486:
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17,000 miles per hour (27,000 km/h) compared to the surface of the Earth. At that rate, any given station would spend only a few minutes over the Soviet Union. To ensure there were enough stations in the right locations at any given time, hundreds of stations were needed. The Air Force noted that there was nowhere near enough launch capacity to build such a system, and even if it could be launched, maintaining it would cost at least $ 30 billion a year in 1963 dollars (equivalent to $ 299 billion in 2023). Additionally, it was noted that there was no effective way to protect the stations against attacks by
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amount of energy needed to do this was very low, far less than the amount of energy needed to destroy a missile. This meant that while it was still unknown whether one could ever build a useful directed-energy anti-ICBM weapon, it was already possible to build an anti-SDI weapon that would blind such a system's sensors. One commentator went so far as to note that protecting the optics was "impossible". Such a system could be used against the pebbles in a fashion similar to the A-135, rendering them useless for a critical period while ICBMs were launched.
31:
324:(to become Secretary of Defense much later) concluded that the system had "extremely limited capability for boost phase intercept of present Soviet ICBMs and no capability against future MX-like Soviet boosters, even with no Soviet effort to overcome the defense". Graham's connections in Washington's political circles meant the concept was well known in spite of any official indifference. This led to a constant stream of questions by politicians to the SDIO about the system and why they were not working on it. In 1985,
753:
825:. In the next phase, the interceptor would perform a series of more radical maneuvers in order to characterize the performance of the controls and the tracking system in a more realistic scenario. Finally, the system would perform another series of smaller maneuvers intended to be more accurate movements. This test was largely a failure; the system failed to pick up the target, and all of the subsequent movements were found to be much less accurate than required, to a large degree due to the failure of the
447:. Such lightweight designs would have a limited "cone of action", carrying so little rocket propellant that they could only attack targets right in front of them. A larger interceptor with more propellant could attack more targets, so smaller numbers would be needed to provide coverage. In any event, launch costs would be greatly reduced compared to the baseline system that required hundreds of battle stations, each of which weighed 30 short tons (27 t) and could only be launched one at a time.
477:"You may have seen Lowell Wood, who is responsible for this program, running around town with ... on a little cart." There were concerns about the changing estimates through this period; cost estimates for the pebbles were initially $ 100,000, but by the end of 1988 this had already risen to $ 500,000 to $ 1.5 million. Additionally, the sensor alone cost several million dollars and there was scepticism about whether this could be scaled down by a factor of 10 as Wood's estimates required.
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264:(LLNL or Livermore) made an apparent breakthrough. Nuclear explosions give off massive amounts of X-ray energy, and it appeared possible these could be focused down into narrow beams as the basis for a long-range laser weapon. Previous systems had used carbon-based lasing materials, but calculations showed that the energy could be greatly increased by using a metal rod instead. The idea had been largely theoretical until a key test of the new concept in November 1980.
561:
874:; to be successful, the marginal cost of adding to the defense had to be less than the cost of adding to the offense. If this is not true, then the simplest response to any new defense system is simply to build more offensive missiles. But if the defense is cheaper, this will not work, and the enemy will have to explore other solutions to address the imbalance. Ideally, they too would build defenses, ultimately rendering the offence impotent.
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Wallops Island. Once the two vehicles separated, the kill vehicle was to begin tracking the target, and then use its propulsion system to bring it to within 10 meters (33 ft) of the target vehicle. Seventeen seconds after liftoff the ground crew could see pieces falling off the booster, and it was destroyed by the range safety officer at 55 seconds. The problem was later traced to a failure in one of the rocket nozzles in the
218:, each carrying several dozen small missiles similar to a conventional air-to-air missile. The platforms would carry advanced sensors to detect and track Soviet ICBMs as they launched, and then launch its missiles and guide them until the missile's own infrared sensors picked up the ICBM. As the ICBM rocket engine was extremely bright in infrared, even a very simple interceptor missile could successfully track them.
297:
366:, the lengthy report stated in no uncertain terms that none of the concepts were remotely ready for use. In every case, performance had to be improved at least a hundred times, and for some of the concepts, as much as a million times. It concluded that at least another decade of work was required before they would even know if any of the systems could ever reach the necessary performance.
253:
428:, meaning no warhead would be needed. Considering how small such a system could be scaled, he came up with a lower limit under 1 gram (0.035 oz). But if one considered armored ICBMs, a practical lower limit would be a burnout weight around 1.5 to 2.5 kilograms (3.3–5.5 lb), in order to have more than enough impact energy to destroy any conceivable fuselage.
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presenting a bare minimum of information. One observer derided the concept as being "one view-graph deep" and "unencumbered by practical engineering considerations or the laws of physics". In spite of this, Graham soon found a group of like-minded
Republicans who formed a group known as the High Frontier Panel to help develop and support his idea. The group was led by
677:. Brilliant Eyes was a low-orbit detection platform to aid Pebbles and the ground-based missiles. Additional contracts for the ground-based missiles and interceptors went out at the same time. This marked the first time since the Safeguard program of the 1960s that a production of a ballistic missile defense system was funded, and the first for SDI.
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nighttime test that was supposed to have occurred on the first flight. This test intended to have the interceptor separate from the launcher and then perform a programmed turn so it could see the launcher through several following test phases. The first phase was to simply acquire the target via its rocket plume and keep it in sight using the
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before, the proponents still had no answer to this problem. But now the system added more critical elements, especially the high-orbit sensor satellites which not only had to survive, but had to be able to transmit their information at high speed to the interceptors. Disrupting any one of these many systems could render the system useless.
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out late in 1989, was an Air Force report making one last comparison between the SDS concept with simplified "gun rack" garages versus a
Pebbles system, which concluded the former would cost $ 69 billion and the latter $ 55 billion. This system included only 4,600 pebbles, and some of the savings were due to the removal of the high-orbit
684:, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, arrived late and then essentially took over the meeting. He noted that the complaints that SDIO was not being provided with the required funding was largely their problem, because Cooper was directing too much funding towards Pebbles, which would not be ready by 1996. He stated:
2460:, has a detailed examination of the weight and performance tradeoffs inherent to any kinetic-kill vehicle. Suggests that empty weight was around 20 kg and all-up weight including the life jacket was about 1850 kg. Based on this, they estimate the total cost of a fleet of 2600 pebbles would be $ 76 billion.
609:. Bush praised Patriot, claiming that 42 launches had resulted in 41 intercepts. Congress, formerly skeptical of SDI, suddenly had a very different opinion of the matter, especially with the realignment of the concept towards the PALS concept which would have been helping deal with missiles like Scud.
