Knowledge (XXG)

Quota method

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1026: 161: 1001: 36: 1194:. Each party is first allocated a number of seats equal to their integer. This will generally leave some remainder seats unallocated. To apportion these seats, the parties are then ranked on the basis of their fractional remainders, and the parties with the largest remainders are each allocated one additional seat until all seats have been allocated. This gives the method its name. 1013: 1662:
By the same token, the results of an apportionment for all parties can depend on the exact order of calculations. If the number of independents who win a seat is calculated first, and an apportionment is then computed excluding their seats, the results may be different from those reached by treating
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The largest remainder methods require the numbers of votes for each party to be divided by a quota representing the number of votes required to win a seat. Usually, this is given by the total number of votes cast, divided by the number of seats. The result for each party will consist of an
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to the Union, the House was expanded by 5 seats, equal to Oklahoma's apportionment, to ensure it would not affect the seats for any exiting state. apportionment. However, when the full apportionment was recalculated, the House was stunned to learn that New York had lost a seat to
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in the number of seats allocated to a certain party. In the example below, when the number of seats to be allocated is increased from 25 to 26 (with the number of votes held constant), parties D and E counterintuitively end up with fewer seats.
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However, a greater concern for social choice theorists, and the primary cause behind their abandonment in most countries, is the tendency of such rules to produce bizarre or irrational behaviors called
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It is easy for a voter to understand how the largest remainder method allocates seats. Moreover, the largest remainder method satisfies the
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in the number of seats it hands out, and so is more proportional than the Droop quota (which tends to be biased towards larger parties).
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The Hare quota is more generous to less popular parties and the Droop quota to more popular parties. Specifically, the Hare quota is
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avoid all the paradoxes discussed above, with the exception of quota violations. However, quota violations in low-
668: 46: 3069: 3024: 2970: 2882: 1227:. The choice of quota affects the properties of the corresponding largest remainder method, and particularly the 716: 709: 193: 3059: 2945: 2903: 2822: 2747: 2683: 2641: 1202: 1075: 770: 698: 687: 550: 537: 520: 497: 475: 438: 428: 2678: 86: 3084: 3074: 3049: 2865: 2742: 1700: 1139: 1105: 896: 750: 433: 3125: 3064: 2927: 2870: 1188: 925: 805: 735: 542: 2206: 68: 3029: 2950: 2715: 1622: 1163: 1135: 833: 673: 557: 363: 342: 274: 252: 2563: 2391:"Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities" 2360:"Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities" 1120: 1025: 891: 3099: 2668: 1677: 1610: 1127: 964: 951: 919: 183: 3079: 2673: 1708: 870: 704: 357: 3120: 2730: 1648: 1287: 1206: 1167: 1151: 1114: 1030: 901: 512: 296: 2688: 1691:
population relative to another, e.g. go from having 5Ă— as many people to 6Ă— as many people, yet
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How Math Explains the World: A Guide to the Power of Numbers, from Car Repair to Modern Physics
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of this entitlement, and any seats left over are distributed according to a specified rule.
3130: 2762: 2618: 2603: 2489: 2293: 2246: 1085:, i.e. a given number of votes needed to win a seat. This is used to calculate each party's 1017: 974: 865: 853: 567: 443: 269: 263: 245: 234: 229: 217: 178: 140: 3178: 3094: 2935: 2913: 2725: 2646: 2636: 2614: 1720: 1681: 1637: 1224: 1218: 1198: 1171: 1155: 1082: 1069: 1005: 838: 693: 658: 579: 490: 393: 316: 258: 136: 93: 2482:"Apportioning Representatives in the United States Congress – Paradoxes of Apportionment" 17: 160: 2993: 2698: 2658: 1644: 1159: 1131: 1090: 875: 815: 800: 611: 480: 455: 306: 1000: 3198: 2737: 2534: 2331: 1104:, i.e. the most leftover votes). They are typically contrasted with the more popular 884: 584: 372: 210: 173: 148: 1361:
These examples take an election to allocate 10 seats where there are 100,000 votes.
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Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and Their Applications
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Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and Their Applications
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Largest remainder methods can also be used to apportion votes among
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each independent as if they were in their own political party.
