440:. For example, if a company had nine directors, then three directors would be up for re-election each year, with a three-year term. This would present a potential acquirer with the position of having a hostile board for at least a year after the first election. In some companies, certain percentages of the board (33%) may be enough to block key decisions (such as a full merger agreement or major asset sale), so an acquirer may not be able to close an acquisition for years after having purchased a majority of the target's stock. As of December 31, 2008, 47.05% of the companies in the S&P Super 1500 had a classified board. As of March 31, 2020, 27.1% of the companies in the S&P Super 1500 had a classified board.
61:
will have the right to buy a new issue of shares at a discount. If all other shareholders are able to buy more shares at a discount, such purchases would dilute the bidder's interest, and the cost of the bid would rise substantially. Knowing that such a plan could be activated, the bidder could be discouraged from taking over the corporation without the board's approval, and would first negotiate with the board in order to revoke the plan.
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Canada are also weakened by the ability of a hostile acquirer to petition the provincial securities regulators to have the company's pill overturned. Generally, the courts will overturn the pill to allow shareholders to decide whether they want to tender to a bid for the company. However, the company may be allowed to maintain it for long enough to run an auction to see if a
256:
employees may quit immediately after having cashed in their stock options. This poison pill is designed to create an exodus of talented employees, reducing the corporate value as a target. In many high-tech businesses, attrition of talented human resources may result in a diluted or empty shell being left behind for the new owner.
217:, to existing shareholders. These new shares usually have severe redemption provisions, such as allowing them to be converted into a large number of common shares if a takeover occurs. This immediately dilutes the percentage of the target owned by the acquirer, and makes it more expensive to acquire 50% of the target's stock.
383:
in many "strategic" companies such as telecom monopolies and energy companies. Governments have also served as "poison pills" by threatening potential suitors with negative regulatory developments if they pursue the takeover. Examples of this include Spain's adoption of new rules for the ownership of
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or other takeover attempts not accompanied by an acquisition of a significant block of the company's stock. It can, however, prevent shareholders from entering into certain agreements that can assist in a proxy fight, such as an agreement to pay another shareholder's expenses. In combination with a
60:
Typically, such a plan gives shareholders the right to buy more shares at a discount if one shareholder buys a certain percentage or more of the company's shares. The plan could be triggered, for instance, if any one shareholder buys 20% of the company's shares, at which point every other shareholder
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plc, which was a 20% shareholder of
Falconbridge. Xstrata applied to have Falconbridge's pill invalidated, citing among other things that the Falconbridge had had its pill in place without shareholder approval for more than nine months and that the pill stood in the way of Falconbridge shareholders
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guaranteed its customers in June 2003 that if it were acquired within two years, presumably by its rival Oracle, and product support were reduced within four years, its customers would receive a refund of between two and five times the fees they had paid for their PeopleSoft software licenses. While
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A "flip-in" permits shareholders, except for the acquirer, to purchase additional shares at a discount. This provides investors with instantaneous profits. Using this type of poison pill also dilutes shares held by the acquiring company, making the takeover attempt more expensive and more difficult.
