semantics. If thought also has such a

997:. What is important is the function of a mental state regardless of the physical substrate which implements it. The foundation for this view lies in the principle of the 4741: 4781: 953:

vision of the world which did not violate the "generality of physics". Their proposal was, first of all, to reject the then-dominant theories in philosophy of mind:

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The second argument that Fodor provides in favour of representational realism involves the processes of thought. This argument touches on the relation between the

880:) are caused by A (horses), but at other times—when, for example, because of the distance or conditions of low visibility, one has confused a cow for a horse—the 2925: 977:

An illustration of multiple realizability. M stands for mental and P stand for physical. The diagram shows that more than one P can instantiate one M, but not

4009: 1184:. The same is obviously true, suggests Dennett, of many of our everyday automatic behaviors such as "desiring to breathe clear air" in a stuffy environment. 512:

expressed by such sentences. Fodor's own position, instead, is that to properly account for the nature of intentional attitudes, it is necessary to employ a

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to which he subscribed earlier in his career. As of 2010 Fodor criticizes inferential role semantics (IRS) because its commitment to an extreme form of

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Having criticized the idea that semantic evaluation concerns only the internal relations between the units of a symbolic system, Fodor can adopt an

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From the beginning of the 1980s, Fodor adhered to a causal notion of mental content and of meaning. This idea of content contrasts sharply with the

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and global, hence sensitive to all possibly relevant background beliefs to (dis)confirm a belief. This creates, among other problems, the

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theorizes that representations are decomposable into constituent parts, and these decomposed representations are built into new strings.

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as "an overdue and valuable onslaught on neo-Darwinist simplicities". The book also received a positive review from mathematician and

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for the computational theory, because the relevance of a belief is not one of its local, syntactic properties but context-dependent.

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caused by As (true) from those caused by Bs (false). The point of departure, according to Fodor, is that while the false cases are

916:= A or B). The first can subsist independently of the second, but the second can occur only because of the existence of the first: 4711: 4002: 2879: 2820: 1120: 770: 406: 4726: 4519: 4452: 3903: 410: 908:

on the true cases, the reverse is not true. There is an asymmetry of dependence, in other words, between the true contents (

455:. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against 2734: 371:(CUNY). From 1988 until his retirement in 2016 he was State of New Jersey Professor of philosophy and cognitive science at 4640: 4467: 4119: 4026: 3597: 3077: 938: 135: 945:, and Fodor tried to resolve the puzzle of developing a way to preserve the explanatory efficacy of mental causation and 4756: 4285: 4059: 3966: 3478: 3400: 3117: 2911: 1531: 1084:

for philosophy of mind and cognitive philosophy in 1993. His lecture series for the Prize, later published as a book by

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relations between symbols can be "imitated" by their syntactic relations. The inferential relations which connect the

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somewhere inside its circuits the equivalent of the propositional attitude "I believe I can kick this guy's butt" in

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of two symbols can be imitated by the formal syntax rules which regulate the derivation of one symbol from another.

739:. Systematicity in natural languages was explained by Chomsky in terms of two more basic concepts: productivity and 528:

notion of functional architecture. These notions are, according to Fodor, our best explanation of mental processes.

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tradition have tried to build non-classical networks that can account for the apparent systematicity of language.

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to be learned, why shouldn't the same be said for the LOT itself and then for the representational substrate of

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that theory there is surely a presumed inference; and this is even more likely when ... we are dealing with the

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A wide variety of philosophers of diverse orientations have challenged many of Fodor's ideas. For example, the

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Fodor, Jerry A.; Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (1988). "Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis".

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generalization can never be successful. And, therefore again, there is no hope for an intentional psychology.

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inference, is a matter of debate. Fodor's own response to this kind of criticism is expressed bluntly in

1060:. He received numerous awards and honors: New York State Regent's Fellowship, Woodrow Wilson Fellowship ( 4801: 4544: 4482: 4432: 4406: 4307: 4194: 4169: 4044: 3859: 3815: 3314: 3127: 2975: 2593: 1491: 1077: 1020: 1124: 2527: 1780: 4676: 4671: 4589: 4322: 3037: 2394: 1100: 1069: 1065: 1061: 958: 348: 340: 213: 89: 2289:

Smolensky Paul (1987). "The constituent structure of mental states: A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn".

