1189:"According to Carnap, discussing a new kind of entity requires the construction of a linguistic framework, defined as a new set of rules governing the ways in which these entities are described and referenced. A linguistic framework is thus a way of organizing human communication about particular sets of experiences or observations. For every linguistic framework there exist two types of questions: internal questions, which are asked and answered within the framework, and external questions asked of the larger system within which the entities are supposed to exist. Internal questions may concern definitions or facts, and thus may be decided through either logical or empirical mechanisms (that is, they may be analytic or synthetic); what distinguishes them from external questions is the fact that they presuppose the linguistic framework in which they are asked. Thus âWhere did I leave my keys?â, âIs ice frozen water?â, âWho was Julius Caesarâs father?â, and âWhat kind of quarks are protons made of?â are all internal questions with respect to thing-language."
128:
questions, but then the answer would be obvious in the relevant framework. For the two example questions, the answers found within the framework of everyday language would be trivially "yes, numbers exist" and "yes, material objects exist". However, when a general existence question, like the two example questions, is asked and discussed by philosophers as an external question, there are lengthy arguments that don't result in any generally agreed upon answer. According to Carnap, external questions should be reinterpreted as practical questions about whether or not to accept the relevant linguistic framework, or philosopher's could construct one. In any case, there is no resulting gain in understanding the reality of the related kinds of entities as viewed from outside the framework.
2056:. In contrast, Thomasson's concern is with the internal-external distinction, which is what she calls Carnap's meta-ontology, and what she and Price call 'Carnapian deflationism'. Deflationism is a form of meta-ontology, which in Carnap's case depends upon his internal-external distinction. So we first have to determine whether you agree with this appraisal. I have laid out the basis for the latter. Inwagen's own paper is adequate basis for the first. You can just look at the situation and decide what you think is going on, or suggest what needs to be done to establish the point in your opinion if these three sources appear to you inadequate.
3057:
elaboration of one debate used to illustrate that theme. Your questions which relate to the elaboration are not being answered because the connection is to the elaboration itself. Oh and I am not talking about 'bare bones' restrictions but one of 'sufficiency to purpose' and that is very usual. Otherwise if I actually 'rant' you can use the word, but given that I am not its a personal attack. Also I suspect your confusion is genuine and it is what has caused the problem here and on other articles, plus the problems on
Physics. It takes a lot for the community to turn a one year ban to an indef. You need to learn from that. ----
299:"âThe acceptance of a new kind of entities is represented in the language by the introduction of a framework of new forms of expressions to be used according to a new set of rules. There may be new names for particular entities of the kind in question; but some such names may already occur in the language before the introduction of the new framework. (Thus, for example, the thing language contains certainly words of the type of "blue" and "house" before the framework of properties is introduced; and it may contain words like "ten" in sentences of the form "I have ten fingers" before the framework of numbers is introduced.)â
1160:âThe acceptance of a new kind of entities is represented in the language by the introduction of a framework of new forms of expressions to be used according to a new set of rules. There may be new names for particular entities of the kind in question; but some such names may already occur in the language before the introduction of the new framework. (Thus, for example, the thing language contains certainly words of the type of "blue" and "house" before the framework of properties is introduced; and it may contain words like "ten" in sentences of the form "I have ten fingers" before the framework of numbers is introduced.)â
2009:-Carnapian meta-ontology presupposes a Carnapian meta-ontology. Do you agree? She continues by discussing the 'internal-external' separation of Carnap. I gather that the Carnapian meta-ontology is the meta-consideration that an ontology consists of two parts - the internal part related to frameworks and the external part that prevails outside frameworks. It is 'meta'-ontology because it is not about a particular ontology but a view of ontologies in general, regardless of their particular assertions about what
408:: "Internal questions may concern definitions or facts, and thus may be decided through either logical or empirical mechanisms (that is, they may be analytic or synthetic); what distinguishes them from external questions is the fact that they presuppose the linguistic framework in which they are asked." The huge emphasis in discussion upon 'existence questions' is because most philosophers are not interested in the trivial tautological aspects but in the ontological (i.e. existence) implications.
108:, to discuss a kind of entity requires relevant terms which are part of a linguistic framework that includes rules for the use of the terms. In this framework, questions regarding the existence of these kinds of entities are called internal questions. Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in the linguistic framework of 'everyday language'. An internal question in this framework could be, âIs there a white piece of paper on my desk?â The answer can be found by the
1803:
sources at the RS discussion but you seem not to be listening/paying attention to that. Also you need to think about how many actual edits you are managing to get into the articles you are working on, the lack of support from other editors and the sheer length of your postings on talk pages. Its getting too much and you are therefore getting minimal responses and engagement. That is only going to get worse over time unless you keep it shorter and within policy ----
731:"So long as we can identify a specific language, in whatever way, we can also draw Carnap's internal/external distinction. For once we have identified a language, then we can identify particular internal questions within it, and the general internal questions whose answers follow logically from the former, given a specific notion of logical consequence; and we can also identify a practical external question about whether we should adopt such a language."
31:
2852:. Apparently you think the treatment of Quine's meta-ontology need not alert the reader to any of this background, because "it is not 'meta-ontology'". The weak basis for this position leads me to think your resistance is for other reasons, not the nature of the material you object to, which clearly does fall under meta-ontology and is discussed as meta-ontology by Inwagen, Thomasson, Price, Eklund, Bird ...
4235:
too much of a coat rack and needs to be made relevant. Please stop making statements about other editors motivation, you inevitably get it wrong. Now when you are prepared to discuss the legitimate range of this article we might make progress. If you continue to insist on reinserting material rejected and adding whole wardrobes of coatracks then we are just going to end up with a stalemate. ----
3820:
will check it later but if I can't see anything new from when you last attempted to insert similar material it will be reverted. I will also try and find the time to cut the material back from an extended discussion of what is only an example of the article's subject. Try and stop the constant comments on editors by the way, it really has little effect ----
4352:
gain agreement here for any future edit. I am working on a proposal as to how this page can move forward but you will have to wait a day or so for that as I am teaching most of this week. There is a way forward but you are going to have to accept the coat rack point, if you can't do that then its going to be stalemate at best ----
3392:
arguments time and time and time again. You have had reasonable arguments in response. The material should not be placed in the article unless you can get a consensus of other editors . At the moment you don't have that, this or most other places for that matter. Futher repitition will simply receive a
3939:
And you are just continuing to argue your perspective and not listening Brews. I disagree with the extensions get your mind around it. Given you are not agreeable I have reverted to the last stable version. I have added two tags which illustrate my concerns which are further described above. When
3924:
Snowded: All you have provided here is your own unsubstantiated opinion that this material is needless. I have pointed out that it corrects an erroneous version of the Carnap-Quine differences and supported that remark with half a dozen sources. You are simply being obstructive and have not responded
3857:
Brews, in my experience many things are obvious to you that represent failure to follow policy for others. As I say above I will double check but you have acquired another bad habit recently of reverting anyone who disagrees you on the grounds they have not understood you. Regrettably, most of the
3819:
As I remember it Brews you had the same argument with Bob and its not sourced per se. in the meta-ontology references Nor is it remotely clear that it is needed here. You are constantly seeking to expand articles beyond their natural limits and adding material that belongs on other articles. I
3695:
My objection hasn't changed Brews it has been very consistent. Material here has to explain the term meta-ontology, it should not be an extended discussion of one dispute around which some people use the term. From that perspective it doesn't matter if the names are used or not, the material needs
3620:
I can, of course, add to the list of authors holding the same view, namely that the analytic/synthetic division is distinct from the internal/external division, for example, Thomasson, Hirsch, Eklund. I'll point out that you have accepted already
Thomasson as an adequate source all by herself for the
3411:
No, Snowded, it is not disagreement that makes me unhappy - disagreement is an opportunity to improve a contribution. It is deliberate obstructionism in the form of non-specific vague general objections that are not tied to the text under criticism and include nothing specific for improvement. And of
3006:
To me, the article is open to discussion of various meta-ontological approaches (like Carnap's internal-external divisions, Quine's analytic-synthetic & so forth) and also to comparing and contrasting approaches. You apparently do not agree with this view, but I don't understand how your criteria
2983:
Or continuing to make personal attacks. Brews I think you either don't want to or can't understand the point. Its very similar to things you did not understand on
Physics articles on 3 RfCs on Philosophy articles. Maybe its time to realise the problem is you not other editors. If you don't then
2754:
Snowded: The added material about Quine is about about a confusion over what Quine objected to when he made meta-ontological assertions about Carnap's approach - the analytic/synthetic viz a viz the internal/external. I think you should read the material again, perhaps a little more slowly so it can
2179:
Brews you are in my opinion expanding this material beyond its purpose of explaining the term, You are writing essays and your explanation if the summary paragraph confirms this. You may have your own 'arbitary' views of the article that exhibit your own 'personal taste' but I am afraid I disagree
988:
Re "You will notice that the first sentence 'And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence' explicitly restricts the discussion to questions of existence." â Yes, it is a discussion of existence questions, and the term 'internal question' is defined as "questions of the existence of
672:"Internal questions may concern definitions or facts, and thus may be decided through either logical or empirical mechanisms (that is, they may be analytic or synthetic); what distinguishes them from external questions is the fact that they presuppose the linguistic framework in which they are asked."
4351:
The point is that the article has too much on that already Brews, my edit avoided any possible error but reduced the content a bit (ie going in the right direction). I do not agree with adding extended discussion at this level of detail so I will revert any expansion. Please STOP EDIT WARRING, and
4234:
I'm happy for the article to include all and any material that explains the use of the term. However that does not mean extended discussion of subjects covered elsewhere, especially when not all of those involved of those discussions would use or recognise the validity of the term. The article is
3665:
Possibly one source of the general contention on this page might be from a disagreement about whether the material should be presented as a dispute between philosophers, or just presented. In that regard, it might be better to present the material without philosopher's names in the section headings
3647:
Snowded: Very conciliatory - I offer a solution to your objection, and you change the objection. It is a pattern with you. The objective is exclude new material with one objection after another, so this article remains a stub instead of a full article, all with the dying aim of shoring up your merge
3293:
in restricting analyticity to pure logical tautology, noting that Quine himself does not contest logical truths or stipulations. Even such counterproposals, however, concede a severe curtailment of the distinction, and in the wake of challenges from pragmatism it is hard to envision the analytic and
2882:
Snowded: Your comment is baffling. You say "material is only relevant in so far as it illustrates what the term means". I simply do not understand how that applies here. The subject is meta-ontology. The article discusses the analytic-synthetic distinction. Is that meta-ontology? Should it be in the
2499:"The construction of logical frameworks led to a distinction between logical statements and descriptive statements. This was called the analytic-synthetic distinction, and it can be regarded as the successor of both the Kantian analytic/synthetic and a priori-a/posteriori distinctions." According to
1643:
There is no point in agreeing something on the talk page if your first reaction to not having wider changes accepted is to attempt to qualify the agreed text. its time wasting. You don't think Bob responds directly, you don;t think I respond to your content discussions. Well take that revert as a
1487:
This is a classic. You object to the secondary source on the basis of your interpretation of Carnap's meaning. Then you bring in your interpretation of
Wittgenstein. This is clear original research. Otherwise I realise that not agreeing with you means I am not (in Brew's speak) engaging with the
890:
questions are not limited to questions of existence, but include any and all questions of whatever nature that can be posed using the vocabulary of a linguistic framework. An example I have used is: "Is a square a rectangle?". This is a question of an analytic nature, not an existence question like:
4287:
I disagree, given your definition here you could simply replicate and extend the ontology article. Come to think of it, given the rejection of your particular take on
Philosophy that may even be your intention. Sorry Brews my next set of edits will be to make another attempt to reduce the content
3506:
However, the analytic/synthetic distinction and the internal/external distinction are separate matters. As pointed out by Bird: "Now it is one thing to claim that the analytic/synthetic distinction can be used to support the external/internal distinction, and another to claim that the contrasts are
2635:
It is (as I am sure you know) ridiculous to say in an article that discusses meta-ontology that pointing out that Quine's objections to Carnap's meta-ontology are known to be an erroneous conflation of internal/external with analytic/synthetic, for which three sources are supplied. I am afraid that
2552:
questions. That interpretation excludes all 'analytic' statements, and vitiates any consideration of the analytic/synthetic distinction. I've suggested this ambiguity be fixed by inserting the adjective 'existence' in the statement (underscored addition): "questions regarding the existence of these
1541:
I an understand that fully. Once he has decided on an interpretation or an approach he will not let go. Hence his block record. I'm loosing the will to live over multiple articles so I'm really just policing at the moment to make sure we don't get a mass of original research and/or synthesis.