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The final test was carried out on 22 October 1992, using a much more developed prototype built by
Livermore that had been miniaturized and was more indicative of a production model. This test would begin like the others, with both the kill vehicle and the target being launched from a single rocket at
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that was supposed to separate the rocket fired 81 seconds into flight, much earlier than planned, causing the fairing to flip over to one side and pull the pebble partially out of the airframe. The only success on the mission was that another experiment, the ultraviolet plume instrument (UVPI) flying
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sounding rocket. After launch, the pebble was to separate from the rocket, and then use its sensors to keep itself oriented with the still firing third stage of the Brant while also recording its orientation through the star tracker. The stage would be above the horizon and would take place at night,
688:
So, it is my assertion, Mr. Ambassador – which you can rebut – that what you've done by a combination of funding, and the reduction in GSTS, is, you made sure that Grand Forks would not be effective if we did it during this decade. Therefore, you made it almost impossible for it to happen during this
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Cooper noted that pebbles in their current form were designed to operate against a missile in the boost phase. Against a short-range rocket, this period would be too short for a pebble to reach it. To make it effective in this "Protection
Against Limited missile Strikes" concept, or PALS, the pebbles
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strongly supported
Brilliant Pebbles over the alternatives. Cooper's report went much further. Considering the major changes to the strategic outlook with the ongoing dissolution of the Soviet Union, Cooper stated that the massive attack that SDS was designed to defeat was no longer the only concern,
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Monahan had already given the DAB a "heads up" that major changes to the SDS concept were coming, and had been told to prepare a report for them for early 1990. The new system relied on
Brilliant Pebbles as the baseline design. BSTS was not cancelled outright, but instead passed to the Air Force as a
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A third review focussing on possible Soviet countermeasures did find that the system was possibly compromised by a number of issues, but pointed out that this was true for any other space-based system and these should not be the basis for selecting some other system over SDS. The final study, carried
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The $ 40 billion (equivalent to $ 90 billion in 2023) budget estimate was dismissed as "pure fantasy". Over the next year the budget continued to grow, apparently without bound, first to $ 60 billion (equivalent to $ 140 billion in 2023), to $ 75 billion (equivalent to $ 180 billion in
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could be fired at the
Pebbles. By timing such an attack moments before an ICBM launch, the A-135 system's 100 missiles could destroy those pebbles approaching the USSR and temporarily "punch a hole" for their ICBMs to fly through. Because of the absentee ratio, 1,000 additional pebbles would have to
914:
The SDIO argued that such a response by the
Soviets would be welcome; while the Soviets were deploying their fleet of new missiles to counter Pebbles, SDI would be on its way to deploying new systems based on directed energy weapons that could defeat those missiles. Critics noted that this meant the
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The second test was carried out on 17 April 1991. In this case the interceptor was supposed to be looking down at the target against the daylight Earth, testing its capability to see targets in this orientation. Because of the failure of the first launch, it was decided to instead repeat the simpler
468:
With Teller's help, Wood was able to brief
Abrahamson on the concept in October 1987. Abrahamson was impressed enough to visit Livermore to view the mockups and watch the animated simulation they had created. This led to increased funding for further studies of the concept. In March 1988, Teller and
151:. Pebbles was modified, but doing so raised its weight and cost; the original design called for around 10,000 missiles and would cost $ 10 to $ 20 billion, but by 1990 the cost for 4,600 had ballooned to $ 55 billion. Fighting in Congress through the early 1990s led to Pebbles' cancellation in 1993.
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being studied by SDI were remotely ready for use. Abandoning these approaches for the short term, SDIO then promoted a new concept that was essentially a renamed Smart Rocks. It was at this point that Wood introduced
Pebbles, suggesting that advances in sensors and microprocessors meant there was no
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Critics noted a key flaw in this comparison; since it was only a pebble in the right place at the right time that could attack the ICBM, adding a single ICBM did not require one more pebble, but many more in order to fill out the orbit so one would be in the right area. In the case of Pebbles, this
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The final language for the 1992 version of the bill contained Nunn's language on the focus towards the Limited Defense System. It firmed up language that stated that the deployed system would have to be fully compliant with the ABM Treaty, and reduced funding for the space-based portions from $ 465
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that would allow deployment, and ordered "robust funding" for Brilliant Pebbles. But it also stated that the immediate goal was to produce a Limited Defense System by 1996 what would be fully compliant with the Treaty, meaning it could have a maximum of 100 ground-based interceptors and they had to
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agreed to proceed with a deployment option for a system that was for all intents and purposes an updated version of Smart Rocks. Named "Strategic Defense System, Phase I", or SDS for short, the concept added a ground-based interceptor that would be located in the United States, along with a host of
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was even less. The report went on to explore the ultimate end of such a "fast burn" approach, concluding that it was possible to build a missile that would launch and disperse its warheads in as little as one minute. Such a missile would require many dozens of pebbles for each one so that at least
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In contrast, the Pebbles interceptors flew independently, and thus to attack them the Soviets would have to launch an ASAT for each one. This would mean that developing countermeasures to the system would be on the same order of cost as the pebbles themselves, something the Soviets' weaker economy
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The new GPALS concept was fully described in a May 1991 report published by the SDIO. It consisted of four parts: a ground-based missile system to protect the United States, a ground- and sea-based system to defend overseas United States forces and allies, Brilliant Pebbles in space, and a command
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In May 1988, Abrahamson initiated the Space Based Element Study in order to refine the design of SDS's Space Based Interceptor (SBI). As part of this study, he had Livermore's work considered as one of the interceptor concepts. This study agreed with the basic concept that all the required sensors
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Starting the next year, Wood had the former Excalibur team begin a more detailed study. By the fall of 1987, he had blueprints of the proposed design, a physical model to show, and computer simulations of the system in action. He also came up with a clever play on the Smart Rocks name, calling the
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with no attempt at streamlining. The main body was about 3 feet (0.91 m) long, most of that consisting of propellant tanks for the final-stage directional controls. At the very front was the LIDAR receiver, with the laser illuminator just behind it to one side along with the UV/visible light
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problem. On 1 December 1993, James D. Carlson, its acting deputy director, ordered a stop work on the program. This was part of significant budget rollbacks to the entire program, limiting the organization to work on a single kill-vehicle. Brilliant Pebbles was dead. In August 1994, the Ballistic
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Following Cooper's lead, Monahan began the Mid-and-Terminal Tiers Review (MATTR) in early 1990. Before this was complete, Cooper was appointed as the director of the SDIO on 10 July 1990, and Monahan retired. Within SDIO at least, PALS was now the mainline concept. In order to fill the need for a
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For the next year, Wood and Teller ceaselessly advocated for Pebbles, to the point of it becoming something of a joke in Washington. During a briefing for reporters and congressional staff members, Charles Infosino, deputy director of the SDI architecture and analysis office, was quoted as saying
146:
After considerable study, in 1990, Pebbles replaced Rocks as the baseline SDI design and in 1991 it was ordered into production and became the "crowning achievement of the Strategic Defense Initiative". By this time the Soviet Union was collapsing and the perceived threat changed to shorter-range
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Finally, there was another overarching technical issue that affected all of the space-based weapons. Since the late 1970s, the Soviets had used ground-based lasers to "paint" United States satellites on a number of occasions, in some cases temporarily blinding them. The APS report noted that the
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Compared to earlier ground-based systems, the Smart Rocks interceptor missiles were relatively simple and low-cost. This meant the US could afford to launch several for every Soviet ICBM. However, they suffered the major flaw that they were dependant on support from the garage, and thus a single
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had the problem that they cost more than the ICBMs they were designed to shoot down; the United States would have to purchase $ 20 worth of interceptors for every $ 1 the Soviets spent on new ICBMs. In such a situation, the Soviets could defeat any possible ABM deployment simply by building more
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was coming to an end. He immediately ordered a review of all ongoing strategic programs. This led to the June 1989 National Security Directive 14, continuing the SDI program on the basis of the SDS. Meanwhile, Abrahamson's tenure at the helm of SDIO came to an end. He wrote an end-of-term report
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Teller was also a member of the High Frontier group and began attacking Graham's Smart Rocks as "outlandish", and suggested his own Excalibur be used in its place. Graham countered by pointing out a serious flaw in Excalibur; he noted that it worked by blowing itself up, so in the event a Soviet
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By surrounding a nuclear warhead with dozens of rods, each could be independently aimed to shoot down an enemy missile. A single such warhead might be able to destroy 50 missiles in a radius of a 1,000 kilometers (620 mi) around it. A small fleet of such warheads could seriously disrupt any
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As the interceptors were relatively small and carried a limited amount of rocket fuel, they could only attack ICBMs within a limited range of the stations. This meant the stations had to be in low orbit, to keep them close to their targets. At these altitudes, the stations moved at speeds around
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The worst-case scenario was one in which every silo-based missile was launched at the same time and all of the Soviet mobile launchers were moved to a single location to maximize their density. In that case, only those pebbles over the Soviet Union that instant would be in the right position to
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Wood began exploring the idea using back-of-the-envelope calculations. Wood's "O-group" had been working for some time on new computing systems in their S-1 project that aimed to produce a "supercomputer on a wafer". He combined this with a new sensor system known as "Popeye". At the speeds the
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The system immediately faced withering criticism. As before, the newly christened "garage satellites" would be open to attack by anti-satellite weapons; a single ASAT attacking the station or its sensors could disable all of the interceptor missiles within. Although this concern had been raised
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Although twenty years had elapsed since BAMBI had first been studied and the concept had been re-examined several times, no obvious solution to these problems had presented itself. The Smart Rocks proposal, now known officially as Global Ballistic Missile Defense, ignored all of these problems,
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or even the main one. Instead, it was United States forces in the field that bore the brunt of the missile threat, this time from short and medium range missiles. Although the SDS system should move ahead, he suggested that the system be modified to provide defenses against these new threats.
