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to physically meet with every specific original author or developer, or users would need to physically meet with the original-releaser of file-signing pub-key, or, users would need to find another alternative trustworthy user, who is in trusted-chain of WOT (aka, another user or another developer or another author, who is trusted by that very specific original author or developer), and then physically meet with that person, to verify their real ID with his/her PGP/GPG key (and also provide your own ID and key to the other user, so that both side can sign/certify and trust each other's PGP/GPG key). Whether a software is popular or not, software users are usually located around the world in different locations. It is physically not possible for an original author or developer or file-releaser to provide public-key or trust or ID verification services to millions of users. Neither is it practical for millions of software users to physically meet with each and every software or every software-library or every piece of code's developer or author or releaser, which they will (use or) need to use in their computers. Even with multiple trusted people/person (by original-author) in trusted-chain from WOT, its still not physically or practically possible for every developer or author to meet with every other users, and it is also not possible for every users to meet with hundreds of developers whose software they will be using or working on. When this decentralized hierarchy based WoT chain model will become popular and used by most nearby users, only then physical meeting and pub-key certify and sign procedure of WoT will be easier.
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produced using the matching public key found in an OpenPGP certificate. Early PGP certificates did not include expiry dates, and those certificates had unlimited lives. Users had to prepare a signed cancellation certificate against the time when the matching private key was lost or compromised. One very prominent cryptographer is still getting messages encrypted using a public key for which he long ago lost track of the private key. They can't do much with those messages except discard them after notifying the sender that they were unreadable and requesting resending with a public key for which they still have the matching private key. Later PGP, and all OpenPGP compliant certificates include expiry dates which automatically preclude such troubles (eventually) when used sensibly. This problem can also be easily avoided by the use of "designated revokers", which were introduced in the early 1990s. A key owner may designate a third party that has permission to revoke the key owner's key (in case the key owner loses his own private key and thus loses the ability to revoke his own public key).
330:": given two individuals, it is often possible to find a short chain of people between them such that each person in the chain knows the preceding and following links. However, such a chain is not necessarily useful: the person encrypting an email or verifying a signature not only has to find a chain of signatures from their private key to their correspondent's, but also to trust each person of the chain to be honest and competent about signing keys (that is, they have to judge whether these people are likely to honestly follow the guidelines about verifying the identity of people before signing keys). This is a much stronger constraint.
306:) depends on other users for trust. Those with new certificates (i.e., produced in the process of generating a new key pair) will not likely be readily trusted by other users' systems, that is by those they have not personally met, until they find enough endorsements for the new certificate. This is because many other Web of Trust users will have their certificate vetting set to require one or more fully trusted endorsers of an otherwise unknown certificate (or perhaps several partial endorsers) before using the public key in that certificate to prepare messages, believe signatures, etc.
313:, it is possible in practice to be unable to readily find someone (or several people) to endorse a new certificate (e.g., by comparing physical identification to key owner information and then digitally signing the new certificate). Users in remote areas or undeveloped ones, for instance, may find other users scarce. And, if the other's certificate is also new (and with no or few endorsements from others), then its signature on any new certificate can offer only marginal benefit toward becoming trusted by still other parties' systems and so able to securely exchange messages with them.
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servers), and must have to be located and kept securely inside their own premises: own-home, own-home-office, or own-office. In that way, those small pieces of original keys/code, will travel intact through internet and will remain unmodified during transit (because of encrypted connection) and will reach destination without being eavesdropped or modified, into user's side, and can be treated as trustworthy public-keys because of single or multi channel TTPA based verification. When a public-key is obtained (from original developer's own web-server) via more than one
580:, other than a public CA. DNSSEC is another form of PGP/GPG WOT but for name-servers; it creates a trusted-chain for name-servers first (instead of people/person), and then people/person's PGP/GPG Keys and fingerprints can also be added into a server's DNSSEC DNS records. So any users who want to communicate securely (or any software users), can effectively get/receive their data/key/code/webpage etc. verified (aka, authenticated) via two (aka, dual/double) trusted PKI TTPAs/Channels at the same time: ICANN (DNSSEC) and
337:) to verify their identity and ownership of a public key and email address, which may involve travel expenses and scheduling constraints affecting both sides. A software user may need to verify hundreds of software components produced by thousands of developers located around the world. As the general population of software users cannot meet in person with all software developers to establish direct trust, they must instead rely on the comparatively slower propagation of indirect trust.
