416:
this figure down to 60,177. Prunier, attempting to make sense of these numbers, notes that if a low estimate of the pre-crisis Kibeho population (about 80,000) is taken as correct, this still means that at least 20,000 people "vanished." From this, Prunier concludes that it is likely that 20,000 to 30,000 former residents of Kibeho died after the massacre as a result of being expelled from the comparative safety of the camps. Hundreds of patients were evacuated to, triaged and treated at the UN hospital in Kigali operated by the
Australian Defence Force. All age groups and both genders were represented with Defence clinicians working round the clock with limited staff and consumable resources. All areas of the hospital were overloaded, including wards, ICU and the operating theatre.
343:
nothing, just stare at the
Zambians... The two roads winding through the mountains to Kibeho have been closed. Food and water convoys from aid organisations are being stopped and sent back. The government has forbidden all refugee aid...A group of refugees, about six of them, break away and start running into the valley. Rwandan troops started firing immediately. We see the refugee fall dead. I scream at Capt. Francis "Stop them! Do something!"... He answers "We have been ordered to cooperate with the Rwandan authorities, not shoot at them." "Even if they kill innocent people before your eyes?" "Yes," he answers.
412:
May, without any field visits, the commission reached a conclusion backing the government account of events that criminal or genocidaire elements were in the camp and that the massacre had happened when "there had been firing from the IDPs and the RPA suffered casualties... The RPA responded by firing into the crowd," and noted that they could not determine fatalities because of "logistics and time constraints". The government figure of 338 casualties has never been questioned by any official body.
408:
Zambian officer tried to present him with the figure compiled by the
Australian unit. Both Rwandan government and UN officials minimized the numbers killed, giving public estimates of 330 and 2000 killed respectively. However, a series of photos taken by UN Provost Marshal Mark Cuthbert-Brown show some of the extent of the massacre on the morning of 23 April, as Zambian troops commenced moving bodies.
231:. In January 1995, after RPF fears of Western sanctions had abated and the sanctioned killings had resumed, the IDPs refused to return to their home villages, where they would be vulnerable to the kill squads. By the third week of February, the OIC had basically stopped working and the camps were filling back up with villagers fleeing the violence in the hills. The UN field workers were caught in a
482:(DMI) leaked a memo to the press identifying Sendashunga as linked to "extremist forces", he disbanded the Local Defense Forces (LDF), groups set up to replace police but largely turned into thugs under the direction of RPF rural leaders. Prime Minister Twagiramungu called a special security meeting on 23 August that reached a climax after three days when Sendashonga, Minister of Finance
248:
The IOC situation reports reflected its conflicting responsibilities, blaming a "deliberate campaign of disinformation" for IDPs refusing to leave the camps, while nearly simultaneously reporting "people return to the camps, fearing for their personal safety. There have been reports that some people are fleeing the communes and entering the camps for the first time."
50:
498:. Kagame responded by leaving the room, thus ending the meeting. After two days, Prime Minister Twagiramungu announced his resignation but President Bizimungu, furious at the rebellion within the ranks of the government, got Parliament to fire Twagiramungu on August 28. The next day, Sendashonga, Minister of Transport and Communications
337:, who assured him that he would make sure things stayed under control. The next day soldiers opened fire again, killing twenty and killing sixty before surrounding the camp. Journalist and eyewitness Linda Polman, who was accompanying the approximately 80 Zambian soldiers from UNAMIR at Kibeho, described the situation that day:
317:, held a press conference in which he noted, "There are rumours that if the IDPs return home they will be killed... If that were the government's intention then it would have gone ahead and killed the people within the camps. After all, the camps are within Rwandan territory." In contrast, the Hutu RPF minister of the interior,
441:
An account by Thomas Odom, the US Defence
Attache in Kinshasa, described the cause in the same way: "Hard-liners (in the camp) drove other IDPs like cattle to try to break through RPA lines and the RPA commander lost control of the situation. His report adds; "the camp was heavily populated by people
436:
potential informers. Whatever the reason, this resulted in panic amongst the crowd which began pushing against the RPA cordon. The RPA soldiers, fearing a riot, began to shoot into the crowd and soon most joined in, firing indiscriminately. Their motive soon became less crowd control and more revenge.
