261:. In March, 1987 the Soviets decided to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, and they were concerned that the vacuum would be filled by an "Islamic fundamentalist" regime. There was also the prospect of Islamist revolution spreading to Soviet Central Asia. This "Islamic factor" became a major concern for the Soviet leadership during the last phase of the Iran–Iraq War and led them to boost arms supplies to Iraq. "The decision to give Iraq the military edge was universal. Not only the Soviet Union, but the entire Western alliance, largely financed by conservative Arab states, engaged in the most comprehensive and massive arms transfer in history to a Third World state engaged in conflict (...) The 'Western package' for Iraq, however, paled in comparison with the Soviets'. Between 1986 and 1988, the Soviets delivered to Iraq arms valued at roughly $ 8.8 to $ 9.2 billion, comprising more than 2,000 tanks (including 800
1304:. They could also monitor supply to the Afghan resistance that came through Pakistan. The Shoravis were also remarked in Balouchistan, where starting in late 1981 they began work on a network of ground surveillance stations that would be linked to an enormous listening base dug into the side of Kuh-e-Malek-Siah mountain, which dominated the Iranian-Afghan-Pakistani border. Iran allowed this due to concern over the increasingly warm relations between Pakistan, the U.S., and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Tehran also agreed to let the installation be built due to the presence of listening stations in Pakistan tuning in on Iran with American help.
967:, were providing Soviet products to Iran, and the Soviets did not announce a general embargo on them. That the Soviets were willing do so selectively, as when they proposed shipment of advanced naval mines from Libya to Iran, saying "opposed the unauthorized transfer of their military technology to a third country" indicates that some exports were tolerated."After American officials told Moscow of the deal, Soviet officials said they opposed the unauthorized transfer of their military technology to a third country and informed the United States that they had made this policy known to Tripoli," according to Administration officials.
919:. Nevertheless, the Soviets hoped not to lose all influence. As a 1980 CIA document put it, "The Soviets see Iran as a greater geopolitical prize than Iraq...while hoping to prevent an Iranian turn to the West and to improve their own relations with Tehran", the Soviets also value their ties with Iraq. Timmerman quotes "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers", United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, 1985, as conservatively estimating Iran's arms imports over the 1979–83 period at $ 975 million from the Soviet Union.
185:, the USA's key ally in the Middle East. Iran's new anti-American stance presented the USSR with a golden opportunity to win the country over to the Soviet camp. But the war between Iraq and Iran complicated matters. Iraq had been a very close ally of the Soviets since 1958 and in 1972, the USSR and Iraq had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in which both countries promised to help each other under threat and to avoid entering hostile alliances against one another. Iraq, along with Syria and the PLO, had replaced
99:
38:
707:
with more and more acquired during the war. They started in 1979 with 2,500 older T-55 and T-62 model Soviet tanks, and a few more advanced T-72 tanks, probably less than 100. Iraq had roughly 2,750 tanks in late 1980. In early 1988, it had more than 4,500 Soviet T-54s, 55s, 62s, and 72s, some 1,500 Chinese Type 59 and Type 69-II main battle tanks (copies/derivatives of the Soviet T-54A), 60 Romanian M-77s, and some captured
Iranian British-made (30?)
634:. Iraq adopted Soviet deployment and fire techniques, and relied on standard Soviet tactics without adapting to Iraqi needs. The SA-2, and SA-3 were designed for a medium- to high-altitude threat, tactics which the Iranian Air Force rarely if ever used. By the time of the 1988 ceasefire, Iraq had obtained from the Soviet Union approximately 120 SA-2 launchers, 150 SA-3 launchers, 25–60 SA-6 launchers. The Soviet weapons depended on a low-altitude system of
233:, and then expelled 18 Soviet diplomats. The Soviets were also keen to counterbalance Iraq's increasingly friendly relations with the West by boosting military aid to Saddam. Iraq became "the largest recipient of Soviet-bloc military aid among the countries of the Third World". In 1984, Iraq officially established diplomatic relations with the USA. This, combined with the outbreak of the "tanker war" (Iranian-Saudi confrontation over oil tankers in the
110:
68:
1080:(IRGC) was also authorized. This expanded, by the mid-1980s, into the domestic capability to manufacture arms of moderate complexity, such as armored fighting vehicles, artillery, and some missiles and aircraft parts. In all of these developments, direct and indirect technical help from many countries made it possible for Iran to rapidly expand the technical capabilities of her defense industrial base. These countries included...the USSR.
1231:
they quickly adapted to moving the
Western forces out of the Gulf, "by tilting away from Kuwait and towards Iran. Over the summer of 1989, the Soviets probably hoped the United States could be frightened out of the Gulf...Bolstering Iranian opposition to reflagging would contribute to this result." Such a tilt would serve the objective of building influence with Iran, while offsetting the United States' extensive support to Kuwait.
822:
482:. In early 1987, the Soviet Union delivered a squadron of twenty-four MiG-29 Fulcrums to Baghdad. Considered to be the most advanced Soviet fighter, the MiG-29 had previously only been provided to Yugoslavia, Syria and India. The MiG-29 export deal to Iraq gave a more advantageous payment schedule than any offered by the West: Iraq was caught in a financial crisis and needed the low-interest loans provided by the Soviet Union.
1407:
1169:,Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, said Kornyenko's visit, "will have a great effect on our relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern world...One can be optimistic in fields such as technical, military, economic and possibly political relations. Soviet policy towards Afghanistan and Iraq, however, remained a problem." Iran, shortly after the visit, launched an offensive that regained the
157:. Such a prospect was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, which now resumed arms sales to Iraq while still maintaining an official policy of neutrality. The Soviets also feared losing Saddam's friendship with the West. After further Iranian gains in 1986, the Soviet Union massively increased its military aid to Iraq. The Soviets were now afraid of the Iranians encouraging Islamic revolution in
719:
203:, sold weapons to the Iranians, presumably with Soviet permission. The Soviets also worried what Western reaction would be if they opted to back either Iraq or Iran. The complicated balancing act of trying to maintain good relations with both Iran and Iraq led the USSR to observe a policy of "strict neutrality" during the opening phase of the war while calling for a negotiated peace.
699:
471:
57:
270:
economic concessions to Iran and opposed the US reflagging of ships in the
Persian Gulf. However, Iran showed little interest in friendship with the USSR, rejecting the Communist world along with the West. Soviet aid allowed Iraq to begin a renewed offensive against Iran in April, 1988, the success of which led to a ceasefire and the end of the war on August 20 of that year.
1352:
137:, which had aimed to ally itself with both Iran and Iraq. In the first period of the war, the Soviets declared a policy of "strict neutrality" towards the two countries, at the same time urging a negotiated peace. Iraq had been an ally for decades and the Soviets had tried to win over Iran as well, but their offers of friendship were rebuffed by both the pro-Western
491:
1012:, starting in January 1978 and leading to the departure of the Shah in January 1979 was Islamic, so not automatically well disposed to a Communist government. Iran, having had an import-oriented policy of the time, needed to obtain weapons from one of the superpowers, or at least an ally who made equipment compatible with one of the superpowers.
576:
780:"By the end of 1982, Iraq had been resupplied with new Soviet materiel, and the ground war entered a new phase. Iraq used newly acquired T-55 tanks and T-62 tanks, BM-21 Stalin Organ rocket launchers, and Mi-24 helicopter gunships to prepare a Soviet-type three-line defense, replete with obstacles, minefields, and fortified positions."
249:. This and other military gains offered the prospect of an Iraqi collapse. This worrying development pushed the conservative Arab rulers closer to the USA, which they saw as their protector. The USSR did not relish the idea of increased American military presence in the area. The Soviets were also worried about what would happen in
1501:
568:
734:
armored fighting vehicle. Even during the opening stages of the war, Saddam
Hussein was aware that Soviet tank types were individually inferior to those used by the Iranians. In October 1980, he said: "Their cannons are greater in number, their tanks more advanced, their navy can reach long distance
216:
elsewhere in the world. Although officially still neutral, the USSR gradually increased economic and military support to Iraq to stop the collapse of Saddam. The
Soviets had a commitment not to let an ally be overthrown and support for Iraq also played well with many Arab nations (the Soviets finally
1230:
Fukuyama observes that the Soviet policy toward the
Persian gulf, in 1987 and early 1988, was complex, with several competing goals. Overall, they sought to increase Soviet influence in the region, especially if Western navies left the area. When they made the tactical mistake of chartering tankers,
1036:
toward Iran and Iraq, with initial Iraqi military successes, made Iran more eager to find a source of arms, and the Soviet Union capitalized on this opportunity. U.S. domestic opinion was not as much pro-Iraqi as anti-Iranian, which created an opening for the Soviet Union to gain influence in Iran.