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It was reported in 2001 that since 1997, for every company with a poison pill which successfully resisted a hostile takeover, there were 20 companies with poison pills that accepted takeover offers. The trend since the early 2000s has been for shareholders to vote against poison pill authorization,
449:
A minuscule number of companies are giving shareholders a say on poison pills. As of June 15, 2009, 21 companies that had adopted or extended a poison pill had publicly disclosed they plan to put the poison pill to a shareholder vote within a year. That was up from 2008's full year total of 18, and
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when other bidders were considering emerging at higher prices. If these companies had poison pills, they could have prevented the raids by threatening to dilute the positions of their hostile suitors if they exceeded the statutory levels (often 10% of the outstanding shares) in the rights plan. The
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ruled that
Falconbridge's pill could remain in place for a further limited period as it had the effect of sustaining the auction for Falconbridge by preventing Xstrata increasing its ownership and potentially obtaining a blocking position that would prevent other bidders from obtaining 100% of the
316:
In Canada, almost all shareholders rights plans are "chewable," meaning they contain a permitted bid concept such that a bidder who is willing to conform to the requirements of a permitted bid can acquire the company by take-over bid without triggering a flip-in event. Shareholder rights plans in
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Several studies indicate that companies with poison pills (shareholder rights plans) have received higher takeover premiums than companies without poison pills. This results in increased shareholder value. The theory is that an increase in the negotiating power of the target is reflected in higher
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threatened to make the takeover as difficult as possible unless
Microsoft raised the price to US$ 37 per share. One Microsoft executive commented, "They are going to burn the furniture if we go hostile. They are going to destroy the place." Yahoo has had a shareholders rights plan in place since
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The target adds to its charter a provision which gives the current shareholders the right to sell their shares to the acquirer at an increased price (usually 100% above recent average share price), if the acquirer's share of the company reaches a critical limit (usually one third). This kind of
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Poison pill is sometimes used more broadly to describe other types of takeover defenses that involve the target taking some action. Although the broad category of takeover defenses (more commonly known as "shark repellents") includes the traditional shareholder rights plan poison pill. Other
255:
Under this scenario, the target company re-phases all its employees' stock-option grants to ensure they immediately become vested if the company is taken over. Many employees can then exercise their options and then dump the stocks. With the release of the "golden handcuffs", many discontented
282:, a company will charter preferred stock with superior voting rights over that of common shareholders. If an unfriendly bidder acquired a substantial quantity of the target firm's voting common stock, it then still would not be able to exercise control over its purchase. For example,
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against the board or by acquiring a controlling block of shares and using the associated votes to get elected to the board. Once in control of the board, the bidder can manage the target. Currently, the most common type of takeover defense is a shareholder rights plan. Because the
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In addition to these pills, a "dead-hand" provision allows only the directors who introduce the poison pill to remove it (for a set period after they have been replaced), thus potentially delaying a new board's decision to sell a company.
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A "flip-over" enables stockholders to purchase the acquirer's shares after the merger at a discounted rate. For example, a shareholder may gain the right to buy the stock of its acquirer, in subsequent mergers, at a two-for-one rate.
147:. As stock prices plummeted due to the pandemic, various companies turned to shareholder rights plans to defend against opportunistic takeover offers. In March 2020, 10 U.S. companies adopted new poison pills, setting a new record.
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2001. Analysts suggested that
Microsoft's raised offer of $ 33 per share was already too expensive, and that Yang was not bargaining in good faith, which later led to several shareholder lawsuits and an aborted proxy fight from
990:
704:
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368:. The LSE's ultimate fate is currently up in the air, but NASDAQ's stake is sufficiently large that it is essentially impossible for a third party bidder to make a successful offer to acquire the LSE.
57:, shareholder rights plans were devised in the early 1980s as a way to prevent takeover bids by taking away a shareholder's right to negotiate a price for the sale of shares directly.
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rules. The rights of public shareholders are protected by the Panel on a case-by-case, principles-based regulatory regime. Raids have helped bidders win targets such as
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accepting
Xstrata's all-cash offer for Falconbridge shares. Despite similar facts with previous cases in which securities regulators had promptly taken down pills, the
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The goal of a shareholder rights plan is to force a bidder to negotiate with the target's board and not directly with the shareholders. The effects are twofold:
1067:
Cain, Matthew D.; McKeon, Stephen B.; Solomon, Steven
Davidoff (1 June 2017). "Do takeover laws matter? Evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers".
869:
140:. Yahoo's stock price plunged after Microsoft withdrew the bid, and Jerry Yang faced a backlash from stockholders that eventually led to his resignation.
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While there is some evidence that takeover protections allow managers to negotiate a higher purchase price, overall, they reduce firm productivity.
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throughout history, a pill which was taken by the spies if they were discovered to eliminate the possibility of being interrogated by an enemy.