415:
Those IDPs who were forced to leave the camps were subject to attacks by crowds seeking vengeance for family killed during the genocide, as well as dehydration and exhaustion. On 24 April, the IOC announced that 145,228 IDPs had returned to Butare
Prefecture from the camps, and two days later revised
307:
On
Tuesday 18 April at 0300 hrs two battalions of RPA soldiers surrounded Kibeho camp. The RPA used the expedient measure of firing shots in the air to move the IDPs along. One woman was shot in the hip and ten people, mostly children, were trampled to death... torched many of the huts so that the
247:
insisted on proper procedures and close cooperation with the RPF government. The former UNREO director would later write, "The government was on board but never fully committed, allowing the humanitarian community to assume responsibility for an 'integrated' approach that in reality never existed."
473:
The Kibeho
Massacre, and its aftermath, began the final fracturing of the government of national unity that had been created in July 1994. Seth Sendashonga came to the conclusion that the Hutu were being collectively treated as murderers and being shot without trial. He proceeded to make himself a
435:
leaders in particular began to become concerned… as imprisonment or execution were very real possibilities for them. As a result, they began to harass the people and then to attack the crowd with machetes. Their reasons were probably two-fold - to create a diversion in order to escape and to silence
226:
In late 1994, the large camps in the former so-called Safe
Humanitarian Zones housed about 350,000 people. The UN set up an Integrated Operations Centre (IOC) to handle the caseload and managed to repatriate about 80,000 IDPs between October 1994 and January 1995. However, this period fortuitously
510:
were fired. Sendashonga and
Twagiramungu were placed under house arrest, but were eventually allowed to leave the country unharmed by the end of the year. While the government of national unity ostensibly continued until the presidential crisis of 2000, these events destroyed it for all practical
411:
Interior
Minister Sendashonga asked for an international commission of inquiry but was rebuffed by Kagame. An Independent International Commission of Inquiry, consisting of members handpicked by the RPF, was formed and led by RPF member Christine Omutonyi. After meeting in Kigali between 3 and 8
377:
Not long after 10 am, in heavy rain, RPA forces began firing into the crowd in the hospital compound, causing a stampede of refugees against razor wire and barricades. RPA forces continued to fire at fleeing refugees for the next two hours. While initially firing into the massed crowd with rifles,
357:
and we certainly weren't wanted. The Government forces made that very, very clear... They insisted we only treat people who had decided to leave the camp... The government forces were extremely aggressive indicating that if we didn't empty the hospital they would... killing people who remained"
543:
to return home before the massacre and being helpless to prevent it once it was underway. However, some commentaries claim that the Australian actions helped reduce the numbers killed and wounded. Writing in the Australian Army Journal, Paul Jordan, has said that: "While there was little that we
407:
Minister Sendashonga had attempted to reach Kibeho on the morning of 23 April but was turned away by the army. President Bizimungu arrived that same afternoon and was told that there had been about three hundred casualties, which he accepted without comment. Bizimungu showed displeasure when a
398:
The RPA began burying bodies during the night of 22–23 April. At daybreak of 23 April, Australian Medical Corps personnel began counting the dead. About 4200 were counted in the areas to which they had access, and they noted evidence that unseen bodies had already been removed. Terry Pickard's
385:
hospital. Despite this, the medical teams continued their work while the infantry sections brought in wounded to the clearing station and hospital, during breaks in the firing. During the morning the hospital was also moved, under fire, into the Zambian compound. Firing continued intermittently
342:
about 150,000 refugees standing shoulder to shoulder on a mountain plateau the size of three football fields... For the last sixty hours the refugees had been forced to relieve themselves where they stand or where they have fallen. The stench takes my breath away... The refugees do nothing, say
514:
Johan Pottier argues that the manner in which the RPF government restricted the access of journalists to information about Kibeho foreshadowed its approach in eastern Zaire later. He states, "Kibeho was a half-way stage in the development of Kagame's doctrine of tight information control."
235:. "The government's hostility to the camps was profound, visceral...A large proportion of those who had taken shelter within Zone Turquoise were seen by the government as perpetrators of the genocide", in the words of the former director of the
403:
posits that "a not unreasonable estimate" would be over 5000 dead. There were also many wounded, but not as many as would be expected as in combat, as most of the dead were bayoneted or shot at close range, and thus died of their wounds.
272:(MSF). The RPA maintained a tight cordon around the camp. Refugees wishing to leave the camp to return home had to pass through a checkpoint, where genocide survivors would point out individuals who had taken part in the 1994 killings.
378:
the RPA later began using 60mm mortars. Corporal Paul Jordan wrote "we watched (and could do little more) as these people were hunted down and shot." The RPA slowed for a while after lunch before resuming fire until about 6 pm.