775:
The Iraqis made logistic oversupply a key operational principle. They operated on the Soviet system of "supply push", rather than the U.S. system of "demand pull". Iraqi forces at the front were given massive ammunition stocks and war reserves. This was necessary given their Soviet-style extremely
389:
Iraqi pilots were less aggressive because of their more conservative Soviet training. Yet, French, Indian and
Egyptian trainers indicated that Iraqi pilots could be extremely effective after Western-style training that put the initiative in the air in the pilot's cockpit and with his flight leader.
1390:
For Iran, the radar is the critical component for the F-14 system. The
Phoenix missile was designed for engaging Soviet bombers at very long ranges, in the Outer Air Battle component of the defense of an aircraft carrier battle group, and there are few threats of this type with which Iran needs to
1239:
Under the Soviet system, there was little incentive for highly profitable arms exports. Rather, Soviet arms exports were first and foremost governed by military secrecy. If the military determined that a particular piece of equipment, manufacturing technology, or other information was ahead of the
751:
Iraq still kept most of its helicopters in its air force at the beginning of the war, which created major problems because of a lack of effective coordination between the air force and forward deployed army units. In mid-1980, it had 35 Mi-4s, 15 Mi-6s, 78 Mi-8s, 18-34 Mi-24s, 47 Alloutte IIIs, 10
189:
as the
Soviets' chief ally in the region after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat aligned with USA, and recognized Israel in 1977 and made a peace treaty in 1979 . In 1967, Iraq signed an agreement with the USSR to supply the nation with oil in exchange for large-scale access to Eastern Bloc arms. The
1382:
The F-14 and
Phoenix have been retired in U.S. service, and there were recent reports of Iran getting spare parts from surplus sales. Obviously, current surplus sales did not affect F-14/AWG-9 use in the war under discussion, but the Associated Press report on the current market quoted Greg Kutz,
706:
Soviet doctrine emphasized tanks, and Iraq followed its example. It consistently improved its skills with tanks, both Soviet-made and Chinese copies. It also used its attack helicopters with some of the Soviet "flying tank" methods. Most Iraqi tanks were Soviet, or Chinese copies of Soviet tanks,
211:
However, the Iranians rebuffed Soviet offers of friendship and by 1982 they also had the upper hand in the war. They decided to push on into Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein. This led to a change in Soviet policy from Summer, 1982. The Soviets did not like the implications of an Iranian victory,
1176:
Other opportunities, although primarily realized after the war ended, involved Soviet technology for components and systems beyond the short-term capabilities of Iran to design. Iran had reason to explore Soviet willingness export missile system components that the Iranians could adapt, do final
1144:
member and head of the Foreign Policy Commission), wants cooperation with "large, geopolitically important Third World States, regardless of their ideological orientation." Fukuyama wrote "The area of heaviest Soviet involvement with capitalist Third World states has been the Middle East/Persian
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money transfers, in which money and weapons could change hands numerous times between different countries. Iranians also were careful not to purchase their arms from a single source and often skillfully pitted one dealer against another in the hope of foiling the attempt of one or all to exert a
970:
In spite of the antagonism between the U.S. and Iran, Timmerman observed that Iran, as the war continued, sought arms imports from countries that were not subject to, or complying with, U.S. export restrictions. Some of these countries were Soviet clients, or the Soviet Union itself By 1982, the
689:
The Soviet Union initially cut off supplies in response to being caught by surprise, but this position was later reversed. Iraq was not prepared for effective infantry combat when the war began. In accordance with Soviet doctrine, the Iraqis placed great stress on the use of tanks and mechanized
377:
France supported Iraq as the second greatest military supplier, and tended to supply higher-technology equipment than the Soviets. The competition between France and the Soviet Union as an arms supplier was a continuing issue for Iraq. Iraq approached the French in late 1980 with requests to buy
886:
Individual soldiers had Soviet gas masks, and one of three types of chemical defense suits. "Number one" suits, which gave the greatest protection, were used only by chemical units. "Number two" suits covered the torso, hands and legs (in addition to the gas masks), and the "Number three" suits
784:
The Iraqi Army had about 200,000 men under arms in September 1980, with another 250,000 in the reserves. It was equipped with almost 3,000 Soviet-built tanks, including about 100 T-72s, 2,500 armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), and about 1,000 tubes of artillery. The tank force was a mixture of
269:
Bs) and thousands of pieces of heavy artillery and armored personnel vehicles." The massive increase in weaponry allowed Iraq to regain the initiative in the war. At the same time, the USSR continued to press for a ceasefire and offer itself as a mediator. To this end, the Soviets made several
1064:
After the revolution, from the early-to-mid-1980s, the Iranians were far more conservative about foreign dependence, so they focused more on internal production. A Military Industries Organization of the Ministry of Defense had been formed in 1969, but was given new authority, as the Defense
878:
Iraqi army units of approximately 3,000 men had a 20-man chemical defense unit assigned. This unit was equipped with two "R469" chemical attack detectors; one RS-19, RS-12, or RS-14 vehicle for decontaminating weapons, buildings and roads; and two "DDA" vehicles for decontaminating soldiers.
449:
The Iraqis and Soviets had different priorities for waging air warfare, shown by how each assigned their best pilots to different aircraft types. This conflicted with Saddam Hussein's strict control of the Iraqi military, but over the course of the war some flexibility did emerge. The Iraqis
874:
report suggested that the Iraqis used Soviet chemical defense equipment. All units in the Iraqi army had some chemical defense capability, using principally Soviet equipment. The basic vehicle-mounted system was composed of: "BBAR" and "RCH 469" chemical attack detectors; "GSP12" chemical
926:
took power in 1985, relations improved somewhat. "Support" began to include some diplomatic exchanges and economic cooperation, preparing the way for much better relations after the war ended in 1988. While the fall of the Soviet Union was not foreseen, Gorbachev took a long-term view of
393:
Movement away from Soviet doctrine was also seen in land warfare, where the Iraqis also learned to place greater emphasis on training and preparation for complex combined arms operations. This was seen in the training provided to new recruits and the use of large-scale battle rehearsals.
1040:
Nevertheless, the fact that most Iranian equipment, and training on it, was American, meant that the Soviets could not immediately provide compatible equipment, meant to operate under the doctrines taught to the Iranian military who had not been purged by revolutionary forces.
303:, who had refused the Soviets more access to Iraqi ports in exchange for arms. Soviet prestige was at stake if its arms were defeated, so the Soviets began to provide spare parts and ammunition. They later replaced complete vehicles and weapons in one-to-one exchanges.
1441:
missiles, plus a 20mm cannon; all these are more appropriate for the likely type of combat these aircraft would face—if they are used in combat. Given their unique radar capability, Iran would be more likely to hold back its F-14's and use other fighters, such as the
1164:
Iran agreed to "expand economic and trade relations, and to conduct joint oil exploration in the Caspian Sea." This gave Gorbachev some ability to balance interests between Iraq and Iran. Iranian official radio broadcast that he urged "increased political contacts".