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since poison pills are designed to resist takeovers, whereas from the point of view of a shareholder, takeovers can be financially rewarding.
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Some have argued that poison pills are detrimental to shareholder interests because they perpetuate existing management. For instance,
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Takeover law is still evolving in continental Europe, as individual countries slowly fall in line with requirements mandated by the
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However, many jurisdictions other than the U.S. have held the poison pill strategy as illegal, or place restraints on their use.
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established a voting plan in which 99% of the company's common stock would only harness 16.5% of the total voting power.
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in Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The Law and
Finance of Corporate Acquisitions (2d ed. Supp. 1999) at 10-18.
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itself is another example of a company that has seen significant stakebuilding by a hostile suitor, in this case the
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in an effort to make the debt load too high to be attractive—the acquirer would eventually have to pay the debts.
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the acquisition ultimately prevailed, the hypothetical cost to Oracle was valued at as much as US$ 1.5 billion.
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in Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, "The Law and
Finance of Corporate Acquisitions" (2d ed. Supp. 1999)
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The legality of poison pills had been unclear when they were first put to use in the early 1980s. However, the
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can be found. A notable
Canadian case before the securities regulators in 2006 involved the poison pill of
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of the company can redeem or otherwise eliminate a standard poison pill, it does not typically preclude a
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850:
Fundamentals of
Corporate Finance (6th ed.), Editions McGraw-Hill Ryerson, §23: Mergers and Acquisitions
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728:"Twitter's board detailed its poison-pill defense against Elon Musk and 'unfair takeover tactics'"
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Board of Directors unanimously enacted a shareholder rights plan in 2022 following an unsolicited
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96:. Poison pills became popular during the early 1980s in response to the wave of takeovers by
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379:. Formal poison pills are quite rare in continental Europe, but national governments hold
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was the largest number ever reported since the early 1980s, when the pill was invented.
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poison pill cannot stop a determined acquirer, but ensures a high price for the company.
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790:
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1141:"How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law"
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Limitations on the ability to call special meetings or take action by written consent.
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upheld poison pills as a valid instrument of takeover defense in its 1985 decision in
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961:"Merger Agreements, Corporate Governance, IPOs, High Yield Debt Covenants, Spin Offs"
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1105:"The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy"
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795:"The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy"
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72:" attached to existing shares, and only be revoked at the discretion of the board.
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It gives management time to find competing offers that maximize the selling price.
904:
Malatesta, Paul H.; Walkling, Ralph A. (January 1988). "Poison pill securities".
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In publicly held companies, there are various "poison pill" methods to deter
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375:. Stakebuilding is commonplace in many continental takeover battles such as
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1013:"Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences"
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Poison pills saw a resurgence of popularity in 2020 as a result of the
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584:"Poison Pill Popping - CFO Magazine - October 2001 Issue - CFO.com"
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Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Coates, John C.; Subramanian, Guhan (2002).
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In the United Kingdom, poison pills are not allowed under the
1200:(6th ed. McGraw-Hill Ryerson) §23: "Mergers and Acquisitions"
108:. The term "poison pill" derives its original meaning from a
1011:
Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil (October 2003).
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and France's threats to punish any potential acquiror of
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which at the time was the subject of a friendly bid from
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The plan can be issued by the board of directors as an "
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The company buys a number of smaller companies using a
188:, however, a shareholder rights plan can be a defense.
697:"Coronavirus-stricken U.S. companies pop poison pills"
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The target issues a large number of new shares, often
573:
Harvard Business School, Case Study 9-496-037, page 5
473: with: more examples of effects. You can help by
763:. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.
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Supermajority vote requirements to remove directors.
131:, but subsequently dropped the bid after Yahoo! CEO
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436:Classified boards with staggered elections for the
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Supermajority vote requirements to approve mergers.
665:"Microsoft's Failed Yahoo Bid Risks Online Growth"
556:For a description of a standard rights plan, see
635:"Microsoft Withdraws Proposal to Acquire Yahoo!"