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344:, itself vulnerable to abuse or attacks. To avoid this risk, an author can instead choose to publish their public key on their own key server (i.e., a web server accessible through a domain name owned by them, and securely located in their private office or home) and require the use of HKPS-encrypted connections for the transmission of their public key. For details, see
478:(physical/paper-material based) book, by the original author/developer, is the 2nd best form of sharing trustworthy key with and for users. Before meeting a developer or author, users should research on their own on the developer or author in book library and via internet, and aware of developer's or author's photo, work, pub-key fingerprint, email-address, etc.
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server or from any mirror or from any shared cloud/hosting servers, because, non-encrypted connection based downloaded items/data/files can be authenticated later, by using the original public-keys/signed-codes, which were obtained from the original author's/developer's own server over secured, encrypted, and trusted (aka, verified) connection/channels.
599:, and if users use that new DLV (along with ICANN-DNSSEC) root-key in their own local DNSSEC-based DNS Resolver/Server, and if domain-owners also use it for additional signing of their own domain-names, then there can be a new third TTPA. In such case, any PGP/GPG Key/signed-code data or a webpage or web data can be three/triple-channel verified.
277:-protected Web pages, email messages, etc. can be authenticated without requiring users to manually install root certificates. Applications commonly include over one hundred root certificates from dozens of PKIs, thus by default bestowing trust throughout the hierarchy of certificates which lead back to them.
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code/file (ASC, SIG). So users would need to use original developer's or original author's trustworthy and verified public-key, or users would need to use trustworthy file-signing public-key trusted-by the original owner of that public-key. And to really trust a specific PGP/GPG key, users would need
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However, it is not practical for millions of users who want to communicate or message securely to physically meet with each recipient users, and it is also not practical for millions of software users who need to physically meet with hundreds of software developers or authors, whose software or file
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Senders encrypt their information with the recipient's public key, and only the recipient's private key will decrypt it. Each sender then digitally signs the encrypted information with their private key. When the recipient verifies the received encrypted information against the sender's public key,
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are: original author/developer need to first set a trust-level to sign/certify their own file-signing key. Then updated public-keys and updated file-signing public-keys must also have to be published and distributed (or made accessible) to users, via online secure and encrypted mediums, so that any
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scheme to assist with this; its operation has been termed a web of trust. OpenPGP certificates (which include one or more public keys along with owner information) can be digitally signed by other users who, by that act, endorse the association of that public key with the person or entity listed in
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keys. This forms the basis for the global web of trust. Any two keys in the strong set have a path between them; while islands of sets of keys that only sign each other in a disconnected group can and do exist, only one member of that group needs to exchange signatures with the strong set for that
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The scheme is flexible, unlike most public key infrastructure designs, and leaves trust decisions in the hands of individual users. It is not perfect and requires both caution and intelligent supervision by users. Essentially all PKI designs are less flexible and require users to follow the trust
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encrypted webpage, under their own web server, from their own primary domain website, (not-from any sub-domains which are located in external-servers, not-from any mirror, not-from any external/shared forum/wiki etc website servers, not-from any public or external/shared cloud or hosting service
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Physically meeting with original developer or author, is always the best way to obtain and distribute and verify and trust PGP/GPG Keys with highest trust level, and will remain as the best level of best trustworthy way. Publishing of GPG/PGP full Key or full Key fingerprint on/with widely known
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The OpenPGP web of trust is essentially unaffected by such things as company failures, and has continued to function with little change. However, a related problem does occur: users, whether individuals or organizations, who lose track of a private key can no longer decrypt messages sent to them