1471:
In other words, to make a meaning sharp and relations precise, one has to abstract from 'everyday language' using a boundary upon meaning and relationships that serves a special purpose, in other words, a 'linguistic framework'. I am not suggesting that
Wittgenstein is directly addressing Carnap in
969:
Hi Bob: We are becoming real lawyers over this eh? You will notice that the first sentence "And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence" explicitly restricts the discussion to questions of existence. That of course does not suggest that there are no other kinds of questions. The
390:
Bob: you don't want to extend the definition of internal questions beyond existence questions because that is all
Thomasson talks about. Carnap says: "Once we have accepted the thing language with its framework for things, we can raise and answer internal questions, e.g., "Is there a white piece of
2263:
Carnapian meta-ontology, which should be done as this article is about 'meta-ontology', and it supplies supporting references for this identification. It also introduces the term 'Carnapian deflationism', with sources for its identification, a form of
Carnapian meta-ontology that goes further than
2148:
Carnapian meta-ontology, which should be done as this article is about 'meta-ontology', and it supplies supporting references for this identification. It also introduces the term 'Carnapian deflationism', with sources for its identification, a form of
Carnapian meta-ontology that goes further than
1363:
FWIW, I've read and considered every word of your messages in our discussions. The TL;DR comment I made to
Snowded previously was referring to the problem facing editors other than you and me. I think there may be a lot of self deception in your personality in order to cope with the psychological
1278:
I agree with you as to the status of the Kate Stafford source. However, you will agree that she sees things exactly as I do. Apparently she and I, in your view, have a common defect of understanding. I have no idea how you arrive at Juhl & Loomis as extending Carnap's meaning. They themselves
795:
To be less argumentative about this, the answer is 'no'. I see no way to restrict the sentence: "For once we have identified a language, then we can identify particular internal questions within it, and the general internal questions whose answers follow logically from the former, given a specific
127:
Existence questions that are not asked inside a linguistic framework are called by Carnap 'external questions'. These are questions asked by philosophers and tend to be general in nature, such as "Do numbers exist?" or "Do material objects exist?" These general questions could be asked as internal
3899:
OK I reviewed it and per my previous comment this is needless expansion of the material with stuff that is not relevant to explaining the article subject - it belongs on other articles if anything. I also removed more material which simply elaborated the Q-C debate which again belongs elsewhere
3155:
So Snowded, we have a peculiarly one-sided approach: the first debate that most authors agree has the least to do with Carnap's meta-ontology, and which has been mistakenly confounded with the real issue, is given much space; while the the second debate, which is the more pertinent, you object to
2650:
My objection is as stated Brews. Your statement shows that you are attempting additional commentary over and above what is needed. Further that what is there is excessive and needs to be summarised into a paragraph or two. Your involvement over many articles is highly disruptive, but where you
2195:
It appears the 'we' who have to resolve this consist of you and I. Inasmuch as you have afforded no explanation of just why you think this contribution is a personal 'essay', which I find no grounds for saying, and a matter of 'personal taste', again unsubstantiated, can you provide anything more
1747:
actually refers neither to the analytic/synthetic distinction nor to the internal/external distinction. He has one footnote (number 10) that says "See for example Quineâs discussion (Quine 1951) of Carnapâs distinction between âinternalâ and âexternalâ questions." which is a footnote to Inwagen's
871:
When you posted this quoted excerpt and the others using 'internal question', I thought your point was that in the context of those excerpts, 'internal question' couldn't mean just 'internal existence question' because it wouldn't make sense. If that wasn't your point , then what was the point of
825:
Re "To be less argumentative about this, the answer is 'no'. I see no way to restrict the sentence: 'For once we have identified a language, then we can identify particular internal existence questions within it, and the general internal existence questions whose answers follow logically from the
4013:
is a sufficient indication to the reader. I provide you with a check-list to make it easy for you to articulate your reasons, which so far has been rendered unavailable to you, possibly because you are easily distracted by generalities and a penchant for assessing my behavior instead of content.
3624:
However, if your problem with this material is that it may be parochial, the obvious way to avoid this problem is (i) to state the obvious, that it is the view of some, but not necessarily all, and (ii) to present whatever arguments can be found that state the opposite view, and cite them. Quine
3616:
In this material, there is nothing originated by myself, as I think you would allow, but I don't think that is what you mean by my presenting 'my personal interpretation'. I think you are saying that these statements, while accurately portraying these three authors' views of the matter, may be a
3391:
No Brews, I have responded before and you are not happy with the response Live with it. Just as on the RfC on Philosophy you seem to think that if anyone disagrees with you the solution is lengthly statements and restatements of your original argument. I've had enough of dealing with the same
1922:
a term without need for a particular framework. Quoting Price: "The only legitimate external questions simply mention the terms in question." She speaks about the Carnapian approach to metaontology, and I'd propose that it is this that we want to point out in the Carnap section of the article on
848:
Bob: Of course it does make sense. It also makes sense in the original and more general form: "For once we have identified a language, then we can identify particular internal questions within it, and the general internal questions whose answers follow logically from the former, given a specific
3479:
You can report what the authors who use meta-ontology say about the debate in so far as it relates to an understanding of that word. you can not develop an article based on your own interpretation (selection of primary sources) of that debate. Nothing to do with easy generalities or personal
3214:
You can report what the authors who use meta-ontology say about the debate in so far as it relates to an understanding of that word. you can not develop an article based on your own interpretation (selection of primary sources) of that debate. Nothing to do with easy generalities or personal
2511:
accuses Quine of a mistaken identification of the two: "Now it is one thing to claim that the analytic/synthetic distinction can be used to support the external/internal distinction, and another to claim that the contrasts are effectively identical. Yet it is the stronger claim which Quine also
1802:
Inwagen's description illustrates his use of the term 'meta-ontology' which is what this is all about. You constantly seek to extend that into a detailed discussion of the Quine-Carnap debate. The problem with this has been explained to you by at least two editors in your posting on primary
2225:
I have stated clearly that in my opinion the article is about meta-ontology and material on Carnap-Quine is only relevant in so far as it explains the subject. Your paragraph (and other material) was an expansion of said debate that adds nothing to the article. As I also said if anything the
3056:
I have been very specific on content Brews but your refusal to listen means that sooner or later its necessary to comment on the behavioural issues. I will repeat the content point for the upteenth tim. An article on meta-ontology is one on meta-ontology, it is not the place for an extended
2295:
You have already driven one editor who tried to work with you from participation; not sure if you have learning any lesson from that. I've increasingly lost any motivation to explain things to you again and again when you don't listen to anyone who disagrees with you. The issue of merge and
810:
To elaborate further, when it comes time to discuss Quine and the notion of 'analytic' statements (those that are true by virtue of semantics, and not by virtue of the nature of the world we live in), the idea of 'internal' questions must allow inclusion of analytic statements and questions.
1927:. She claims that Carnap has restricted the existence of entities to existence within a framework, but there is work to be done in explaining how conceptual choices between frameworks are to be made. These are pragmatic issues, discussed by 'mentioning' concepts, not inquiries into what
2866:
The material is only relevant in so far as it illustrates what the term means Brews. You seem to what to use this article for an extended discussion which is not related to that. I have made no comment on the relevance of the analytic-synthetic argument to Quine's work and reputation
1430:"Internal questions Carnap initially characterizes as âquestions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the frameworkâ; they include questions (asked within the framework of everyday language) such as âIs there a white piece of paper on my desk?â (1950, 207)... "
3500:
is actually what you say here, the issue is that this material is seen by you as Brews' interpretation, not my own creation, but my own interpretation by virtue of my having selected particular primary sources. So let's look at the second part of the rejected material, which states:
3326:
I find it improbable that you are unaware of these facts and these works and their content, or that you really believe that these introductory words forming the prolegomena is in any way 'my interpretation'. Your reasons for rejection therefore do not apply here, to this part of the
2376:
Mark 7:5 " And the Pharisees and the scribes asked him, âWhy do your disciples not walk according to the tradition of the elders, but eat with defiled hands?â " What is the relevance here, Snowded? It appears to me that it has little to do with critiquing me instead of the material.
2296:
relevance are separate ones as you should know. In respect of your second paragraph, you make my point well. You are trying to make this a general essay on Carnap rather than its use as an exemplar or illustration of the use of the term meta-ontology. It is essay writing and also
3235:
is actually what you say here, the issue is that this material is seen by you as Brews' interpretation, not my own creation, but my own interpretation by virtue of my having selected particular primary sources. So let's look at the first part of the rejected material, which states:
3873:
Snowded: Your generalizations as to my actions and motivations are your own and stem from problems that attribute to you as well as myself. They are irrelevant here. I look forward to your 'double' check. Look at the sources particularly with a view to establishing that there are
2106:
The article should not be an extended article on the Carnap-Quine debate, it is here only used as an illustration. We really need to cut that section back to a one/two paragraph summary not extend it. I have simplified the first sentence and removed your additional paragraph.
2047:
Snowded: A preliminary problem is the introductory sentence "Inwagen exemplified meta-ontology by analyzing Quine's critique of Carnap's analytic/synthetic distinction" because it is incorrect. Inwagen's notion of meta-ontology was concerned with Quine's methodology in applying
2226:
material should be shortened and summarised If you don't find that clear then I'm not sure how else to explain it to you. As to terms like 'personal taste', don't use them and try and recognise irony when you see it, the quotation marks were there to help you spot that.----
1557:
Snowded: As is your wont, rather than contribute to understanding of material or between editors, you step in to help widen any rift with no comment about content or assistance with meeting of minds. Instead it is just one more opportunity for slander and self-congratulation.