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Division he has served as Vice President (2004–2005) and President (2005–2006). In 2005, he won the

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In that article, he attempted to show how mental representations, specifically sentences in the

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Some linguists and philosophers of language have criticized Fodor's self-proclaimed "extreme"

990: 609: 591: 549: 477: 291: 205: 1672: 598:. This simplistic view of modularity has been disproved over the course of the last century. 4401: 4394: 4359: 4342: 4327: 4149: 3744: 3721: 3711: 3534: 3483: 3380: 3236: 2402: 2308: 2263: 2206: 2176: 1959: 1918: 1795: 1753: 1617: 1536: 1381:, with Ernie Lepore (eds.), Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol 46. Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1993, 1236: 1140: 1081: 740: 504:

view that such relations are between individuals and sentences of natural languages and the

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are relational has remained unchanged from its original formulation up to the present time.

251: 170: 99: 4244: 4104: 4064: 3895: 3875: 3849: 3823: 3716: 3706: 3686: 3418: 3385: 3276: 3261: 3112: 3097: 3017: 2996: 2623: 2604: 2581: 2506: 1144: 1045: 946: 800: 697: 456: 409:. He maintained that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a 375:, where he was emeritus. Besides his interest in philosophy, Fodor passionately followed 2398: 1024:(2010), in which they describe neo-Darwinists as "distressingly uncritical" and say of 4504: 4354: 4249: 4159: 4124: 4094: 4079: 4049: 3923: 3805: 3676: 3607: 3602: 3567: 3468: 3365: 3334: 3319: 3281: 3271: 3226: 3001: 2688: 2406: 2312: 2064: 1510: 1168: 1025: 1015: 804: 701: 633: 572: 490: 452: 2498: 1635: 981:. Causal relations between states are represented by the arrows (M1 goes to M2, etc.). 652:, or any other, model. The main reason for this shortcoming is that most cognition is 4665: 4584: 4509: 4462: 4379: 4369: 4274: 4229: 4224: 4199: 4174: 4164: 4144: 4069: 3944: 3913: 3908: 3800: 3795: 3775: 3765: 3731: 3701: 3696: 3627: 3622: 3552: 3544: 3521: 3428: 3375: 3266: 3231: 3193: 3122: 3022: 2991: 2626:. University of Oxford Faculty of Philosophy. Ox.ac.uk. 2009. Accessed 22 March 2010. 2210: 2092: 1995: 1991: 1765: 942: 820:

of its epistemic bonds. And this makes the realism of mental states an impossibility:

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to both model his theory of the mind and to refute alternative architectures such as

657: 645: 641: 612:, which is the author cited in the references instead, more specifically Hollander's 595: 505: 501: 473: 394: 352: 324: 175: 2226: 1809: 4539: 4529: 4524: 4487: 4437: 4234: 4214: 4204: 4134: 4054: 3833: 3749: 3617: 3562: 3511: 3458: 3453: 3413: 3360: 3329: 3324: 3296: 3256: 3183: 3067: 2960: 2535: 2531: 1252: 1033: 994: 732: 568: 560: 460: 2845: 2650:. American Philosophical Association. Apaonline.com. 2009. Accessed 22 March 2010. 2638:. American Philosophical Association. Apaonline.com. 2009. Accessed 22 March 2010. 2562: 2468: 2010: 1580: 4605: 4579: 4389: 4302: 4279: 4254: 4239: 4209: 4114: 4089: 4084: 3918: 3885: 3880: 3828: 3790: 3785: 3739: 3653: 3463: 3433: 3423: 3370: 3355: 3291: 2955: 2738: 1664: 1647: 1435:

The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology

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The Mind Doesn't Work That Way:The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology

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RePresentations. Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science

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Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science

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Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science

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book of the same name. He has also delivered the Patrick Romanell Lecture on

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The vertical vision can be traced back to the 19th century movement called

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relation between individuals, representations and propositional contents.