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Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote
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Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote
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Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017), Pukelsheim, Friedrich (ed.),
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Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017), Pukelsheim, Friedrich (ed.),
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LR-Hare is sometimes called Hamilton's method, named after
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seats, by increasing the size of the electoral quota. Such
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a particular party's apportionment, a problem called the
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Adding more parties to the can cause a bizarre kind of
2286:"Securing System Consistency: Coherence and Paradoxes" 1306: 1262: 3154: 3108: 3012: 2979: 2926: 2891: 2858: 2785: 2776: 2627: 1096:By far the most common kind of quota method is the 60:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. 2533: 2330: 1329: 1275: 1253:The Hare (or simple) quota is defined as follows: 2420:Gallagher, Michael; Mitchell, Paul (2005-09-15). 2239:"Quota Methods of Apportionment: Divide and Rank" 1130:discourage the use of quota methods, rather than 2329:Balinski, Michel L.; Young, H. Peyton (1982). 1108:(also called divisor methods). When using the 2588: 1134:, because of their greater susceptibility to 1048: 8: 3045:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives 2453:. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer. 1223:There are several possible choices for the 2782: 2595: 2581: 2573: 2532:Balinski, Michel; H. Peyton Young (1982). 1055: 1041: 131: 1711:tend to be both mild and extremely rare. 1313: 1307: 1305: 1263: 1261: 120:Learn how and when to remove this message 27:Proportional-representation voting system 2211:. New York: Prentice Hall. p. 128. 1964: 1737: 1727:in the total number of seats leads to a 1375: 3040:Independence of irrelevant alternatives 2818:Sequential proportional approval voting 2488:. Mathematical Association of America. 2480:Caulfield, Michael J. (November 2010). 2324: 2322: 2194: 1235:quota will always be more favorable to 147: 3205:Party-list proportional representation 2564:Hamilton method experimentation applet 2447:Eerik Lagerspetz (26 November 2015). 1613:, which can violate the principle of 1126:Despite their intuitive appeal, most 7: 2395:British Journal of Political Science 2364:British Journal of Political Science 2337:. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2279: 2277: 2275: 2232: 2230: 2228: 2200: 2198: 58:adding citations to reliable sources 2850:Indirect single transferable voting 2450:Social Choice and Democratic Values 1695:a seat to the slower-growing state. 1242:The two most common quotas are the 1290:, who devised the method in 1792. 25: 2423:The Politics of Electoral Systems 2208:Excursions in Modern Mathematics 1962:With 26 seats, the results are: 1735:With 25 seats, the results are: 1024: 1011: 999: 947:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem 593:Semi-proportional representation 225:First preference plurality (FPP) 34: 2511:. New York: Smithsonian Books. 