Knowledge (XXG)

Planning fallacy

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optimistic. However, it is believed that forming implementation intentions "explicitly recruits willpower" by having the person commit themselves to the completion of the task. Those that had formed implementation intentions during the experiments began work on the task sooner, experienced fewer interruptions, and later predictions had reduced optimistic bias than those who had not. It was also found that the reduction in optimistic bias was mediated by the reduction in interruptions.
84:. The average estimate was 33.9 days. They also estimated how long it would take "if everything went as well as it possibly could" (averaging 27.4 days) and "if everything went as poorly as it possibly could" (averaging 48.6 days). The average actual completion time was 55.5 days, with about 30% of the students completing their thesis in the amount of time they predicted. 177:
the planner to deliberately underestimate the project effort required. It is easier to get forgiveness (for overruns) than permission (to commence the project if a realistic effort estimate were provided). Such deliberate underestimation has been named by Jones and Euske "strategic misrepresentation".
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Carter and colleagues conducted three studies in 2005 that demonstrate empirical support that the planning fallacy also affects predictions concerning group tasks. This research emphasizes the importance of how temporal frames and thoughts of successful completion contribute to the planning fallacy.
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The "authorization imperative" offers another possible explanation: much of project planning takes place in a context which requires financial approval to proceed with the project, and the planner often has a stake in getting the project approved. This dynamic may lead to a tendency on the part of
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Another explanation proposed by Roy and colleagues is that people do not correctly recall the amount of time that similar tasks in the past had taken to complete; instead people systematically underestimate the duration of those past events. Thus, a prediction about future event duration is biased
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and underestimate the time needed. This phenomenon sometimes occurs regardless of the individual's knowledge that past tasks of a similar nature have taken longer to complete than generally planned. The bias affects predictions only about one's own tasks. On the other hand, when outside observers
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are concrete plans that accurately show how, when, and where one will act. It has been shown through various experiments that implementation intentions help people become more aware of the overall task and see all possible outcomes. Initially, this actually causes predictions to become even more
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The segmentation effect is defined as the time allocated for a task being significantly smaller than the sum of the time allocated to individual smaller sub-tasks of that task. In a study performed by Forsyth in 2008, this effect was tested to determine if it could be used to reduce the planning
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A survey of Canadian tax payers, published in 1997, found that they mailed in their tax forms about a week later than they predicted. They had no misconceptions about their past record of getting forms mailed in, but expected that they would get it done more quickly next time. This illustrates a
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in how people interpret their past performance. By taking credit for tasks that went well but blaming delays on outside influences, people can discount past evidence of how long a task should take. One experiment found that when people made their predictions anonymously, they do not show the
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in 1979. In 2003, Lovallo and Kahneman proposed an expanded definition as the tendency to underestimate the time, costs, and risks of future actions and at the same time overestimate the benefits of the same actions. According to this definition, the planning fallacy results in not only time
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Sanna and colleagues examined temporal framing and thinking about success as a contributor to the planning fallacy. They found that when people were induced to think about a deadline as distant (i.e., much time remaining) vs. rapidly approaching (i.e., little time remaining), they made more
197:, that as size of effort increases the error increases much more as a natural effect of inefficiencies of larger efforts' ability to react, particularly efforts that are not divisible in increments. Additionally this is contrasted with earlier efforts being more commonly on-time (e.g. the 212:
Bent Flyvbjerg and Dan Gardner write that planning on government-funded projects is often rushed so that construction can begin as soon as possible to avoid later administrations undoing or cancelling the project. They say a longer planning period tends to result in faster and cheaper
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faced severe delay and a cost overrun. The construction started in 2005 and was expected to be completed by 2009, but completed only in 2023. Initially, the estimated cost of the project was around 3 billion euros, but the cost has escalated to approximately 10 billion euros.
