321:, to speak to Hammarskjold again, regarding rumored Egyptian deployment in the Gaza Strip and the possible evacuation of the UN Emergency Force. Israeli officials were also upset that UN military personnel did not inform Israel of significant Egyptian military moves in the Gaza region, despite the previous practice of doing so. Hammarskjold would only suggest a visit to the region "in the near future," or a meeting with Ben-Gurion during his upcoming visit the US. He pointed out that Egypt had informed the UN of the February 23 reconnaissance flight yet had not filed an official complaint, an indication of its own reluctance to escalate the crisis. It is unclear whether Hammarskjold had ever contacted Cairo regarding Israeli concerns, and Ben-Gurion soon concluded Hammarskjold could not be counted on for assistance.
388:
room to maneuver, able to deter Israel by the deployment of forces without the actual necessity of going to war. When, in 1967, Nasser once again moved the
Egyptian army into the Sinai following renewed reports of tension along the Israeli-Syrian border, many in the IDF General Staff were reminded of events in 1960. Both Rabin and Weizman, in their respective memoirs, noted that events in 1967 at first seemed like a repeat of the Rotem crisis, and that lessons drawn from the first were applied in the second. There was initially little thought of war. In 1992, retired Major-General Jamal Mat'lum, Director of the Egyptian Army's Center for Strategic Studies, also noted the role played by the Rotem Crisis in Egyptian decision making in 1967:
162:, wrote that Egypt had declared a state of emergency and moved its forces to the border, where "The two armies constitute an effective pincer against Israel." Israel's military intelligence, however, found no evidence for such moves, and attributed the increased state of alert in both Egypt and Syria to fears of further Israeli attacks. Arab leaders appear to have genuinely believed Israel was preparing for an offensive. On February 8, Nasser went as far as to declare that the UAR was expecting an Israeli attack "any minute." While Israel did bolster its forces following the Syrian moves, it had made no plans to initiate hostilities and was, rather, acting to de-escalate tensions in the north.
229:
358:
60:
286:. Ben-Gurion had refused a massive call-up of reservists in order to keep a low profile and prevent actions that might be deemed provocative, and also refused to allow additional reconnaissance flights over the Sinai. Censorship prevented the media from reporting the heightened state-of-alert, and Ben-Gurion met with newspaper editors to brief them on what they should not report.
141:(cricket), raiding Syrian positions in the village of al-Tawafiq. Nine Syrians were killed and 15 injured, while Israel suffered three fatalities and 17 wounded. In response, the Syrian military raised its state of alert, mobilized two reserve brigades and moved an artillery regiment and tank company closer to the border.
348:
on the same day described the crisis from the
Egyptian perspective: an Egyptian deployment had prevented Israel from attacking Syria, prompting the Israeli cabinet to act diplomatically rather than militarily. The Egyptian media, mostly silent on the affair since February 24, described the outcome as
281:
Beyond the immediate danger of an
Egyptian attack on its inadequate defenses, however, Israel also faced two additional threats. First, the massing of forces along both sides of the border could, even inadvertently, deteriorate into open warfare. Furthermore, a massive Egyptian presence on the border
379:
described it as the most dramatic event of his tenure. It revealed deficiencies in the
Israeli intelligence community, which failed to provide warning of an imminent threat, and in the IDF's ability to translate such warnings into immediate action. Although intelligence had suggested Egyptian forces
387:
The crisis has come to be regarded as a "trial run" for the events that led to the 1967 Six-Day War. Israel and Egypt had drawn very different conclusions from the crisis. While the former came to believe new and restrictive rules had been set in place, the latter believed that it had gained more
380:
were on the move, a week went by before the full extent of the
Egyptian deployment came to light and countermeasures were taken. Rabin, a future Chief-of-Staff, later wrote that Israeli intelligence had never been in worse shape. Laskov had lost all faith in the head of military intelligence,
199:
on
February 17 and between February 22 and 24 both the 2nd Infantry Division and 4th Armored Division moved into Sinai in radio silence. By February 27, 6 out of Egypt's 10 infantry brigades and all three Egyptian armoured brigades were in place. UAR forces on the Syrian front comprised seven
384:, but was prevented from dismissing him by Ben-Gurion. The crisis influenced Israeli national security policy, defining any Egyptian military build-up along its border as unacceptable, while the Israeli intelligence community took extensive measures to improve its collection capabilities.
