296:(outward, inward, and hybrid) the intentional content supplied to the mood state is not capable of sufficiently capturing the phenomenal aspects of the mood states. In the case of inward directedness, the phenomenology of the mood does not seem tied to the state of one's body, and even if one's mood is reflected by the overall state of one's body that person will not necessarily be aware of it, demonstrating the insufficiency of the intentional content to adequately capture the phenomenal aspects of the mood. In the case of outward directedness, the phenomenology of the mood and its intentional content does not seem to share the corresponding relation they should given that the phenomenal character is supposed to reduce to the intentional content. Hybrid directedness, if it can even get off the ground, faces the same objection.
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unrestricted version, for any state with phenomenal character that state's phenomenal character reduces to its intentional content. Only this unrestricted version of representationalism is able to provide a general theory about the nature of phenomenal character, as well as offer a potential solution to the hard problem of consciousness. The successful reduction of the phenomenal character of a state to its intentional content would provide a solution to the hard problem of consciousness once a physicalist account of intentionality is worked out.
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conclude that because moods are undirected they are also nonintentional i.e. they lack intentionality or aboutness. Because they are not directed at anything they are not about anything. Because they lack intentionality they will lack any intentional content. Lacking intentional content their phenomenal character will not be reducible to intentional content, refuting the representational doctrine.
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have intentional content to which that character is reduced. Phenomenal states without intentional content therefore serve as a counterexample to the unrestricted version. If the state has no intentional content its phenomenal character will not be reducible to that state's intentional content, for it has none to begin with.
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symbol structures (concepts and propositions). Content (i.e., thought) emerges from the meaningful co-occurrence of both sets of symbols. For instance, "8 x 9" is a meaningful co-occurrence, whereas "CAT x §" is not; "x" is a symbol rule called for by symbol structures such as "8" and "9", but not by "CAT" and "§".
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In the case of outward directedness, moods might be directed at either the world as a whole, a changing series of objects in the world, or unbound emotion properties projected by people onto things in the world. In the case of inward directedness, moods are directed at the overall state of a person's
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very much like those of natural languages. For the
Portuguese logician and cognitive scientist Luis M. Augusto, at this abstract, formal level, the syntax of thought is the set of symbol rules (i.e., operations, processes, etc. on and with symbol structures) and the semantics of thought is the set of
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Mental representations (or mental imagery) enable representing things that have never been experienced as well as things that do not exist. Our brains and mental imageries allow us to imagine things have either never happened or are impossible and do not exist. Although visual imagery is more likely
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Even if one can identify some possible intentional content for moods we might still question whether that content is able to sufficiently capture the phenomenal character of the mood states they are a part of. Amy Kind contends that in the case of all the previously mentioned kinds of directedness
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There are also objective and subjective mental representations. Objective representations are closest to tracking theories—where the brain simply tracks what is in the environment. Subjective representations can vary person-to-person. The relationship between these two types of representation can
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Though emotions are typically considered as having directedness and intentionality this idea has also been called into question. One might point to emotions a person all of a sudden experiences that do not appear to be directed at or about anything in particular. Emotions elicited by listening to
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When arguing against the unrestricted version of representationalism people will often bring up phenomenal mental states that appear to lack intentional content. The unrestricted version seeks to account for all phenomenal states. Thus, for it to be true, all states with phenomenal character must
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Canadian philosopher P. Thagard noted in his work "Introduction to
Cognitive Science", that "most cognitive scientists agree that knowledge in the human mind consists of mental representations" and that "cognitive science asserts: that people have mental procedures that operate by means of mental
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In response to this objection, a proponent of representationalism might reject the undirected non-intentionality of moods, and attempt to identify some intentional content they might plausibly be thought to possess. The proponent of representationalism might also reject the narrow conception of
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A common example of this kind of state are moods. Moods are states with phenomenal character that are generally thought to not be directed at anything in particular. Moods are thought to lack directedness, unlike emotions, which are typically thought to be directed at particular things. People
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on intentional content. Strong representationalism aims to provide a theory about the nature of phenomenal character, and offers a solution to the hard problem of consciousness. In contrast to this, weak representationalism does not aim to provide a theory of consciousness, nor does it offer a
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Strong representationalism can be further broken down into restricted and unrestricted versions. The restricted version deals only with certain kinds of phenomenal states e.g. visual perception. Most representationalists endorse an unrestricted version of representationalism. According to the
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Structural representations are also important. These types of representations are basically mental maps that we have in our minds that correspond exactly to those objects in the world (the intentional content). According to Morgan, structural representations are not the same as mental
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There are two types of representationalism, strong and weak. Strong representationalism attempts to reduce phenomenal character to intentional content. On the other hand, weak representationalism claims only that phenomenal character
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There is a wide debate on what kinds of representations exist. There are several philosophers who bring about different aspects of the debate. Such philosophers include Alex Morgan, Gualtiero
Piccinini, and Uriah Kriegel.
