57:. In this case the assumption implies that irrespective of the division of the coalitional payoff, members of the coalition enjoy the same total utility.
112:
1011:
828:
363:
161:
35:
if one player can losslessly transfer part of its utility to another player. Such transfers are possible if the players have a common
647:
466:
82:
46:
does not imply that utility is transferable: wealthy and poor players may derive a different utility from the same amount of money.
268:
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572:
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24:
1087:
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36:
90:
808:
798:
476:
28:
49:
Transferable utility is assumed in many cooperative games, where the
577:
40:
39:
that is valued equally by all. Note that being able to transfer
94:
1096:
1055:
837:
781:
563:
465:
372:
230:
129:
53:are not given for individual players, but only for
106:
8:
113:
99:
91:
7:
162:First-player and second-player win
14:
71:Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict
269:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
279:Evolutionarily stable strategy
1:
207:Simultaneous action selection
1139:List of games in game theory
319:Quantal response equilibrium
309:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
244:Bayes correlated equilibrium
73:. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
608:Optional prisoner's dilemma
339:Self-confirming equilibrium
1196:
1073:Principal variation search
789:Aumann's agreement theorem
452:Strategy-stealing argument
364:Trembling hand equilibrium
294:Markov perfect equilibrium
289:Mertens-stable equilibrium
1109:Combinatorial game theory
768:Princess and monster game
324:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
249:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
1124:Evolutionary game theory
857:Antoine Augustin Cournot
743:Guess 2/3 of the average
540:Strictly determined game
334:Satisfaction equilibrium
152:Escalation of commitment
75:Harvard University Press
1129:Glossary of game theory
728:Stackelberg competition
354:Strong Nash equilibrium
21:cooperative game theory
1154:Tragedy of the commons
1134:List of game theorists
1114:Confrontation analysis
824:Sprague–Grundy theorem
344:Sequential equilibrium
264:Correlated equilibrium
927:Jean-François Mertens
1056:Search optimizations
932:Jennifer Tour Chayes
819:Revelation principle
814:Purification theorem
753:Nash bargaining game
718:Bertrand competition
703:El Farol Bar problem
668:Electronic mail game
633:Lewis signaling game
177:Hierarchy of beliefs
17:Transferable utility
1104:Bounded rationality
723:Cournot competition
673:Rock paper scissors
648:Battle of the sexes
638:Volunteer's dilemma
510:Perfect information
437:Dominant strategies
274:Epsilon-equilibrium
157:Extensive-form game
1083:Paranoid algorithm
1063:Alpha–beta pruning
942:John Maynard Smith
773:Rendezvous problem
613:Traveler's dilemma
603:Gift-exchange game
598:Prisoner's dilemma
515:Large Poisson game
482:Bargaining problem
387:Backward induction
359:Subgame perfection
314:Proper equilibrium
1162:
1161:
1068:Aspiration window
1037:Suzanne Scotchmer
992:Oskar Morgenstern
887:Donald B. Gillies
829:Zermelo's theorem
758:Induction puzzles
713:Fair cake-cutting
688:Public goods game
618:Coordination game
492:Intransitive game
422:Forward induction
304:Pareto efficiency
284:Gibbs equilibrium
254:Berge equilibrium
202:Simultaneous game
67:Myerson, Roger B.
1187:
1149:Topological game
1144:No-win situation
1042:Thomas Schelling
1022:Robert B. Wilson
982:Merrill M. Flood
952:John von Neumann
862:Ariel Rubinstein
847:Albert W. Tucker
698:War of attrition
658:Matching pennies
299:Nash equilibrium
222:Mechanism design
187:Normal-form game
142:Cooperative game
115:
108:
101:
92:
88:
19:is a concept in
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1190:
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1188:
1186:
1185:
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1165:
1164:
1163:
1158:
1092:
1078:max^n algorithm
1051:
1047:William Vickrey
1007:Reinhard Selten
962:Kenneth Binmore
877:David K. Levine
872:Daniel Kahneman
839:
833:
809:Negamax theorem
799:Minimax theorem
777:
738:Diner's dilemma
593:All-pay auction
559:
545:Stochastic game
497:Mean-field game
468:
461:
432:Markov strategy
368:
234:
226:
197:Sequential game
182:Information set
167:Game complexity
137:Congestion game
125:
119:
85:
77:. p. 568.