1340:and is applied to elections in 45:needs additional citations for 2961:Mixed ballot transferable vote 1089:. Every party is assigned the 985:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem 942:Moulin's impossibility theorem 907:Conflicting majorities paradox 1: 1654:When Congress first admitted 811:Frustrated majorities paradox 3162:Comparison of voting systems 3004:Satisfaction approval voting 2989:Single non-transferable vote 2808:Proportional approval voting 1676:seats, a situation called a 980:Condorcet dominance theorems 920:Social and collective choice 2768:Graduated majority judgment 2389:Gallagher, Michael (1992). 2358:Gallagher, Michael (1992). 2298:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_9 2251:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_5 646:By mechanism of combination 417:Proportional representation 3226: 3020:Condorcet winner criterion 2711:First-past-the-post voting 2205:Tannenbaum, Peter (2010). 1216: 844:Multiple districts paradox 575:Fractional approval voting 563:Interactive representation 3175: 3167:Voting systems by country 3070:Mutual majority criterion 3025:Condorcet loser criterion 2971:Vote linkage mixed system 2883:Largest remainders method 2610: 1098:largest remainders method 791:Paradoxes and pathologies 640:Mixed-member proportional 635:Mixed-member majoritarian 630:By results of combination 521:Approval-based committees 18:Largest remainders method 3060:Majority loser criterion 2946:Additional member system 2904:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota 2823:Single transferable vote 2748:Positional voting system 2684:Minimax Condorcet method 2642:Combined approval voting 2507:Stein, James D. (2008). 1701:highest averages methods 1672:a party can cause it to 1632:the number of seats may 1547:Highest-remainder seats 1203:single transferable vote 1201:, as in the case of the 1154:occur by increasing the 1146:a party can cause it to 1106:highest averages methods 970:Condorcet's jury theorem 771:Double simultaneous vote 746:Rural–urban proportional 741:Dual-member proportional 703: 692: 659:Parallel (superposition) 551:Fractional social choice 538:Expanding approvals rule 367: 352: 337: 268: 257: 233: 3085:Resolvability criterion 3075:Participation criterion 3050:Later-no-harm criterion 2866:Highest averages method 1623:apportionment paradoxes 1136:apportionment paradoxes 1128:social choice theorists 1112:, the method is called 897:Tyranny of the majority 674:Fusion (majority bonus) 491:Quota-remainder methods 3126:First-preference votes 3065:Monotonicity criterion 3035:Independence of clones 2738:Simple majoritarianism 1331: 1277: 1031:Mathematics portal 937:Majority impossibility 926:Impossibility theorems 722:Negative vote transfer 543:Method of equal shares 164: 3210:Apportionment methods 3030:Consistency criterion 2951:Alternative vote plus 2716:Instant-runoff voting 1332: 1278: 834:Best-is-worst paradox 823:Pathological response 558:Direct representation 211:Single-winner methods 163: 3100:Seats-to-votes ratio 2871:Webster/Sainte-LaguĂ« 1678:negative vote weight 1611:seats-to-votes ratio 1304: 1260: 1152:population paradoxes 1018:Economics portal 965:Median voter theorem 184:Comparative politics 54:improve this article 3080:Plurality criterion 2679:Kemeny–Young method 1076:apportionment rules 1006:Politics portal 717:Vote linkage system 688:Seat linkage system 275:Ranked-choice (RCV) 3121:Election threshold 3055:Majority criterion 2731:Supplementary vote 2494:10.4169/loci003163 1327: 1288:Alexander Hamilton 1273: 1207:quota Borda system 1168:house monotonicity 1121:Jefferson's method 902:Discursive dilemma 861:Lesser evil voting 736:Supermixed