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When original public-keys/signed-codes are shown in original dev's or author's own web server or key server, over encrypted connection or encrypted webpage, then any other files, data or content can be transferred over any type of non-encrypted connection, like: HTTP/FTP etc from any sub-domain
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OpenPGP-compliant implementations also include a vote counting scheme which can be used to determine which public key – owner association a user will trust while using PGP. For instance, if three partially trusted endorsers have vouched for a certificate (and so its included public key – owner
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As time goes on, you will accumulate keys from other people that you may want to designate as trusted introducers. Everyone else will each choose their own trusted introducers. And everyone will gradually accumulate and distribute with their key a collection of certifying signatures from other
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also makes key verification easier by linking OpenPGP users via a hierarchical style web of trust where end users can benefit by coincidental or determined trust of someone who is endorsed as an introducer, or by explicitly trusting GSWoT's top-level key minimally as a level 2 introducer (the
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There are two keys pertaining to a person: a public key which is shared openly and a private key that is withheld by the owner. The owner's private key will decrypt any information encrypted with its public key. In the web of trust, each user has a key ring with other people's public keys.
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user from any location in world, can get the correct and trusted and unmodified public-key. To make sure that each users are getting the correct and trusted public-keys and signed-code/file, original dev/author or original-releaser must publish their updated public-keys on their own
236:), or if one fully trusted endorser has done so, the association between owner and public key in that certificate will be trusted to be correct. The parameters are user-adjustable (e.g., no partials at all, or perhaps six partials) and can be completely bypassed if desired.
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they can confirm that it is from the sender. Doing this will ensure that the encrypted information came from the specific user and has not been tampered with, and only the intended recipient can decrypt the information (because only they know their private key).
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are a relatively popular mechanism to resolve this problem of finding other users who can install one's certificate in existing webs of trust by endorsing it. Websites also exist to facilitate the location of other OpenPGP users to arrange keysignings. The
273:. Root certificates must be available to those who use a lower-level CA certificate and so are typically distributed widely. They are for instance, distributed with such applications as browsers and email clients. In this way
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people, with the expectation that anyone receiving it will trust at least one or two of the signatures. This will cause the emergence of a decentralized fault-tolerant web of confidence for all public keys.
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588:). So PGP/GPG key/signed-code data (or file) can be trusted, when such solutions and techniques are used: HKPS, HKPS+DNSSEC+DANE, HTTPS, HTTPS+HPKP or HTTPS+HPKP+DNSSEC+DANE.
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A non-technical, social difficulty with a Web of Trust like the one built into PGP/OpenPGP type systems is that every web of trust without a central controller (e.g., a
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MSD has become a common metric for analysis of sets of PGP keys. Very often you will see the MSD being calculated for a given subset of keys and compared with the
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Obtaining the PGP/GPG key of an author (or developer, publisher, etc.) from a public key server also presents risks, since the key server is a third-party
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Ulrich, Alexander; Holz, Ralph; Hauck, Peter; Carle, Georg (2011). "Investigating the OpenPGP Web of Trust". In Atluri, Vijay; Diaz, Claudia (eds.).
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WOT favors the decentralization of trust anchors to prevent a single point of failure from compromising the CA hierarchy.
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which generally refers to the keys ranking within one of the larger key analyses of the global Web of trust.
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endorsement of the PKI generated, certificate authority (CA)-signed, certificates.
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The possibility of finding chains of certificates is often justified by the "
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in this context. The web of trust makes use of the concept of emergence.
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PKI enables each certificate to be signed by a single party: a
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services for millions of users around the world, at any time.
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903:, no longer maintained; last archived link from August 2020.