1946:
In order to include that material you would need to show how it applies specifically to the article subject. The purpose of the material on Carnap is to illustrate the subject, this is not an article on Carnap per se. We also need to remember that metaontology is a post
2456:
jumps from the internal-external distinction of Carnap to the analytic-synthetic distinction as though these two ideas were the same. That is not so, and the relation between the two has to be established if the analytic/synthetic distinction is to be brought up. Quine's
1163:âAfter the new forms are introduced into the language, it is possible to formulate with their help internal questions and possible answers to them. A question of this kind may be either empirical or logical; accordingly a true answer is either factually true or analytic.â
908:
A different example posed internal to the system of natural numbers would be "Is 6 greater than 5?" It is not a question like "Does the number 5 exist?" or "Is the number 5 real". It is an internal question decided by the rules and definitions of the system of integers.
996:
Re "Am I to understand that you do not wish to entertain the other authors I've quoted? " â No. You can quote other authors and we'll see if any of them explicitly modify Carnap's definition of 'internal question' to include questions other than questions of existence.
1259:
The quote in your last message seems to be using 'internal question' in a more general sense than the above definition, but since the quote in your last message isn't an explicit definition of the term, I don't think we should overrule Carnap and Thomasson by doing
676:
It is clear that matters of 'definition and fact' are not limited to simple existence issues. For example, in the framework of geometry, the question "Is a square a rectangle?" is not an existence question, but it is a question internal to the framework of geometry.
1585:
Now how is this to be reconciled? I have tried three approaches to meet your objection: (i) providing sources that agree with me. You discount them. (ii) providing quotes from Carnap that support me. You ignore them. (iii) providing the logical point that discussing
4050:. The Carnap sections in this article are already a coat rack and there is no justification in making that problem worse. Your final sentence contradicts itself; if you want to focus on content stop making trivial statements about the behaviour of other editors----
3507:
effectively identical. Yet it is the stronger claim which Quine also indicates..." Accordingly, Quine's analysis of the analytic/synthetic distinction is not directly concerned with that part of Carnap's meta-ontology that rests on the internal/external distinction.
3368:
approach to my serious effort to allow a simple non-answer that required no thought. Your original reason not only does not stand, you are applying it in a situation where it is simply absurd. Read the discussion, and respond to the discussion. Make an effort, eh?
3010:
Maybe (I'm guessing) 'illustrates' is intended to say "not every important discussion but only the bare bones needed to establish the meaning of the word 'meta-ontology'?" If that is your criterion, why would this article be restricted in this way? It's not usual.
2419:
points out specifically that Carnap's meta-ontology consists of two parts: his internal-external distinction and his deflationism. The material preceding the summary does not do this, so the summary is useful in clarifying the connection to the article's subject:
2381:
points out specifically that Carnap's meta-ontology consists of two parts: his internal-external distinction and his deflationism. The material preceding the summary does not do this, so the summary is useful in clarifying the connection to the article's subject:
2338:
points out specifically that Carnap's meta-ontology consists of two parts: his internal-external distinction and his deflationism. The material preceding the summary does not do this, so the summary is useful in clarifying the connection to the article's subject:
1503:
These remarks have been clearly identified as an attempt to convey the issues here for purposes of discussion. On the other hand, Snowded, your remarks are interpretable as an attempt to block discussion of this matter by introduction of hostility and derision.
826:
former, given a specific notion of logical consequence'; to being strictly true only of existence questions." â Using this sentence in a follow-up of my previous message, here it is with the substitution of 'internal existence question' for 'internal question',
3974:
Assuming you agree, as indeed there is no choice about this and the question is largely rhetorical, do you agree that these two matters are discussed as separate issues in on-going philosophical publications? I refer to Thomasson, Eklund , Price, Bird, Hirsch,
2004:
Snowded: do you have any particular comments to make about the above presentation of Thomasson's views about Carnapian meta-ontology? In her introduction she says "the prospects for a neo-Carnapian meta-ontology are really rather good" One might suppose that a
1707:
refers to the focus of Inwagen's introduction of the term 'meta-ontology' as being motivated by the presentation of Carnap's and Quine's positions on the analytic/synthetic distinction. This is the idea, then, as to why the presentation is set up in this way.
3795:
are made clear in separate WP articles, in the original sources by Quine and Carnap, and in later discussions by Thomasson, Price, Eklund, Hirsch, Bird and who knows how many other sources linked on this Talk page and in various reverted material. To oppose a
704:
Now perhaps, Snowded, you would object that these sources lack sufficient stature in your mind. Bob may feel the same way. But that is no reason to simply ride roughshod over these views and avoid all discussion based upon the fact that Thomasson's article
1157:âIf someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question.â
829:"For once we have identified a language, then we can identify particular internal existence questions within it, and the general internal existence questions whose answers follow logically from the former, given a specific notion of logical consequence."
619:) there are unresolved issues here regarding Carnap's meaning for 'internal' and 'external' questions that require full discussion. It is insufficient to rest all authority upon one discussion by Thomasson that is focused narrowly upon existence issues.
1254:"First, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions."
3996:
Assuming your answer is "Yes! It does indeed discuss these matters adequately." how do you support that opinion of yours? I'll offer a few possible answers, none of which I find reasonable: (i) Yes the two aspects exist, but only one of them, the
796:
notion of logical consequence"; to being strictly true only of existence questions. And there isn't any doubt that Euclidean geometry is an example of a framework, and that 'Is a square a rectangle?' is an internal question within this framework.
1293:
I can support your saying that the vast majority of the literature is about ontology and has no other interest in the internal-external distinction beyond existence questions, because that is what ontology is about. I'd agree if that aspect were
1756:
and he goes on to list 5 aspects of this work that he thinks are meta-ontology. It begins to appear that we need a different way to connect the Quine-Carnap dispute to meta-ontology. Inwagen is not going to do it. Maybe Thomasson will do it?
751:
Let's look at the issue regarding 'internal questions' first. In all the quoted excerpts you gave regarding this, could you reread them with 'internal existence question' substituted for 'internal question' and see if they still make sense?
1659:
I am unaware of any agreement so far, and my changes were, I thought, a minor change that would meet Bob's approval. You, Snowded, were anxious to intervene where intervention was unnecessary. I think Bob can look after things quite well.
2738:
Brews, the point is that this is an article about meta-ontology, not one about the connection/difference between 'distinctions'. So if you want to remove material that would be welcome. At most we should have one/two summary paragraphs
3289:, for example, contend that analyticity, necessity, and cognitive synonymy constitute an internally coherent family of terms, which Quine takes out of context in appealing to extensional criteria such as semantic reference. Others follow
3751:. The literature is very clear about this distinction, and sources have been provided. Of course, the matter could be explained more carefully, as suggested here, but Snowded is adamant in his opposition, although his reasons are vague.
472:
Actually, all of the first part, i.e. first paragraph, is supported by the secondary source Thomasson(2013). I can make that clearer by removing all the current citations and placing the following footnote at the end of each paragraph.
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In fact, the accurate statement is that 'existence' questions of all types do not exhaust the population of all questions, while the classifications of 'internal' and 'external' together & jointly include all possible questions.
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This 'test' you propose seems to me to amount to this: if a statement is true not only of a set of objects but of a sub-set, then it is preferable to adopt the more restricted view that the statement applies only to the sub-set.
1447:
everyday language, although it uses words that are also used in everyday language. The 'thing language' is not called 'everyday language' because it is not a synonym for 'everyday language'. Rather it is a linguistic framework.
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is not acceptable. Snowded makes only airy assertions unrelated to this material, mostly about my poor character as an editor. You could help a lot here by identifying anything objectionable in this material, so I can fix it.
2346:
You have not argued about this; instead you launch again into your refrain about my personal deficiencies (as you see them) and your noble patience in avoiding all useful activity. Critique the material, not its contributor.
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Quine and many others argue that the analytic-synthetic distinction is untenable. Fine. They also argue that this has a bearing upon Carnap's meta-ontology. That is debatable, inasmuch as Carnap's meta-ontology is about the
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Well, Bob, I am glad you read what I had to say. Mostly it agrees with you. The fundamental point of disagreement is simply that the statements by Kate Stafford and by Juhl & Thomas that you dismiss along with mine are
264:"Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in a linguistic framework based upon 'everyday language'. An internal question in this framework could be, âIs there a white piece of paper on my desk?â"
1214:"Properly executed, an explication would show us how what looked like meaningful philosophical statements were in fact the result of confusing âinternalâ questions about what is true within a particular language (such as
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Snowded: It is a separate issue, and there is no reason to delay its discussion while other matters are underway. As usual, you have made no comments about the specific content of this (or any other) proposed material.
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preference, other than possibly your personal preference for stringing together quotes from primary sources in contravention of wikipedia policy (as recently clarified for you on the reliable sources notice board) ----
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preference, other than possibly your personal preference for stringing together quotes from primary sources in contravention of wikipedia policy (as recently clarified for you on the reliable sources notice board) ----
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It may be that as an alternative the first sentences should be changed to characterize Inwagen's discussion of the Quine-Carnap debate differently. That might avoid the need to go into the analytic-synthetic question.
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think they are presenting Carnap's position, and you will be very, very hard-pressed to present anything from Carnap that contradicts them. (Bob, in the interest of objectivity, try this exercise. It cannot be done.)
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apply to some particular situation) go beyond simple existence issues. Carnap would call such a decision a pragmatic matter of practical concern, the only sort of external question he allows as having significance.
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on my desk?" Maybe this is overly ambiguous, but it would seem more natural to ask if 'paper' exists or 'desk' exists, than if 'paper on the desk' exists. The contrast between 'internal' and 'external' questions is
254:"Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in the linguistic framework of 'everyday language'. An internal question in this framework could be, âIs there a white piece of paper on my desk?â"
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Bob I would be happier with a secondary source for the first part, but otherwise its an improvement on what we have at the moment. Brews I think you are making an artificial distinction its all about existence.
3666:(e.g. "Carnap and Quine" and "Quine's approach"), but with just topics in the section headings (e.g. "Linguistic frameworks" and "Deflationism"). (Just a brief interjection from me and I'll leave it at that.)--
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Just above your last entry, I have pointed out the purpose and accomplishments of the summary paragraph, and it is all sourced, not a matter of my opinion at all. Can you make any objective comments about it?
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It is hard to understand your remark, Snowded. The evaluation of the ontologies presented in the Carnap and Quine sections is intended to illustrate meta-ontology, but the connection has not been made so far.