793:; Coates, John C.; Subramanian, Guhan (2002).
1219:
8:
889:: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (
862:"Oracle chokes on PeopleSoft's poison pill"
433:, diluting the value of the target's stock.
38:", is a type of defensive tactic used by a
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1196:Ross, Westerfield, Jordan & Roberts,
1851:Metaphors referring to war and violence
1139:Kahan, Marcel; Rock, Edward B. (2002).
695:Herbst-Bayliss, Svea (March 25, 2020).
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127:originally made an unsolicited bid for
92:in 1982, as a response to tender-based
27:Defense against a takeover of a company
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305:Moran v. Household International, Inc.
7:
1145:The University of Chicago Law Review
987:"Shareholder Input on Poison Pills"
860:at 16:10, John Leyden 11 Nov 2003.
810:(5). Stanford Law Review: 887–951.
405:anti-takeover protections include:
1187:Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
770:from the original on 18 April 2022
738:from the original on 19 April 2022
707:from the original on April 1, 2020
558:Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
388:of Germany made a hostile bid for
90:Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
25:
1198:Fundamentals of Corporate Finance
1819:
1809:
461:
80:The poison pill was invented by
1049:from the original on 2020-12-23
993:from the original on 2011-07-24
967:from the original on 2022-12-04
942:from the original on 2019-09-08
872:from the original on 2017-11-14
833:from the original on 2018-06-02
677:from the original on 2009-04-15
645:from the original on 2008-05-05
590:from the original on 2004-11-30
539:from the original on 2022-07-02
1606:Debtor-in-possession financing
1191:The Share Purchase Rights Plan
1069:Journal of Financial Economics
906:Journal of Financial Economics
726:Soon, Weilun (19 April 2022).
562:The Share Purchase Rights Plan
527:Institute, Corporate Finance.
112:physically carried by various
1:
1081:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.003
336:Ontario Securities Commission
156:purchase offer from Elon Musk
1546:Staggered board of directors
1020:Journal of Political Economy
918:10.1016/0304-405X(88)90050-5
294:Constraints and legal status
204:Common types of poison pills
186:staggered board of directors
1663:Accretion/dilution analysis
932:"SharkRepellent.net - Home"
533:Corporate Finance Institute
145:global coronavirus pandemic
34:, colloquially known as a "
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1626:Leveraged recapitalization
663:Lohr, Steve (2008-05-05).
422:The target takes on large
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239:
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1797:Valuation using multiples
1782:Sum-of-the-parts analysis
1752:Modigliani–Miller theorem
1611:Dividend recapitalization
1426:Secondary market offering
609:"Yahoo weighs up options"
1846:Mergers and acquisitions
1815:List of investment banks
1730:Free cash flow to equity
1556:Super-majority amendment
1481:Management due diligence
1421:Seasoned equity offering
82:mergers and acquisitions
55:mergers and acquisitions
1526:Shareholder rights plan
1516:Post-merger integration
1486:Managerial entrenchment
1456:Contingent value rights
1396:Initial public offering
758:"001-36164 Twitter Inc"
400:Other takeover defenses
384:energy companies after
329:and a hostile bid from
32:shareholder rights plan
1668:Adjusted present value
1531:Special-purpose entity
1369:Direct public offering
1339:At-the-market offering
989:. SharkRepellent.net.
936:www.sharkrepellent.net
300:Delaware Supreme Court
1856:Political terminology
1683:Conglomerate discount
866:www.theregister.co.uk
362:London Stock Exchange
199:acquisition premiums.
1705:Economic value added
1700:Discounted cash flow
251:Back-end rights plan
209:Preferred stock plan
1290:Senior secured debt
1112:Stanford Law Review
963:. Deal Point Data.