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All OpenPGP-compliant implementations include a certificate
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The web of trust concept was first put forth by PGP creator
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191:) can be a part of, and a link between, multiple webs.
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Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator
655:"Dynamic Public Key Certificates with Forward Secrecy"
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If a vast number of user's group create their own new
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is an alternative to the centralized trust model of a
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564:public certificate is declared/shown in TLSA/
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198:in 1992 in the manual for PGP version 2.0:
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751:Ferguson, Niels; Schneier, Bruce (2003).
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465:Learn how and when to remove this message
127:Learn how and when to remove this message
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30:For the internet security website, see
892:An explanation of the PGP Web of Trust
808:"Explanation of this Keyring Analysis"
576:: DNSSEC and DNS namespace maintainer
731:"Fraudulent *.google.com Certificate"
183:(PKI), which relies exclusively on a
167:-compatible systems to establish the
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1258:Naccache–Stern knapsack cryptosystem
360:refers to the largest collection of
65:adding citations to reliable sources
143:Schematic diagram of a Web of Trust
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787:from the original on 2 March 2013
175:and its owner. Its decentralized
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781:"on the apache.org web of trust"
696:Computer Security – ESORICS 2011
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1289:Discrete logarithm cryptography
384:In statistical analysis of the
52:needs additional citations for
1646:Information-theoretic security
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653:Chien, Hung-Yu (2021-08-19).
492:trusted third-party authority
298:Public key authenticity check
1304:Non-commutative cryptography
705:10.1007/978-3-642-23822-2_27
398:mean shortest distance (MSD)
320:Gossamer Spider Web of Trust
1762:Message authentication code
1717:Cryptographic hash function
1530:Cryptographic hash function
1401:Identity-based cryptography
1294:Elliptic-curve cryptography
672:10.3390/electronics10162009
445:the claims made and adding
380:MSD-based trust explanation
215:Operation of a web of trust
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1641:Harvest now, decrypt later
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1820:Public key infrastructure
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1355:Post-Quantum Cryptography
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257:Contrast with typical PKI
207:Note the use of the word
181:public key infrastructure
171:of the binding between a
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1737:Authenticated encryption
1592:Random number generation
729:Nightingale, Johnathan.
1742:Public-key cryptography
1732:Symmetric-key algorithm
1535:Key derivation function
1495:Cryptographic primitive
1488:Authentication protocol
1478:Outline of cryptography
1473:History of cryptography
1299:Hash-based cryptography
946:Public-key cryptography
901:in the PGP web of trust
619:Self-sovereign identity
615:(F2F) computer network.
411:WOT assisting solutions
346:WOT Assisting Solutions
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864:Practical Cryptography
755:. Wiley. p. 333.
753:Practical Cryptography
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372:Mean shortest distance
328:small world phenomenon
261:Unlike WOT, a typical
244:Simplified explanation
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189:public key certificate
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1636:End-to-end encryption
1582:Cryptojacking malware
961:Integer factorization
868:John Wiley & Sons
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267:certificate authority
185:certificate authority
155:is a concept used in
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1752:Quantum cryptography
1676:Trusted timestamping
289:Loss of private keys
61:improve this article
1840:Identity management
1835:Computational trust
1515:Cryptographic nonce
1264:Three-pass protocol
586:SSL/TLS Certificate
315:Key signing parties
226:key signing parties
1621:Subliminal channel
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814:on 3 February 2009
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624:Virtual community
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1252:Merkle–Hellman
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999:Naccache–Stern
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886:External links
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762:978-0471223573
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629:Chain of trust
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1772:Steganography
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1727:Stream cipher
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1686:Onion routing
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1666:Shared secret
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1562:Key generator
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1525:Hash function
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1500:Cryptanalysis
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1024:Schmidt–Samoa
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984:Damgård–Jurik
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979:Cayley–Purser
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634:Root of trust
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595:based DNSSEC
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428:This section
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78: –
77:
73:
72:Find sources:
66:
62:
56:
55:
50:This article
48:
44:
39:
38:
33:
19:
1722:Block cipher
1567:Key schedule
1557:Key exchange
1547:Kleptography
1510:Cryptosystem
1459:Cryptography
1411:OpenPGP card
1391:Web of trust
1390:
1047:Cramer–Shoup
898:
863:
838:. Retrieved
828:
816:. Retrieved
812:the original
801:
789:. Retrieved
774:
766:
752:
746:
734:. Retrieved
724:
695:
689:
665:(16): 2009.