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This is an article about meta-ontology not about the two distinctions you mention. Those are already covered elsewhere in wikipedia and material from contemporary debates should be part of the articles on
1011:
Bob, I'll look further into this, although I think the point has already been made. Your statement: "the term 'internal question' is defined as âquestions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind
2013:. At any rate, apparently Thomasson thinks this is meta-ontology and, when it is combined with Carnap's views about the nature of the two portions of all ontologies, calls it "Carnapian deflationism". BTW,
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Snowded: If the problem is duplication to excess, point out the overlap and let's work on it. I think the problem is not that - it is an erroneous presentation of Carnap's meta-ontology. The material in
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I refer you to my statement above. As ever you quote it then misinterpret or restate it in incomplete form You are seeking to use this article as a coatrack for material that is not directly relevant ----
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analytic and synthetic statements within 'internal questions', that is, internal questions may concern definitions or facts, and thus may be decided through either logical or empirical means. According to
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The Kate Stafford paper is not a reliable source since it was a paper by a student (Kate Stafford) for an assignment in her college class. (See the section "Examples of Student Work" in the lower part of
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of that language) with âexternalâ questions about a system of language as a whole. In fact, Carnap argued, only internal questions are genuine, but internal questions do not require philosophers to answer
4209:, but made no effort to present both equally. For example, referring to "Iwagen's critique of Quine's analysis of Carnap", rather than the more precise "Inwagen's critique of Quine's analysis of Carnap's
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Now Carnap explicitly says this question is to be asked within the "thing language", which is identified as "the spatio-temporally ordered system of observable things and events". The 'thing language' is
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But I cannot agree with the idea of actually saying that Carnap and Thomasson support the view that the common-sense notion that 'internal' means internal to a framework and 'external' means external is
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No Brews I won't. I have made a point that you don't accept. Just repeating again and again and again and again that you think you are right is not going to make a difference. The edit is not agreed
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As you often do , Snowded, you have misrepresented the point of my remarks in their entirety to make some room for a rant about my behavior that contributes nothing to the evolution of this article.
4070:, in its role as an article strictly about 'meta-ontology', a discussion of the two different aspects of Carnap's meta-ontology is irrelevant and is covered elsewhere. But one of these aspects, the
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himself does not fall under this heading, because his error was to dismiss the internal/external distinction as a trivial matter, leaving only the analytic/synthetic distinction to worry about.
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reference to Quine's treatment of "quantification in ontological contexts", whatever one wants to make of that. He says that " Quineâs meta-ontology comprises such propositions as his theses on
891:"Is there such a thing as a square?" or: "Is a square real?". It is a question 'internal' to the framework, and is answered using the rules and definitions of whatever geometry we have selected.
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entirely within the internal part of this division. Hence, at least from Carnap's viewpoint, the analytic-synthetic distinction is not about the internal-external division of Carnap's ontology.
1611:
I have inserted one word 'existence' into your text that, in my opinion, makes it factual although not as illuminating as it might be. If you consent to this change, I'll close our discussion.
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Perhaps, like the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, you will switch now to some other objection. Failing some reasonable argument, I suggest this prolegomena be returned to the article.
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Snowded: There are certainly elements of a lack of productivity here. However, you just don't seem to think my confusion is genuine. I do not understand your criteria for what is relevant to
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It would appear some additional remarks are needed about Carnap's position on the analytic/synthetic distinction in order to follow through with the ostensible purpose of bringing it all up.
1970:
was coined after the era of Carnap, it doesn't mean that it can't be applied to some of his activities, as is in fact done by Thomasson. She would be hurt, I imagine, to hear your judgment.
1154:âTo accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing accepting or rejecting them.â
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This discussion is becoming tendentious and unproductive. I think the bottom line here, Brews, is that you should not be trying to press through changes that don't have agreement on talk.
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Read the above, then read Mark 7:5 Brews. The explanation is clear, you either don't want to, or can't understand it. I've had enough of repeating myself in the face of obduracy ----
1016:â." over-reaches. What Carnap says verbatim is : âAnd now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind
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are perfectly clear. What you do not recognize is that your desires are not based upon any substantial argument. If 'personal taste' is irony when you use it, well, right back at you.
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I take this non-answer as evasive, especially as no indication is given where you have already responded. In fact you have not, and your position is unsupported and unsupportable.
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to relevant material. As long as you revert those and/or attempt to extend the article it will simply be stalemate. You should have tried to work with Bob a little harder. ----
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based upon simply your personal conception of how long the section should be is completely arbitrary and simply your personal taste. Your predilections (already expressed in your
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It may indeed be a personality disorder on my part to take such a matter seriously - how much concern should be given to yet another problem with presentation in Knowledge (XXG)?
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illustrates some situations that are more general. However, I'll look at this harder tomorrow. Am I to understand that you do not wish to entertain the other authors I've quoted?
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your main objection to this material is that I am involved in its contribution here, especially as no alternative reason in line with WP etiquette or policy is presented by you.
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problem. The simple fact is that I am not prepared to engage in discussion about primary sources. I am readily prepared to agree with an editor who uses secondary ones ----
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2. The statement: "Existence questions that are not asked inside a linguistic framework are called by Carnap 'external questions'." While true, it is more generally true that
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in conflict with Thomasson and Carnap, but compatible with them. That is not your position, but you have not found anything in Carnap or Thomasson to support incompatibility.
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1. The statement: "In this framework, questions regarding the existence of these kinds of entities are called internal questions." While true, it is more generally true that
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this instance (although he has done so elsewhere). The point is just to draw attention to the difference between usage for a special purpose and usage in everyday language.
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have made a useful contribution I have not reverted. The fact that you seem unable to learn from interactions with multiple editors over time is your problem not mine----
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The only explicit definition of 'internal question' that I could find in Juhl & Loomis was a quote of Carnap on p. 61 that was mentioned previously in this discussion,
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Personally I think both debates should be present, and their differences pointed out. Both debates are discussed widely in the literature. Sources have been provided.
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So I ask you: isn't the above paragraph all about meta-ontology? Isn't it, therefore, part of the subject of meta-ontology? And so, shouldn't it be in the WP article on
1438:"Once we have accepted the thing language with its framework for things, we can raise and answer internal questions, e.g., âIs there a white piece of paper on my desk?â"
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question, so apparently the division into 'internal' and 'external' is not all-encompassing and there are other kinds of questions that cannot be classified either way.
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beyond your personal opinions based upon nothing at all. Your remarks about the above summary are in direct conflict with its content and my statement of its purpose.
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Sorry you are baffled Brews, but the position is very simple, this is not the place for an extended discussion on something which is used to illustrate a topic. ----
2718:. Confusion over the connection between the two is historically important, so probably the topic should be brought up, but if that is done, it requires clarification.
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So, from my standpoint, the reason for the length of our exchange is that I have tried several ways to reach you, but you do not respond directly. Could you do that?
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Do you know of any excerpt where Carnap has explicitly modified this definition of 'internal question' to include questions other than just questions of existence? --
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My suggestion about how to treat this issue is to point out Quine conflated the two distinctions, and several authors have pointed out that this is a mistaken view.
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In Thomasson(2013) and Carnap(1950), the term 'internal questions' doesn't include questions that are not about existence, so I wouldn't want to make that change. --
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method. Linguistic frameworks are either factual or logical, depending on whether the answers to internal questions can be found using empirical or logical methods.
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significant. The 'analytic-synthetic' argument underlies a very large part of Quine's work and reputation and is the basis for several articles on WP: among them
2724:, which Snowded and now yourself object to, points out these facts, and provides three impeccable sources to back it up. So, what is the objection, specifically?
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Your claim that the summary paragraph makes no contribution to the article is refuted by what has been said already: "Among its contributions, it identifies what
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Snowden's reasons are precise - this article is already over extended. You are also putting the "two major differences" again which was previous rejected. ----
3281:. Critics, however, maintain that some notion of analyticity is indispensable to any coherent account of either formal systems or our everyday use of language.
1463:. ...To repeat. we can draw a boundary - for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all! (Except for that special purpose.)" (
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A problem impacting this discussion of the analytic/synthetic distinction arises from its apparent exclusion implied in the preceding discussion of Carnap in
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I've provided quotes from Carnap and others about a more general meaning for internal questions. Apparently the failure to classify analytic statements like â
2461:, often taken as his definitive critique of Carnap, is all about the analytic/synthetic division. However, it is addressed to Carnap's book about logic, his
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Snowded, Considering the long discussions that I have been having with Brews ohare, it doesn't seem worthwhile for me to continue working on this article. --
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lead to exclusion. Your wording "material is only relevant in so far as it illustrates what the term means" appears to me to include what I want to include.
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Bob: Although Snowded has endorsed your paragraph, he has not engaged at all in discussing its content. As I have pointed out earlier and more emphatically
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It's great to hear from you Snowded, but you are again taking it a bit too easy on yourself in identifying the ridiculous and the impossible. Although the
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I wish to assert that is not the case, that 'internal' questions include questions about how the framework is constructed - like "Are squares rectangles?".
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Matthew not Mark - sorry Brews my memory failed me there I should have looked it up. Mind you I rather like the error, raises interesting questions ----
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formulation that naturally included the narrower one. In a different example, "Murder using a weapon is wrong" includes "Murder using a knife is wrong".
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We have a situation where you wish to assert that Carnap's and Thomasson's discussions about 'internal existence questions' are an indication that the
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Thomasson(2013) and Carnap(1950) are referring to only one linguistic framework regarding everyday language, so I wouldn't want to make that change. --
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Bob: Is it your notion that none of the sources intend to state the general position that 'internal' means internal and 'external' means external?
3095:"An article on meta-ontology is one on meta-ontology, it is not the place for an extended elaboration of one debate used to illustrate that theme."
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Please stop opening multiple and lengthy threads, its seems designed to break up discussion and discourage other editors from participation. ----
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And if we look at Thomasson's use in so far as it illustrates the topic of the article that is fine Brews. Try and read before you respond ----
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questions are not limited to questions of existence" â Here's an excerpt from the first paragraph of "§2. Linguistic frameworks" of the source
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is made between this topic and meta-ontology, the subject of this article. Carnap's meta-ontology concerns the internal-external distinction,
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Propose an amendment and I will look at it Brews, but I am not prepared to waste anymore time engaging in general discussion of the topic ----
404:"external questions cannot be settled within a framework, but rather concern the status and legitimacy of the framework itself." We also have
3323:. These works are already cited in the article, and links to them are provided. I can, of course, footnote them again here, if you wish.
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linguistic framework regarding everyday language is an unsupported and incorrect assertion that no author makes. Carnap has pointed out:
934:"And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind
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why I'm having trouble with your exclusion of the Quine material. You haven't answered any of my questions. You have not critiqued the
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reason for this focus is that a major subject of debate with Quine is 'ontology' which deals with existence issues. I believe that my
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So don't rant about 'my problems'. It isn't that I can't hear you; it is that you have not articulated clearly what you want to say.
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Again assuming you agree, as again there is no choice about this and the question is largely rhetorical, do you think the article
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993:". No other definition of 'internal question' is given in Carnap(1950) that includes questions other than questions of existence.
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FreeKnowledge: In common with Snowded, you make no substantive comment about the proposed additional material, but simply add a â
688:"External questions cannot be settled within a framework, but rather concern the status and legitimacy of the framework itself."