2863: 2565:. Rutgers University. Ruccs.rutgers.edu. C. 2000. Accessed 22 March 2010. 1988:

In search of the soul: and the mechanism of thought, emotion, and conduct

1203: 1161: 903: 2584:. Jean Nicod Institute. Institutnicod.org. 2009. Accessed 22 March 2010. 2574: 32: 4457: 2821:"Jerry A. Fodor, Philosopher Who Plumbed the Mind's Depths, Dies at 82" 2482:"Worst science journalism of the year: Darwin completely wrong (again)" 2275: 1757: 1188: 625: 2903: 1923: 1906: 807:

must include an explanation of content in atomistic and causal terms.

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and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adhered to a species of

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Jerry A. Fodor, Philosopher Who Plumbed the Mind’s Depths, Dies at 82

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excludes the possibility of a true naturalization of the mental. But

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What Darwin Got Wrong by Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli Palmarini

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Fodor, Jerry A. (1985). "Fodor's Guide to Mental Representations".

989:, a hypothesis which was designed to overcome the failings of both 4219: 1907:"Marie-Jean-Pierre Flourens (1794-1867) and cortical localization" 1223:

explain the former, you don't also need 'exist' to be polysemic."

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Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind

1239:, and had two children. Fodor died at home on November 29, 2017. 1115:(2004) and the Royce Lecture on Philosophy of Mind (2002) to the 4549: 4477: 519:

Considering mental states as three-place relations in this way,

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of the representations that make up the language of thought.

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BloggingHeads dialogue between Jerry Fodor and Elliott Sober

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Minds without meanings: an essay on the contents of concepts

2648:"APA Eastern Division: Officers & Committees 2005–2006" 294:. His writings in these fields laid the groundwork for the 260: 1198:, for example, takes Fodor to task for his criticisms of 1139:

hypothesis has been accused of either falling prey to an

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Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology

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depend on the fact that cows cause one to say "horse"...

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The Uses of "Use": A Study in the Philosophy of Language

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meaningful words without sense, & other revolutions

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One can solve these problems, according to Fodor, with

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accounts of the mind. He argued that mental states are

2607:. MIT Press. Mitpress.mit.edu. Accessed 22 March 2010. 1323:

The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology

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theory of mental content and asserts that there is an

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and the author of many crucial works in the fields of

282:; April 22, 1935 – November 29, 2017) was an American 1882:

The Modularity of Mind:An Essay in Faculty Psychology

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Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik

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Fodor lived in Manhattan with his wife, the linguist

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semantics, then there must be a language of thought.

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Presidents of the American Philosophical Association

1946:

Kerr, PB; Caputy, AJ; Horwitz, NH (April 15, 2005).

1451:, with Ernie Lepore, Oxford University Press, 2002, 1074:

Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences

1064:), Chancellor Greene Fellow (Princeton University), 920:

From the point of view of semantics, errors must be

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The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics

1393:

The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics

1283:, with T. Bever and M. Garrett, McGraw Hill, 1974, 367:. From 1986 to 1988 he was a full professor at the 254: 223: 191: 181: 169: 156: 146: 134: 124: 110: 95: 81: 65: 42: 23: 2687: 2441: 2429:Survival of the fittest theory: Darwinism's limits 2063: 2009: 888:) are caused by B (cows). In this case the symbol 544:have predecessors in the 19th-century movement of 428:For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as 363:From 1959 to 1986 Fodor was on the faculty of the 1671:(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 1395:, The 1993 Jean Nicod Lectures, MIT Press, 1994, 1018:Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini co-authored the book 4737:American consciousness researchers and theorists 2854:"Semantics – An Interview with Jerry Fodor" 1095:. In 1996–1997, Fodor delivered the prestigious 1311:, Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US), 1979, 937:During the 1960s, various philosophers such as 680:Fodor starts with some criticisms of so-called 508:view that they are between individuals and the 2385:Fodor, Jerry (1981). "The Mind/Body Problem". 616:. Two properties of modularity in particular, 4003: 2919: 2192: 2190: 1823:Frege, G. (1892). "Über Sinn und Bedeutung". 1744:Field, H.H. (1978). "Mental Representation". 8: 2781:Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong 1407:Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong 1105:Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong 965:was that it failed to account for causation 693:rejecting strongly the truth of the second. 379:and regularly wrote popular columns for the 447:because of this problem of the meaning and 339:in 1956, where he wrote a senior thesis on 309:City University of New York Graduate Center 4010: 3996: 3988: 3517: 3302: 3199: 2945: 2926: 2912: 2904: 1582:Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers 1090:The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its 468:what he characterized as the ill-grounded 31: 20: 2302: 2122: 2120: 2118: 2116: 2114: 1963: 1922: 1875: 1873: 1871: 1799: 4742:Fellows of the Cognitive Science Society 2326: 2324: 2322: 1685: 1683: 1681: 1477:LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited 405:, are relations between individuals and 4782:American philosophers of social science 2728: 2726: 2446:. Independent.co.uk. January 29, 2010. 1636:"Consciousness Concepts of Jerry Fodor" 1547: 1143:or of being superfluous. Specifically, 722:Productivity, systematicity and thought 532:The functional architecture of the mind 2344: 2342: 1998:(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner). 1606:"Remembering Jerry Fodor and his work" 1367:, with Ernie Lepore, Blackwell, 1992, 1156:representational substrate and so on, 436:processes, are structured in terms of 331:descent. He received his A.B. degree ( 4611:Philosophy of artificial intelligence 2352:, (with E. Lepore), Blackwell, 1992, 1845: 1843: 1723:. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1218:: "People sometimes used to say that 1058:American Academy of Arts and Sciences 484:Fodor and the nature of mental states 365:Massachusetts Institute of Technology 7: 2563:"Curriculum Vitae: Jerry Alan Fodor" 2129:A Theory of Content and Other Essays 1948:"A history of cerebral localization" 1654:. Lrb.co.uk. Accessed 22 March 2010. 1553: 1551: 1351:A Theory of Content and Other Essays 696:In particular, Fodor criticizes the 675: 670:A Theory of Content and Other Essays 2896:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2819:Fox, Margalit (November 30, 2017). 