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Eliminativists think that subjective representations do not exist. Reductivists think subjective representations are reducible to objective. Non-reductivists think that subjective representations are real and distinct.
344:. e.g. The 3 rings on the bell of a bus mean the bus is full—the rings on the bell are independent of the fullness of the bus—we could have assigned something else (just as arbitrary) to signify that the bus is full.
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204:(i.e., mentalese). The contents of thoughts are represented in symbolic structures (the formulas of mentalese) which, analogously to natural languages but on a much more abstract level, possess a
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Hybrid directedness: What it is like to be in mood M is to have both a certain kind of outwardly focused representational content and a certain kind of inwardly focused representational content.
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in general. According to this version of the theory, the mental representations were images (often called "ideas") of the objects or states of affairs represented. For modern adherents, such as
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music are another potential example of undirected, nonintentional emotions. Emotions aroused in this way do not seem to necessarily be about anything, including the music that arouses them.
336:'s forthcoming work, he discusses topics on natural and nonnatural mental representations. He relies on the natural definition of mental representations given by Grice (1957) where
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There are also internal representations. These types of representations include those that involve future decisions, episodic memories, or any type of projection into the future.
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proposes that images are used to help solve certain types of problems. We are able to visualize the objects in question and mentally represent the images to solve it.
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Mental representations also allow people to experience things right in front of them—however, the process of how the brain interprets and stores the
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Henrich, J. & Boyd, R. (2002). Culture and cognition: Why cultural evolution does not require replication of representations.
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to be recalled, mental imagery may involve representations in any of the sensory modalities, such as hearing, smell, or taste.
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Outward directedness: What it is like to be in mood M is to have a certain kind of outwardly focused representational content.
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Inward directedness: What it is like to be in mood M is to have a certain kind of inwardly focused representational content.
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body. In the case of hybrid, directedness moods are directed at some combination of inward and outward things.
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intentionality as being directed at a particular thing, arguing instead for a broader kind of intentionality.
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Augusto, Luis M. (2013). 'Unconscious
Representations 1: Belying the Traditional Model of Human Cognition.'
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All representations found in subjective and none in the objective: e.g. an agent that experiences in a void.
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Augusto, Luis M. (2014). "Unconscious representations 2: Towards an integrated cognitive architecture".
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Vision. A Computational
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Hypothetical internal cognitive symbol that represents external reality
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An Essay
Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language
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representations for the implementation of thinking and action"
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of things that are not actually present to the senses. In
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ed. Uriah
Kriegel. New York, NY: Routledge, 180–95.
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ed. Uriah
Kriegel. New York, NY: Routledge, 161–79.
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ed. Uriah
Kriegel. New York, NY: Routledge, 113–34.
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ed. Uriah
Kriegel. New York, NY: Routledge, 91-108.
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ed. Uriah Kriegel. New York, NY: Routledge, 73–90.
557:Imagination and thinking: A psychological analysis
801:The Bodily Formats Approach to Embodied Cognition
601:Pearson, Joel; Kosslyn, Stephen M. (2015-08-18).
822:The Case against Representationalism about Moods
138:The representational theory of mind attempts to
607:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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231:solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
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862:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
851:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
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826:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
805:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
847:The Sufficiency of Objective Representation
773:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind
720:Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind
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387:Cognitive model § Dynamical systems
700:Mind. Introduction to Cognitive Science
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54:, is a hypothetical internal cognitive
188:and was a dominant theme in classical
169:. In contrast to theories of naĂŻve or
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264:There are three alternative kinds of
239:Problems for the unrestricted version
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722:. New York: Routledge. p. 118.
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124:Representational theories of mind
733:Grice, H.P. (1957). "Meaning".
18:Representational theory of mind
1565:Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
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2221:Hard problem of consciousness
1446:Principle of compositionality
775:. Routledge. pp. 161–79.
486:"Representations Gone Mental"
69:Mental representation is the
1595:Philosophical Investigations
574:Robert J. Sternberg (2009).