803:Stanford Law Review
373:European Commission
170:bids. Takeovers by
1825:Outline of finance
1737:Market value added
1720:Financial modeling
1678:Business valuation
1601:Debt restructuring
1379:Follow-on offering
1364:Corporate spin-off
1322:(terms/conditions)
1239:investment banking
438:board of directors
177:board of directors
172:soliciting proxies
44:board of directors
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1757:Net present value
1742:Minority interest
1673:Associate company
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1648:
1616:Financial sponsor
1536:Special situation
1506:Pre-emption right
1496:Minority discount
1406:Private placement
1305:Subordinated debt
1260:Exchangeable debt
1247:Capital structure
1235:Corporate finance
491:
490:
445:Shareholder input
323:Falconbridge Ltd.
98:corporate raiders
94:hostile takeovers
18:Porcupine Defense
16:(Redirected from
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1866:Takeover defense
1823:
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1715:Fairness opinion
1710:Enterprise value
1693:Weighted average
1621:Leveraged buyout
1476:Drag-along right
1374:Equity carve-out
1331:Equity offerings
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1295:Shareholder loan
1280:Second lien debt
1275:Preferred equity
1255:Convertible debt
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1026:(5): 1043–1075.
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102:T. Boone Pickens
53:In the field of
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1631:High-yield debt
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1566:Tag-along right
1491:Mandatory offer
1461:Control premium
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1359:Bought out deal
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1408:
1403:
1398:
1393:
1392:
1391:
1381:
1376:
1371:
1366:
1361:
1356:
1351:
1346:
1341:
1335:
1333:
1324:
1316:
1315:
1313:
1312:
1307:
1302:
1297:
1292:
1287:
1282:
1277:
1272:
1267:
1265:Mezzanine debt
1262:
1257:
1251:
1249:
1243:
1242:
1233:
1231:
1230:
1223:
1216:
1208:
1202:
1201:
1194:
1182:
1179:
1178:
1177:
1151:(3): 871–915.
1136:
1118:(5): 887–951.
1098:
1095:
1093:
1090:
1087:
1086:
1075:(3): 464–485.
1059:
1032:10.1086/376950
1003:
977:
952:
923:
896:
852:
843:
781:
749:
718:
687:
670:New York Times
655:
626:
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566:
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518:
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398:
349:Takeover Panel
344:
343:United Kingdom
341:
313:
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295:
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272:Main article:
269:
266:
259:For instance,
252:
249:
240:Main article:
237:
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225:Main article:
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210:
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77:
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26:
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14:
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1377:
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1370:
1367:
1365:
1362:
1360:
1357:
1355:
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1350:
1347:
1345:
1344:Book building
1342:
1340:
1337:
1336:
1334:
1332:
1328:
1325:
1317:
1311:
1308:
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1199:
1195:
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1188:
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1037:
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1021:
1014:
1007:
1004:
992:
988:
985:Laide, John.
981:
978:
966:
962:
956:
953:
941:
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933:
927:
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919:
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911:
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867:
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847:
844:
829:
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821:
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809:
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804:
796:
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782:
766:
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737:
733:
729:
722:
719:
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688:
676:
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659:
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589:
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579:
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563:
559:
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538:
534:
530:
529:"Poison Pill"
523:
520:
513:
508:
504:
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496:
494:
485:
476:
472:
469:This section
467:
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439:
435:
432:
428:
425:
421:
417:
414:
411:
408:
407:
406:
399:
397:
395:
394:Groupe Danone
391:
387:
382:
381:golden shares
378:
374:
369:
367:
363:
358:
354:
350:
342:
340:
337:
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107:
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99:
95:
91:
87:
86:Martin Lipton
83:
75:
73:
71:
67:
62:
58:
56:
51:
49:
45:
41:
37:
33:
19:
1861:Shareholders
1767:Real options
1583:Tender offer
1525:
1443:acquisitions
1431:Underwriting
1416:Rights issue
1319:Transactions
1197:
1190:
1148:
1144:
1115:
1111:
1092:Bibliography
1072:
1068:
1062:
1051:. Retrieved
1023:
1019:
1006:
995:. Retrieved
980:
969:. Retrieved
955:
944:. Retrieved
935:
926:
909:
905:
899:
874:. Retrieved
865:
855:
846:
835:. Retrieved
807:
801:
784:
772:. Retrieved
752:
740:. Retrieved
731:
721:
709:. Retrieved
700:
690:
679:. Retrieved
668:
658:
647:. Retrieved
629:
618:. Retrieved
612:
603:
592:. Retrieved
578:
569:
561:
552:
541:. Retrieved
532:
522:
492:
479:
475:adding to it
470:
448:
403:
370:
346:
319:white knight
315:
303:
297:
288:
277:
258:
254:
245:
230:
212:
190:
165:
149:
142:
122:
118:
79:
63:
59:
52:
35:
31:
29:
1541:Squeeze-out
1511:Proxy fight
1441:Mergers and
1354:Bought deal
1285:Senior debt
912:: 347–376.