348:
Several days of mounting tension between those in the camp and the RPF soldiers followed, with the RPF firing (at people and into the air) to control and move the refugees into an increasingly smaller area as processing of
430:
As the processing slowly continued, people became very weary and restless. One casualty we received later told us they had been so crowded in by the RPA, without food or water, that they had been barely able to sit. The
399:
account states the RPA forced Australians to stop counting bodies "when they realised what was going on". The Australians estimated that there were still 400-500 bodies uncounted, not including those removed. Scholar
1105:
460:
that would occur 18 months later: "nontreatment of the consequences of genocide, well-meaning but politically blind humanitarianism, RPF resolve to 'solve the problem' by force, stunned impotence of the
424:
One Australian eyewitness notes that, "the events which occurred on that day are still not completely clear but one theory based on the reports of several eye witnesses and Intel reports is as follows":
386:
throughout the day. Jordan recalls seeing people being "killed all over the camp." The RPA also directed automatic rounds, rocket propelled grenades and .50 calibre machine gun fire at another wave of
365:
force discovered about 100 refugees had been wounded or killed in the night. About half of those injured had gunshot wounds, presumably from RPA soldiers, the remainder machete wounds, presumably from
474:
hindrance to the RPF, declaring that the many people arrested from Kibeho should not be held in crowded cells where they were suffocating to death and then canceling an attempt by Kigali mayor
456:, expresses skepticism of the claims that génocidaires were a significant factor in the massacre and characterizes the Kibeho as being a miniature version of the characteristics of the
790:
544:
could have done to stop the killings, I believe that, if Australians had not been there as witnesses to the massacre, the RPA would have killed every single person in the camp."
479:
1125:
539:. All available accounts indicate that the small Australian team found the event deeply distressing, and were frustrated both by being unable to encourage many of the
1109:
227:
coincided with the period when the new RPF government had reduced the activities of its kill squads after their activities were documented in the officially-denied
719:
Heavily disputed figure with estimates ranging from 50,000 to 150,000. The best estimate of an IOC staffer who followed day to day events was 80,000 to 100,000.
243:
asserts that "the camps sheltered thousands of women and children as well as men who might or might not have been genocidaires." Meanwhile, UN headquarters in
208:
148:
1092:
1188:
691:
Col. P.G. Warfe , "Address on the Kibeho Massacre," Australian Red Cross Conference on Humanitarian Law, Hobart, Australia, July 22–23, 1999, quoted in
325:, held an emergency meeting of the UN and NGOs to arrange transport for the IDPs before the RPA lost all restraint. He further briefed Prime Minister
1085:"Photos of Kibeho IDP camp, Rwanda, April–May 1995 through the lens of Mark Cuthbert-Brown, Provost Marshal of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda"
236:
1067:
1037:
868:
1163:
801:
791:"Australian Women In War: Investigating the experiences and changing roles of Australian women in war and peace operations 1899 – Today"
1129:
490:(all Hutus who had been publicly identified by the DMI as being potential traitors) were joined by Tutsi minister of women's affairs
478:
to distinguish current city residents from those residents returning from Zaire by color-coding their residency permits. After the
1178:
283:
announced that all camps in the prefecture would be closed immediately. The declared aim of this was to forcibly separate known
938:"Guerrillas From the Mist: A Defense Attaché Watches the Rwandan Patriotic Front Transform from Insurgent to Counter Insurgent"
381:
The MSF and Australian medical teams struggled to cope with the large numbers of wounded, many of whom were later evacuated to
353:
continued. One of the Australian medics, Major Carol Vaughan-Evans recalled "I remember getting there four days preceding the
308:
IDPs would not return home. At 1630 hrs the RPA fired warning shots and nine more IDPs were killed in the resulting stampede.
767:
269:
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350:
204:
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239:(UNREO), and the RPF was contemptuous of the inadequate programs proposed by the UN bureaucracy. In contrast, scholar
553:
540:
92:
1173:
1168:
1029:
442:"involved in the 1994 genocide... and ... was an active insurgent base." Odom uses the UN estimate of 2000 killed.
70:
507:
1096:
1158:
1059:
503:
462:
216:
152:
188:
176:
156:
123:
536:
535:; Corporal Andrew Miller, Warrant Officer Rod Scott, Lieutenant Thomas Tilbrook and Major (then Captain)
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in confronting Kagame, especially over his recent selection of 117 Tutsis out of the 145 newly appointed
369:
who were "trying to terrorise the refugees into remaining in the camp… so as to provide a human shield."
499:
326:
268:
presence at the camp was maintained by a Zambian infantry company, with medical services provided by
524:
483:
986:
558:
487:
314:
54:
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estimated at least 4,000 people in the camp were killed by soldiers of the military wing of the
465:
in the face of violence, and, finally, a hypocritical denial that anything much had happened."