662:
658:
648:
590:
555:
541:
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518:
516:
507:authenticity
504:
496:verification
480:
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169:authenticity
163:, and other
153:web of trust
152:
149:cryptography
146:
123:
114:
104:
97:
90:
83:
71:
59:Please help
54:verification
51:
32:WOT Services
1710:Mathematics
1701:Mix network
1381:Fingerprint
1345:NSA Suite B
1309:RSA problem
1186:NTRUEncrypt
818:13 December
791:13 December
659:Electronics
311:key servers
177:trust model
1809:Categories
1661:Ciphertext
1631:Decryption
1626:Encryption
1587:Ransomware
1335:IEEE P1363
953:Algorithms
899:strong set
640:References
524:key server
500:delegation
455:April 2024
439:improve it
405:global MSD
358:strong set
352:Strong set
342:middle-man
173:public key
87:newspapers
18:Strong set
1651:Plaintext
840:8 January
736:29 August
681:2079-9292
519:solutions
511:signature
498:or trust-
443:verifying
209:emergence
1790:Category
1696:Kademlia
1656:Codetext
1599:(CSPRNG)
1396:Key size
1330:CRYPTREC
1247:McEliece
1201:RLWE-SIG
1196:RLWE-KEX
1191:NTRUSign
1004:Paillier
785:Archived
607:See also
597:registry
482:signing
284:Problems
117:May 2023
1825:OpenPGP
1466:General
1242:Lamport
1222:CEILIDH
1181:NewHope
1128:Schnorr
1111:ElGamal
1089:Ed25519
969:Benaloh
562:SSL/TLS
437:Please
394:OpenPGP
348:below.
275:SSL/TLS
234:binding
221:vetting
165:OpenPGP
101:scholar
1577:Keygen
1364:Topics
1340:NESSIE
1282:Theory
1210:Others
1067:X25519
874:
759:
712:
679:
558:DNSSEC
517:A few
103:
96:
89:
82:
74:
1607:(PRN)
1176:Kyber
1171:BLISS
1133:SPEKE
1101:ECMQV
1094:Ed448
1084:EdDSA
1079:ECDSA
1009:Rabin
578:ICANN
528:HTTPS
390:GnuPG
263:X.509
161:GnuPG
108:JSTOR
94:books
1376:OAEP
1350:CNSA
1227:EPOC
1072:X448
1062:ECDH
872:ISBN
842:2015
820:2013
793:2013
757:ISBN
738:2011
710:ISBN
677:ISSN
574:TTPA
570:HPKP
566:DANE
547:TTPA
533:TTPA
356:The
151:, a
80:news
1386:PKI
1269:XTR
1237:IES
1232:HFE
1163:SIS
1158:LWE
1143:STS
1138:SRP
1123:MQV
1106:EKE
1057:DSA
1042:BLS
1014:RSA
989:GMR
700:doi
667:doi
601:ISC
593:DLV
544:PKI
488:GPG
484:PGP
441:by
386:PGP
365:PGP
157:PGP
147:In
63:by
1811::
1217:AE
1052:DH
870:.
866:.
783:.
765:.
708:.
675:.
663:10
661:.
657:.
582:CA
551:CA
304:CA
228:.
159:,
1451:e
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124:(
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115:(
105:·
98:·
91:·
84:·
57:.
34:.
20:)
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