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In defending his priorities, Cooper stated that the budget for these items was actually within the guidelines laid out the year before, about 11% for Pebbles and 14% for the other components of the space-based portion. He went on to suggest that the 1996 date was unrealistic and that setting
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On 23 March 1983, Reagan gave his famous "Star Wars" speech that called on the scientists of the United States to build defenses that would render nuclear weapons obsolete. Over the next year this was formalized as the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) as a separate branch under the
552:. This series would conclude in February 1993, in time to allow the President to review the system and decide whether to proceed. Information from these tests would be fed back into the production designs. The first of these prototypes would begin testing in June 1990 and end in June 1993.
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Seeing himself increasingly sidelined, Graham left the group in December 1981 to form High Frontier Inc. In March 1982, they published a glossy book on the topic. It claimed that the system could be "fully deployed within five or six years at a minimum cost of some $ 10–$ 15 billion". A
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anti-satellite weapon approached, it could either blow itself up to attack the ASAT, or allow itself to be blown up by the ASAT. In either case, the Excalibur would be destroyed. Teller soon returned with a solution. In this concept, the Excalibur weapons would be placed on missiles on
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For GPALS, Brilliant Pebbles gained new sensors. The core vehicle consisted mostly of propellant tanks for the manoeuvring thrusters clustered around the center of the vehicle. The LIDAR illuminator and receiver are at the front, along with a visible and UV camera. At the rear are the
732:, immediately began downgrading the Pebbles system. On 2 February 1993, he issued budget guidance lowering its budget from $ 100 million to $ 75 million, and moving it to the "follow on technology" category. In March 1993, it was renamed the Advanced Interceptor Technology Program.
460:
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Wood were able to directly brief President Reagan on the concept, taking the model pebble with them and theatrically hiding it under a black cloth when reporters were allowed to take pictures. Teller reiterated that the price for the system would be on the order of $ 10 billion.
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Cooper essentially ignored the anti-Pebbles sentiment of the Missile Defense Act, and maintained its place as the primary weapon within the GPALS system. With funding secured, in June 1991 the SDIO sent out development contracts for Brilliant Pebbles and Brilliant Eyes to
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I have directed that the SDI program be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes – whatever their source. Let us pursue an SDI program that can deal with any future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas, and to our friends and
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Considering the numbers required, it appeared a fleet would have on the order of 7,000 missiles in orbit, which would keep about 700 over the Soviet Union at any given time. The ratio of the total number of missiles in orbit to those available for action was known as the
547:
Early contract tenders were sent to six suppliers for production vehicles. Testing was to run in a two-phase program, some of it in parallel. To start, LLNL would supply prototype pebbles interceptors that would be tested both on the ground and in space after launch on
436:. If one wanted complete coverage against any potential attack, the numbers could reach as high as 100,000 missiles in total. Since the cost of each missile was expected to scale down into the $ 100,000 range, even the fully expanded system would cost $ 10 billion.
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could be placed on the missile. While this was going on, the United States Air Force Space Division began a similar study on the baseline Space Based Interceptor. They also concluded that the sensors could be on the missiles, greatly simplifying the stations.
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should be able to continue tracking the missiles after their motors had burned out. This would either require a dramatic increase in the capability of the pebble's seekers, or require a network of low-orbit satellites to provide this same information.
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performance on a single chip. These chips were powerful enough that the processing capacity that formerly required the battle stations, or even computers on the ground, could now fit in the missiles themselves. Additionally, new sensors offered the
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priorities to make it happen would not help. Seeing the implied threat to the program, Cooper soon moved $ 2 billion out of Pebbles into the ground-based systems. Nunn reiterated his attack on Pebbles in August, at which point Secretary of Defense
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With the deployable system finally specified, the next step was to go to Congress for funding. This led to the Missile Defense Act of 1991. From one perspective, the Missile Defense Act was a victory for SDI as it considered making changes to the
309:, and soon, many of the United States weapons laboratories and major defense contractors were exploring a variety of systems to meet this goal. Along with Excalibur and the space-based laser, new proposals included ground-based lasers, various
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stepped in and threatened that if the attacks continued that the president might veto the entire bill. His position was undermined by the failure of the third Pebbles test on 22 October 1992, when the booster broke up shortly after liftoff.
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in 1979; there he saw the systems that could detect a Soviet launch and then track their warheads. When he asked what they could do in that situation, the answer was "launch our own missiles". Whatever the source, Reagan was convinced that
352:, demonstrated performance that was so poor it was unlikely it could ever work. The best among them all was the space-based laser, but it needed to improve its beam quality by at least 100 times before it would be able to disable an ICBM.
359:(APS) published their review of the directed-energy weapon efforts. After a lengthy declassification procedure, it was released to the public in March 1987. Compiled by a number of notables in the laser and physics community, including
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and control system tying them all together. Brilliant Pebbles was seen as both a system for providing early detection of launches, as well as being able to attack any missile with a range greater than 600 kilometers (370 mi).
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needed to track a missile at long range and still fit within a missile nose cone. Such a design offered an enormous advantage over the SDS; by flying freely, without a garage satellite, the interceptors could not be attacked
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camera. At the rear were the batteries. Forward speed was provided by a series of four boosters known as "drop stages". Each consisted of a tank about the size of the pebble's own, along with a thruster engine at the rear.
