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Pessimistic induction

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312:, do not represent the most successful theories at their time. A further objection tries to point out that in scientific progress, we indeed approximate the truth. When we develop a new theory, the central ideas of the old one usually become refuted. Parts of the old theory, however, we carry over to the new one. In doing so, our theories become more and more well-founded on other principles, they become better in terms of predictive and descriptive power, so that, for example, aeroplanes, computers and DNA sequencing all establish technical, operational proof of the effectiveness of the theories. Therefore, we can hold the realist view that our theoretical terms refer to something in the world and our theories are approximately true. 63: 413: 22: 192: 133: 325:, new scientific theories do not always build upon the older ones. In fact, they are created by an entirely new set of premises (a new "paradigm"), and reach vastly different conclusions. This gives greater weight to the proponents of anti-realism, and illustrates that no scientific theory (thus far) has proved infallible. 279:, particularly the scientific realist's notion of epistemic optimism. The pessimistic meta-induction is the argument that if past successful and accepted scientific theories were found to be false, we have no reason to believe the scientific realist's claim that our currently successful theories are approximately true. 300:
argues that if past scientific theories which were successful were found to be false, we have no reason to believe the realist's claim that our currently successful theories are approximately true. The pessimistic meta-induction argument was first fully postulated by Laudan in 1981.
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Scientific realists argue that we have good reasons to believe that our presently successful scientific theories are true or approximately true. The pessimistic meta-induction undermines the realist's warrant for their
292:(the view that science tends to succeed in revealing what the world is like and that there are good reasons to take theories to be true or truthlike) via historical counterexample. Using meta- 304:
However, there are some objections to Laudan's theory. One might see shortcomings in the historic examples Laudan gives as proof of his hypothesis. Theories later refuted, like that of
369: 92: 454: 321: 35: 394: 351: 483: 250: 232: 173: 114: 49: 447: 151: 473: 478: 75: 440: 210: 85: 79: 71: 214: 155: 41: 96: 334: 337:, the belief that, although viewpoints have changed up until now, the current beliefs are permanently fixed 346: 202: 420: 264: 354:, a variation of realism that is purportedly impervious to the argument from the pessimistic induction 293: 276: 390: 309: 305: 424: 383: 340: 316: 467: 297: 343:, a variation of realism motivated by the argument from the pessimistic induction 412: 385:
The Half-life of Facts: Why Everything We Know Has an Expiration Date
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Laudan, Larry. "A Confutation of Convergent Realism",
382: 84:but its sources remain unclear because it lacks 448: 8: 213:. There might be a discussion about this on 50:Learn how and when to remove these messages 455: 441: 251:Learn how and when to remove this message 233:Learn how and when to remove this message 174:Learn how and when to remove this message 115:Learn how and when to remove this message 322:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 368:, Vol. 48, No. 1, (Mar. 1981): 19–49. 275:, is an argument which seeks to rebut 352:Structuralism (philosophy of science) 7: 409: 407: 427:. You can help Knowledge (XXG) by 14: 31:This article has multiple issues. 411: 190: 131: 61: 20: 140:This article is written like a 39:or discuss these issues on the 1: 154:and discuss the issue on the 484:Philosophy of science stubs 315:However, as articulated by 500: 406: 273:pessimistic meta-induction 381:Samuel Arbesman (2012). 70:This article includes a 335:End-of-history illusion 99:more precise citations. 423:-related article is a 347:Half-life of knowledge 474:Philosophy of science 421:philosophy of science 389:. Current Hardcover. 366:Philosophy of Science 308:in astronomy, or the 269:pessimistic induction 265:philosophy of science 271:, also known as the 203:confusing or unclear 479:Inductive reasoning 306:crystalline spheres 211:clarify the article 148:improve the article 290:epistemic optimism 277:scientific realism 152:encyclopedic style 72:list of references 436: 435: 396:978-1-59184-472-3 310:phlogiston theory 261: 260: 253: 243: 242: 235: 184: 183: 176: 125: 124: 117: 54: 491: 457: 450: 443: 415: 408: 400: 388: 256: 249: 238: 231: 227: 224: 218: 194: 193: 186: 179: 172: 168: 165: 159: 135: 134: 127: 120: 113: 109: 106: 100: 95:this article by 86:inline citations 65: 64: 57: 46: 24: 23: 16: 499: 498: 494: 493: 492: 490: 489: 488: 464: 463: 462: 461: 404: 397: 380: 377: 375:Further reading 361: 331: 285: 257: 246: 245: 244: 239: 228: 222: 219: 208: 195: 191: 180: 169: 163: 160: 145: 136: 132: 121: 110: 104: 101: 90: 76:related reading 66: 62: 25: 21: 12: 11: 5: 497: 495: 487: 486: 481: 476: 466: 465: 460: 459: 452: 445: 437: 434: 433: 416: 402: 401: 395: 376: 373: 372: 371: 360: 357: 356: 355: 349: 344: 341:Entity realism 338: 330: 327: 284: 281: 259: 258: 241: 240: 198: 196: 189: 182: 181: 150:by writing in 139: 137: 130: 123: 122: 80:external links 69: 67: 60: 55: 29: 28: 26: 19: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 496: 485: 482: 480: 477: 475: 472: 471: 469: 458: 453: 451: 446: 444: 439: 438: 432: 430: 426: 422: 417: 414: 410: 405: 398: 392: 387: 386: 379: 378: 374: 370: 367: 363: 362: 358: 353: 350: 348: 345: 342: 339: 336: 333: 332: 328: 326: 324: 323: 318: 313: 311: 307: 302: 299: 295: 291: 282: 280: 278: 274: 270: 266: 255: 252: 237: 234: 226: 216: 215:the talk page 212: 206: 204: 199:This article 197: 188: 187: 178: 175: 167: 157: 153: 149: 143: 138: 129: 128: 119: 116: 108: 98: 94: 88: 87: 81: 77: 73: 68: 59: 58: 53: 51: 44: 43: 38: 37: 32: 27: 18: 17: 429:expanding it 418: 403: 384: 365: 320: 314: 303: 298:Larry Laudan 289: 286: 272: 268: 262: 247: 229: 220: 209:Please help 200: 170: 161: 146:Please help 141: 111: 102: 91:Please help 83: 47: 40: 34: 33:Please help 30: 317:Thomas Kuhn 97:introducing 468:Categories 359:References 205:to readers 36:improve it 294:induction 156:talk page 105:July 2014 42:talk page 329:See also 283:Overview 223:May 2019 164:May 2019 319:in his 263:In the 201:may be 93:improve 393:  267:, the 142:debate 419:This 78:, or 425:stub 391:ISBN 470:: 296:, 82:, 74:, 45:. 456:e 449:t 442:v 431:. 399:. 254:) 248:( 236:) 230:( 225:) 221:( 217:. 207:. 177:) 171:( 166:) 162:( 158:. 144:. 118:) 112:( 107:) 103:( 89:. 52:) 48:(

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list of references
related reading
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improve the article
encyclopedic style
talk page
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confusing or unclear
clarify the article
the talk page
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philosophy of science
scientific realism
induction
Larry Laudan
crystalline spheres
phlogiston theory
Thomas Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
End-of-history illusion
Entity realism
Half-life of knowledge

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