systems 439:Largest remainders 297:Round-robin voting 165: 3192: 3191: 3090:Reversal symmetry 2999:Cumulative voting 2981:Semi-proportional 2956:Mixed single vote 2922: 2921: 2798:Mixed single vote 2706:Exhaustive ballot 2669:Copeland's method 2664:Condorcet methods 2604:Electoral systems 2433:978-0-19-153151-4 2307:978-3-319-64707-4 2260:978-3-319-64707-4 2218:978-0-321-56803-8 2187: 2186: 1960: 1959: 1649:new state paradox 1615:one man, one vote 1598: 1597: 1325: 1316: 1311: 1271: 1270: 1267: 1065: 1064: 952:Gibbard's theorem 892:Dominance paradox 829:Perverse response 533:Phragmen's method 399:Majority judgment 327:Positional voting 285:Condorcet methods 153:electoral systems 130: 129: 122: 104: 16:(Redirected from 3217: 3131:Liquid democracy 2783: 2763:Two-round system 2674:Dodgson's method 2597: 2590: 2583: 2574: 2552: 2551: 2540:. Yale Univ Pr. 2539: 2529: 2523: 2522: 2504: 2498: 2497: 2477: 2471: 2470: 2468: 2467: 2444: 2438: 2437: 2417: 2411: 2410: 2386: 2380: 2379: 2355: 2349: 2348: 2336: 2326: 2317: 2316: 2315: 2314: 2281: 2270: 2269: 2268: 2267: 2234: 2223: 2222: 2202: 2085:Automatic seats 2060:Quotas received 1965: 1858:Automatic seats 1833:Quotas received 1738: 1709:Webster's method 1496:Automatic seats 1431:Seats (divisor) 1376: 1336: 1334: 1333: 1328: 1326: 1324: 1317: 1314: 1309: 1308: 1282: 1280: 1279: 1274: 1272: 1268: 1265: 1264: 1199:solid coalitions 1087:seat entitlement 1074:are a family of 1057: 1050: 1043: 1029: 1028: 1016: 1015: 1004: 1003: 959:Positive results 854:Strategic voting 751:Majority jackpot 708: 697: 568:Liquid democracy 444:National remnant 434:Highest averages 371: 356: 341: 273: 264:Alternative vote 262: 246:Partisan primary 238: 179:Mechanism design 132: 125: 118: 114: 111: 105: 103: 62: 38: 30: 21: 3225: 3224: 3220: 3219: 3218: 3216: 3215: 3214: 3195: 3194: 3193: 3188: 3171: 3150: 3104: 3095:Smith criterion 3008: 2975: 2936:Parallel voting 2918: 2914:Imperiali quota 2887: 2854: 2772: 2726:Contingent vote 2689:Nanson's method 2647:Unified primary 2637:Approval voting 2623: 2606: 2601: 2560: 2555: 2548: 2531: 2530: 2526: 2519: 2506: 2505: 2501: 2479: 2478: 2474: 2465: 2463: 2461: 2446: 2445: 2441: 2434: 2419: 2418: 2414: 2388: 2387: 2383: 2357: 2356: 2352: 2345: 2328: 2327: 2320: 2312: 2310: 2308: 2283: 2282: 2273: 2265: 2263: 2261: 2236: 2235: 2226: 2219: 2204: 2203: 2196: 2192: 1721:Alabama paradox 1717: 1715:Alabama paradox 1682:no-show paradox 1638:Alabama paradox 1603: 1374: 1367: 1359: 1312: 1302: 1301: 1258: 1257: 1225:electoral quota 1221: 1219:Electoral quota 1215: 1180: 1172:Alabama paradox 1160:spoiler effects 1156:electoral quota 1140:no-show paradox 1132:divisor methods 1091:integer portion 1083:electoral quota 1061: 1023: 1022: 1010: 998: 990: 989: 956: 932:Arrow's theorem 922: 912: 911: 880: 850: 839:No-show paradox 820: 806:Cloning paradox 796:Spoiler effects 793: 783: 782: 757: 644: 627: 617: 616: 589: 580:Maximal lottery 547: 528:Thiele's method 517: 487: 419: 409: 408: 394:Approval voting 382:Cardinal voting 378: 323: 317:Maximal lottery 281: 213: 203: 126: 115: 109: 106: 63: 61: 51: 39: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 3223: 3221: 3213: 3212: 3207: 3197: 3196: 3190: 3189: 3176: 3173: 3172: 3170: 3169: 3164: 3158: 3156: 3152: 3151: 3149: 3148: 3143: 3138: 3133: 3128: 3123: 3118: 3112: 3110: 3106: 3105: 3103: 3102: 3097: 3092: 3087: 3082: 3077: 3072: 3067: 3062: 3057: 3052: 3047: 3042: 3037: 3032: 3027: 3022: 3016: 3014: 3010: 3009: 3007: 3006: 3001: 2996: 2994:Limited voting 2991: 2985: 