2787:. Oxford University Press. p. 1565:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1107:, which went on to become his 1998 307:, and had taught previously at the 4732:Columbia College (New York) alumni 4697:21st-century American philosophers 4687:20th-century American philosophers 2443:"Did Charles Darwin get it wrong?" 2407:10.1038/scientificamerican0181-114 2313:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1988.tb00470.x 1835:La Struttura Logica del Linguaggio 1788:Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1297:, Harvard University Press, 1975, 1117:American Philosophical Association 608:, where he points to Gall through 14: 4762:American philosophers of language 4717:American male non-fiction writers 2450:from the original on June 8, 2022 2254:Cummins (1996). "Systematicity". 1852:Jerry A. Fodor:Mente e Linguaggio 1479:, Oxford University Press, 2008, 1465:, Oxford University Press, 2003, 524:notion of mental content and the 4707:Linguists from the United States 3971: 3962: 3961: 2243:. The Hague/Paris: Mouton. 1957. 351:in 1960, under the direction of 250: 16:American philosopher (1935–2017) 4692:21st-century American essayists 4682:20th-century American essayists 2575:"Jean-Nicod Prize and Lectures" 2070:. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 1837:, Bompiani, Milan 1973, pp 9–32 771:representational theory of mind 708:the intentional strategy works: 556:Following in the path paved by 347:, and a PhD in philosophy from 222: 4767:American philosophers of logic 3174:Analytic–synthetic distinction 2291:Southern Journal of Philosophy 1585:. A&C Black. p. 817. 327:on April 22, 1935, and was of 1: 4772:American philosophers of mind 4722:American philosophy academics 4468:Hard problem of consciousness 2871:Interview by Richard Marshall 2374:. Cambridge University Press. 1255:(eds.), Prentice Hall, 1964, 2860:. Vol. 5, n. 8 (March 2007). 2211:10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5 1560:"Jerry A. Fodor (1935—2017)" 1532:Computational theory of mind 868:horses cause occurrences of 860:horses cause occurrences of 834:The asymmetric causal theory 676:Fodor's criticism of Dennett 182:Other academic advisors 4797:Princeton University alumni 2694:. Oxford University Press. 2152:Dennett, Daniel C. (1987). 1986:Hollander, Bernard (1920). 1850:Francesco Ferretti (2001). 1781:"Conceptual Role Semantics" 1449:The Compositionality Papers 618:informational encapsulation 369:City University of New York 4828: 4812:21st-century American Jews 4807:Rutgers University faculty 4777:Philosophers of psychology 4747:Jean Nicod Prize laureates 4702:20th-century American Jews 3073:Causal theory of reference 2891:Jerry A. Fodor (1935—2017) 2511:The Greatest Show on Earth 2372:Mind, Language and Reality 1622:www.philosophy.rutgers.edu 1281:The Psychology of Language 1056:Fodor was a member of the 797:inferential role semantics 638:evolutionary psychologists 385:on that and other topics. 4631: 4190:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 4180:David Lewis (philosopher) 3957: 2350:Holism: A Shopper's Guide 2066:Computation and Cognition 1854:. Rome: Editori Laterza. 1595:– via Google Books. 1379:Holism: A Consumer Update 1365:Holism: A Shopper's Guide 1267:Psychological Explanation 1249:The Structure of Language 912:= A) and the false ones ( 864:. The second is that not 459:. Fodor strongly opposed 239: 106: 30: 3133:Scientific structuralism 2827:– via NYTimes.com. 2499:"The Improbability Pump" 2181:10.1093/mind/xciv.373.76 2127:Fodor, Jerry A. (1990). 1880:Fodor, Jerry A. (1983). 