482:August 2023
280:voting plan
274:Voting plan
268:Voting plan
181:proxy fight
110:poison pill
40:corporation
36:poison pill
1840:Categories
1787:Tax shield
1747:Mismarking
1551:Stock swap
1501:Pitch book
1471:Divestment
1349:Bookrunner
1270:Pari passu
1053:2020-12-23
997:2009-06-24
971:2022-11-27
946:2019-07-05
876:2019-08-20
837:2019-08-29
681:2008-05-06
649:2008-05-03
620:2008-02-03
594:2004-09-14
543:2022-07-12
509:References
503:Green mail
431:stock swap
261:PeopleSoft
138:Carl Icahn
133:Jerry Yang
106:Carl Icahn
46:against a
1762:Pure play
1655:Valuation
1521:Sell side
1384:Greenshoe
1173:214800991
711:April 16,
639:Microsoft
377:Scania AB
242:Flip-over
236:Flip-over
125:Microsoft
1593:Leverage
1571:Takeover
1466:Demerger
1451:Buy side
1169:ProQuest
1097:Articles
1044:Archived
991:Archived
965:Archived
940:Archived
885:cite web
870:Archived
828:Archived
774:19 April
765:Archived
742:19 April
736:Archived
705:Archived
675:Archived
643:Archived
588:Archived
537:Archived
497:See also
355:plc and
339:shares.
168:takeover
162:Overview
100:such as
68:" or a "
48:takeover
1576:Reverse
1561:Synergy
1401:Pre-IPO
1389:Reverse
1310:Warrant
1165:1600634
1132:1229689
1040:4693227
824:1229689
732:Insider
701:Reuters
357:AWG plc
331:Xstrata
227:Flip-in
221:Flip-in
152:Twitter
84:lawyer
76:History
70:warrant
1171:
1163:
1130:
1038:
822:
454:Effect
390:Endesa
366:NASDAQ
312:Canada
284:ASARCO
129:Yahoo!
66:option
1300:Stock
1181:Books
1161:JSTOR
1128:JSTOR
1108:(PDF)
1047:(PDF)
1036:S2CID
1016:(PDF)
831:(PDF)
820:JSTOR
798:(PDF)
768:(PDF)
761:(PDF)
514:Notes
424:debts
278:In a
114:spies
1237:and
891:link
788:See
776:2022
744:2022
713:2020
386:E.ON
327:Inco
150:The
104:and
1153:doi
1120:doi
1077:doi
1073:124
1028:doi
1024:111
914:doi
812:doi
477:.
353:BAA
88:of
42:'s
1842::
1189:,
1167:.
1159:.
1149:69
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1143:.
1126:.
1116:54
1114:.
1110:.
1071:.
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1034:.
1022:.
1018:.
938:.
934:.
910:20
908:.
887:}}
883:{{
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864:.
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818:.
808:54
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1134:.
1122::
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1079::
1056:.
1030::
1000:.
974:.
949:.
920:.
916::
893:)
879:.
840:.
814::
778:.
746:.
715:.
684:.
652:.
623:.
597:.
546:.
484:)
480:(
20:)
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