2983: 2977: 2976: 2974: 2973: 2968: 2963: 2958: 2953: 2948: 2943: 2938: 2932: 2930: 2924: 2923: 2920: 2919: 2917: 2916: 2911: 2906: 2901: 2895: 2893: 2889: 2888: 2886: 2885: 2880: 2879: 2878: 2873: 2862: 2860: 2856: 2855: 2853: 2852: 2847: 2842: 2841: 2840: 2835: 2830: 2820: 2815: 2810: 2805: 2800: 2795: 2789: 2787: 2780: 2774: 2773: 2771: 2770: 2765: 2760: 2755: 2750: 2745: 2740: 2735: 2734: 2733: 2728: 2723: 2721:Coombs' method 2713: 2708: 2703: 2702: 2701: 2699:Schulze method 2696: 2691: 2686: 2681: 2676: 2671: 2661: 2659:Bucklin voting 2656: 2651: 2650: 2649: 2644: 2633: 2631: 2625: 2624: 2611: 2608: 2607: 2602: 2600: 2599: 2592: 2585: 2577: 2571: 2570: 2559: 2558:External links 2556: 2554: 2553: 2546: 2524: 2517: 2499: 2472: 2459: 2439: 2432: 2426:. OUP Oxford. 2412: 2401:(4): 469–496. 2381: 2370:(4): 469–496. 2350: 2343: 2318: 2306: 2271: 2259: 2224: 2217: 2193: 2191: 2188: 2185: 2184: 2181: 2178: 2175: 2172: 2169: 2166: 2163: 2159: 2158: 2155: 2152: 2149: 2146: 2143: 2140: 2137: 2136:Surplus seats 2133: 2132: 2130: 2127: 2124: 2121: 2118: 2115: 2112: 2108: 2107: 2104: 2101: 2098: 2095: 2092: 2089: 2086: 2082: 2081: 2079: 2076: 2073: 2070: 2067: 2064: 2061: 2057: 2056: 2053: 2051: 2049: 2047: 2045: 2043: 2041: 2037: 2036: 2033: 2031: 2029: 2027: 2025: 2023: 2021: 2017: 2016: 2013: 2010: 2007: 2004: 2001: 1998: 1995: 1991: 1990: 1987: 1984: 1981: 1978: 1975: 1972: 1969: 1958: 1957: 1954: 1951: 1948: 1945: 1942: 1939: 1936: 1932: 1931: 1928: 1925: 1922: 1919: 1916: 1913: 1910: 1909:Surplus seats 1906: 1905: 1903: 1900: 1897: 1894: 1891: 1888: 1885: 1881: 1880: 1877: 1874: 1871: 1868: 1865: 1862: 1859: 1855: 1854: 1852: 1849: 1846: 1843: 1840: 1837: 1834: 1830: 1829: 1826: 1824: 1822: 1820: 1818: 1816: 1814: 1810: 1809: 1806: 1804: 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944: 939: 934: 923: 918: 917: 914: 913: 910: 909: 904: 899: 894: 879: 878: 876:Turkey-raising 873: 868: 863: 849: 848: 847: 846: 836: 831: 819: 818: 816:Center squeeze 813: 808: 803: 801:Spoiler effect 794: 789: 788: 785: 784: 781: 780: 775: 774: 773: 760:By ballot type 756: 755: 754: 753: 748: 743: 733: 732: 731: 730: 729: 724: 714: 713: 712: 701: 678: 677: 676: 671: 666: 661: 643: 642: 637: 628: 623: 622: 619: 618: 615: 614: 612:Limited voting 609: 608: 607: 588: 587: 582: 577: 572: 571: 570: 565: 546: 545: 540: 535: 530: 516: 515: 510: 505: 500: 486: 485: 484: 483: 481:Localized list 478: 473: 468: 463: 453: 452: 451: 449:Biproportional 446: 441: 436: 420: 415: 414: 411: 410: 407: 406: 401: 396: 391: 377: 376: 361: 346: 322: 321: 320: 319: 314: 309: 304: 294: 280: 279: 278: 277: 266: 253:Instant-runoff 250: 249: 248: 240:Jungle primary 227: 216:Single vote - 214: 209: 208: 205: 204: 202: 201: 191: 186: 181: 176: 170: 167: 166: 156: 155: 145: 144: 128: 127: 69:"Quota method" 42: 40: 33: 26: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 3222: 3211: 3208: 3206: 3203: 3202: 3200: 3187: 3186: 3181: 3180: 3174: 3168: 3165: 3163: 3160: 3159: 3157: 3153: 3147: 3144: 3142: 3139: 3137: 3134: 3132: 3129: 3127: 3124: 3122: 3119: 3117: 3114: 3113: 3111: 3107: 3101: 3098: 3096: 3093: 3091: 3088: 3086: 3083: 3081: 3078: 3076: 3073: 3071: 3068: 3066: 3063: 3061: 3058: 3056: 3053: 3051: 3048: 3046: 3043: 3041: 3038: 3036: 3033: 3031: 3028: 3026: 3023: 3021: 3018: 3017: 3015: 3011: 3005: 3002: 3000: 2997: 2995: 2992: 2990: 2987: 2986: 2984: 2982: 2978: 2972: 2969: 2967: 2964: 2962: 2959: 2957: 2954: 2952: 2949: 2947: 2944: 2942: 2939: 2937: 2934: 2933: 2931: 2929: 2925: 2915: 2912: 2910: 