1801:10.1305/ndjfl/1093883628 1690:Fodor, Jerry A. (1981). 1579:Shook, John. R. (2005). 1113:Philosophical Naturalism 323:Jerry Fodor was born in 319:Early life and education 4712:American male essayists 4318:Eliminative materialism 2549:"What Darwin Got Wrong" 2370:Putnam, Hilary (1988). 2335:. Mass.: The MIT Press. 1965:10.3171/foc.2005.18.4.2 1905:Pearce, J.M.S. (2009). 1719:Carnap, Rudolf (1947). 1295:The Language of Thought 1231:Personal life and death 1109:Oxford University Press 119:21st-century philosophy 4570:Propositional attitude 4565:Problem of other minds 4473:Hypostatic abstraction 3189:Reflective equilibrium 2848:London Review of Books 2841:Jerry Fodor's Homepage 2808:on September 12, 2006. 2765:The Generative Lexicon 2715:Dennett, D.C. (1981). 2686:Blackburn, S. (1984). 2663:Edizione Cogsci – 2005 2603:July 21, 2010, at the 2154:The Intentional Stance 1652:London Review of Books 1269:, Random House, 1968, 1125:Mind & Brain Prize 999:multiple realizability 982: 930: 831: 719: 606:The Modularity of Mind 577:modularity of the mind 565:psychological nativism 553: 521:representative realism 445:philosophy of language 407:mental representations 382:London Review of Books 202:Philosophy of language 4727:Analytic philosophers 4641:Philosophers category 4545:Mental representation 4308:Biological naturalism 4195:Maurice Merleau-Ponty 4170:Frank Cameron Jackson 3860:Nicholas Wolterstorff 3315:David Malet Armstrong 2503:What Darwin Got Wrong 2487:Why Evolution is True 2470:What Darwin Got Wrong 2256:Journal of Philosophy 2062:Pylyshyn, Z. (1984). 2041:. London: Alan Lane. 1721:Meaning and Necessity 1492:What Darwin Got Wrong 1421:In Critical Condition 1078:Guggenheim Fellowship 1038:What Darwin Got Wrong 1021:What Darwin Got Wrong 976: 918: 822: 791:The nature of content 710: 614:In search of the soul 539: 491:intentional attitudes 4323:Emergent materialism 2241:Syntactic Structures 2037:Plotkin, H. (1997). 2016:. New York: Norton. 1669:The Enigma of Reason 1101:University of Oxford 1088:in 1995, was titled 1070:University of Oxford 1066:Fulbright Fellowship 1062:Princeton University 959:type identity theory 949:while adhering to a 349:Princeton University 90:Princeton University 4757:Jewish philosophers 4520:Language of thought 4270:Ludwig Wittgenstein 4100:Patricia Churchland 3682:Patricia Churchland 3613:Christine Korsgaard 3499:Logical positivists 3391:Ludwig Wittgenstein 3168:paradox of analysis 2935:Analytic philosophy 2846:Jerry Fodor at the 2741:on November 5, 2016 2636:"Prizes and Awards" 2551:. February 6, 2010. 2399:1981SciAm.244a.114F 2387:Scientific American 1952:Neurosurgical Focus 1831:Senso e denotatione 1779:Harman, G. (1982). 1663:Mercier, H., & 1513:, MIT Press, 2014, 1437:, MIT Press, 2000, 1423:, MIT Press, 1998, 1353:, MIT Press, 1990, 1339:, MIT Press, 1987, 1325:, MIT Press, 1983, 1137:language of thought 1097:John Locke Lectures 1080:. He won the first 963:logical behaviorism 961:. The problem with 749:language of thought 664:Intentional realism 498:language of thought 465:multiple realizable 411:language of thought 345:Sidney Morgenbesser 337:Columbia University 300:language of thought 234:Language of thought 186:Sidney Morgenbesser 86:Columbia University 4787:Philosophy writers 4348:Neurophenomenology 4019:Philosophy of mind 3855:William Lane Craig 3573:Friedrich Waismann 3530:Carl Gustav Hempel 3489:Timothy Williamson 3449:Alasdair MacIntyre 3307:Australian realism 3287:Russ Shafer-Landau 3148:Analytical Thomism 3103:Logical positivism 2825:The New York Times 2778:Fodor, J. (1998). 