115:(SDI). This used large battle stations with powerful sensors, carrying dozens of small missiles, the rocks. To keep enough missiles above the Soviet Union at any given time, a minimum of 423 stations would be needed. The
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anti-satellite weapon could render all of the interceptors inoperative. Smart Rocks thus failed the Nitze criterion, as it was less expensive for the Soviets to attack the system than it would be for the US to build it.
961:$ 55 billion was the price of the entire system, including the ground-based missiles and various sensor platforms. The price of the Pebbles alone is difficult to isolate but various sources put it close to $ 35 billion.
463:
In March 1988, Teller and Wood (on the left) present the original Pebbles concept to Reagan, Bush, Abrahamson and members of the SDIO. The model of the pebble was theatrically draped in black cloth to hide it from the
665:. It was specifically stated that Brilliant Pebbles would not be part of this initial system. Although there was some concern about the Missile Defense Act, many considered it to be the best deal that could be made.
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radars and high- and low-orbit sensor satellites, all netted together with a command and control system. They briefed Reagan on the concept on 17 December 1986, and by mid-1987 had a proposal ready for review by the
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stating that Brilliant Pebbles should be aggressively pursued and that tests could be carried out within two years for a system deployment in five years at a total cost of $ 25 billion. Bush and Vice President
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SDIO was arguing that Pebbles would lead to an offensive arms buildup, precisely the opposite of what they had previously claimed was the point of the entire SDI concept, and contrary to the Nitze criterion.
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need for a central station—the missiles could host all the equipment they needed to act alone. To attack this system, anti-satellite weapons would have to be launched against every pebble, not every station.
335:
By 1986, many of the systems being studied had run into difficulties. Among these was Teller's Excalibur, which failed several critical tests in 1986. A similar test carried out by skeptical physicists at
402:
After Excalibur's failed tests in 1986, the program was about to be defunded. At that time, Livermore had no other major SDI programs. Teller and Wood were looking for a concept that would be feasible.
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attack. Against a staggered launch, or one that was spread out physically, new pebbles would be arriving all the time in their individual orbits, so fewer were needed over the Soviet Union at one time.
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pointed out that this would require an enormous space lift capability, well beyond what was available. In meetings with Graham, Teller dismissed the concept as "outlandish" and vulnerable to attack by
520:. Their report essentially stated that there were no apparent "show stopper" issues in the concept, although they did have concerns about possible countermeasures. Soon after, a similar report by the
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pointed out early in the SDI program, any system that relied on boost-phase attacks had to be able to reach the target while the missile's motor was still firing. With existing Soviet ICBMs like the
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In November 1992, SDIO was forced to remove Pebbles from the deployment contracts, sending it back to a research program. On 18 December 1992, program management was transferred to the Air Force's
406:
The two had breakfast with Gregory Canavan, a Los Alamos physicist who worked on SDI related topics. Canavan noted that ongoing improvements meant microprocessors were on the verge of delivering
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were vocal supporters of the Pebbles concept in the press; Quayle noted its low cost and light weight and stated that "it could revolutionize much of our thinking about strategic defense".
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This change in posture meant the system no longer had to deal with a large-scale attack, only small ones. Once again the number of pebbles was reduced, this time to between 750 and 1,000.
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On 9 April 1992, Cooper testified before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee, where he was questioned by Democrats in the group.
512:, planned a rapid series of studies with the goal of moving to approval for deployment by the end of the year. Among the first of these studies was one prepared by the
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in orbit above the launch, was able to successfully track the rocket. As a result of the failure of the first test, the follow-up series was delayed by 10 months.
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and collide with them. Because the pebble strikes the ICBM before the latter could release its warheads, each pebble could destroy several warheads with one shot.
210:, to look for possible solutions. At first, Graham proposed a system of crewed space fighters, but the idea was quickly dismissed. Next, he revived the 1960s
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newer, smaller, smarter concept Brilliant Pebbles. In another clever turn of phrase, one skeptical congressman would later refer to them as "loose marbles".
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GSTS, the Ground-Based Surveillance and Tracking System, was a series of radars and other sensors that would provide tracking to the ground-based missiles.
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could not afford. This appeared to meet the Nitze criterion; they could not afford to build their way out of the problem either using ASATs or new ICBMs.
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transceiver. The shell itself was intended to provide protection from laser strikes and pellets from the known Soviet anti-satellite weapon, part of the
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39:
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891:"absentee ratio" was on the order of 10-to-1, meaning that adding a single ICBM would require ten new pebbles, driving the cost much closer to parity.
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that did it. Edward Teller instead pointed to a talk he gave on the topic of BMD in 1967 that Reagan attended. Others point to Reagan's visit to the
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broke out and Cooper's scenario of United States troops being attacked by short range missiles came true; the nightly news carried vivid images of
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James Abrahamson, director of the SDIO, initially dismissed the Smart Rocks concept, but later selected a modified version for the SDI mission.
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66:
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The APS report provides a good overview of many of the major technologies that were considered during the early stages of the SDI program.
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million in the 1991 version to $ 300 million. Further, the wording that the system should be deployed as rapidly as possible was dropped.
332:, director of the SDIO, about it once again. Abrahamson stated that "he would not recommend that the United States proceed to deploy it".
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driven by a nuclear warhead that could attack dozens of ICBMs at once. In 1986, Excalibur failed several critical tests. Soon after, the
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792:
Only three all-up tests of the Pebbles concept were carried out before the program was cancelled. All three failed for various reasons.
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could launch dozens, perhaps hundreds. They were so light that some consideration was given to launching them from the ground using a
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interceptors and ICBMs would be approaching each other, the mass of the projectile had six times the energy of an equal weight of
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pre-publication copy was sent to the Air Force, who dismissed it, saying that it "had no technical merit and should be rejected".
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2160:
1154:
829:. Some useful data characterizing the IR background was performed, but the UV sensor only recorded its own background noise.
337:
895:
657:
489:
Bush and Quayle remained vocal supporters of the program as the strategic outlook changed with the ending of the Cold War.
2194:
777:
529:
177:
112:
207:
1620:
795:
The first pebble test was carried out on 25 August 1990. This consisted of a basic airframe carrying an IR sensor, a
716:, and the January 1993 contracts were for "advanced technology demonstration" as opposed to a pre-production system.
2252:
928:
be added to the fleet to counter this possibility, not 100. This sort of attack would cost the Soviets very little.
439:
Launch costs were not part of that estimate. If the empty weight was on the order of a few kilograms, then a single
662:
196:
768:
For most of its lifetime, the pebble would be held inside its "life jacket". This provided electrical power via a
740:
383:
356:
191:
148:
135:
34:
A pebble emerges from its "life jacket" just prior to launch. This is an earlier model before the GPALS upgrades.
1051:"An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives"
420:. If the Soviets wished to attack the system, they would have to launch an anti-satellite weapon for every one.