1138:
1063:
1047:
1033:
884:
864:
445:
400:
330:
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215:) and a number of aid organizations. The new Rwandan government, dominated by the victorious
1052:
Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe
318:
232:
168:
41:
491:
457:
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hastily dispatched 32 Australian soldiers and medical officers to support its presence in
280:
1021:
Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century
302:
Colonel P.G. Warfe of the Australian Army would later describe the events of that day:
240:
228:
264:, sprawling for 9 square kilometers and containing between 80,000 and 100,000 people.
1152:
885:"The Kibeho Tragedy (Rwanda, April-May 1995) through the lens of Mark Cuthbert-Brown"
244:
937:
603:
militia were armed and active within the camp. See Paul Jordan’s account for example
1084:
366:
284:
184:
996:. 22 September 1997. Australian defence force personnel in peacekeeping operations
187:) fled from the RPF controlled areas to zones controlled by the French as part of
1019:
1106:"Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Repatriation Virtually at a Standstill"
918:
600:
532:
475:
432:
334:
220:
1108:. Medicins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders). July 1995. Archived from
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17:
321:, rushed to Kibeho the next day to stop the shooting and, upon his return to
203:. When the French withdrew in August 1994, the administration of a number of
1025:
582:
49:
922:
731:
354:
200:
105:
192:
768:"Witness to genocide – A personal account of the 1995 Kibeho massacre"
1055:
860:
Combat Medic: An Australian Eyewitness Account of the Kibeho Massacre
528:
382:
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322:
296:
292:
288:
265:
261:
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144:
140:
74:
66:
183:, including an unknown number of those who had committed genocide, (
1134:
Official Australian War Artist George Gittoes’ artwork from Rwanda
196:
172:
180:
936:
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, US Army (ret.) (July 2006).
287:
from those who would be sent home via a staging camp in nearby
531:, the first gallantry medals awarded to Australians since the
159:. The Rwandan Government estimated the death toll to be 338.
147:
on 22 April 1995. Australian soldiers serving as part of the
1143:
Major Carol Vaughan-Evans' short interview on the massacre
223:
militia members in the camps who had committed genocide.
840:
838:
836:
834:
798:
Australian Government – Department of Veterans' Affairs
703:
701:
638:
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611:
609:
994:
The Parliament of Australia – House of Representatives
1095:. www.defence.gov.au. November 2005. Archived from
119:
111:
99:
88:
80:
62:
34:
27:
Massacre of refugees by the Rwandan Patriotic Front
1126:"The Preacher - (a portrait of courage and faith)"
730:
863:. Australia: Big Sky Publishing. pp. 80–81.
219:(RPF), wished to identify those individuals and
770:. Queensland: ANZAC Day Commemoration Committee
427:
339:
304:
599:Later Australian accounts confirm that former
8:
209:United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
149:United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
780:Reprinted from the Australian Army Journal.
313:The Tutsi RPF minister of rehabilitation,
31:
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1101:Includes short clip of Kibeho IDP camp
390:who tried to break out after 5.00 pm.
237:United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office
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7:
480:Directorate of Military Intelligence
333:and Vice President/Defense Minister
191:and into the neighbouring states of
527:for their distinguished service at
171:and the victory by the army of the
667:"Connor, John: Bravery Under Fire"
523:Four Australians were awarded the
207:(IDP) camps was taken over by the
25:
1189:Aftermath of the Rwandan genocide
1141:. australiansatwar.gov.au. 2001.
48:
729:Linda Polman (September 1999).
587:Australian War Memorial Website
420:Possible causes of the massacre
361:On the morning of 22 April the
583:"Rwanda (UNAMIR), 1993 - 1996"
1:
40:Part of the aftermath of the
1128:. Art Equity. Archived from
800:. p. 97. Archived from
506:and Minister of Information
469:Consequences of the massacre
260:IDP camp was the largest in
205:internally displaced persons
137:internally displaced persons
1164:April 1995 events in Africa
554:List of massacres in Rwanda
1205:
1139:"Eyewitness to a Massacre"
1030:Cambridge University Press
766:Jordan, Paul (June 2003).
589:. Australian War Memorial.
508:Jean-Baptiste Nkuriyingoma
1093:"The senseless slaughter"
673:. Australian War Memorial
373:Massacre of 22 April 1995
57:, where Kibeho is located
47:
39:
486:and Vice Prime Minister
270:Médecins Sans Frontières
1179:Rwandan Patriotic Front
1060:Oxford University Press
1018:Pottier, Johan (2002).
