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Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market

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prevailing interest rate for said instrument or loan. In 1870 Britain the interest rate paid by the British Government for its annuities was 3.00% therefore a rate of 3.50% would have caused a loss of capital for a bank pledging this instrument as collateral. We also have to consider that a bank has assets higher than its capital so any loss would cause a higher loss of equity for the bank, and it is not in the best interest of the central bank to cause high losses of equity to the firms making up its banking system. Therefore, if the asset has an interest rate of 3.00% a high central bank rate would be 2.50% without causing a leveraged loss of capital to the bank. Take for example the Bank of England's bank rate of 0.10% and the United Kingdom's 10 year Gilt at 0.65% on 14 July 2021.
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security to offer... No advances indeed need be made by which the Bank will ultimately lose. The amount of bad business in commercial countries is an infinitesimally small fraction of the whole business... The great majority, the majority to be protected, are the 'sound' people, the people who have good security to offer. If it is known that the Bank of England is freely advancing on what in ordinary times is reckoned a good security—on what is then commonly pledged and easily convertible—the alarm of the solvent merchants and bankers will be stayed. But if securities, really good and usually convertible, are refused by the Bank, the alarm will not abate, the other loans made will fail in obtaining their end, and the panic will become worse and worse.
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First. That these loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest. This will operate as a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity, and will prevent the greatest number of applications by persons who do not require it. The rate should be raised early in the panic, so that the fine may be paid
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Secondly. That at this rate these advances should be made on all good banking securities, and as largely as the public ask for them. The reason is plain. The object is to stay alarm, and nothing therefore should be done to cause alarm. But the way to cause alarm is to refuse some one who has good
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High rates that cause losses to the firm may be too high, say higher than the interest rate the firm or bank is earning from the same asset it is placing as good collateral. Therefore, the highest interest to charge a bank for its good collateral without causing losses to it would be the same
156:. Lombard Street was a historic center of the London banking industry from medieval times to the 1980s, from which the book draws its title. When Overend, Gurney and Company suspended payments on 10 May 1866, panic spread across London, Liverpool, Manchester, Norwich, Derby and Bristol. 203: 400: 493: 218:"to avert panic, central banks should lend early and freely (ie without limit), to solvent firms, against good collateral, and at ‘high rates’". 243:
early; that no one may borrow out of idle precaution without paying well for it; that the Banking reserve may be protected as far as possible.
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The Repertoire of Official Sector Interventions in the Financial System: Last Resort Lending, Market-Making, and Capital
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in understandable language. The book was initially printed in Great Britain by Henry S. King & Co. in 1873.
26: 503: 339: 393: 153: 262: 172: 128:. Bagehot was one of the first writers to describe and explain the world of international and corporate 211: 520: 498: 475: 486: 180: 404: 168: 314: 480: 197:(Nonetheless, Goodhart emphasizes that many of these ideas were spelled out earlier by 125: 40: 514: 235: 176: 257: 231: 371:, 12 May 1866, p. 12; Issue 25496; col C "The Panic". were calming down a bit. 346:
Notes on Banking in Great Britain and Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, and Hamburgh
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Since 1873 the book has been reprinted and published many times. See
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Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability, Bank of England,
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Charles Goodhart (1999), 'Myths about the lender of last resort.'
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The book was in part a reaction to the financial collapse of