320:
Through the early phases of SDI, the Smart Rocks concept was ignored by the SDIO. A study by research scientist
2478:
980:
822:
537:
509:
360:
235:
116:
752:
2072:
851:
513:
139:
30:
948:
The term "smart rocks" has since been used for a variety of different weapons systems. Examples include
521:
314:
306:
256:
Concept art of Excalibur. Had it worked, would have been able to attack multiple ICBMs in a single shot.
223:
120:
639:
260:
Around the same time that Graham was formulating his Smart Rocks concept, studies into X-ray lasers at
1003:
859:
missiles. This was a major argument against ABM systems in the 1960s and 70s, and became known as the
647:
led the attack on Pebbles, which ultimately led to strong limitations being placed on its development.
214:
to be the basis of a new system he referred to as Smart Rocks. This concept used "battle stations" in
2284:
808:
799:
and an attitude control system. It was to be launched to an altitude of 124 miles (200 km) over
781:
570:
341:
310:
78:
907:
860:
329:
38:
560:
459:
2129:
1536:
MacKenzie, Donald (1991). "Notes Toward a Sociology of Supercomputing". In La Porte, Todd (ed.).
911:
one of them was close enough to catch it, making the defenses much more expensive than the ICBM.
761:
613:
412:
394:
2023), and then reaching $ 100 billion by April 1988 (equivalent to $ 240 billion in 2023).
1231:
979:
The idea of using an entire wafer for a single computer processor was in vogue at the time, see
2024:
2018:
268:
Soviet attack. In February 1981, Teller and Wood traveled to Washington to pitch the idea of a
2424:
2340:
2237:
2216:
2179:
2028:
1235:
1079:
1073:
616:
speech to announce that SDI was being refocussed to the new "Global PALS", or GPALS, concept:
517:
493:
378:
363:
273:
269:
247:
127:
85:
2418:
1989:
2372:
2292:
903:
591:
203:
181:
108:
74:
670:
606:
586:(HEDI), essentially a short-range, mobile version of ERIS. A new lightweight interceptor,
549:
215:
97:
82:
54:
43:
744:
Missile Defense Organization was reoriented to a single Boost Phase Interceptor program.
2288:
206:, his military advisor during the 1980 presidential campaign and former director of the
168:
Daniel Graham proposed the Smart Rocks concept that ultimately led to Brilliant Pebbles.
1224:
899:
871:
834:
813:
800:
349:
231:
199:(MAD) was ridiculous, dismissing it as the international equivalent of a suicide pact.
2314:
296:
2467:
2050:"To Deter or Win Future Wars, the United States Must Reverse the Cost-Exchange Ratio"
1363:
440:
407:
211:
173:
62:
756:
The "life jacket" protected the pebble in orbit, providing power and communications.
2457:
2296:
796:
773:
725:
582:
ground-based interceptor to back up the pebbles, the Army began development of the
186:
89:
1162:
2334:
2304:
2231:
2210:
2173:
2233:
The Star Wars Enigma: Behind the Scenes of the Cold War Race for Missile Defense
769:
701:
131:
104:
58:
252:
2376:
867:
689:
decade. I don't know the motive for that, but that's what it looks like to me.
544:
missile and its host of supporting radars and low-orbit satellites, remained.
502:
321:
226:(ASATs), and the Soviets could easily afford to launch one for each platform.
855:
826:
729:
281:
1991:
Strategic Defense Initiative: Some Claims Overstated for Early Flight Tests
17:
2260:
804:
681:
674:
644:
598:
540:
satellites. Other parts of the original design, including the land-based
497:
345:
325:
70:
2212:
Way Out There In the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War
340:
suggested there was no lasing going on at all. Other concepts, like the
1015:
Later analysis put the number closer to 4 hits for 42 Patriot launches.
949:
444:
272:-level development effort to produce these weapons in what they called
164:
1226:
The Essential Ronald Reagan: A Profile in Courage, Justice, and Wisdom
1050:
2309:(Technical report). Office of Technology Assessment. September 1985.
1538:
Social Responses to Large Technical Systems: Control or Anticipation
180:. According to one often repeated tale, it was Reagan's viewing of
2275:
Herken, Gregg (October 1987). "The earthly origins of Star Wars".
751:
638:
559:
484:
458:
295:
251:
163:
37:
29:
2447:"Brilliant Pebbles: The Revolutionary Idea for Strategic Defense"
2356:"Exclusive Graphic Soviet lasers said to zap U.S. spy satellites"
123:. The SDI Office (SDIO) was similarly dismissive of the concept.
602:
2386:"Year of Lobbying Turned 'Brilliant Pebbles' into Top SDI Plan"
425:
2175:
American Arsenal: A Century of Weapon Technology and Strategy
2084:
2082:
1954:
1952:
1587:
1585:
1583:
1581:
1549:
1547:
1507:
1505:
1503:
1324:
1322:
1320:
1307:
1305:
1268:
1266:
1253:
1251:
1101:"Smart Rocks Might Be Ticket To Great Weapons Hall Of Fame"
516:, a standing committee of science advisers administered by
2134:(Technical report). American Physical Society. April 1987.
739:(BMDO), reflecting the administration's shift towards the
96:
fleet, the pebbles would detect their rocket motors using
172:
There are a wide variety of stories about the origins of
126:
Teller and Wood initially proposed their own BMD system,
42:
Approximately 1,600 satellites maintained in orbit for a
2363:
Smith, David (1993). "The Missile Defense Act of 1991".
1969:
1967:
1939:
1937:
1804:
1802:
1789:
1787:
1762:
1760:
1758:
1602:
1600:
1568:
1566:
1564:
1562:
728:
became President in 1993, his new Secretary of Defense,
1181:
1179:
1137:
1135:
1133:
1131:
1129:
1127:
1125:
2148:
The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies
902:, this period lasted as long as six minutes. The US's
776:
to provide basic alignment information, and carried a
1075:
To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans
1648:
1646:
1466:
1464:
1462:
2458:Space Based Missile Interceptor Sizing Methodology
2336:Voodoo Science: The Road from Foolishness to Fraud
2161:"What's Next for 'Star Wars'? 'Brilliant Pebbles'"
1733:
1731:
1729:
1727:
1725:
1723:
1721:
1389:
1387:
1385:
1223:
923:Another issue raised was that the existing Soviet
532:(BSTS), a role the pebbles themselves would fill.
374:In a sudden reversal, in late 1986 Abrahamson and
2131:Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons
2397:Stevens, Charles; White, Carol (13 April 1990).
906:fleet only burned for four minutes, and the new
686:
618:
569:A month later, another independent review by
77:, each with missiles similar to conventional
8:
2100:
2088:
1591:
1553:
1053:. National Research Council. 5 November 2012
455:Pebbles becomes the Strategic Defense System
138:published a report stating that none of the
92:at all times. If the Soviets launched their
1161:: 55. January–February 2001. Archived from
812:easing the problem of tracking. One of the
73:. The system would consist of thousands of
1994:(Technical report). GAO. 1993. p. 36.
1511:
1340:
1328:
1311:
1296:
1284:
1272:
1257:
1209:
760:The final pebble design was similar to an
1984:
1982:
556:Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
2399:"'Brilliant Pebbles' are not that smart"
2141:"The Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles"
1621:"'Brilliant Pebbles'? No, Loose Marbles"
1155:"Adapting to a Changing Weapons Program"
584:High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor
234:and began meeting in a room provided by
2251:Heller, Arnie (January–February 1999).