209:) to conclude it indicates inherent flaws in more modern planning systems and modern efforts having hidden fragility. (For example, that modern efforts – being computerized and less localized invisibly – have less insight and control, and more dependencies on transportation.) 303:
is another case. After 15 years of planning, construction began in 2006, with the opening planned for October 2011. There were numerous delays. It was finally opened on October 31, 2020. The original budget was €2.83 billion; current projections are close to €10.0 billion.
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Another study asked students to estimate when they would complete their personal academic projects. Specifically, the researchers asked for estimated times by which the students thought it was 50%, 75%, and 99% probable their personal projects would be done.
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issues. The asymmetry results from random events giving negative results of delay or cost, not evenly balanced between positive and negative results. The scaling difficulties relate to the observation that consequences of disruptions are not
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predict task completion times, they tend to exhibit a pessimistic bias, overestimating the time needed. The planning fallacy involves estimates of task completion times more optimistic than those encountered in similar projects in the past.
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fallacy. In three experiments, the segmentation effect was shown to be influential. However, the segmentation effect demands a great deal of cognitive resources and is not very feasible to use in everyday situations.
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Buehler, Roger; Griffin, Dale, & Ross, Michael (2002). "Inside the planning fallacy: The causes and consequences of optimistic time predictions". In Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, & Daniel Kahneman (Eds.),
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Kahneman and Tversky originally explained the fallacy by envisaging that planners focus on the most optimistic scenario for the task, rather than using their full experience of how much time similar tasks
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was expected to be completed in 1963. A scaled-down version opened in 1973, a decade later. The original cost was estimated at $ 7 million, but its delayed completion led to a cost of $ 102 million.
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Pezzo, Mark V.; Litman, Jordan A.; Pezzo, Stephanie P. (2006). "On the distinction between yuppies and hippies: Individual differences in prediction biases for planning future tasks".
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defining feature of the planning fallacy: that people recognize that their past predictions have been over-optimistic, while insisting that their current predictions are realistic.
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Sanna, Lawrence J.; Parks, Craig D.; Chang, Edward C.; Carter, Seth E. (2005). "The Hourglass Is Half Full or Half Empty: Temporal Framing and the Group Planning Fallacy".
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is still under construction, with tens of billions of dollars in overruns expected, and connections to major cities postponed until after completion of the rural segment.
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optimistic bias. This suggests that the people make optimistic estimates so as to create a favorable impression with others, which is similar to the concepts outlined in
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Roy, Michael M.; Christenfeld, Nicholas J. S.; McKenzie, Craig R. M. (2005). "Underestimating the Duration of Future Events: Memory Incorrectly Used or Memory Bias?".
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optimistic predictions and had more thoughts of success. In their final study, they found that the ease of generating thoughts also caused more optimistic predictions.
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because memory of past event duration is also biased. Roy and colleagues note that this memory bias does not rule out other mechanisms of the planning fallacy.
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Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos (1982). "Intuitive prediction: Biases and corrective procedures". In Kahneman, Daniel; Slovic, Paul; Tversky, Amos (eds.).
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Pezzo, Stephanie P.; Pezzo, Mark V.; Stone, Eric R. (2006). "The social implications of planning: How public predictions bias future plans".
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Buehler, Roger; Dale Griffin; Michael Ross (1994). "Exploring the "planning fallacy": Why people underestimate their task completion times".
442:"Overcoming the planning fallacy through willpower: Effects of implementation intentions on actual and predicted task-completion times" 1232: 1213: 643: 324:
went over budget by approximately 9 billion dollars, and was sent into orbit 14 years later than its originally planned launch date.
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Kruger, Justin; Evans, Matt (15 October 2003). "If you don't want to be late, enumerate: Unpacking Reduces the Planning Fallacy".
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predicts the outcome of a planned action based on actual outcomes in a reference class of similar actions to that being forecast.