272:one might posit for moods.
77:, specifically in fields of
1436:Modality (natural language)
856:Shapiro, Lawrence (2014). '
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1575:Language, Truth, and Logic
1315:Theological noncognitivism
1200:Contrast theory of meaning
1195:Causal theory of reference
926:Index of language articles
858:When Is Cognition Embodied
799:Goldman, Alvin I (2014). '
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1943:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
1933:David Lewis (philosopher)
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1660:Philosophy of information
1260:Mediated reference theory
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812:Culture and Cognition, 2,
674:10.1007/s10516-012-9207-y
505:10.1007/s11229-013-0328-7
397:Condensation (psychology)
58:that represents external
1585:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
831:Kriegel, Uriah (2014). '
554:Mckellar, Peter (1957).
402:Knowledge representation
118:representational content
36:cognitive representation
2445:Concepts in metaphysics
2071:Eliminative materialism
1386:Use–mention distinction
1230:Direct reference theory
771:Kriegel, Uriah (2014).
620:10.1073/pnas.1504933112
167:experimental psychology
75:contemporary philosophy
2323:Propositional attitude
2318:Problem of other minds
2226:Hypostatic abstraction
1320:Theory of descriptions
1255:Linguistic determinism
917:Philosophy of language
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432:Representative realism
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2061:Biological naturalism
1948:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
1923:Frank Cameron Jackson
1431:Mental representation
1366:Linguistic relativity
1250:Inquisitive semantics
875:Mental Representation
484:Morgan, Alex (2014).
32:mental representation
2435:Cognitive psychology
2076:Emergent materialism
1615:Naming and Necessity
1525:De Arte Combinatoria
1324:Definite description
1285:Semantic externalism
735:Philosophical Review
580:. Cengage Learning.
577:Cognitive Psychology
44:cognitive psychology
2460:Metaphysics of mind
2425:Analytic philosophy
2273:Language of thought
2023:Ludwig Wittgenstein
1853:Patricia Churchland
1665:Philosophical logic
1655:Analytic philosophy
1461:Sense and reference
1340:Verification theory
1295:Situation semantics
820:Kind, Amy (2014). '
613:(33): 10089–10092.
437:Schema (psychology)
342:P does not entail P
334:Gualtiero Piccinini
328:Gualtiero Piccinini
202:language of thought
129:Representationalism
2430:Cognitive modeling
2101:Neurophenomenology
1772:Philosophy of mind
1515:Port-Royal Grammar
1411:Family resemblance
1330:Theory of language
1305:Supposition theory
718:Kind, Amy (2014).
560:. Oxford, England.
417:Object of the mind
291:Further objections
159:philosophy of mind
83:philosophy of mind
40:philosophy of mind
2440:Cognitive science
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2308:Mind–body problem
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2170:Substance dualism
1788:G. E. M. Anscombe
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1240:Dynamic semantics
843:Rupert, Robert D.
533:. The MIT Press.
163:cognitive science
52:cognitive science
16:(Redirected from
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2155:Property dualism
2148:Type physicalism
2113:New mysterianism
2081:Epiphenomenalism
1903:Martin Heidegger
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2138:Phenomenology
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499:(2): 213–44.
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382:Basic beliefs
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2374: /
2370: /
2366: /
2297:
2283:Mental image
2278:Mental event
2241:Intelligence
2191:Chinese room
2159:
2037:
1988:Gilbert Ryle
1968:Derek Parfit
1958:Thomas Nagel
1888:Fred Dretske
1808:J. L. Austin
1780:Philosophers
1633:
1623:
1613:
1603:
1593:
1583:
1573:
1563:
1543:
1533:
1523:
1513:
1503:
1485:
1430:
1426:Metalanguage
1421:Logical form
1376:Truth-bearer
1335:Unilalianism
1245:Expressivism
1072:Wittgenstein
1017:von Humboldt
934:Philosophers
878:
861:
850:
836:
825:
811:
804:
790:
772:
738:
734:
728:
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690:
665:
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556:
549:
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452:Visual space
407:Mental model
369:
351:
341:
337:
331:
323:
319:
312:
303:
300:Philosophers
294:
285:
266:directedness
265:
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246:
242:
233:
224:
215:
183:
156:contemporary
137:
127:
120:is debated.