2907: 2905: 2902: 2900: 2897: 2896: 2894: 2890: 2884: 2881: 2877: 2874: 2872: 2869: 2868: 2867: 2864: 2863: 2861: 2857: 2851: 2848: 2846: 2843: 2839: 2836: 2834: 2831: 2829: 2826: 2825: 2824: 2821: 2819: 2816: 2814: 2811: 2809: 2806: 2804: 2801: 2799: 2796: 2794: 2791: 2790: 2788: 2784: 2781: 2779: 2775: 2769: 2766: 2764: 2761: 2759: 2756: 2754: 2751: 2749: 2746: 2744: 2741: 2739: 2736: 2732: 2729: 2727: 2724: 2722: 2719: 2718: 2717: 2714: 2712: 2709: 2707: 2704: 2700: 2697: 2695: 2692: 2690: 2687: 2685: 2682: 2680: 2677: 2675: 2672: 2670: 2667: 2666: 2665: 2662: 2660: 2657: 2655: 2652: 2648: 2645: 2643: 2640: 2639: 2638: 2635: 2634: 2632: 2630: 2629:Single-winner 2626: 2622: 2620: 2616: 2609: 2605: 2598: 2593: 2591: 2586: 2584: 2579: 2578: 2575: 2569: 2565: 2562: 2561: 2557: 2549: 2547:0-300-02724-9 2543: 2538: 2537: 2528: 2525: 2520: 2518:9780061241765 2514: 2510: 2503: 2500: 2495: 2491: 2487: 2483: 2476: 2473: 2462: 2460:9783319232614 2456: 2452: 2451: 2443: 2440: 2435: 2429: 2425: 2424: 2416: 2413: 2408: 2404: 2400: 2396: 2392: 2385: 2382: 2377: 2373: 2369: 2365: 2361: 2354: 2351: 2346: 2344:0-300-02724-9 2340: 2335: 2334: 2325: 2323: 2319: 2309: 2303: 2299: 2295: 2291: 2287: 2280: 2278: 2276: 2272: 2262: 2256: 2252: 2248: 2244: 2240: 2233: 2231: 2229: 2225: 2220: 2214: 2210: 2209: 2201: 2199: 2195: 2189: 2182: 2179: 2176: 2173: 2170: 2167: 2164: 2161: 2160: 2156: 2153: 2150: 2147: 2144: 2141: 2138: 2135: 2134: 2131: 2128: 2125: 2122: 2119: 2116: 2113: 2110: 2109: 2105: 2102: 2099: 2096: 2093: 2090: 2087: 2084: 2083: 2080: 2077: 2074: 2071: 2068: 2065: 2062: 2059: 2058: 2054: 2052: 2050: 2048: 2046: 2044: 2042: 2039: 2038: 2034: 2032: 2030: 2028: 2026: 2024: 2022: 2019: 2018: 2014: 2011: 2008: 2005: 2002: 1999: 1996: 1993: 1992: 1988: 1985: 1982: 1979: 1976: 1973: 1970: 1967: 1966: 1963: 1955: 1952: 1949: 1946: 1943: 1940: 1937: 1934: 1933: 1929: 1926: 1923: 1920: 1917: 1914: 1911: 1908: 1907: 1904: 1901: 1898: 1895: 1892: 1889: 1886: 1883: 1882: 1878: 1875: 1872: 1869: 1866: 1863: 1860: 1857: 1856: 1853: 1850: 1847: 1844: 1841: 1838: 1835: 1832: 1831: 1827: 1825: 1823: 1821: 1819: 1817: 1815: 1812: 1811: 1807: 1805: 1803: 1801: 1799: 1797: 1795: 1792: 1791: 1787: 1784: 1781: 1778: 1775: 1772: 1769: 1766: 1765: 1761: 1758: 1755: 1752: 1749: 1746: 1743: 1740: 1739: 1736: 1733: 1730: 1726: 1722: 1714: 1712: 1710: 1707:methods like 1706: 1702: 1694: 1690: 1686: 1683: 1679: 1675: 1671: 1667: 1661: 1657: 1653: 1652: 1650: 1646: 1642: 1639: 1635: 1631: 1628: 1627: 1626: 1624: 1618: 1616: 1612: 1608: 1601:Pros and cons 1600: 1593: 1590: 1587: 1584: 1581: 1578: 1575: 1572: 1571: 1567: 1564: 1561: 1558: 1555: 1552: 1549: 1546: 1545: 1542: 1539: 1536: 1533: 1530: 1527: 1524: 1521: 1520: 1516: 1513: 1510: 1507: 1504: 1501: 1498: 1495: 1494: 1491: 1488: 1485: 1482: 1479: 1476: 1473: 1470: 1469: 1465: 1463: 1461: 1459: 1457: 1455: 1453: 1450: 1449: 1446:10 (10+1=11) 1445: 1443: 1441: 1439: 1437: 1435: 1433: 1430: 1429: 1425: 1422: 1419: 1416: 1413: 1410: 1407: 1404: 1403: 1399: 1396: 1393: 1390: 1387: 1384: 1381: 1378: 1377: 1371: 1369: 1364: 1362: 1356: 1354: 1352: 1351: 1345: 1343: 1321: 1318: 1300: 1299: 1298: 1297:is given by: 1296: 1291: 1289: 1256: 1255: 1254: 1251: 1249: 1245: 1240: 1238: 1234: 1230: 1226: 1220: 1212: 1210: 1208: 1204: 1200: 1195: 1193: 1190: 1186: 1177: 1175: 1173: 1169: 1165: 1162:and can fail 1161: 1157: 1153: 1149: 1145: 1141: 1137: 1133: 1129: 1124: 1122: 1118: 1116: 1111: 1107: 1103: 1099: 1094: 1092: 1088: 1084: 1081: 1077: 1073: 1071: 1058: 1053: 