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I understand your situation exactly, Snowded. You have chosen awkwardly to include one aspect of Carnap's meta-ontology, the
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Now you left the long Ryan quote in place, but removed the prolegomena. Now it is easily verifiable that Quine's critique in
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to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all
1455:"I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are
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1286:â as internal questions does not trouble you, nor indeed the looming prospect in the next section of making sense of how the
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So, Snowded, what is the basis for including one debate and not the other? Can you answer this question by comment directed
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entitles §2 of his paper: 'Carnap's Deflationism' and also focuses upon his internal-external division of all ontolgies.
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1422:"Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in the linguistic framework of 'everyday language'."
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Carnap and Thomasson is a wrong description of your suggestion. You do not accept that Thomasson's discussion is merely
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Snowded: It is odd that you tire of 'repeating over and over again' your 'point'. Your 'point' as stated above is that
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I have changed the leading sentence to provide a more accurate description and segue to the following sub-subsections.
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a stub by forcing all discussion of meta-ontology to a minimum, regardless of any disservice to the reader and to WP.
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Snowded: Inconsistency is the last adjective I'd apply to you. Unresponsive? Unhelpful? Unfocussed? Very consistent.
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should be restricted to material that "explains the use of the term". Where does that idea come from? The article is
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and taken the subject instead to be inclusive of all and every type of question. It isn't; it is a discussion of the
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notion of logical consequence." Maybe I have the wrong idea here, but I think you are headed in the direction that a
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One more instance of a common occurrence: quotation of scripture to duck issues and avoid thought about the issues.
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However, in this case Thomasson has chosen words similar to Carnap's but has changed Carnap's meaning. Carnap says:
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3971:(which does not mention the internal-external distinction). Do you agree that there are in fact these two issues?
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Snowded: There are two aspects being discussed by published philosophers regarding Carnap's views: they are the
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The restriction of 'internal' questions to 'existence questions posed within a framework' is misleading in that
335:"In this framework, questions regarding the existence of these kinds of entities are called internal questions."
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4213:". These little word games don't improve the article, and simply burying this matter doesn't 'fix' the problem.
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Bob: Thanks. Any concrete proposal is better than vague assaults. We'll see if Snowded endorses your approach.
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outside the realm of existence questions. That goes beyond anything they (or indeed any other sources) support.
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The summary paragraph you removed and I have replaced serves several purposes. Among them, it identifies what
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However, the subsequent discussion of Carnap's position does not mention the analytic/synthetic distinction.
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aspects? Why is one aspect of 'meta-ontology' to be distinguished as interesting, and the other aspect not?
4009:, is important enough to warrant inclusion. (iii) Yes the two aspects exist, but the 'See-also' link to the
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I gather that pointing out your comments about myself is a personal attack upon you, Snowded. Hey. Why not?
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FreeKnowledge: I am not 'trying to press through changes'. What I am trying to do is obtain something about
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question. I emphasize this point lest you think Carnap has defined out of existence what are usually called
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Here are the two debates about Quine in the literature viz a viz his meta-ontological comments on Carnap:
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The question of Inwagen's paper, which deals with how satisfactorily Quine's meta-ontology applies to the
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I believe this sequence of quotations introduces the subject and the definition of 'internal' questions.
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failure to understand positions that disagree with you, and the requirement for constant repetition is
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is nuts, as you would agree, so I conclude only that you have not fully absorbed what is going on here.
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is independent of the internal/external distinction and of Carnap's repudiation of external questions."
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Quine's pragmatic challenge to the analytic-synthetic distinction has won many sympathizers, including
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can be relied upon to keep the presentation here brief, but it should not be ignored or distorted in
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Snowded inconveniently removed the text with my additions of the word 'existence' so you may find it
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Snowded: How would such an additional disclaimer suit you as a solution to allowing this material?
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an article about 'meta-ontology'. We all know that. To progress further it would help to know how
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you are ready to discuss them rather than just assert that your content is right let me know ----
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You are so kind to look for my welfare. I'd rather you attended to contributing to the article.
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Having examined this dispute, I would have to say I concur with Snowded. Please stop reverting.
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happens to focus upon the existence issues. These matters require a full and proper discussion.
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Graham H. Bird (2003). "Carnap's internal and external questions". In Thomas Bonk, ed (ed.).
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discussion of the most famous of all meta-ontological arguments â the Quine-Carnap debates.
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The issue of whether 'everyday language' is a framework can be compared with Wittgenstein:
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is not the place for an extended elaboration of one debate used to illustrate that theme
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internal questions, although she (and no other author, either) says anything of the kind.
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I have modified the discussion of the Quine-Carnap differences to clarify that there are
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on-topic sentence in all that stuff about my failure to listen and to learn. It is this:
1931:
exists. That is the Carnapian deflationary ontology. How is this matter to be presented?
1572:
Bob: The length of the discussion between us is not a problem; the problem is its course.
3270:
3003:. My interpretation of your words as ordinary English seems to be different from yours.
2264:
his internal-external division and also belongs in a section about Carnap's position."
2149:
his internal-external division and also belongs in a section about Carnap's position.
2049:
1749:
1644:
response. If you can't agree something on the talk page leave the article alone. ----
1115:
analytic questions (like "Are all bachelors unmarried"), not just existence question?
391:
paper on my desk?" Do you think what Carnap is asking is "Does a white piece of paper
4313:
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4075:
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Snowded: You mis-remember. It is obvious that these changes are needed here. Why not
3426:
See comment in section below Brews and I see you are into personal attacks again ----
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Snowded: Your opinion that this article should be not only shortened but merged with
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unintelligible. Carnap and indeed nobody would argue that a question like "Is 6 : -->
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1313:'existence' questions, but prefer to interpret it as a discussion that is somehow a
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Well, Snowded, you string words together that sound like English, but they aren't.
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I have added a summary paragraph to the section on Carnap with additional sources.
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Same issue, expansion of material beyond that relevant to the article name. ----
1744:
360:
questions posed within a framework are 'internal', not just existence questions.
46:
If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the
3575:
Language, Truth and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap
2544:. This discussion contains an ambiguity allowing the mistaken implication that
112:
method of looking at the desk. Another example is the linguistic framework of '
3282:
3123:
I'll argue there are (at least) two debates, and only one is being included:
2571:
I've incorporated some of these sources and a brief statement in the section
1629:. A few other minor changes were made that have no effect upon your meaning.
312:
a framework where they are provided with a new set of definitions and rules.
3711:
Bob, I think Snowded's answer to your suggestion is not complicated: "NO!!"
3040:. You simply complain about me, and say nothing specific about the content.
2844:. So, without the analytic-synthetic arguments, we are left with (possibly)
1111:
Would it settle the matter if it is shown that internal questions encompass
536:
Carnap, Rudolf (1956). "Supplement A. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology".
195:
Carnap, Rudolf (1956). "Supplement A. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology".
109:
3960:
3185:
How many threads are you going to open? See response to section below ----
2468:
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Snowded: Your explanation here for reverting useful changes to the section
1146:
2014:
1899:
454:; I am insisting that 'internal' questions go beyond existence questions.
4266:
of the term. That includes examples of meta-ontology, and in particular,
3800:
of the issues in favor of a completely wrong description on the basis of
2458:
2242:
1331:
We don't seem to be communicating, so this ends the discussion for me. --
692:
Clearly, questions about the status of a framework (for example, whether
3843:
instead of relying on vague recollections about hazily recalled events?
3099:
You haven't attempted to explain how this general remark applies to the
660:
questions posed outside a linguistic framework are 'external questions'.
2666:
Snowded: Your reply above is pure blather without one word of content.
121:
4005:-ontology. (ii) Yes the two aspects exist, but only one of them, the
3900:
unless it is used to specifically illustrate the subject's topic ----
1918:
a term only within a framework, but in discussing frameworks one can
3963:(which does not mention the analytic-synthetic distinction) and the
511:
174:
1951:
term so talking about Carnapian metaontology makes no sense. ----
2698:â Let me point out what you are subscribing to. The last half of
2163:
Snowded: Your version of what Inwagen said and did is incorrect.
1418:
The remaining issue I have with this paragraph is the statement:
4168:. Don't worry about it - things like this happen. Just fix it.
1346:
853:
interpretation being true, it is more correct than the original
345:"Questions that can be answered within a 'framework' are called
3141:, the feature characterizing Carnap's meta-ontology, which is
931:
where Carnap explicitly defines the term 'internal question'.
524:
Carnap, Rudolf (1950). "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology".
183:
Carnap, Rudolf (1950). "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology".
25:
4082:
is neglected. Why do you apply your argument only to exclude
3294:
the synthetic ever again enthroned in resplendent isolation.
1772:
It illustrates the subject Brews, it is not the subject ----
1426:
This statement is almost verbatim from Thomasson, who says:
1290:
was connected by Quine to the internal-external definitions.
1264:
to construct a definition of 'internal question' from it. --
1024:; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality
942:; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality
653:
questions posed within a framework are 'internal' questions.
3969:
Meaning and Necessity: A study in semantics and modal logic
2180:
with you. So I have reverted while we resolve this. ----
1858:
The advise related to your contributions and it stands ----
538:
Meaning and necessity: a study in semantics and modal logic
197:
Meaning and necessity: a study in semantics and modal logic
1594:
of internal questions do not exist. You ignore this point.
811:
Otherwise, there is just nothing for Quine to talk about.
395:
on my desk?" or is he asking "Is the while piece of paper
292:
Bob: That is simply not true. The idea that there is only
2984:
I think the community will run out of patience again ----
971:
4250:
Snowded: There is no WP requirement that an article on
3497:
3496:
Snowded: Assuming the reason for your rejection of the
3472:
3328:
3240:
A major part of Quine's critique of Carnap is his work
3232:
3231:
Snowded: Assuming the reason for your rejection of the
3207:
3167:
3151:. Quine botched this point according to the literature.
3100:
3037:
3033:
2963:
2810:
2721:
2416:
2378:
2335:
2334:
To support my assertions, notice the following points.
1626:
616:
593:
3412:
course, sermons about my being deaf, dumb, and blind.
3349:
My original reason, as stated my me, stands Brews ----
2300:
in respect of what you are choosing as important. ----
2196:
substantial in the way of opposing this contribution?
1542:
However you showed more patience than I so kudos! ----
3250:
of statements raised by Carnap in his book on logic:
3108:âAn article on meta-ontology is one on meta-ontologyâ
2467:, and Carnap's formulation of his meta-ontology, his
120:
greater than 100?â The answer here can be found by a
4197:
Snowded: Your revisions attempted only to avoid the
1579:
internal questions are internal existence questions.
1130:
If you have something in mind, I'll look at it. --
2503:"The role of the analytic/synthetic distinction in
2490:calls this "guilt by association". Carnap includes
1048:statements, which would make the argument over the
645:The most glaring problems with this paragraph are:
3113:That brings us to the second part of the precept:
3103:. So I'll try to formulate its application below.
1364:challenges involved in editing Knowledge (XXG). --
894:If some uncertainties remain, please let me know.