1023:
starting in November 1979. The U.S. had been strongly allied with the Shah of Iran, who had bought weapons from the West, primarily but not exclusively from the U.S. Iranian domestic opinion was anti-U.S. because the U.S. had been seen as the patron of the unpopular
194:
allies to continue doing so. At the same time, the USSR attempted to court Iran and offered to sell arms to the Iranians, a bid for friendship which was rejected by Tehran, due to its historic distrust of Russia and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the USSR's allies,
975:
estimated that more than 40% of Iran's annual $ 2 billion arms imports originated from North Korea. Much of this equipment was purchased from China or manufactured under license from the Soviet Union. Soviet-bloc weapons were also exported to Iran via Syria, Libya,
1157:. Consequently, his “new thinking” also seemed to facilitate a change in Iran’s views towards the Soviet Union. This thinking may have complemented Iranian awareness of their need to improve their economy. In February 1986, therefore, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister
742:
Iraq's tanks were more effective against Iranian helicopter gunships. The Soviet 12.5mm anti-aircraft machine guns on the Iraqi tanks were of adequate range and lethality to hold Iranian helicopters out of the range of their most lethal anti-tank guided missiles.
996:$ 1.2 billion from the US, $ 20 million from France, $ 140 million from the UK, $ 5 million from FRG, $ 150 million from Italy, $ 230 million from the PRC, $ 5 million from Romania, $ 40 million from Poland... and $ 2.6 billion from unspecified "other" sources."
1152:
had a new model of Soviet foreign policy when he came to power in 1985. Rather than supporting only ideologically compatible state, he saw country-specific bilateral agreements, involving economic cooperation, as a means of offsetting US power in the
298:
At the start of the Iran–Iraq War, while Iraq was on the offensive, the Soviet Union stopped all overt and most covert arms shipments to Iraq for 18 months. Rather than wanting to help Iran, the Soviet Union was probably annoyed with Iraq's president
498:
In the ground support role, the IQAF provided aircraft for close air support and strike roles and, to a limited extent, for air superiority over the immediate battlefield. In 1980, the Iraqi air force had 12 ground attack squadrons-4 equipped with
1032:. The hostage crisis turned a good deal of U.S. public opinion against Iran, so even if the U.S. government, for reasons of state, wanted to support Iran in the Iran–Iraq War, it would face strong domestic resistance. The original U.S. policy of
417:
as reporting that the Soviet Union had to reschedule its satellite coverage during the more intense periods of tension between Iran and the West. In November and December 1987, the Soviet Union lowered its Kosmos 1983 photo-reconnaissance
1008:, between 1980 and 1988, in which the Soviet Union and the Cold War were still very real. The revolutionary forces that overthrew the Shah resented what they considered continuing U.S. support of an unpopular ruler. At the same time, the
584:
1221:
Apparently, the Soviets also saw opportunities at the same time, presumably to block U.S. influence. In 1985, the Iraqi defense minister said, "Eighty percent of the weapons we capture today (from Iran) are of Soviet origin"
1462:
1218:, it reinforces the idea that the Iran-Iraq conflict was seen as a proxy war by the U.S., and possibly the Soviet Union. Certainly, the Soviet Union would sell to post-revolutionary Iran after 1979, when the U.S. would not.
1129:
445:
At the start of the war, the Iranian air arm had superior equipment to what was largely Soviet equipment in Iraqi hands. The Iraqis used the Soviet air defense model, which gave pilots relatively little initiative.
934:
of spares and replacements compatible with its Western equipment base. To the extent the Soviet Union could satisfy these needs, it had incentive to do so. Some equipment was shipped from satellite states such as
1307:
Complementing the first station at Kuh-e-Malek-Siah, an intelligence base at Gardaneh Pireh Zan allowed surveillance of air activity in northern Saudi Arabia. Coupled with other Soviet intelligence facilities in
422:
satellite to monitor the battlefield between Iraq and Iran. Similarly, it altered the orbit of Kosmos 1985 in a way that implied it either had night coverage of the battlefield or was covering U.S. activity at
1287:
Advisors were to wear distinctive uniforms, but with nothing that identified them as Soviets, and were to have their expenses paid in U.S. dollars. The number grew to 3000 by mid-1983, and 4200 in March 1987.
369:, was allowed to broadcast calls for the end of the war from the Soviet Union. This may have been more due to Soviet irritation at the war than a serious attempt to harm Iraq: Iran was not seen as pro-Soviet.
290:
than did any other country, as well as providing military advisers. The public position of the Soviet Union was officially neutral, especially early in the war. They clandestinely provided a smaller amount of
1243:
If there was a question of sensitivity, traditional Soviet decisionmaking was for more, not less, secrecy. Every decision about exporting things of perceived military significance were made centrally, with
657:
Some Israeli experts came to regard Iraqi ability to manage the command and control and electronic warfare aspects of their Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missile systems as far inferior to those of Syria,
2491:
Office of International Affairs (OIA), National Academy of Sciences (1997), "Efforts of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to Establish and Upgrade Export Control Systems: Inheritance from the USSR",
1263:
document said that the Soviet Union is likely to hasten the delivery of $ 220 million in "ground equipment", and to permit Eastern European countries to "selectively provide some items in short supply."
317:"Although the Soviets might not receive payments for several years, the sale of military hardware remained a critical source of revenue for them, and they have tried to retain Iraq as a customer ...
1371:, and there are reports that U.S. technicians, leaving Iran after the Revolution, sabotaged critical parts, the Iranian Air Force found a new role for its F-14 fighters, in command and control. Its
887:
issued to troops consisted of long gloves. All received Yugoslav first-aid packets with two atropine injectors, "tablets for nuclear radiation", and two bottles for spot-cleaning unknown chemicals.
756:(NATO reporting name AT-2 SWATTER), and the rest French, and 86 U.S. designs (either U.S. made or built under license) lightly armed helicopters: 26 Hughes 530F, 30 Hughes 500D, and 30 Hughes 300C.
1124:
calls "hard" and "soft". The "soft" variant de-emphasizes shared ideology as grounds for assistance, but generally decreased Soviet military aid to the Third World. The "hard" variant, proposed by
1065:
Industries Organization, in 1981. According to Globalsecurity, the DIO was, at the least, using Soviet designs as a basis for their own work; Iran said it had manufactured an undisclosed number of
1052:, two Soviet-Iranian arms cooperation agreements were signed in July 1981. This agreement also provided Soviet advisors, justified as helping defend Iran against U.S. attack, as in the April 1980
785:
T-34/55/62s and PT-76s of Soviet origin and some 100 French AMX-30's, of which more were on order. Mechanized forces included Soviet BTR 50/60/152s, and BMPs, French Panhards and British Ferrets.
1480:
These included Soviet antiaircraft artillery and short-range missiles. It is not established how Iran acquired these weapons, which are short-range and presumably used as final point defenses.
1272:
The July 1981 military agreements were described by the Iranians as defensive. They covered training and construction of Iranian bases, but also the construction of Soviet signals intelligence
952:
726:
Iraq had about 2,500 other armored vehicles in late 1980. By late 1985, Iraq had about 3,000 AFVs. It had about 5,100 such systems in early 1988, including roughly 1,000 models of the Soviet
190:
Soviets were unhappy with Iraq's offensive against Iran, although they avoided issuing an official condemnation. They were reluctant to supply Iraq with more arms although they allowed their
1547:
670:
Each interceptor squadron was deployed at a separate base for defense of a specific target. Their five interceptor squadrons had limited all-weather capability and were all equipped with
2756:
1538:. Of these, in 1985, the Soviet Union clearly had the greatest missile expertise. Iran used Scud-B SSMs, presumed to be of Libyan origin, and to which the Soviets voiced no objection.
1044:
The USSR, when the war broke out and a policy was not yet in place, arranged to fly jet fuel from Soviet bases to Tehran. This was followed, by Soviet-ordered shipments from Syria of
619:
Iraq's ground-based air defense suffered from poor leadership as well as both a lack of understanding of the Soviet operational doctrine and technical characteristics of their Soviet
1572:
1534:
Iran obtained technical assistance from a number of countries, including China and North Korea, Pakistan, Libya, Israel, Argentina, Brazil, West Germany, East Germany, Taiwan, and
752:
Super Frelons, 40 Gazelles, 3 Pumas, and 7 Wessex Mk-52s. By early 1988, it had a strong Army Aviation Corps with 150–200 armed helicopters, including 40–80 Soviet Mi-24s with the
2311:
1567:
1562:
478:
In 1979, the Soviet Union supplied Iraq with 240 fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft, along with military advisors, initially stationed at as-Shoibiyah Air Base 45 km SW of
304:
292:
677:
The Iraqis were displeased with Soviet air-to-air missiles. Pakistani technicians were reported to have helped the Iraqis modify some MiG-21s to carry the French-made
1387:
as saying "He believes Iran already has Tomcat parts from Pentagon surplus sales: "The key now is, going forward, to shut that down and not let it happen again."