1051: 1046: 1044: 1039: 1038: 1036: 1035: 1032: 1027: 1019: 1014: 1009: 1007: 1002: 997: 996: 994: 993: 986: 983: 981: 978: 976: 975:May's theorem 973: 971: 968: 966: 963: 962: 961: 960: 953: 950: 948: 945: 943: 940: 938: 935: 933: 930: 929: 928: 927: 921: 916: 915: 908: 905: 903: 900: 898: 895: 893: 890: 889: 888: 887: 886: 885:majority rule 883:Paradoxes of 877: 874: 872: 869: 867: 864: 862: 859: 858: 857: 856: 855: 845: 842: 841: 840: 837: 835: 832: 830: 827: 826: 825: 824: 817: 814: 812: 809: 807: 804: 802: 799: 798: 797: 792: 787: 786: 779: 776: 772: 769: 768: 767: 764: 763: 762: 761: 752: 749: 747: 744: 742: 739: 738: 737: 734: 728: 725: 723: 720: 719: 718: 715: 711: 706: 702: 700: 695: 691: 690: 689: 686: 685: 684: 683: 679: 675: 672: 670: 667: 665: 662: 660: 657: 656: 655: 654: 649: 648: 647: 641: 638: 636: 633: 632: 631: 626: 625:Mixed systems 621: 620: 613: 610: 606: 603: 602: 601: 598: 597: 596: 595: 594: 586: 585:Random ballot 583: 581: 578: 576: 573: 569: 566: 564: 561: 560: 559: 556: 555: 554: 553: 552: 544: 541: 539: 536: 534: 531: 529: 526: 525: 524: 523: 522: 514: 511: 509: 506: 504: 501: 499: 496: 495: 494: 493: 492: 482: 479: 477: 474: 472: 469: 467: 464: 462: 459: 458: 457: 454: 450: 447: 445: 442: 440: 437: 435: 432: 431: 430: 429:Apportionment 427: 426: 425: 424: 418: 413: 412: 405: 402: 400: 397: 395: 392: 390: 387: 386: 385: 384: 383: 374: 370: 365: 364:Antiplurality 362: 359: 355: 350: 347: 344: 340: 335: 332: 331: 330: 329: 328: 318: 315: 313: 310: 308: 305: 303: 300: 299: 298: 295: 293: 292:Condorcet-IRV 290: 289: 288: 287: 286: 276: 271: 267: 265: 260: 256: 255: 254: 251: 247: 244: 243: 241: 236: 231: 228: 226: 223: 222: 221: 219: 212: 207: 206: 199: 195: 192: 190: 187: 185: 182: 180: 177: 175: 174:Social choice 172: 171: 169: 168: 162: 158: 157: 154: 150: 149:Social choice 146: 142: 138: 134: 133: 124: 121: 113: 110:November 2011 102: 99: 95: 92: 88: 85: 81: 78: 74: 71: â€“  70: 66: 65:Find sources: 59: 55: 49: 48: 43:This article 41: 37: 32: 31: 19: 3183: 3177: 2793:Mixed-member 2778:Proportional 2753:Score voting 2694:Ranked pairs 2613:Part of the 2612: 2568:cut-the-knot 2535: 2527: 2508: 2502: 2485: 2475: 2464:. Retrieved 2449: 2442: 2422: 2415: 2398: 2394: 2384: 2367: 2363: 2353: 2332: 2311:, retrieved 2289: 2264:, retrieved 2242: 2207: 2162:Total seats 1961: 1935:Total seats 1734: 1728: 1724: 1718: 1698: 1692: 1688: 1673: 1669: 1633: 1629: 1619: 1604: 1573:Total seats 1471:Ideal seats 1451:Droop quota 1368: 1360: 1349: 1346: 1342:South Africa 1339: 1292: 1285: 1252: 1241: 1236: 1232: 1222: 1196: 1187:part plus a 1181: 1147: 1143: 1125: 1113: 1097: 1095: 1079: 1068: 1066: 958: 957: 924: 882: 881: 866:Exaggeration 852: 851: 822: 821: 795: 759: 758: 727:Mixed ballot 682:Compensatory 680: 653:compensatory 650: 645: 629: 591: 590: 549: 548: 519: 518: 489: 488: 476:List-free PR 421: 389:Score voting 380: 379: 325: 324: 312:Ranked pairs 283: 282: 215: 116: 107: 97: 90: 83: 76: 64: 52:Please help 47:verification 44: 3136:Spoilt vote 2899:Droop quota 2838:Schulze STV 2813:Rural–urban 2758:STAR voting 2654:Borda count 2486:Convergence 2040:Hare quota 1813:Hare quota 1723:is when an 1647:called the 1372:Droop quota 1315:total seats 1310:total votes 1295:Droop quota 1269:total seats 1266:total votes 1248:Droop quota 766:Single vote 669:Conditional 664:Coexistence 513:Quota Borda 503:Schulze STV 461:Closed list 404:STAR voting 349:Borda count 3199:Categories 3155:Comparison 2909:Hare quota 2859:Allocation 2845:Spare vote 2833:Hare-Clark 2803:Party-list 2466:2017-08-17 2313:2024-05-10 2266:2024-05-10 2190:References 2111:Remainder 1884:Remainder 1630:Increasing 1607:quota rule 1522:Remainder 1365:Hare quota 1244:Hare quota 1189:fractional 1110:Hare quota 1102:remainders 871:Truncation 600:Cumulative 423:Party-list 198:By country 189:Comparison 80:newspapers 3146:Unseating 3141:Sortition 2743:Plurality 2619:Economics 2407:0007-1234 2376:0007-1234 1239:parties. 