540:(2 ed.). University of Chicago Press. pp. 205â221.
199:(2 ed.). University of Chicago Press. pp. 205â221.
3299:Frank X. Ryan, "Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic" in
1057:question. You would argue that it also is not an
1032:.â You have chosen to ignore the topic sentence:
116:' and an internal question could be, âIs there a
2824:correctly used by Quine in addressing Carnap is
3621:Carnap paragraph preceding this one on Quine.
3267:
1345:Bob, I don't think you read my reply - another
1034:distinguish two kinds of questions of existence
97:
3787:Snowded: Wake up! The separate matters of the
3696:to relate to the subject of the article. ----
2813:fails to qualify as being about meta-ontology.
2316:Snowded: You have never undertaken to explain
886:Bob: Sorry I was not clear. My point was that
483:. §1. Carnap's approach to existence questions
146:. §1. Carnap's approach to existence questions
137:
135:
2816:You say, Snowded, that pointing out that the
682:following remark from a different third party
668:in support of these more general statements:
304:IMO, he makes perfectly clear that words are
8:
3089:Snowded: Your longer response contains only
516:Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.)
481:"Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology"
179:Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.)
144:"Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology"
3137:The question about how satisfactory is the
972:lengthy exposition based upon Carnap quotes
3260:, Frank Ryan concludes his article on the
707:Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology
251:Hi Bob: How about this change. Instead of
3466:
3201:
3110:. Now I don't think anyone doubts that.
332:Also, how about this change. Instead of:
2473:, does not mention this subject at all.
4381:was invoked but never defined (see the
4367:
4182:I did Brews, but then you reverted ----
3743:major differences: the debate over the
3529:Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
3512:
131:
3600:
3590:
2820:is considered by many philosophers as
2702:is about his arguments concerning the
2553:kinds of entities are called internal
501:
490:
164:
153:
44:Do not edit the contents of this page.
3925:in any way to reasonable commentary.
1832:Its not a rant Brews, its advice ----
1305:Bob, your comment that we should not
592:I made this change in my above draft.
233:per discussion with Snowded below. --
7:
4216:It appears that your aim is to keep
3522:"Does ontology rest upon a mistake?"
3319:and is the basis of Inwagen's paper
3301:American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia
1026:of the system of entities as a whole
944:of the system of entities as a whole
4373:
3961:Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology
3467:Snowded's basis for refusal: Part 2
3202:Snowded's basis for refusal: Part 1
2542:Meta-ontology#Linguistic frameworks
1887:Thomasson on Carnapian metaontology
1148:Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology
1145:Here are four quotes from Carnap's
526:Revue Internationale de Philosophie
185:Revue Internationale de Philosophie
4104:See multiple previous replies ----
3982:adequately presents both aspects?
2505:Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology
2470:Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology
1699:The analytic/synthetic distinction
24:
3364:Snowded: I guess you applied the
989:certain entities of the new kind
834:Does this sentence make sense? --
666:this quotation from a third party
4260:of meta-ontology, not about the
3548:"On Quine on Carnap on Ontology"
3471:Snowded says he has refused the
3206:Snowded says he has refused the
872:providing all those excerpts? --
29:
4306:analytic-synthetic distinction
4211:analytic-synthetic distinction
4203:analytic-synthetic distinction
4162:analytic-synthetic distinction
4072:analytic-synthetic distinction
4048:analytic-synthetic distinction
4007:analytic-synthetic distinction
3999:analytic-synthetic distinction
3965:analytic-synthetic distinction
3789:analytic-synthetic distinction
3749:analytic-synthetic distinction
3329:proposed insertion about Quine
3262:analyticâsynthetic distinction
3149:analytic-synthetic distinction
3132:analytic-synthetic distinction
2893:analytic-synthetic distinction
2716:analytic-synthetic distinction
2704:analytic-synthetic distinction
2573:Meta-ontology#Quine's approach
2454:Meta-ontology#Quine's approach
2417:The proposed summary paragraph
2379:The proposed summary paragraph
2336:The proposed summary paragraph
2124:Meta-ontology#Carnap_and_Quine
1705:Meta-ontology#Carnap_and_Quine
1288:analytic-synthetic distinction
1050:analytic-synthetic distinction
93:Finished draft from Bob K31416
1:
4310:internal-external distinction
4207:internal-external distinction
4166:internal-external distinction
4080:internal-external distinction
4044:internal-external distinction
4011:internal-external distinction
3957:internal-external distinction
3793:internal-external distinction
3745:internal-external distinction
3139:internal-external distinction
2889:internal-external distinction
2818:'analytic-synthetic' argument
1743:I am bewildered to find that
2834:indeterminacy of translation
2700:the present section on Quine
1910:as an interpretation of the
1674:My above comments stand ----
1590:is not tantamount to saying
1588:internal existence questions
1465:Philosophical Investigations
3546:M Allspector-Kelly (2001).
3248:analytic/synthetic division
2964:the proposed Quine material
2842:inscrutability of reference
612:
4404:
4074:is discussed at length in
4066:Snowded: You say that for
3473:proposed material on Quine
3315:is a critique of Carnap's
3208:proposed material on Quine
3168:proposed material on Quine
3106:The precept says firstly:
3101:proposed material on Quine
3038:proposed material on Quine
2850:existential quantification
2838:holophrastic indeterminacy
723:Here is a discussion from
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2902:? What is going on here?
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680:I also have included the
479:Amie L Thomasson (2013).
142:Amie L Thomasson (2013).
3747:and the debate over the
3313:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
3258:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
3243:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
2459:Two dogmas of empiricism
2447:
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243:12:53, 6 June 2013 (UTC)
223:17:33, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
4164:, but not another, the
4145:and intransigent . ----
4078:, while the other, the
3256:. In regard to Quine's
2548:internal questions are
308:from ordinary language
4201:of including only the
3520:Stephen Yablo (1998).
3305:
2846:ontological commitment
2054:ontological commitment
1898:, Thomasson refers to
1754:ontological commitment
1414:A last remaining issue
1284:squares are rectangles
923:Re "My point was that
500:Check date values in:
485:. Retrieved 06-04-2013
452:Au contraire, mon cher
210:
163:Check date values in:
148:. Retrieved 06-04-2013
3967:proposed in Carnap's
3959:proposed in Carnap's
3555:Philosophical Studies
3394:See previous response
3253:Meaning and Necessity
2811:the proposed material
2722:The proposed material
2464:Meaning and Necessity
2130:) are not WP policy.
513:Ontology after Carnap
176:Ontology after Carnap
100:Linguistic frameworks
42:of past discussions.
4377:The named reference
3858:time they have. ----
3578:. Springer. p. 107.
3246:, which attacks the
2947:FreeKnowledgeCreator
2682:FreeKnowledgeCreator
1018:within the framework
1014:within the framework
991:within the framework
936:within the framework
641:Two important issues
2830:radical translation
1900:Price's distinction
698:Riemannian geometry
568:OK, go with it ----
510:To be published in
173:To be published in
3603:has generic name (
3156:including at all.
1914:division. One can
1030:external questions
1022:internal questions
948:external questions
940:internal questions
18:Talk:Meta-ontology
4361:
4297:
4257:about the subject
4244:
4191:
4154:
4113:
4059:
3949:
3909:
3867:
3841:sources presented
3837:look at the issue
3829:
3798:correct statement
3774:
3705:
3641:
3617:parochial view.
3498:proposed material
3489:
3435:
3405:
3358:
3317:Meaning and Truth
3233:proposed material
3224:
3194:
3066:
2993:
2925:
2891:, and places the
2876:
2798:
2748:
2660:
2629:
2599:
2409:
2370:
2309:
2235:
2189:
2116:
2041:
1993:
1960:
1912:internal/external
1867:
1841:
1812:
1781:
1683:
1653:
1551:
1497:
1262:original research
1210:(my underscore):
1208:Juhl & Loomis
1053:5?" exists as an
591:
577:
547:
517:
439:
90:
89:
54:
53:
48:current talk page
4395:
4388:
4387:
4386:
4380:
4372:
4360:
4358:
4296:
4294:
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4241:
4190:
4188:
4153:
4151:
4112:
4110:
4058:
4056:
3948:
3946:
3908:
3906:
3866:
3864:
3828:
3826:
3773:
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3704:
3702:
3640:
3638:
3609:
3608:
3602:
3598:
3596:
3588:
3569:
3563:
3562:
3552:
3543:
3537:
3536:
3526:
3517:
3488:
3486:
3434:
3432:
3404:
3402:
3357:
3355:
3303:
3223:
3221:
3193:
3191:
3065:
3063:
3034:tried to explain
2992:
2990:
2924:
2922:
2875:
2873:
2797:
2795:
2747:
2745:
2659:
2657:
2628:
2626:
2598:
2596:
2448:Quine's approach
2408:
2406:
2369:
2367:
2308:
2306:
2234:
2232:
2188:
2186:
2115:
2113:
2040:
2038:
1992:
1990:
1959:
1957:
1866:
1864:
1840:
1838:
1811:
1809:
1780:
1778:
1682:
1680:
1652:
1650:
1550:
1548:
1496:
1494:
664:I have provided
585:
576:
574:
541:
533:
521:
509:
503:
498:
496:
488:
486:
476:
438:
436:
406:this explanation
206:
200:
192:
172:
166:
161:
159:
151:
149:
139:
81:
56:
55:
33:
32:
26:
4403:
4402:
4398:
4397:
4396:
4394:
4393:
4392:
4391:
4378:
4376:
4374:
4369:
4354:
4290:
4237:
4184:
4147:
4106:
4052:
3942:
3902:
3860:
3822:
3767:
3698:
3634:
3613:
3612:
3599:
3589:
3585:
3571:
3570:
3566:
3550:
3545:
3544:
3540:
3524:
3519:
3518:
3514:
3482:
3469:
3428:
3398:
3351:
3304:
3298:
3217:
3204:
3187:
3059:
2986:
2918:
2869:
2791:
2741:
2653:
2622:
2592:
2512:indicates..."