987:"Votes and Proceedings"
857:Pickard, Terry (2008).
463:international community
217:Rwandan Patriotic Front
153:Rwandan Patriotic Front
135:occurred in a camp for
887:. Pbase.com. p. 3
504:Alphonse-Marie Nkubito
502:, Minister of Justice
439:
438:
346:
345:
311:
310:
275:On 17 April 1995, the
177:Rwandan Patriotic Army
157:Rwandan Patriotic Army
124:Rwandan Patriotic Army
69:, Nyaruguru District,
732:"The Problem Outside"
428:
340:
305:
291:. Taken by surprise,
921:(9 September 2002).
327:Faustin Twagiramungu
1184:Massacres in Rwanda
1112:on 19 February 2015
537:Carol Vaughan-Evans
525:Medal for Gallantry
256:By early 1995, the
189:Opération Turquoise
179:(RPA), many ethnic
945:Small Wars Journal
559:Our Lady of Kibeho
488:Alexis Kanyarengwe
454:Africa's World War
315:Jacques Bihozagara
55:Nyaruguru District
1174:Massacres in 1995
1169:April 1995 crimes
1132:on 22 April 2009.
1099:on 22 March 2011.
1069:978-0-19-537420-9
1039:978-0-521-52873-3
964:, pp. 44–46.
925:. warriordoc.com.
870:978-0-9803251-2-6
828:, pp. 40–41.
671:Wartime, Issue 39
630:, pp. 38–39.
519:Australian awards
500:Immaculée Kayumba
458:invasion of Zaire
450:The Rwanda Crisis
331:Pasteur Bizimungu
129:
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71:Southern Province
16:(Redirected from
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319:Seth Sendashonga
299:, on 18 April.
169:Rwandan genocide
143:, in south-west
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42:Rwandan genocide
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1048:Prunier, GĂ©rard
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807:on 1 March 2017
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492:Aloysia Inyumba
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155:, known as the
133:Kibeho massacre
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58:
35:Kibeho massacre
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18:Kibeho Massacre
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1159:1995 in Rwanda
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1078:External links
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229:Gersony Report
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1130:the original
1114:. Retrieved
1110:the original
1097:the original
1087:. Pbase.com.
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1020:
998:. Retrieved
993:
981:
974:Pottier 2002
969:
962:Prunier 2009
957:
948:
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919:Smart, Tracy
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906:Prunier 2009
901:
889:. Retrieved
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845:Prunier 2009
826:Prunier 2009
821:
809:. Retrieved
802:the original
797:
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772:. Retrieved
743:Prunier 2009
741:, quoted in
736:
724:
715:
708:Prunier 2009
693:Prunier 2009
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677:25 September
675:. Retrieved
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643:Prunier 2009
628:Prunier 2009
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367:GĂ©nocidaires
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285:GĂ©nocidaires
276:
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255:
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185:GĂ©nocidaires
166:
132:
130:
120:Perpetrators
29:
601:Interahamwe
533:Vietnam War
496:bourmestres
476:Rose Kabuye
433:Interahamwe
335:Paul Kagame
252:Kibeho Camp
221:Interahamwe
175:-dominated
101:Attack type
1153:Categories
1012:References
511:purposes.
394:Casualties
115:338–4,000+
1026:Cambridge
565:Footnotes
1050:(2009).
923:"Kibeho"
745:, p. 40.
695:, p. 39.
548:See also
355:massacre
233:Catch-22
201:Tanzania
106:Massacre
63:Location
193:Burundi
163:History
1066:
1056:Oxford
1036:
867:
737:Granta
529:Kibeho
383:Kigali
363:UNAMIR
323:Kigali
297:Kibeho
293:UNAMIR
289:Butare
281:Butare
277:préfet
266:UNAMIR
262:Rwanda
258:Kibeho
213:UNAMIR
199:, and
145:Rwanda
141:Kibeho
112:Deaths
89:Target
75:Rwanda
67:Kibeho
1116:5 May
1000:5 May
990:(PDF)
941:(PDF)
891:6 May
811:5 May
805:(PDF)
794:(PDF)
774:8 May
197:Zaire
181:Hutus
173:Tutsi
139:near
1118:2017
1064:ISBN
1034:ISBN
1002:2017
951:(2).
893:2017
865:ISBN
813:2017
776:2017
679:2008
452:and
131:The
95:camp
81:Date
541:IDP
388:IDP
351:IDP
279:of
93:IDP
1155::
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195:,
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211:(
20:)
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