1177:
assembly of Soviet aircraft and armored vehicles, and establish licensed Soviet equipment factories in Iran. This primarily happened after the war's end in 1988.
988:, perhaps not a superpower but another rival of the Soviet Union. He cites U.S. estimates of Iran's arms imports over the 1979-83 period at $ 5,365 billion, viz:(
349:
2571:
2541:
1173:. Follow-up Soviet official visits, in August and December 1986, resulted in the resumption of Iranian natural gas exports, which had been halted in 1980.
2051:
1515:. These missiles have a limited shelf life under less than ideal storage conditions, so they could not have been acquired too long before the Revolution.
345:
2696:
1583:
1426:
missile (NATO reporting name AMOS AA-9) was reverse-engineered. Gennadiy Sokolovskiy of the Vympel Design Bureau denies that the R-33 was based on the
1240:
equivalent in the West, it would not be available for export, and the foreign military sales organizations of the Soviet Union had no means to appeal.
611:
optimized for low and medium altitude engagements. "Iran's Western-made air defense system seemed more effective than Iraq's Soviet-made counterpart."
358:
Despite strong policy disagreements with Iraq, the Soviet Union was concerned about the reputation of its weapons and arms deliveries resumed in 1982.
2751:
2746:
1323:
Smaller intelligence bases ran on a line Khash, Paskouh, Faslabad, Kalateh-Shah-Taghi, and in the Birag valley. These were operational by 1983-1984.
37:
229:). In 1983, the actions of the Iranians became increasingly anti-Soviet. The authorities cracked down on the Moscow-backed Iranian communist party,
129:
from 1980 to 1988 varied, beginning with a stance of "strict neutrality" and moving towards massive military support for Iraq in the final phase of
2300:
237:) opened the worrying prospect for the Soviets of an increased US presence in the region. The USSR responded with yet more military aid to Saddam.
1137:
735:
targets, and they have better arms." The Iraqis were unprepared for urban warfare, even using Soviet methods that cost the Soviets heavily in the
559:(NATO reporting name HIND), as well as European-designed models. Soviet helicopters had troop transport capability rather than being attack-only.
2495:
Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union
245:
In 1986–87, the Soviet Union definitely turned to supporting Iraq. The war had been bogged down in a stalemate until the Iranians had taken the
2697:"MANPADS Task Force Update:ALPA line pilot security experts and staff have been examining the threat to airliners from shoulder-fired missiles"
763:(NATO reporting name HOOK) heavy transport helicopters, and 100 Mi-8 (NATO name HIP), 20 Mi-4 (NATO name HOUND), and an additional 10 French
2511:
2435:
177:
The outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in September 1980 provided the Soviets with a quandary since they aimed to be friends with both sides. The
1527:, which, given the disparity in size and design objectives, are cheaper and less complex than a multirole fighter aircraft such as the U.S.
348:
calling for a ceasefire and for all member states to refrain from actions contributing to continuing conflict. A key resolution in 1987 was
2651:
1280:
below). There were agreements to train Iranian personnel in Soviet military schools, and cooperate with the revolutionary secret police,
149:, the Islamic Republic established its slogan as "neither East nor West." In 1982, the war turned in Iran's favor and the Iranian leader
2660:
2346:
1876:
1245:
1045:
427:. There have been numerous reports that Iraq received intelligence from third countries, especially satellite imagery from the U.S. The
2761:
1376:
1212:
1037:
The Soviets recognized that Iran saw both superpowers as antagonists, and remained open to opportunities, especially under Gorbachev.
403:
1300:, in a location that gave a view of the Afghan and Pakistani borders. Radar at this base could monitor all naval traffic through the
2664:
1077:
972:
1762:
1473:
was a key and predictable part of these local defenses, since Iran had significant difficulties obtaining spare parts for its U.S.
381:
Many other nations provided materials or encouraged client states to do so, and private arms traders also sold arms to both sides.
1332:
1205:
1198:
1049:
916:
355:
The Soviet Union opposed the war and cut off arms exports to both Iran and Iraq, the latter being an ally under a 1972 treaty.
955:
both shipped Soviet-designed weapons it made, as well as acting as a conduit for shipments directly from the Soviet Union and
797:
were at the lowest level of training and readiness for operations. The Iraqi Navy numbered about 40,000 men and consisted of
1194:
1092:
decisive influence on Iranian policy. Furthermore, the routes for physical delivery of weapons had to be modified too, as
985:
930:
Iran, after the Western embargo of 1979, was motivated to expand its own manufacturing capability and to seek short-term,
1454:
During the war, Iran did not have an integrated air defense system. It did have local air defense systems at Tehran and
607:
GOA) anti-aircraft missiles using American tactics developed in Vietnam, though they were less successful against Iraqi
1932:; Wagner, Abraham R. (2003-09-26), "Chapter XI: Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence and Battle Management",
875:
concentration measuring device; a small chemical laboratory; night flares and flags to signal the direction of attack.
320:
In early 1988, Iraq owed the Soviet Union between US$ 8 billion and US$ 10 billion in military debts alone."
1260:
2451:
2385:
2221:
2678:
2141:
Special National Intelligence Estimate: Soviet Interests, Policies, and Prospects with Respect to the Iran–Iraq War
1967:(15 December 1986), "CIA Aiding Iraq in Gulf War; Target Data From U.S. Satellites Supplied for Nearly Two Years",
1524:
793:
The Iraqi Navy was largely ineffective due to a poor state of training and inadequate Soviet weaponry. Most of the
2579:
2549:
1557:
1552:
335:
1384:
1297:
736:
659:
1189:, had proposed that the US should offer to sell weapons to Iran, as a means of blocking Soviet influence there.
17:
2059:
1986:, vol. IV: Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations, Air Force Historical Research Agency, 1993
856:, there is little evidence that they helped the Iraqi development of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.
2030:; Wagner, Abraham R. (2003-09-26), "Chapter XIII: The Air and Missile Wars and Weapons of Mass Destruction",
879:
Smaller-units had one-man chemical defense units with a Soviet chemical attack detector and a German Kärcher
307:
as the second greatest military supplier, and tended to supply higher-technology equipment than the Soviets.
1372:
959:, even though China was a rival of the Soviets for Middle East influence. Certainly, Soviet allies, such as
635:
161:. Soviet aid allowed the Iraqis to mount a counteroffensive which brought the war to an end in August 1988.
1577:
931:
1512:
1477:
1470:
1020:
865:
794:
631:
2722:
Kazem Sajjadpour: "Neutral Statements, Committed Practice: The USSR and the War" in Farhang Rajaee (ed.)
254:
2715:
Mohiaddin Mesbahi: "The USSR and the Iran–Iraq War: From Brezhnev to Gorbachev" in Farhang Rajaee (ed.)
2306:
1029:
362:
182:
138:
2082:
2031:
1933:
1523:
In 1985, Iran recognized the embargo forced it to simplify its domestic production goals. One goal was
378:
Crotale and Roland surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) to augment their depleted Soviet SAM arsenal.
2139:
1375:, unique in capability at the time, allowed Iran to use the F-14's not as front-line fighters, but as
2105:
1785:
1053:
764:
213:
1125:
1256:) input. If a decision was made in favor of exporting, it reflected a consensus of the government.
2011:
1647:
1639:
1368:
1166:
1016:
1009:
806:
178:
150:
146:
1850:
1084:
1005:
904:
279:
2493:
2202:
295:. Later in the war they more visibly supported Iraq, but still maintained official neutrality.
2612:
2507:
2431:
2397:
2358:
2324:
2078:
2027:
1929:
1830:
1215:
1158:
1149:
1133:
923:
451:
450:
considered ground attack to be the most important and put their best pilots into their French
366:
326:
142:
103:
1885:
2499:
2468:
2276:
1631:
1434:
1301:
1121:
908:
798:
1908:
1069:
rockets, by 1987 (i.e., still during the Iran–Iraq War) that were derived from Soviet-made
2633:
2410:
2371:
1190:
1033:
880:
681:
air-to-air missile. The Iraqis claimed to have used a MiG-21 so equipped to down an F-14.
