31:, crucially shape lawmaking and dispute adjudication and have not been reformed after the initial exogenous transplantation by Europeans. Therefore, they affect economic outcomes to date. According to the evidence reported by the initial proponents of such a theory, countries that received civil law would display today less secure investor rights, stricter regulation, and more inefficient governments and courts than those that inherited common law. These differences would reflect both a stronger historical emphasis of common law on private ordering and the higher adaptability of judge-made law.
103:"(a) better investor protection, which in turn is associated with improved financial development , (b) lighter government ownership and regulation, which are in turn associated with less corruption, better functioning labor markets, and smaller unofficial economies, and (c) less formalized and more independent judicial systems, which are in turn associated with more secure property rights and better contract enforcement."
63:. These last four countries then exported their common law model to the respective colonies or to those jurisdictions (China, Greece, Japan, Romania, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey), which were never colonized but borrowed their initial legal order from the European codes considered most advanced at the time.
173:
The key institution differentiating the two legal traditions is the lawmaking institution, which determines the identity of the lawmaker. Common law relies on case law, whereby precedents set by appellate courts guide subsequent adjudication by courts of the same or lower standing and can be changed
181:
Since overruling is costly, precedents tend to include both the deciding appellate judge’s opinion and those of the preceding appellate judges in such a way that the long-run law optimally incorporates the different opinions of all appellate judges, whereas statute law can be permanently biased by
116:
The "legal origins" scholars suggest that common law has at least two favorable consequences. First, historical events in
England and in France built into the common law a stronger emphasis on the independence of the judiciary, private ordering, and human capital. Second, judge-made law would make
78:
Structurally, the two legal traditions constitute a well-defined bundle of lawmaking and adjudication institutions and operate in quite different ways . While common law entrusts a key role to the precedents selected by appellate judges and allows more procedural discretion to lower adjudicating
107:
Operationally, the "legal origins" scholars assigned the majority of countries in the world to either the
English-common law, the French-civil law, or one among the German, Scandinavian, and Socialist legal traditions and then they calculated correlations between these legal origins dummies and
152:
success of the
English judiciary in establishing its independence should have reinforced these dissimilarities, instilling at the same time into the common law a stronger emphasis on judicial independence and on private ordering. This divergence would imply that common law will always shore up
164:
power to make law through precedent, and that French judges enjoyed a greater independence because their office could be inherited as property. Hence, the only permanent divergence between the legal orders in
England and in France originated from the different fortunes of the judiciary in the
66:
Civil law instead has its roots in Roman law, was incorporated by the
Napoleonic codes first and then by both the Austrian and Russian Civil codes, and has been then introduced via mainly colonization and occupation into continental Europe, the Near East, Latin America, Africa, and Indochina.
132:
contend that the development of a system of adjudication by lay juries in
England and one of adjudication by professional judges in France were conscious choices reflecting the different political power of the English and French barons during the 12th century.
160:, who conclude that a system of adjudication by lay juries was initially favored in England because of low literacy levels and later enforced to place the judicial power in the hands of the crown. They argue that both French and English judiciaries had the
141:. The relatively weak French crown, by contrast, was less a threat than other barons. French barons accordingly desired a centralized adjudication system controlled by royal judges who would not be easily captured by local interests."
99:
exploited the exogenous assignment of these very different institutions and assumed that they have not been reformed later on to provide evidence consistent with the idea that common law is correlated with:
174:
by appellate judges only with a costly justification effort. Civil law instead relies on statute law, which comprises legislation enacted by political representatives.
137:"The former were concerned about the powerful English king’s ability to interfere in adjudication and bargained for trial by local, lay juries, a right enshrined in
657:
47:’s ex-colonies (United States, Canada, Australia, and several countries in Central America, Africa and Asia), the Scandinavian common law was developed in
742:
779:
354:
188:
Since inefficient rules tend to be appealed more often, they should be evaluated more often by appellate judges than by politicians.
759:
157:
625:
Porta, La; Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei (2008). "The
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins".
219:
Porta, Rafael La; Lopez-De-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei (2008). "The
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins".
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79:
courts, civil law relies on legal codes designed by political representatives and bright-line adjudication rules.
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24:
148:’s attempt to turn through its codes the judiciary into bureaucrats controlled by the State and the post-1688
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634:
228:
67:
Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Iran, and
Kazakhstan instead purposely borrowed their initial legal order from either
39:
While
English common law originated in thirteenth century England and has then been transplanted through
185:
Appellate judges can effectively introduce new information into the law by distinguishing the precedent.