2690:Spreading the Word 2667:. Mentecervello.it 2622:2011-07-20 at the 2580:2010-01-26 at the 2091:Fodor, J. (2000). 2012:How the Mind Works 2008:Pinker, S (1997). 1911:European Neurology 1758:10.1007/BF00160888 1648:"LRB: Jerry Fodor" 1618:"Emeritus Faculty" 1042:intelligent-design 983: 622:domain specificity 554: 542:modularity of mind 393:Fodor argued that 389:Philosophical work 373:Rutgers University 305:Rutgers University 296:modularity of mind 288:philosophy of mind 230:Modularity of mind 198:Philosophy of mind 151:Rutgers University 129:Western philosophy 4659: 4658: 4555:Mind–body problem 4453:Cognitive closure 4417:Substance dualism 4035:G. E. M. Anscombe 3985: 3984: 3953: 3952: 3669:Pittsburgh School 3659:Peter van Inwagen 3593:Roderick Chisholm 3581: 3580: 3474:Richard Swinburne 3409:G. E. M. Anscombe 3245: 3244: 3143:Analytic theology 3118:Ordinary language 3056: 3055: 2875:Guardian obituary 2806:(online PDF text) 2798:978-0-19-823636-8 2701:978-0-19-824650-3 2538:, 6 February 2010 2331:Fodor, J (1978). 2138:978-0-262-56069-6 2131:. The MIT Press. 2104:978-0-262-56146-4 2048:978-0-7139-9138-3 2039:Evolution in Mind 1924:10.1159/000206858 1891:978-0-262-56025-2 1884:. The MIT Press. 1861:978-88-420-6220-2 1730:978-0-226-09347-5 1705:978-0-262-06079-0 1698:: The MIT Press. 1511:Zenon W. Pylyshyn 1200:lexical semantics 1072:), Fellow at the 1052:Awards and honors 1004:token materialism 610:Bernard Hollander 592:Franz Joseph Gall 550:Franz Joseph Gall 478:natural selection 343:and studied with 341:Søren Kierkegaard 292:cognitive science 243: 242: 206:Cognitive science 76:New York City, US 69:November 29, 2017 60:New York City, US 4819: 4752:Jewish linguists 4407:Representational 4402:Property dualism 4395:Type physicalism 4360:New mysterianism 4328:Epiphenomenalism 4150:Martin Heidegger 4012: 4005: 3998: 3989: 3975: 3974: 3965: 3964: 3904:Nancy Cartwright 3745:Nicholas Rescher 3722:Bas van Fraassen 3712:Nicholas Rescher 3535:Hans Reichenbach 3518: 3484:Bernard Williams 3381:Bertrand Russell 3303: 3237:Rigid designator 3200: 2946: 2942:Related articles 2928: 2921: 2914: 2905: 2829: 2828: 2816: 2810: 2809: 2807: 2801:. Archived from 2786: 2775: 2769: 2768: 2757: 2751: 2750: 2748: 2746: 2737:. 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Smart 3332: 3327: 3322: 3320:David Chalmers 3317: 3311: 3309: 3300: 3299: 3294: 3289: 3284: 3282:Giuseppe Peano 3279: 3274: 3272:Edmund Gettier 3269: 3264: 3259: 3253: 3251: 3247: 3246: 3243: 3242: 3240: 3239: 3234: 3229: 3227:Possible world 3224: 3219: 3214: 3208: 3206: 3197: 3196: 3191: 3186: 3181: 3179:Counterfactual 3176: 3171: 3160: 3158: 3154: 3153: 3151: 3150: 3145: 3140: 3135: 3130: 3125: 3120: 3115: 3110: 3105: 3100: 3095: 3090: 3085: 3080: 3075: 3070: 3064: 3062: 3058: 3057: 3054: 3053: 3051: 3050: 3045: 3040: 3038:Paraconsistent 3035: 3030: 3025: 3020: 3014: 3012: 3008: 3007: 3005: 3004: 2999: 2994: 2988: 2986: 2982: 2981: 2979: 2978: 2973: 2968: 2963: 2958: 2952: 2950: 2949:Areas of focus 2943: 2939: 2938: 2933: 2931: 2930: 2923: 2916: 2908: 2900: 2899: 2888: 2884:New York Times 2877: 2872: 2866: 2861: 2851: 2843: 2836: 2835:External links 2833: 2831: 2830: 2811: 2797: 2770: 2752: 2722: 2707: 2700: 2678: 2652: 2640: 2628: 2609: 2586: 2567: 2561:Fodor, Jerry. 