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5:
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1057:
1053:
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1044:
1039:
1034:
1029:
1024:
1019:
1014:
1012:Robert Axelrod
1009:
1004:
999:
994:
989:
987:Olga Bondareva
984:
979:
977:Melvin Dresher
974:
969:
967:Leonid Hurwicz
964:
959:
954:
949:
944:
939:
934:
929:
924:
919:
914:
909:
904:
902:Harold W. Kuhn
899:
894:
892:Drew Fudenberg
889:
884:
882:David M. Kreps
879:
874:
869:
867:Claude Shannon
864:
859:
854:
849:
843:
841:
835:
834:
832:
831:
826:
821:
816:
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804:Nash's theorem
801:
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730:
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663:Ultimatum game
660:
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645:
643:Dollar auction
640:
635:
630:
628:Centipede game
625:
620:
615:
610:
605:
600:
595:
590:
585:
583:Infinite chess
580:
575:
569:
567:
561:
560:
558:
557:
552:
550:Symmetric game
547:
542:
537:
535:Signaling game
532:
530:Screening game
527:
522:
520:Potential game
517:
512:
507:
499:
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447:Mixed strategy
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329:Risk dominance
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172:Graphical game
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1099:
1097:Miscellaneous
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1064:
1061:
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1054:
1048:
1045:
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1040:
1038:
1035:
1033:
1032:Samuel Bowles
1030:
1028:
1027:Roger Myerson
1025:
1023:
1020:
1018:
1017:Robert Aumann
1015:
1013:
1010:
1008:
1005:
1003:
1000:
998:
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985:
983:
980:
978:
975:
973:
972:Lloyd Shapley
970:
968:
965:
963:
960:
958:
957:Kenneth Arrow
955:
953:
950:
948:
945:
943:
940:
938:
937:John Harsanyi
935:
933:
930:
928:
925:
923:
920:
918:
915:
913:
910:
908:
907:Herbert Simon
905:
903:
900:
898:
895:
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890:
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739:
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731:
729:
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724:
721:
719:
716:
714:
711:
709:
708:Fair division
706:
704:
701:
699:
696:
694:
691:
689:
686:
684:
683:Dictator game
681:
679:
676:
674:
671:
669:
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664:
661:
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589:
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581:
579:
576:
574:
571:
570:
568:
566:
562:
556:
555:Zero-sum game
553:
551:
548:
546:
543:
541:
538:
536:
533:
531:
528:
526:
525:Repeated game
523:
521:
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511:
508:
506:
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500:
498:
495:
493:
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488:
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480:
478:
475:
474:
472:
470:
464:
458:
455:
453:
450:
448:
445:
443:
442:Pure strategy
440:
438:
435:
433:
430:
428:
425:
423:
420:
418:
415:
413:
410:
408:
407:De-escalation
405:
403:
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385:
383:
380:
379:
377:
375:
371:
365:
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360:
357:
355:
352:
350:
349:Shapley value
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233:
229:
223:
220:
218:
217:Succinct game
215:
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84:0-674-34116-3
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60:
58:
56:
52:
47:
45:
42:
38:
34:
30:
26:
22:
18:
1002:Peyton Young
997:Paul Milgrom
912:Hervé Moulin
852:Amos Tversky
794:Folk theorem
505:-player game
502:
427:Grim trigger
70:
64:
48:
33:transferable
32:
16:
15:
1175:Game theory
1119:Coopetition
922:Jean Tirole
917:John Conway
897:Eric Maskin
693:Blotto game
678:Pirate game
487:Global game
457:Tit for tat
392:Bid shading
382:Appeasement
232:Equilibrium
212:Solved game
147:Determinacy
130:Definitions
123:game theory
1169:Categories
763:Trust game
748:Kuhn poker
417:Escalation
412:Deterrence
402:Cheap talk
374:Strategies
192:Preference
121:Topics of
61:References
55:coalitions
947:John Nash
653:Stag hunt
397:Collusion
25:economics
1088:Lazy SMP
782:Theorems
733:Deadlock
588:Checkers
469:of games
236:concepts
69:(1991).
37:currency
1180:Utility
840:figures
623:Chicken
477:Auction
467:Classes
51:payoffs
44:payoffs
29:Utility
23:and in
81:
578:Chess
565:Games
259:Core
79:ISBN
41:cash
838:Key
31:is
1171::
573:Go
27:.
503:n
114:e
107:t
100:v
87:.
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