2501:Alspector-Kelly
2450:
2402:
2363:
2302:
2228:
2182:
2128:merger proposal
2109:
2034:
1986:
1953:
1889:
1860:
1834:
1805:
1774:
1701:
1676:
1646:
1544:
1524:
1490:
1416:
1315:limitation upon
1216:analytic truths
1020:; we call them
938:; we call them
725:one more source
643:
570:
544:On-line version
535:
523:
499:
489:
484:
478:
432:
211:
209:
203:On-line version
194:
182:
162:
152:
147:
141:
140:
133:
114:natural numbers
102:
95:
77:
30:
22:
21:
20:
12:
11:
5:
4401:
4399:
4390:
4389:
4366:
4349:
4348:
4347:
4346:
4345:
4344:
4343:
4342:
4341:
4340:
4339:
4338:
4337:
4336:
4335:
4334:
4333:
4332:
4331:
4330:
4329:
4328:
4271:
4214:
4039:
4038:
4037:
4036:
4035:
4034:
4033:
4032:
4031:
4030:
4029:
4028:
4027:
4026:
3994:
3976:
3972:
3897:
3896:
3895:
3894:
3893:
3892:
3891:
3890:
3785:
3784:
3783:
3782:
3781:
3780:
3779:
3778:
3737:
3723:
3663:
3662:
3661:
3660:
3614:
3611:
3610:
3583:
3564:
3538:
3511:
3510:
3509:
3508:
3503:
3494:
3493:
3468:
3465:
3464:
3463:
3462:
3461:
3460:
3459:
3458:
3457:
3456:
3455:
3454:
3453:
3384:
3383:
3382:
3381:
3309:
3308:
3307:
3306:
3296:
3271:Nelson Goodman
3229:
3228:
3203:
3200:
3199:
3198:
3153:
3152:
3135:
3087:
3086:
3085:
3084:
3083:
3082:
3081:
3080:
3079:
3078:
3077:
3076:
3075:
3074:
3073:
3072:
3071:
3070:
3030:
3016:
3008:
3004:
2981:
2980:
2979:
2896:
2884:
2814:
2786:
2785:
2784:
2783:
2782:
2781:
2780:
2779:
2778:
2777:
2776:
2775:
2774:
2773:
2772:
2771:
2770:
2769:
2768:
2767:
2719:
2449:
2446:
2445:
2444:
2443:
2442:
2441:
2440:
2439:
2438:
2437:
2436:
2344:
2332:
2293:
2292:
2291:
2290:
2289:
2288:
2287:
2286:
2285:
2284:
2283:
2282:
2281:
2280:
2279:
2278:
2277:
2276:
2257:
2208:
2161:
2142:
2099:
2098:
2097:
2096:
2082:
2068:
2050:quantification
2002:
2001:
2000:
1999:
1998:
1997:
1888:
1885:
1884:
1883:
1882:
1881:
1880:
1879:
1878:
1877:
1876:
1875:
1874:
1873:
1872:
1871:
1750:quantification
1745:Inwagen's work
1700:
1697:
1696:
1695:
1694:
1693:
1692:
1691:
1690:
1689:
1688:
1687:
1672:
1609:
1595:
1583:
1580:
1573:
1570:
1523:
1522:How to proceed
1520:
1519:
1518:
1517:
1516:
1469:
1468:
1440:
1439:
1432:
1431:
1424:
1423:
1415:
1412:
1411:
1410:
1409:
1408:
1407:
1406:
1405:
1404:
1403:
1402:
1401:
1400:
1399:
1398:
1384:
1303:
1295:
1291:
1280:
1257:
1256:
1255:
1249:
1248:
1245:
1221:
1220:
1191:
1190:
1165:
1164:
1161:
1158:
1155:
1143:
1142:
1109:
1108:
1107:
1106:
1105:
1104:
1103:
1102:
1101:
1100:
1099:
1098:
1097:
1096:
1095:
1094:
1093:
1092:
1091:
1090:
1089:
1088:
1073:
994:
953:
952:
951:
906:
892:
832:
831:
830:
808:
793:
778:
733:
732:
690:
689:
674:
673:
662:
661:
654:
642:
639:
638:
637:
636:
635:
634:
633:
632:
631:
609:
608:
607:
550:
549:
548:
534:Reprinted in
519:
518:
470:
469:
468:
467:
466:
427:
426:
425:
424:
423:
422:
421:
420:
353:
352:
351:
350:
342:could we use:
339:
338:
337:
336:
330:
329:
328:
327:
326:
325:
324:
302:
301:
300:
261:could we use:
258:
257:
256:
255:
249:
248:
247:
246:
245:
208:
207:
193:Reprinted in
180:
130:
101:
98:
96:
94:
91:
88:
87:
82:
75:
70:
65:
62:
52:
51:
34:
23:
15:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
4400:
4384:
4371:
4368:
4365:
4364:
4359:
4357:
4327:
4323:
4319:
4315:
4314:Meta-ontology
4311:
4307:
4302:
4301:
4300:
4295:
4293:
4286:
4285:
4284:
4280:
4276:
4272:
4269:
4265:
4264:
4259:
4258:
4253:
4252:meta-ontology
4249:
4248:
4247:
4242:
4240:
4233:
4232:
4231:
4227:
4223:
4219:
4218:Meta-ontology
4215:
4212:
4208:
4204:
4200:
4196:
4195:
4194:
4189:
4187:
4181:
4180:
4179:
4175:
4171:
4167:
4163:
4159:
4158:
4157:
4152:
4150:
4144:
4140:
4139:unsupportable
4136:
4132:
4131:
4130:
4126:
4122:
4118:
4117:
4116:
4111:
4109:
4103:
4102:
4101:
4097:
4093:
4089:
4085:
4081:
4077:
4076:Meta-ontology
4073:
4069:
4068:Meta-ontology
4065:
4064:
4063:
4062:
4057:
4055:
4049:
4045:
4025:
4021:
4017:
4012:
4008:
4004:
4000:
3995:
3993:
3989:
3985:
3981:
3980:Meta-ontology
3977:
3973:
3970:
3966:
3962:
3958:
3954:
3953:
3952:
3947:
3945:
3938:
3937:
3936:
3932:
3928:
3923:
3922:
3921:
3920:
3919:
3918:
3917:
3916:
3915:
3914:
3913:
3912:
3907:
3905:
3889:
3885:
3881:
3878:issues here.
3877:
3872:
3871:
3870:
3865:
3863:
3856:
3855:
3854:
3850:
3846:
3842:
3838:
3834:
3833:
3832:
3827:
3825:
3818:
3817:
3816:
3815:
3811:
3807:
3803:
3799:
3794:
3790:
3777:
3772:
3770:
3764:
3763:
3762:
3758:
3754:
3750:
3746:
3742:
3738:
3736:
3732:
3728:
3724:
3722:
3718:
3714:
3710:
3709:
3708:
3703:
3701:
3694:
3693:
3692:
3688:
3684:
3680:
3679:
3678:
3677:
3673:
3669:
3659:
3655:
3651:
3646:
3645:
3644:
3639:
3637:
3631:
3630:
3629:
3626:
3622:
3618:
3606:
3594:
3586:
3581:
3577:
3576:
3568:
3565:
3560:
3556:
3549:
3542:
3539:
3534:
3530:
3523:
3516:
3513:
3505:
3504:
3502:
3499:
3492:
3487:
3485:
3478:
3477:
3476:
3474:
3452:
3448:
3444:
3440:
3439:
3438:
3433:
3431:
3425:
3424:
3423:
3419:
3415:
3410:
3409:
3408:
3403:
3401:
3395:
3390:
3389:
3388:
3387:
3386:
3385:
3380:
3376:
3372:
3367:
3363:
3362:
3361:
3356:
3354:
3348:
3347:
3346:
3345:
3341:
3337:
3332:
3330:
3324:
3322:
3321:Meta-ontology
3318:
3314:
3302:
3295:
3292:
3288:
3287:P.F. Strawson
3284:
3280:
3279:Hilary Putnam
3276:
3272:
3266:
3265:
3263:
3259:
3255:
3254:
3249:
3245:
3244:
3239:
3238:
3237:
3234:
3227:
3222:
3220:
3213:
3212:
3211:
3209:
3197:
3192:
3190:
3184:
3183:
3182:
3181:
3177:
3173:
3169:
3165:
3160:
3157:
3150:
3146:
3145:
3140:
3136:
3133:
3129:
3128:
3127:
3124:
3122:
3119:
3116:
3111:
3109:
3104:
3102:
3097:
3096:
3092:
3069:
3064:
3062:
3055:
3054:
3053:
3052:
3051:
3047:
3043:
3039:
3035:
3031:
3029:
3025:
3021:
3017:
3014:
3009:
3005:
3002:
3001:Meta-ontology
2998:
2997:
2996:
2991:
2989:
2982:
2978:
2974:
2970:
2965:
2962:
2958:
2957:
2956:
2952:
2948:
2944:
2943:
2942:
2938:
2934:
2930:
2929:
2928:
2923:
2921:
2915:
2914:
2913:
2909:
2905:
2901:
2900:Meta-ontology
2897:
2894:
2890:
2885:
2881:
2880:
2879:
2874:
2872:
2865:
2864:
2863:
2859:
2855:
2851:
2847:
2843:
2839:
2835:
2831:
2827:
2823:
2819:
2815:
2812:
2808:
2807:Meta-ontology
2804:
2803:
2802:
2801:
2796:
2794:
2766:
2762:
2758:
2753:
2752:
2751:
2746:
2744:
2737:
2736:
2735:
2731:
2727:
2723:
2720:
2717:
2713:
2709:
2708:No connection
2705:
2701:
2697:
2693:
2692:
2691:
2687:
2683:
2679:
2678:
2677:
2673:
2669:
2665:
2664:
2663:
2658:
2656:
2649:
2648:
2647:
2643:
2639:
2634:
2633:
2632:
2627:
2625:
2619:
2618:
2617:
2613:
2609:
2604:
2603:
2602:
2597:
2595:
2589:
2588:
2587:
2586:
2582:
2578:
2574:
2569:
2568:
2564:
2560:
2556:
2551:
2547:
2543:
2538:
2537:
2533:
2529:
2524:
2523:
2519:
2515:
2510:
2506:
2502:
2498:
2493:
2489:
2485:
2484:
2480:
2476:
2472:
2471:
2466:
2465:
2460:
2455:
2435:
2431:
2427:
2423:
2422:Meta-ontology
2418:
2414:
2413:
2412:
2407:
2405:
2399:
2398:
2397:
2393:
2389:
2385:
2384:Meta-ontology
2380:
2375:
2374:
2373:
2368:
2366:
2360:
2359:
2358:
2354:
2350:
2345:
2342:
2341:Meta-ontology
2337:
2333:
2331:
2327:
2323:
2319:
2315:
2314:
2313:
2312:
2307:
2305:
2299:
2275:
2271:
2267:
2262:
2258:
2256:
2252:
2248:
2244:
2240:
2239:
2238:
2233:
2231:
2224:
2223:
2222:
2218:
2214:
2209:
2207:
2203:
2199:
2194:
2193:
2192:
2187:
2185:
2178:
2177:
2176:
2175:
2174:
2170:
2166:
2162:
2160:
2156:
2152:
2147:
2143:
2141:
2137:
2133:
2129:
2125:
2121:
2120:
2119:
2114:
2112:
2105:
2104:
2103:
2102:
2101:
2100:
2095:
2091:
2087:
2083:
2081:
2077:
2073:
2069:
2067:
2063:
2059:
2055:
2051:
2046:
2045:
2044:
2039:
2037:
2031:
2030:
2029:
2028:
2024:
2020:
2016:
2012:
2008:
1996:
1991:
1989:
1983:
1982:
1981:
1977:
1973:
1969:
1965:
1964:
1963:
1958:
1956:
1950:
1945:
1944:
1943:
1942:
1938:
1934:
1930:
1926:
1925:meta-ontology
1921:
1917:
1913:
1909:
1905:
1901:
1897:
1895:
1886:
1870:
1865:
1863:
1857:
1856:
1854:
1850:
1846:
1845:
1844:
1839:
1837:
1831:
1830:
1829:
1825:
1821:
1817:
1816:
1815:
1810:
1808:
1801:
1800:
1799:
1795:
1791:
1786:
1785:
1784:
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1183:Kate Stafford
1179:
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588:edit conflict
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107:
106:Rudolf Carnap
104:According to
99:
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63:
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49:
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41:
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35:
28:
27:
19:
4375:Cite error:
4370:
4355:
4350:
4291:
4273:Not policy.