1185:
1042:
941:
2306:Ballistic missile defense technologies
2004:
1973:
1958:
1943:
1928:
1916:
1904:
1892:
1880:
1868:
1856:
1832:
1820:
1808:
1793:
1778:
1766:
1749:
1712:
1700:
1688:
1676:
1664:
1637:
1606:
1572:
1482:
1441:
1376:
1197:
1141:
1078:. Black Rose Books. pp. 248–249.
1072:Kaku, Michio; Axelrod, Daniel (1987).
737:Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
530:Boost Surveillance and Tracking System
262:Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
67:Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
2054:Proceedings of the US Naval Institute
1844:
1652:
1470:
1453:
590:, would arm both ERIS and the Navy's
524:offered largely the same assessment.
7:
2253:"Leading the Best and the Brightest"
2112:
1494:
1230:. Rowman & Littlefield. p.
952:weapons, and hypervelocity missiles.
870:to propose what became known as the
88:so that hundreds would be above the
69:(LLNL) in 1987, near the end of the
2384:Smith, R. Jeffrey (26 April 1989).
1737:
1523:
1429:
1417:
1405:
1393:
925:A-135 anti-ballistic missile system
735:On 1 May 1993, the SDIO became the
2445:Gattuso, James (25 January 1990).
612:On 29 January 1991, Bush used the
103:The name is a play on the idea of
25:
2354:Sale, Richard (23 January 1988).
2277:Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
1619:Bennett, Charles (17 June 1989).
1359:Federation of American Scientists
1099:Weller, Steve (2 February 1986).
496:became President in 1989, as the
2420:Secret Gear, Gadgets, and Gizmos
2159:Broad, William (25 April 1989).
2071:Krepon, Michael (28 July 2010).
2020:Thinking About America's Defense
714:Space and Missile Systems Center
27:US anti-ballistic missile system
2178:. Oxford University Press USA.
1159:Science & Technology Review
536:replacement for their existing
2297:10.1080/00963402.1987.11459585
2139:Baucom, Donald (Summer 2004).
338:Los Alamos National Laboratory
1:
2257:Science and Technology Review
896:Union of Concerned Scientists
658:Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
2474:Strategic Defense Initiative
2209:FitzGerald, Frances (2001).
1354:"Missile Defense Milestones"
178:Strategic Defense Initiative
113:Strategic Defense Initiative
2339:. Oxford University Press.
2193:Correll, John (June 2012).
2073:"Nitze's Strategic Concept"
2048:Ullman, Harlan (May 2021).
635:Missile Defense Act of 1991
605:missiles being attacked by
208:Defense Intelligence Agency
2495:
2406:EIR Science and Technology
2195:"They Called it Star Wars"
663:Grand Forks Air Force Base
508:Abrahamson's replacement,
292:Early failures, APS report
284:and launched when needed.
245:
197:mutual assured destruction
149:theatre ballistic missiles
2377:10.1080/01495939308402904
741:theatre ballistic missile
481:Moving towards production
384:Defense Acquisition Board
357:American Physical Society
192:Cheyenne Mountain Complex
136:American Physical Society
57:(BMD) system proposed by
55:ballistic missile defense
2172:Coffey, Patrick (2014).
2101:Stevens & White 1990
2089:Stevens & White 1990
1592:Stevens & White 1990
1554:Stevens & White 1990
370:Strategic Defense System
107:, a concept promoted by
44:boost-phase interception
2451:The Heritage Foundation
981:wafer scale integration
846:Promising cost-exchange
823:attitude control system
597:As work continued, the
538:Defense Support Program
236:The Heritage Foundation
140:directed-energy weapons
117:United States Air Force
2215:. Simon and Schuster.
852:anti-ballistic missile
757:
697:
661:be in the vicinity of
648:
629:
566:
510:George L. Monahan, Jr.
490:
465:
315:nuclear shaped charges
301:
257:
224:anti-satellite weapons
169:
121:anti-satellite weapons
47:
35:
2333:Park, Robert (2002).
1222:Edwards, Lee (2005).
755:
642:
563:
522:Defense Science Board
488:
462:
311:particle-beam weapons
307:Department of Defense
299:
255:
167:
79:heat seeking missiles
41:
33:
2417:Yenne, Bill (2005).
2365:Comparative Strategy
2017:Kent, Glenn (2008).
1540:. NATO. p. 167.
782:Istrebitel Sputnikov
778:laser communications
376:Secretary of Defense
355:That same year, the
2315:"Brilliant Pebbles"
2289:1987BuAtS..43h..20H
2230:Hey, Nigel (2006).
1907:, pp. 180–181.
1679:, pp. 153–156.
1640:, pp. 151–152.
861:cost-exchange ratio
854:(ABM) systems like
342:neutral beam weapon
330:James A. Abrahamson
2423:. Zenith Imprint.
2319:GlobalSecurity.org
2202:Air Force Magazine
1625:The New York Times
1004:to lose one's mind
1002:An idiom meaning "
762:air-to-air missile
758:
649:
614:State of the Union
567:
491:
466:
413:optical resolution
302:
258:
170:
48:
36:
2236:. Potomac Books.
2204:. pp. 66–70.
2034:978-0-8330-4452-5
1366:on March 6, 2016.
904:Minuteman missile
518:Mitre Corporation
494:George H. W. Bush
398:Brilliant Pebbles
379:Caspar Weinberger
364:Charles H. Townes
274:Project Excalibur
270:Manhattan Project
248:Project Excalibur
128:Project Excalibur
51:Brilliant Pebbles
16:(Redirected from
2486:
2454:
2434:
2413:
2403:
2393:
2380:
2359:
2350:
2329:
2327:
2325:
2310:
2300:
2271:
2269:
2268:
2259:. Archived from
2247:
2226:
2205:
2199:
2189:
2168:
2155:
2145:
2135:
2116:
2110:
2104:
2098:
2092:
2086:
2077:
2076:
2068:
2062:
2061:
2045:
2039:
2038:
2023:. RAND. p.