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opened sixteen months later than scheduled, with a total cost of $ 4.8 billion, over $ 2 billion more than expected.
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was completed seven years later than planned, for $ 8.08 billion on a budget of $ 2.8 billion (in 1988 dollars).
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Buehler, Roger; Dale Griffin; Michael Ross (1995). "It's about time: Optimistic predictions in work and love".
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is a phenomenon in which predictions about how much time will be needed to complete a future task display an
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Apart from psychological explanations, the phenomenon of the planning fallacy has also been explained by
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Wilson, Timothy D.; Wheatley, Thalia; Meyers, Jonathan M.; Gilbert, Daniel T.; Axsom, Danny (2000).
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Sydney Opera House, still under construction in 1966, three years after its expected completion date
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defense project took six years longer than expected, with an overrun cost of 8 billion euros.
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13% of subjects finished their project by the time they had assigned a 50% probability level;
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In a different paper, Buehler and colleagues suggest an explanation in terms of the
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10.1002/1099-0992(200011/12)30:6<873::AID-EJSP22>3.0.CO;2-U
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students were asked to estimate how long it would take to finish their
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Roger Buehler and colleagues account for the fallacy by examining
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The Planning Fallacy: Cognitive, Motivational, and Social Origins
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For infrastructure projects to succeed, think slow and act fast
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Bent Flyvbjerg; Nils Bruzelius; Werner Rothengatter (2003).
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Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment
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19% finished by the time assigned a 75% probability level;
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45% finished by the time of their 99% probability level.
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Decision Research Technical Report PTR-1042-77-6. In
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Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
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Buehler, Roger; Dale Griffin; Johanna Peetz (2010).
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Vol. 185. pp. 414–421. 14: 1241:Lev Virine and Michael Trumper. 1069:Johnson, Glen (July 13, 2006). 727:. Vol. 43. pp. 1–62. 1208:. Cambridge University Press. 1101:"Denver International Airport" 1: 733:10.1016/s0065-2601(10)43001-4 1223:Bent Flyvbjerg, ed. (2019). 1002:Forsyth, D. K. (June 2008). 939:(4): 437–460. Archived from 636:10.1017/CBO9780511809477.031 506:10.1017/CBO9780511808098.016 294:Denver International Airport 1227:. Oxford University Press. 970:. Random House Publishing. 867:10.1037/0033-2909.131.5.738 249:Reference class forecasting 244:Reference class forecasting 1294: 1150:Lehto, Essi (2023-04-15). 906:10.1037/0022-3514.78.5.821 830:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.03.001 566:10.1016/j.paid.2006.03.029 424:10.1016/j.jesp.2003.11.001 389:10.1037/0022-3514.67.3.366 322:James Webb Space Telescope 315:California High-Speed Rail 301:Berlin Brandenburg Airport 184:as resulting from natural 1175:Buli, Nora (2021-08-23). 803:10.1037/1089-2699.9.3.173 534:10.1080/14792779343000112 237:Implementation intentions 232:Implementation intentions 218:Methods for counteracting 285:which undergrounded the 693:Harvard Business Review 1008:Memory & Cognition 962:Taleb, Nassim (2012). 845:Psychological Bulletin 614:Cite journal requires 264: 166:The Mythical Man-Month 43: 42:, proposed the fallacy 340:Hiding hand principle 287:Boston Central Artery 262: 199:Empire State Building 139:impression management 116:Proposed explanations 34: 76:In a 1994 study, 37 72:For individual tasks 1021:10.3758/MC.36.4.791 276:Eurofighter Typhoon 255:Real-world examples 223:Segmentation effect 55:overruns, but also 1050:on 8 November 2014 269:Sydney Opera House 265: 207:Golden Gate Bridge 203:The Crystal Palace 67:Empirical evidence 61:benefit shortfalls 44: 1253:978-1-56726-217-9 1081:on March 11, 2007 977:978-1-4000-6782-4 152:One explanation, 134:self-serving bias 1285: 1273:Cognitive biases 1238: 1219: 1191: 1190: 1188: 1187: 1172: 1166: 1165: 1163: 1162: 1147: 1141: 1140: 1138: 1137: 1122: 1116: 1115: 1113: 1111: 1105: 1097: 1091: 1090: 1088: 1086: 1077:. 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Index

optimism bias

Daniel Kahneman
Amos Tversky
Daniel Kahneman
Amos Tversky
cost overruns
benefit shortfalls
psychology
senior theses
wishful thinking
self-serving bias
impression management
focalism
Fred Brooks
The Mythical Man-Month
Brooks's law
Taleb
asymmetry
scaling
linear
Empire State Building
The Crystal Palace
Golden Gate Bridge
Implementation intentions
Reference class forecasting

Sydney Opera House
Eurofighter Typhoon
Big Dig

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