1229:seat bias 1192:remainder 1117:'s method 778:Dual-vote 471:Panachage 466:Open list 456:List type 334:Plurality 230:Two-round 218:plurality 141:Economics 3013:Criteria 2966:Scorporo 2615:politics 1729:decrease 1725:increase 1656:Oklahoma 1634:decrease 1426:100,000 1357:Examples 1350:unbiased 1246:and the 1164:resource 1115:Hamilton 498:Hare STV 137:Politics 135:A joint 3185:Project 2876:D'Hondt 2828:CPO-STV 2786:Systems 1668:Voting 1382:Yellows 1237:smaller 1205:or the 1185:integer 1072:methods 508:CPO-STV 358:Baldwin 307:Schulze 302:Minimax 220:methods 94:scholar 3179:Portal 3116:Ballot 2892:Quotas 2621:series 2544:  2515:  2457:  2430:  2405:  2374:  2341:  2304:  2257:  2215:  2020:Seats 1994:Votes 1989:Total 1793:Seats 1767:Votes 1762:Total 1659:Maine. 1466:9,091 1417:12,000 1414:15,800 1411:16,000 1408:47,000 1405:Votes 1400:Total 1391:Greens 1385:Whites 1233:larger 1213:Quotas 1178:Method 373:Coombs 143:series 96:  89:  82:  75:  67:  3109:Other 2928:Mixed 2015:5100 1968:Party 1788:5100 1741:Party 1540:0.341 1537:0.671 1534:0.320 1531:0.738 1528:0.760 1525:0.170 1489:0.341 1486:0.671 1483:1.320 1480:1.738 1477:1.760 1474:5.170 1423:3,100 1420:6,100 1397:Pinks 1394:Blues 1379:Party 1080:fixed 1070:quota 710:'MMP' 699:'AMS' 101:JSTOR 87:books 2617:and 2542:ISBN 2513:ISBN 2455:ISBN 2428:ISBN 2403:ISSN 2372:ISSN 2339:ISBN 2302:ISBN 2255:ISBN 2213:ISBN 2129:0.02 2126:0.55 2123:0.55 2120:0.59 2117:0.65 2114:0.65 2078:1.02 2075:2.55 2072:2.55 2069:4.59 2066:7.65 2063:7.65 2055:196 2000:1500 1997:1500 1902:0.98 1899:0.45 1896:0.45 1893:0.41 1890:0.35 1887:0.35 1851:0.98 1848:2.45 1845:2.45 1842:4.41 1839:7.35 1836:7.35 1828:204 1773:1500 1770:1500 1719:The 1705:bias 1699:The 1693:lose 1689:gain 1674:lose 1388:Reds 1293:The 1148:lose 1067:The 651:Non- 605:SNTV 194:List 151:and 139:and 73:news 2941:MMP 2566:at 2490:doi 2294:doi 2247:doi 2183:26 2106:23 2035:26 2012:200 2009:500 2006:500 2003:900 1956:25 1879:22 1808:25 1785:200 1782:500 1779:500 1776:900 1680:or 1670:for 1594:10 1174:). 1166:or 1144:for 369:el. 354:el. 343:IRV 339:el. 56:by 3201:: 3182:— 2484:. 2399:22 2397:. 2393:. 2368:22 2366:. 2362:. 2321:^ 2300:, 2288:, 2274:^ 2253:, 2241:, 2227:^ 2197:^ 2157:3 1930:3 1651:. 1625:: 1617:. 1568:2 1517:8 1344:. 1123:. 705:NZ 694:UK 270:US 259:UK 242:) 235:US 2596:e 2589:t 2582:v 2550:. 2521:. 2496:. 2492:: 2469:. 2436:. 2409:. 2378:. 2347:. 2296:: 2249:: 2221:. 2180:1 2177:2 2174:2 2171:5 2168:8 2165:8 2154:0 2151:0 2148:0 2145:1 2142:1 2139:1 2103:1 2100:2 2097:2 2094:4 2091:7 2088:7 1986:F 1983:E 1980:D 1977:C 1974:B 1971:A 1953:1 1950:3 1947:3 1944:4 1941:7 1938:7 1927:1 1924:1 1921:1 1918:0 1915:0 1912:0 1876:0 1873:2 1870:2 1867:4 1864:7 1861:7 1759:F 1756:E 1753:D 1750:C 1747:B 1744:A 1684:. 1640:. 1591:0 1588:0 1585:1 1582:2 1579:2 1576:5 1565:0 1562:0 1559:0 1556:1 1553:1 1550:0 1514:0 1511:0 1508:1 1505:1 1502:1 1499:5 1322:1 1319:+ 1056:e 1049:t 1042:v 707:: 696:: 375:) 366:( 360:) 351:( 345:) 336:( 272:: 261:: 237:: 232:( 200:) 196:( 123:) 117:( 112:) 108:( 98:· 91:· 84:· 77:· 50:. 20:)

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