177:"Legal origins" scholars identify three main advantages of judge-made law compared with statute law:
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532:
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481:
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318:
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Miceli, Thomas J. (2009). "Legal Change: Selective Litigation, Judicial Bias, and Precedent".
350:
703:
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Miceli, Thomas J (2009). "Legal Change: Selective Litigation, Judicial Bias, and Precedent".
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674:
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Porta, La; Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. (1997).
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446:
408:
310:
272:
238:
96:
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La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-De-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. (1997).
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markets and the civil law will always restrict markets or replace them with state command.
129:
92:
88:
156:
This analysis of the medieval European history has been criticized by Daniel Klerman and
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125:
599:
545:
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396:
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28:
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56:
48:
44:
737:. Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank, Washington, DC.
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72:
68:
52:
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Rosenthal, Howard; Voeten, Erik (2007). "Measuring Legal Systems".
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477:
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common law more adaptable to the contracting needs of the economy.
87:
In a series of influential papers published between 1997 and 2008,
112:
Theoretical Justification to the Putative Primacy of Common Law
437:
Klerman, Daniel, and Paul G. Mahoney (2007). "Legal Origin?".
577:
Klerman, Daniel; Mahoney, Paul G. (2007). "Legal Origin?".
35:
Colonial Transplantation and Main Structural Differences
23:
claims that the two main legal traditions or origins,
121:
Historical Emphasis of Common Law on Private Ordering
16:
Claims that civil law and common law shape lawmaking
746:, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York.
704:
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance
342:
108:proxies for the aforementioned economic outcomes.
734:Doing Business in 2004: Understanding Regulation
297:Gennaioli, Nicola, and Andrei Shleifer (2007).
395:Glaeser, Edward, and Andrei Shleifer (2002).
8:
707:. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
511:Gennaioli, Nicola; Shleifer, Andrei (2007).
381:. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press.
165:aftermath of their respective revolutions.
544:Glaeser, Edward; Shleifer, Andrei (2002).
638:
615:
276:
232:
600:"Legal Determinants of External Finance"
377:Zweigert Konrad, and Hein Koetz (1998).
261:"Legal Determinants of External Finance"
740:Zweigert, Konrad, and Hein Kötz. 1998.
513:"Overruling and the Instability of Law"
349:. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
299:"Overruling and the Instability of Law"
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661:. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
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14:
713:Journal of Comparative Economics
579:Journal of Comparative Economics
517:Journal of Comparative Economics
439:Journal of Comparative Economics
303:Journal of Comparative Economics
743:Introduction to Comparative Law
379:Introduction to Comparative Law
627:Journal of Economic Literature
550:Quarterly Journal of Economics
401:Quarterly Journal of Economics
221:Journal of Economic Literature
169:Adaptability of Judge-made Law
91:, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
1:
780:Comparative economic systems
796:
562:10.1162/003355302320935016
413:10.1162/003355302320935016
341:Merryman, John H. (1969).
725:10.1016/j.jce.2007.08.001
655:Merryman, John H., 1969.
591:10.1016/j.jce.2007.03.007
529:10.1016/j.jce.2007.02.003
451:10.1016/j.jce.2007.03.007
315:10.1016/j.jce.2007.02.003
667:Journal of Legal Studies
466:Journal of Legal Studies
83:Early Empirical Evidence
658:The Civil Law Tradition
345:The Civil Law Tradition
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105:
760:Administrative theory
135:
101:
701:Roe, Mark J., 2004.
649:10.1257/jel.46.2.285
243:10.1257/jel.46.2.285
21:legal origins theory
150:Glorious Revolution
731:World Bank. 2004.
604:Journal of Finance
265:Journal of Finance
182:special interests.
43:and occupation to
775:Law and economics
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728:
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610:(3): 1131–1150.
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556:(4): 1193–1229.
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407:(4): 1193–1229.
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271:(3): 1131–1150.
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546:"Legal Origins"
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130:Andrei Shleifer
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93:Andrei Shleifer
89:Rafael La Porta
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5:
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719:(4): 711–728.
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679:10.1086/587439
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633:(2): 285–332.
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472:(2): 157–168.
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445:(2): 278–293.
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309:(2): 309–328.
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227:(2): 285–332.
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126:Edward Glaeser
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75:, or England.
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585:(2): 278–93.
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523:(2): 309–28.
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29:common law
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635:CiteSeerX
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25:civil law
162:de facto
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482:JSTOR
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351:ISBN
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