293:(1 ed.). New York: Scribner, Armstong & Co 109: 97: 89: 79: 71: 54: 46: 36: 20:Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 482:Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 471:Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 316:Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 290:Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 121:Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 230:, Chapter 7, paragraphs 57–58), lending by the 418:"The History of Interest Rates Over 670 Years" 8: 502:, vol. 014, no. 14, archived from 19: 492:Caldwell, Christopher (22 December 2008), 152:, a wholesale discount bank located at 65 25: 18: 210:Bagehot's dictum has been summarized by 278: 16:1873 book on finance by Walter Bagehot 7: 416:LePan, Nicholas (15 November 2019). 319:. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 14: 204:The Paper Credit of Great Britain 167:is known for its analysis of the 1: 193:On good banking securities. 190:At a high rate of interest. 150:Overend, Gurney and Company 547: 526:Books about stock traders 238:should follow two rules: 24: 531:1873 in economic history 494:"The Unwisdom of Crowds" 403:20 February 2012 at the 358:: 134–150. January 1874. 313:Bagehot, Walter (1897). 287:Bagehot, Walter (1873). 226:In Bagehot's own words ( 447:www.bankofengland.co.uk 75:Henry S. King & Co. 344:by Walter Bagehot and 154:Lombard Street, London 382:International Finance 348:by R. H. I. Palgrave" 263:Lender of last resort 173:lender of last resort 160:Lender of last resort 352:The Quarterly Review 124:(1873) is a book by 506:on February 9, 2013 499:The Weekly Standard 234:in order to stop a 21: 476:Project Gutenberg 422:Visual Capitalist 179:is summarized by 117: 116: 90:Publication place 31:Hardcover edition 538: 507: 487:Internet Archive 458: 457: 455: 453: 439: 433: 432: 430: 428: 413: 407: 391: 385: 384:2:3, pp. 339–60. 378: 372: 366: 360: 359: 336: 330: 328: 326: 324: 309: 303: 302: 300: 298: 283: 181:Charles Goodhart 81:Publication date 29: 22: 546: 545: 541: 540: 539: 537: 536: 535: 511: 510: 491: 466: 461: 451: 449: 441: 440: 436: 426: 424: 415: 414: 410: 405:Wayback Machine 392: 388: 379: 375: 367: 363: 338: 337: 333: 329:via Archive.org 322: 320: 312: 310: 306: 296: 294: 286: 284: 280: 276: 254: 169:Bank of England 162: 146: 98:Media type 82: 67: 32: 17: 12: 11: 5: 544: 542: 534: 533: 528: 523: 513: 512: 509: 508: 489: 478: 465: 464:External links 462: 460: 459: 434: 408: 386: 373: 361: 342:Lombard Street 331: 304: 277: 275: 272: 271: 270: 265: 260: 253: 250: 249: 248: 244: 228:Lombard Street 220: 219: 199:Henry Thornton 195: 194: 191: 188: 165:Lombard Street 161: 158: 145: 142: 126:Walter Bagehot 115: 114: 111: 107: 106: 99: 95: 94: 91: 87: 86: 83: 80: 77: 76: 73: 69: 68: 66: 65: 62: 58: 56: 52: 51: 48: 44: 43: 41:Walter Bagehot 38: 34: 33: 30: 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 543: 532: 529: 527: 524: 522: 519: 518: 516: 505: 501: 500: 495: 490: 488: 484: 483: 479: 477: 473: 472: 468: 467: 463: 448: 444: 438: 435: 423: 419: 412: 409: 406: 402: 399: 397: 390: 387: 383: 377: 374: 370: 365: 362: 357: 353: 349: 347: 343: 335: 332: 318: 317: 308: 305: 292: 291: 282: 279: 273: 269: 266: 264: 261: 259: 256: 255: 251: 245: 241: 240: 239: 237: 236:banking panic 233: 229: 224: 217: 216: 215: 213: 208: 206: 205: 200: 192: 189: 186: 185: 184: 182: 178: 177:credit crunch 174: 170: 166: 159: 157: 155: 151: 143: 141: 139: 135: 131: 127: 123: 122: 112: 108: 104: 100: 96: 93:Great Britain 92: 88: 84: 78: 74: 70: 63: 60: 59: 57: 53: 49: 45: 42: 39: 35: 28: 23: 504:the original 497: 481: 470: 450:. Retrieved 446: 437: 425:. Retrieved 421: 411: 395: 389: 381: 376: 368: 364: 355: 351: 345: 341: 334: 321:. Retrieved 315: 307: 295:. Retrieved 289: 281: 258:Money market 232:central bank 227: 225: 221: 214:as follows: 209: 202: 196: 187:Lend freely. 183:as follows: 164: 163: 147: 120: 119: 118: 340:"Review of 212:Paul Tucker 521:1873 books 515:Categories 369:The Times 175:during a 72:Publisher 401:Archived 268:Bank run 252:See also 201:'s book 144:Overview 103:hardback 47:Language 452:14 July 427:14 July 323:21 July 297:21 July 134:banking 130:finance 101:Print ( 64:finance 61:Banking 55:Subject 50:English 443:"Home" 136:, and 37:Author 485:from 474:from 274:Notes 138:money 110:Pages 454:2021 429:2021 325:2014 299:2014 285:See 85:1873 356:136 207:.) 113:359 517:: 496:, 445:. 420:. 354:. 350:. 132:, 456:. 431:. 327:. 301:. 105:)

Index


Walter Bagehot
hardback
Walter Bagehot
finance
banking
money
Overend, Gurney and Company
Lombard Street, London
Bank of England
lender of last resort
credit crunch
Charles Goodhart
Henry Thornton
The Paper Credit of Great Britain
Paul Tucker
central bank
banking panic
Money market
Lender of last resort
Bank run
Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market
Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market
"Review of Lombard Street by Walter Bagehot and Notes on Banking in Great Britain and Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, and Hamburgh by R. H. I. Palgrave"
Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability, Bank of England, The Repertoire of Official Sector Interventions in the Financial System: Last Resort Lending, Market-Making, and Capital, Bank of Japan 2009 International Conference, 27–28 May 2009, p. 5
Archived
Wayback Machine
"The History of Interest Rates Over 670 Years"
"Home"
Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market

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