116:. These tensions along the border became more complicated in February 1958 with the establishment of the UAR, a short-lived political union of Egypt and Syria. Escalations on the northern border were, henceforth, likely to trigger a response on the relatively quiet front in the south.
392:
There was an incident in 1960, when Israel deployed against Syria and Egypt reacted and concentrated most of its forces in Sinai, and Israel refrained. The
Egyptian leadership may have imagined the possibility of a show of military force that would end without war, as had happened in
261:
refused the IDF's request for a massive mobilization of reserves, but authorized the call-up of 7,000 men, the minimum required to maintain a heightened state-of-alert for a prolonged amount of time. Thus the units deployed in the next 24 hours were mostly regular army units. The 1st
216:
zone to bring back news that the 4th
Armored Division had in fact left its garrison. A second flight over the Sinai a day later revealed the full extent of the Egyptian deployment. Egyptian forces had deployed both close to the border and in depth, and Israel's forces in the
85:, the peninsula remained de facto demilitarized of most Egyptian forces. It was garrisoned by one infantry brigade, elements of several reconnaissance regiments and up to 100 tanks. Although the outcome of the Suez Crisis had been politically positive for Egyptian president
190:
Nasser had apparently come to believe that the state of alert publicly declared after the
Tawafiq incident had succeeded in deterring Israel from attacking Syria. Now that Israel was allegedly deploying its forces again, Nasser (probably on February 16) ordered the
203:
Aman had gotten wind of the
Egyptian decision to mobilize soon after it was taken, yet political fears of exasperating the already tense situation along the border delayed much needed reconnaissance flights. Only on February 23, after an American tip-off, did an
175:. Although Israel responded with stern warnings, both sides initially remained calm. Yet beginning on February 15 and 16, the UAR began receiving intelligence of Israeli preparations for an attack on Syria. These included news of large IDF concentrations in the
170:
As neither side actually sought confrontation, tensions appeared to subside towards the second week of February. Israeli forces were recalled from the north. On February 12, however, two Israeli soldiers on patrol were killed by Syrian fire near
282:
would force Israel to maintain its forces, mostly reserve troops, in the south for an indeterminate amount of time, a drain on national resources. These could also have repercussions on other points of conflict, such as Israeli shipping in the
340:
authorized the demobilization of 6,000–7,000 Israeli troops, and the 7th and 35th brigades returned to routine standing. Although Egyptian forces were still fully deployed, all but 400 Israeli reservists had been discharged by March 5.
313:, but told Israeli diplomats he did not consider the situation dire enough to take action, and that a dramatic change in his plans would only serve to exacerbate tensions. This response enraged Israeli Foreign Minister
253:, commander in chief of the IAF, a note saying: "We've been caught with our pants down. During the next twenty four hours everything depends on the air force." Israel had been caught off guard and the
133:. The Syrians eventually started shelling Israeli military positions with heavy mortars and, on January 31, 1960, an Israeli policeman was killed and two others were wounded. That same night, Israel's
47:
deployed its armed forces on Israel's largely undefended southern front, catching Israel off guard. Although hostilities did not break out, the crisis influenced events leading up to the 1967
257:
now issued a set of orders, codenamed "Rotem," for an emergency movement of forces. Israel's plans for the defense of the south had called for the deployment of four brigades. Prime Minister
278:
and 37th Mechanized Brigade held the Ketziot region. As these moved into position, the air force was instructed to prepare for immediate action against Egyptian forces in the Sinai.