2554: 2540: 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108: 107: 104: 103: 97: 93: 92: 83: 79: 78: 75: 73:(aged 82) 67: 63: 62: 59: 57:April 22, 1935 46: 44: 40: 39: 36: 28: 27: 24: 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 4824: 4813: 4810: 4808: 4805: 4803: 4800: 4798: 4795: 4793: 4790: 4788: 4785: 4783: 4780: 4778: 4775: 4773: 4770: 4768: 4765: 4763: 4760: 4758: 4755: 4753: 4750: 4748: 4745: 4743: 4740: 4738: 4735: 4733: 4730: 4728: 4725: 4723: 4720: 4718: 4715: 4713: 4710: 4708: 4705: 4703: 4700: 4698: 4695: 4693: 4690: 4688: 4685: 4683: 4680: 4678: 4675: 4673: 4670: 4669: 4667: 4652: 4649: 4647: 4644: 4642: 4639: 4637: 4634: 4633: 4630: 4624: 4620: 4616: 4612: 4609: 4607: 4604: 4603: 4601: 4597: 4591: 4588: 4586: 4585:Understanding 4583: 4581: 4578: 4576: 4573: 4571: 4568: 4566: 4563: 4561: 4558: 4556: 4553: 4551: 4548: 4546: 4543: 4541: 4538: 4536: 4533: 4531: 4528: 4526: 4523: 4521: 4518: 4516: 4513: 4511: 4510:Introspection 4508: 4506: 4503: 4499: 4496: 4494: 4491: 4490: 4489: 4486: 4484: 4481: 4479: 4476: 4474: 4471: 4469: 4466: 4464: 4463:Consciousness 4461: 4459: 4456: 4454: 4451: 4449: 4446: 4444: 4441: 4439: 4436: 4434: 4431: 4430: 4428: 4424: 4418: 4415: 4413: 4410: 4408: 4405: 4403: 4400: 4396: 4393: 4392: 4391: 4388: 4386: 4385:Phenomenology 4383: 4381: 4380:Phenomenalism 4378: 4376: 4373: 4371: 4370:Occasionalism 4368: 4366: 4363: 4361: 4358: 4356: 4353: 4349: 4346: 4345: 4344: 4343:Naïve realism 4341: 4339: 4336: 4334: 4333:Functionalism 4331: 4329: 4326: 4324: 4321: 4319: 4316: 4314: 4311: 4309: 4306: 4304: 4301: 4300: 4298: 4294: 4288: 4287: 4283: 4281: 4278: 4276: 4275:Stephen Yablo 4273: 4271: 4268: 4266: 4263: 4261: 4258: 4256: 4253: 4251: 4248: 4246: 4243: 4241: 4238: 4236: 4233: 4231: 4230:Richard Rorty 4228: 4226: 4225:Hilary Putnam 4223: 4221: 4218: 4216: 4213: 4211: 4208: 4206: 4203: 4201: 4200:Marvin Minsky 4198: 4196: 4193: 4191: 4188: 4186: 4183: 4181: 4178: 4176: 4175:Immanuel Kant 4173: 4171: 4168: 4166: 4165:William James 4163: 4161: 4158: 4156: 4153: 4151: 4148: 4146: 4143: 4141: 4138: 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3708: 3705: 3703: 3702:Ruth Millikan 3700: 3698: 3697:John McDowell 3695: 3693: 3690: 3688: 3685: 3683: 3680: 3678: 3675: 3674: 3672: 3670: 3666: 3660: 3657: 3655: 3652: 3651: 3649: 3645: 3639: 3636: 3634: 3631: 3629: 3628:Hilary Putnam 3626: 3624: 3623:Robert Nozick 3621: 3619: 3616: 3614: 3611: 3609: 3606: 3604: 3601: 3599: 3596: 3594: 3591: 3590: 3588: 3584: 3574: 3571: 3569: 3566: 3564: 3561: 3559: 3556: 3554: 3553:Rudolf Carnap 3551: 3550: 3548: 3546: 3545:Vienna Circle 3542: 3536: 3533: 3531: 3528: 3527: 3525: 3523: 3522:Berlin Circle 3519: 3513: 3510: 3508: 3505: 3504: 3502: 3500: 3496: 3490: 3487: 3485: 3482: 3480: 3477: 3475: 3472: 3470: 3467: 3465: 3462: 3460: 3457: 3455: 3452: 3450: 3447: 3445: 3442: 3440: 3437: 3435: 3432: 3430: 3429:Philippa Foot 3427: 3425: 3422: 3420: 3417: 3415: 3412: 3410: 3407: 3406: 3404: 3402: 3398: 3392: 3389: 3387: 3384: 3382: 3379: 3377: 3376:Graham Priest 3374: 3372: 3369: 3367: 3364: 3362: 3359: 3357: 3356:Charlie Broad 3354: 3352: 3349: 3348: 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L. Austin 4027:Philosophers 3834:Cora Diamond 3770: 3750:Morton White 3618:Thomas Nagel 3563:Otto Neurath 3512:Ernest Nagel 3459:Gilbert Ryle 3454:Derek Parfit 3414:J. L. Austin 3361:Casimir Lewy 3330:Peter Singer 3325:J. L. Mackie 3297:Barry Stroud 3257:Noam Chomsky 3250:Philosophers 3184:Natural kind 3068:Anti-realism 3028:Mathematical 3002:Performative 2961:Epistemology 2901: 2894: 2883: 2857: 2847: 2824: 2814: 2803:the original 2780: 2773: 2767:. MIT Press. 2764: 2755: 2743:. Retrieved 2739:the original 2733:Bach, Kent. 2719:. MIT Press. 2716: 2710: 2689: 2681: 2669:. Retrieved 2662: 2655: 2643: 2631: 2612: 2595: 2589: 2570: 2557: 2543: 2536:The Guardian 2532:Mary Midgley 2523: 2514: 2510: 2502: 2494: 2485: 2477: 2469: 2464: 2452:. 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