440:
2653:
Iranian Operational Warfighting Ability: An Historical Assessment and View to the Future
1770:
907:, not surprisingly given its massive assistance to Iraq, the mutual antagonism between
2256:
1996:
1427:
1406:
1364:
1343:
tank. It is not clear if Iran ever obtained Russian spare parts for this elderly tank.
708:
527:(NATO reporting name BEAGLE) respectively, though the latter were probably inoperable.
524:
341:
300:
154:
2122:
2081:; Wagner, Abraham R. (2003-09-26), "Chapter XII: The Combined Arms and the Land War",
1015:
Iraq's invasion of Iran, starting the Iran–Iraq War, came shortly after the 1978-1979
821:
2740:
1651:
1509:
1438:
1331:
Both sides captured tanks and other major equipment for the other. Iran developed an
1208:
1201:
1186:
1170:
984:- and directly from the Soviet Union. Soviet-compatible equipment also came from the
512:
246:
130:
2526:
National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency (20 November 1981),
1964:
1745:
1455:
1154:
1097:
1088:
896:
802:
753:
424:
283:
234:
158:
114:
72:
1910:
Symmetrical Warfare and Lessons for Future War: the Case of the Iran-Iraq Conflict
1296:
Soviet personnel, in late 1981, started construction of a surveillance station in
2425:
1610:
515:. They also had some Su-22's, the final upgrade of the Su-17 with Russian/French
1528:
1474:
1443:
1423:
1309:
948:
718:
250:
191:
2472:
2280:
2174:
1809:
1635:
1403:
crew defected to the Soviet Union. This might have been an intelligence coup.
1101:
698:
678:
592:
470:
258:
1981:
507:(NATO reporting name FITTER), 4 with Su-20s (i.e., the export version of the
153:
pledged not to stop the conflict until he had overthrown the Iraqi president
2325:"Russian-Iranian Relations: Outlook for Cooperation with the "Axis of Evil""
1277:
1141:
2593:
Theimer, Sharon (16 January 2007), "Iran Gets Army Gear in Pentagon Sale",
1884:, Airpower Research Institute, United States Air University, archived from
1748:, Arms Transfers Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
1351:
490:
1489:
1320:, the installations achieved complete coverage of the Arabian Peninsula.
1313:
1249:
936:
912:
760:
552:
516:
454:
rather than Soviet air-superiority fighters and interceptors such as the
1643:
1120:
Under Gorbachev, new models of Soviet political thinking emerged, which
583:
1834:
1465:
ZSU-23-4 Shilka mobile antiaircraft vehicle, used by both Iran and Iraq
1105:
977:
944:
852:
While the Soviet Union assisted Iraq with long-range missiles like the
1161:
visited Tehran on February 26, 1986, hoping for economic cooperation.
2695:
Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) MANPADS Task Force (October 2004),
2335:(8), Center for Contemporary Conflict, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
1420:
1281:
1273:
981:
940:
712:
671:
500:
459:
455:
226:
1087:
had to rely on a complex web of global arms dealers and inefficient
1004:
Motivations need to be understood in the context of the time of the
575:
535:
Iraq had two transport squadrons whose primary aircraft were Soviet
431:
article suggests that the Soviets also might have provided imagery.
265:), 300 fighter aircraft, almost 300 surface-to-air missiles (mostly
253:. They had invaded this neighbour of Iran in 1979 and fought a long
1461:
257:
there. Iran had provided support to some of the anti-Soviet Afghan
2503:
2299:"Episode 17, Good Guys, Bad Guys: Interview with Karen Brutents".
1499:
1460:
1405:
1350:
1317:
1197:, advanced the suggestion, which circulated over the signature of
1109:
1093:
1066:
964:
960:
956:
731:
727:
717:
697:
651:
600:
582:
574:
566:
556:
540:
536:
520:
508:
489:
479:
469:
419:
407:
230:
200:
196:
186:
2179:
Fanning the Flames: Guns, Greed & Geopolitics in the Gulf War
1855:, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Moscow website, 21 July 2014
1814:
Fanning the Flames: Guns, Greed & Geopolitics in the Gulf War
1116:
Soviet opportunities to gain influence, as part of broad strategy
1100:
started inspecting and seizing Iranian bound cargo ships through
1400:
1360:
1340:
1336:
1108:
and these modifications went as far as airlifting of tanks from
1070:
1025:
900:
853:
647:
643:
639:
628:
624:
620:
608:
604:
596:
504:
287:
266:
262:
218:
134:
61:
1508:
Also part of the Kharg Island air defenses were shoulder-fired
1500:
1430:, maintaining that he has never actually seen a live Phoenix."
567:
1253:
871:
816:
222:
2052:"The BEKAA Valley Air Battle, June 1982: Lessons Mislearned?"
1913:, Canadian Forces College, Advanced Military Studies Course 3
1145:
Gulf. Moscow has...moved closer to Saudi Arabia and Iran..."
1048:, tank engines and ammunition. Arranged by Soviet Ambassador
169:
According to Mesbahi, Soviet policy fell into three periods:
2145:
286:(USSR) sold or gave more military equipment and supplies to
2427:
The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How Peacemaking Changed
2238:
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1985),
1181:
US considers reopening embargo to balance Soviet influence
1073:-B surface-to-surface missiles provided to Iran by Libya.
2386:"AROUND THE WORLD; Iranian Says Ties With Soviet Improve"
2058:, Air University, United States Air Force, archived from
1076:
In 1983, other military manufacturing, controlled by the
2452:"C.I.A. Nominee tied to '85 Memo urging Iran Arms Deals"
2124:
Subject: Iraqi Chemical Weapons and Defense Capabilities
1399:
There have been U.S. industry reports that at least one
519:. Also, the IQAF had two bomber squadrons equipped with
127:
The policy of the Soviet Union towards the Iran–Iraq War
2084:
The Lessons of Modern War: Volume II, The Iran–Iraq War
2073:
2071:
2069:
2033:
The Lessons of Modern War: Volume II, The Iran–Iraq War
1935:
The Lessons of Modern War: Volume II, The Iran–Iraq War
1924:
1922:
1920:
1292:
Command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I)
833:
2474:
Gorbachev and the new Soviet Agenda in the Third World
2282:
Gorbachev and the new Soviet Agenda in the Third World
953:
North Korean support for Iran during the Iran–Iraq war
1488:
The Kharg Island defenses included the well-regarded
406:
using a British Thompson CSF Tiger radar on a Soviet
1548:
International aid to combatants in the Iran–Iraq War
660:
even considering the poor Syrian performance in 1982
2271:
2269:
1204:. While the section was rejected by the incumbent
92:
44:
2222:"U.S. and Soviet Protest to Libya Over Iran Mines"
1359:While the U.S. officially embargoed parts for the
702:Type 59 tank in Iraqi colors, captured in 1991 war
2731:The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence
2168:
2166:
2164:
2162:
2160:
2158:
2156:
1803:
1801:
1799:
1797:
1573:Italian support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war
1531:that were the backbone of the Iranian Air Force.
1278:Command, control, communications and intelligence
915:government of Iran, and Muslim antagonism to the
711:. It is believed that France sold also about 100
2627:
2625:
2138:Central Intelligence Agency (18 December 1980),
2099:
2097:
2090:, Center for Strategic and International Studies
2039:, Center for Strategic and International Studies
1941:, Center for Strategic and International Studies
1568:Soviet support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war
1563:Soviet support for Iran during the Iran–Iraq war
1433:F-14 aircraft in Iranian service also carry the
410:airframe, the combination called the Baghdad 1.
18:Soviet support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war
1852:Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (April 9, 1972)
315:
2606:
2604:
2240:World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
1825:
1823:
1611:https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2007/N1524.pdf
1410:AIM-54 Phoenix; forward wings not yet attached
1379:early warning and tactical control platforms.