93:(Aman), as well as military and civilian decision makers, had regarded Israel's military victory in the war as an effective deterrent to future Egyptian designs. In early 1960, the
401:, leaving the various players with less room to maneuver. Nasser demanded the withdrawal of UNEF and the crisis soon gathered a momentum of its own, eventually leading to war.
397:
Yet while the Egyptian deployment in 1960 had been discreet, in 1967 it was carried out in full view of the public. The new deployment evoked widespread enthusiasm in the
183:
for military shipments, the recall of pilots and officers from abroad, and sharp debates between Israel's leaders. Most of this intelligence, probably supplied by the
344:
On March 9, Egyptian forces also started to withdraw, starting with the 2nd division and followed in the second half of the month by the 4th. An editorial in
329:
Just as Egyptian forces were completing their deployment, Aman begun picking up indications of a decrease in Egypt's military state of alert. On February 27,
664:
254:
90:
129:
In late 1959 tensions along the northern border escalated once more over Israeli cultivation rights in the southern DMZ, on the eastern shore of the
303:
375:, the Rotem Crisis was the most serious challenge to Israel's doctrine of deterrence in the years between the Suez Crisis and the Six-Day War.
302:
it stressed both the increased Arab military presence on its borders and the faulty Arab intelligence regarding its intentions towards Syria.
843:
807:
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877:
94:
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187:, was untrue, yet the leadership of the UAR was convinced of an impending Israeli attack, probably scheduled for February 22.
98:
267:
545:
Barak, Eitan (2006). "Caught in the Middle: The United Nations Emergency Force, Israel, and the 1960 "Rotem Crisis"".
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exercises resumed, and more such indications arrived in subsequent days. In light of this, Ben-Gurion and IDF
862:
778:
The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, armed forces and defence policy 1963–1967
148:(IDF) losses. It also did not make any secret of the heightened state of alert in both Egypt and Syria. In
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97:, therefore, estimated that Egypt would seek "to avoid a military confrontation with Israel and keep the
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was prone to further conflicts, rooted in disputes over the nature and boundaries of Israel's
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Arab media portrayed the Tawafiq raid as an Israeli defeat, carrying reports of heavy
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192:
32:
479:
Bar-Joseph, Uri (July 1996). "Rotem: The Forgotten Crisis on Road to the 1967 War".
43:(UAR) in February–March 1960. Prompted by tensions along the Israeli–Syrian border,
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Air War on the Edge – A History of the Israel Air Force and its Aircraft since 1947
597:"Turning Water Into Fire: The Jordan River as the Hidden Factor in the Six Day War"
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184:
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236:. This aircraft conducted both IAF reconnaissance flights on February 23 and 24.
221:, consisting of between 20 and 30 tanks, were now facing 500 Egyptian tanks and
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into the Sinai. Advanced detachments of the Egyptian army began crossing the
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Unlike Israel's southern border, however, its northern border with
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Chief of the IDF General Staff at the time of the Rotem Crisis,
317:. On February 25, she asked Israel's representative at the UN,
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Israel turned to the diplomatic front. In overtures to the
179:, mobilization of reserve formations, the closing off of
607:(2). Herzliya: GLORIA center, Interdisciplinary Center
716:רבין על הרצוג: מעולם לא היה המצב במודיעין כה חמור
371:Although neglected in the historiography of the
70:signing the Syria-Egypt union pact, forming the
601:The Middle East Review of International Affairs
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232:Sud-Ouest Vautour IIB 33 "Big Brother" at the
16:1960 Israel-United Arab Republic confrontation
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349:a brilliant victory for the Egyptian army.
802:. Osprey Elite Series. Osprey Publishing.
255:General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces
270:deployed to the northern Negev, near the
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624:
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694:(in Hebrew). Israeli Air Force Magazine
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245:On February 25 IDF Chief of Operations
7:
95:Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
77:Following Israel's withdrawal from
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820:Middle East Record Volume One 1960
158:, friend and adviser to President
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688:Fischel, Dan (February 1, 1998).