2014:
2008:
2002:
1996:
1995:
1986:
1977:
1971:
1962:
1956:
1947:
1941:
1932:
1926:
1920:
1914:
1908:
1902:
1896:
1890:
1884:
1878:
1872:
1866:
1860:
1854:
1848:
1842:
1836:
1830:
1824:
1818:
1812:
1806:
1797:
1791:
1782:
1776:
1770:
1764:
1753:
1747:
1741:
1735:
1716:
1710:
1704:
1698:
1692:
1686:
1680:
1674:
1668:
1662:
1656:
1650:
1641:
1635:
1629:
1628:
1616:
1610:
1604:
1595:
1589:
1576:
1570:
1557:
1551:
1542:
1541:
1533:
1527:
1521:
1515:
1509:
1498:
1492:
1486:
1480:
1474:
1468:
1457:
1451:
1445:
1439:
1433:
1427:
1421:
1415:
1409:
1403:
1397:
1391:
1380:
1374:
1368:
1367:
1362:. Archived from
1350:
1344:
1338:
1332:
1326:
1315:
1309:
1300:
1294:
1288:
1282:
1276:
1270:
1261:
1255:
1246:
1245:
1229:
1219:
1213:
1207:
1201:
1195:
1189:
1183:
1174:
1173:
1171:
1170:
1151:
1145:
1139:
1120:
1119:
1117:
1116:
1107:. Archived from
1096:
1090:
1089:
1069:
1063:
1062:
1060:
1058:
1047:
1025:
1022:
1016:
1013:
1007:
1000:
994:
990:
984:
977:
971:
968:
962:
959:
953:
946:
695:
627:
607:Patriot missiles
592:Standard Missile
550:sounding rockets
204:Daniel O. Graham
182:Alfred Hitchcock
109:Daniel O. Graham
98:infrared seekers
75:small satellites
21:
2494:
2493:
2489:
2488:
2487:
2485:
2484:
2483:
2479:Missile defense
2464:
2463:
2444:
2441:
2439:Further reading
2431:
2416:
2401:
2396:
2390:Washington Post
2383:
2362:
2353:
2347:
2332:
2323:
2321:
2313:
2303:
2274:
2266:
2264:
2250:
2244:
2229:
2223:
2208:
2197:
2192:
2186:
2171:
2158:
2143:
2138:
2128:
2125:
2120:
2119:
2111:
2107:
2099:
2095:
2087:
2080:
2070:
2069:
2065:
2047:
2046:
2042:
2035:
2016:
2015:
2011:
2003:
1999:
1988:
1987:
1980:
1972:
1965:
1957:
1950:
1942:
1935:
1927:
1923:
1915:
1911:
1903:
1899:
1891:
1887:
1879:
1875:
1867:
1863:
1855:
1851:
1843:
1839:
1831:
1827:
1819:
1815:
1807:
1800:
1792:
1785:
1777:
1773:
1765:
1756:
1748:
1744:
1736:
1719:
1711:
1707:
1699:
1695:
1687:
1683:
1675:
1671:
1663:
1659:
1651:
1644:
1636:
1632:
1618:
1617:
1613:
1605:
1598:
1590:
1579:
1571:
1560:
1552:
1545:
1535:
1534:
1530:
1522:
1518:
1512:FitzGerald 2001
1510:
1501:
1493:
1489:
1481:
1477:
1469:
1460:
1452:
1448:
1440:
1436:
1428:
1424:
1416:
1412:
1404:
1400:
1392:
1383:
1375:
1371:
1352:
1351:
1347:
1341:FitzGerald 2001
1339:
1335:
1329:FitzGerald 2001
1327:
1318:
1312:FitzGerald 2001
1310:
1303:
1297:FitzGerald 2001
1295:
1291:
1285:FitzGerald 2001
1283:
1279:
1273:FitzGerald 2001
1271:
1264:
1258:FitzGerald 2001
1256:
1249:
1242:
1221:
1220:
1216:
1210:FitzGerald 2001
1208:
1204:
1196:
1192:
1184:
1177:
1168:
1166:
1153:
1152:
1148:
1140:
1123:
1114:
1112:
1098:
1097:
1093:
1086:
1071:
1070:
1066:
1056:
1054:
1049:
1048:
1044:
1039:
1034:
1029:
1028:
1023:
1019:
1014:
1010:
1001:
997:
991:
987:
978:
974:
969:
965:
960:
956:
947:
943:
938:
921:
888:
848:
843:
841:Countermeasures
814:explosive bolts
790:
750:
722:
696:
693:
671:Martin Marietta
637:
628:
625:
571:Henry F. Cooper
558:
483:
457:
400:
372:
348:atoms near the
294:
250:
244:
216:low Earth orbit
162:
157:
130:. This used an
111:as part of the
83:low Earth orbit
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
2492:
2490:
2482:
2481:
2476:
2466:
2465:
2462:
2461:
2455:
2440:
2437:
2436:
2435:
2429:
2414:
2394:
2381:
2360:
2351:
2345:
2330:
2311:
2301:
2272:
2248:
2242:
2227:
2221:
2206:
2190:
2184:
2169:
2165:New York Times
2156:
2136:
2124:
2121:
2118:
2117:
2105:
2093:
2078:
2063:
2040:
2033:
2009:
2007:, p. 167.
1997:
1978:
1976:, p. 181.
1963:
1948:
1946:, p. 184.
1933:
1931:, p. 183.
1921:
1919:, p. 182.
1909:
1897:
1895:, p. 178.
1885:
1883:, p. 177.
1873:
1871:, p. 176.
1861:
1859:, p. 175.
1849:
1837:
1835:, p. 171.
1825:
1823:, p. 269.
1813:
1811:, p. 170.
1798:
1796:, p. 270.
1783:
1781:, p. 166.
1771:
1769:, p. 165.
1754:
1752:, p. 164.
1742:
1717:
1715:, p. 160.
1705:
1703:, p. 159.
1693:
1691:, p. 158.
1681:
1669:
1667:, p. 153.
1657:
1642:
1630:
1611:
1609:, p. 150.
1596:
1577:
1575:, p. 149.
1558:
1543:
1528:
1526:, p. 211.
1516:
1514:, p. 482.
1499:
1497:, p. 188.
1487:
1485:, p. 147.
1475:
1458:
1446:
1444:, p. 146.
1434:
1432:, p. 145.
1422:
1420:, p. 296.
1410:
1398:
1381:
1379:, p. 145.
1369:
1345:
1343:, p. 142.
1333:
1331:, p. 135.
1316:
1314:, p. 129.
1301:
1299:, p. 131.
1289:
1287:, p. 134.
1277:
1275:, p. 114.
1262:
1260:, p. 127.
1247:
1240:
1214:
1202:
1190:
1175:
1146:
1144:, p. 268.
1121:
1091:
1084:
1064:
1041:
1040:
1038:
1035:
1033:
1030:
1027:
1026:
1017:
1008:
995:
985:
972:
963:
954:
940:
939:
937:
934:
920:
919:Other problems
917:
887:
886:Absentee ratio
884:
872:Nitze criteria
847:
844:
842:
839:
801:Wallops Island
789:
786:
749:
746:
724:Shortly after
721:
718:
691:
636:
633:
623:
557:
554:
482:
479:
456:
453:
434:absentee ratio
399:
396:
371:
368:
361:Nobel laureate
350:speed of light
293:
290:
246:Main article:
243:
240:
232:Karl Bendetsen
161:
158:
156:
153:
86:constellations
26:
24:
14:
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10:
9:
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2430:9781610607445
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2346:9780198604433
2342:
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2273:
2263:on 2017-05-02
2262:
2258:
2254:
2249:
2245:
2243:9781574889819
2239:
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2224:
2222:9780743203777
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2185:9780199959747
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2149:
2142:
2137:
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2127:
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2122:
2114:
2109:
2106:
2103:, p. 28.
2102:
2097:
2094:
2091:, p. 26.
2090:
2085:
2083:
2079:
2074:
2067:
2064:
2059:
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2044:
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2013:
2010:
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1877:
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1870:
1865:
1862:
1858:
1853:
1850:
1847:, p. 73.
1846:
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1631:
1626:
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1615:
1612:
1608:
1603:
1601:
1597:
1594:, p. 27.
1593:
1588:
1586:
1584:
1582:
1578:
1574:
1569:
1567:
1565:
1563:
1559:
1556:, p. 29.