115:
107:
68:
64:abstractions
48:neuroscience
35:
31:
29:
2455:Imagination
2368:information
2359:Metaphysics
2333:Tabula rasa
2143:Physicalism
2128:Parallelism
2056:Behaviorism
2013:Michael Tye
2008:Alan Turing
1993:John Searle
1868:Dharmakirti
1843:Tyler Burge
1838:C. D. Broad
1670:Linguistics
1635:Limited Inc
1555:On Denoting
1381:Proposition
1032:de Saussure
997:Ibn Khaldun
696:Thagard, P.
527:Marr, David
309:Alex Morgan
194:Jerry Fodor
79:metaphysics
2470:Perception
2419:Categories
2404:Task Force
2372:perception
2246:Artificial
2196:Creativity
2118:Nondualism
2018:Vasubandhu
1938:John Locke
1908:David Hume
1863:Andy Clark
1730:Discussion
1725:Task Force
1675:Pragmatics
1466:Speech act
1396:Categories
1310:Symbiosism
1265:Nominalism
1177:Watzlawick
1057:Bloomfield
977:Chrysippus
791:Axiomathes
662:Axiomathes
464:References
427:Perception
228:supervenes
190:empiricism
150:and other
95:describing
91:explaining
2268:Intuition
2201:Cognition
2165:Solipsism
1828:Ned Block
1798:Armstrong
1793:Aristotle
1707:Semiotics
1695:Semantics
1545:Alciphron
1481:Statement
1416:Intension
1356:Ambiguity
1235:Dramatism
1215:Cratylism
967:Eubulides
962:Aristotle
942:Confucius
845:(2014). '
816:Full text
682:122896502
668:: 19–43.
629:0027-8424
457:Worldview
256:Responses
210:semantics
175:observing
2465:Ontology
2389:Category
2236:Identity
2179:Concepts
2049:Theories
2033:Zhuangzi
1963:Alva Noë
1720:Category
1680:Rhetoric
1505:Cratylus
1476:Sentence
1451:Property
1371:Language
1349:Concepts
1187:Theories
1152:Strawson
1137:Davidson
1127:Hintikka
1122:Anscombe
1067:Vygotsky
1022:Mauthner
992:Averroes
982:Zhuangzi
972:Diodorus
952:Cratylus
814:87–112.
795:Preprint
698:(1996).
647:26175024
529:(2010).
513:18194442
493:Synthese
422:Paradigm
375:See also
148:concepts
103:concepts
87:ontology
81:such as
2399:Project
2352:Related
2211:Concept
2066:Dualism
2039:more...
1898:Goldman
1487:more...
1391:Concept
1132:Dummett
1107:Gadamer
1102:Chomsky
1087:Derrida
1077:Russell
1062:Bergson
1047:Tillich
1007:Leibniz
947:Gorgias
755:2182440
638:4547292
412:Mindset
179:objects
140:explain
62:or its
60:reality
2343:Zombie
2328:Qualia
1639:(1988)
1629:(1982)
1619:(1980)
1609:(1967)
1599:(1953)
1589:(1951)
1579:(1936)
1569:(1921)
1559:(1905)
1549:(1732)
1539:(1668)
1529:(1666)
1519:(1660)
1509:(n.d.)
1471:Symbol
1172:Searle
1162:Putnam
1112:Kripke
1097:Austin
1082:Carnap
1027:Ricœur
1012:Herder
1002:Hobbes
753:
680:
645:
635:
627:
584:
537:
511:
353:vary.
206:syntax
56:symbol
50:, and
38:), in
2251:Human
1973:Plato
1893:Fodor
1497:Works
1406:Class
1167:Lewis
1157:Quine
1142:Grice
1092:Whorf
1052:Sapir
1037:Frege
987:Xunzi
957:Plato
751:JSTOR
678:S2CID
509:S2CID
489:(PDF)
144:ideas
99:ideas
2376:self
2313:Pain
2303:Mind
2231:Idea
1456:Sign
1361:Cant
1147:Ryle
1117:Ayer
1042:Boas
643:PMID
625:ISSN
582:ISBN
535:ISBN
208:and
196:and
165:and
101:and
93:and
85:and
34:(or
1401:Set
860:.'
849:.'
835:.'
824:.'
803:.'
743:doi
670:doi
633:PMC
615:doi
611:112
501:doi
497:191
332:In
154:in
2421::
1557:"
877:–
763:^
749:.
739:66
737:.
708:^
676:.
666:24
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641:.
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702:.
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672::
649:.
617::
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515:.
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268:/
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