487:(3). Sage Publications: 547–566.
91:Military Intelligence Directorate
742:Dromi, Uri (September 1, 2008).
651:
634:
481:Journal of Contemporary History
799:Israeli elite units since 1948
99:United Nations Emergency Force
35:) was a confrontation between
1:
595:Seliktar, Ofira (June 2005).
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521:
713:Oren, Amir (July 18, 2008).
309:was asked to intervene with
81:, captured during the 1956
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823:. Israel Oriental Society.
669:(in Hebrew). Merchav Aviri
547:Diplomacy & Statecraft
493:10.1177/002200949603100306
416:Origins of the Six-Day War
101:" (UNEF) installed in the
559:10.1080/09592290600695342
553:(2). Routledge: 393–414.
744:
715:
690:
665:
274:Opening, while the 35th
234:Israeli Air Force Museum
156:Mohamed Hassanein Heikal
878:Egypt–Israel relations
817:Oron, Yitzhak (1960).
411:Retribution operations
395:
368:
237:
105:following the crisis.
74:
828:Norton, Bill (2004).
796:Katz, Samuel (1988).
373:Arab–Israeli conflict
360:
231:
200:additional brigades.
166:Egyptian mobilization
146:Israel Defense Forces
62:
775:Gluska, Ami (2007).
304:UN Secretary General
276:Paratroopers Brigade
72:United Arab Republic
41:United Arab Republic
290:United Nations role
268:7th Armored Brigade
114:demilitarized zones
836:Midland Publishing
369:
331:Egyptian Air Force
238:
160:Gamal Abdel Nasser
87:Gamal Abdel Nasser
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64:Gamal Abdel-Nasser
868:Israeli Air Force
845:978-1-85780-088-3
809:978-0-85045-837-4
788:978-1-134-16377-9
225:tank destroyers.
210:Sud-Ouest Vautour
206:Israeli Air Force
68:Shukri al-Quwatli
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259:David Ben-Gurion
241:Israeli response
139:Operation Hargol
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666:ווטור ב' מס' 33
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154:on February 1,
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863:1960 in Israel
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834:. Surrey, UK:
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335:Chief-of-Staff
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300:United Nations
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264:Golani Brigade
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135:Golani Brigade
131:Sea of Galilee
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781:. Routledge.
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769:Bibliography
756:December 18,
754:. Retrieved
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727:December 18,
725:. Retrieved
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698:December 17,
696:. Retrieved
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673:December 13,
671:. Retrieved
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611:December 17,
609:. Retrieved
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382:Chaim Herzog
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319:Yosef Tekoah
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251:Ezer Weizman
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185:Soviet Union
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137:carried out
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125:Tawafiq Raid
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21:Rotem Crisis
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18:
752:(in Hebrew)
723:(in Hebrew)
652:Norton 2004
635:Gluska 2007
377:Haim Laskov
366:Haim Laskov
338:Haim Laskov
89:, Israel's
83:Suez Crisis
49:Six-Day War
857:Categories
422:References
399:Arab world
315:Golda Meir
214:Suez Canal
197:Suez Canal
181:Haifa Port
103:Gaza Strip
55:Background
567:154196909
522:Katz 1988
509:159492526
353:Aftermath
173:Lake Hula
654:, p. 171
582:, p. 190
405:See also
363:Rav Aluf
346:Al-Ahram
298:and the
266:and the
151:Al-Ahram
39:and the
750:Haaretz
721:Haaretz
524:, p. 24
284:Red Sea
177:Galilee
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223:SU-100
208:(IAF)
120:Crisis
37:Israel
25:Hebrew
563:S2CID
505:S2CID
497:JSTOR
427:Notes
393:1960.
311:Cairo
272:Rafah
249:sent
219:Negev
110:Syria
79:Sinai
45:Egypt
33:broom
840:ISBN
804:ISBN
783:ISBN
758:2011
729:2011
700:2011
675:2011
613:2011
580:Oron
66:and
29:רותם
19:The
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