1555:
1550:
1548:
1544:
1539:
1532:
1529:
1525:
1520:
1517:
1513:
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1496:
1491:
1488:
1484:
1479:
1476:
1472:
1467:
1465:
1463:
1459:
1456:, p. 86.
1455:
1450:
1447:
1443:
1438:
1435:
1431:
1426:
1423:
1419:
1414:
1411:
1408:, p. 35.
1407:
1402:
1399:
1395:
1390:
1388:
1386:
1382:
1378:
1373:
1370:
1365:
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1254:
1252:
1248:
1243:
1241:9780742543751
1237:
1233:
1228:
1227:
1218:
1215:
1212:, p. 20.
1211:
1206:
1203:
1200:, p. 20.
1199:
1194:
1191:
1188:, p. 66.
1187:
1182:
1180:
1176:
1165:on 2017-05-02
1164:
1160:
1156:
1150:
1147:
1143:
1138:
1136:
1134:
1132:
1130:
1128:
1126:
1122:
1111:on 2018-01-07
1110:
1106:
1102:
1095:
1092:
1087:
1085:9780921689065
1081:
1077:
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1068:
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1021:
1018:
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1005:
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989:
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967:
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918:
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909:
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892:
885:
883:
879:
875:
873:
869:
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862:
857:
853:
845:
840:
838:
837:first stage.
836:
830:
828:
824:
818:
815:
810:
806:
802:
798:
793:
787:
785:
783:
779:
775:
772:, included a
771:
766:
763:
754:
747:
745:
742:
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690:
685:
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664:
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641:
634:
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626:George Bush,
622:
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441:Space Shuttle
437:
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408:supercomputer
404:
397:
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322:Ashton Carter
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285:
283:
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275:
271:
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249:
241:
239:
237:
233:
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225:
219:
217:
213:
212:Project BAMBI
209:
205:
202:Reagan asked
200:
198:
193:
189:
188:
183:
179:
175:
174:Ronald Reagan
166:
159:
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84:
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72:
68:
64:
63:Edward Teller
60:
56:
52:
45:
40:
32:
19:
2450:
2419:
2409:
2405:
2389:
2371:(1): 71–73.
2368:
2364:
2335:
2322:. Retrieved
2318:
2305:
2283:(8): 20–28.
2280:
2276:
2265:. Retrieved
2261:the original
2256:
2232:
2211:
2201:
2174:
2164:
2151:
2147:
2130:
2123:Bibliography
2108:
2096:
2066:
2057:
2053:
2043:
2019:
2012:
2000:
1990:
1924:
1912:
1900:
1888:
1876:
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1840:
1828:
1816:
1774:
1745:
1708:
1696:
1684:
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1633:
1624:
1614:
1537:
1531:
1519:
1490:
1478:
1449:
1437:
1425:
1413:
1401:
1372:
1364:the original
1357:
1348:
1336:
1292:
1280:
1225:
1217:
1205:
1193:
1186:Correll 2012
1167:. Retrieved
1163:the original
1158:
1149:
1113:. Retrieved
1109:the original
1105:Sun Sentinel
1104:
1094:
1074:
1067:
1055:. Retrieved
1045:
1020:
1011:
998:
988:
975:
966:
957:
944:
930:
922:
913:
893:
889:
880:
876:
865:
849:
831:
819:
797:star tracker
794:
791:
774:star tracker
767:
759:
734:
726:Bill Clinton
723:
720:Cancellation
711:
707:
698:
687:
679:
667:
654:
650:
630:
619:
611:
596:
580:
576:
568:
546:
534:
526:
507:
492:
475:
471:
467:
449:
438:
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430:
422:
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405:
401:
392:
388:
373:
354:
334:
319:
303:
286:
278:
266:
259:
228:
220:
201:
187:Torn Curtain
185:
171:
145:
125:
102:
90:Soviet Union
81:, placed in
50:
49:
2324:12 February
2005:Baucom 2004
1974:Baucom 2004
1961:, Figure 9.
1959:Heller 1999
1944:Baucom 2004
1929:Baucom 2004
1917:Baucom 2004
1905:Baucom 2004
1893:Baucom 2004
1881:Baucom 2004
1869:Baucom 2004
1857:Baucom 2004
1833:Baucom 2004
1821:Coffey 2014
1809:Baucom 2004
1794:Coffey 2014
1779:Baucom 2004
1767:Baucom 2004
1750:Baucom 2004
1713:Baucom 2004
1701:Baucom 2004
1689:Baucom 2004
1677:Baucom 2004
1665:Baucom 2004
1638:Baucom 2004
1607:Baucom 2004
1573:Baucom 2004
1483:Baucom 2004
1442:Baucom 2004
1377:Baucom 2004
1198:Herken 1987
1142:Coffey 2014
809:Black Brant
770:solar panel
748:Description
702:Dick Cheney
344:which shot
160:Smart Rocks
132:X-ray laser
105:Smart Rocks
59:Lowell Wood
18:Smart Rocks
2468:Categories
2267:2017-12-08
1845:Smith 1993
1653:Smith 1989
1471:Broad 1989
1454:Yenne 2005
1169:2017-11-27
1115:2018-01-06
1057:1 December
1032:References
908:MX missile
868:Paul Nitze
827:gyroscopes
694:Sam Nunn,
565:batteries.
503:Dan Quayle
464:reporters.
282:submarines
2113:Sale 1988
1495:Park 2002
1037:Citations
866:This led
856:Nike Zeus
784:program.
730:Les Aspin
242:Excalibur
1524:Hey 2006
1430:Hey 2006
1418:OTA 1985
1406:OTA 1985
1394:APS 1987
850:Earlier
805:Virginia
692:—
682:Sam Nunn
645:Sam Nunn
643:Senator
624:—
599:Gulf War
498:Cold War
418:en masse
346:hydrogen
326:Sam Nunn
71:Cold War
2285:Bibcode
1738:Pebbles
950:railgun
894:As the
835:Aries I
807:, by a
621:allies.
445:railgun
386:(DAB).
155:History
65:of the
46:system.
2427:
2358:. UPI.
2343:
2240:
2219:
2182:
2031:
1238:
1082:
514:JASONs
328:asked
53:was a
2412:(16).
2402:(PDF)
2198:(PDF)
2144:(PDF)
936:Notes
900:SS-18
788:Tests
2425:ISBN
2341:ISBN
2326:2018
2238:ISBN
2217:ISBN
2180:ISBN
2154:(2).
2060:(4).
2029:ISBN
1236:ISBN
1080:ISBN
1059:2021
673:and
603:Scud
588:LEAP
542:ERIS
313:and
94:ICBM
61:and
2373:doi
2293:doi
2058:147
1232:115
675:TRW
426:TNT
184:'s
176:'s
2470::
2449:.
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2408:.
2404:.
2388:.
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2367:.
2317:.
2291:.
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2279:.
2255:.
2200:.
2163:.
2152:29
2150:.
2146:.
2081:^
2056:.
2052:.
2027:.
2025:49
1981:^
1966:^
1951:^
1936:^
1801:^
1786:^
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1720:^
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1234:.
1178:^
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1124:^
1103:.
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863:.
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1088:.
1061:.
983:.
20:)
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