4267:
4262:
4261:
4256:
4255:
4238:
4210:
4205:but not the
4198:
4185:
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4142:
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3333:
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3291:Wittgenstein
3275:Morton White
3268:
3257:
3251:
3241:
3230:
3218:
3205:
3188:
3164:specifically
3163:
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2463:
2452:The section
2451:
2403:
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2317:
2303:
2294:
2260:
2229:
2183:
2145:
2110:
2035:
2010:
2006:
2003:
1987:
1967:
1954:
1948:
1928:
1919:
1915:
1911:
1907:
1903:
1893:
1890:
1861:
1835:
1806:
1775:
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1710:
1703:The section
1702:
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1380:
1314:
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1299:
1283:
1242:this webpage
1222:
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1017:
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947:
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929:Carnap(1950)
924:
887:
854:
850:
734:
722:
703:
691:
679:
675:
663:
657:
650:
644:
571:
537:
529:
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512:
502:|accessdate=
451:
433:
428:
402:described as
396:
392:
357:
346:
309:
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293:
212:
196:
188:
184:
175:
165:|accessdate=
126:
118:prime number
103:
78:
43:
37:
4318:Brews ohare
4275:Brews ohare
4222:Brews ohare
4170:Brews ohare
4135:unsupported
4121:Brews ohare
4092:Brews ohare
4016:Brews ohare
3984:Brews ohare
3927:Brews ohare
3880:Brews ohare
3845:Brews ohare
3806:Brews ohare
3753:Brews ohare
3727:Brews ohare
3713:Brews ohare
3683:Brews ohare
3650:Brews ohare
3443:Brews ohare
3414:Brews ohare
3371:Brews ohare
3336:Brews ohare
3172:Brews ohare
3042:Brews ohare
3020:Brews ohare
2969:Brews ohare
2933:Brews ohare
2904:Brews ohare
2854:Brews ohare
2757:Brews ohare
2726:Brews ohare
2668:Brews ohare
2638:Brews ohare
2608:Brews ohare
2577:Brews ohare
2559:Brews ohare
2557:questions"
2528:Brews ohare
2514:Brews ohare
2509:Graham Bird
2475:Brews ohare
2426:Brews ohare
2388:Brews ohare
2349:Brews ohare
2322:Brews ohare
2266:Brews ohare
2247:Brews ohare
2213:Brews ohare
2198:Brews ohare
2165:Brews ohare
2151:Brews ohare
2132:Brews ohare
2086:Brews ohare
2072:Brews ohare
2058:Brews ohare
2019:Brews ohare
1972:Brews ohare
1933:Brews ohare
1849:Brews ohare
1820:Brews ohare
1790:Brews ohare
1759:Brews ohare
1731:Brews ohare
1716:Brews ohare
1662:Brews ohare
1631:Brews ohare
1613:Brews ohare
1599:Brews ohare
1592:other kinds
1560:Brews ohare
1506:Brews ohare
1474:Brews ohare
1388:Brews ohare
1351:Brews ohare
1319:Brews ohare
1294:emphasized.
1224:Brews ohare
1194:Brews ohare
1169:Brews ohare
1117:Brews ohare
1078:Brews ohare
1063:Brews ohare
976:Brews ohare
911:Brews ohare
896:Brews ohare
859:Brews ohare
813:Brews ohare
798:Brews ohare
783:Brews ohare
768:Brews ohare
736:Brews ohare
711:Brews ohare
621:Brews ohare
456:Brews ohare
410:Brews ohare
362:Brews ohare
349:questions."
314:Brews ohare
266:Brews ohare
36:This is an
4199:appearance
3668:Bob K31416
3648:proposal.
3584:1402012063
3535:: 229â261.
3396:note ----
3283:H.P. Grice
1528:Bob K31416
1467:§65. §69).
1366:Bob K31416
1333:Bob K31416
1311:limited to
1266:Bob K31416
1132:Bob K31416
999:Bob K31416
957:Bob K31416
874:Bob K31416
836:Bob K31416
754:Bob K31416
597:Bob K31416
554:Bob K31416
378:Bob K31416
280:Bob K31416
235:Bob K31416
215:Bob K31416
4383:help page
3593:cite book
3561:: 93â122.
3475:because:
3210:because:
2755:sink in.
2555:existence
2550:existence
1949:Carnapian
1894:Prospects
1042:existence
1028:, called
946:, called
694:Euclidian
450:Snowded:
110:empirical
85:Archive 6
79:Archive 5
73:Archive 4
68:Archive 3
60:Archive 1
3839:and the
3791:and the
3601:|editor=
3013:WP:WINAD
2883:article?
2696:me too!!
2318:anything
2298:WP:Synth
2243:Ontology
1902:between
1461:language
1307:overrule
1206:Here is
1181:Here is
1059:internal
1055:external
1046:analytic
925:internal
888:internal
851:narrower
532:: 20â40.
493:cite web
347:internal
191:: 20â40.
156:cite web
4356:Snowded
4292:Snowded
4268:careful
4239:Snowded
4186:Snowded
4149:Snowded
4143:evasive
4108:Snowded
4086:of the
4054:Snowded
3944:Snowded
3904:Snowded
3862:Snowded
3824:Snowded
3802:brevity
3769:Snowded
3700:Snowded
3636:Snowded
3484:Snowded
3430:Snowded
3400:Snowded
3366:WP:TLDR
3353:Snowded
3219:Snowded
3189:Snowded
3166:at the
3061:Snowded
3032:I have
2988:Snowded
2920:Snowded
2871:Snowded
2793:Snowded
2743:Snowded
2655:Snowded
2624:Snowded
2594:Snowded
2404:Snowded
2365:Snowded
2304:Snowded
2230:Snowded
2184:Snowded
2111:Snowded
2036:Snowded
1988:Snowded
1955:Snowded
1920:mention
1908:mention
1891:In her
1862:Snowded
1836:Snowded
1807:Snowded
1776:Snowded
1678:Snowded
1648:Snowded
1546:Snowded
1492:Snowded
1457:related
855:broader
572:Snowded
434:Snowded
397:located
306:brought
122:logical
39:archive
3277:, and
2497:Decock
1929:really
1349:, eh?
4133:Your
4001:, is
3551:(PDF)
3525:(PDF)
2488:Yablo
2015:Price
1896:paper
1300:wrong
1219:them"
1038:types
615:(see
613:below
393:exist
16:<
4379:Ryan
4322:talk
4308:and
4279:talk
4226:talk
4174:talk
4137:and
4125:talk
4096:talk
4046:and
4020:talk
4003:meta
3988:talk
3975:...?
3931:talk
3884:talk
3849:talk
3810:talk
3757:talk
3731:talk
3717:talk
3687:talk
3672:talk
3654:talk
3605:help
3580:ISBN
3447:talk
3418:talk
3375:talk
3340:talk
3285:and
3176:talk
3147:the
3115:âit
3046:talk
3024:talk
2973:talk
2951:talk
2937:talk
2908:talk
2867:----
2858:talk
2848:and
2789:----
2761:talk
2739:----
2730:talk
2714:the
2686:talk
2672:talk
2642:talk
2612:talk
2581:talk
2563:talk
2532:talk
2518:talk
2492:both
2479:talk
2430:talk
2392:talk
2353:talk
2326:talk
2270:talk
2251:talk
2217:talk
2202:talk
2169:talk
2155:talk
2136:talk
2107:----
2090:talk
2076:talk
2062:talk
2052:and
2023:talk
1976:talk
1968:word
1937:talk
1906:and
1853:talk
1824:talk
1794:talk
1763:talk
1752:and
1735:talk
1720:talk
1666:talk
1635:talk
1627:here
1617:talk
1603:talk
1577:only
1564:talk
1532:talk
1510:talk
1478:talk
1392:talk
1370:talk
1355:talk
1347:TLDR
1337:talk
1323:talk
1270:talk
1228:talk
1198:talk
1173:talk
1136:talk
1121:talk
1082:talk
1067:talk
1003:talk
980:talk
961:talk
915:talk
900:talk
878:talk
863:talk
840:talk
817:talk
802:talk
787:talk
772:talk
758:talk
740:talk
715:talk
625:talk
617:this
601:talk
558:talk
506:help
460:talk
430:----
414:talk
382:talk
366:talk
318:talk
310:into
284:talk
270:talk
239:talk
219:talk
169:help
4263:use
4088:two
4084:one
3876:two
3741:two
3559:102
3144:not
3091:one
2961:how
2826:not
2822:not
2712:not
2546:all
2007:neo
1916:use
1904:use
1445:not
1381:not
1113:all
1040:of
696:or
658:all
651:all
477:1.
358:all
294:one
4385:).
4324:)
4316:.
4281:)
4228:)
4176:)
4127:)
4098:)
4022:)
3990:)
3933:)
3886:)
3851:)
3812:)
3759:)
3733:)
3719:)
3689:)
3674:)
3656:)
3597::
3595:}}
3591:{{
3557:.
3553:.
3533:72
3531:.
3527:.
3449:)
3420:)
3377:)
3342:)
3331:.
3297:â
3273:,
3264::
3178:)
3121:.â
3048:)
3026:)
2975:)
2953:)
2939:)
2910:)
2860:)
2840:,
2836:,
2832:,
2763:)
2732:)
2706:.
2688:)
2674:)
2644:)
2614:)
2583:)
2575:.
2565:)
2534:)
2520:)
2481:)
2432:)
2424:.
2394:)
2386:.
2355:)
2328:)
2272:)
2261:is
2253:)
2219:)
2204:)
2171:)
2157:)
2146:is
2138:)
2092:)
2078:)
2064:)
2025:)
2011:is
1978:)
1939:)
1855:)
1826:)
1796:)
1765:)
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1722:)
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1534:)
1512:)
1480:)
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1372:)
1357:)
1339:)
1325:)
1272:)
1244:.)
1230:)
1200:)
1185::
1175:)
1138:)
1123:)
1084:)
1069:)
1005:)
997:--
982:)
963:)
950:."
917:)
902:)
880:)
865:)
842:)
819:)
804:)
789:)
774:)
760:)
752:--
742:)
727::
717:)
684::
627:)
603:)
595:--
560:)
552:--
546:.)
542:â
528:.
497::
495:}}
491:{{
462:)
416:)
384:)
368:)
320:)
286:)
272:)
241:)
221:)
213:--
205:.)
201:â
187:.
160::
158:}}
154:{{
134:^
64:â
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4277:(
4224:(
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50:.
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