1355:F-14 fighter with maximum Phoenix missile load
441:Iraqi Air Force § 1980s and war with Iran
2717:The Iran–Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression
2196:
2194:
2192:
2190:
2188:
1756:
1754:
8:
1902:
1900:
1898:
1870:
1868:
1866:
1864:
1862:
1833:, ed. (1988), "Arms from the Soviet Union",
1383:head of special investigations for the U.S.
551:The 11 helicopter squadrons included Soviet
87:
30:
2528:Iran–Iraq War: Status, Impact and Prospects
1492:radar-controlled 23mm antiaircraft cannon.
1083:Iran trying to defeat embargoes during the
809:of Soviet, Turkish and Yugoslavian origin.
2757:Foreign relations during the Iran–Iraq War
2006:
2004:
1580:(clandestine US military supplies to Iran)
690:units during the first stages of the war.
2724:Iranian Perspectives on the Iran–Iraq War
2204:Iran: Current National Security Situation
1878:The Role of Airpower in the Iran–Iraq War
2498:, National Academies Press, p. 91,
2251:
2249:
2110:, Marine Corps Command and Staff College
1790:, Marine Corps Command and Staff College
1787:The Iran–Iraq War: Strategy of Stalemate
2450:Engelberg, Stephen (23 February 1987),
2257:"Defense Industries Organization (DIO)"
2220:Sciolino, Elaine (September 11, 1987),
2107:The Iran–Iraq War: Struggle Without End
1983:United States Gulf War Air Power Survey
1594:
1060:Iran reassesses foreign arms dependence
165:Soviet policy towards the Iran–Iraq War
2406:
2395:
2367:
2356:
1784:Sonnenberg, Robert E. (1 April 1985),
1746:TIV of arms imports to Iraq, 1980–1988
86:
29:
2104:Martinson, Martin J. (1 April 1984),
899:did not provide extensive support to
207:The USSR tilts towards Iraq (1982–86)
7:
2480:, Rand Arroyo Center, pp. 50–58
2288:, Rand Arroyo Center, pp. v–vii
2144:, SNIE 11-34/36.2-80, archived from
2121:Central Intelligence Agency (1989),
1763:"The United States and the Gulf War"
1761:Shalom, Stephen R. (February 1990),
1622:"Iraq and U.S.S.R.: Oil Agreement".
1046:130 mm towed field guns M1954 (M-46)
994:$ 975 million from the Soviet Union,
666:Interceptors and air-to-air missiles
2726:(University Press of Florida, 1997)
2719:(University Press of Florida, 1993)
2661:School of Advanced Military Studies
2323:O’Connor, Edward A. (August 2005),
2305:. October 1997. CNN. Archived from
1997:Exhumating the Dead Iraqi Air Force
694:Tanks and armored fighting vehicles
225:and an agreement to supply arms to
217:achieved diplomatic relations with
133:. The war was inconvenient for the
2050:Hurley, Matthew M. (Winter 1989),
1584:Israel's role in the Iran–Iraq war
1148:As mentioned in the introduction,
571:SA-6 launcher in desert camouflage
523:(NATO reporting name BLINDER) and
340:When the Iran–Iraq war began, the
25:
2679:"The Air War in The Persian Gulf"
2677:Segal, David (March–April 1986),
2665:Command and General Staff College
1419:These reports suggested that the
1078:Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
973:United States Department of State
539:(NATO reporting name CANDID) and
241:Active support for Iraq (1986–88)
2611:Baugher, Joseph (3 March 2000),
2150:URL goes to the FOIA search page
1199:Director of Central Intelligence
917:Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
820:
373:Competition with other countries
108:
97:
66:
55:
36:
2632:Alexander, Greg (12 May 2002),
2347:"Soviet Official visiting Iran"
2201:National Intelligence Council,
1700:This section: Mesbahi pp. 78–82
801:, patrol boats, missile boats,
674:(NATO reporting name FISHBED).
311:Motives for policy towards Iraq
2578:, 8 March 1982, archived from
2548:. 8 March 1982. Archived from
1736:This section: Mesbahi pp.82–94
1691:This section: Mesbahi pp.74–78
1630:(2): 307–311. 1 January 1968.
1458:, a key Iranian oil facility.
1136:International Department) and
883:for decontaminating soldiers.
776:heavy artillery bombardments.
767:medium transport helicopters.
555:(NATO reporting name HIP) and
511:FITTER C), and 1 with British
212:fearing Tehran would go on to
1:
2733:(Duke University Press, 1991)
2613:"Tomcat In Service with Iran"
1875:Bergquist, Ronald E. (1981),
1624:International Legal Materials
1226:Soviets explore opportunities
1195:National Intelligence Council
650:missiles, and eventually the
591:Iranian pilots avoided Iraqi
173:"Strict neutrality" (1980–82)
2430:, Indiana University Press,
2242:, Government Printing Office
1954:, December 19, 1987, p. 1400
1268:Military training and advice
1132:; first deputy chief of the
579:SA-2 on camouflaged launcher
346:Security Council resolutions
2752:Iran–Soviet Union relations
2747:Iraq–Soviet Union relations
2175:"Iran's new Soviet Arsenal"
1525:surface-to-surface missiles
1261:Central Intelligence Agency
587:SA-3 surface-to-air missile
543:(NATO reporting name CUB).
88:Iraq–Soviet Union relations
31:Iran–Soviet Union relations
2778:
986:People's Republic of China
927:Soviet-Iranian relations.
863:
438:
365:, driven from Iraq by the
333:
2762:1980s in the Soviet Union
2424:Hume, Cameron R. (1994),
1636:10.1017/s0020782900052517
1446:, for close engagements.
1385:General Accounting Office
737:1956 Hungarian Revolution
214:export Islamic revolution
120:
107:
96:
78:
65:
54:
35:
2634:"Iranian Air Force F-14"
1185:In 1985, a CIA analyst,
2650:Davis, Mark J. (1992),
2173:Timmerman, Kenneth R.,
1808:Timmerman, Kenneth R.,
1513:surface-to-air missiles
1496:Surface-to-air missiles
1478:surface-to-air missiles
1193:, then head of the CIA
932:clandestine procurement
795:Osa class missile boats
636:anti-aircraft artillery
632:surface-to-air missiles
615:Surface-to-air missiles
282:from 1980 to 1988, the
179:1979 Iranian revolution
2181:– via Iran Brief
1907:Clark, Robert (2000),
1816:– via Iran Brief
1505:
1484:Antiaircraft artillery
1471:antiaircraft artillery
1466:
1411:
1356:
1021:Iranian Hostage Crisis
1000:Motivations for Policy
866:Iraqi chemical warfare
782:
723:
703:
588:
580:
572:
495:
494:Su-22 version of Su-17
475:
322:
2683:Air University Review
2530:, CIA/NESA 81-10049 M
2309:on December 31, 2006.
1952:Jane's Defence Weekly
1839:, Library of Congress
1836:Iraq: a Country Study
1558:Iraq–Russia relations
1553:Iran–Russia relations
1503:
1464:
1409:
1354:
1030:Mohammed Reza Pahlevi
778:
759:Army aviation had 10
721:
701:
603:(NATO reporting name
595:(NATO reporting name
586:
578:
570:
493:
473:
415:Jane's Defence Weekly
363:Iraqi Communist Party
336:Iraq–Russia relations
334:Further information:
305:France supported Iraq
2016:, Globalsecurity.org
1363:and its specialized
1252:and State Security (
1213:Secretary of Defense
1054:Operation Eagle Claw
722:Captured Iraqi BMP-2
398:Intelligence support
344:(UN) responded with
2582:on October 23, 2012
2552:on October 23, 2012
1810:"Operation Staunch"
1664:Sajjadpour pp.31–32
1050:Vladimir Vinogradov
402:Iraq improvised an
181:had overthrown the
145:of Iran. After the
89:
84:Bilateral relations
32:
27:Bilateral relations
2729:Oles M. Smolansky
2617:AirToAirCombat.com
2456:The New York Times
2405:Unknown parameter
2392:, 10 February 1986
2390:The New York Times
2366:Unknown parameter
2351:The New York Times
2329:Strategic Insights
2261:Globalsecurity.org
2226:The New York Times
2079:Cordesman, Anthony
2028:Cordesman, Anthony
1930:Cordesman, Anthony
1831:Metz, Helen Chapin
1578:Iran–Contra affair
1519:Missile technology
1506:
1504:SA-7 ready to fire
1467:
1412:
1369:air-to-air missile
1357:
1206:Secretary of State
1167:Hashemi Rafsanjani
1138:Aleksandr Yakovlev
1017:Iranian Revolution
1010:Iranian Revolution
832:. You can help by
813:Missile technology
724:
704:
589:
581:
573:
496:
476:
151:Ayatollah Khomeini
147:Iranian revolution
2638:Aerospace Web.com
2597:, Washington Post
2542:"Iran: Tuning In"
2513:978-0-309-05741-7
2469:Fukuyama, Francis
2437:978-0-253-32874-8
2353:, 3 February 1986
2277:Fukuyama, Francis
1773:on March 27, 2008
1216:Caspar Weinberger
1150:Mikhail Gorbachev
1134:Central Committee
924:Mikhail Gorbachev
911:ideology and the
850:
849:
799:submarine chasers
327:Helen Chapin Metz
124:
123:
82:
81:
16:(Redirected from
2769:
2704:
2703:
2692:
2686:
2685:
2674:
2668:
2667:
2658:
2647:
2641:
2640:
2629:
2620:
2619:
2608:
2599:
2598:
2595:Associated Press
2590:
2584:
2583:
2568:
2562:
2561:
2559:
2557:
2538:
2532:
2531:
2523:
2517:
2516:
2488:
2482:
2481:
2479:
2465:
2459:
2458:
2447:
2441:
2440:
2421:
2415:
2414:
2408:
2403:
2401:
2393:
2382:
2376:
2375:
2369:
2364:
2362:
2354:
2343:
2337:
2336:
2320:
2314:
2310:
2296:
2290:
2289:
2287:
2273:
2264:
2263:
2253:
2244:
2243:
2235:
2229:
2228:
2217:
2211:
2210:
2209:
2198:
2183:
2182:
2170:
2151:
2149:
2148:on March 1, 2001
2135:
2129:
2128:
2118:
2112:
2111:
2101:
2092:
2091:
2089:
2075:
2064:
2063:
2056:Airpower Journal
2047:
2041:
2040:
2038:
2024:
2018:
2017:
2008:
1999:
1994:
1988:
1987:
1978:
1972:
1971:
1961:
1955:
1949:
1943:
1942:
1940:
1926:
1915:
1914:
1904:
1893:
1892:
1891:on March 9, 2004
1890:
1883:
1872:
1857:
1856:
1847:
1841:
1840:
1827:
1818:
1817:
1805:
1792:
1791:
1781:
1775:
1774:
1769:, archived from
1758:
1749:
1743:
1737:
1734:
1728:
1727:Mesbahi pp.88–89
1725:
1719:
1716:
1710:
1707:
1701:
1698:
1692:
1689:
1683:
1682:Sajjadpour pp.32
1680:
1674:
1671:
1665:
1662:
1656:
1655:
1619:
1613:
1608:
1602:
1599:
1435:AIM-9 Sidewinder
1333:enhanced version
1302:Strait of Hormuz
1159:Georgi Kornyenko
1122:Francis Fukuyama
1056:hostage rescue.
909:Marxist-Leninist
891:Support for Iran
870:A raw, redacted
860:Chemical warfare
845:
842:
824:
817:
413:Cordesman cites
367:Ba'athist regime
330:
274:Support for Iraq
112:
111:
101:
100:
90:
70:
69:
59:
58:
40:
33:
21:
2777:
2776:
2772:
2771:
2770:
2768:
2767:
2766:
2737:
2736:
2712:
2707:
2694:
2693:
2689:
2676:
2675:
2671:
2656:
2649:
2648:
2644:
2631:
2630:
2623:
2610:
2609:
2602:
2592:
2591:
2587:
2570:
2569:
2565:
2555:
2553:
2540:
2539:
2535:
2525:
2524:
2520:
2514:
2490:
2489:
2485:
2477:
2467:
2466:
2462:
2449:
2448:
2444:
2438:
2423:
2422:
2418:
2404:
2394:
2384:
2383:
2379:
2365:
2355:
2345:
2344:
2340:
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2095:
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2077:
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2067:
2049:
2048:
2044:
2036:
2026:
2025:
2021:
2010:
2009:
2002:
1995:
1991:
1980:
1979:
1975:
1969:Washington Post
1963:
1962:
1958:
1950:
1946:
1938:
1928:
1927:
1918:
1906:
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1896:
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1740:
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1718:Sajjadpour p.35
1717:
1713:
1709:Sajjadpour p.34
1708:
1704:
1699:
1695:
1690:
1686:
1681:
1677:
1673:Smolanksy p.231
1672:
1668:
1663:
1659:
1621:
1620:
1616:
1609:
1605:
1601:Sajjadpour p.29
1600:
1596:
1592:
1544:
1521:
1498:
1486:
1452:
1417:
1397:
1349:
1329:
1294:
1270:
1237:
1235:Export controls
1228:
1191:Robert M. Gates
1183:
1118:
1062:
1002:
893:
881:pressure washer
868:
862:
846:
840:
837:
830:needs expansion
815:
791:
773:
749:
696:
687:
668:
617:
599:GUIDELINE) and
565:
549:
533:
488:
468:
443:
437:
400:
387:
385:Soviet training
375:
338:
332:
324:
313:
293:support to Iran
276:
243:
209:
175:
167:
113:
109:
102:
98:
85:
71:
67:
60:
56:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
2775:
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2749:
2739:
2738:
2735:
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2727:
2720:
2711:
2708:
2706:
2705:
2701:Air Line Pilot
2687:
2669:
2642:
2621:
2600:
2585:
2563:
2533:
2518:
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2312:Scholar search
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2212:
2184:
2152:
2130:
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2093:
2065:
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2019:
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1989:
1973:
1956:
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1517:
1497:
1494:
1485:
1482:
1451:
1448:
1428:AIM-54 Phoenix
1416:
1413:
1396:
1393:
1373:AN/AWG-9 radar
1365:AIM-54 Phoenix
1348:
1345:
1328:
1325:
1293:
1290:
1269:
1266:
1236:
1233:
1227:
1224:
1182:
1179:
1126:Karen Brutents
1117:
1114:
1061:
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1001:
998:
892:
889:
864:Main article:
861:
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790:
787:
772:
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748:
745:
695:
692:
686:
683:
667:
664:
616:
613:
564:
561:
548:
545:
532:
529:
513:Hawker Hunters
487:
486:Ground support
484:
467:
464:
436:
433:
399:
396:
386:
383:
374:
371:
350:Resolution 598
342:United Nations
314:
312:
309:
301:Saddam Hussein
275:
272:
242:
239:
208:
205:
174:
171:
166:
163:
155:Saddam Hussein
122:
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117:
106:
94:
93:
83:
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75:
64:
52:
51:
49:
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45:
42:
41:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
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6:
4:
3:
2:
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2605:
2601:
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2515:
2509:
2505:
2504:10.17226/5590
2501:
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2457:
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2420:
2417:
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2407:|agency=
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2368:|agency=
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2197:
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2159:
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2100:
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2086:
2085:
2080:
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2070:
2066:
2062:on 2008-09-23
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2034:
2029:
2023:
2020:
2015:
2014:
2013:Iran–Iraq War
2007:
2005:
2001:
1998:
1993:
1990:
1985:
1984:
1977:
1974:
1970:
1966:
1965:Woodward, Bob
1960:
1957:
1953:
1948:
1945:
1937:
1936:
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1481:
1479:
1476:
1472:
1463:
1459:
1457:
1449:
1447:
1445:
1440:
1439:AIM-7 Sparrow
1436:
1431:
1429:
1425:
1422:
1414:
1408:
1404:
1402:
1394:
1392:
1388:
1386:
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1241:
1234:
1232:
1225:
1223:
1219:
1217:
1214:
1210:
1209:George Shultz
1207:
1203:
1202:William Casey
1200:
1196:
1192:
1188:
1187:Graham Fuller
1180:
1178:
1174:
1172:
1171:Fao Peninsula
1168:
1162:
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1123:
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1111:
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1103:
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1085:Iran–Iraq War
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1038:
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1007:
1006:Iran–Iraq War
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906:
905:Iran–Iraq War
902:
898:
890:
888:
884:
882:
876:
873:
867:
859:
857:
855:
844:
835:
831:
828:This section
826:
823:
819:
818:
812:
810:
808:
804:
803:torpedo boats
800:
796:
789:Naval warfare
788:
786:
781:
777:
770:
768:
766:
762:
757:
755:
746:
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740:
738:
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684:
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637:
633:
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569:
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560:
558:
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546:
544:
542:
538:
530:
528:
526:
522:
518:
514:
510:
506:
502:
492:
485:
483:
481:
474:Soviet MiG-29
472:
465:
463:
461:
457:
453:
447:
442:
434:
432:
430:
426:
421:
416:
411:
409:
405:
397:
395:
391:
384:
382:
379:
372:
370:
368:
364:
359:
356:
353:
351:
347:
343:
337:
331:
328:
321:
318:
310:
308:
306:
302:
296:
294:
289:
285:
281:
280:Iran–Iraq War
273:
271:
268:
264:
260:
256:
252:
248:
247:Faw Peninsula
240:
238:
236:
232:
228:
224:
220:
215:
206:
204:
202:
198:
193:
188:
184:
180:
172:
170:
164:
162:
160:
156:
152:
148:
144:
140:
136:
132:
128:
119:
116:
105:
95:
91:
77:
74:
63:
53:
50:
48:
47:
43:
39:
34:
19:
2730:
2723:
2716:
2700:
2690:
2682:
2672:
2663:, U.S. Army
2652:
2645:
2637:
2616:
2594:
2588:
2580:the original
2575:
2566:
2554:. Retrieved
2550:the original
2545:
2536:
2527:
2521:
2494:
2486:
2473:
2463:
2455:
2445:
2426:
2419:
2389:
2380:
2350:
2341:
2332:
2328:
2318:
2307:the original
2301:
2294:
2281:
2260:
2239:
2233:
2225:
2215:
2203:
2178:
2146:the original
2140:
2133:
2127:, CIA 369862
2123:
2116:
2106:
2083:
2060:the original
2055:
2045:
2032:
2022:
2012:
1992:
1982:
1976:
1968:
1959:
1951:
1947:
1934:
1909:
1886:the original
1877:
1851:
1845:
1835:
1813:
1786:
1779:
1771:the original
1766:
1741:
1732:
1723:
1714:
1705:
1696:
1687:
1678:
1669:
1660:
1627:
1623:
1617:
1606:
1597:
1535:
1533:
1529:F-4 Phantoms
1522:
1507:
1487:
1468:
1456:Kharg Island
1453:
1432:
1418:
1398:
1389:
1381:
1377:"mini-AWACS"
1358:
1330:
1327:Land warfare
1322:
1306:
1295:
1286:
1271:
1258:
1242:
1238:
1229:
1220:
1184:
1175:
1163:
1155:Persian Gulf
1147:
1119:
1098:Saudi Arabia
1089:black market
1082:
1075:
1063:
1043:
1039:
1014:
1003:
993:
989:
969:
929:
921:
897:Soviet Union
894:
885:
877:
869:
851:
838:
834:adding to it
829:
807:minesweepers
792:
783:
779:
774:
758:
754:3M11 Falanga
750:
741:
725:
705:
688:
685:Land warfare
676:
669:
656:
618:
590:
550:
534:
497:
477:
448:
444:
428:
425:Diego Garcia
414:
412:
401:
392:
388:
380:
376:
360:
357:
354:
339:
323:
319:
316:
297:
284:Soviet Union
277:
244:
235:Persian Gulf
210:
176:
168:
159:Central Asia
126:
125:
115:Soviet Union
73:Soviet Union
2572:"Tuning In"
1510:Strela SA-7
1475:MIM-23 Hawk
1450:Air defense
1444:F-4 Phantom
1367:long-range
1347:Air warfare
1310:South Yemen
1298:Baluchistan
1276:bases (see
1259:In 1981, a
949:North Korea
903:during the
747:Helicopters
563:Air defense
547:Helicopters
503:Bs, 2 with
452:Mirage F-1s
435:Air warfare
278:During the
251:Afghanistan
192:Warsaw Pact
2741:Categories
1767:Z Magazine
1590:References
1102:Suez Canal
1034:neutrality
709:Chieftains
679:R550 Magic
593:S-75 Dvina
439:See also:
259:Mujahideen
2409:ignored (
2370:ignored (
1652:249004473
1142:Politburo
841:July 2010
771:Logistics
715:to Iraq.
531:Transport
143:Ayatollah
2471:(1989),
2398:citation
2359:citation
2302:COLD WAR
2279:(1989),
1644:20690330
1542:See also
1536:the USSR
1490:ZSU-23-4
1395:Aircraft
1314:Ethiopia
1250:military
1104:and the
1019:and the
990:emphasis
937:Bulgaria
913:Islamist
517:avionics
466:Aircraft
221:and the
141:and the
2710:Sources
1469:Soviet
1415:Weapons
1335:of the
1106:Red Sea
978:Romania
945:Romania
672:MiG-21s
131:the war
2556:23 May
2510:
2434:
1650:
1642:
1421:Vympel
1391:cope.
1316:, and
1282:SAVAMA
1274:SIGINT
982:Poland
941:Poland
922:After
713:AMX-30
646:, and
627:, and
557:Mi-24s
541:An-12s
537:Il-76s
525:Il-28s
521:Tu-22s
501:MiG-23
460:MiG-29
456:MiG-25
429:Jane's
329:, 1988
227:Kuwait
2657:(PDF)
2478:(PDF)
2286:(PDF)
2208:(PDF)
2088:(PDF)
2037:(PDF)
1939:(PDF)
1889:(PDF)
1882:(PDF)
1648:S2CID
1640:JSTOR
1318:Syria
1246:Party
1110:Syria
1094:Egypt
1067:Oghab
965:Syria
961:Libya
957:China
951:(see
732:BMP-2
728:BMP-1
652:SA-14
638:with
609:SA-6s
601:S-125
553:Mi-8s
509:Su-17
480:Basra
420:IMINT
408:Il-76
404:AWACS
263:T-72s
231:Tudeh
201:Syria
197:Libya
187:Egypt
2576:Time
2558:2010
2546:Time
2508:ISBN
2432:ISBN
2411:help
2372:help
1437:and
1424:R-33
1401:F-14
1361:F-14
1341:T-55
1337:T-54
1211:and
1096:and
1071:Scud
1026:Shah
980:and
963:and
943:and
901:Iran
895:The
854:SCUD
805:and
765:Puma
761:Mi-6
730:and
648:SA-9
644:SA-8
640:SA-7
629:SA-6
625:SA-3
621:SA-2
605:SA-3
597:SA-2
505:Su-7
458:and
361:The
288:Iraq
267:Scud
219:Oman
199:and
183:Shah
139:Shah
135:USSR
104:Iraq
62:Iran
2500:doi
1632:doi
1254:KGB
992:) "
872:CIA
836:.
255:war
223:UAE
2743::
2699:,
2681:,
2659:,
2636:,
2624:^
2615:,
2603:^
2574:,
2544:.
2506:,
2454:,
2402::
2400:}}
2396:{{
2388:,
2363::
2361:}}
2357:{{
2349:,
2333:IV
2331:,
2327:,
2268:^
2259:,
2248:^
2224:,
2187:^
2177:,
2155:^
2096:^
2068:^
2054:,
2003:^
1919:^
1897:^
1861:^
1822:^
1812:,
1796:^
1765:,
1753:^
1646:.
1638:.
1626:.
1312:,
1284:.
1248:,
1130:ru
1112:.
1028:,
947:.
939:,
739:.
662:.
654:.
642:,
623:,
462:.
352:.
325:–
2560:.
2502::
2413:)
2374:)
1654:.
1634::
1628:7
1339:/
1140:(
1128:(
843:)
839:(
20:)
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
